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- [00:00]
A
On this episode of Full Signal, I'm very excited to share, we have Neil Dutta of Renaissance Macro. He is consistently called one of the most accurate forecasters on Wall Street. And we get into the Fed his views on rising oil prices and the Iran war, what it means for investors, and how to think about the macro outlook in 2026. This is a fantastic conversation. There's a lot of views in here I have not heard anywhere else. I think you're going to love it.
- [00:26]
B
Neil, it's great to see you.
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A
I know you're typically an optimist, but
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B
in the last few months you've been getting a little more cautious. Can you walk us through your thesis right now on the macro outlook?
- [00:38]
C
Yeah, sure. First, thanks for having me, Phil. I really like the between two fern setup you got in here. Yeah, I mean, for me, I think the process on how we think about the economy hasn't really changed from the time that we were bullish to now. So it really comes down to, number one, household incomes. Household incomes are slowing. If you look at real incomes, ex transfers, I mean, they're basically flat over the last year. The other thing I would say is that housing market conditions remain quite sluggish. So even though the Fed's cut a few times, if you look at home builder sentiment, it's still quite weak. I would suspect that new home sales remain sluggish and more importantly, housing starts remain below housing completions. Right. So whenever that's the case, it means that units under construction will keep coming down, so there's going to be less residential construction activity. I think going forward. The third thing I would say is that there's a lot of optimism around tax refunds and the tax filing season because of OB3. But in the background, state and local governments are still shedding workers, cutting pay to their workers. Right. So they're more of a headwind for growth. And then lastly, you know, I would say that I'm, I'm a big believer in the element of surprise. So a few years ago, everyone was thinking there was going to be a recession and there wasn't one. So the fact that there wasn't one, it means you have to restock your inventories and invest more and hire more because you anticipated something bad to happen and it didn't happen. And if you fast forward to the present, the opposite is true. Right? I mean, generally speaking, I think investors, companies, they're, you know, sort of optimistic about things. And so if, if that optimism isn't justified, then there's a risk that you get, you know, sort of an abrupt shift in activity where, you know, now you have to clear inventories out or, you know, spend and hire less and invest less. And so that's, I think that element of surprise factor is also kind of interesting.
- [02:52]
B
Do you think you're looking at something that consensus is not? Because if you're more cautious than consensus, is it that you're looking at different data or you just have a different lens on it?
- [03:04]
C
Well, as I said, I mean, my process hasn't changed. I mean, like, you know, last year I wrote a piece where I talked about how it's really three economies, right? Like, you have the consumer, which is, you know, kind of muddling along here, middling along. You know, if you look at real consumption, excluding health care, it's only up about a percent in real terms over the last year. So you have the consumer, which is sort of okay. In the middle you have the housing market, which is in a recession. Then you have this sort of spectacular AI capex boom, and that's supporting equity market valuations and it's supporting consumption right through the wealth effect of, of rising equity prices. So I wouldn't say that I'm seeing things, you know, I don't have any sort of like crystal ball data set that, you know, I don't, I don't, I'm not, I'm a big, anyone that's known me knows that. I'm not like a big believer in indicator, macro. Like, I don't believe in like I have this hot indicator or anything. But I would say that I'm, I'm looking at things from a different lens where I'm saying, you know, as a US macro economist in my career, historically, if you don't have income growth and you don't have the housing market really contributing, I mean, residential investment's been sliding for several quarters in a row now. If you don't have those two things working, usually it's not a great story for the US economy. So that's all I'm saying. And right now it's really a question of how long can markets remain buoyant in the face of weak income growth and are we really only. I mean, I do believe very strongly that we do have a bit of a breadth problem in the U.S. economy. And if you look in the fourth quarter, outside of information processing equipment and software, there wasn't really much growth in investment. And the same is sort of true of the labor markets as well. I mean, at the surface, things look okay, but education and healthcare represent a sort of outsized driver of employment growth. So that leaves me a little bit more cautious on things.
- [05:18]
B
Are you concerned at all about the talk of AI replacing jobs and maybe the hits of the labor market from the AI component?
- [05:28]
C
Not really. I mean, I think if, I think it's more of a cyclical story than anything else, that that's what concerns me.
- [05:35]
B
What do you mean?
- [05:37]
C
Well, I think. Well, first of all, people are talking about the AI story as if it's like a present day reality. We have like this widespread like jobs displacement because of AI. But think about like prime age employment rates. They're basically at cycle highs, even though we're talking about widespread job displacement. So that's a little unusual. So I don't really buy it. You know, I, There are some industries where, you know, you do maybe see some evidence of like AI displacing work, but there are other. I mean, that's clearly not the case in things like construction employment, which has been doing a little better lately, or manufacturing employment, which did a little bit better in the last month or two. Right. So, you know, in any genuine sort of productivity boom, right, like if you think about it like at its core, like AI is, it does what it's supposed to make the workforce more productive. Right. That's ultimately the point. And if you think about it, wouldn't companies want more of those productive workers? Like if AI boosts productivity, then companies should want those productive workers because they're able to use AI efficiently and that's good for profits. So you know, I mean, I just like there are certain things with this argument that doesn't, don't really compute in my, in my mind. But I would just say at a more basic level, it's really difficult to kind of buy into the idea of, of widespread labor displacement with, with prime age rates of employment still relatively strong.
- [07:20]
B
I think that's very fair. I'm closer to your view than others. I think a lot of investors right now looked at the Citrini article and they said, okay, we're going to get companies wiping out huge swaths of their workforce. I don't expect that. That's not my base case. Neil, let me ask you about oil prices. We are up double digits this week. We have conflict in Iran breaking out weekend. How is that fitting into your sort of macro thesis right now?
- [07:53]
C
Well, it's just like one more headwind on this like sort of long list of uncertainty shocks that we've had over the last, you know, 12 months, you could say. Right. I mean, as I mentioned earlier, Real incomes are sluggish. I mean, real incomes net of transfers have basically been flat over the last year. Now if you have, you see, this is like everybody on the street sends out the same boilerplate research every time there's an oil shock, America produces more energy, therefore it's a modest hit to gdp. I mean, that's almost besides the point. If everyone's saying the same thing, then no one's saying anything. You know what I mean? I think the interesting angle for this is basically to say that, I'm not saying I disagree with that necessarily, but to me the real issue is to say the hit to consumers. In an ideal world, when a consumer spends more money on oil, that money goes to the oil producer. And in an ideal world, the producers takes that windfall and spends it quickly into the economy. That's what makes the shock non existent. If you're an energy producer like the US Is, of course, in practice that doesn't happen because the propensity to consume for an oil company is a lot lower than it is for a household, right? So when you go to the, to the gas station, that money that you're now losing more of because of the oil price shock, that's not going to get recycled into the economy very quickly. And that to me is a problem, particularly in an environment where real incomes are already quite weak. There's also a bit of an asymmetry here, I think. I mean, I'm not a geopolitical expert, but the people that are most hurt by this, it's not us, because not everybody's an oil producer, right? It's the folks in that area, particularly in Europe, Asia. I mean, these are big oil importers. And think about it, right? Like if we're the ones that are really prosecuting the war and we're somewhat insulated from the most obvious ramification of the war, which is a supply shock in oil, we have less incentive to give up or sort of, you know, pull back because of oil prices. Do you see what I mean? Like, so there's an asymmetry there, I think, where people in Europe and Asia, they're going to feel a lot more than we are. So in other words, like is oil prices, will oil prices get the US to pull back from the war sooner than, than, than people think that maybe that's not the case, right? Because we have, we're more insulated from it because of our, our oil position.
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B
I mean, how is there a level of oil prices that you're watching if we get to 90 bucks a barrel or 95, like what happens as far as the sort of the trickle down
- [10:44]
C
effects of the, well, the 90 to 95. I mean I think the foremost expert on sort of like oil and economics, like the relationship between oil and the, the economy is Jim Hamilton. He's a professor at University of California and he's done so much work. You know, I've, I've, I followed him a lot of his stuff like you know, back in like oh, seven zero eight, like when we had a big sort of oil price boom. So the so called like Hamilton trigger is, you know, essentially what it suggests is that it's not so much about the level of prices per se, but the level in relation to the recent past. So if prices go to a point that they haven't been in the last three years, then that creates sort of a sticker shock type dynamic. I mean the way I think about oil prices is that they tend to affect consumption in a very, in a very linear way until you hit these trigger points. Right. So right now all you can say is real incomes are weak. We're going to get an increase in gasoline prices that's going to weigh on real incomes a bit more, which will erode consumer spending. If you hit that trigger point, like let's say at some point, God forbid in the next month we get retail gasoline north of $3.50 or close to $4, then that can have a more material effect on consumer spending. So it's really about, you know, is there a trigger point like where the consumption slowdown evolves in a more nonlinear fashion. And that's what that trigger point really gets at.
- [12:25]
A
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- [13:08]
B
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- [13:10]
A
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- [13:33]
B
Help me understand, is it that black and white of a scenario where if oil prices go up, gas prices go up X amount and then consumer spending drops? That seems almost too simple.
- [13:47]
C
Well, I mean, I think consumer spending will slow, I mean, as a result of the rise in gasoline prices. I mean the March and April inflation numbers can look pretty, pretty, pretty, pretty bad. I mean, and you know, all else equal, that's going to weigh on real incomes. And so if, and there's probably an asymmetry, right, where if gas prices go up a bit, that probably hurts consumption more than it helps when it goes back down. So the other thing I would say is that there isn't really a big savings buffer right now. Right. This isn't like 2022 when we had a big spike in energy prices and households had boatloads of excess savings they could draw down right now, if anything, savings buffers have been drawn down quite a bit over the last year. That's one of the reasons why consumer spending has been looking so good in the first place. I mean, extent that it has looked good. So you know, I would just say it's a little bit more of a precarious time for this shock it's coming at, you know, I would argue an inopportune time for the economy. And that's also true of like the way the, the bond market's reacting to all this. Right. Like, so to the extent that higher energy prices could shift inflation expectations for households, that may give the Fed a reason to kind of not look through the oil shock. Maybe they kind of wait around and maybe you're seeing, you're seeing some repricing in the fixed income markets as a result of this. That's happening also at a very inopportune time because we're entering the spring selling season. So you're going into the spring selling season with mortgage rates north of 6%. Like what does that mean for homebuilders? What does that mean for resale activity? I don't think it means anything good.
- [15:22]
B
How do you see the Fed participating or maybe holding back right now if oil stays elevated and maybe they get concerned about inflation repercussions?
- [15:36]
C
Well, I mean there is a school of thought that says one of the ways you got the 70s was basically bad luck, stagflation, bad luck. You just had a series of supply shocks. And I think the risk Also is that back then you did have a lot of these arguments where it was kind of like, well, it's energy related, we can look through it. That's why we have core inflation and so forth. But if you have a number of temporary supply shocks, at some point that becomes permanent. Right. In a way it starts to embed into household inflationary psychology. And I'm not saying I agree with this, but there are certainly a lot of people at the Fed that believe, look, we had Covid, we had the Russian invasion of Ukraine and now we have this, that's basically three meaningful supply shocks inside of six years. So a one every two years. Are we going to keep saying, oh, well, we can look through this because it's transitory. If you keep doing that, there's a risk that household inflation expectations can become unglued. And I think to the extent they're worried about that, it'll make them more reluctant to cut. And in fact, you're seeing that. I mean, if you look at some of the public commentary from the Fed, I think I saw Beth Hammock from the Cleveland Fed out today. Kashkari was out earlier this week. You know, I mean, Hammock's been hawkish. Kashkari is basically saying, you know, I thought we were going to cut once. Now I don't think it's going to happen at all. And so, you know, there's a, and remember that the, the cut in December of last year, that was a really, really close call. Right. So, you know, I think it took a lot of political capital to get that, that cut through the door. And so I think it just makes the Fed more reluctant to ease. If the Fed is easing at any point in the next few months, it means that something bad's happened in the markets or the economy. But, you know, for now, I think they probably think they have policy in a good place. And to the extent that energy prices represent an inflationary shock, it probably reinforces their sort of wait and see approach that they're currently in.
- [17:50]
B
All right, wait, I want to have you drill down on a couple things. You said the markets are the economy now, and you said if the Fed cuts anytime soon, something is wrong. Can you unpack those two things?
- [18:03]
C
Yeah, I mean, the Fed isn't cutting preemptively anymore. That's what the last, that's what 2024 and 2025 was about. It was about like essentially getting policy to neutral in order to avoid a passive tightening of monetary policy, you know, to keep the labor markets from cooling Anymore. If the Fed believes that policy is currently at neutral with inflation somewhat above target, they're going to be reluctant to continue to do these sort of preemptive insurance cuts. Right. So that's why I say if the Fed is cutting, that means that they need to move policy into a accommodative stance. Right. It's not, it's not about getting less restrictive or getting to neutral anymore. It's if you're at neutral, if you think you're at neutral, that means you need to see evidence that things are actually getting worse in a material way before you're willing to cut to cut rates. In terms of the markets, I mean, yeah, I would just say that it feels like for a while we've been talking about how financial market conditions are loose, whether that's tight credit spreads, high equity prices, but I would just say that you haven't seen the kind of momentum in the economy that you would have expected to see from those loose financial market conditions. Right. Maybe that's going to change this year. I don't know. I mean, maybe everyone's talking about re acceleration. I'm not so sure I agree with that. But you know, we've had very loose financial conditions and job openings relative to unemployment. I mean, vacancies to unemployment have still been coming down. Right. That's not what you'd expect to see. Or if financial conditions are loose, why are home sales so sluggish? Right. I mean, if, you know, for households, if you have loose financial conditions, you should be able to buy a house. That's not the case. Or what about cars? Right. That's also like credit sensitive spending. Auto sales have generally been sliding over the last, you know, 12 to 18 months. So I think there's a, there's a distinction here that might be getting missed, which is like financial market conditions as we think about them in terms of like equity prices and actual financial conditions for households and businesses, which might, which might in fact be a little bit tighter.
- [20:31]
A
Real quick, we'll get right back to the interview. Just wanted to pop in and say if you like this content, I write a newsletter every single morning called Opening Bell Daily. I cover macro, the stock market, asset prices, why things are going up, why they're going down. And if you want to get that for free, you can sign up at the link in the description. Let's get back to the interview.
- [20:52]
B
I've been seeing a lot of headlines in the last couple days from the financial press saying because of the Iran war, the Fed is put in a bind. They're not going to be as willing to cut and they're restricted based on potential inflation shocks, oil shocks. Part of me thinks that that's a bit of a leap to already say that a couple days into a Mideast conflict. Do you think that this is having a material impact on what the Fed was going to do anyway?
- [21:26]
C
Not yet. I mean, I think people are kind of just saying, well, if it is sustained, what does it mean? Right. I don't think that they're, I mean, it's so far. I mean, what's embedded in the futures curve is probably not enough to matter for the Fed if it's sustained. I mean, that would be a different story, but we're not there yet. But I would just say as a general principle, negative supply shocks are tough because it pulls the Fed or any central bank in different directions. Right. On the one hand it pulls, it pushes prices up, on the other hand it pushes growth down. So that creates a tension for the central bank. That's always been the case.
- [22:03]
B
What do you make of Trump's nominee, Kevin Warsh?
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C
Well, I've been pretty vocal about not being a supporter of him. I have my reasons. I mean, I think I've, I've always believed that the Fed job is really a, it's an economic forecasting job. Right. Like your main job is like, do rates go up, down or sideways? Right. And I think objectively he's not very good at that. I mean, how so? Well, I mean, I don't know. This is probably before your time, but in 2008, you're a much younger guy than I am in 2008. I mean, he was basically, you know, he was kind of latching on to commodity prices and kind of ignoring the signal from the job market as a rationale to stay hawkish. Like he was kind of worried about this inflation phantom that didn't really exist. I mean, it's really hard to get meaningful inflation pressure with the labor markets falling out of bed, which at the time they were. I mean, we had like, you know, by the, by the, By May of 2008, we probably had like four or five negative jobs numbers in a row and the unemployment rate was going higher and he was talking about commodity prices and arguably like the fact that he was worried about that was a big problem because the Fed is a consensus building institution. So you need to get buy in from everyone around the table before you make a decision. So you have that debate. And because of those concerns that he had, it probably kept the Fed from cutting more at the time than they could have. And that probably made things worse, you know, more onerous than they had to be at the time. I mean, it wasn't like things were going to get better. I mean, we're in a credit crisis. But it could have helped had he not latched onto those inflation fears. And I also think that, you know, it's also a good, like I'm a market economist. Like one thing that it's important is that you need to be able to like update your priors when things don't go your way. Right? Like so, for example, he was a very big believer in the idea that like the Fed's balance sheet expansion, like LSAPs, large scale asset purchases would be inflationary. They weren't yet even after it was shown that they weren't, he kept saying that it was going to be a big risk. I also think it's like, you know, in my career, I mean, he's been, he's been hawkish my entire public career. His entire public career, you know, up until six to nine months ago. So I'll let you guess why. And the last thing I would say is that, you know, to the extent, I mean the power of the chair is the power to persuade, right? You have to be able to like, you get the political capital to go out and persuade your colleagues. None of them, I'm sorry to say, are going to believe this idea that there's some kind of economic golden age out there of high productivity that can just keep you from, that can, that will allow you to sort of front run economic data and just start cutting rates. Like they all, they keep talking about like pull a Greenspan. Have you heard them say that? Pull a Greenspan. That is like, to me that's a, that's like a misrepresentation of what actually happened in the 90s. In the 90s we had opportunistic disinflation. And what Greenspan rightly saw was that we were in a productivity boom that allowed him to go basically look at the data and say like, okay, even though the labor markets are tightening, we don't really need to worry about inflation because inflation's also falling. It was sort of a rules based framework. But look at what Greenspan did in the late 90s, like the labor markets were overheating. And guess what he did? He hiked very aggressively. So it's sort of a choose your own adventure with the whole Greenspan analog. But I think more importantly, one thing, Greenspan was a fairly astute economic forecaster. He was pretty Good at that. I liked him a lot because he had very good business economics instincts and Kevin Warsh is an Alan Greenspan and so he's not going to be able to persuade anybody to the Golden Age thesis. In fact, I mean, if you look at some of the comments out of some of the governors, like Michael Barr, I mean, he did a whole speech not too long ago basically talking about how in the short run the AI productivity boom is actually inflationary because of all the things associated with the build out, like prices for memory chips are going up and the copper wires that need to go into the data centers and all the investment spending that's associated with it. How does the, how is that deflationary or disinflationary? It's not so convincing everyone that, you know, that we're in a golden age, that Nehru and our star are a lot lower than we currently think they are. It's going to be a big leap. And because, and it's interesting because Warsh has always been like, like a critical of the Fed because, you know, they, they use too much, they exercise too much discretion. Like he's always talked about that. I mean, appealing to the Golden Age thesis, what is that other than an appeal to discretion? So it's kind of like a heads I win, tails you lose sort of thing. So I don't think he's going to be persuasive and I think if once he gets seated, whenever that is, he's going to have a pretty tall order and it could, you know, it's like he's been wanting that job for his whole life, basically.
- [27:43]
B
I think that's a pretty good job.
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C
Well, it's a pretty lonely job. It's one of the loneliest jobs in D.C. and I think it's going to be even lonelier for him because I don't think he's going to have a lot of support around that table.
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B
Wow. I think all of that criticism is fair. He definitely, from my, let's say, amateurish reading of it, he seems like he has incredible experience behind him. I mean, he's done a bunch of these very impressive jobs at very young ages. And as a young man I see that as pretty aspirational. He can get into all these legacy institutions as a very young person, but that, I'm not saying that should qualify him.
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C
I mean, people talk a lot about qualifications, Phil. I mean, it's like saying the New York jets are qualified to be in the super bowl, right? Like he's qualified in the shallowest definition of the word. Qualified. I mean he's held these positions of repute, admittedly, but he hasn't actually been in like monetary policy decision making circles. Like what he's. I think it's not what's interesting about the whole like fault lines around the Wash Nomination. It's kind of interesting to see it play out in central banking. It's not really a, it's not a left right thing because he did have a lot of people on the center left side of the political spectrum coming out in his favor. It's sort of like an in out thing. Like you're in the club or out of the club and he's in the club. Right. Like he's like part of the establishment central banking community and that's why you had a lot of these people come out in support of him. Right. I think that that to me was very interesting.
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B
So if he's in the club, you just think his chops are just not up to snuff.
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C
I don't think. I mean, look, I, who am I to say whether he's qualified or not? I mean I think that of the choices that the President had in front of him, he was probably the worst of the lot. And you do, and you do get a lot. I mean it is interesting to see like how many people on the street, like we'll just try to like rationalize away like all of this stuff like, oh, he's not hawkish on rates, he's hawkish only on the balance sheet. As if that means anything. Like it's just sort of like it's so ridiculous. I mean, you want to know someone who's been cutting the Fed's balance sheet and also cutting interest rates. Jerome Powell, they were doing that last year. Like it's sort of like, I think this sort of myopic fixation on the balance sheet kind of misunderstands like what drives monetary policy today.
- [30:13]
B
So, okay, let me ask you about Powell. What would you grade his, let's say last several years as the Fed chair?
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C
I mean, I think you have to grade on a curve and at the end of the day, the US economy has probably had enjoyed the best performance since the pandemic of any other economy. Like would you trade like our economic performance for Europe or Japan or Canada? I mean, I wouldn't. So I think you have to grade it on that basis. Like, did they make mistakes? Sure. I mean like was transitory a mistake? Yes. And guess what? He admitted to it. I'd like to see Kevin Wash admit something that he said wrong. You Know, like it's kind of, that's sort of where I'm at. I think the Fed arguably might be making a mistake right now because I do think that in January they probably, I think we could be looking back maybe in a year and say like, maybe it was premature for them to kind of take out their risk assessment around the labor market. I think the labor market's not out of the woods. I mean you still continue to see consumers, for example, telling you that, you know, it's very difficult to find jobs. And historically when consumers say that, it means something. Right. I mean consumers tend to be able to spot changes in their local economies before the, before the data picks it up. So, you know, but that's kind of like, that's all within, like, within bounds. You know what I mean? It's not like I, I don't. So, you know, I. Is he perfect? No, but I think, you know, I think one of the things that is critic the critics of the Fed and Powell are unable to do is like, show me a central bank in the world that has the kind of policy since the pandemic that you would have wanted to emulate. Are they all terrible? I mean, it's, you know, like, so if you had to pick, you know, because we have to. I mean everything is about choices and trade offs. And so from that perspective, I think, you know, he, he gets better marks than most.
- [32:14]
B
I think that's such a good way to think about it. And I definitely have not thought about it as in whose economy would you trade with? Yeah, that I, I like that a lot. So tell us how, how Renaissance Macros research is different than other firms. Like what are you doing that you think differentiates you?
- [32:33]
C
Well, I'm a business economist. I mean, I don't, I don't focus. I'm not trying to like jam our clients with like academic research that they don't have time to read. I mean most of our clients are portfolio managers or analysts at buy side, you know, shops. Long, short equity, things like that. They, they probably have like 5 to 10 minutes a day that they can dedicate to macro. And, and all I'm really trying to do is give them a framework to think about what's going on and digest it within that time. And I think a lot of, so when I write something, it's usually very quick. It's to the point it kind of tells you my thoughts and that's really it. I'm not spending my time like writing like big think pieces about, you know, like most people don't have time to read that and a lot of that stuff is like commoditized, you know, on the, on the, on the, on the sell side, you know. So it's, it's just like so for me it's like what makes our research different is that it's, it's to the
- [33:40]
B
point and short that is hard to find in Wall Street. I because I read the notes from all these different shops all the time and many are many very long I will say. So where can people find your work?
- [33:55]
C
Well you can find us on X Renmac LLC, you can find me on LinkedIn and yeah, Renaissance Macro Research we've
- [34:04]
B
been around since 2011 and you specifically are consistently praised in the press as being one of the most accurate forecasters on the street. So just want to get that in there. Neil, thank you so much for your time. Thanks.
- [34:18]
C
Appreciate it.
- [34:18]
B
And we'll do it again.