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- [00:00]
A
Eric, you consistently publish some of the best macro research in the business and you've also worked at the Federal Reserve. So I have to ask you, what's your read on this new Kevin Warsh regime?
- [00:10]
B
Listen, I think Kevin is going to do a great job. I think he was a fantastic pick. I also think he has a huge mandate ahead of him that people aren't really paying attention to, which is the regulatory regime, the Fed's balance sheet and monetary policy implementation. So everyone's very know worried or thinking a lot about what will he do on rates. You know, he is much more than one vote. He is the chair. But I think day one for Kevin looks a lot more like what happened when we ended quantitative tightening. What are we doing now with pumping, you know, tens of billions of dollars of liquidity into the market each month? Why are we doing that? What are the ramifications? And then how do we further press forward with, right, sizing the regulatory environment, making sure banks aren't constrained from actually lending to the real economy. So I think there's a lot more to central banking than just the policy rate. And fortunately he's very focused on that. So I'm excited to see, you know, the next few meetings.
- [01:09]
A
I think a lot of market watchers and commentators are focused on the hike or the cut debate. And right now markets have pretty much priced out cuts, it seems like, for this year. What's your read on this and do you think markets are wrong on their call?
- [01:23]
B
No, I think the policy rate is mostly a function of the macro environment. And before Iran, I think there was a very credible case for disinflation which still exists underneath the surface. I think shelter inflation will come down over the next few months and quarters. But with the current macro backdrop, I think it makes sense and Fed communication thus far has supported that as well. Where you have a mix of slightly hawkish, a mix of slightly dovish, everyone's probably just wait and see mode. But since the breakout of the Iran war, about a week or two in, what you saw was tons of hikes priced into foreign central bank curves. Everyone expected several hikes out of the ECB, the BoE, the bank of Canada, a lot of central banks with much flimsier macro environments, more much weaker growth, some of which are in technical recessions at the moment, labor markets with much less growth and the US labor market's been re accelerating. And so I think my bias was that, listen, U.S. rates are more likely than not to stay the same for several months, if not through the rest of the year. But these other central banks where we're pricing in two, three at sometimes four hikes, we're actually much more likely to get cuts at some point later this year because, sure, inflation is hitting right now, but you already had a weak growth environment. You're adding on, you know, basically a negative demand shock. So I think it's much more likely that the Fed stays the same and all the fireworks basically happen overseas.
- [02:56]
A
And if all the fireworks are happening overseas, there are still ramifications on US Asset prices. Am I thinking about that the right way?
- [03:04]
B
For sure. I think there's been a lot of debate about the dollar. Where's it going to go? A lot of people think that foreign investors are going to repatriate. No one wants Treasuries anymore. Frankly, FX pairs and currencies are in large part a function of interest rate differentials. So if I have a pretty bearish perspective on the rest of the world or select economies with large currencies, and I think US Nominal growth is going to chug along, which it mostly has, then by default there's going to be upward pressure on the dollar vis a vis those currencies. And so I think that's been why the dollar's been mostly just pinned for the past couple months at a pretty strong historical level.
- [03:47]
A
So if I am remembering my math correctly, the dollar index is down about 10% from a year ago or a year and a half ago. I think that is more bearish looking, at least on the dollar. And my view is that. Not my view, but my sense is that consensus view is more bearish on the dollar as well. But you're taking the opposite of that.
- [04:08]
B
I think we came into basically President Trump's second term with a really overvalued dollar in historical terms, looking at the real effective exchange rate, which takes into account trade and inflation, but it was like the highest on record. So Even after that 10% decline, we're still at pretty lofty levels. Historically, I think between inflows into US equities for the AI trade, continued demand for our assets thanks to just higher interest rates here than in comparable developed economies and just a strong growth environment. There's just tons of upward lift. And now I don't think the dollar is going to rally another 10%. I think there's forces pushing up and down, but I don't think, I think people took that first 10% as like the first leg of this multi year generational bear market. And I just didn't see it in the fundamentals.
- [05:01]
A
Okay. I think that makes sense. So in one of your recent notes with this new Fed regime, you were essentially saying you had a bias for US Banks as a trade. Can you walk us through that?
- [05:17]
B
Yeah. So you know people who are Fed watchers or know that Kevin Warsh doesn't like QE and he wants to shrink the balance sheet. I think their initial impulse is to go, oh, you know, q T, that's bad for markets. They're draining liquidity when in fact the precursor to shrinking the balance sheet is to ease up on all the reasons that banks demand reserves, which are really just restrictive regulatory requirements. The crescendo of 15 years following the great financial crisis of more and more regulations, more and more reasons to hold capital. So you have to push against that in the opposite direction to allow banks to have more capital to buy Treasuries but also make loans, make securitized products and actually do banking. And so for me I was like, okay, we've had a lot of dereg both from the Fed and financial regulators tied to the admin. It's just going to get pressed with a chair who's, you know, working in tandem with the vice chair of supervision and you know, understands the direction from a lot of the financial regulatory agencies. So it's been a positive environment. I think it'll continue to be. And that's why when we have earnings season, the banks report and everyone's like, wow, they're doing great because we have strong nominal growth in the US and we have for the first time in a long time a favorable regulatory regime.
- [06:35]
A
Why do you think the market then has punished financials so badly to start the year in the stock market? What's the disconnect we're seeing?
- [06:45]
B
So it's interesting about a week into the Iran war is when I basically played this US European growth divergence through a bearish view on European cyclicals and industrials and then a bullish view on US Financials and cyclicals more broadly. But what you had just before the Iran war, which everyone forgot about, is the crazy saskpocalypse sell off. You had several cuts priced into the Fed curve or the Fed expectations curve in the market. You know, financials were down because they had exposure to the private credit companies who have been selling off nonstop all year since then. So a lot of that year to date performance was, you know, financials got hit from the private credit fears. But I think when you see earnings and you see these big beats, like that's going to continue for the rest of the year and thereafter and then
- [07:37]
A
that could hopefully bring a RE rating to the sector. Is that the right way to think about it?
- [07:41]
B
Yeah, I think earnings have been strong and the hit's been mostly on valuation. For me it was the purest play on U.S. nominal growth and what I think will be a yield curve steepening plus more financial activity, looser regs. But it was also relative to Europe. So it was like a US cyclicals against European cyclicals. I think just there's almost all tailwinds I see to European cyclicals. And that was the best way to express it because a lot of European banks basically have revenues that are not just Europe. Right. It's more the industrial sector where you could play that theme, I suppose.
- [08:19]
A
Okay, so let me ask you about your more bearish view on Europe. Broadly. Part of your forecast is that you expect NATO to effectively break up this year. And the macro implications of that I need help understanding, I think.
- [08:40]
B
Okay, yeah. So I think we can all see that President Trump and the Trump administration have a bearish view on NATO. They're not super happy with their performance in the Russia, Ukraine war. They think the US is a payer into a system that doesn't give enough back. And so will NATO continue to exist in two years? On paper, sure. But I think what most of the world will realize, or is realizing, is that the US could either tacitly withdraw by pulling funding Article 5. There could be concerns that the US won't live up to it. Regardless, I think the push is that NATO will cease to exist. And its current expectation or what people have assumed it, it was there to do. And I think the second order effect a lot of people think is that the EU will congeal around this and they'll spend more on defense. They'll take the onus upon them to be the big payers into NATO. And I just don't see that reaction. I think it's part of a long. It's just another domino in Europe struggling to basically figure out how to run as a bloc. This fiscal spending, defense spending need we've been talking about for 18 months. I'd say all the sticks and carrots there could possibly be have been out there and yet not much has really happened. I think the Savings and Investment Union is a great idea. It's done little, if anything, Euro bonds may never happen. So what you're going to see I think is more bilateral trade deals between certain European countries and the US and certain European countries and China. And you're going to get more of a fragmentation. And so the winners. On the other side of that are those who spend their government resources in a fiscally responsible way on defense, on education. And the people who will lose out are those who spend a lot on entitlements, on pensions, on the equivalents of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid for the us. So there are some big winners and losers, but what it ultimately means is more dispersion rather than just like the EU as a whole as an entire allocation.
- [10:53]
A
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- [12:19]
B
Listen, I think any sort of isolationist posture from the US is a massive opportunity for a lot of European both countries, but also equities, right? Like if you feel that the US is not going to be there for certain defense contracts or pushes them out like makes a longer backlog, you might turn to Europe for certain industrial goods or dual use goods if you want more legal reliability because your country might be on the outs with a certain administration or there's political volatility. You know, there are large companies in Europe which can maybe provide the same services or goods. So I think that makes sense. And then there's the repatriation angle, which I think is overblown but you know, there's a lot of pension, sovereign, you know, investor money in Europe. There's been a huge allocation to the us whether it's corporate equities, corporate credit agency, MBS or Treasuries. Even an inkling of repatriation would be a tailwind for the euro and then for their own sectors. So I disagree that that will really happen, but I think that would be a powerful force if it ever did.
- [13:28]
A
Okay, so the implications then for investors is to effectively find the countries that fall into the winners of your thesis. Could you name some of those?
- [13:40]
B
Yeah, I mean, I think thematically the beneficiaries are those that are European but actually outside the European Monetary Union. So Poland is a great example. They spend four and a half percent of GDP on defense. You know, the wall against Russia is something they've actually taken personally. They've already built that. There's not, you know, there's a lot of Western European countries that spend one and a half, 2% on defense and a lot of that's infrastructure, it's not even defense. So they don't need to pivot towards China. Right. They can make their own deals with the US that are probably more favorable for them because they've been paying into this system too and they don't have this huge entitlement spending overhang on their budget. So I think Poland is a big one. And then I think two others are Norway and Sweden. And Norway was actually an important allocation for me coming out of the first week of the Iran war once it seemed like this would be protracted because, well, just on an energy basis or in terms of trade beneficiary, but fiscally they have a very cleaned up budget as does Sweden. They have a huge sovereign wealth fund that they can basically it's the other side of your balance sheet versus your debt. And they've been, frankly, I don't think they've needed to hike, but like they've been hiking with decent macro fundamentals. They have pretty high interest rates relative to the rest of the world. So you know, their currencies appreciated anywhere from like 7 to 10% against the euro or the dollar. It's just a really. Everyone complains about the US fiscal trajectory. The EU broadly has a lot of countries with these same exact issues, except they do not have the reserve currency. They don't have all these AI companies listed on their stock exchanges with US households who will be the beneficiaries of these companies going public. Right. You're creating a lot of millionaires and sometimes billionaires. Who will be buying US real estate and US stocks and US venture capital or allocating to US venture capital. So Europe's not a total wash. There will be plenty of opportunities. I think it's just important to highlight winners and losers will be more disperse and you actually have to pick your spots rather than just betting on Europe.
- [15:53]
A
One of the things I thought was really interesting you wrote about recently was the idea of two Europes. And I think that fits into what you're saying here with these winners and losers. Basically this idea, the countries that are closer to Moscow have higher economic growth. And is it right that those are the countries that therefore you should be betting on those assets?
- [16:17]
B
Yeah, and that's the underpinning, that thesis that I just laid out. And it's not even my own idea. I took it from economic researchers who pointed out just that it was a geographical. They ran regressions on basically the geography. How close or far are you from Moscow? But it ends up being those countries that are outside the emu. They have their own currencies, their own central banks are in control of their own fiscal trajectory that are closer to Moscow. And the onus was upon them to build their own defense sectors and keep their government budgets in balance versus the Spains and Italy's of the world that could spend EU pandemic money on whatever they wanted. Basically juice their economies and their stock market with those funds and haven't had to spend much on defense. So they've used it for welfare spending. But welfare spending is not a high productivity use of your budget, of your government budget. So really interesting idea, supported my kind of bias for where NATO and the EU were heading. And I think those are the economies that have a just a better macro trajectory but also will have more leverage in this new kind of geoeconomic trade war world that we live in.
- [17:33]
A
And then the flip side of that would be betting against the countries that are one, further from Moscow, but two just investing less in these key sectors like defense and maybe education. So something like Spain, Right? Is that a market you would try to short?
- [17:50]
B
Yeah. So I think countries that have shaky trajectories like France, Italy, Spain. France and Italy also have very troublesome fiscal outlooks. Their debt to GDP is quite high. Their deficits are not small enough. So just functionally every year they go on, they're piling on more debt to GDP and greater interest expense. So more and more of your tax revenues are just going to bondholders as opposed to productive endeavors. I think for Spain, and it was really troubling, like When I was in the Council of Economic Advisors, the trade war, trade deal with the EU is a big deal and Spain just completely didn't buy into any of it. They're basically pivoting to China. Pedro Sanchez, the Prime Minister, has gone to China like four times during his tenure. He was mostly recently there in April talking about how, you know, trade imbalances are bad and, you know, he hopes China, like, rectifies it. Meanwhile, like 75% of the Spanish trade deficit is just their bilateral balance with China. So, like, that's not. I'm pretty sure most countries, even not just the US and the Trump administration, understand that China is not playing by the rules. They're interested in themselves and not some, like, altruistic, you know, like policies that will help others. Spain seems to not get that. And they've allowed Huawei into their country, which is a national security risk that becomes a choke point, you know, just because it's like 20% cheaper than the next telecom offering. So I think a company like a country like that, especially where 40% of their stock market index are financials, which have a heavy risk of like sanctions, you know, especially if you're doing more and more business with China, just looks way crummier, for lack of a better word, than even within that core kind of eu, I don't know, group of countries like Germany that has a much more industrial economy, they've been struggling to compete with China in terms of manufacturing, but they have a lot of companies that will be successful in this new dual use geoeconomic world. So yeah, a country like Spain that spends nothing on defense, that is cozying up to China as a growing trade deficit and basically just benefited from a tailwind of latam immigration and a tourism boom. Post Covid, like those things were real, but they've topped out. There's no more immigration boom, there's no more like post Covid tourism boom. And their service sector isn't doing great. But I think, you know, all good things must come to an end, I suppose. And I think that's topped out and they'll really struggle in the years ahead now that they've fully pivoted to China, which is not a market you can export to, it's a strictly import from China. There's no reciprocity there. So going to Beijing to ask, you know, to look for a reciprocal trade agreement just because you think the US pissed you off once, like, is not a sustainable strategy in my opinion.
- [20:50]
A
I totally agree with you. And you know, everything you're saying runs counter to one of the most popular narratives since Trump came back into office, which is the end of US Exceptionalism. And I can't tell you how many investors and strategists were positioning outside the US or anti US because they thought one with tariffs or because it's President Trump. These are all reasons to move on from the pro America trade or even just US assets in general, which I thought was so absurd. I think we've seen twice now with Liberation Day and the Iran conflict. Nothing can really shake the boom in US asset prices. What do you make of I guess that resilience for one. But two, the Iran backdrop specifically not really dampening the outlook for US stocks.
- [21:41]
B
Well so for starters, I do think a lot of those people were more talk than actually adjusting their portfolios. Granted some of these foreign allocators, they're more like Titanic style ships, it takes them a long time to steer. But still I don't think it's just the bulk of opportunities are in the US whether due to just pure supply of fixed income and credit or like the AI boom. So you know, you don't want to buy us well you got to buy dollars to buy Nvidia stock or buy whatever. So there's that. I think Iran, the US was always going to be an economic beneficiary and financially like in a market sense we are always going to do better relative than like Europe or well East Asia has Gai boom going for them. But outside of that, like there are a lot of economies that are struggling, we really aren't. Right. Like there's higher gas prices and like there's bit higher inflation, little dent to growth. But like on relative terms we're outperforming geopolitically. I don't think it's good. You know, I think if there's a winner from the US Iran war right now it's China in market and economic terms they're not doing well. There's been a policy decision to, to destroy demand basically in China. And that's part of the reason Brent is 100 bucks and not 125 because China's been importing less, doing less. Granted. They also have a sliding economy that's you know, in some sectors in a recession and they have a huge property over like bubble overhang that's you know, troublesome. And I'd be surprised if they're growing like 4% let alone 5 that they say they are. That said in geopolitical terms, I mean moving missiles out of South Korea, delays in arms shipments to Japan, you Know, we've basically reoriented this, like US China, I don't know, antagonistic relationship more towards like the Middle east and centcom and everything that's happening there. And so I think in geopolitical terms, China's happy to eat the economic hit in the short term. And they're thinking if Taiwan was five years away, now it's four is probably how they're thinking. So I'm not overall thrilled with the war from a financial perspective, to say that US Cyclicals or US Growth will outperform Europe. I actually am surprised at how contrarian that was. Granted. Like, I had to, you know, this was a perspective I had to think about for a long time, for the past year plus. But, yeah, I mean, it's, it's an unfortunate situation and I do think there's an opportunity to come out with wins that at least support, you know, our interest in the Middle east or our interest elsewhere longer term. But as far as a geopolitical rivalry goes, I'm not sure this is actually a benefit to us.
- [24:39]
A
It's incredibly nuanced, the way you break that down. One thing I want to call out, I think it was two days after the Iran conflict started in February. You had an op ed that was published in the papers essentially saying this was a boon for US Asset prices no matter how long the Iran conflict would last. One, how did you know that would be the case and how did you make that call? And two, can you walk us through your thinking on how you arrived at that conclusion?
- [25:12]
B
Yeah, I mean, I'm not going to say I knew how the future would go, but we did bomb Iranian nuclear facilities in June. I was in the White House Council of Economic Advisors in June. I didn't exactly know what it would look like eight months later. But I had an idea and I had to think about, like, okay, what are the economic ramifications? What can the US Eat but still continue to grow at a decent clip? How bad would inflation really be if it devolved into a situation where the strait is closed and so many unknowns, Lots of question marks, a wide band of probability, probabilistic weightings for the future scenarios. But ultimately, we export energy. We're geographically not there. There's a lot of metals and minerals in between Latin America and North America or the US And Canada. We have a lot of our own stuff. So you actually saw like a few, maybe two or three weeks into the war using American natural gas as leverage or part of trade deals that were already, you know, underway or negotiations were Ongoing. And we have more defense spending for U.S. defense companies. We're on the forefront, we're on the cutting edge for a lot of this. It's good. So directionally, it doesn't really matter directionally versus a counterfactual that you'll never understand, which is what would have happened if the war never occurred. But in relative terms, I kind of understood, okay, so I'm Europe. I have an incredibly lofty, real effective exchange rate. 50% of my. So exports of goods and services for Europe are like 50% of GDP. For the US it's like 10 to 15%. Dramatically more export dependent. And they're in a trade war with their largest trading partner where there's an asymmetric benefit to us versus them because we had more leverage. And that's what we chose to do. So if I'm thinking, okay, and then these guys have insecure energy due to both Russia, Ukraine, and now this, you know, second thing, they'll do nothing on the other side of it, and they literally haven't. It was an easy call, in my opinion. And also, I don't think a lot of people, like, the war happened and they were like, oh, let's press bets against the US Because I think other countries are gonna outperform. I think just from a rhetoric perspective, people focus too much on, oh, you know, the President's destroying alliances, or, oh, this was a bad move. But, like, most of us don't work for Brookings. Like, we're not at CFR analyzing the geopolitical implications of this. We have fiduciary responsibilities or a responsibility to our readers or whomever to just be matter of fact and parse out the nuance. And you can lose one part of something or everything has pros and cons. And my perspective is that geopolitically this is not going that well. But economically, where else would you want to be than this massive country with large reserves of energy? We have tons of natural gas that, you know, we're exporting as much as we can, but we don't even have the terminals to get it all onto the market. So, you know, if AI wasn't happening, growth would be weaker. But AI is happening, and that was the backdrop under which this war started. So it all comes together. And at the end of the day, I could be very simplistic and say, like, you know, never bet against the U.S. that's, like, not actually my bias. It's just been the story for the past couple years and I think will continue to be for the foreseeable future.
- [28:43]
A
I mean, I think the patriotism call, it comes off simplistic, but the data certainly support that call and it has for a while. Is there a trade that you like specifically against the Iran conflict backdrop?
- [29:01]
B
Yeah, I think everything I've had for the past two and a half months, Iran centric iron, I still pretty much like. So I was big on Norway, big on Brazil, kind of anti India. So I reflected this through like unhedged bond pairs where I was getting currency and some carry on the fixed income side. But the bulk of it was US versus eu. So basically your US short rates would probably remain pretty, pretty static as the Fed remained on hold. We priced in a lot of hikes in the eu. I mean the French economy's in a technical recession, German growth is slowing, China's eating their lunch. I think the services boom in southern Europe is going to slow. So eventually I think what you'll see is cuts in Europe. So you can play that through the currency, through short rates. I think in terms of the equities, there's a divergence there, but no, I mean there's country by country. It's funny, it was a huge negative terms of trade shock for so many places. But if you're Brazil, it's not so bad for this to be happening. You're geographically hedged, you have your own energy, you have a lot of critical minerals. Well, they have reserves, they don't exactly have the processing quite yet. If you're India, the private credit selloff was pretty bad. Like the AI kind of boon SaaS apocalypse is pretty bad because you're an IT services heavy economy, you're super energy dependent. But then a place like South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, they got crushed on the energy side, but had a huge terms of trade shock positively from export, the export of chips and the machinery and manufacturing to help the entire AI boom occur. So there's been tons of country by country divergences. We all just get stuck looking at the S and P kind of step function, keep crawling up. It's almost boring because everything's AI. But outside of the S and P and outside of AI, outside of South Korea and SK, Hynix and all these companies, there's a lot going on. It's just, it's hard in New York and in the US while I'm in la, you get blinkers because your PA and your portfolio and whatever just keeps going up slowly by day by day.
- [31:20]
A
I mean it's incredibly difficult to ignore the AI stocks, the AI trade. I mean if you say, hey look I want to diversify country by country. A lot of people just say, let me go to South Korea then. But that's just the same. There's no diversification there. Right. It's the same trade. So you're one of the few people that I'm speaking with that is looking one, not only outside the US but two, outside the AI trade, which, I mean, it's really. It's really easy to get blinders these days and to find those pockets of opportunity, it's really valuable. I imagine there's a lot of alpha there. Eric, before I let you go, what was it like working at the Fed with Governor Moran? Because that is where you were before Clock Tower. And I think you had an amazingly unique vantage point to be able to be part of that Fed regime and work closely with one of, I would say, the most controversial Fed appointees in some time.
- [32:19]
B
I think the thing about Steve is he's really a fantastic person to work with, both as he was my boss and he was such a great boss. But I think a lot of people at the Fed were kind of shocked that he's this really nice collegiate guy. And we worked on. He was trying to really pack it in. He had so much breadth across all the functions of a central bank, writing papers about the intersection of bank regs and policy implementation and how is the regulatory regime actually constricting what we can do on the balance sheet. It's a very tough topic. And he was walking in there in month two, publishing really intricate speeches and working a lot with the staff across everything we did. And a lot of people outsource their bank regulatory thinking to the vice chair for supervision, who's doing a fantastic job. But going from CEA to the Fed, there is a natural overlap. You're thinking about inflation, you're thinking about US growth. But for him to dive into everything else that goes on in the Fed, and there is a lot of stuff that goes on at the Fed and there are a lot of votes that just aren't. The FOMC votes was really amazing. So I'm super fortunate to have worked with him. I'm super fortunate to call him a friend. And I'm really impressed with how well he did there in such a short amount of time and really left, you know, an indelible mark after just like, what, eight months. So, yeah, it was fantastic. And for me, great to be there. Because I had only been at the New York Fed, I had never been to the board. You know, going to a meeting was pretty cool. It was actually Basically the same environment as when I was at the New York Fed, which was like 2019 and 2020. Repo markets were going a little crazy. We had a lot of spread widening talk about dysfunction. We ended qt. Same thing that happened a month into me joining the Fed. Restarted reserve management purchases. Always questions about the intersection of regs and what do we do with the discount window and, you know, could we ease up on certain regulatory ratios? But so interesting to be in the room and helping someone craft those policies and their view on those policies. So I'm just eternally grateful for that opportunity.
- [34:34]
A
Wow. All right, Eric, where can people find your work online?
- [34:39]
B
Our research is largely institutional, but I do tweet too much and I started to put some of my thoughts on Substack, which you can find through my Twitter, just to engage more with people out there. And I'm always happy to chat about macro and whatever else, though a little too much AI these days. So I appreciate questions that are about FX or rates or something, but I generally try to be available and appreciate conversations like this. So thank you so much for having me.
- [35:06]
A
Thank you for coming on the show. We'll do it again soon.