Ahmad Sharawi & Dominik Lett: How Should the U.S. Evaluate the Iran War?

Summary

Future of Freedom — Episode Summary

Podcast: Future of Freedom
Host: Scott Bertram
Episode: Ahmad Sharawi & Dominik Lett: How Should the U.S. Evaluate the Iran War?
Date: May 22, 2026

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Overview

This episode of Future of Freedom critically examines the ongoing U.S. military and policy engagement in the Iran War. Host Scott Bertram conducts in-depth back-to-back interviews with two expert guests who offer contrasting perspectives: Ahmad Sharawi, Senior Research Analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), and Dominik Lett, Budget and Entitlement Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute. The conversation centers on U.S. strategy, the definition of success, fiscal implications, regional impacts, and prospects for negotiation and resolution.

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Ahmad Sharawi: U.S. Strategy and Military Realities

Background:
Ahmad Sharawi is a senior research analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), focusing on Middle East security and U.S. policy toward Iran.

Key Points & Insights

• Defining Success in War (01:14–02:54)

  • The U.S. had initial objectives: destroy Iran’s military infrastructure (navy, air force), and weaken the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).
  • Sharawi notes significant tactical degradation of Iran’s military, but concedes issues remain, especially around the closed Strait of Hormuz—a focal point for international economic disruption.
  • Quote: “On day one of the war, we set out clear guidelines... the destruction of Iran's military infrastructure... as well as weakening the IRGC... But... the biggest issue here is the Strait of Hormuz.” (01:14, Sharawi)

• Strait of Hormuz and Asymmetrical Warfare (03:11–04:28)

  • U.S. war planning anticipated issues with Hormuz, but underestimated Iran’s willingness to rapidly leverage the strait’s closure.
  • Iran internationalized the conflict—targeting energy infrastructure to exert economic pressure, influencing U.S. allies' willingness to cooperate.

• Tactical vs. Strategic Success (04:28–06:25)

  • Tactical gains (“significant degradation”) do not guarantee durable political advantages.
  • The focus of current negotiations is on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, but Iran’s missile and air force capacities—though weakened—are not destroyed.
  • Quote: “We have not completely eradicated their military capabilities. They still retain a lot.” (05:19, Sharawi)

• Nuclear Deadlock (06:07–07:23)

  • There's little hope for Iran fully relinquishing enriched uranium—negotiations will likely revolve around time-limited pauses, not permanent abandonment.
  • Quote: “The Iranians have not shown any willingness to concede on that specific issue... I’m not confident that there will be a deal that includes Iran fully dismantling... its nuclear program.” (06:25, Sharawi)

• Dismissing 'Endless War' Concerns (07:23–09:21)

  • This conflict is different from Iraq or Afghanistan: no major U.S. ground presence, emphasis is on air campaigns and economic tools.
  • Initiatives like “Operation Economic Fury” (blockade, sanctions) demonstrate a multi-pronged rather than open-ended approach.
  • Quote: “These are signs that the U.S. has maintained a focused policy on weakening and pressuring this regime without... an extensive military campaign that involves personnel on the ground.” (08:34, Sharawi)

• Regional Powers’ Involvement (09:21–11:32)

  • UAE and Saudi retaliation was not initially preferred by the U.S., but is now understood as self-defense after repeated Iranian and proxy attacks.
  • Operational coordination is limited—Israel and U.S. have trained together, but less so with Gulf Arab partners.

• Danger of Weakened Conventional Forces (11:32–13:22)

  • Iran’s degraded conventional capability may push it further toward asymmetric strategies: more proxy funding, persistent regional pressure.
  • Negotiations overlook proxy influence—this remains an unresolved threat.

• Economic Attrition vs. Iranian Resolve (13:22–14:55)

  • Blockade and economic strains are seriously hurting Iran, but its ability to sustain proxy attacks and limited smuggling persists.
  • Quote: “[Iran is] trying to balance that by not rebuilding their military capabilities but at least retaining what has been bombed during the five week campaign.” (14:44, Sharawi)

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Dominik Lett: Fiscal, Constitutional, and Strategic Critique

Background:
Dominik Lett is a Budget and Entitlement Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, focusing on the economics and constitutional implications of U.S. foreign engagement.

Key Points & Insights

• Arguments Against Continued U.S. Involvement (15:23–16:05)

  • Lett’s main case: U.S. should not spend “another penny” on the Iran war, citing strategic, fiscal, and constitutional flaws.
  • Quote: “Washington and folks tend to underestimate the long term fiscal costs of conflict.” (15:49, Lett)

• Lack of Clear, Consistent War Aims (16:05–17:25)

  • Administration’s rationale has shifted—from regime change, to reopening Hormuz, to undefined goals.
  • Unstable war aims risk “a very long term and costly conflict”—mirroring recent U.S. experiences in the Middle East.

• Quantifying Opportunity Cost (17:25–19:17)

  • The administration overstates necessity; threat arguments have persisted for years.
  • Real question: “Are these threats large enough to justify large-scale, costly conflict—especially given economic fallout?” (Paraphrased)
  • Quote: “The US did not need to strike Iran... these aren't strong enough reasons to justify a large scale conflict.” (18:26, Lett)

• Military Resource Depletion & Strategic Risk (19:17–20:51)

  • U.S. is exhausting expensive and limited missile stockpiles (e.g., Thaad, Patriot), impeding readiness for future contingencies (e.g., with China).
  • Even aside from cost, Lett maintains the war isn’t “worth fighting on its merits.”

• Ignoring Escalation Danger (20:51–22:35)

  • Policymakers consistently underestimate risk of mission creep—post-9/11 wars ballooned to $8 trillion fiscal burden.
  • Quote: “Emergencies... persist and... build costs over the long run... become integrated into the broader budget.” (21:38, Lett)

• What If U.S. Withdraws? (22:35–23:58)

  • Lett argues strait closure and direct threats only arose after U.S. attacks.
  • A U.S. withdrawal and de-escalation would create peaceable conditions; escalation is more likely if conflict continues.
  • Quote: “If the U.S. had never struck Iran, the Strait of Hormuz would not have been closed.” (22:54, Lett)

• Congressional Authority and Fiscal Restraint (23:58–25:43)

  • Congress should restrict war spending, enforce War Powers Act requirements, and return to its constitutional role of declaring war.
  • Executive branch has gradually usurped this power due to congressional inaction.

• Economic Consequences for U.S. (25:43–27:23)

  • Energy prices in the U.S. have surged—crude oil up 54%, gas by 55%.
  • Inflation at 3.8% (highest since May 2023); "energy filters into everything."
  • Quote: “Eight in ten Americans are saying that gas is straining their family budgets... The conflict is kind of squeezing Americans' budgets and squeezing the American economy.” (26:18, Lett)

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Memorable Moments & Quotes

• On Success vs. Reality:
  “We have not completely eradicated their military capabilities. They still retain a lot.” (05:19, Sharawi)

• On U.S.’s Non-Ground Approach:
  “This is not Iraq 2003. What we're seeing is an extensive aerial campaign... which has now moved on to an economic, or there's an economic dimension to this war.” (07:50, Sharawi)

• On Fiscal Blindness:
  “Washington and folks tend to underestimate the long term fiscal costs of conflict.” (15:49, Lett)

• On Precipitating Conflict:
  “If the U.S. had never struck Iran, the Strait of Hormuz would not have been closed.” (22:54, Lett)

• On Escalation Costs:
  “Emergencies... build costs over the long run and become integrated into the broader budget.” (21:38, Lett)

• On Everyday Impact:
  “Eight in ten Americans are saying that gas is straining their family budgets... The conflict is... squeezing the American economy.” (26:18, Lett)

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Timestamps for Important Segments

• Defining Success & Strait of Hormuz: 01:14–04:28
• Military Gains vs. Strategic Outcomes: 04:28–06:25
• Nuclear Negotiations Friction: 06:07–07:23
• Endless War Counterargument: 07:23–09:21
• Regional Powers’ Participation: 09:21–11:32
• Proxy & Asymmetrical Warfare: 11:32–13:22
• Economic Attrition: 13:22–14:55
• Cato’s Fiscal Critique & Cost Arguments: 15:23–19:17
• Resource Depletion Concerns: 19:17–20:51
• Escalation Risk & Policy Paralysis: 20:51–22:35
• Withdrawal Scenarios & Consequences: 22:35–23:58
• Congressional Power Over Spending: 23:58–25:43
• Economic Impact on U.S. Public: 25:43–27:23

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Conclusion

This episode delivers a balanced, comprehensive exploration of the U.S. role in the Iran conflict. Sharawi argues the U.S. has achieved significant tactical objectives and is strategically leveraging economic tools to avoid past mistakes, while Lett contends the war’s rationale is unclear, the costs are underestimated, and a rethink—rooted in fiscal restraint and constitutional process—is urgent. Consequences ripple beyond military and diplomatic circles, affecting everyday Americans and the U.S.'s global readiness and economic health. The conversation is civil, substantive, and crucial for understanding the multi-dimensional stakes of continued U.S. involvement in Iran.

Transcript

[A]

Welcome to FUTURE of Freedom. I'm your host, Scott Bertram. Future of Freedom is a production of Franklin News Foundation. To support this show, go to franklinnews.org donate we bring you interviews today from different sides of the conversation about the war in Iran. In a little bit, we'll be joined by Dominic Lett, budget and entitlement policy analyst at the Cato institute. [e-mail] first we talk with Ahmad Sharawi. He is senior research analyst with foundation for Defense of Democracies. You can find [e-mail] Ahmad. Thanks so much for joining us.

[B]

Thank you for having me.

[A]

Discussing today, the war conflict in Iran, you could look at various polls and probably find various things, but there certainly is a, a significant portion who think we're not succeeding in this, in this conflict, in this war right now. What do you think? By and large, critics are misunderstanding most about the current state of this conflict.

[B]

I mean, of course, I mean, this all depends on how we, how we, how we define success. On day one of the war. We set out clear guidelines on what we expect from this military campaign, that is the destruction of Iran's military infrastructure, including its naval air force. And as well as weakening the irgc, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps military capability. Since then, we've seen reports, multiple reports about the significant degradation of Iran's military capabilities. But of course, I mean, with war, we, I mean, there are, there are issues that arise. And I mean, the biggest issue here is the Strait of Hormuz. And I think a lot of people who look at the current developments and the fact that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed would think that way. But of course, I mean, again, this is a consequence of the war. This is a consequence of Iran's strategy and to internationalize this conflict, to hit the US and hit the region as a whole where it's hurt the most. And that's by using economic power, or at least the weapon of energy, to get concessions or at least to weaken some of these countries. And that's why we saw them targeting the Gulf states, extensively targeting their energy infrastructure, because the way they deal with these things is not the way that the US Deals with it. And that's why we're seeing reports that some of these countries have pressured President Trump not to continue the war or at least not to restart strikes this week.

[A]

Certainly, it should not be a surprise that the Strait of Hormuz has become such a big stumbling block or a big hurdle in this conflict. Should we have been better prepared? Was there a possibility to have a better strategy to deal with this.

[B]

I mean, I think that was. I think when it comes to war planning, the question of the state of Hormuz was on every, every person's mind in the planning process for this war or for this campaign. What I think happened is that the expectation that the Iranians would use the Strait of Hormuz as soon as the war started was a bit underestimated. And it's not just the state of Hormuz, again, as I stated in my previous answer, it's the fact that they made this war about energy and resorted to asymmetrical warfare, knowing that this will hurt the US and its allies and its partners in the region. So I think it's underestimating how far the Iranians were able to use or to use that weapon as a survival mechanism. And again, I mean, at the end of the day, the question of Hormuz remains unanswered. The US has tried to implement the Project Freedom. Again, some countries were hesitant. It's all a matter of planning, and it's all a matter of how many of our allies and partners are willing to cooperate to reopen the strait.

[A]

One challenge in modern warfare is that tactical success sometimes doesn't always translate into strategic success. In this instance in Iran, do we know that our battlefield gains the degradation of their capabilities? Do we know that's going to be producing durable political gains as well?

[B]

Well, I mean, it all depends on one happens on the negotiation table. And I think the US has been focused on the nuclear issue at the moment as a defining mechanism for these negotiations and for this political deal. But again, when it comes to Iran's ballistic missiles and when it comes to Iran's navy and air force, they've been significantly degraded, some more than others. Of course, Iran still maintains growing capabilities. It still maintains its ballistic military capabilities, again, significantly degraded, but. But not destroyed. And that really affects the future of this conflict if it were to restart. Because, I mean, as we saw, they were relentlessly attacking US Bases and US Partners in the region, despite the US strikes and Israeli strikes against their military capabilities. So we have not completely eradicated their military capabilities. They still retain a lot. But again, it all depends on what happens on the negotiation table. But the fact that the negotiations have been focused on the nuclear issue means that Iran will be able to retain some of its weapons that can be used in future conflicts, maybe not necessarily against the U.S. but any conflict against Israel or any of the regional, regional, Arab partners.

[A]

Do you foresee an outcome or a resolution in which Iran agrees to give up all of its enriched uranium. That seems to be a red line for President Trump that he demands all of it. It also seems that that's one point in which Iran does not wish to concede. Is there a way around that?

[B]

So, I mean, I mean, the Iranians are very stubborn and they're, I mean, they're strong negotiators and I think they're explicit in terms of the future of their nuclear program and the fact that they're not willing to let go of that program now. I mean, it's. The devil is in the details. Will the US Agree to a timeframe in which Iran pauses or stops enrichment? Will that be 15 years? Will that be 20 years? Will that be 10 years? Again, these are questions to be asked to the negotiators. But I think the critical aspect here is that the Iranians have not shown any willingness to concede on that specific issue. And that's why when I look at the possibility of a deal, I struggle to. I'm not confident that there will be a deal that includes Iran fully dismantling or moving away from its nuclear program.

[A]

Critics could argue and do argue, that the US Risks again getting pulled into some sort of open ended regional conflict here with what's happened in Iran. I know you've heard the term endless war. Why are they wrong? Why do you think this won't end up that way?

[B]

So, I mean, as I said, I think President Trump has been very clear in the expectation that this is not like the other wars. This is not a war where we're going to see boots on the ground moving to Tehran. And I mean, this is not Iraq 2003. What we're seeing is an extensive aerial campaign, or what we saw was an extensive aerial campaign which has now moved on to an economic, or there's an economic dimension to this war. And I think the US has recognized that it has multiple tools that it can use in order to put maximum pressure on the Islamic Republic. And that's why we've seen that shift into the less costly avenues to cause that pressure. Be that operation Economic fury. We're seeing a blockade to, to prevent Iranian oil shipping. We're seeing broad and extensive sanctions on Iranian money exchange offices in the Gulf, shadow banking and the shadow fleet. These are signs that this is not an endless conflict. These are signs that the US has maintained a focused policy on weakening and pressuring this regime without having to resort to the mechanisms that would lead to an endless conflict. Be that an extensive military campaign that involves personnel on the ground. So we're seeing that flexibility from the US Side. And I mean, that's, for me, that's a clear sign that this is not similar to any, to any of the previous wars that critics often use as examples for, and for the Endless War example or for the Endless War concept.

[A]

What should we think about these regional powers around, around Iran conducting strikes and conducting attacks against Iran? Was that something that we probably anticipated happening? Is that a different wrinkle in this conflict?

[B]

So, I mean, I look at this from two different perspectives. The first perspective is that countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been struck by Iran and its proxies extensively during the conflict. We're still seeing attacks from Iraqi militias that are backed by Iran against the UAE and Saudi Arabia or primarily the UAE and Kuwait. And the expectation is that these countries are sovereign countries that have military capabilities and that it's the right to respond because, again, they are not parties to this conflict. Iran framed the attacks on the Gulf states as attacks against US Bases. But if we look at the numbers and we look at the targets, they've mainly targeted civilian and energy infrastructure. So these countries have the right to respond that way. But if you, if you had asked me this question on the first week of this campaign, I would have said that the US May not be confident with or may not be happy with the inclusion of these, of these powers or these regional powers into this conflict. And these are, this is mainly because of operational reasons, because the US And Israel have maintained a strict professional campaign. They've trained together. Israel has trained extensively with the US But Israel has not trained extensively with the Arab partners, with the US Allies in the region. And so from an operational standpoint, that might have been an issue. But from what I understand, and based on the reports that have been coming out in the previous weeks, it seemed like the attacks, the Emirati and the Saudi attacks were in response to direct attacks from Iranian soil into, into Saudi Arabia and the uae, as well as the attacks from Iraq into the, into these countries. So they've framed this as a, as a response and as a retaliation to unprompted attacks against their territory.

[A]

We talked about Iran's weakened infrastructure and, and the degradation of their, their capabilities. Does that in a way make them more dangerous, meaning that the possibility of nuclear enrichment and those sorts of weapons become a more direct option if, if conventional weapons have been degraded to a certain extent?

[B]

Well, I mean, of course there's, there's always that fear of, of, of, of the dash towards the, the, the, the nuclear weapon because of, because of this weakness. But again, this is all part of the negotiation process. And I think, I think the US and the policymakers that are negotiating understand the risk of that. But also, I mean, Iran has always employed the asymmetrical warfare method in these times. Despite its military strength at certain periods, it recognizes that it cannot beat the US or Israel in the conventional war. And that's why they've continued to fund these proxy groups. They've continued to fund weapons for these proxy groups to, to encircle the US partners in the region to encircle Israel and increase their pressure or increase pressure on these countries. And so I don't see Iran stopping from pursuing that goal. I don't see Iran, despite everything that's happening, Iran still wants to empower its proxies in the region. It still wants to empower or increase that asymmetrical warfare method. And again, this is an issue that will not be discussed on the negotiation table and it will remain an unanswered question in the future. If a deal is struck, what is the future of these proxies? Will they remain in power? Will they continue to threaten Israel the

[A]

longer that this goes without an agreement, without an end, is it generally a benefit to Arameter and are they in a stronger position position the longer this drags out?

[B]

So I mean this, this all depends on, I mean I'm basing this off reports from media, but apparently they were, they managed to retain some of the weapons during this brief ceasefire. Again, we've seen continuous attacks from Iran against Kurds in Iraq, the Iranian Kurdish opposition. We're still seeing attacks from Iraqi militias. It seems like their ambitions have not been stopped by this war. It seems like the five weeks or six weeks of extensive strikes did not stop their ability to continue attacking these countries. But on the negotiation table and I think the fact that the US has managed to increase this blockade of the Gulf has really hurt the Iranian economy and is really hurting their ability to export oil. Now they do have alternatives and they've managed to smuggle some, some of them through, through, through land borders. But it's, it's, they're, they're significantly affected by, by, by, by the lack of solution mainly because of the economic dimension of this, of this war. But it's, it's, they're trying to balance, they're trying to balance that by, by not rebuilding their military capabilities but at least retaining what has been bombed during the five week campaign.

[A]

Ahmad Sharawi is senior research analyst with the foundation for Defense of Democracies you can find [e-mail] Ahmad thanks so much for joining us here on Future of Freedom.

[B]

Thank you very much.

[A]

Now to hear another side of the conversation about the war in Iran, we talk with Dominic Latt, Budget and Entitlement Policy Analyst at the Cato institute. [e-mail] Dominic, thanks so much for joining us.

[C]

Thank you for having me.

[A]

Talking today about the war in Iran, the conflict with Iran, something posted over at the CATO Institute's website, 5 reasons the US should not spend Another Penny on the war in Iran cato.org is that argument primarily strategic based, fiscally based, constitutionally based? Why should we not spend any more money on this war?

[C]

I'd say all three There's a lot of reasons to oppose the conflict I primarily look at from a fiscal perspective. I think Washington and folks tend to underestimate the long term fiscal costs of conflict. But I think there's a lot of different reasons to oppose this conflict.

[A]

Part of the essay says that the administration's pursuing an undefined war, no clear exit. Now the administration has said, hey, we've done this. We've told you exactly what this looks like, what we're trying to accomplish. Where, from your perspective, have they failed to do so?

[C]

I would say it's kind of how the stated aim has evolved over the course of the war. At the beginning of the conflict, the president, for example, was truthing about possible regime change. Now it seems like that is not the primary aim. And the primary aim is maybe to reopen the Strait, or maybe the primary aim has already been accomplished and we're very close to exiting the war. The the actual state of the conflict, from the perspective of the administration also seems to change constantly, which should be concerning from the perspective of the average taxpayer, the average American, and from politicians in Congress who will ultimately be tasked making the decision about whether or not to further fund this war. A constantly changing rationale for why we're pursuing a conflict is a recipe for getting embroiled in a very long term and costly conflict. Something that has already happened in the Middle east and happened faster than I think maybe people realized.

[A]

I want to talk a bit more about the cost on one aspect, the financial cost. There is obviously a dollar figure you can place on how much this effort is costing us. What we might not know or is tougher to nail down is the cost of not, not doing something right if Iran continues in their path toward a nuclear weapon, or if this conflict is going to happen inevitably. But maybe it's five years from now, is there a cost that we could assign to not acting in this instance?

[C]

That's a good question. It's worth clarifying that there's two ways of looking at the cost of the conflict of inaction or action, which is the financial cost, the economic cost. So for example changes in energy prices, inflation, so on. And then there's also the fiscal cost, which is the literal costs of financing the conflict via increasing the deficit, spending more money on defense and so on. As to this counterfactual possibility, I think that we should look at the kind of existing situation, what it was just prior to the US striking Iran and then what it is today. The US did not need to strike Iran. The arguments the administration has made for why the strikes were necessary have been around for a very long time. That is Iran has the capacity to build a nuclear weapon or that they are a threat to other regional actors that the US is friendly with, so on. In my view, these aren't strong enough reasons to justify a large scale conflict, particularly one that has had such a significant impact on the economy already and may have long term fiscal costs that increase the deficit, drive up the debt and harm taxpayers over the longer run.

[A]

It's also a question of cost as to our military preparedness. By this I mean we have been providing arms, selling arms, helping Ukraine. We have been involved in strikes along with Israel. We have been involved in previous strikes in Iran. There is not an unlimited supply of weapons that the US has. What is the cost that you might argue to our prepared for potential future military conflicts?

[C]

That's a good question. So one way of looking at this is looking at our missile interceptor stockpile. So we have these missile interceptors called Thaad and Patriot missiles. They cost a significant amount of money. It's about 13 million for every Thaad missile. And we only have a set stockpile, set amount of those missiles. By some estimates we've burnt through about half of that stockpile and we can only produce them at a certain rate. It will take a long time for us to rebuild that stockpile. And if the US were to get involved in another conflict, let's say with China, the US would have kind of depleted reserve of weapons to draw on. Now of course that is to me a secondary argument behind the sort of the primary one which is that this war is not worth fighting on its merits. We generally shouldn't prosecute wars at all, let alone say we need it for another conflict. But it is something we're thinking about is is this the right use of these weapons that we've already spent money on. And in my view, no, there is

[A]

skepticism toward the idea in the essay that limited strikes will remain limited, that they will not expand. Do policymakers generally underestimate the risk of escalation when entering a conflict like this?

[C]

I would say yes. And I think the easiest comparison is looking at the post 911 wars in the Middle East. At the outset of most of those conflicts, the pitch from the administrations at the time was that the war would be quick, the US Would be efficient and lethal, and we would get in and then get out as quickly as possible. That obviously did not happen. For example, by some estimates, the post 911 conflicts have $8 trillion fiscal burden created an $8 trillion fiscal burden on the United States. I don't think the administration or Congress had even remotely considered that large of a fiscal impact from these conflicts. And from my perspective, the concern is the same. You can also make a similar comparison to emergencies. More broadly. Emergencies, once they are kind of created and we begin spending money on them, they tend to persist and they kind of build costs over the long run and become integrated into the broader budget. So from my perspective, the Pentagon, for example, said we spent $29 billion so far on the conflict today. That is both an underestimate in my view, but also kind of understates the possible longer term cost that the US Becomes embroiled in this conflict, continues to spend money on it and cost balloon.

[A]

Dominic, the essay again says don't spend another penny. Okay, what happens at that point? Are we at a, are we at a position, Are we in a position to simply say we're done, let's go home, we're done here. What happens next if in fact we say we don't want to continue this conflict?

[C]

Well, first of all, the Iran, we should, we should start with this, with, with this perspective. If the US had never struck Iran, the Strait of Hormuz would not have been closed. Iran was not attacking the United States was not closing the strait until we attacked them. If we stopped spending money on the conflict and we immediately de. Escalated and sought peace, I don't think that it would immediately resolve itself overnight. But if the US Acted in good faith, I think that it would create the conditions to bring about peace. If the US Continues to strike Iran, it's likely things will escalate. That's just kind of how this works. Iran doesn't have a strong incentive to continue to prosecute this conflict against the U.S. so if the U.S. stops spending money on the conflict, it creates the conditions to bring about peace.

[A]

Congress has power of the purse. Congress has the opportunity to, as you point out, cease funding if they wish to. What actions would be necessary for Congress to force this matter?

[C]

Well, for one, Congress could. Every year Congress passes is supposed to pass an annual budget, part of which goes to the Department of Defense, that discretionary side of the overall federal government's budget. Congress has significant power to determine where money is spent and how they can include requirements and restrictions on how money is spent. So in this context, for example, Congress could, when passing that annual budget, say only this amount of money can go towards conflict in Iran, or say these missiles should not be used for this conflict and attach conditions to that defense spending. More generally, I think that Congress needs to exercise its power of the purse when it comes to the administration prosecuting conflict. There's kind of this whole conversation about whether or not this is a war or not, in part because Congress is supposed to declare wars before we get involved in them. But over the years, the executive branch has generally kind of aggrandize power and undermine Congress. And really it's because Congress does not act affirmatively. They don't take the power. They just kind of cede it and defer to the administration. So in this context, it means, you know, enforcing existing war powers laws and passing bills that would restrain the executive branch's use of taxpayer resources.

[A]

We've talked a lot about economics debate. With the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz, what are the effects and the impacts on the United States economy? We talk about it largely in ways that it might be harming Iran. How is it harming or how is it affecting us here in the United States?

[C]

That's a good question. I'd say the easiest way to look at it is through energy. Crude has increased about 54% since the start of the conflict from around $65 a barrel to 100 plus dollars a barrel. Gas has increased from about $2.80 to $4.50. That's on an average national basis. That's a 55% increase. If you ask Americans. There was a recent poll by NPR, about 8 in 10Americans are saying that gas is straining their family budgets. Energy filters into everything in the economy. It filters into production and filters into transportation, obviously. And all those things are hurting Americans pockets. They're hurting the American economy. And also something to know is that the consumer price CPI, which is a metric for inflation, is at 3.8% a year over year, which is the highest since May 2023, which is to say that inflation is up, it's significantly above the Federal Reserve's 2% target. So broadly, this is all changed since the conflict started. The conflict is kind of squeezing Americans budgets and squeezing the American economy.

[A]

Dominic led his budget and Entitlement Policy analyst at the Cato Institute. You can find [e-mail] Dominic thank you so much for joining us today on Future of Freedom.

[C]

Thanks.

[A]

We thank both of our guests for joining us today. Ahmad Sharawi, Senior Research Analyst with the foundation for Defense of Democracies FM

[B]

and

[A]

Dominic Lett, budget and Entitlement Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute, cato.org to find additional episodes of Future of Freedom, go to Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your audio. Thank you for listening to Future of Freedom, a production of Franklin News Foundation.