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- [00:00]
A
I think there's a decent chance Iran is going to play this out through the midterms because they'd love to give President Trump a black eye. In fact, they apparently would love to do worse than that, as we've uncovered through intelligence. And I don't doubt that they have assassination plots against him. Not to mention, again, some of the people who were in the chain of command back in January 2020 when the United States killed Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian head of the Quds Force. So, yeah, I think could be months. Could still be months.
- [00:41]
B
Hello and welcome to the GD Politics Podcast. I'm Galen Druk. Back in December, I invited Michael o' Hanlon from the Brookings Institution on the POD to talk about the developing conflict between the United States and Venezuela. At the time, we were talking about the possibility of being at war with Venezuela by the midterms, and I asked Michael if Venezuela would be the next Iraq. He said no, and he was right. Turns out that I got the country wrong. Seven months later, we find ourselves in a quagmire in Iran. Of course, it's an exaggeration to compare it to Iraq at this point. There's been no ground invasion and five months is not nine years. But we're in another war of choice in the Middle east that has not gone quite as intended. After a 12 week ceasefire during which fire did not entirely cease, Iran's attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz led the US to retaliate with, so far as of Wednesday, 11 days of strikes. In this most recent flare up, Iranian attacks on US bases have killed four service members and injured at least 100. To get a sense of where we are and where this is all going, I wanted to invite Michael o' Hanlon back on the podcast. And he's the Phil Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution and author of the book To Dare Mighty Things US Defense Strategy since the Revolution. Welcome back, Michael Kaylin.
- [01:56]
A
Thank you. It's really good to be part of the podcast.
- [01:59]
B
I'm so glad to have you. So let me start with a slightly different question to the one I asked you in December. Is Iran the next Iraq?
- [02:11]
A
No, but it looks like it could be an extended conflict. You pointed out there are no ground troops, and for that reason alone, I would hesitate to make the analogy too tight. But you're also correct in your intro to point out that we're now five months into something that was supposed to last four to five weeks. According to the President's initial estimates. And he may have even thought it would be less than that, because I think he really had built up overconfidence that the Venezuela Maduro snatch would be a good precedent for what would happen in Iran, or at least the Israeli killing of leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, maybe. Maybe would be the model. And after the decapitation strike on February 28 and a few other limited blows, Iran would agree to a good deal and the nuclear infrastructure would be destroyed. That was his expectation, it would seem. And Iran has made this go a lot longer and shown remarkable tenacity. Some of us are not completely surprised. We always thought that it was better for the United States to keep its powder dry vis a vis Iran, unless absolutely facing no other choice, just because Iran does have so many options. It's a big country, it's got strategic depth, a lot of weaponry, a lot of experience in asymmetric conflict, an ideology that centers on violent resistance to the order that the United States is seen as upholding. You put all those ingredients together and it's not surprising this thing's gone on and that it could continue to go on. I'm getting to the point now where I'm gonna be surprised if it ends this calendar year. But it's still not Iraq. It's still not the same as a war where 4,500Americans died, where many tens of thousands of Iraqis died. In fact, you know the analogy. You probably were not trying to make it too precise. But one place where there are some analogies is in both cases, the regime in power had complete contempt for the lives of its own citizens. And Saddam killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and Iran slaughtered tens of thousands of Iranians just earlier this year. So President Trump's motives, like President Bush's in Iraq, were sort of mostly strategic, but partly even humanitarian, at least in the mind of the American president launching the war. So, yes, there are parallels, but it's still not Iraq.
- [04:28]
B
I want to talk about the broader conflict and its effect on the region and the world and the United States. But I want to stay on this most recent flare up for a moment. How do you see this moment progressing? Because it does seem right now like we're at a fork between Pakistan's offer of a 10 day ceasefire or something like that, maybe going down that path versus renewed all out war with Israel getting back involved in the conflict as well.
- [04:56]
A
Well, I wouldn't be surprised if there is some escalation and we seem to be in a mode of very specific escalatory steps being considered like an attack on Pickaxe Mountain, or now President Trump's threat to hit power plants if Iran itself, you know, hits ships. And so trying to find sort of just the right level of conflict to adjust the rheostat to a place where we apply enough pressure that Iran itself doesn't escalate, but not so much as to really draw us into a deeper engagement. That kind of thinking doesn't have a great history in war. You know, trying to sort of get the Goldilocks approach, just, just so, not too hot, not too cold, not too much of an all out war, but enough pressure to reshape Iran's calculus. Generally speaking, when we've tried to do things that way in Vietnam or Kosovo or where have you, we haven't really been successful. Or in Kosovo, maybe that was the exception that proves the rule to some extent, because we did start bombing Belgrade in that war, not destroying power plants so much as shorting them out. And then Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a peace because all he had to give up at that point was Kosovo, a part of Serbia that he cared about some, but not as much as his own hold on power. So we combined an escalatory bombing campaign with the threat of a ground attack with a sort of compromise outcome for the negotiated peace, and that allowed for progress at the negotiating table. In this case, we're still going for a maximalist demand. It would appear on Iran's nuclear program and it would completely be eliminated. And I think as long as President Trump has that goal clearly in his head, he's unlikely to succeed in forcing an end to this just by turning up the Rio stat a little bit. I think more likely is that he'll lead Iran to retaliate in kind and we'll see a prolongation, maybe intensification of the conflict. Perhaps not back to where it was in March, but worse than it's been
- [07:05]
B
in the spring in terms of Iranian retaliation. One threat that has already been made is by the Houthis in Yemen, who are an Iranian proxy. They've threatened to attack ships transiting the Bab Al Mandab Strait, which has been the alternative route to ship oil in the Red Sea while the Strait of Hormuz has been closed. How significant is that? Because this is a politics podcast, after all, and probably the most politically influential aspect of this war so far has been the energy crisis that it has brought with it.
- [07:39]
A
I think the Houthis can cause real trouble. I mean, they've done it before, right? They've been shooting at ships throughout, on and off for extended period going Back to the October 7, 2023 attack and Israel's retaliation. And they haven't been doing it as much lately. So therefore the threat is meaningful because it would reflect a change in policy. But that is credible because they've done it before and they've really driven a lot of shipping out of that area. Now, it does raise the question, since they're not as well armed as Iran, and since we might be able to escort ships, would we try to escort there in a way that we were less successful achieving in the Strait of Hormuz, where the waterway is tighter and the adversary is better equipped? Maybe in this case we would try to intercept missiles and drones from the Houthi. But of course, we've tried that before too, and not always succeeded with U.S. navy vessels. So I think it's a credible threat. It could really cause us some big problems and it may or may not lead to the complete elimination of the use of Red Sea ports for oil shipping.
- [08:47]
B
I'll say here that the average national gas price right now is $4 a gallon, which is down slightly from the peak back a couple months ago and down from the all time high of around $5 during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Nonetheless, the Iran war is deeply underwater with the American public. The net support for the Iran war is negative 25 points. Support for Trump himself is negative 20 points. Given that political circumstance in America, which side has the advantage in a protracted war like does Iran see a benefit in playing for time given American domestic politics?
- [09:32]
A
I'm not sure I see it in terms of who has an advantage so much as I see both sides having substantial leverage over the other. Which means the only place that we'll meet and ultimately get a deal is somewhere in the middle. Or at least there'll be some issues where we have to give ground. I don't know that Iran has more leverage over us. I mean, you know, we've killed a lot of their leadership, we've shut down much of their economy. The leaders in Iran may not really care that much about their people's well being or even their own, because they have this hostile resistance ideology. But I think they have proven in the way they negotiate, or their predecessors negotiated the Iran nuclear deal back under President Obama's tenure at office that they do value their economy and at some point they're going to want to revive it. And of course, that's why they signed the memorandum last month that did grant them access to trade and their frozen assets. So we do have leverage over them, but it may not be enough leverage to get the exact outcome we want with both the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian nuclear program, not to mention Iran's support for terrorists in the region. They also clearly have leverage over us in that they know we don't want a ground invasion. In the absence of that, we can't really end the war definitively on terms that we would find acceptable. And maybe we could forever impede them from relaunching a nuclear program. Who knows? We don't really know where all their stuff is. But we can't reopen the Strait of Hormuz, you know, short of putting ground troops along the coastline. And it would take a couple of years to build enough pipelines to simply bypass the Gulf. And you mentioned gasoline prices being a little lower than they were earlier this spring. But I think we also don't really know how high they would go if we went back to full scale blockade, counter blockade, more or less the world we're inching towards as you and I speak here on July 22nd. And so I think countries may be running out of strategic reserves. There may be other harmful effects on the world economy that may get worse. And Iran knows it. And Iran also knows. You mentioned politics. They certainly study American politics. They know that President Trump's popularity is not high. People aren't happy about the economy or the war. And maybe if Iran pushes this to the midterms, they feel like they'll, you know, achieve a Democratic takeover of Congress. I don't know how much they really value that. You know, Trump would still be Commander in Chief for two more years, even with Democratic Congress. I don't think a Democratic Congress is likely to impeach and remove Trump from office. And in fact, my $0.02, I think they would be foolish to try, but we'll leave that for later or for another one of your shows with somebody else. And so I think Iran, I'm sorry for the long answer, but this is the way Iran looks at it, I believe, and therefore they understand they have leverage over us. So the two sides have substantial leverage over the other. I think the only way you get to yes is with a compromise. So, for example, Iran could be allowed to enrich uranium the way they were under President Obama's Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but maybe keep the restrictions indefinitely into the future, rather than just for a 10 to 15 year time horizon as Obama had negotiated. And maybe that's a way you get to. Yes, but I don't really think of it in terms of who has more leverage, because both sides have a lot.
- [13:03]
B
At the outset of the war, the US And Israel had very lofty goals, as you described it included seemingly regime change to degrade and destroy Iran's ballistic missiles, drones, navy and air defenses, prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb, end Iran's support for its proxies, and keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Are there any of those efforts on which you would say the US And Israel have achieved their goals or come close?
- [13:31]
A
Well, I think that first of all, Iran's navy is largely obliterated and much of its air and missile defense, although that's more of a means to an end than an end in and of itself for us. And I would say right now, Iran's proxies are much weaker, but that's primarily because Israel has been attacking them directly, not so much because the regime has been under siege since February 28th. That may be a supporting element here, but it's not the main factor. I would say that Iran's nuclear program is probably more or less out of commission right now, but we're not sure and we really want to be sure, and so on. The sinking of the navy, yes. Support for terrorists, somewhat decapitation. Obviously some of the leaders are dead. I'm not sure that's an end in and of itself so much as a means to hopefully finding a more reasonable set of leaders, which I don't think we have yet. So there's no success there. The support for proxy groups, Partial success, but again, not primarily due to this campaign and the counter nuclear strikes. Partial success, but we're not really sure that adds up to a somewhat unsatisfying, you know, bottom line, and especially with now close to 20Americans dead, a lot of munitions expended, a lot of damage to friendly infrastructure and countries in the Gulf as a result of Iranian retaliation. And as you point out, the world oil, gas, helium, fertilizer, markets badly disrupted. So it would be hard for me to say it's been worth it, but I think there have been some specific military achievements.
- [15:11]
B
One of the tensions right now is that the US Originally seemed pretty optimistic about the degree to which it had degraded the Iranian military. And as you suggested, they have degraded the Iranian military quite a bit. But it still seems capable of preventing ships from transiting the Strait of Hormuz, capable of firing on and killing US Troops on bases in the region. Is it a surprise that Iran still has that capability? Why is it still able to inflict so much damage? Damage if they've been so degraded.
- [15:43]
A
Yeah. Well, the missile and drone capability of Iran is impressive. And I think a big part of the answer to your question is, first of all, we have a hard time finding the launchers quickly. And that goes back to Operation Desert Storm, when we really didn't find any of the Scud launchers from, you know, remote inspection or surveillance. And, yes, we have a lot more satellites in space today, but we really are still using the same kind of physics to look for things on the ground. And missile launchers are not that easy to pick up, and they're, of course, generally mobile. And then Iran's dug down, dug deep, gotten pretty good, as have the North Koreans at understanding that things that are below ground are hard for us to attack and impossible for us to see. And there are some things underground that produce signatures that you. Some kinds of effects that you could pick up, even if the facility itself may not be visible. But generally speaking, things underground are beyond our surveillance, and even if we do find them, they can be difficult to attack. And the Iranians can always dig out the rubble and reopen the passageways, especially if they have hundreds of locations, which I think they do, maybe even thousands. So I think that's what it boils down to. I would have expected us to be a little bit more effective. Nonetheless, despite all these caveats, I would have thought that after dropping, what is it now, 20,000 rounds of ordnance, plus or minus, that we would have done more damage to the Iranian missile and drone capabilities than we apparently have. We see different estimates out there of how much they've been degraded, but it's probably 30% or something like that. And, yeah, I would have thought it would have been more, but a combination of the direct damage and then the ongoing surveillance and the ability to suppress launch rates by forcing the Iranians to shoot and scoot and hide has at least limited their ability to engage in huge attacks. But nonetheless, it's worse than I would have thought, and it's pretty bad, given the region's fragility and need to have hotels and ports and airfields and ships sail safely and stay safely in the region, which right now is not the case.
- [18:08]
B
What is the strategy now for the U.S. well, I guess maybe in the context of how those goals have shifted. I don't hear the White House talking anymore about regime change. I think the focus is still somewhat on nuclear weapons, but we also have now newer issues, which is stability in the region, the Strait of Hormuz, and things like that. So is it clear from the White house, what the goal is or what the strategy is to get there.
- [18:36]
A
I think there are only two things that really matter at this point. Reopening.
- [18:38]
B
That's the end of today's Preview. Head to GDPolitics.com to become a paid subscriber and catch the full episode. Michael and I spoke about how Trump's goals in the region have shifted and what could actually lead to an end of the fighting long term. We also took a broader look at how the war in Iran has shaped American security and our relationships with other countries. Lastly, we followed up on the situation in Venezuela, which was the reason I originally spoke to Michael back in December. And we also talked about the war in Ukraine. Like I said, head over to GDPolitics.com to catch the whole thing. For eight bucks a month or 80 bucks a year, you'll get twice the number of episodes and help ensure we can keep making an independent podcast again. That's gdpolitics.com, see you there.