B (2:49)

Great to be with you, Galen. Happy holidays.

A (2:51)

Great to be with you, too. Happy holidays. I look, I can see your Christmas tree in the background of your shot. Whether that was intentional or not, it's definitely getting me in the mood.

B (3:01)

Well, it's also Hanukkah right now, so.

A (3:03)

It is also Hanukkah. We are officially in the first day of Hanukkah. Bulger with us is managing editor at Vote Beat, Nathaniel Rakic. Welcome to the podcast.

C (3:12)

Hi, Galen. Yeah, happy Hanukkah and a happy early Merry Christmas.

A (3:17)

Yeah, I should say it was kind of like a wretched weekend from a news perspective. Not things that pertain to this podcast necessarily in particular, but just the shootings at Brown and Bondi beach and Rob Reiner and, like, it was just kind of coming from all sides. So I'll just say at the top here, my heart goes out to everyone impacted by all of these stories.

B (3:42)

Yeah, it's grim.

C (3:43)

Yeah, well said.

B (3:45)

If it makes you feel any better, the Hanukkah mobile that drives around my neighborhood was out today. It just has a menorah on top with the right number of candles lit and just, like, blasts Hanukkah music and drives around the neighborhood.

A (3:56)

Oh, okay.

C (3:57)

Lovely.

A (3:58)

All right. To move on to something far less depressing, let's talk about healthcare politics. Boy. Okay, so to flesh out what I said in the introduction a little bit, Senate Democrats were promised a vote on extending the ACA enhanced subsidies as part of their agreement to reopen the government. As expected, that vote failed. Similarly, as expected, a Republican plan that would allow the subsidies to end, but expand tax advantaged healthcare savings accounts and provide payments of up to $1,500 for people who buy the most basic health insurance plans also failed. It appears almost certain that 2026 will begin with Americans who rely on ACA coverage paying more for less coverage. According to an analysis from KFF based on federal and other publicly available data, expiration of the enhanced subsidies is estimated to more than double what subsidized enrollees currently pay annually for premiums. So, to be specific here, a 114% increase from an average of $888 in $21,904 in 2026. And there are about 22 million Americans who receive those subsidies. So let's start with the machinations in Washington. Before we dig into the polling data. Is there any sense that there is still an agreement to be had to address the, as I've mentioned, significant increase for quite a number of Americans when it comes to their healthcare bills?

C (5:33)

I think it'll be really interesting to find out. Right. And I think this does tie into the public opinion aspect of it because Trump's approval rating and, you know, maybe we'll talk about it, I know, in a minute. Trump's approval ratings on, like, the economy and inflation are even lower than his overall approval ratings, which was not the case back in his first term, for instance. And so I think there, I think there already is very real pressure on him to address this issue. And the health, the cost of healthcare ties into that. Now, obviously, this isn't, doesn't apply to everyone. It's just people who buy their health care through the Obamacare insurance exchanges. But if it is the kind of thing that does impact enough Americans and it becomes part of the conversation, I think there will be pressure to come up with a legislative solution. And it does sound like the people who are working on that, like Lisa Murkowski gave a quote to Politico that indicated that they're going to continue to try into the new year to reach a bipartisan agreement. And I do think that in an election year, you're not going to see any big sweeping bills passed.

A (6:34)

Right.

C (6:35)

But, like, given the existence of the Phillip and the fact that it doesn't seem like that's going anywhere, despite what Trump is, has been pushing for, I think the only things you might see are these small kind of legislative fixes. And I think that a bipartisan agreement to extend or at least kick the can down the road for these subsidies seems like the kind of thing that actually could happen to me. I don't know. Like, we're in this weird situation where things are so partisan, but because of the filibuster, I think only like, some, like, small bipartisan things that aren't on big, like, you know, sweeping issues like immigration or, you know, culture war, like those, those are the things that are going to pass are those smaller, like, wonkier fixes. And it could be the kind of thing where Trump isn't super involved because it's not like, one of his, like, core issues. But then Lisa Murkowski and some Democrats strike a deal, and then Trump is all too glad to take credit for it because inflation is hurting him.

B (7:29)

Yeah. And there are some, like, Little glimmers of attempts at some bipartisan stuff inside of what's going on here. So, like, if you look at the package that the Republicans rolled out last week on Friday, it did include stuff like reforms to pharmacy benefit managers, which had previously been proposed in a bipartisan fashion. And so you could see there being some room for some compromise. I mean, that had almost unanimous bipartisan support early on in Trump's term before it was killed by Elon in Elon's killing legislation era. But they could revive it. Right. Elon started down with the killing legislation era, it seems. Uh, so perhaps there's some room for compromise on some of these other unrelated issues that could bring some people together to help address some of this stuff. Now, I will say though, that package that the Republicans introduced on Friday does not seem to have anything in it that would affect premiums in the immediate term. It's really more about sort of like long term costs rather than this year premiums.

C (8:27)

Yeah. And it seems pretty clear to me that the ground that has been taken out so far, you know, with the shutdown and things like Democrats demand for the three year extension, like both sides, sides are still on their, like, the reason no progress has been made, I think, is because both sides are very much still on their kind of like extreme demand ends. And it seems to me that there is middle ground in between there that could be that hasn't been kind of like hashed out yet and maybe will be.

A (8:52)

Yeah, I want to provide a little bit of context here because we keep talking about the enhanced subsidies for the Affordable Care act, but maybe it's not entirely clear what we're talking about. This is a relatively new thing, and it was not originally intended to last forever. It was in part a response to Covid. And whereas previously, you know, you could receive benefits or subsidies on the Affordable Care act marketplace up to a certain income level, it implemented basically this rule that you couldn't pay more than 8 1/2% of your income on a sort of silver standard care plan in your marketplace, which allowed people who were making, you know, you could make like, especially because some of these plans have gotten so expensive, you can make $100,000 as an individual and still qualify for subsidies from the government to pay for this coverage. And this is part of like a broader challenge maybe at the moment, which is that the Affordable Care act is a little bit of a misnomer. Right. It expanded the number of Americans who had coverage and it improved that coverage. You know, you couldn't lose it because of pre existing conditions or a diagnosis or things like that. But during this time, and in part because the coverage had to be fuller and better, the plans have gotten far more expensive. And so we're now in this place where if you go and I've spent some, you know, as, as an semi unemployed individual, I have spent some time poking around on these marketplaces and the coverage is extremely expensive, especially if you don't qualify for these subsidies. And so the approach has been, you know, I'm talking like fifteen hundred dollars a month for a, like a Norma nothing, not even a platinum plan. And so the coverage has gotten so expensive, the Affordable Care act never really addressed the fact of healthcare inflation, healthcare cost inflation. And sort of the political approach now is just keep throwing federal dollars at Americans to help them buy extremely expensive health insurance. So I think we are quickly approaching a place again where people are going to start feeling like the system itself is broken. And I, there's a, the question now is, should the government just be subsidizing this to keep people, I guess, whole? So not everyone's going broke over health care and things like that. And I should say even when these enhanced subsidies go away, low income people will still get most of their, the cost of their premiums covered by the government. This is just an enhancement associated with COVID but that's a little bit of the context here.

B (11:30)

To your point about this, like getting more expensive, ironically, the structure that we are currently in is like designed to make stuff get more expensive. Right. Because we've lost the individual mandate. They've set the, like the tax to zero. And so if the price goes up, then only people who really, really need insurance buy insurance. And the fact that insurance can no longer discriminate against those with pre existing conditions, actually part of the, like a key part of the Affordable Care act means that the people that are actually buying the policies are sicker and sicker over time. It's basically designed in that way at this point. So you're right, this is like the spiral should continue. Like that's what the incentive structure is.

A (12:13)

Right. And the fix for now is federal subsidies and it's also popular, which are also like the idea the government just.

C (12:24)

Being like, yeah, sure, you know, band Aid, you know, take the money to, you know, cover over the problem.

A (12:30)

As Nathaniel is bringing up, whether it's good policy, whether it's bad policy, the wonks can debate it, but Americans are making up their minds nonetheless. So Mary, what, what do Americans think about all of this?

B (12:43)

Well, according to the latest polling from Gallup and West Health who've been tracking this for a long time. The, the chart I'm looking at goes back to 2013. The approval of the Affordable Care act has reached an all time high among Americans overall of 57% and disapproval an all time low of 35%. And I actually think that disappro number is quite a lot more interesting than the approval number here because we have seen at various points in the past approval up in those mid-50s. Right. So in 2020, they had approval at 55%. Back in 2017 they also had it at 55%. But this is a major low in the disapproval rating at 35%. They have never registered a disapproval lower than 41 in this tracking series up until now. So that's a pretty significant shift. You know, even if you look at at 2020, when approval was 55%, disapproval was higher, 43%. So I think that's like more interesting to me than the like. Yes, it's a high, but only by like two points.

A (13:48)

Yeah. Well, can we also place this in the broader context of things that Americans care about. We just got off a few years of politics in which inflation and immigration were the top issues every time we talked about it. Now, inflation can obviously contain health care coverage. Inflation, in fact, prices for plans are rising on average 18 year. But healthcare, as the blockbuster issue, has faded more recently. So how much. And I should say also when you, when you look at the Gallup polling that asks, you know, Americans consistently, what's the most important problem facing the country? 5% of Americans say it's healthcare. Now, if you look at the economy, that's 30%. And within that, about 10% say it's the cost of living or inflation. But how much do Americans care about this issue that we're talking about?

B (14:41)

Yeah, I mean, that's tricky because when people say cost of living, does that include healthcare inside of it? It might. I'm looking at the weekly YouGov economist survey. They had like highs for healthcare as the most important issue back in March of 2020, again, a time that Gallup.

C (14:59)

Measured there were things going on back then.

A (15:02)

March of 2020.

B (15:02)

Well, yeah, that's true. I guess I didn't really clock that. But you, um. It's been down. It's been down in the single digits in re. In the last year or so, it's popped back up to the low double digits. The most recent survey has it at 11%. Inflation and prices is still higher at 26.3% than we see for healthcare. But I don't know that you really should separate inflation, prices and health and the cost of healthcare as much. Do you know what I mean? Because I think they're really tied to each other. I think if you, if you asked, you know, we, everyone's been using the word affordability, right, to talk about this broader context of cost of living. And I think healthcare is one component of that. So like, to the extent that the 2025 elections, for example, were driven by the issue of cost of living and affordability, I think that like, healthcare is wrapped up in that, even if it is not the issue that people say, like, yes, that's the most important issue to me.

C (16:01)

Right. And I think this gets to some of the difficulties with asking about the most important problem because a lot of these issues are interrelated and stuff. And I think that healthcare and affordability is a big point of intersection. I think you're right, Galen, that healthcare does not seem to be front of mind for people right now. Certainly not the way that it was back in 2009 when Obamacare was being debated and such. But I think that is a benefit in terms of trying to solve the problem legislatively because kind of, again, to my point from before, I don't think you're going to see any sweeping bills on like, you know, immigration or like any something like, I think that's something that is the focus of people's political attention that makes it harder to come to a bipartisan agreement on something. And I think when you're talking about health care as like almost like a cultural issue, like, you know, like changes to the system, like changing how, you know, like her whole insurance setup works and going to like a Medicare for all type of system that is different from just kind of like making nips and tucks that to bring down the cost and kind of, as you guys were saying, kind of put a, you know, kick the can down around, put a band aid on the, on the larger problem and not solving anything structurally. And so I think that because you're not necessarily changing anything fundamental about healthcare, that makes it more likely that a legislative solution can be found to extend these subsidies, which as I mentioned, are quite popular. So to drill in on some specific polls about that, KFF had a poll from November that found that 74% of Americans thought that Congress should extend the enhanced premium tax credits. That was during the shutdown. So I think, you know, maybe there were some, there may have been some valence about that because, for instance. Well, actually, even in that poll, 50% of Republicans still said that they should extend the enhanced premium tax credits. That was lower than in a previous poll in September when 59% of Republicans said that. But if you would like a more recent poll, Morning Consult had a recent survey that found that 58% of voters thought the enhanced subsidies should be extended. So there is broad support for this, at least some support among Republicans. And so I. I don't think that it is as much of a rail as certainly the whole Obamacare debate was, or trying to fix some kind of broader, more systemic issue right now.

B (18:15)

Yeah, I don't think I've seen any polls with this underwater, like, at all.

C (18:19)

Right.

A (18:20)

Yeah. And actually, Nathaniel, to add fuel to your argument, the power in Washington and the incentives are aligned just so that it would make sense for something like this to pass. You know, ideologically, Democrats are in favor of passing something like this, so it's unlikely that they would hold up legislation, withhold their support for political reasons, like they don't want to give Republicans a win or something like that.

C (18:46)

They just did an entire shutdown over this issue. They can't backjack on it now.

A (18:51)

Exactly. And then from Republicans perspective, they're ideologically opposed to this kind of government spending. But from an electoral standpoint, there are incentives to getting this win and sort of taking this off the table for the 2026 midterm playbook, you know, we saw, just to draw a parallel, we saw a lot of this in 2020. Right. When Covid hit. There were a lot of policies that Democrats wanted passed. Republicans were like, okay, you know, we were trying to win the 2020 presidential election. We might as well let Democrats spend all the money they want, send out these checks, beef up government programs, and we'll get credit for it. So it may be the case that the incentives are aligned in just a way again, this time, of course, we will have to see, but from a broader perspective on, like, the systemic challenges to the American healthcare apparatus. Looking through the polling on this, I was like, this is so ripe for, you know, Democratic primary 2028, hashing out. Right. We're talking about how there's a record high in terms of Americans approving of the aca. But if you look underneath that, a plurality of those people, 49, say that there need. The program needs to be completely overhauled.

B (20:06)

It's worth saying that the plurality that want to make significant changes among those who approve is actually fairly low relative to the times that they've asked this question. In the past, it used to be a majority that said of. Of Those who approved that thought we should make significant changes, but in 2020 it was 62%. In 2018 it was 63%. So the plurality do say should make significant changes is is down significantly from where it's been in the past.

A (20:30)

But I will say on top of that, the percentage of Americans overall who say that the government is responsible for ensuring health coverage for Americans is up in recent years. If you compare 2020 to 2025, it's now at 66%. It used to be in the high 50s, low 60s. And a lot of that growth is actually amongst Republicans. So 68% of Republicans said that it is not the government's responsibility in 2020, 59% of Republicans say is not the government's responsibility now. So a drop of 10% and you see the equal opposite growth in the number of Republicans who say it is the government's responsibility. So if Democrats are gonna try to do the economic populism thing and win over maybe some of the folks that Trump won, I don't know, or maybe Democrats will say this is a third rail. We don't wanna make our whole primary about healthcare and have everyone have the sort of, you know, main message be that we're socialists. So, well, we'll see how it goes. But things are shifting underneath the surface.

C (21:35)

Yeah. And I think at the same time, crucially, you also see the healthcare industry in general is not popular among Americans. So among Gallup's latest polling, only 36% of Americans had a very or somewhat positive view of the healthcare industry and 51% had a very or somewhat negative view. So it does seem like an area that I think a lot, despite their kind of contentness with the Affordable Care act for now perhaps, it does seem like an area that is ripe for still some long term reform.

B (22:04)

Yeah. I think there's a tricky electoral thing here though, because like Nathaniel was saying earlier, a lot of what can be done legislatively at this point is this like nips and tucks and like cleaning up around the edges. It's just like very unsexy policymaking where like it's not going to get like a ton of headlines that like there's reforms to the pharmacy benefit manager system, which like, like. Yeah, I mean, I just, I don't know how many Americans are paying attention to that kind of a thing.

C (22:30)

I get ads for that in D.C. there are ads for that all. You live in D.C. i know. No, but they do this, right. You know, these groups with like very niche concerns will like air ads just specifically in the D.C. media market to get like policymakers essentially attention.

B (22:45)

But like, but like for the rest of Americans, like, it seems to me that there's like not very many stories on this that can really break through to the American public. It's like, yeah, the, the stor that's broken through right now is like your prices are going to go up by a whole lot. And that makes sense as something that's broken through because people are going to actually have to pay those prices if they don't do something about this. They're going to have to pay those premiums. But whatever solutions they come up with are going to be like kind of boring to regular people.

C (23:13)

Right.

A (23:13)

I think, which is why, which is Nathaniel's point, which is why they're capable of passing.

B (23:18)

Right, right.

A (23:18)

If it was big and sexy, like we're going to restart your Dr. System.

C (23:23)

Death panels.

A (23:24)

Death panels.

B (23:25)

You know, if it's boring and not big and sexy, time to take over the Capitol. Does this really help the Republicans if the narrative has been set that the Republicans are like behind this big effort to increase premiums? Even if you don't see your personal premiums coming going up because of whatever reason, I wonder if the narrative is baked in and there's not really anything they can do about it.

A (23:45)

I don't know. I think help Republicans. I don't think it's going to help Republicans necessarily keep control of the House or something like that. But the stories are going to be pretty bananas if they don't do something. I was digging through the data here and KFF projected the kind of cost increases that people could experience. And you know, so a 45 year old individual who makes $65,000 a year will have their premium costs for the year go up by $2,500. Right. That's a lot of money when you look at some of these. And this actually skews toward Republican states and it's going to hit hardest in places like Texas and Florida. You look at some other examples, like, I know these are very specific examples, but again, you only need one example of this to make a news story that really resonates. A 60 year old couple. So two people, 60 years old, obviously they're 60, so they don't yet qualify for Medicare. Making $85,000 a year, not fabulously wealthy. Their costs annually for premiums will go up almost $23,000. Right. Like what I mean, some of this is it's like phenomenally high. And so there are going to be people hearing, I think from constituents and local News outlets focusing on some of these specific stories. People caught right in this, like, they're not super high income earners, so they never qualified for subsidies to begin with, but they're not like low income Americans either. And they've gotten a lot of help from this. And you can debate whether or not it's fair that they've gotten this help. And, you know, as we establish, the system's pretty fucking broken to begin with. But, like, that's gonna be a news, like, you're gonna hear from like Jenny and Bob who, you know, one of them has an ailment or whatever that incentivizes them to stay in the health insurance market even though prices are going up so high and they gotta spend 23,000 extra dollars. Like, I don't know.

B (25:36)

I think 23,000 is bananas.

A (25:39)

Is bananas. And like, I'm checking that as I say it. And that is, is correct. That is actually what the. The data show. Okay, shall we move on to talk about something beyond healthcare?

C (25:52)

Sure, sure.

A (25:53)

All right, let's do it. But first, a break. Today's podcast is brought to you by you, the listeners. Without paid subscribers, GD Politics wouldn't be possible. Your support means that we can continue making an independent podcast guided by curiosity, rigor, and a sense of humor. Paid subscribers also get about twice the number of episodes, access to the videos, and can join the paid subscriber chat. You can also connect your personal feed to your favorite podcast player, so you get every episode wherever you listen to podcasts. Also, a reminder, we now have merch, so head over to gdpolitics.com merch for that and gdpolitics.com to become a paid subscriber. See you there. As I mentioned earlier, friend of the pod, Kristen Soltis Anderson wrote in the New York Times last week, quote, trump's approval ratings are low again. This time it might matter. She went on to say, affordability has slipped away from Mr. Trump as an issue of strength. Recent polling shows voters assessing his impact on the economy in much the same way they ultimately rated Mr. Biden, with only 15% of respondents saying in a Fox News poll last month that they thought Mr. Trump's economic policies had helped them personally. Okay, so is Kristen Salty Sanderson right that Trump's approval ratings are low, but this time it might matter.

C (27:18)

So I thought that Kristen's analysis, as it always is, was spot on. And you read the article I recommend people do. I think it is. It is correct. I would have an issue with that headline, which I'm guessing that Kristen did not write there's one more step that I would have taken that she doesn't go as far as saying. But I think that, like, this matters generally, right? Like, she makes a good point about how it is important that as I mentioned earlier, the economy has gone from a good issue for Trump to a bad issue for Trump. But like his bad approval rating during his first term, I would argue that also mattered. Like his low approval. The fact that he was unpopular during 2018, I think led to the Democratic wave in 2018. I think it, he, he lost reelection the first time. Like that mattered. He obviously then subsequently won the next election. But, like, still mattered that he didn't get elected in 2020. And if his approval rating continues to be low in 2026, I think it's going to matter again for the midterm. So, like, more broadly speaking, and like, she makes the point in the article that, like, we are in an era of just like, low approval ratings for presidents generally and like, there's not a lot of persuadable voters anymore. But like, again, I think that matters. And like, we have not had, like, in 2016, Trump won. We haven't had a president get reelected since Barack Obama in 2012. And I think that is not a coincidence given that during that basically that whole time, Americans have generally been dissatisfied with the direction the country is going. We haven't had a net positive approval score or the, the number of Americans saying the country's on the right track versus the wrong track hasn't been net positive in 20 years. Like, I think that the fact that presidents have low approv approval ratings now is quite important to understanding the environment that we are in and really the politics of the early of the first quarter of the century.

B (29:10)

Yeah, I think I would agree with a lot of what Nathaniel said there. And I would also add like, the low approval rating. I think what's interesting is, yes, we're in an era of low approval ratings, but we're also in an era of like, very stagnant approval ratings. Right. Like, other than at the very beginning or the very end of a president's term. If you look back for decades, I guess at this point you just see the president's approval rating, like, sitting within this several points range. It's just like hard partisans approve. People who are not hard partisans don't approve. That is the end of the story. It's like, not clear to me the extent to which the president's approval rating, any president's approval rating, not just Donald Trump at this moment in American politics is going to be reactive to events or actions that that president takes, because we haven't really seen it be reactive in. In a. So, like, there's little wiggles up and down. It goes down two points, it goes back up two points, but, like, two points of movement here and there really doesn't mean all that much. I think the extent to which we can get a better understanding of how people feel about the present really is in that underlying data. Like, how do you. Do you approve or disapprove on the economy, on healthcare, on this, on that? I think those are probably more valuable data points than the top line of we're rating at this point because it's frozen.

A (30:28)

Yeah. And that was kind of the argument of her piece, which is the reason Trump's low approval rating is worse for him and perhaps the Republican Party this time around than it was back in his first term, is because his ratings are so low on things like the economy and affordability that used to buoy him even when Americans really disliked his behavior.

B (30:55)

And he's still got good numbers on some of the other issues, like immigration and border security. He's got good numbers on those issues, but it doesn't seem like those are going to be the issues that are driving the midterms.

C (31:05)

Yeah, I mean, I guess I would view it in just kind of exactly the opposite way, which is to say that those numbers, because they don't seem to have any correlation with his overall approval rating or president's overall approval rating, that shows that they don't really matter if we're only looking at the kind of broader universal consequences like. Like midterm losses and winning reelection, or I guess in this case, J.D. vance, or whoever it is winning the next White House election. I don't think that it necessarily matters, the individual ratings in the economy. I do think it matters in terms of telling the story of the era. Right. I think it is important that the economy was doing well and people generally approved of it during Trump's first term and that right now there is this malaz with it. But. But, yeah, I mean, usually on this podcast, we are talking about the electoral outcomes. Sounds like you guys disagree. Please.

A (31:55)

We have had so many elections recently in which people have cast a vote for people that they disapprove of or don't like or that they view unfavorably. And so I think it matters why you view the politician unfavorably if you view the person unfavorably, because they're an asshole, but you actually think they're going to make you richer or keep your country secure or whatever, that's easier to hold your nose and vote for somebody who is an asshole, but who you think gets the, like, nuts and bolts of the job done. Whereas you're like, this guy represents, you know, I know at the end of the day that this guy represents me and people like me and he's a fighter on my behalf in the culture wars, but, boy, is he gonna make me less capable of affording the things that I want in life and gonna make it harder for my family to get health insurance, food, transit, whatever. I mean, not transit because gas is cheaper, but, like, whatever. And that's harder to hold your nose for. And so in an era where regularly like 10 to 20% of voters are casting a ballot for people that they actually don't like, I think it actually matters why they don't like the person.

B (33:04)

Yeah. I would argue like, that the thing that matters the most is the approval rating on whatever the issue is that ANSA or the couple of issues that end up being what the 2026 midterms are about right now. We, like, think it might be affordability, but we don't know. Right. Like, it could change between now and then. If it goes back to being about, like, cracking down on immigration and border security, then, like, the problem, or we.

A (33:29)

Could look at war with Venezuela by then or whatever.

B (33:32)

There's lots of stuff that can happen. Right. So we don't know exactly what the issues are going to be that are driving the way voters are thinking about the midterms. But I would, I would posit that in this particular environment, and I'm. I mean, maybe is worth going back and having a look at the data, but I would posit that in this environment, the way people feel about the party in power's handling of those key issues in that, in the relevant election is perhaps more powerful than, like, a presidential approval rating that doesn't seem to be all that reactive to the president.

C (34:03)

Yeah, I think you both make good points. I think I. I would definitely just. Just disaggregate the midterms from the presidential elections. Right. I think that, you know, know, midterms have. There's a loose correlation between, historically between the president's approval rating and the number of seats that the opposition party picks up. It's not solid, but it is there. I think a lot of it. I think it's partially, you know, midterms are partially about persuasion, but also partially about turnout. Right. The president's party's voters tend to be less motivated to turn out, especially when the president is. Is unpopular. I think when you're talking about the next presidential election, I think. Yeah, your point is certainly well taken. I think that, Galen, to your point, you know, if Trump during his first term had been perceived to be bad on the economy, but maybe he was seen as an upright, upright, moral gentleman and basically the things, the people's opinions had been inverted, then maybe he wouldn't have been the right messenger for a time when people were really dissatisfied with Democrats on the economy. And maybe they would have been more receptive to Kamal Harris, you know, being not Joe Biden or something like that.

B (35:05)

It's also possible that in that inverted universe, he gets reelected in 2020.

A (35:11)

Right.

C (35:11)

I was gonna say Trump had low.

A (35:13)

Approval ratings and almost won that election. So.

C (35:16)

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I think. Right. Very close elections.

A (35:22)

Yeah.

C (35:23)

Right. So, but I think. Yeah, in 2028, when you are not going to have Donald Trump being on the ballot, I think his approval rating, I think, you know, if he is unpopular, I think that will hurt whoever the Republican nominee is. If he is popular, I think it'll help who other Republican nominees. But I don't think it'll be determinative to your point. And it'll be more of a question of like, which party do you trust more on whatever two issues tend, the big ones.

A (35:43)

Yeah, yeah. Every time we talk about Trump's approval rating, I do just like, something in my head is like, does it matter? Well, he's a lame duck president, so no, it doesn't matter. He's never going to stand for election again.

C (35:54)

But it matters. I think it matters in a few ways, obviously.

A (35:57)

Obviously. Like the fact that Bush's approval rating was 25% in the fall of 2008 mattered enormously for Barack Obama's election.

C (36:06)

And I also think it matters.

A (36:08)

John McCain was able to do and not do sort of with his candidacy. So, yes, obviously it matters.

C (36:14)

But I also think it matters in terms of, like, legislating. Right. Like, you know, we'll talk maybe a bit about.

A (36:19)

Well, we're going to talk about another situation.

C (36:22)

The president gets a lot of their power from, you know, the fact that they are. From their political potency. And so, you know, you may not be able to pass big sweeping legislation if you're not popular. I also think it just matters historically. Right. Like, you know, in telling, again, telling the story of this era. But yes. Anyway, we're getting a bit far away from Kristen's analysis, but good job, Kristen. Overall, I like the article Was great.

A (36:45)

Snaps are Christian. Okay, we're going to take like a very nerdy detour and then we're going to actually come back to exactly this topic. So we're going to talk about Indiana redistricting, which gets at Trump's power and influence. But first, on the topic of Trump's approval rating, Mary found a very fitting good data, bad data, not data. Example for us last week, Mary, you highlighted some of new, some new Trump approval polling on X. Writing quote, here's a neat one from today. Two polls with identical methodology taken on the same day with different results, but both are within the margin of error of each other. These results are totally consistent, end quote. So one poll showed Trump's approval at net negative 11 and the other at net negative 5. I imagine, Mary, that you are not going to cite yourself as bad data, but can you flesh out what we saw here and how it's instructive for interpreting polls?

B (37:41)

Yeah, I mean, I think this is like a really lovely example of how you can think about margin of error. So just like, for a second, what actually does it mean when we say margin of error? I think people tend to interpret this as like, the true value is within so many points of the number we've given you, which statistically is not what it means. What it means is if you were to run this survey a bunch of times in exactly the Same way way, 95% of the time, you should expect to see a result that's within whatever that margin is of the result that's being presented to you. So the first survey, you had a approval rating of 43%. So the margin of error was, I think, 3.4 on that survey. And so then if the, the statistical thing is, if you did it again, 95% of the time, you would see a result within 3.4 points, points of 43, which is exactly what happened. They did it again and they got a result of 46, which is clearly within 3.4 points of 43. So this like, makes sense from a statistical perspective that, like, what we're saying is we don't actually know the true value of Donald Trump's approval rating. It's literally not possible to know that number. What we can know is what we.

A (38:54)

Are doing philosopher Mary, coming out here. I love it.

B (38:57)

I mean, you just can't know. It's no way. Right.

C (39:00)

We could hold an election. You know, we could help. We could hold an election and force everybody compulsory voting, bring out the democracy sausages and yeah, nice little referendum on. Do you like Donald Trump, yes or no? No, not going to happen, obviously.

B (39:14)

But. But what they're saying is with this methodology, with the thing that we are doing, the way we have done it, we believe that you should get results around this number. How close around? This close around. And that's. I mean, I think that's exactly what happened here. So a couple like sort of takeaways. First of all, you cited, Galen, the margin on these polls, and I cited the approval numbers. Now, if you look at the margin, the net approval, you get a doubling of the margin of error situation. So one of them had a net of negative 5 and the other had a net of negative 11. That's two times you see that margin of error come into play because you are different on the approval number and you are likewise different on the disapproval number in a corresponding and opposite way. So if you're thinking about net, you gotta be really careful with what this means. Right, because it's like twice the margin of error. But the other thing is, this is like, really demonstrative of the reason that we aggregate lots and lots of polls and put them all together and use statistical methodology to try to make sense of this entire universe. Because on individual surveys you can see differences, and it doesn't mean that the pollster's doing anything wrong. It's just how statistics works. You won't get, you shouldn't get the same answer. Actually, if you run the same survey over and over again with identical methodology, if you did get the same answer every time, I would have questions about how random your random sample really is. So, like, this is just the kind of thing that happens and should be.

A (40:43)

Expected to happen, and that is church with Mary Radcliffe. Good data.

C (40:49)

Amen.

A (40:50)

Amen. Nathaniel, would you like to challenge Mary's good data in any way?

C (40:56)

Not at all. No, I, I agree. It's a, it's a cool little demonstration. Mary, why did the pollster take these two surveys on the scene? Were they trying to teach people a lesson about margin of error or what was the last story?

B (41:08)

No, no. So they were writing a story and they were. It was broadly about, like, government fraud and corruption. And so they had two surveys, one that was, like, framed around, like, fraud committed by politicians, and the other that was framed around, like, general government corruption. So they had two different tactics that they wanted to approach the electorate with in order to get an understanding of how different framings of the issues might impact the way people responded. So I don't want to say that this was like a survey experiment. It wasn't. It was Two different surveys with two different focuses.

A (41:43)

And on both surveys, they asked about Trump approval, but then the rest of the questions were different.

B (41:47)

Correct.

C (41:48)

Interesting.

A (41:48)

Ooh. And so we got a natural little.

B (41:50)

Experiment if anyone wants to go look this up. These polls were conducted by Tavern Research for the Searchlight Institute.

A (41:58)

All right. Okay. Mary, would you like to sing us out of that sermon? I know you are in church choir.

B (42:05)

Amen.

A (42:07)

Oh, there we go. Okay. Okay. And with that, we are going to close on Indiana's redistricting story. So, on Thursday of last week, the Indiana Senate voted down new congressional maps that would have added two Republican favored seats to their ranks. The vote was 31 to 19 against the maps, with 21 Republicans joining 10 Democrats to reject them. Nathaniel, as part of your job at Vote Beat now, you are very plugged into redistricting, gerrymandering and all other election administration stories. But what is the backstory here?

C (42:46)

Yeah, well, the backstory, as folks who listen to this podcast know, is that we have seen a really unprecedented spate of mid decade redistricting happening so far this year that is unprecedented in that it is like basically explicitly meant to try to gain a partisan advantage. First, you know, Donald Trump was urging Republican led states to do it, and then so far, one Democratic led state, California, has retaliated with a new map of their own. But, so Indiana was supposed to be kind of the next battle in that redistricting war. And Donald Trump was really pushing Indiana state senators in particular, because that's where the opposition was for months to pass a new map. Because the state, as Galen alluded to, currently has two Democratic held districts, one in northwest Indiana, around the Chicago suburbs, and then one in Indianapolis. And it is possible to draw a map, you know, fairly easily that eliminates both of those seats, although the legality of those, that might be questioned. But Republicans put that map up for a vote. Donald Trump lobbied very, very heavily. He was threatening primary challenges to state senators who were going to vote against the map. He put people on blast on social media.

A (44:00)

People dispatched J.D. vance.

C (44:02)

He dispatched J.D. vance. Yeah. J.D. vance went in person to go talk to them. You know, regrettably, a lot of the state senators who were listed as, who had come out against the plan, and also some who just hadn't, who were just kind of undecided or had said no comment, became the targets of threats, like bomb threats to their houses and businesses. So, you know, the debate over this was taking place among a very kind of toxic climate. And ultimately what ended up happening was they had a vote and it was suspenseful. Nobody knew how it was gonna go. We knew certain senators were in favor, certain were opposed, but a lot were undecided. And it turned out that most of the undecided voter or Republican senators, because Republicans control the state Senate in Indiana, they ended up voting against the map. And so Indiana will not have a new congressional map. It will continue in all likelihood to send two Democrats to Congress. And yeah, it's kind of the first big high profile loss for the Trump administration in its quest to redraw all these maps.

A (45:03)

So this is my opportunity to ask my highly anticipated leading question from the introduction, which is, is this a story about redistricting or is it really a story about the power limitations of a lame duck president?

C (45:16)

It's a great question. I think that a lot of people were asking that, right. Donald Trump, they really went hard on this. Right. Again, this was a months long effort. He pulled every lever at his disposal and it didn't work. And I think people are looking at that, they're looking at the fact that his approval rating is down. He's now a second term president. Right. Which carries, as you say, of connotations of, of being a lame duck. And I think people are asking the question that a lot of people have asked at various points over the last 10 years, which is, you know, has Donald Trump finally lost like his iron grip on the Republican Party? I think it is a valid question. Given that, you know, the, the lame duck phenomenon is real. I tend to think I would like to see more evidence. Right. There have been a lot of points at which we thought that Republicans were finally going to turn against Donald Trump and they didn't. You know, you've always, always the smarter bet has always been to bet on. Yeah. Republicans are going to continue doing what Donald Trump says. So I think I'm going to continue believing that for a little bit longer. But if you, you know, in six months, if it looks like, you know, Trump has lost, loses control over congressional Republicans, and I guess we did have this conversation kind of about Marjorie Taylor Greene about a month ago. So it wouldn't shock me if this were a turning point because it does seem that he, you know, like his ability to, for instance, threaten primary challenges and people being afraid of that because voters listen to Donald Trump. It seems like, like that did not work here and has worked in the past.

B (46:39)

Yeah, I mean, these Republicans in the Indiana state legislature are cross pressured. Right. Like, because we have polling on this that shows that Indiana voters do not like it. Right. So like, unfortunately there's not any like nonpartisan polling on this. It's all been done for interest groups that have a position on this issue one way or the other. But for example, bellwether research for Indiana Conservation voters found redistricting underwater 51 to 39. 3D strategic for Unite America founded underwater 44 to 31. Northstar for independent Indiana underwater 53 to 34. I mean this is not popular with Indiana voters. Now if you look among Republicans, there is some more support for this among Republicans, but it's not like a zillion. Right. Like it's not an 80, 20 issue even with Republican voters. So that North Star Opinion Research survey found this above water with Republicans Republicans 59 to 25. So, so 60 to 25 roughly. That's like yes, there is support, but it's not like absolutely want my senators to, to do this thing. I just don't know that this is going to be an issue on which like voters are going to be voting in the next Indiana primaries. And like, like there is some principled opposition here among Indiana Republicans that, and if this issue ultimately doesn't matter that much in, in terms of electoral consequences, then they're, it's surprising perhaps, but they stuck by their principled opposition. Even, even in the face of Donald Trump's. What belligerence do I say? I don't know.

A (48:19)

Right. It's interesting. It's sort of like we've, we've talked about how in the past it's like even though gerrymandering is unpopular, there aren't real negative consequences electorally to pursuing it anyway. It's like, well, the reverse might also be true. Right. Even though Republicans wanted there to be gerrymandering in the state, declining to actually do it isn't going to lose these folks. A primary like this is just not the issue that's going to it sounds like that's what you're saying, Mary.

B (48:46)

Yeah, I mean I expect that that's true. And I don't know, I mean Nathaniel, you will know.

A (48:51)

Well, obviously Trump, Trump injecting himself could make me think not so much about redistricting and then comes about a referendum on Trump and then we can really learn something about whether he's a lame duck president because then it's up to the voters to determine his influence.

B (49:03)

Nathaniel, I will be when do voters vote for state senators in Indiana? Is it every four years? Every two years? What's the situation there?

C (49:12)

They are staggered. So some state senators, they have four year terms. So some estate senators will be up in 2026. And that primary, I believe is in May, so relatively soon. So this will probably still be on people's minds lines. But then some state senators, including some of the most high profile opposers, are not up until 2028. Also, some of the opposers are not running for reelection, which obviously insulates them from, from electoral pressures. But yes, I, I completely agree. I think that redistricting is such an inside baseball nerdy thing. People aren't going to be voting on that in particular. But if Donald Trump recruits a primary challenger to these people and then gives them his full, total and complete endorsement and does his whole thing, that has proven very successful at electing people to like, you know, senate, that's how J.D. v. His Senate seat, for instance, and House, then I think that, you know, that that could have impacts. But yeah, I think, I think that's a great point is that I would like to see evidence. So at 5:38, we tracked Trump's endorsement, like win, loss, record in congressional primaries in 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024. Hopefully someone out there is tracking that. Maybe, you know, Mary, a good job for 50 plus one or. But hopefully somebody is out there is tracking that into 2026. Because I think if you see a decrease in 2026, that to me will be compelling evidence that maybe he is a lame duck, because that will be more systematic. Right. It'll be looking at, you know, potentially hundreds of races that he endorses in, you know, and not just this kind of one isolated incident where he failed to get his way, but that, I think will be the real telling of whether he has lost his grip on the Republican Party. And if that's the case, then then who knows? Because that opens up the door to anti Trump candidates, or at least Trump questioning candidates running in the 2028 primary against JD Vance. It opens up the door to opposition, congressional opposition in like legislatively, like, you know, Donald Trump wants us to pass this bill, but like, we think we should do something different. So that becomes a very interesting scenario. Obviously, we haven't been living in a world where Republicans in Congress have been afraid of Donald Trump for the last nine years. So that would be a really notable change if it happens. Still a little skeptical.

A (51:21)

All right, well, guess what we're going to do if it does happen.

C (51:25)

Talk about it on this podcast.

B (51:26)

Will we come back here and talk.

A (51:27)

About it on the GD Politics podcast? Exactly, exactly, exactly.

C (51:31)

How did I know?

A (51:32)

This has been, this has been a good one. This has been fun, but I think we're going to call it for today. So, Mary, Nathaniel, thank you so much for joining me.

C (51:40)

Thanks Galen, thank you. And happy holidays to everybody out there.

B (51:43)

Yeah, Happy holidays friends.

A (51:45)

My name is Galen Druke. Remember to become a subscriber to this podcast at GD Politics and wherever you get your podcasts. Paid subscribers get about twice the number of episodes. You can also join our paid subscriber chat and pass along questions for us to discuss on the show and you ensure that we can keep making this podcast. Also, be a friend of the POD and go give us a five star rating wherever you listen. Maybe even tell a friend about us. Thanks for listening and we will see you soon.