CBC Podcast Host (3:06)

He served two terms as president in the 1980s before becoming supreme leader after the 1989 death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Early on, he expanded the Shiite clerical class and empowered the Revolutionary Guard. He shifted Iran from conventional warfare to supporting proxy forces. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, and support for former President Bashar Assad in Syria.

Vali Nasr (3:33)

He didn't rule as an absolute ruler the way we see in some Arab countries or some other countries, developing countries, but the system as a whole basically followed his lead, particularly on issues of foreign policy, postures towards America, posture towards the region. So his removal is a major turning point for Iran and for the region.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (3:58)

I want to come back to what it means for the regime. But just first, what did you make of the fact that he was located and killed in his compound instead of like a safe house somewhere?

Vali Nasr (4:09)

It was quite a surprise that he chose to be in his office, in his compound, not in a hideout, not in a bunker, particularly at a moment where an American attack, an American Israeli attack looked imminent, which to me suggests that he was preparing himself for this moment, that he didn't want to die in a bunker. He didn't want to die looking like he was hunkering down or trying to evade death. He actually embraced it. It was a martyrdom, if you would, in a cause that he had fought for most of his life and definitely had made it the cause of Iran during his time as Supreme Leader. And I think he was comfortable in the sense that he had prepared the system to function without him, that decapitation would not mean the end of the regime. And so he essentially, in a way, I don't want to say welcomed it, but he was prepared for it.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (5:08)

And just tell me more about how the regime has prepared for this moment.

Vali Nasr (5:14)

I mean, generally, the Islamic Republic from the get go was not created or didn't strive for popularity. It was created for resilience. I mean, as soon as the revolution happened, Iran found itself in war with Iraq. There was a campaign of assassination of many of its early leaders, President, prime Minister, large numbers of its senior revolutionary leaders. So it basically evolved as a state which has many nodes of power, which has a delegative authority. It had different institutions, economic, legal and political, each with a great deal of authority, all of whom worked through the Supreme Leader, but often operated independently, not just rivaling one another, but actually with decision making capability. And this kind of a Structure was very evident even in the June war when Israel surprised Iran by killing 30 Revolutionary Guard commanders.

Monday.com Ad Narrator / Kathleen Goldhar (6:16)

Thirty plus, Israel launched its most brazen

News Anchor / Reporter (6:19)

and far reaching attack on Iran, hitting nuclear and military targets, but also airports and residential areas. According to Iranian state Media, at least 78 Iranians have been killed, including three top generals and several nuclear scientists.

Vali Nasr (6:34)

And yet the Iranian, the Revolutionary Guard was able to engage in the war and retaliate against Israel. It didn't collapse Iranian ballistic missiles, some of them piercing Israel's missile defense. And between June of 2025 and the start of this war, Iran did even more to disperse authority, create redundancies, create more nodes of power. And the Supreme Leader delegated a lot of operational day to day decision making to this structure. So in a way the system can go on without its head. Khamenei was not this indispensable to the state functioning.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (7:19)

What about these other high ranking officials that have reportedly been killed, including the Army Chief of Staff? What impact will all of this have?

Vali Nasr (7:28)

Not much I think, because you know these, these figures were actually only in these posts since June of 2025. Their predecessors had been there much longer and were more important statesmen slash generals. Their elimination did not really hamper Iran's ability to engage in war with Israel. And so I think these ones are more dispensable than the ones were in June. And again the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's military is now built to function with decapitation. Decapitation has been taken on board in the Islamic Republic as something that it has to prepare for and plan around. Now it cannot do this indefinitely. At some point you have a threshold that's crossed where the system cannot work. But that threshold has been made to be much, much higher than it is for other states.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (8:39)

I wonder if you could tell me more about some of the other targets that we have seen the US and Israeli airstrikes hit. Of course, that school. Over 150 people have been killed so far, including many children.

News Reporter (8:52)

Grey Sailors have also targeted a school in the city of Minab Hormuzgan Province, killing more than 100 children. The number of innocent civilians continues to

Podcast Host / Interviewer (9:04)

rise as it appears the school is in session at the time. The scenes from that have been gut wrenching. Blood stained backpacks, parents screaming at the site of destruction. But just what else have we seen from these strikes?

Vali Nasr (9:18)

So we can only go by reports that either the US or Israel are putting out or what at least is coming out of Iran in spurts because of the Internet shutdowns that it's experiencing it's very clear that the first wave of attacks was the directed at killing leaders of the Islamic Republic. In fact, perhaps the attack came when it did in daytime, was to surprise the leaders that might have expected an attack at night and also first day of the week in Iran, that they would all be in their offices, they would more likely to be reached by the missiles that were sent in. So the first wave was designed at killing key people, including Khamenei. I think after that they have targeted a lot Iran's air defense systems. And then they're probably going after Iran's missile capabilities, which are very important to Iran's ability to retaliate missiles and drones. And then thirdly, finally, I think they have started going after the regime's capability to manage inside the country bases where police this force, it's just called the Basij, which is used to suppress population and uprisings and riot control, et cetera. That they have been hit, basis of the Revolutionary Guards have been hit, which is to sort of incapacitate the regime, not only to wage war against United States and Israel, but also to be able to suppress any kinds of domestic dissent, to be able to police the population.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (11:00)

Trump just posted that the US has sunk nine Iranian naval ship and ships. And what's the significance of that?

Vali Nasr (11:08)

I think that's important too. And that has been on the target because this time around there is worry that Iran could use these naval ships to either close the Straits of Hormuz or to hit tankers, which it has done already, and that it is to degrade Iran's ability. Iran's Iranian naval forces ability to actually either attack US Naval assets in the Gulf or to attack tankers or to be able to close the Straits of Hormuz. So it's to take away from Iran the ability to use attacking energy supply chain as a way of putting pressure on the United States and global energy

Podcast Host / Interviewer (11:52)

prices to dig a little deeper into that. The state of Hormuz has been severely restricted because of these events. And just could you walk me through more of its significance as the world watches with oil prices?

Vali Nasr (12:04)

So the streets of Hormuz is a very narrow waterway, a bottleneck that connects the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea, which then goes on into the Indian Ocean. Now, most of Middle east oil is produced at the end of the Persian Gulf on its western dead end. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, even Iran and all of that oil for it to come. And even some of the oil of uae, the gas of Qatar, they're all sort on the west side of The Straits of Hormuz, deep inside Persian Gulf. So all of that for it to get on tankers to be able to get on the world markets has to pass through the Straits of Hormuz and get into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Now, the northern part of the Straits of Hormuz is Iran. The southern part of it is uae. It's a very narrow waterway and it's not very difficult to close it down, either by deploying ships that would prevent tankers and other commercial ships to actually get through, or by actually trying to sink a large tanker or a number of ships at choke points that then does not allow large tankers to be able to get through the straits. Because of the world's dependence on oil ever since the 1970s, it is an incredibly important strategic waterway.

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Podcast Host / Interviewer (14:41)

Iran has retaliated by attacking Israel in a number of Gulf cities in the region that are home to US Military bases. First we saw strikes on those bases themselves, but later on we saw strikes on tourist centers like Dubai and Abu Dhabi, targeting hotels and the Dubai International Airport as well. And just what are Iran's aims here? What is it trying to do right now?

Vali Nasr (15:05)

Well, I think at one level, it's trying to signal that it's part of its defense strategy and deterrence against the United States to say that this war will not remain between Israel, US And Iran, that it's going to become a regional war. And a regional war does not mean that. Only that Iran's proxies are going to join, like Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias, but that also that Iran will fight the United States on the soil of the rest of the region. And I think partly it is to increase risk and cost to the United States. So when the United States calculates what are the risks and potential costs of attacking Iran, it may not have calculated what does it mean if the Gulf is damaged greatly, if it's services business, if it's energy, if it's infrastructure are also damaged. And therefore, Iran's hope is that it will change the calculation that the United States has in waging war against Iran, particularly in calculating when is it that the United States should look for a ceasefire, when is it good enough? They've killed Khamenei, they've destroyed Iran, how much farther should the US Go? And the Iranians are deliberately trying to expand the geography of risk to the United States and the geography of the conflict to the United States. They think that the United States calculations is based on a much narrower geography of risk and geography of conflict, which is focused on only attacking Iran and the Israel part of it. For instance, the United States has brought its largest aircraft carrier, the Gerald Ford, to Israel's shore outside of Haifa to defend Israel, but it does not have the same capacity to defend Saudi Arabia, uae, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, et cetera. So as a result, inflaming that frontier, it forces the United States to sort of spread itself more thin and to have to calculate a very different proposition about how it would de risk the war in the Gulf.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (17:22)

So far, three US Service members have died in the operation against Iran.

News Reporter / Narrator (17:28)

We pray for the full recovery of the wounded and send our immense love and eternal gratitude to the families of the fallen. And sadly, there will likely be more before it ends. That's the way it is, likely be more, but we'll do everything possible where that won't be the case, but America will.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (17:51)

Trump told the Atlantic on Sunday that he and Iranian leaders have agreed to resume negotiations. Right. He hasn't said when those talks are expected to resume, namely because some of those involved from Iran, I think, have been killed. But what do you think of the fact that he said this kind of 48 hours after he called for regime change? I'm not even sure if it was 48 hours afterwards.

Vali Nasr (18:17)

It suggests that, first of all, he's looking for a way out already. And he also said separately that I could stay there a very long time, or I can get out right now and tell the Iranians I will be back in two years if you restart your nuclear program, which, if people in Iran are listening to this, they're saying that he's Looking for a clean war. He came in, he killed Khamenei. He wants to now find a way to declare victory and move on. And he's not willing to put effort in actually overthrowing the regime or doing something much more decisive in Iran, particularly if the costs are going to be high, if Iran is going to bloody the Gulf as a whole. Hit Dubai, hit Abu Dhabi, create a shadow of risk over the region that will impact its economies going forward, or to kill American service people at another level. It also would tell the Iranians that he's not really serious about anything. He's not serious about negotiations, he's not serious about war. He enters negotiations without actually being committed to them, and then goes to war in the middle of them. He goes to war, calls for regime change, calls for a drastically different Iran. And then two days into the war, he basically says, I'm already talking to them and I want a way out. But the Iranians think that it is too premature, because if the war stopped now, Trump will be back six months from now again with another war. I think the Iranians are now of a belief that they really need to create enough havoc, enough risk in the Gulf, incur more cost on the United States. So Trump begins to think about war with Iran in fundamentally different ways. I mean, they think that either this war will break them completely or that this has to be the last war for a long period of time.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (20:20)

I want to understand where talks were left before these attacks. Right. The foreign minister of Oman, who is helping mediate the talks, went on CBS News to share where they left off. And he said that Iran will never,

News Reporter (20:35)

ever have a nuclear material that will create a bomb. This is, I think, a big achievement. This is something that is not in the old deal that was negotiated during President Obama's time. This is something completely new.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (21:02)

So I think that means like zero stockpiling, as he put it. And just why wasn't that enough to prevent these attacks?

Vali Nasr (21:12)

I mean, at some level, you could say the decision to go to war had been taken a while back, and going through these negotiations was pro forma, which is one reason why Iranians did not want to give too much at the table, because they didn't think he's actually serious. I mean, he sends two envoys without real preparation to discuss technical details for a two hour meeting, three hour meeting, after which they're going to go talk about a peace in Ukraine and between Ukraine and Russia in the same day. And I think that the very fact that the Omani foreign minister and Oman is Extremely quiet and taciturn. You never hear them sort of raise their voice in international diplomacy, et cetera. Came all the way to Washington and went on television to say this to me was an act of desperation that he knew that didn't matter what was achieved at the table, that there was a march to war, and that he decided to basically reveal that there was real breakthroughs in the hope that somebody would be listening. And in fact, in Washington, the only person who met with them of consequence, was Vice President J.D. vance. And the President's reaction a few hours after this interview, I don't know whether he saw it or not, was to say that he's very unhappy with the negotiations and Iranians are not giving him what he wants, which is the magic words, we don't want nuclear weapons. Now, again, this lacks seriousness because Iran for 20 years has said they don't want nuclear weapons. Now, you may not believe them, but they have said it. Khamenei had issued a religious fatwa banning nuclear weapons. They now, you may dismiss his fatwa as irrelevant, as untrustworthy, but he had said it. That's the highest thing he could do as a religious leader of Iran is to issue a fatwa that we will not do that. So to say that the Iranians have never said it or are not saying it was just not true, I mean, literally was not true. So I think that the achievements in, in Geneva was important and it's significant. And one day when they go back to the table, if that happens, I think the Americans would actually grab at what the Omanis said as a base point. Because if Iran says they will give up the right to stockpile, in effect, they cannot really enrich because you enrich, you have to give it up immediately. And so if, as a matter of national honor, the Iranians need to hold onto the idea that they have a right to enrich, you could give him that and say, but de facto you really cannot enrich because you cannot stockpile.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (24:19)

This idea that the decision to go to war was a foregone conclusion from the US And Israel. Like, to what end? Like, what is it that they wanted to achieve here?

Vali Nasr (24:33)

Well, for Israel, I think is more straightforward. Israel sees a unique opportunity. Iran has been its main regional rival. Even if we put aside the adjectives that the two sides use against each other, it has been for a while a decade that the Middle east has been basically in a sort of a great power rivalry between Israel and Iran. Iran had these proxies around Israel which served as a deterrence against Israel Attacking Iran, they menaced Israel, they attacked Israel, they supported and armed Palestinians, which eventually ended up in the October 7 attacks on Israel. And Israel after October 7 became determined to basically end this situation. And it was successful. It was successful not only because it battered Hamas and really in many ways has completely sidelined the Palestinian issue or the idea of a two state solution altogether. But then its greatest success was to defang Hezbollah, to decapitate it, to destroy its missiles, destroy its ability to threaten Israel. Without Hezbollah's threat on Israel, Israel's hand is free to attack Iran. And Israel has decided that this is the enemy, this is its rival. Now that it has the opportunity, it has to finish the job. Now, the United States maybe subscribes to this idea, but the United States has also other equities, which is that it has to look at the security and safety of the Gulf, which even if Iran were to collapse into chaos, would impact the Gulf. And the United States is not as threatened by Iran's missiles and menace as Israel is. And so has had a lesser set of goals. And these has been around the fact that, okay, Iran should not have nuclear capability or Iran should not have long range transcontinental missiles. But the United States did not quite share the goals of Israel, but more so under President Trump, he actually really did not even articulate an objective. But the United States under President Trump has vacillated from wanting a nuclear deal. Then when he bombed Iran's nuclear facilities, he thought that that issue is taken care of, he doesn't need to talk to Iran. Then all of a sudden, the reason for war became protecting protesters and helping them bring about regime change. Then he didn't intervene then. And then he went back to the nuclear deal again in an urgent way that Iran must sign this deal right now, otherwise this is, I'm gonna go to war. Which was not very clear. And then after the attack started, he basically went back to regime change. That the real reason we're doing this is because this is a bad regime. That since the capture of the American diplomats hostage in 1979, has been a danger and a menace. And I'm gonna be the president that's going to get rid of this. And again called on the Iranian people to rise up.

News Reporter / Narrator (27:44)

When we are finished, take over your government, it will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.

Vali Nasr (27:54)

Even his regime change strategy is not clear. How are you gonna get from point A to point B? And what does the day after look like? How exactly are you going to bring about regime Change. Who is the person who's gonna take over in Iran? And so to me, it seems like that the United States policy in that sense is rudderless. United States is enormously powerful, it's wielding its sword, but it's not clear what the purpose is. Where does it want this to finish, and what does it expect to be the endgame here and the fact that the President looks like he's looking for an exit already I'm talking to the Iranians again, suggest to you that he's veering from regime change and the worst regime on the planet needs to go yesterday to all of a sudden I'm talking to them about ending this war.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (28:52)

Yeah. What do you think is the most likely outcome here?

Vali Nasr (28:57)

I mean, once you start a war, any outcome is possible. And it's possible that eventually, under the battering of American Israeli bombardment, a tipping point is pass. The regime in Iran collapses. And if the regime in Iran collapses, Iran can become a much larger version of Libya or Syria. In other words, internal strife, civil war, nuclear government, a failed state. One cannot rule that out, particularly if you bomb a country and its infrastructure and institutions of state ceaselessly and with effect. The other alternative is that at some point, and let me say this, there is no alternative to the Islamic Republic that if it collapses, is gonna take over. There is no political movement or political leader in Iran with organization that is able to actually govern Iran in a day after of the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Not easily. And the other alternative is that at some point you basically have a ceasefire. And then with the supreme leader in Iran killed, there is an opening that Iran, that a new leadership at the helm in the Islamic Republic will decide to change course. And the man that basically was the anchor of the ideological and foreign policy outlook of this regime not being there, There is that opportunity to change course, but that also will depend greatly on the international community of how they react to that moment, particularly the United States, that does it win that moment in the right way or that we may lose that moment and then Iran could go in a much more darker direction.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (30:50)

Okay. Vali Nasser, thank you so much for your time today. Really appreciate it.

Vali Nasr (30:54)

Thank you.

Podcast Host / Interviewer (31:05)

All right, that is all for today. We're going to be on this story all week, so please do stay tuned. Talk to you tomorrow.

CBC Podcast Host (31:20)

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.