What Is The Endgame In Iran?

Summary

GD POLITICS PODCAST SUMMARY

Episode: What Is The Endgame In Iran?
Date: March 12, 2026
Host: Galen Druke
Guest: Mara Karlin, Professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS; former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans & Capabilities

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Overview

This episode dives deep into the U.S.-Israel war with Iran, now entering its 13th day. Host Galen Druke and national security expert Mara Karlin cut through the noise of political messaging and military updates to clarify the current state of the conflict, its underlying goals, risks, and the possible outcomes. The conversation covers U.S. and Israeli objectives, Iran’s military and domestic situation, regional and global consequences (especially economic impacts), and the daunting challenges of “regime change.” The tone is rigorous, analytical, but approachable, aiming to bring clarity amid the “dim sum menu” of explanations and real-time chaos.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Current Situation in Iran

• Multiple Rationales, Unclear Objectives:
  The invasion’s justification isn’t singular or entirely coherent, with explanations ranging from preventing Iranian nuclear breakout, punishing support for terrorism, retaliation for attacks on U.S. interests, and the pursuit of regime collapse.
  "The reasons for going to war has kind of been like a dim sum menu, to be frank. A whole bunch of ideas that can make sense." – Mara Karlan, 03:03

• Operational and Strategic Picture:

  • The Iranian military has suffered significant losses: air force and navy “largely destroyed,” ballistic missile capability severely degraded, though drones remain.
  • The IRGC and government have shifted to decentralized “devolved” command, instructing loyalists to raise costs on adversaries as much as possible.
  • No significant evidence yet of regime collapse: no major defections, no large-scale armed opposition.
    "The Iranian military is so, so much weaker than it was a week and a half ago… And yet we're not seeing the sorts of indicators we would expect that would tell us it has collapsed." – Mara Karlan, 05:06

2. Why Now? The Timing and Trigger Debate

• Competing Narratives:
  • Strategic opportunity: Iran and its proxies were already significantly weakened.
  • Missed diplomatic opening? Reports suggested Iran was considering new nuclear constraints prior to the war; skepticism remains on whether this was credible.
  • Growing internal instability inside Iran, especially following nationwide diverse protests violently suppressed in January, may have spurred U.S.-Israeli action. "I remain perplexed about why the US and Israel decided to go to war at this time." – Mara Karlan, 08:14

3. U.S. and Israeli Strategic Goals: Harmony or Discord?

• Some Alignment, Some Divergence:

  • Official rhetoric fluctuates: Trump has stated goals ranging from outright regime change to mere destruction of Iranian military might.
  • Israel appears more explicitly motivated by regime change and strikes on political-economic infrastructure, such as oil facilities; U.S. rhetoric is somewhat more restrained but operational actions have gone beyond military targets.
  • Divisions are sharper in secondary theaters: e.g., Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Lebanese state’s “historic” moves against the group, with scant U.S. attention. "I do believe it is to collapse the regime." – Mara Karlan, 10:58
    "I don't think that the Trump administration is paying a lot of attention to what's going on [in Lebanon]." – Mara Karlan, 11:42

• Political Messaging vs. Real Intent:

  • Trump’s public statements and calls for Iranian civilian resistance point to regime change as a key aim, but administration officials (e.g., Secretary Rubio) often frame objectives more narrowly for political purposes.
  • The difficulty of defining victory grows as high-value targets dwindle and public patience wanes.

4. Planning, Over-Optimism, and Unintended Consequences

• Lack of Preparation Revealed:

  • The administration seemed surprised by both Iranian retaliation across the region and the global economic shock from the Strait of Hormuz’s near-closure.
  • A notable failure: Lack of advance planning for mass evacuations of U.S. citizens across the Middle East (in contrast to 2006 Lebanon).
    "I am so struck by how The Trump administration seems not to have realized that part of its job is to take care of Americans overseas... It was really hard, complicated, and took three weeks. This is 14 countries, hundreds of thousands of Americans and it's a war that we launched." – Mara Karlan, 14:50

• Chronic U.S. Overconfidence:

  • Wars rarely proceed as planned; the U.S. military doctrine emphasizes the importance of “branches and sequels,” but even recent examples (Afghanistan withdrawal) show a persistent optimism bias.

5. Regional and Global Repercussions

• Gulf States' Calculus:

  • Shared priority across Gulf monarchies: neutralizing Iran. Yet, they were not eager for this war now.
  • Unity between rivals (Saudi, Emirati) built on shared fear, but if Iran collapses, a new phase of unpredictability (civil war, proliferation) could bring instability closer to their borders. "They did not want this war at this time." – Mara Karlan, 19:59

• Economic Shockwaves:

  • Strait of Hormuz’s near-blockade is three times the scale of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine oil shock.
  • Political risk for Trump: Oil and gas prices spike, markets gyrate—hastening pressure for a quick endgame.

6. Upside and Downside Risks / Endgame Scenarios

Military Commitment – Boots on the Ground:

• Major U.S. ground deployment is seen as “almost inconceivable” except for special forces missions around nuclear risks.
• Pure air campaigns have rarely toppled regimes cleanly (Libya '11 cited, but considered a poor precedent).
  “We don’t have a whole bunch of examples or case studies where air power alone has really brought down a regime.” – Mara Karlan, 24:33

Worst Case:

• Regime collapse leads to fragmentation, civil war, and proliferation risks—enriched uranium and high-end weaponry spread among militias or terrorist groups.
• Potential for a Syria-style nightmare, but on a far larger scale.
  “You have massive fragmentation. I mean, there’s a little bit of a devil you know versus the devil you don’t know.” – Mara Karlan, 28:01

Best Case:

• A moderately pro-Western, representative regime emerges, stabilizing the region—but only after a long, costly process akin to or worse than the post-civil war Syrian experience.
  “Even if we get to our best case scenario … it will need major stabilization efforts… It could be a 15 year process.” – Mara Karlan, 28:45

Nuclear Questions:

• Attacks in summer 2025 appear to have devastated Iran’s nuclear capability, but no international inspectors are on the ground to verify.
• Prospect of repeated attacks and unstable governance may heighten Iranian (and regional) incentives to pursue their own nuclear deterrent. “You could imagine why, if you’re sitting in Iran … this might be what you want as well.” – Mara Karlan, 32:00

7. What to Watch For: Signposts for the Road Ahead

• Key indicators of trajectory:

  • High-level defectors from the Iranian regime.
  • Emergence of opposition groups with access to weapons. “Who’s defecting and who’s got the weapons?” – Mara Karlan, 34:55

• Six-Month Outlook:

  • Regardless of who “wins,” Mara predicts pervasive violence inside Iran, either from an embattled IRGC-run rump state or from internecine conflict after regime collapse. "Six months from now, we are seeing a whole lot of violence happening inside Iran." – Mara Karlan, 36:03

• U.S. Off-Ramps and Political Calculations:

  • Expect a rapid attempt to declare victory, cite operational achievements, and draw down U.S. involvement—driven by domestic political calculations and international summit diplomacy (e.g., Trump-Xi meeting). "I think the Trump administration will want to see its way out of this sooner rather than later. And that is counted in weeks on one hand, definitely not months." – Mara Karlan, 38:05

• Iran's Agency:

  • Iranian actors may prolong conflict for leverage or vengeance; internal priorities (regime stabilization, neighbor relations) will dominate their calculus.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• "The reasons for going to war has kind of been like a dim sum menu, to be frank." – Mara Karlan, 03:03
• "We're not seeing the sorts of indicators we would expect that would tell us it has collapsed. So ... we've got a little bit longer to go to get to collapse. Regime change, of course, is a different ballgame." – Mara Karlan, 06:40
• "It is almost inconceivable to me that the U.S. will put substantial troops on the ground." – Mara Karlan, 24:33
• "You have massive fragmentation. I mean, there's a little bit of a devil you know versus the devil you don't know." – Mara Karlan, 28:01
• "If we live in our best case scenario fantasy, like you've got a fragile state that will need major stabilization efforts..." – Mara Karlan, 28:45
• "Who’s defecting and who’s got the weapons?" – Mara Karlan, 34:55
• "Six months from now, we are seeing a whole lot of violence happening inside Iran." – Mara Karlan, 36:03
• "The Trump administration will want to see its way out of this sooner rather than later. And that is counted in weeks on one hand, definitely not months." – Mara Karlan, 38:05

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Timestamps for Major Segments

• [03:03] Mara Karlan on the “dim sum menu” of war justifications
• [05:06] Assessment of Iran’s degraded military & regime resilience
• [08:14] Why the war now? Protest suppression, strategic weakness
• [10:58] Actual strategic logic vs. public explanations
• [11:42] U.S.-Israel alignment, Lebanon and Hezbollah’s fate
• [14:50] Trump, regime change, and unplanned evacuations
• [17:45] On over-optimism and war planning gone awry
• [19:59] Gulf States’ “number one concern” and war’s regional impact
• [22:20] Strait of Hormuz, oil market shock, and global economic fallout
• [24:33] Karlin on boots on the ground: “almost inconceivable”
• [28:01] “Devil you know” vs. “devil you don’t know” after regime collapse
• [34:55] Signposts: defectors and armed opposition
• [36:03] Violence—likely “lots of it”—no matter the outcome
• [38:05] U.S. political off-ramps, declaring victory, and ending the war

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Conclusion

Karlin and Druke offer a sobering, nuanced survey of the Iran crisis, pushing beyond surface narratives to weigh unspoken risks, probable (violent) outcomes, and the limits of military power for effecting regime change. The episode is rich in regional context and historical analogies—especially about the perils of unintended consequences and U.S. strategic overreach—while maintaining an incisive, skeptical eye toward official rhetoric. Listeners walk away with a clarified map of the situation, informed skepticism of all “best case” scenarios, and a sense that even after “victory,” the hard part in Iran will just be beginning.

Transcript

[A]

Hey there, listeners. An important note before we get started today. If you've been listening to this podcast and its forebearer for a while, you know that I somehow always manage to plan vacations that coincide with major news events. Unfortunately, this war with Iran is no different. I'm going to be away for the next two weeks. First big family vacation in 10 years. Wish me luck. But fear not, I've pre recorded episodes for the whole time I'm gone. Some pretty interesting conversations, at least I think. But I but I wanted to make sure to let you know because those episodes won't quite track the news cycle the way that we often do. They'll tackle some more evergreen topics. I'm going to be back in person on Monday, March 30, ready to talk about whatever happens over the next two weeks. So please hold down the fort for me. Don't do anything too crazy with the country while I'm gone. All right, that's the plan. Here's today's episode. Hello, and welcome to the GD Politics Podcast. I'm Galen Druck. We're entering our 13th day of the Iran war and we've been getting rather conflicting signals about how long it might last and what the end goal actually is. At the start, it seemed the goal was regime change. President Trump called on Iran's forces to lay down their arms and for civilians to revolt, saying the operation could last four to five weeks. Since then, Trump has called for Iran's unconditional surrender and Secretary of State Marco Rubio has framed the goal of the conflict as to destroy Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, missile production factories, and navy. On Monday, Trump said the war was ahead of schedule and, quote, very complete, pretty much end quote. The same day, the Department of War said, quote, we have only just begun to fight. On Tuesday, Democratic senators emerged from a briefing and telling the press that they were concerned about the likelihood of the US Putting boots on the ground in Iran. Meanwhile, the economic repercussions of the conflict and the near closure of the Strait of Hormuz have rippled across the globe, amping up the stakes for the US to borrow an analogy from a friend of the podcast, there's an awful lot of noise surrounding the operation and today we're going to try to find the signal. Where do things stand? What are the upside and downside risks and what are the possible outcomes? Here with me to do that is professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Mara Karlan. She served in national security roles for six US Secretaries of Defense and most recently served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for strategy plans and capabilities under President Biden. Mara, welcome to the GD Politics podcast.

[B]

Thanks so much for having me.

[A]

It's great to have you. So I was listening to an interview that you did a while back, and you said that when building a military strategy, establishing what your current position is is as important, if not more important, than establishing where you want to go. So let's start with the basics. What is the current situation on the ground in Iran?

[B]

First of all, I really appreciate that you highlighted that point. You know, it is so easy for us to dream up what we want to do and the great policies or approaches that we want to pursue. I'm always amazed at how hard it is to diagnose where we are today and kind of how sticky and difficult those kind of conversations and debates can be. So thank you for starting us there. Are we now. So we're nearly two weeks into this war that was launched by the US And Israel. The reasons for going to war has kind of been like a dim sum menu, to be frank. A whole bunch of ideas that can make sense. Iran's nuclear program, its missile program, its support of terrorist activity, its efforts to kill a whole bunch of American service members in Iraq, et cetera, et cetera. It's not entirely clear why, however, they wanted to go to war at this time. So what we saw a week ago Saturday was the launching of this massive multi domain conventional operation. That's actually the type of war that the US And Israeli militaries do best. Working again across domains that means like air and maritime and cyber and space, and knitting together a whole bunch of capabilities to to hit a number of political and military targets across Iran, both people and places. Despite the panoply of reasons for why they wanted to go to war, I think ultimately the goal is to collapse the regime in Iran.

[A]

So just further establishing where we are before we get to some possible outcomes. The US military says it struck more than 5,000 targets. Trump says Iran's navy and air force have been destroyed. The irgc, perhaps unsurprisingly, says that its missile program is still intact. I mean, how do you assess where Iran is right now in the fog of war? Like, how close are we to destroying its military capabilities?

[B]

What's important to understand when we're dissecting this is operational efforts that have happened and strategic efforts that have happened. So I'll talk about the operational first. And you just highlighted a bunch, right? So Iran doesn't have much of an air force anymore. It doesn't have a whole lot of a navy anymore. And actually it's lost a bunch of its ballistic missile capability, either because it has fired off the missiles or a number of its launchers have been targeted. It's used a number of drones, although I think we can safely assume it's still got a whole lot of those as well. Effectively, the way the military and security services are operating is through devolved command and control. So it's no longer folks saying, hey, boss, what do we need to do? It's them feeling like they have the guidance, which is act like there is no tomorrow. Raise the costs as much as you can, spread this conflict and make the pain as serious as possible for folks around the region and around the world so that they pressure the US And Israel to end the war pretty quickly. So the Iranian military is so, so much weaker than it was a week and a half ago. And this, of course, builds on a lot that's happened over the last two years to weaken a bunch of its proxies. To be totally frank, Iran's never had, you know, has not had a terribly impressive military for most of the last few decades, and because of that, it invested a lot in supporting a bunch of terrorist groups and proxies. Hamas and Hezbollah are two great case studies. Both are the weakest that they have been in a number of decades. The third group is the Houthis, which come out of Yemen. Interestingly, those folks have not wanted to play in this war at all, which is kind of one of the surprises coming out of it. So operationally, the Iranian regime is a lot weaker, and yet we're not seeing the sorts of indicators we would expect that would tell us it has collapsed. So one perfect example, defections, armed opposition. We're not seeing a bunch of evidence of either of those two, which tells me we've got a little bit longer to go to get to collapse. Regime change, of course, is a different ballgame, because now you need someone to fill the space.

[A]

You mentioned that it's not exactly clear why we decided to enter this conflict at the moment that we did. And there's, I guess, maybe you alluded to one argument, which is that Iran has been weakened so much and its proxies have been weakened so much that now there's a real strategic opportunity to, I don't know, achieve regime collapse or change or whatever it might be. At the same time, just before the strikes began, Oman's foreign minister told CBS that a breakthrough had been reached and that Iran had agreed to never stockpile enriched uranium and to full verification. You know, I don't know to the degree that that's accurate. But on one hand, you have an argument that, you know, strike while the iron's hot. Iran is really weak. On the other hand, you have folks suggesting, well, because Iran was really weak, they were about to agree to some kind of, you know, stronger nuclear agreement than they had agreed to with President Obama. Do you believe the foreign minister of Oman? Do you like, what do you make sense of this exact moment, the choice to go to war?

[B]

Now, I remain perplexed about why the US And Israel decided to go to war at this time. I do not have a good, good answer on that front. It's really hard to imagine the nuclear talks would have finally had some breakthrough. I just don't see a lot of evidence that that would be the case. But here's where we need to take a moment and talk about the domestic situation in Iran and in particular, what happened in January. So toward the end of December, Iran's economy was just melting. Its currency was, you know, largely worthless. And you started to see mass protests. And a couple things were really interesting about these protests. First of all, they were all over the place. It's not like they were just confined to the big city. You saw them in every single province. Second thing that was interesting was the demographics of who was participating in the protest. You had a wide variety of Iranians all wanting to come out into the streets. Pretty dangerous proposition, as I'll get to in a moment, and really pressure this regime. That's notable because in protests that we've seen in Iran over the last decade, sometimes you get protests of young people, sometimes you get a bunch of protests of women, for example. This was really across the board in terms of who's showing up. So all across Iran, all different types of people go out into the street and protest, and the regime responds with devastating violence. I mean, it was just horrific. I have heard very credible estimates that tens of thousands of Iranians were murdered and that I think, look, the relationship with the regime and its population had gotten really dicey for a number of years. A population that, you know, probably at least 80% or so doesn't really buy the sort of ideology of the Islamic Republic in Iran. A population that's like, this isn't helping me economically. Population that's frustrated that so much of their money is going to support causes outside of their country and not to support them. And so I could imagine that one dynamic that might have animated Washington and Jerusalem at this time was seen. Iran is so weak domestically and so weak regionally that this could be the moment to sort of strike and try to collapse it and see what the public does to try to replace it.

[A]

We mentioned at the start that there has been, as you mentioned, a dim sum menu of explanations for the war. But when you look at actual strategy, how this military operation has been carried out, either from the United States or Israel, can you just sort of like, as a professional in the space, discern what the actual strategy is or what the end goal might be? Putting aside what we, the American public,

[B]

have been told, yeah, operationally, I do believe the end goal is to weaken a whole bunch of pieces of Iran's military capabilities. Strategically, I do believe it is to collapse the regime.

[A]

And do the United States and Israel's strategic goals align here? Because the Wall Street Journal published an article just yesterday saying, you know, Trump says that the war in Iran is near a close, Israel has different ideas, and essentially describing a situation where Israel is more motivated to see regime change. The United States, at least according to the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, were really interested in destroying all of its military capability. And what happens politically in Iran might be at this point beside the point.

[B]

It seems to me that this is probably less an area where there's disagreement between the US And Israel, particularly just given the size, scale, and scope of this conflict as waged by both sides. But I would note that when you look at other pieces to this war, I do see some divisions. And the most interesting one here is actually looking at Lebanon. So Hezbollah attacked Israel early on in this war, and Israel immediately launched a pretty massive military operation in Lebanon against Hezbollah. I don't think that the Trump administration is paying a lot of attention to what's going on there. It's a really interesting moment vis a vis Hezbollah. So effectively, Hezbollah has been, up until about two years ago, the most capable terrorist group in the entire region, and capable more capable than a whole bunch of militaries in the region as well. And the Israelis over the last years have kind of systematically hit its leadership, its operators, and a bunch of its kind of military capabilities. What's fascinating about this is over the last few months, the Lebanese military has been working to disarm Hezbollah in different pieces of the country. And when Hezbollah launched this attack on Israel early on to the war, the Lebanese ca banned Hezbollah and has been taking steps to arrest Hezbollah members. I cannot explain what a huge deal this is. I mean, the. The Hezbollah has been stronger than the Lebanese military historically. And the military and the political leadership in Lebanon for decades, has just been terrified of ever trying to go after Hezbollah. The one time they tried to was in May 2008, when the politicians in Lebanon said, hey, it's not cool that Hezbollah is running the airport. So if you fly into airport, they were kind of in charge of what was really going on there. And that it wasn't cool that Hezbollah had kind of this communication system across Lebanon. And the minute the politicians said that, Hezbollah took its weapons into the streets of Beirut and started using them against the Lebanese public, and since then, everyone in Lebanon has been terrified to go near this. So, look, we get to this point because of Israeli efforts against Hezbollah over the last few years. A ceasefire that the US brokers between ISRA and Lebanon, and now you start to see the military in the country going after its biggest threat. Really, really big deal. Again, as I note, I don't think the US is paying any attention to this.

[A]

I want to put a bit of a finer point on this, because you suggested that the United States and Israel's goals are basically aligned in Iran. I think Israel has been more explicit that it's interested in regime change. And its. Its actions, you know, bombing oil fields and things like that, have also perhaps made that more expl. Whereas the White House has said, you know, this isn't a regime change war. Like, is that all political messaging? Does that actually not describe the US's goals there?

[B]

I mean, I think any answer you want. You have heard from President Trump in the last 13 days, right? He has talked about regime change. He is. Even if you recall when these massive protests were happening in January, he was tweeting to the Iranian public. Help is on the way, urging them to go and take over institutions of the state. I mean, effectively trying to. Trying to change the regime. So I think that has been animating him to some extent. And what I've been wondering is, is this turning out to be a lot harder than he and his team expected? I mean, for example, as Iran was first getting attacked, it responded by sending missiles and drones to a whole bunch of countries around the region. The Gulf countries, Israel, Turkey. The list goes on and on. The Trump administration seemed pretty surprised by that, which I find very curious. Now there's a whole discussion about Strait of Hormuz closure. Anytime anyone has ever gamed out or modeled what some sort of conflict would look like on this front, Strait of Hormuz is always one of the top two things that comes out as well. And then finally, I will just say, as an American citizen, I am so struck by how The Trump administration seems not to have realized that part of of its job is to take care of Americans overseas. And so there appeared to be zero planning to actually conduct non combatant evacuations of the hundreds of thousands of Americans raid across 14 countries in the region. I'll just note I, back in 2006 ran the largest one of these we had ever done after Israel and Hezbollah went, went to war. And we evacuated 15,000Americans from one country when we didn't know a war was going to happen. And it was really hard, complicated, and took three weeks. This is 14 countries, hundreds of thousands of Americans and it's a war that we launched.

[A]

Yeah. It seems like there is some evidence based on Trump's response that he wasn't quite imagining that things would go this way. And I do want to ask though, like, how unique is that to this situation versus we have a tendency, the United States military has a tendency of being overly optimistic about how things will go. I mean, Biden found himself in not exactly the same position, but a similar position in Afghanistan where the withdrawal turned into complete chaos, resulting in the United States losing service members. We all saw the videos of people hanging onto flights at the airport trying to get evacuated because I guess the government, the military, whatever, just didn't imagine that the Afghani government would collapse so quickly and the Taliban would take over. So do we just have a tendency of being overly optimistic and therefore kind of not crafting policy and strategy that ends up being super effective, or is this unique to this situation?

[B]

So look, the minute a war starts, it goes all sorts of different ways, some of which you predicted, some of which you didn't predict. But that's why you have a war planning process. So in my last job in the Pentagon, I oversaw all of our war plans. And what was really important there was we were never gonna get a conflict right in how we pictured it. Either a conflict being launched against the United States or that the US Military was launching. But that's why you go through the effort, right? You figure out branches and sequels and what might happen and what might not happen. And you know, what are the black swans you haven't thought of? You're invariably going to miss things. You brought up Afghanistan, which In July and August 2021, the government there just melted away and collapsed so much more quickly than anyone had had predicted. So you're going to get some things wrong. But because of the serious rigorous planning, there's a whole bunch of stuff you will manage to get right and you'll have thought through how to mitigate risks as well. Again, this is what's so amazing to me, and I should probably just say bewildering to me. If you are going to think about a conflict against Iran, you have to assume there is going to be an issue with the Strait of Hormuz closure, and you have to assume that the military is going to devolve command and control. And so you're gonna have a whole bunch of folks shooting missiles and drones everywhere they can around the region. Those are just really obvious ones.

[A]

On both of those points, I'm curious what the fallout is. It seems as though the Gulf states were not particularly interested in the United States and Israel going to war in this manner. Again, sometimes there are differences between what countries say publicly and what they say privately. But it seems like they were not particularly interested in this conflict now that they have been involved because Iran has been firing at them. And as you mentioned, countries beyond just the Gulf states as well, does that strain the United States relationship with those countries because they are annoyed, or does it make them more resolved to counter Iran because they don't want something like this to happen again and become invested in regime change? I guess that's the question I'll ask on the Gulf states and then I want to ask about the Strait of Hormuz.

[B]

So if we were talking a month ago and you asked me about the Gulf states, what we would be spending all our time on is about how the Saudis and the Emiratis are bickering left and right. And now we are in a different ballgame because they're focused on the strategic threat. The Gulf states for decades have had their number one priority, their number one concern as being Iran. I remember sort of early on in my career being struck at how similar the talking points sounded whenever you were sitting with the Gulf states or the Israelis on this topic. Number one worry. Number number one concern. And even though that has been their number one concern, I do agree with you that they did not want this war at this time. On the whole, some of them I do think probably pushed forward as we've heard rumors about that happening, particularly from the Saudis. So what this means for the US Relationship with the Gulf is in many ways going to depend on how long and how complicated and how painful this war is for them in particular. So, look, if it gets rid of their number one strategic threat in the long term, that's actually a pretty good thing for them. If, however, you now have an Iran, either a rum state run by the Revolutionary Guard Corps or a collapsed state you know, engulfed in civil war. That's gonna be pretty painful for them as well. You know, the Gulf states have sold themselves as the quiet, prosperous place in the region, as the future of the region. And if you've been watching your TV for the last week and a half or so, that is not the image you're getting. And so the Gulf states want this to end sooner rather than later so that they can go back and try to repair that image.

[A]

Now, let's talk about the Strait of Hormuz, which I think has probably created more pressure for the Trump administration than perhaps anything else in this war. How does it change the strategic picture? The fact that, you know, essentially a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has shot up oil prices and therefore gas prices, made markets gyrate, because obviously they have military goals. But that intersects with the global economy and politics here at home.

[B]

If you remember back when Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, there was a really big shock in the oil market, particularly because so many European countries had gotten oil from Russia. Now, what comes out of Iran is about three times more than that. So we can imagine a similar earthquake, if not a much bigger earthquake in the system. I have heard arguments saying, but look, if you get a different regime in Iran, in fact, oil prices will ultimately be cheaper and we'll have more stability in the market. It's a little hard to imagine that happening, not least because the economy there has crumbled. That even in, like, our best case, butterflies and unicorns scenario. I don't know how we are in a situation in which oil markets aren't pretty sporty for a period of time. Again, a really obvious thing to think about when you are planning a conflict against Iran. And so one would want to think about, well, how do you shift supply? Are there ways that you can flood the market a little bit more? The US has these capabilities, for example, with the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

[A]

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[B]

It is almost inconceivable to me that the US Will put substantial troops on the ground. There is a possibility of putting some small special forces teams in to go and deal with issues like the couple hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium that's running around Iran. That could be pretty potent in the wrong hand. Even then, my instinct is that the administration will want to try to avoid that and see if they can't get some sort of opposition, you know, trusted opposition types to go in and deal with that. That specific issue. When you go in with ground forces, it is a completely different conflict. You're at much higher risk of casualties. There's a logistics piece. You gotta get them all there. So once you've invested that, it's actually very easy to end up having a much longer term, drawn out commitment as well. That said, we don't have a whole bunch of examples or case studies where air power alone has really brought down a regime. I mean, the best example, which is a stretch that people reach for, is Libya in 2011. But what happened there is he had a whole bunch of armed opposition folks running around and kind of ready to take charge and then ultimately engage in a pretty ugly civil war. We don't really see that right now.

[A]

So boots on the ground is a political risk for Trump domestically. But when we're talking about upside downside risks, like what is the worst case scenario here? And of course, we'll get more optimistic in a second. But what's like the really bad thing that can happen, happen?

[B]

Iran is a huge player in this region. Since the regime took over in 1979, it has sowed problems across all of it. The biggest downside risk is that you have crumbled those who have the capabilities and the weapons to actually execute all of that change and you don't know what's going to replace it. Look, this might also be your optimistic scenario as well, right? We just don't know. You have taken kind of the giant actor in the region and you're trying to change it. And at a minimum, even if we get to our butterflies and unicorns scenario where like a Democratic Regime takes over and Iran is prosperous and playing a positive role for the whole region. Let's like leave it. Live in that, in that sort of fantasy for a moment. Getting to that place is going to be long and ugly. And there is an argument that many countries in the region and the United States had found enough ways to mitigate the threat posed by Iran without actually having to take this kind of massive action.

[A]

So I guess trying to decipher there, the worst case scenario is the regime collapses and like there's civil war and terrorists got their hands on, you know, enriched uranium or all of the state capacities that were centralized with the Supreme Leader get dispersed across a bunch, a bunch of different bad actors. And now the United States has lost its strategy because it's not dealing with one actor, it's dealing with many.

[B]

Yeah, you, you have massive fragmentation. I mean, there's a little bit of a devil you know versus the devil you don't know. And there are Argum folks make, which is. But the devil you know, was just so bad and so problematic and responsible for so much chaos in the region, instability, and had killed just so many Americans. I deeply understand that and think it is spot on. And yet you just don't know what you're purchasing on the other side.

[A]

And then so the best case scenario is what you've purchased on the other side is like a moderate pro American regime that, that stabilizes the region, blah, blah, blah. But you think even getting to that point, even if that is the best case scenario, there's no way that we get to that point without a lot of conflict along the way.

[B]

Absolutely. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, again, if we live in our best case scenario fantasy, like you've got a fragile state that will need major stabilization efforts. Let me give you an example that's worth thinking about for a moment, which is Syria. So Syria was run by the Assad family. They were just awful in about a thousand ways, both domestically in terms of how they treated their population, regionally in terms of their support to terrorist groups. Just a whole bunch of really bad stuff. And there was this big civil war that started in Syria now a decade and a half or so ago. It was hideous. I mean, hundreds and thousands killed, millions and millions who were displaced. And it really hit a whole bunch of different parts of the region. It was not just contained to Syria.

[A]

I was living in, I was living in Turkey at the time. It launched a whole refugee crisis.

[B]

Right, Massive. Exactly. You live this, right. The refugee crisis that you saw in Jordan, in Turkey, in Lebanon, that affected Europe, I would argue it has played a role in Germany's elections over the last few years in particular. So really shook things up. Then, of course, you have ISIS running all over Syria and also Iraq. And then you fast forward to today and there's been this effort to bring down and collapse the Assad regime, which was pretty inspiring. It was an internal effort, although run by folks who used to be affiliated with Al Qaeda. And now they're trying to rebuild. Right. They're trying to see what does Syria look like. And I was there not long ago, and on one level, it's just really inspiring. Right. You've got a diverse representative government. Not diverse enough. Not representative enough, but nevertheless, you know, on. Kind of on that, on that right. Trajectory, you've got refugees flowing back to the country, and yet you have massive economic destruction and devastation. I mean, walking around places where chemical weapons were used. Outside Damascus, it's just like, it's flat. I mean, skeletons of buildings. You have kind of the historical backpack. Right, of neighbors fighting neighbors, trying to figure out what does it all mean to live together again. And this is taking a lot of international attention, a lot of international funding. And again, this is Syria whole lot smaller and I would say a whole lot less meaningful to the future of the region than what happens in Iran.

[A]

So. Right. Even if we get to a place where things are looking optimistic for a representative government in Iran, Iran, it could be a 15 year process to get there. I do want to ask about the nuclear question. It seems like, you know, the main objective, the overriding objective here is to prevent a nuclear Iran. Is there a world in which this strengthens the argument inside Iran for acquiring a bomb? I mean, it probably, it probably does if the regime stays intact. But could they act on it? Like, have we eliminated enough of their capabilities that even if sort of, we've just created their best argument for why they should try to create a nuclear bomb, it doesn't matter because they can't.

[B]

So as you'll recall, last summer the US Hit Iran's major nuclear sites and President Trump told us that we, our military obliterated their nuclear program. I think what probably happened was pretty devastating to their nuclear program. We don't have all the details because there used to be inspectors on the ground. And as you can imagine, the Iranians kicked all of those folks out after these attacks. So it is accurate to say that after last summer's attacks, it has been much harder for Iran to actually get a nuclear weapons capability based on what we know. And it's quite Conceivable there's a bunch we don't know. But actually on this topic, it's worth stepping back a moment because I think what you're suggesting unfortunately applies to a bunch of different places, particularly across Europe and Asia. You know, there's a whole bunch of countries around the world who said we're not gonna get nuclear weapons, weapons and we're not going to do it. Maybe because it's really expensive, we're not going to do it because maybe we have an extended deterrence agreement from the United States, which really covers a lot of countries in Europe and Asia where the US Effectively says we've got weapons, maybe, possibly we'll take care of you. It's a little bit of a bet, if you will, so don't worry about getting your own. But particularly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which has been done under the kind of nuclear specter and then paired with a lot of valid and open questions about Washington's commitment to its alliances, the conversation in a bunch of countries has changed on this topic. I'll just run through a couple examples. The Polish Prime Minister has said we need to get nuclear weapons. The German Chancellor is talking with the French in particular about what does it look like to have some sort of sharing relationship with nuclear weapons. In South Korea, 70% plus of the population wants nuclear weapons. Even in Japan, the one country that has felt the pain of nuclear weapons, you've got the overwhelming majority of the population wanting to relook its non nuclear principles. So it's worth just recognizing this backdrop where a bunch of countries are saying, I feel like the way to protect myself is to get this, this capability and I want to figure out how to do it. You could imagine why, if you're sitting in Iran and you've now been attacked in pretty spectacular ways multiple times, this might be what you want as well. What will be especially dangerous, however, is the period of time between making that decision and then getting that capability. Because to the extent anyone's aware that you're on that adventure, they're gonna try to attack.

[A]

Of course, as we look towards the future, I mean, what signposts are you going to be watching for to understand the trajectory of this war?

[B]

So the two indicators that I'm really focused on and they're interrelated are first of all, where are the defectors? Who is saying, I was a part of this regime and I no longer want to be either. I was a political leader, military security service leader, you name it, at, at different levels, who are the defectors and the next piece is who has the weapons. Right. I mean, right now, even though you have 80% plus of the population in Iran opposing this regime, almost none of those folks have weapons. And if you're fundamentally trying to be the replacement, you actually need to find a way to come together, ideally, and to have those. So who's defecting and. And who's got the weapons?

[A]

Okay, here's the hard part we've talked about.

[B]

Everything we've talked about has been easy so far.

[A]

But here's the real hard part. Sort of like put aside what the best case scenario is, what the worst case scenario is, given everything you're seeing in terms of messages from the Trump administration, what our military strategy has been so far, like, what do you think the region looks like six months from now?

[B]

The region has been transformed over the last two and a half years. So the Syrian regime, as we discussed, is gone. A whole bunch of terrorist groups are a whole lot weaker than they were. And now you have this massive shock that's happened in Iran. And I do think we are on a trajectory where the regime is kind of 50, 50 going to collapse or going to be an Iranian Revolutionary Guard rump state over these next few days. It'll be a lot clearer, I believe, as to which one of those is going to occur. And frankly, whichever happens, I think six months from now, we are seeing a whole lot of violence happening inside Iran. If it's an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps rump state, they are going around and trying to deal with any potential opposition, they are going to be nervous and scared and, you know, for. For all of the reasons that make sense. If it is a regime that has collapsed, we are also going to be seeing a whole bunch of violence, as you have what will have been roughly one unitary actor kind of profoundly fragment and then competition between and among those groups.

[A]

And in both, both, I guess, situations, the Trump administration at a certain point has to say, we've achieved our goals, the war has come to an end. How does that happen? I mean, on a podcast earlier this week, I was speaking with, you know, a fellow political analyst. We were talking about how oftentimes, you know, the markets are what motivates Trump. Like, he is. He's keenly aware of public opinion, even if he doesn't always act sort of on the side of majority public opinion. He seems sensitive to a sort of backlash against, you know, this idea. Like, he seems aware of the political risks involved here. How, like, what are the off ramps? How does, how do we get to a place where almost no matter what happens domestically with Iran, the United States sees itself out of this.

[B]

I think the Trump administration will want to see its way out of this sooner rather than later. And that is counted in weeks on one hand, definitely not months. It's only gonna get tricky here. It's only going to get more complicated. And you mentioned early on about just how many thousands of targets have been hit. It gets harder and harder to find iconic targets in particular. Right. So it's one thing to be sitting here a week ago plus, and say the US And Israel killed the Supreme Leader of Iran. If you're sitting here a couple weeks from now, you're killing, like, you know, person number 700 who no one's ever heard of. And the American public will increasingly be saying, wait, what are you doing? Why are you doing this? This? And why? Our gas prices just so incredibly high. And obviously, every day longer this lasts is a day we're closer to the midterms. There's also an interesting kind of deadline to look at, which is that President Trump is supposed to have a very big meeting with President Xi of China at the end of the month. And I would watch how that is shaping, how he's thinking about deadlines as well. This is a big summit. He wants it to be successful. You know, these are kind of two of the biggest actors, obviously, in the international system. So it seems to me that there will sooner rather than later be a story built about what has all been achieved. And again, operationally, a lot has been achieved. And then the US Will begin stepping back. There are obviously spectacular things that could happen that could shift this. Right. A massive attack by Iran that actually goes through. To date, we've unfortunately seen seven members of the US Military who've been killed. What if you start to see a whole lot more? If the Iranians actually manage to target, say, a US Ship successfully, for example, or a bunch of Americans, those could play into this. But I think these stories being built to get the US Closer rather than further to an off ramp, and to be able to say, we've achieved these things, we're now done.

[A]

Final question here. Iran gets a say as well in sort of when the war ends. If the United States is like, okay, politically, this is too risky. We've destroyed the military, we're no longer invested in the political outcome. We're going to see ourselves out of this. Is there a world in which Iran says no? Like, we're, let's keep fighting, let's keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, let's really make this so painful that they never try it again or something like that.

[B]

That that is conceivable. I think the debate will be to what end, right? There's a whole lot of cleanup that's gonna need to happen. They're gonna want to repair relations with their neighbors to the extent that that's possible as well. You might have seen the Iranian president earlier this week was apologizing to the Gulf states for the attacks on them. And so the whomever is running Iran at that moment, and it could again be like a panoply of different actors is going to want to come together and figure out what does it mean to solidify their hold domestically. And I think that will end up sucking up a lot of the oxygen in terms of what they're focused on.

[A]

All right, well, we're gonna leave things there. Thank you so much for helping make sense of everything that's happened in Iran over the past week and a half.

[B]

Thank you so much for having me.

[A]

My name is Galen Drook. Remember to become a subscriber to this [e-mail] and wherever you listen to podcasts. Paid subscribers get about twice the number of episodes and can join in our paid subscriber chats and pass along questions for us to discuss on the show. Most importantly, you ensure that we can keep making a podcast that prioritizes curiosity, rigor and a sense of humor. Also, be a friend of the POD and go give us a five star rating where every you listen to podcasts, maybe even tell a friend about us. Thanks for listening and we will see you soon.