Loading summary
Transcript66 lines
- [00:01]
Mary Radcliffe
The girls are fighting.
- [00:02]
Galen Bruck
The girls are fighting. Also, if Elon Musk were born in America, like she would be the next Ross Perot. Like she has all of the makings of Ross Perot. Verifiably insane. A billionaire, lives in Texas. It's dead o'. Clock.
- [00:17]
Lenny Brauner
The company has a weird cult like following.
- [00:20]
Galen Bruck
Like she could do it. Hello and welcome to the GD Politics Podcast. I'm Galen Bruck and prepare to get nerdy today. Any responsible election watcher knows that when it comes to parsing through polling cross tabs, it's important to tread carefully. Now stay with me here, non election nerds. Although I don't know how many non election nerds are in the audience. Grandma, just, you know, I'm talking to my own grandma here. Just stick with us. This is all to say, don't put too much stuff stock in what individual polls tell you about how one group of the electorate feels like young voters or Latino voters, or people with an income under 50 grand. If the margin of error for the top line numbers of a poll is say, 4 percentage points, the margin of error for those individual groups will be significantly larger. It's too easy to get carried away with narratives that are based on just a fraction of the 500 or 1000 people in any individual poll. Or alternatively, narratives like there's no way young voters are shifting that much. This whole poll must be wrong. Sound familiar? Well, dear listener, today we are throwing caution to the wind. Or maybe I should say we have enough data that caution is no longer wise. Seven months after Election Day 2024, much of the high quality data about what happened is in we had exit polls immediately afterwards, but now we have precinct level data and surveys that have verified whether people actually voted. We can say how portions of the electorate voted without worrying about sample sizes. We're going to get into the nitty gritty. But an important takeaway for me is that American politics is dynamic. In an era of close elections, it's easy to think that everyone is just stuck in the mud. That isn't the case. While the overall results remain close underneath, voters are changing their minds. They're sometimes voting and sometimes staying home. And the trends that seemed rock solid just a handful of years ago are changing course. Americans are not just hardcore partisans who pull a red or blue lever in every election. They're people with full and complex lives whose behavior for many is subject to change. So let's get into it all and here with me to discuss, we have an all star crew. Mary Radcliffe, welcome to the podcast thanks.
- [02:47]
Mary Radcliffe
For having me, Galen.
- [02:49]
Galen Bruck
Always good to see you. Are you wearing a Pittsburgh Steelers shirt, by the way?
- [02:52]
Mary Radcliffe
Of course I am.
- [02:53]
Galen Bruck
Okay. All right. I thought that's what I saw. Also joining us for the first time on the GD Politics podcast is Lenny Brauner, senior data scientist at the Washington Post. Welcome, Lenny.
- [03:03]
Lenny Brauner
It's great to be here.
- [03:04]
Galen Bruck
Thanks for having me to pull back the curtain a little bit. You are a friend in real life too. So if for any reason we sound a little too casual, I'm not being rude. I actually just know you a little too well. Is that fair to say?
- [03:17]
Lenny Brauner
I'll take real offense at whatever later.
- [03:21]
Galen Bruck
On in the show. We also have a GDBD needy example which Mary picked out. It's a poll that asks Americans whether they prefer a populist or abundance agenda. Eek. Okay, we will see how that looks, but let's get into what happened in 2024. One of the main new pieces of data we have is from a report from the Democratically aligned data data firm Catalyst. While they are partisan, they have a track record of quality, clear eyed work. So we'll be talking plenty about that. We also have nonpartisan data to work off of as well. Lenny, you recently gave a presentation on all of this at apor, the American association of Public Opinion Researchers. Now, I shared my top line takeaway, which is, you know, the usual, Galen, like don't try to pinpoint who Americans are, keep an open mind, whatever. I think listeners have heard the spiel before. I want to give you all the opportunity to give top line takeaways now that much of the data is in Mary, how are the groups in the electorate doing?
- [04:26]
Mary Radcliffe
Top line takeaway is that the trends that we were observing in advance of the election and discussing on the 538 politics podcast and writing about, and all of that largely seemed to bear out when you look at the voting patterns we saw in the electorate. So we saw movement in the, in the crosstab data of Hispanic and Latino voters, black voters and younger voters toward Republicans. And that is exactly what happened in the election. I think that top line of younger voters and voters of color moving toward Republicans has been mostly what's been publicized from this research. And I think there's a reason for that because those groups basically swayed the election. I did some playing around with the numbers, right. If you bumped back their support levels to where they were in 2018, the election would have gone the other way. So it's really these sort of key groups that drove the shift toward Republicans in the 2024 election. Now, that's not to say that we don't see movement among other groups. We do. There were only two subgroups that Catalyst identified in the data that moved toward Democrats, which were black voters.
- [05:41]
Galen Bruck
Wait, wait, hold on, hold on. Oh, I was gonna try to guess, say the first one. I'll try to guess the second one. It was black voters over the age of 65. Is that what you were gonna say?
- [05:49]
Mary Radcliffe
Yes.
- [05:50]
Galen Bruck
Is the second one college educated women?
- [05:53]
Mary Radcliffe
Close.
- [05:57]
Galen Bruck
Is it? It's so college educated women with an income over $100,000. Is it college educated men? I don't know. Yeah.
- [06:05]
Mary Radcliffe
White married women.
- [06:08]
Galen Bruck
White married women. Okay, so it wasn't about education. It was about marital status.
- [06:14]
Mary Radcliffe
Yeah.
- [06:15]
Galen Bruck
Hmm.
- [06:15]
Mary Radcliffe
Although those are correlated, so.
- [06:17]
Galen Bruck
Yeah.
- [06:18]
Mary Radcliffe
So, I mean. Well, my point is to say, like, yes, every group shifted toward Republicans except for these, like, little, tiny, weird examples. But the big movement among voters of color and young voters is really what, like, tipped the election.
- [06:31]
Galen Bruck
So people after an election always try to say, oh, this is the group that swung the election. You know, oftentimes being like, we. It'll be interest groups being like, we are an important part of the electorate. We decided this election in favor of X or, yeah, group. That can be, like, a tricky argument to make. But, Mary, it sounds like you are confident in saying that younger voters and Latino and black voters decided this election for Republicans.
- [06:58]
Mary Radcliffe
Well, I mean, so if you left everything else constant and just moved white voters back to the support level they had for Democrats in 2020, according to the Catalyst report, which they dropped about 2 points between 2020 and 2024 in terms of Democratic support, if you give them back those two points, that roughly works out to a 50, 50 election. So it's impossible to say, like, okay, who would win in 50, 50. And of course, obviously, this is not taking into account things like the Electoral College. Right. This is just looking at basically the national popular vote. So if you consider, like, what would have happened if white voters had held their support for Democrats constant, and you had seen these drops among non white voters, you would still have a situation where Donald Trump probably won that election. So while every voter is important and changes in all of these groups are important, and we love you all, it does seem to me to be the case that the big movement among non white voters, which was concentrated among young voters, was a big part of what happened here.
- [08:04]
Galen Bruck
All voters are important, Mary, but you, as a Pennsylvania resident, are a far more important voter than.
- [08:09]
Mary Radcliffe
And a white married and a white.
- [08:11]
Galen Bruck
Man, a white married woman, are far more important than me as a New York State man or Lenny, who is not yet an American citizen. But we're rooting for you. Lenny is joining us from Austria today, where it's a little bit later in the day. So I think your analysis is going to be even more on point. You've had the whole day to get ready for this. What do you think about what Mary is saying and are there any other top line takeaways that you have?
- [08:38]
Lenny Brauner
No. I mean, I totally agree with Mary and my takeaway is going to be very similar. I will add to that that I do think not only is it sort of what we expected based on the pre election polling and sort of the general discourse, but it's also the culmination of sort of the last 10 years of trending the way the electorate was trending. That comes out pretty clearly in the Catalyst report. But it's sort of, you can see that across data we see sort of racial depolarization that's been taking place. We see education polarization, gender polarization becoming more important. And we see Democrats losing ground amongst sort of irregular voters. Like the last couple elections, it's been less dramatic for Democrats, but that has been the way things have been going since the Obama era. And them, according to the Catalyst report, now doing worse amongst those voters and Republicans is sort of the sort of the step that we could all expect coming based on the data we've been seeing over the last 10, 15 years.
- [09:31]
Galen Bruck
Yeah. The New York Times recently published some data visualization that showed the places in America that had moved right in three consecutive elections. So 16, 20 and 24 versus the places that had moved left in three consecutive elections. If anyone has seen that map, you don't have to go find it. I'll describe it for you. Many, many places that moved right in three consecutive elections. Very few places that moved left in three consecutive elections. Which brings me to this question about the word realignment. I think up until now folks have been hesitant to use that word because it was unclear if things might revert to the mean. You know, there has been a trend of, for example, Latino voters voting for incumbents at higher rates than other parts of the electorate. So think back to 2004. Bush got quite a bit of Latino support and some folks were explaining Donald Trump's performance with Latino voters in 2020 as that same kind of phenomenon. Support for incumbents. In this instance, I guess there wasn't really an incumbent on the ballot, but Latino voters were voting at significantly higher rates for Republicans. Taken all of this. Are we ready to say that there has been a realignment in American politics over the past decade?
- [10:56]
Mary Radcliffe
So I'm not. I'm. I think it is too early to say whether this change among Latino voters is a blip or a trend there.
- [11:10]
Galen Bruck
Like, still too early.
- [11:12]
Mary Radcliffe
I. I think so, actually. Right. Like, the change in support for Democrats among Latino voters from 2020 to 2024 was 9 percentage points from, according to Catalyst report, from 63% in 2020 to 54% in 2024. That's like a super big drop. But the particular issues in the 2024 election, like the issue landscape in the 2024 election, may have had a lot to do with changes among that demographic in particular. Like we talked about the selection, and I think that the data bears this out, that this was an election focused on two issues, immigration and inflation. When it comes to immigration in particular, there's like, some basic misunderstanding among people about how Hispanic voters think about immigration. I think Democrats seem to expect that Hispanic voters are just universally supportive of broadly open immigration policy, which doesn't really bear out in the polling. They're closer to white voters than to black voters in the polling. I was looking at this morning when it comes to support for pathways to citizenship and things like that. So the particular issue landscape may have been beneficial for Republicans among Latino voters in particular. I'd like to see another cycle to see if this big drop holds up. Right. And even a midterm cycle is fine. I just. It feels like a very large change that may just be very specific to the particular issue landscape.
- [12:56]
Lenny Brauner
I'll give another point to why I think we're not quite there yet with the realignment, which is the variable that gives me the most information about whether someone votes Democratic or Republican is still race. That hasn't changed, and it's still the same breakdown. If that breakdown had reversed from one election to the next, yeah, that would clearly be a realignment. If that were no longer the most important variable, then, yeah, we could be talking about realignment. But that's not true. It's still the most important variable. And the next most important variable, I mean, at least according to sort of a Andes data from previous years, was whether people's. What role religion plays in your life amongst white voters, that was particularly important. That's sort of become a little bit synonymous or not synonymous, but like, very much strongly correlated with education, which has become the second most important indicator to predict whether someone is Democratic or Republican, sort of. As long as those two things are the same. I don't think that we can say that we're in a realignment. I will say it does speak to the fact that it used to be income that was the second most predictive variable. Now it's education. That is more of a realignment in my mind than what we would be seeing from one election to the next.
- [14:00]
Mary Radcliffe
Right now those are also correlated.
- [14:03]
Lenny Brauner
Sure.
- [14:04]
Galen Bruck
You're focusing our attention on an important thing to say up front, which is that here we're going to talk about shifts. In large part, we're not going to talk as much, we'll talk about it as well. Absolute numbers. Right. And so shifts are what we focus on as what changes the results from one election to the next, even though absolute numbers may hold pretty constant. For example, people know that the electorate is becoming less white. Well, in fact, between 2020 and 2024, it did not become less white. It was 72% white in both of those elections. But even if you go a little bit further back, say there is data.
- [14:42]
Lenny Brauner
That sort of contradicts that a little bit. The data that the data that the census put out sort of from the voting supplement that came out one or two weeks ago does suggest it became a little bit less white. But so by how much, I mean a very small change. The, it does look like the, the, the, you know, for a long time after the 1990s, the electorate was becoming less white at a pretty quick rate, 2022 to 2018, or I should say 2018 to 2022 was the first midterm since the 1990s where the electorate became more white. And now we saw the step in this, in the previous direction again, which is the electorate becoming less white. But it's a much smaller change than what we've seen through most other elections since the 1990s.
- [15:20]
Galen Bruck
Yeah. So to cite Catalyst data here, in 2012 the electorate was 75% white. In 2024 it was 72% white. So these are small shifts. The absolute numbers are still pretty important here just to sort of say that up front before we start emphasizing even further some of the shifts. I think normally I probably would have started this conversation by focusing in on those educational divides that Lenny mentioned. But I think for this election I want to start by talking about age because we did see some pretty significant movement there and movement that runs counter to decades long expectations. So what do we see?
- [16:04]
Lenny Brauner
Well, we saw that the group, if we break out the electorate by age, the group that moved most towards Republicans were young voters. So Specifically voters aged 18 to 29 moved towards Republicans by 6 percentage points, compared to voters between the ages of 45 and 64, which moved towards Republicans by only 2 percentage points, and voters over the age of 65, who only move towards Republicans by only 1 percentage point. Again, this is sort of based on the Catalyst data we've been talking about. But to your point, Galen, young voters were still the most Democratic group Of those, the 18 to 29 year olds, even though they moved by six points towards Republicans, they're still the most Democratic group. 55% of them voted for. Voted for Democrats.
- [16:44]
Mary Radcliffe
I want to offer something of a hypothesis here. I just, I've been thinking about this and I just want to say it and see what you guys think about it. So we know from political science research that for most voters, their views of politics are really shaped by what happens in their teens and their early 20s. Now, I was thinking about Gen Z in particular, and I was actually kind of annoyed at this Catalyst report that it continues lumping Gen Z in with millennials even though Gen Z is up to age 27 now voting. So seems like you might have enough data to pull them out separately. I would really like to see them separately because if you think about Gen Z voters, the oldest Gen Z voters in the electorate in 2024 were around 27 years old. I'm using the definitions that Catalyst used in their report, which has the birth year cutoff for millennials at 1996. Okay, so if they're 27, then when 20 in 2015, when Trump, like, entered the political scene, those voters would have been 18 years old. Every single Gen Z voter that is in the electorate now has only really ever known a politics that was fully defined by Donald Trump. And moreover, because Trump's like, takeover of the Republican Party has been so totalizing, they've effectively only ever known a politics that was like Trump or not Trump. Like, that's the. There's not a lot of nuance in the policy discussion. It's all about Donald Trump. Every single presidential election is just like, is it Trump or is it not Trump and not Trump in 2024 seemed not to be working for a lot of the electorate. You know, Biden was deeply unpopular. Inflation is high. People are perceiving crises with respect to immigration. Like, not Trump seemed to be a bad option. And so these voters who have formed their entire political worldview in this Trump versus not Trump era are basically left with one option. So, like, I'm just, I'm just trying to think about the factors that might be driving movement among this group. They don't remember respectable politics.
- [18:55]
Lenny Brauner
No, I mean, I totally agree. I think sort of, I mean, you know, the phrase like normalization gets thrown around a lot, but in these cases, people have, you know, these voters have really been normalized to this kind of politics. It's all they remember.
- [19:05]
Mary Radcliffe
Yeah, but so, so then I know this is out of scope for this conversation, but I'm very curious how well that dynamic holds up when the Trump versus not Trump framing falls away.
- [19:18]
Galen Bruck
You know, we, we say this about every election, but 2028 is going to be super interesting as a result. Right. Both parties are going to have open primaries. They're going to have to chart what they want their next iteration in this post, either Trump or not Trump paradigm. And to your point about not calling it a realignment yet, that's part of the reason, because structurally the next election is more prone to change than the past three.
- [19:46]
Lenny Brauner
I mean, the Republican coalition is so, so strongly built around Donald Trump. He defines it so clearly. He has rebuilt the Republican coalition. And we've said this many times that, yeah, I mean, it'll be quite challenging, I think, for Republicans to see whether they can hold it together or whether they can form some new kind of coalition. And obviously Democrats have their own challenges about convincing these voters that abandoned them or left them to win them back.
- [20:09]
Galen Bruck
Well, I think also the Democratic Party is still going to be defined in certain ways for these young voters. Even after Trump leaves the scene. It's still going to be the party that was most adamantly pro lockdown and school closure and ending sort of civic and social life for them. Framed another way. It was the most, you know, risk averse when it came to COVID infections. But maybe that's most appealing to the older part of the electorate where you haven't seen as much movement towards Republicans. It's also taken on something of a identity as like, of like a joyless party. Right. When I was 18 years old, some of the most popular people in politics were like Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert. And that in some ways came to define what the Obama era Democratic Party looked like for those young people who are now in their 30s and are pretty Democratic. And so the manosphere isn't probably going away. You know, us male podcasters, we're like going strong out here. They try to, they try to cancel us, they try to lay us off. But we're back, we're rising again.
- [21:16]
Mary Radcliffe
Galen, do they like gays in the manosphere?
- [21:19]
Galen Bruck
I don't know. I don't know. That's a good question. Mary, call in listeners and let us know. I think it's really up to them.
- [21:27]
Lenny Brauner
The defining, I mean, to Mary's point from earlier, the defining point of politics for millennials, people of our age, was the Great Recession and the Iraq War in the United States at least. And that explains partially why those groups are so Democratic.
- [21:41]
Mary Radcliffe
Well, there was, I think also it's worth noting, the rise of Obama as a generational talent really shaping how millennial voters think about politics.
- [21:52]
Galen Bruck
Also, we're starting to get into this, but let's talk about gender, because I think gender was also an important factor in the age divide. Younger men moving towards the right more quickly than young women, for example. And as you mentioned, married white women being one of the only groups that moved left. So how much of a factor did gender play in the shifts that we saw in 2024? Mary?
- [22:19]
Mary Radcliffe
The gender gap in this election was particularly large, even larger than the 2016 gender gap, which had previously been sort of the high watermark. So by gender gap, we mean the difference in support for Democratic candidates among women versus among men in 2016. That was previously the high watermark. We had a gender gap of 12 points, according to the Catalyst, and it was 13 points in the 2024 election. So a slight change. It had decreased in 2020. But interestingly, it seems to be driven more by men than moving towards Republicans than by women moving towards Democrats. Right. Like we said, no group moved towards Democrats other than those two that we mentioned at the top. So yes, women did move a couple points towards Republicans, but the change among men was very was much more significant. So in 2020, 48% of men supported Democrats. 2024, that fell to 42%. So six point change among men compared to just a one point change among women.
- [23:30]
Lenny Brauner
I mean, one thing that I'm like interested in looking at that angle and if you sort of like include the race angle, is that both men and women, Latino men and women, and Asian American men and women move to the right, though obviously men more so than women. But amongst white and black voters, the change that we saw move to the right was mostly driven by men. So black women didn't move. Seem to have been no change. White women, a very small change if I remember correctly. But the changes from that groups were driven by men versus for Latino and Asian American voters, there was some movement for both men and women to the right. And so I do think that is quite interesting in terms of like we talk about a racial realignment that seems to be true. Or maybe we don't talk about A racial realignment. But at least we ask about a racial realignment. That seems to be true amongst Latino voters, but amongst black voters, less than a racial realignment, it's a gender realignment. That seems to be happening there.
- [24:18]
Mary Radcliffe
Yeah, I have the numbers in front of me. Black women moved one point toward Republicans. Black men moved eight points.
- [24:24]
Galen Bruck
Yeah. So that's a big deal. We talked a little bit on the podcast last week with Joan C. Williams about men in the electorate and, and their, you know, discontent or feeling out of step with the Democratic Party. So far, I think some of the attempts that the Democratic Party has made to deal with this, like asking who's going to be the Democrats, Joe Rogan, or some of the forms of why not you? So, I mean, I think the thing that the question misunderstands is that Joe Rogan isn't principally a politics podcast. Joe Rogan is principally a comedy podcast. This is principally just like your podcast, Gary. I mean, again, I don't know how many times I've said this on the podcast. Now, I don't come to this project through the perspective of promoting Democrats. I want to understand the world around me and have fun along the way, as I've said many times. So for anyone out there who wants to have fun along the way and wants to better understand the world, this is your podcast. I started to get to the point about disengagement. Right. A lot of these folks who are maybe listening to the Joe Rogan podcast or, you know, shifting from one election to the next are not hyper partisans, obviously, because, you know, Joe Rogan is a bit politically amorphous. And if you're moving around in the electorate, either joining or exiting the electorate or switching between. Between one party or the next, you do not view the world through a strictly blue or red lens. And we're moving away from the maybe immutable characteristics. And education is not an immutable characteristic, but the gender, race, those things, and the characteristic of regularity in terms of vote, which is also something that Catalyst looked at. What did we see there?
- [26:15]
Lenny Brauner
Yeah, I mean, I will add here real quick that there is an intersection of those immutable characteristics. Non white voters, men, young voters, are all voters that tend to be sort of less regular voters. So there is. It is still correlated to sort of the immutable characteristics. But to answer your question, what we saw was the Democrats losing ground, in fact, losing voters, like irregular voters for the first time, versus gaining a tiny bit of ground, if I remember correctly, amongst regular voters. And this is sort of Like I said early on in this, in this episode, it's sort of a continuation of a trend we've been seeing for the last couple elections. But it sort of contradicts some of the conventional wisdom that we still have from the Obama era, which is that sort of young irregular voters are Democratic. It's all about sort of getting these voters into the electorate. For the Democrats, it's about juicing turnout versus sort of more regular voters or voters that will vote for Republicans. That is going away and has gone away. We've seen that over the last couple midterms and we, you know, now actually also seen that in this presidential election.
- [27:12]
Mary Radcliffe
Yeah, and the other thing that, that stood out to me is that among the voters that dropped out of the electorate from 2020 to 2024, Catalyst modeled that they were 2020. In 2020, they were more Democratic.
- [27:26]
Galen Bruck
So.
- [27:26]
Mary Radcliffe
So not only did the Republicans win among the irregular voters that did vote in 2024, but they also, the Democrats also lost a chunk of voters that just didn't show up that had voted in 2020.
- [27:42]
Galen Bruck
I think this has led some people to say, oh, Democrats problem in 2024 was a turnout problem. You know, if they had energized natural Democrats more, they would have won. But I think there are several data points that challenge that argument. One, I've seen conclusions along the lines of Trump won this election, the national popular vote, by, you know, a point and a half. If everyone had voted in this election, Trump would have won by more like four points. How do we arrive at a number like that, Lenny? And do you think that's accurate?
- [28:19]
Lenny Brauner
Yeah, I mean, usually the way this works is we take these like large scale surveys that happen after the election, the cooperative election surveys. One of those is cs, and we sort of model what these different demographics mean about how people would have voted. And then we apply that model to the voter file. That's a list of every registered voter. So it's not about everyone who's eligible to vote or everyone who's a voting age population would have turned out. It's like what happens if everyone is a registered voter would have turned out and those models give you a result. In fact, I've run a couple of those models myself for sort of internal purposes at the post. I would be a little wary about over interpreting them. And in fact, there are sort of other groups who have sort of like gotten different numbers based on the same analysis. Sort of. They run their own model. They applied it to the voter file and they would have said like, no, Actually, Democrats would have won the election. And part of the problem here is that the marginal voter, the voter that didn't vote, but that you're sort of applying the model to based on the people that did vote, is actually kind of different from the people who did vote, otherwise they would have voted. So like a, you know, 35 year old white man who voted and a 35 year old white man who didn't vote are actually kind of different. And there's no reason to think that a 35 year old white man, you know, if, if some proportion of those would have voted for Democrats, voted for Democrats amongst those who voted, that the same proportion would have voted for Democrats amongst those who didn't vote. In fact, there are many reasons to think that those voters would have actually voted quite differently from the voters that ended up voting. So I'm kind of wary of those analysis. I mean, they're fun, I like them. I'm a data nerd. You know, I like statistical modeling. But I would not, I would not go sort of to bat for about all these analyses and take them as sort of, you know, real truth here.
- [29:54]
Galen Bruck
There's some other numbers I want to bring up, which is. Friend of the podcast Nate Silver looked at the Catalyst data and crunched some numbers in an attempt to answer this question of like, did Democrats lose because of persuasion or did they lose because of turnout? Which is to say, were voters swinging away from Democrats and towards Republicans or was it just that like, oh, the natural Democrats stayed home and we just need to energize more people in the future. These are the numbers that he came to. Democrats lost a net of 6.4 million votes from repeat voters, switching mostly to Trump. Five and a half million, but some to third parties, about 1 million. Then they lost a net of 2.7 million votes due to drop off voters. So those people who didn't turn out in 2024, further, they lost a net of 0.8 million votes because more new voters went for Trump than for Harris. Taken all of that together, the number of switchers is still significantly larger than people entering or exiting the electorate. So if we want to try to answer this turnout versus persuasion question, maybe we can't do it through those inference models. Can we do it with that data?
- [31:05]
Mary Radcliffe
I mean, I think it's all right.
- [31:07]
Galen Bruck
That's where we're going to leave things for today's preview. If you want to listen to the full episode, we talked for about an hour. Head over to GDPolitics.com and become a paid subscriber you will also be able to link your subscription to many of the places where you might listen to podcasts such as Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and the like. You will also have access to a personalized RSS feed that will have all of the paid episodes in it if you go to gdpolitics.com and never miss a minute of the GD Politics podcast. But that's where we're going to leave things for today. Thank you so much and see you soon.