B (3:48)

On that point, you know, most nations have federal policing bureaus. I'm thinking about the FBI in the us the RCMP here in Canada. Most nations also have foreign intelligence divisions as well. The CIA in the U.S. mossad in Israel, the GRU in Russia. But this particular kind of institution, which, as you have explained, has its tentacles spread so widely across so much of the country's security, intelligence, economic, technological, ideological, spiritual life, as well as the security and intelligence operations outside Iran as well. Like, why did Iran post Islamic revolution establish this kind of institution?

C (4:32)

The reason that the 1979 revolution succeeded, and in fact the day that the Islamic Republic celebrates the revolution Day, is the day that the Shah's army declared its neutrality in the conflict between the state and the society. Now, the Shah's army was US trained, US organized, and in fact, it was through pressure of some US generals who were on the ground that the army decided not to go for a coup or to try to crush the revolution, but actually side with the people. But for that exact reason, the revolutionaries don't trust the army, and they needed to create a parallel institution that would be only loyal to them. But they also didn't want to make the mistake that the US committed in 2003 with de Ba' athification in Iraq.

D (5:24)

There will be a vetting process. Part of it will occur when people step forward to do something. People will say, well, wait a minute, those people were part of the senior bath party, in which case they'll be

C (5:37)

taken out, because then you would basically create an insurgency against yourself. So what they did was that they created a parallel army which was supposed to only safeguard the revolution. You look at the title of the irgc, it's called the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. It doesn't even have the word Iran in it because it signifies that its mandate is to protect the revolution. Now, over the years, of course, the border between the army and the Revolutionary Guards has become very nebulous. There's been a lot of exchanges. Some of the Revolutionary Guards commanders become Army's commanders or the other way around. And the Revolutionary Guards, especially in the Joint Chief's office, has always had the upper hand and Defense Ministry has had the upper hand. So now I think the distinction is not as meaningful as it was in the beginning of the revolution. So that's one point. The second is that also the reason that the Revolution Guards became so powerful is that in the aftermath of the Iran Iraq war, which is the crucible in which the Revolutionary Guards basically learned the art of the war and was matured, there was no place for them. The army had a specific task of safeguarding the country. But how do you, on a daily basis, safeguard the revolution when it's peacetime? So that's why the Revolution Gorse was used in the reconstruction after the war. And that's an economic activity. They were supposed to be engaged only in some mega projects, but then that became a slippery slope and they got engaged in all aspects of the country's economy. And from there they went into politics and intelligence and, and so on, and they became the very powerful actor they are today.

B (7:45)

One part of the Guard that we haven't yet talked about is its elite external operations unit called the CUDS Force. This is the branch responsible for managing Iran's network of proxies and militias. Right. Iran often avoids direct confrontation with its adversaries and instead works through, like, allied militias. And so to what extent has the Quds Force been like, the principal architect and foot soldiers of that strategy?

C (8:15)

So you're absolutely right that, you know, from the early on, the early 1980s, basically the Iranians realized that one way of trying to deter their enemies was to hire partners and proxies away from their borders to deter attacks on their soil. They cultivated and created Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982. And there were certain individuals within the Revolutionary Guards who were in charge of those relationships. But it was not really organized as an expeditionary force. It was only in the late 1990s that they created a branch called the Guts Force, which was in charge of foreign operations. The current commander of the Revolutionary Guards, who took office just after his predecessor and his predecessor's predecessors were killed in the recent confrontations with Israel, was the first commander of the GUTS Force, General Vahidi and. But. And then after him, it was the infamous General Soleimani, who created this massive network of Iranian proxies in the region called the Axis of Resistance, and really managed to project power way beyond Iran's borders.

E (9:35)

He rarely spoke in public, but gave this interview saying Iran's IRCG had expanded Islamic resistance to half a million square kilometers, connecting Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.

C (9:52)

They are deeply ingrained in the societies in which they operate. They often speak very good Arabic or dairy or Urdu or wherever they are based, and have proven very effective in cultivating these relationships. So that these groups don't necessarily think that they're doing Iran's bidding, but they are part of this bigger project in which Iran's interests have been advanced.

B (10:20)

And just for people listening, Soleimani was the guy that Trump assassinated in his

C (10:25)

first correct January of 2020.

E (10:27)

He survived many attacks on his life inside Iran and abroad. But it would be in Iraq, where Shia militias trained by his Quds Force killed hundreds of Americans, that the US ended his reign. Age 62.

B (10:41)

I'm curious, like, how did the Supreme Leader feel about overseeing the building of an institution that wielded this kind of power over the public and political life of his country?

C (10:55)

So the founder of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, was actually against the military getting into politics and had explicitly banned it. But he had the. He was a unique revolutionary leader in the sense that he succeeded in his revolutionary project. He toppled the Shah, ended 2,500 years of monarchy in Iran. He had the charisma, the religious credentials, and the followership to feel secure in his position. But his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, who was killed in the opening act of this war, he was an underdog. He religiously was. It was not even an Ayatollah, when he became supreme leader, was not charismatic, was not very popular. And so he actually saw in the Revolutionary Guards as. As a linchpin for his power. And he's the one who basically built his. The entire edifice of his dominance of the Islamic Republic on the pillar of the Revolutionary Guards. But they were always subservient to him. And that's why. That's because he was the commander in chief, and he could always shuffle the commanders in a way that no one would be able to gain too much popularity within the rank and file, and no one would trust the other commander to be able to coalesce and try to topple Khamenei. So he played this game in a very complex way so that he would always remain above the fray and would be able to subjugate the Revolutionary Guards.

B (12:36)

And I guess to that point. Could you tell me more about the role of the IRGC in. In carrying out acts of repression on dissenting Iranians? Anything that might threaten the Ayatollah's leadership? I guess.

C (12:54)

Yeah. So because there were Ayatollah Khamenei's tools, they would do his bidding across the board whether a politician would challenge Ayatollah Khamenei's authority. This happened with reformist President Khatami in early 2000s. And the revolutionary Guards commanders issued a threatening statement against the sitting president that if he wants to deliver on the agenda that he had promised to the electorate, they will stop him. Or, you know, faced with uprisings, it was the Revolutionary Guards who was responsible for crushing the protests and making sure that any organized movement against the regime was nipped in the bud. But this is not something that they were freelancing on. They were doing all of this on behalf of Ayatollah Khamenei, who had a very firm vision on how he wanted to rule and in which direction he wanted Iran to to move. And whoever challenged that direction, whether they were old allies or elected politicians or civil society actors or even student activists, everybody who stood in in his way, he would ask the Revolutionary Guards to sideline or eliminate.

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F (14:58)

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B (15:26)

Since the end of February now, we have seen the elimination of the Supreme Leader and then many other senior leaders, attacks on Iran's soil. They are in direct conflict now with the greatest military power in the region and the greatest military power in the world. But like, despite all of this, I'm reading and speaking with expert after expert who's talking about the fact that the Iranian political and security apparatus has proven more resilient than they had even predicted. Essentially that the Iranian system was Designed in part to sustain and survive through shocks just like this. And I just. Do you see evidence of that as well? And, and, and, you know, tell me more about why that is.

C (16:12)

Yeah. So, look, one of the maybe benefits of working with the military is that the military is always tasked with learning lessons from other experiences and having contingency plans. And so Ayatollah Khamenei, for instance, after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, realizing how quickly the US is able to destroy command and control if it's concentrated in the capital in cooperation with the Revolutionary Guards, came up with this design, which is known as the mosaic setup, in which every province, 31 provinces in Iran, would have their own command and control. And this would make it so much more difficult to basically paralyze the system through decapitation. And by cultivating these relationships for many years, Khamenei could also have each Revolutionary Guards commander having basically four layers of succession already planned. So this is a regime that is deeply entrenched and also deeply benched. You saw in the 12 day war in 2025 and the very impressive operation known as the Red Wedding that Israel conducted and eliminated 2 dozen IRGC top generals. The system could replace them in a matter of hours and start punching back. And again, we're seeing it this time around that the elimination of the Supreme Leader, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, many other senior military leaders, really did not paralyze the system because it was designed to absorb these shocks, remain coherent and cohesive, and be able to retaliate. This is what I think President Trump underestimated, and this is what has made it very difficult for him to be able to draw a line under this conflict and declare. Declare victory.

B (18:13)

The IRGC's worldview, well, isn't just political. Right. It's theological, ideological. I've seen experts liken the way they think about the US not as a dispute between two nations, but a clash of civilizations. And they have spent decades predicting the collapse of the US empire. The 2008 crisis, the January 6 Capitol insurrection, George Floyd protests were all used as evidence of a prophecy being fulfilled. The idea here being that the decline of the US Is divinely ordained, I think. Right. And Iran is the force that will be responsible for accelerating that decline. And just could you tell me about how central this story is to the IRGC's worldview, how it came about?

C (19:00)

So, look, the Iranian Revolution was an ideological movement, and it does have some of those elements sort of ingrained in its narrative that this is a battle of good against Evil and God and Islam are on the side of Iran, and, you know, Iranians are doing the right thing, and eventually they will prevail. But honestly, I don't. I think it's. There's a little bit of hype around the ideological element here, because you can see that the Iranian system as a whole, Revolutionary Guards in particular, they had adjusted their policies whenever necessary and expedient in a way that was much more pragmatic than ideological. And I give you examples. For instance, you know, the Revolutionary Guards agreed not to test any missiles during the two and a half years of negotiations that led to the 2015 nuclear deal. Or, you know, the Iranian regime that portrayed the United States as a great state and, you know, did a nuclear deal with it and implemented it its own end of the bargain, you know, religiously, even after the US Withdrew from the agreement. Or you could see that the Revolutionary Guards, the first attack that they launched against Israel from their own territory, they telegraphed it in advance so that there will be no fatalities on the ground, or at least with the aim of minimizing casualties. This is not a system that is primarily driven by ideology. But is ideology a motivating factor? Does it help them get through difficult periods? Certainly, But I think experience is the. Is basically the first part of whatever calculation they come up with.

B (21:09)

What do you think these guys think of Trump, really? Because I guess on the one hand, he designated them a terrorist group, he has attacked them. But on the other hand, he is a deeply polarizing president. He is tearing at the fabric of America. He seems to have this kind of spheres of power view of the world. And I do imagine that these things would be seen by the IRGC as forces to kind of hasten America's decline or influence. And. And do you think they see him as at all favorable to them?

C (21:44)

I think they don't understand him. At times they underestimate him. At times they overestimate him. You know, they. They believe sometimes that he's. He's too strategic and. And plays the game of deception very well. At other times, they believe that he's a gambler without necessarily having a plan. It is very clear that I think overall, they have difficulty understanding how Trump functions and how Trump sees the world. But one thing is clear. He has killed more Revolutionary Guards senior commanders than any other US President or anybody else, for that matter, and therefore is definitely seen by them as the definition of enemy. But, you know, that doesn't necessarily mean, again, that down the road, they would not be willing to act in a pragmatic way. One has to remember that the Saddam regime was also, you know, the enemy that Iran fought against for eight years. And after the end of the Iran Iraq war, the same people were fighting him reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq and, and even cooperated with Iraq for a period of time before Saddam was toppled. So these are people who are, you know, the same. The Iranians cooperated or the IRGC cooperated with the US Military to topple the Taliban, only to end up working with Taliban a few years later when the writing was on the wall that the Taliban would drip, return to power. So at this moment they see him as enemy, but that doesn't mean that that's not going to change in the future.

B (23:36)

Do you think that they see him as a force that will ultimately weaken America's decline? And is that like something that they, they find could help them?

C (23:48)

So look, I think there, there was a anti American circle around Khamenei who was giving him all of these like half baked analysis about the future of America and at every turn that the US Would suffer some sort of setback. They say, well, here is the evidence that this is the beginning of the end. And of course that didn't materialize. And Iran actually declined way more and faster than the United States. And there is generally, as a result of this rupture between the two countries, a lot of miscomprehension between the two sides. The Americans don't understand Iran well, Iranians don't understand America well. And I think there is certainly hope among some circles in Iran that the US Is in decline and what Trump is doing would accelerate that decline. But the problem is that the timelines might not necessarily help with, you know, whatever this regime has in mind. Because yes, empires decline. They're not there forever. Although the United States is a unique empire because it's, it's, it's multinational, multicultural and can constantly reinvent itself, which is a skill that a lot of other historic empires in the world did not have. But even if Russia and China rise and even if there is more competition for the United States, it might not help the Islamic Republic in the short run. That is the one thing that I think Ayatollah Khamenei didn't understand. And now we have to see if its successors or the Revolutionary Guards will be able to rectify that miscalculation.

B (25:53)

Israel and the US have said the military campaign they're carrying out today is designed to weaken Iran's government. And on the US Side, I know that those goalposts have shifted. But at one point they did say this. But as we've talked about today, as has been the case with the Revolutionary Guard in the past, this kind of external pressure actually seems to strengthen them, to corroborate their paranoia. Is it possible that if they emerge from this conflict still standing still, governing the affairs of the country and claim they fought the United States and Israel and did not capitulate, that they could come out not weaker, but more militarized and hawkish?

C (26:33)

Well, it. It's. It's not just possible. It has already happened. You know, the. The new supreme leader, who was the son of the last supreme leader, is very close to the Revolutionary Guards. The reason he has been selected is because he's the Revolutionary Guards candidate, and without them, he would not be able to remain in power. And so my argument is that he's not going to be as supreme as his father was. It's going to be subservient to the Revolutionary Guards, the two men who are currently running the country. Speaker of Parliament, Mohammed Tagar Ghaliboff was the former commander of Revolutionary Guards Air Force. The National Security Advisor, Ali Larijani, is also a veteran of the Revolutionary Guards. So the Revolutionary Guards is already running the country. And whatever comes next is going to be a Revolutionary Guards power structure, whether it's, you know, officially men with uniforms assuming positions of power or whether they are behind the curtain, kind of similar to Pakistan or to Egypt. But the Revolutionary Guards is going to call the shots in the future of Iran. And that's the irony of this war and all the pressure that Western countries like the U.S. canada, or the European Union have imposed on the Revolutionary Guards has produced, which is that as a result of sanctions and isolation, the Revolutionary Guards was enriched because it monopolized all channels of trade that were cut off because of sanctions. And as a result of this war, it has reached the most prominent and the pinnacle of power in Iran. So the group that was designated as a foreign terrorist organization by many countries, including Canada, is the one that the world would have to deal with probably for years to come.

B (28:34)

Okay, that feels like a good place for us to end. Ali, thank you very much for this.

C (28:38)

My pleasure.

B (28:50)

All right, that is all for today. Front Burner was produced this week by Kevin Sexton, Kieran Oudshorn, Shannon Higgins, Matthew Almha, Lauren Donnelly and Mackenzie Cameron. Special thanks this week to David Michael Lamb, Jordan Pearson and Peter Johnson from CBC's visual verification team. And two, Lietza Sorzitz. Front Burner's intern is Riley Cunningham. Our YouTube producer is John Lee. Our music is by Joseph Shabazzon. Our senior producers are Elaine Chao and Imogen Burchard. Our executive producer is Nick McCabe. Low coast and I'm Jamie Puisso. Thanks so much for listening. Talk to you next week.

A (29:38)

For more cbc podcasts, go to cbc ca podcasts.