Call Him Daddy: Assessing America’s Strike On Iran | GoodFellows | Hoover Institution - GoodFellows: Conversations on Economics, History & Geopolitics

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[00:00]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
They're not going to be fighting each other.
[00:01]
Sir Neil Ferguson
They've had it.
[00:03]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
They've had a big fight, like two kids in a schoolyard, you know, they fight like hell. You can't stop them. Let them fight for about two, three minutes, then it's easy to stop them.
[00:11]
John Cochran
And then Daddy has to sometimes use strong language.
[00:14]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
You have to use strong language. Every once in a while you have to use a certain word.
[00:22]
Bill Whelan
It's Friday, June 27, 2025. And welcome back to Goodfellows, a Hoover Institution broadcast examining social, economic, political, and in this case, geopolitical concerns. I'm Bill Whelan, I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow. I'll be your moderator today. And we begin. One Goodfellow shy Sir Neil Ferguson is gonna join us at some point. Meanwhile, we're gonna start our show with the knowledge of Lt. Gen. H.R. mcMaster and economist John Cochran. Both John and H.R. are Hoover Senior Fellows. Our time is short, gentlemen. Let's get right to it. HR I turn to you, I'm curious about what has happened here in the Middle east in this regard. The United States did something which militarily is phenomenal. The idea of flying a plane 37 hours round, dropping bombs with precision on a nuclear facility, nobody dying on that mission. And yet those planes come back to the United States and what happens? Two things. Number one, questioning the idea of bombing to begin with, but secondly, then questioning the efficiency of the attack. My question to HR Is this simply a function of the fact that Donald Trump's fingerprints run it thus? It must be bad, or is there something larger afoot here about the media's attitude toward military in general?
[01:29]
John Cochran
You know, I think they're both dynamics at play here. You know, I mean, it's funny, I guess, if you, if you dislike Donald Trump enough, you begin to cheer for Ayatollah Khamenei, you know, and, and, and it was just ridiculous, the whole, you know, the whole discussion about the initial reports of limited effects. Of course we're not going to know that for a little while, but it's clear to me that nuclear program is set way back, I would say definitely much more than, than months. I mean, certainly multiple years, you know, and you have to look at the way that the Israelis went after the whole supply chain and the accurate target emplacement of these mops, the 30,000 pound bombs. I think it's extraordinary because of the precision, because of the intelligence, where they knew exactly where to strike. Right down the ventilation shafts, for example. And you got to remember, centrifuges they, they're pretty delicate things, you know, I mean, I mean, people try not to bump into them if they're walking through the facility, let alone when there's a 30,000 pound bomb hitting. So, you know, it's, it seemed to me like, you know, that whoever leaked this certainly, and maybe even who wrote that intelligence assessment, you know, was kind of, you know, upset that we had taken military action against Iran. I just have to tell you, like, for years I thought our intelligence was tainted by policy preference of the intelligence community on Iran. I mean, these assessments would get. Oh, we don't think that they're weaponizing really. And then we entered the JCPOA, this Iran nuclear deal in 2015. And the day of the agreement, before the ink was dry, the Iranian leaders said, hey, here are all the places you can't look at. What do you think they were doing there? Why did they bury the Natanz site that wasn't discovered till 2002? Why did they bury the Fordo site, you know, 300ft underground? I mean, probably because they're doing something there they don't want you to see. So even the IAEA had caught them, caught them enriching to much higher than they were supposed to be because you have to put in new pipes when you do that. And they came back. Oh, we were just kind of painting the facility really, you know, what are these new pipes for? So I just think, you know, it's ridiculous. It, it reflects the leak itself, which was criminal and kind of the tone of it and the tone of the press reflects, I think, their policy preference for continuing to supplicate to the Iranian regime under this, you know what? We have now disproven the theory that if we're conciliatory with them, Ayatollah Khamenei's heart is going to grow two sizes bigger like the Grinch on Christmas Eve, you know, and they're all going to change and everything's going to be fine.
[04:07]
Bill Whelan
John.
[04:08]
Moderator/Host
So, yeah, I want to wind my way around to a question here. So let us celebrate the precision. It is just amazing feature of modern war. Not only are precision of dropping a 35, 30,000 pound bomb down a ventilator shaft, the amazing amount of intelligence, but the on the Israelis too. The Israelis have been doing amazingly precise stakes to the point that I've seen videos. People in Tehran are out there watching on the rooftops because they know the Israelis are hitting very precise. They've seen just pictures of the top floor of an apartment building gone the bottom floor is still in there. You know, the Iranians are sort of scattering missiles all over, but not the intelligence are our own team turned out to be pretty good. And the Israelis are just amazing at what they know about what's going on in Iran. And likewise the, the opposite, the competence. It is lovely to see a branch of the federal government really know what it's doing. Hr, that, that's, that's your guys this day and age. It's just lovely to see it. But the question I think this, this kerfuffle you're talking about profoundly misses the point. It is not about did this one strike completely eliminate the nuclear capacity of Iran? It's we demonstrated that we are willing to do what it takes to stop it. And Israel demonstrated that they're willing to do what it takes to stop it. And if that means more strikes, we're probably going to have more strikes eventually. I'm sure they're not going to let Iran rebuild its air defenses and, and go back to tit for tat, pretend and so forth. So I really think that's, and this is from where we're sort of winding around to a question for hr Is not the significance of it, that America has finally stood up for something, and that is that we're going to do what it takes and if this doesn't take it, the other ones, the other ones will do no matter what. And that of course leads to is, is Iran going to finally say, well, we had enough, or are they going to try to go back to the old, you know, tit for tat kind of, I'll, I'll throw one at you, you throw one at me. But not serious. We're going to degrade your capacity stuff that Israel is doing now.
[06:07]
John Cochran
Yeah. Hey, John, I think that is the, that is really maybe the most important point is that there's only been one administration in the last seven administrations who has acted directly against Iran, and that's been Donald Trump twice. And you know, I think about the quotation from Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, they said the same phrase, both of them, America can do nothing. And Ayatollah Khamenei said that three or so days before Donald Trump decided to kill Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al muhandas on, on January 3, 2020. And, and so I think what he's done is he showed that he will act. And this is what's really important. Hey, if Iran wants to rebuild this program, they've got a lot of work to do. I mean, they're set back, plus it's going to cost a lot of money. And are they going to decide to do it when they know, hey, there's a US President and there's an Israeli prime Minister who once we restart this, they're probably just going to come right back out after us. So I think, I think that what he has done, you know, is change the incentive structure, man. You know, to put it in economist terms, John. And I think that might be, that, that might, or his cost benefit analysis maybe I should say, has shifted significantly.
[07:29]
Moderator/Host
There's the hardware which we bombed and we will do it again. There's the software. It's amazing that the Israelis had the address of practically the entire upper branches of the Iranian government and, and, and was able to kill them near and near instantaneously. That this has got to be the intelligence story has got to be the most important one here. And that, that, that remains completely right. And then the Iranians incapacity to do anything about it.
[07:55]
John Cochran
And what he would like to ask Neil about this too is, you know, another element of the press reporting has been, oh, they really wanted regime change. I think it's pretty clear to me what they wanted to do was block Iran's path to a nuclear weapon, severely degrade the nuclear capability as well as the missile capabilities and, and do as much as much damage to the regime's effort to continue its proxy wars in the region and maybe set up a situation where the Iranian people or certain people in the Iranian government, like their conventional military leaders could say, hey, maybe we're in charge now. Maybe we can get rid of Vale at Al Faqi. Maybe we can, you know, stop our permanent hostility to the United States, Israel and the Arab world and do something decent for our people. So I think that was, you know, the strikes, some of the strikes were aimed to set those conditions, but I don't think it was ever something that Israel or the United States expected to achieve.
[08:48]
Moderator/Host
Right.
[08:49]
John Cochran
Regime change.
[08:49]
Moderator/Host
Another one of the shibboleths here is that you can't win a war of their power. No, the objectives here were to stop the nuclear program and stop its development, not to take over, take over Iran. Hi, Neil.
[09:00]
Bill Whelan
Let's get Neil in the conversation. Neil, here's a question for you. If you were sitting down with the Iranian officials, what would be your list of demands?
[09:08]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Well, that's a pretty unlikely eventuality. They already have the list of demands. Unconditional surrender. Yes, those are the demands.
[09:21]
Moderator/Host
Those are not the real demands. Right, Neil? I mean, we are not saying, like, you know, Germany in 1945, we want you to surrender. Surrender power, we invade Nazi.
[09:29]
Sir Neil Ferguson
They go, well, what President Trump was conveying when he used that phrase was that Iran was not going to be able to have a nuclear weapons program full stop. And as the Iranians were unwilling to agree to that at the negotiating table when they had multiple opportunities to do so, it was very important indeed that President Trump then make it clear what that meant, namely, that the United States and Israel would destroy Iran's nuclear program. I think the Iranians made a terrible blunder, and I would enjoy pointing that out to them if I had the chance. I would say, what were you thinking? Because you clearly didn't learn the lesson of North Korea. And the lesson of North Korea is you can't take the kind of risk you took until you have some deterrence. Think back eight years, 2017, when President Trump, and I don't need to remind HR about this, spoke of fire and fury.
[10:36]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.
[10:50]
Sir Neil Ferguson
And. And if you look back on those days, the rhetoric that the United States used towards North Korea was actually more aggressive and inflammatory than the rhetoric that was used towards Iran. But military action couldn't be taken against North Korea by then because it was too late. The North Koreans had got so far down the road to possessing weapons of mass destruction that the South Koreans weren't willing to take the risk, and the Japanese weren't willing to take the risk. And a significant number of people in the Trump administration were. Weren't willing to take the risk. The Iranians, by contrast, in 2025, had no air defenses because they'd been taken out in October by Israel. And they've been unable to restore their air defenses because their main supplier of air defense systems, the Russians, had said, air, we need them. And in any case, they're not going to be effective against the kind of planes that, that Israel and the United States now have. And yet the Iranians decided that they would hang tough in the negotiations. Well, they had absolutely no right to do that. They should have folded. I thought for a time that they would simply say, yes, yes, whatever you say, and then resume their lying and cheating. But they were so crazy as to call Trump's bluff. I was confident that the military action would be taken this time last week because it was so easy. They had nothing to stop it. Nothing. And indeed, I think My conversations with the former Israeli Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant convinced me that it must already have been decided, and it was only a question of timing. So you'd have to point out to the Iranians that if you don't learn from this lesson, as HR just said, it can happen again and again.
[12:41]
Moderator/Host
They thought they had deterrence because they thought they had Hamas and Hezbollah and Syria and God knows. And then, I mean, this is the, the thing we've seen since October 7th was just one by one by one, Israel kind of kept going to the, to the final, to the, to the final point, which is this one.
[13:00]
John Cochran
Well, I think this goes back to the point we're talking about earlier. You know, don't underestimate the degree to which the ideology of the revolution really does drive and constrain that regime. And, and I think, you know, what I've heard, Neil, this is what you've heard from our friends in Israel, is that the idea was that the US Would decide whether or not to strike after the sixth round of talks in Oman. That was supposed to be the 15th. By the 12th, it was pretty clear that the Iranians weren't even going to show up. The Iranian foreign minister was kind of recalcitrant, intransigent, you know, in the meetings in Europe or with, you know, the old, you know, the, with the Germans and the French. And so I think President Trump said, okay, enough of it then. You know, and, and, and I think that, I think this is what, what is so significant about this is that now we have rejected finally, you know, the, the mantra of de escalation. Yeah. That de escalation is, is a, is an intrinsically good thing, when in fact, what de escalation has done for really four and a half decades is, has given the Islamic Republic of Iran the ability to, to escalate on its own terms with impunity.
[14:10]
Moderator/Host
That's what's so interesting about this, I think, Neil, actually they placed a perfectly reasonable bet that the US Wouldn't do anything and the US Would stop Israel from doing things and, oh, we might blow up, you know, close the Straits of Hormuz or lob a missile at a US Military base or run some terrorist action somewhere would be enough to deter us. You know, and this is the same administration who wants to give Ukraine to the Russians. I'm being a little exaggerating there, but, you know, that, that the US Would stand up firm and actually do something and let Israel actually do something. They might have placed there's a fairly reasonable bet on their Part which they lost, thank goodness.
[14:46]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Well, I think that was a bet that they'd have won if President Harris had been in the Situation Room. But one of the great delusions of the year so far has been the taco trade. From the moment that the Financial Times ran that joke that Trump always chickens out taco over tariffs, a delusion rapidly spread through media land and presumably beyond that, President Trump chickened out generally. But that was to misread the first Trump term because although Trump was unable to take military action against North Korea, he did take military action against Syria, if you'll remember. I hardly need to remind HR, but I, I was reminding myself because it's eight years ago. And then, of course, in 2020, there was the action that HR has already referenced against Suleimani. President Trump dropped the mother of all bombs on the Taliban in his first term. So the idea that Trump is not capable of using American military power, that was a grave mistake if the Iranians really thought that. But it would have worked if President Harris had been in the Situation Room. I'm sure of that. And HR's right. DE ESCALATION turned out, we talked about this in previous episodes, to be the functional opposite of deterrence. The most important thing about what just happened, not only the bombing of Fordo, but also I think the extraordinary success of the Israeli Operation Rising lion, is that deterrence has been re established, or at least a first important step has been taken to re establish it not only with respect to Iran, but crucially in my mind, with respect to the axis of authoritarians more generally. Because this is a message directed not only at Tehran, it's a message directed at Moscow, it's a message directed at Beijing, it's a message directed at Pyongyang. And John, you mentioned Ukraine. But I've noticed that simultaneously with this toughen, toughening of the administration's treatment of Iran, there has been a toughening of the tone towards Vladimir Putin and a distinctly more sympathetic attitude towards both NATO and Ukraine. So these are signals that are intended to be picked up by the leaders of the four authoritarian regimes. And I am very sure that they are being read loud and clear.
[17:14]
John Cochran
The one thing I would say about President Trump's leadership that's relevant to this is what I saw with him when he took decisions like he did in April of 2017 to strike against the Syrian regime's capabilities that have been employed to commit mass murder with chemical weapons was that he considers the costs and risks of action, but unlike many leaders, he considers the costs and risks of Inaction. Also with President Trump, what does he love more than anything else? Big beautiful deals, you know, so he loves, right. So he's going to try for the big beautiful deal. But then once he's disabused of the idea he can get one, you know, with, with one of these leaders of the axis of aggressors, then he will act. And I think what you're seeing is the Trump administration is backing into policies that I think maybe the three of us, you know, four of us would have, would have liked to see maybe earlier. But in doing so, he's actually building more, I think, international support for his actions because he's given the chance, you know, and hey, you got 60 days. Iran. Okay, 60 days are up. Right? You know, hey, Vladimir, you know, I'm doing everything I can, you know, to give you a shot to, to realize that there needs to be an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine. Well, you know, he's bombing, you know, schools and, and hospitals in, in, in Ukraine. And Trump doesn't like that. You know, and that was the topic of this economist essay that that I put out this week. You know, is that, is that connection, Neil, between, you know, what he did on Iran and what the message should be really for the Europeans as they talk to President Trump about what to do next on Ukraine. So I really think that this was a fantastic operation from a strategic perspective, ending sort of the folly of accommodation or conciliation with Iran, having a practical, a really practical effect on blocking Iran's path to a nuclear weapon. But I do think the second and third order effects are going to be very positive in kind of the way that the disastrous and deadly self defeat in Afghanistan, withdrawal from Afghanistan was profoundly negative in terms of what these rivals, adversaries, potential enemies took from that experience.
[19:31]
Bill Whelan
I have two items for you guys to kick around. One, Steve Witkoff, Trump's Middle east envoy, said the other day there are quote, pretty big announcements coming ahead. The thought is maybe this regards the Abraham Accords, possibility of Syria, Lebanon getting involved. I want your guys thoughts on that expansion. But also, Neil, back in Europe, Donald Trump meets with NATO leaders. He gets a promise of a 5% tithe by the year 2035. And NATO Secretary General refers to the President United States as NATO's and I quote, daddy.
[19:58]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Yeah, two really important points here. One of the things that we're seeing is that the Trump administration understands that diplomacy, the use of military force and the use of economic sanctions are not alternatives to one another. They are complementary tools in your toolbox as a policymaker. And so it's quite right that having inflicted this devastating military blow on Iran, there should now be an attempt to talk once again to them about the terms of the unconditional surrender, the abandonment of their nuclear arms program. And that is how it should be. One of the things that was so frustrating about the Biden administration was the way in which sanctions were seen as an alternative to the use of military force. They're not. They never are. This is one of the key lessons of history. They are necessary in some cases, but never sufficient. Daddy's HOME so one of the most interesting things about the NATO summit is the way in which the assertion of American power in the Middle east underlined the importance of the increase in defence spending to which the Europeans have committed themselves. And I cannot overstate the fact, and the importance of the fact that they just committed to increase their defence spending to 5% of GDP. When, and just a few years ago, before President Trump began to apply the pressure that has been so successful, many of them were spending less than 2%. So something has changed in a very profound way. It's going to have second and third order effects, not least presumably to improve the performance of the German economy. But this is because of the pressure that Donald Trump has applied. Without Trump, the Europeans wouldn't be doing this. And that's the thing that Europeans find it very hard to accept. In fact, I was speaking with a group of Germans and others just last night and I reminded them, however much you may dislike President Trump and certainly your media give the impression that you can't stand him and the polling supports that, you need to thank him because the revival of European defence capability is almost entirely due to the pressure that President Trump has applied. So he, he got a well earned and very Trumpian triumph, the way he was flattered by Mark Rutte and the other NATO Europeans. But, you know, he earned it, didn't he?
[22:32]
Moderator/Host
Some of it, though, was from the pressure applied by Vladimir Putin and the Europeans waking up to it. I want to ask you guys a question. Did the ceasefire come too soon? I mean, Trump actually told the Israelis to turn the bombers around. I gather the Israelis were going after the Revolutionary Guards and some of the other parts of the support of the regime. Was that a mistake? And second, the Wall Street Journal had an article today speculating that the Abraham Accords may actually be, may actually suffer here because, for example, the Saudis don't need to team up with Israel against Iran because Iran seems to be a paper tiger anymore. HR Especially what Do you think of both of those questions?
[23:09]
John Cochran
Yeah, well, you know, I don't know. I don't know about, you know, what targets remained. It seemed that, that Israel had had plenty of time to work down their top priority targets, you know, associated with the leadership. We didn't talk about the scientists. Right. This is really important. These 14. These were the top 14 scientists that set the program back. The infrastructure associated with not only, you know, not only the nuclear program itself, but, but the missile program and the drone factories and the entire supply chain associated with these and some of the leadership targets within the rgc, such that now the leaders of the Iranian armed forces come from the conventional military, as we're mentioning. And I think that might be kind of a setup for a hope and an evolution of the nature of the government such that it ceases its hostility. And then also I think, you know, they can turn it back on if necessary. I think now might be the right time to offer these incentives. I think I, I hear from some of my friends in the GULF that the UAE and Saudis are putting together a $30 billion nuclear program, you know, civilian nuclear program deal for Iran, that, that, that they would, they would sign with Iran in exchange for zero enrichment and I'm sure a very intrusive inspection and verification regime to ensure the dismantlement of any existing elements of a nuclear program and probably the missile program. I'm sure the missile program's on the table, too. You know, that's got to go. So we'll see if the regime takes it. The other thing that I think, you know, at this time, so by shutting the bombing off now, you can say, I think, you know, I know we think about this, Neil. I would say, hey, say, hey, I'm ready to talk to your transitional government. You know, I don't want to talk to the same people. I want to talk to your transitional government. So let me know when you got that together.
[24:59]
Sir Neil Ferguson
I think the interesting thing here is precisely the role of the Gulf states. The reason that, that President Trump reigned in Prime Minister Netanyahu is clear. While the Israelis have every incentive to wreck the regime, they don't care if Iran plunges into chaos as long as they don't have to deal with Khomeini and his nuclear scientists. But it's not the first time in the history of the Middle east that the United States has restrained Israel at the moment when Israel seemed on the brink of outright victory. That's what happened in 1973, too. Because if they'd been left to their own devices, the Israelis would have entirely destroyed the Egyptian army. It was Kissinger who said, stop, we want this war over now so that we can negotiate before you've done that. And I think in the same way President Trump has said, hold it right there, because we have a negotiation. And there are other interested parties. However you may feel about the future of Iran, the Gulf Arabs do not want to be next door to a total scene of chaos. You must remember that the most extreme Islamists want chaos because they believe that out of chaos, the Islamic State, the caliphate can arise. So that's what makes the Saudis and the Emiratis very nervous. And I think it's highly interesting to me that they clearly want there to be some kind of move towards diplomacy now rather than an escalation in which Israel achieves a total victory and Iran plunges into chaos with who knows what consequences.
[26:31]
Moderator/Host
But we're all keeping the Ayatollahs alive in doing that. It's an interesting and interesting paradox.
[26:37]
John Cochran
Yeah. You know, what's, what's unclear, you know, some of the targets that, that, that Israel struck were, were the tools of repression, you know, the BEs, capability, some of the police stations. So I don't know how that's going to play out. But I just want to highlight Neil's point is so important, Right. I mean, I think they have two ideas in mind. Remember when, when Zarqawi, who was leading Al Qaeda in Iraq and initiated the sectarian Civil War in 2004, he said that he was pursuing the Afghan model. And what he meant by that is he wanted to jumpstart a civil war, like the civil war in Afghanistan from 92 to 96, after which the Taliban emerged. And, and then also they're looking at Libya, you know, a country of 6 million people, right, that is still in chaos. And, and now you've got, you know, Iran's a country of 90 million people, right? So I think, I think this is a really important point. There is a great deal of concern about, about fragmentation in, in Iran also. This also analogous to the Syrian civil war, right? Syria shattered like a light bulb, you know, so, yeah, what comes next is always important. And trying to shape that is we have limited agency here to do that. I think we ought to try our best.
[27:47]
Bill Whelan
I hate to play the role of the heel here, but we're up against a hard out. HR's got to run, John's got planes to fly and so forth. So let's leave with one quick question for each of you. Just tell us one thing. You're looking at in the days and weeks ahead. HR you go first.
[28:00]
John Cochran
The one thing I would like to see is more messaging directly to the Iranian people to say to them, hey, listen, we had to do these strikes. We had to do these strikes because of the nature of your regime, a regime that has so much blood on its hands across the region, but blood on its hands inside of Iran as well. And I think we ought to be very direct and as effective as we can in bolstering opposition to the regime and clarifying what our intentions were and clarifying that we care about the Iranian people.
[28:29]
Moderator/Host
Yeah. Is this one and done? We've made our point. Back to the usual. Or is this no, we're really not going to let them have a nuclear. Nuclear weapon. And if the Iranian people rise and wish to have a new and serious government, will we support them this time around? Let's hope so.
[28:47]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Well, I won't be looking at the Middle East. I'll be looking first at Moscow and then at Beijing. It seems to me pretty clear that things are going very badly for Vladimir Putin, badly in the sense that he no longer really has much sympathy from President Trump. I understand from sources close to the president that he really chewed Putin out when Putin had the. Had the rashness to offer his diplomatic services and he was told, I don't need help with Iran, I need help with you. So I think if you watch, he.
[29:28]
John Cochran
Said, why don't you mediate Russia, Vladimir? Yes.
[29:31]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Yeah, yeah. So watching what happens next with respect to Ukraine is important because Putin is now in a much worse position than he was in just six months ago. Moreover, think about this. Germany is rearming. In what century has that been good news for Russia? None. So there's something going very wrong indeed when the consequence of your foreign policy is that NATO commits itself to 5% of GDP and the leading player in the rearmament of Europe is Germany. So I think watch carefully to see what happens next. Putin made a very unreasonable maximalist demand in response to a peace deal that he should have taken. Now he's in quite a spot of difficulty, I think, and he's reduced to attacking civilian targets. I was talking to Dmitry Koleba, the former Ukrainian foreign minister, just a couple of days ago. He made the point that while we were focused on the Middle east, the Russians switched to outright war on civilians. That may be a sign, in fact, of military desperation, because things are not, in fact, working out at all well for Putin's war. Secondly, Beijing, ultimately, this is a strategic game against the four axis powers. As we've often discussed, the biggest risk to President Trump's grand strategy is that a Taiwan crisis develops, which would be, of course, a far, far more difficult proposition from a military standpoint than taking on Iran because China is a formidable economic rival, technological rival and has nuclear weapons. So we've got to watch carefully to see what plays out in Beijing. I think they are looking at this and the probability of a move on Taiwan has gone down significantly this year. Indeed, they continue to struggle with their military leadership and its obvious shortcomings and corruption. But this is not just a one year game. This game is going to be played out over the rest of the Trump administration. And at some point, as we've often discussed on this show, it'll be the Taiwan crisis that we are talking about. And a lot depends on how far American deterrence is being re established, not just in the Middle east, not just Eastern Europe, but globally. If it's re established globally, this Taiwan crisis may never happen. And then we'll look back on that piece I wrote back in January about the Reaganite aspect of the second Trump term. Peace through strength is back and I have to say that's the best news I've heard this year.
[31:54]
Bill Whelan
And gentlemen, we'll leave it there. We'll have a full episode of Goodfellows in the near future. So looking forward to it. On behalf of the Goodfellows, Sir, Neil Ferguson, Lt. Gen. H.R. mcMaster, John Cochran, thanks for joining us today. We'll see you soon. Until next time, take care. Thanks again for watching.
[32:08]
John Cochran
Fly well, John. Fly well.
[32:10]
Moderator/Host
Thank you. If you enjoyed this show and are interested in listening to more content featuring HR McMaster, subscribe to Battlegrounds also available at hoover.org battlegrounds.

Summary9 min read

GoodFellows Podcast Summary

Episode Title: Call Him Daddy: Assessing America’s Strike On Iran
Date: June 27, 2025
Participants:

Bill Whelan (Moderator/Host)
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster (Hoover Senior Fellow, Former National Security Advisor)
John Cochrane (Hoover Senior Fellow, Economist)
Sir Niall Ferguson (Hoover Senior Fellow, Historian; joins partway)

Episode Overview

In this episode, the GoodFellows panel analyzes the strategic, political, and international ramifications of the recent U.S. airstrike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. The discussion explores the effectiveness of the strike, the shift in U.S.-Iran policy under Trump, and the broader implications for deterrence, allied dynamics, and global authoritarian regimes. The panelists critique media narratives, the logic of de-escalation, and the interplay between diplomacy, sanctions, and military force.

Key Segments & Discussion Points

1. Immediate Reactions to the U.S. Strike on Iran

US and Israeli Precision: The panel is unanimous in describing the operation as a "phenomenal" military success—striking deep underground facilities with extreme precision over a 37-hour round trip, and with no casualties.
- "The idea of flying a plane 37 hours round, dropping bombs with precision on a nuclear facility, nobody dying on that mission. And yet those planes come back to the United States and what happens? Two things. Number one, questioning the idea of bombing to begin with, but secondly, then questioning the efficiency of the attack." — Bill Whelan [00:21]
- John Cochrane elaborates on the technical achievement, noting the fragility of the centrifuges and the severe setback for Iran’s program:
  "It's clear to me that nuclear program is set way back... certainly multiple years." [01:28]
Media Skepticism & Political Framing: There is frustration at media focus on potential negatives and skepticism, which H.R. McMaster and John Cochrane attribute in part to anti-Trump sentiment and a longstanding policy bias favoring accommodation with Iran.
- "If you dislike Donald Trump enough, you begin to cheer for Ayatollah Khamenei, you know, and... the leak itself, which was criminal and kind of the tone of it and the tone of the press reflects, I think, their policy preference for continuing to supplicate to the Iranian regime..." — John Cochrane [01:28-04:06]

2. Strategic Implications and Lessons for Iran

Deterrence Re-established: The core strategic message of the strike is not the destruction of specific hardware but the demonstration of American (and Israeli) will.
- "We demonstrated that we are willing to do what it takes to stop it. And Israel demonstrated that they're willing to do what it takes to stop it." — Moderator/Host [04:07]
Changed Cost-Benefit for Iran: McMaster observes that Trump’s decisiveness (as with the Soleimani strike in 2020) disrupts Iranian assumptions about American passivity:
- "America can do nothing. And Ayatollah Khamenei said that three or so days before Donald Trump decided to kill Qasem Soleimani... I think this is what's really important. Hey, if Iran wants to rebuild this program, they've got a lot of work to do... and it's going to cost a lot of money." — H.R. McMaster [06:06]

3. Intentions: Regime Change or Deterrence?

The panel debunks the claim that regime change was the goal.
- "It's pretty clear to me what they wanted to do was block Iran's path to a nuclear weapon, severely degrade the nuclear capability as well as the missile capabilities and... do as much damage to the regime's effort to continue its proxy wars in the region..." — John Cochrane [07:55]
- "No, the objectives here were to stop the nuclear program and stop its development, not to take over, take over Iran." — Moderator/Host [08:49]

4. Niall Ferguson Joins: Iran’s Miscalculation and Historical Lessons

Ferguson argues that Iran blundered by overestimating its deterrent power, unlike North Korea, and failed to learn the right lessons from past U.S. actions.
- "They should have folded. I thought for a time that they would simply say, yes, yes, whatever you say, and then resume their lying and cheating. But they were so crazy as to call Trump's bluff. I was confident that military action would be taken..." — Niall Ferguson [09:29, 10:49]
He places this episode in the broader context of U.S. resolve, noting that "de-escalation" has often served as the opposite of deterrence.

5. Significance Beyond Iran: Signals to Global Adversaries

The panel sees the US action as a message not only to Iran, but to authoritarian regimes elsewhere.
- "This is a message directed not only at Tehran, it's a message directed at Moscow, it's a message directed at Beijing, it's a message directed at Pyongyang." — Niall Ferguson [14:45-17:13]
Ferguson also highlights a shift in U.S. stance towards NATO and Ukraine:
- "There has been a toughening of the tone towards Vladimir Putin and a distinctly more sympathetic attitude towards both NATO and Ukraine." — [14:45-17:13]

6. Trump’s Leadership Style: Weighing Action vs. Inaction

McMaster says Trump not only considers risks of military action but also of inaction, differentiating him from other leaders. Trump pursues “big beautiful deals” but will act decisively if stymied.
- "He considers the costs and risks of action, but unlike many leaders, he considers the costs and risks of inaction." — H.R. McMaster [17:13]
The approach to Iran is read as a return to deterrence, analogous to "peace through strength."

7. Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Post-Strike Opportunities

Ferguson: Trump’s administration uses sanctions, diplomacy, and force as complementary, not exclusive, tools—unlike Biden’s approach.
- "The Trump administration understands that diplomacy, the use of military force and the use of economic sanctions are not alternatives to one another. They are complementary tools in your toolbox as a policymaker." — Niall Ferguson [19:57]
The episode title comes to a head here:
- "Daddy's HOME... The importance of the increase in defence spending to which the Europeans have committed... is because of the pressure that Donald Trump has applied. Without Trump, the Europeans wouldn't be doing this..." — Niall Ferguson [19:57-22:31]

8. Ceasefire Timing, Abraham Accords & Regional Dynamics

Debate on whether the bombing should have continued; some panelists suggest an opportunity to pressure Iran further was missed, while others argue Gulf states prefer a controlled outcome to avoid chaos on their borders.
- "While the Israelis have every incentive to wreck the regime, ... the Gulf Arabs do not want to be next door to a total scene of chaos." — Niall Ferguson [24:58]
Gulf States propose leveraging new civilian nuclear deals to preclude enrichment in Iran.
- "The UAE and Saudis are putting together a $30 billion nuclear program, you know, civilian nuclear program deal for Iran, that... they would sign with Iran in exchange for zero enrichment..." — John Cochrane [23:09]

9. Risks of Fragmentation, Civil War, and Lessons from Syria/Libya

The panel notes the dangers of Iranian state collapse, referencing Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya as civil war cautionary tales.
- "Iran's a country of 90 million people, right? So I think, I think this is a really important point. There is a great deal of concern about, about fragmentation in Iran..." — John Cochrane [26:36]

10. Looking Forward: What Comes Next?

Direct Messaging to Iranian People:
- "We had to do these strikes because of the nature of your regime, a regime that has so much blood on its hands across the region, but blood on its hands inside of Iran as well. I think we ought to be very direct... in bolstering opposition to the regime and clarifying... that we care about the Iranian people." — John Cochrane [27:59]
Expanding Focus to Russia and China:
- Ferguson expects ripples affecting Putin’s position and calculations in Beijing, asserting the restoration of deterrence may curb aggression in Ukraine and delay or prevent a Taiwan crisis.
- "This is a strategic game against the four axis powers. The biggest risk... is that a Taiwan crisis develops... If [deterrence is] reestablished globally, this Taiwan crisis may never happen. And then we'll look back... Peace through strength is back and I have to say that's the best news I've heard this year." — Niall Ferguson [29:31]

Memorable Quotes & Moments

On the Meaning of the Strike

"Daddy's HOME" — Niall Ferguson [19:57]
"This is a message directed not only at Tehran, it's a message directed at Moscow, it's a message directed at Beijing, it's a message directed at Pyongyang." — Niall Ferguson [14:45]
"DE ESCALATION turned out... to be the functional opposite of deterrence." — Niall Ferguson [14:45]
"What de escalation has done for really four and a half decades is, has given the Islamic Republic of Iran the ability to, to escalate on its own terms with impunity." — John Cochrane [13:00]

On Trump’s Policy

"He loves, right. So he's going to try for the big beautiful deal. But then once he's disabused of the idea he can get one... then he will act." — H.R. McMaster [17:13]
"The revival of European defence capability is almost entirely due to the pressure that President Trump has applied." — Niall Ferguson [19:57-22:31]

On Risks of State Collapse

"Iran's a country of 90 million people, right? So... there is a great deal of concern about, about fragmentation in Iran also. This also analogous to the Syrian civil war, right? Syria shattered like a light bulb, you know, so, yeah, what comes next is always important." — John Cochrane [26:36]

On Global Implications

"So watching what happens next with respect to Ukraine is important because Putin is now in a much worse position than he was in just six months ago... Germany is rearming. In what century has that been good news for Russia? None." — Niall Ferguson [29:31]

Critical Timestamps

| Timestamp | Segment / Key Discussion | |-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 00:21 | Opening on the Iranian strike - technical details, media reaction. | | 01:28 | McMaster & Cochrane on media bias and intelligence/policy failures regarding Iran. | | 04:07 | Analytical pivot to deterrence - "not just about hardware". | | 06:06 | McMaster: Only Trump has acted forcefully, shifting Iran's incentives. | | 07:55 | Clarification: The strikes aimed to block nukes, not regime change. | | 09:00 | Ferguson joins: Iran's diplomatic miscalculations, North Korea analogy. | | 10:49 | Ferguson: North Korea’s deterrent power vs. Iran’s vulnerabilities. | | 14:09 | The panel on why traditional deterrence had been lost and is now restored. | | 14:45 | Global message: U.S. willingness to use force resonates in Russia, China, N. Korea. | | 17:13 | McMaster: Trump's method—considering costs of action vs inaction, the "big deal" approach. | | 19:57 | Ferguson: Sanctions, diplomacy, and force as interlocking levers; "Daddy" at NATO. | | 23:09 | New regional dynamics: Gulf nuclear proposal to Iran; on stopping bombing at this juncture. | | 24:58 | Ferguson: U.S. curbs Israel, regional states wary of total Iranian collapse. | | 26:36 | Cochrane: The dangers of instability and civil war in a large state like Iran. | | 27:59 | What happens next: Direct communication with the Iranian people. | | 29:31 | Ferguson: Ramifications for Russia and the escalatory risks with China and Taiwan. |

Conclusion

This episode offers a multi-layered analysis of the U.S. strike on Iran, championing it as a restoration of American and allied deterrence after decades of "de-escalation" and cautious accommodation. The discussion repeatedly emphasizes global ramifications, not only for Iran’s nuclear program but as a lesson to adversarial regimes worldwide. The panel is united in cautioning against regime collapse-induced chaos and stresses the importance of communicating with the Iranian people. Finally, they connect the events in the Middle East to shifts in NATO, European policy, and the strategic chessboard involving Russia and China, arguing that the U.S. actions are an opening move in a much larger game of deterrence and diplomacy.

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[00:00]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
They're not going to be fighting each other.
[00:01]
Sir Neil Ferguson
They've had it.
[00:03]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
They've had a big fight, like two kids in a schoolyard, you know, they fight like hell. You can't stop them. Let them fight for about two, three minutes, then it's easy to stop them.
[00:11]
John Cochran
And then Daddy has to sometimes use strong language.
[00:14]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
You have to use strong language. Every once in a while you have to use a certain word.
[00:22]
Bill Whelan
It's Friday, June 27, 2025. And welcome back to Goodfellows, a Hoover Institution broadcast examining social, economic, political, and in this case, geopolitical concerns. I'm Bill Whelan, I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow. I'll be your moderator today. And we begin. One Goodfellow shy Sir Neil Ferguson is gonna join us at some point. Meanwhile, we're gonna start our show with the knowledge of Lt. Gen. H.R. mcMaster and economist John Cochran. Both John and H.R. are Hoover Senior Fellows. Our time is short, gentlemen. Let's get right to it. HR I turn to you, I'm curious about what has happened here in the Middle east in this regard. The United States did something which militarily is phenomenal. The idea of flying a plane 37 hours round, dropping bombs with precision on a nuclear facility, nobody dying on that mission. And yet those planes come back to the United States and what happens? Two things. Number one, questioning the idea of bombing to begin with, but secondly, then questioning the efficiency of the attack. My question to HR Is this simply a function of the fact that Donald Trump's fingerprints run it thus? It must be bad, or is there something larger afoot here about the media's attitude toward military in general?
[01:29]
John Cochran
You know, I think they're both dynamics at play here. You know, I mean, it's funny, I guess, if you, if you dislike Donald Trump enough, you begin to cheer for Ayatollah Khamenei, you know, and, and, and it was just ridiculous, the whole, you know, the whole discussion about the initial reports of limited effects. Of course we're not going to know that for a little while, but it's clear to me that nuclear program is set way back, I would say definitely much more than, than months. I mean, certainly multiple years, you know, and you have to look at the way that the Israelis went after the whole supply chain and the accurate target emplacement of these mops, the 30,000 pound bombs. I think it's extraordinary because of the precision, because of the intelligence, where they knew exactly where to strike. Right down the ventilation shafts, for example. And you got to remember, centrifuges they, they're pretty delicate things, you know, I mean, I mean, people try not to bump into them if they're walking through the facility, let alone when there's a 30,000 pound bomb hitting. So, you know, it's, it seemed to me like, you know, that whoever leaked this certainly, and maybe even who wrote that intelligence assessment, you know, was kind of, you know, upset that we had taken military action against Iran. I just have to tell you, like, for years I thought our intelligence was tainted by policy preference of the intelligence community on Iran. I mean, these assessments would get. Oh, we don't think that they're weaponizing really. And then we entered the JCPOA, this Iran nuclear deal in 2015. And the day of the agreement, before the ink was dry, the Iranian leaders said, hey, here are all the places you can't look at. What do you think they were doing there? Why did they bury the Natanz site that wasn't discovered till 2002? Why did they bury the Fordo site, you know, 300ft underground? I mean, probably because they're doing something there they don't want you to see. So even the IAEA had caught them, caught them enriching to much higher than they were supposed to be because you have to put in new pipes when you do that. And they came back. Oh, we were just kind of painting the facility really, you know, what are these new pipes for? So I just think, you know, it's ridiculous. It, it reflects the leak itself, which was criminal and kind of the tone of it and the tone of the press reflects, I think, their policy preference for continuing to supplicate to the Iranian regime under this, you know what? We have now disproven the theory that if we're conciliatory with them, Ayatollah Khamenei's heart is going to grow two sizes bigger like the Grinch on Christmas Eve, you know, and they're all going to change and everything's going to be fine.
[04:07]
Bill Whelan
John.
[04:08]
Moderator/Host
So, yeah, I want to wind my way around to a question here. So let us celebrate the precision. It is just amazing feature of modern war. Not only are precision of dropping a 35, 30,000 pound bomb down a ventilator shaft, the amazing amount of intelligence, but the on the Israelis too. The Israelis have been doing amazingly precise stakes to the point that I've seen videos. People in Tehran are out there watching on the rooftops because they know the Israelis are hitting very precise. They've seen just pictures of the top floor of an apartment building gone the bottom floor is still in there. You know, the Iranians are sort of scattering missiles all over, but not the intelligence are our own team turned out to be pretty good. And the Israelis are just amazing at what they know about what's going on in Iran. And likewise the, the opposite, the competence. It is lovely to see a branch of the federal government really know what it's doing. Hr, that, that's, that's your guys this day and age. It's just lovely to see it. But the question I think this, this kerfuffle you're talking about profoundly misses the point. It is not about did this one strike completely eliminate the nuclear capacity of Iran? It's we demonstrated that we are willing to do what it takes to stop it. And Israel demonstrated that they're willing to do what it takes to stop it. And if that means more strikes, we're probably going to have more strikes eventually. I'm sure they're not going to let Iran rebuild its air defenses and, and go back to tit for tat, pretend and so forth. So I really think that's, and this is from where we're sort of winding around to a question for hr Is not the significance of it, that America has finally stood up for something, and that is that we're going to do what it takes and if this doesn't take it, the other ones, the other ones will do no matter what. And that of course leads to is, is Iran going to finally say, well, we had enough, or are they going to try to go back to the old, you know, tit for tat kind of, I'll, I'll throw one at you, you throw one at me. But not serious. We're going to degrade your capacity stuff that Israel is doing now.
[06:07]
John Cochran
Yeah. Hey, John, I think that is the, that is really maybe the most important point is that there's only been one administration in the last seven administrations who has acted directly against Iran, and that's been Donald Trump twice. And you know, I think about the quotation from Ayatollah Khomeini and his successor, Ayatollah Khamenei, they said the same phrase, both of them, America can do nothing. And Ayatollah Khamenei said that three or so days before Donald Trump decided to kill Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al muhandas on, on January 3, 2020. And, and so I think what he's done is he showed that he will act. And this is what's really important. Hey, if Iran wants to rebuild this program, they've got a lot of work to do. I mean, they're set back, plus it's going to cost a lot of money. And are they going to decide to do it when they know, hey, there's a US President and there's an Israeli prime Minister who once we restart this, they're probably just going to come right back out after us. So I think, I think that what he has done, you know, is change the incentive structure, man. You know, to put it in economist terms, John. And I think that might be, that, that might, or his cost benefit analysis maybe I should say, has shifted significantly.
[07:29]
Moderator/Host
There's the hardware which we bombed and we will do it again. There's the software. It's amazing that the Israelis had the address of practically the entire upper branches of the Iranian government and, and, and was able to kill them near and near instantaneously. That this has got to be the intelligence story has got to be the most important one here. And that, that, that remains completely right. And then the Iranians incapacity to do anything about it.
[07:55]
John Cochran
And what he would like to ask Neil about this too is, you know, another element of the press reporting has been, oh, they really wanted regime change. I think it's pretty clear to me what they wanted to do was block Iran's path to a nuclear weapon, severely degrade the nuclear capability as well as the missile capabilities and, and do as much as much damage to the regime's effort to continue its proxy wars in the region and maybe set up a situation where the Iranian people or certain people in the Iranian government, like their conventional military leaders could say, hey, maybe we're in charge now. Maybe we can get rid of Vale at Al Faqi. Maybe we can, you know, stop our permanent hostility to the United States, Israel and the Arab world and do something decent for our people. So I think that was, you know, the strikes, some of the strikes were aimed to set those conditions, but I don't think it was ever something that Israel or the United States expected to achieve.
[08:48]
Moderator/Host
Right.
[08:49]
John Cochran
Regime change.
[08:49]
Moderator/Host
Another one of the shibboleths here is that you can't win a war of their power. No, the objectives here were to stop the nuclear program and stop its development, not to take over, take over Iran. Hi, Neil.
[09:00]
Bill Whelan
Let's get Neil in the conversation. Neil, here's a question for you. If you were sitting down with the Iranian officials, what would be your list of demands?
[09:08]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Well, that's a pretty unlikely eventuality. They already have the list of demands. Unconditional surrender. Yes, those are the demands.
[09:21]
Moderator/Host
Those are not the real demands. Right, Neil? I mean, we are not saying, like, you know, Germany in 1945, we want you to surrender. Surrender power, we invade Nazi.
[09:29]
Sir Neil Ferguson
They go, well, what President Trump was conveying when he used that phrase was that Iran was not going to be able to have a nuclear weapons program full stop. And as the Iranians were unwilling to agree to that at the negotiating table when they had multiple opportunities to do so, it was very important indeed that President Trump then make it clear what that meant, namely, that the United States and Israel would destroy Iran's nuclear program. I think the Iranians made a terrible blunder, and I would enjoy pointing that out to them if I had the chance. I would say, what were you thinking? Because you clearly didn't learn the lesson of North Korea. And the lesson of North Korea is you can't take the kind of risk you took until you have some deterrence. Think back eight years, 2017, when President Trump, and I don't need to remind HR about this, spoke of fire and fury.
[10:36]
Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster
North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.
[10:50]
Sir Neil Ferguson
And. And if you look back on those days, the rhetoric that the United States used towards North Korea was actually more aggressive and inflammatory than the rhetoric that was used towards Iran. But military action couldn't be taken against North Korea by then because it was too late. The North Koreans had got so far down the road to possessing weapons of mass destruction that the South Koreans weren't willing to take the risk, and the Japanese weren't willing to take the risk. And a significant number of people in the Trump administration were. Weren't willing to take the risk. The Iranians, by contrast, in 2025, had no air defenses because they'd been taken out in October by Israel. And they've been unable to restore their air defenses because their main supplier of air defense systems, the Russians, had said, air, we need them. And in any case, they're not going to be effective against the kind of planes that, that Israel and the United States now have. And yet the Iranians decided that they would hang tough in the negotiations. Well, they had absolutely no right to do that. They should have folded. I thought for a time that they would simply say, yes, yes, whatever you say, and then resume their lying and cheating. But they were so crazy as to call Trump's bluff. I was confident that the military action would be taken this time last week because it was so easy. They had nothing to stop it. Nothing. And indeed, I think My conversations with the former Israeli Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant convinced me that it must already have been decided, and it was only a question of timing. So you'd have to point out to the Iranians that if you don't learn from this lesson, as HR just said, it can happen again and again.
[12:41]
Moderator/Host
They thought they had deterrence because they thought they had Hamas and Hezbollah and Syria and God knows. And then, I mean, this is the, the thing we've seen since October 7th was just one by one by one, Israel kind of kept going to the, to the final, to the, to the final point, which is this one.
[13:00]
John Cochran
Well, I think this goes back to the point we're talking about earlier. You know, don't underestimate the degree to which the ideology of the revolution really does drive and constrain that regime. And, and I think, you know, what I've heard, Neil, this is what you've heard from our friends in Israel, is that the idea was that the US Would decide whether or not to strike after the sixth round of talks in Oman. That was supposed to be the 15th. By the 12th, it was pretty clear that the Iranians weren't even going to show up. The Iranian foreign minister was kind of recalcitrant, intransigent, you know, in the meetings in Europe or with, you know, the old, you know, the, with the Germans and the French. And so I think President Trump said, okay, enough of it then. You know, and, and, and I think that, I think this is what, what is so significant about this is that now we have rejected finally, you know, the, the mantra of de escalation. Yeah. That de escalation is, is a, is an intrinsically good thing, when in fact, what de escalation has done for really four and a half decades is, has given the Islamic Republic of Iran the ability to, to escalate on its own terms with impunity.
[14:10]
Moderator/Host
That's what's so interesting about this, I think, Neil, actually they placed a perfectly reasonable bet that the US Wouldn't do anything and the US Would stop Israel from doing things and, oh, we might blow up, you know, close the Straits of Hormuz or lob a missile at a US Military base or run some terrorist action somewhere would be enough to deter us. You know, and this is the same administration who wants to give Ukraine to the Russians. I'm being a little exaggerating there, but, you know, that, that the US Would stand up firm and actually do something and let Israel actually do something. They might have placed there's a fairly reasonable bet on their Part which they lost, thank goodness.
[14:46]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Well, I think that was a bet that they'd have won if President Harris had been in the Situation Room. But one of the great delusions of the year so far has been the taco trade. From the moment that the Financial Times ran that joke that Trump always chickens out taco over tariffs, a delusion rapidly spread through media land and presumably beyond that, President Trump chickened out generally. But that was to misread the first Trump term because although Trump was unable to take military action against North Korea, he did take military action against Syria, if you'll remember. I hardly need to remind HR, but I, I was reminding myself because it's eight years ago. And then, of course, in 2020, there was the action that HR has already referenced against Suleimani. President Trump dropped the mother of all bombs on the Taliban in his first term. So the idea that Trump is not capable of using American military power, that was a grave mistake if the Iranians really thought that. But it would have worked if President Harris had been in the Situation Room. I'm sure of that. And HR's right. DE ESCALATION turned out, we talked about this in previous episodes, to be the functional opposite of deterrence. The most important thing about what just happened, not only the bombing of Fordo, but also I think the extraordinary success of the Israeli Operation Rising lion, is that deterrence has been re established, or at least a first important step has been taken to re establish it not only with respect to Iran, but crucially in my mind, with respect to the axis of authoritarians more generally. Because this is a message directed not only at Tehran, it's a message directed at Moscow, it's a message directed at Beijing, it's a message directed at Pyongyang. And John, you mentioned Ukraine. But I've noticed that simultaneously with this toughen, toughening of the administration's treatment of Iran, there has been a toughening of the tone towards Vladimir Putin and a distinctly more sympathetic attitude towards both NATO and Ukraine. So these are signals that are intended to be picked up by the leaders of the four authoritarian regimes. And I am very sure that they are being read loud and clear.
[17:14]
John Cochran
The one thing I would say about President Trump's leadership that's relevant to this is what I saw with him when he took decisions like he did in April of 2017 to strike against the Syrian regime's capabilities that have been employed to commit mass murder with chemical weapons was that he considers the costs and risks of action, but unlike many leaders, he considers the costs and risks of Inaction. Also with President Trump, what does he love more than anything else? Big beautiful deals, you know, so he loves, right. So he's going to try for the big beautiful deal. But then once he's disabused of the idea he can get one, you know, with, with one of these leaders of the axis of aggressors, then he will act. And I think what you're seeing is the Trump administration is backing into policies that I think maybe the three of us, you know, four of us would have, would have liked to see maybe earlier. But in doing so, he's actually building more, I think, international support for his actions because he's given the chance, you know, and hey, you got 60 days. Iran. Okay, 60 days are up. Right? You know, hey, Vladimir, you know, I'm doing everything I can, you know, to give you a shot to, to realize that there needs to be an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine. Well, you know, he's bombing, you know, schools and, and hospitals in, in, in Ukraine. And Trump doesn't like that. You know, and that was the topic of this economist essay that that I put out this week. You know, is that, is that connection, Neil, between, you know, what he did on Iran and what the message should be really for the Europeans as they talk to President Trump about what to do next on Ukraine. So I really think that this was a fantastic operation from a strategic perspective, ending sort of the folly of accommodation or conciliation with Iran, having a practical, a really practical effect on blocking Iran's path to a nuclear weapon. But I do think the second and third order effects are going to be very positive in kind of the way that the disastrous and deadly self defeat in Afghanistan, withdrawal from Afghanistan was profoundly negative in terms of what these rivals, adversaries, potential enemies took from that experience.
[19:31]
Bill Whelan
I have two items for you guys to kick around. One, Steve Witkoff, Trump's Middle east envoy, said the other day there are quote, pretty big announcements coming ahead. The thought is maybe this regards the Abraham Accords, possibility of Syria, Lebanon getting involved. I want your guys thoughts on that expansion. But also, Neil, back in Europe, Donald Trump meets with NATO leaders. He gets a promise of a 5% tithe by the year 2035. And NATO Secretary General refers to the President United States as NATO's and I quote, daddy.
[19:58]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Yeah, two really important points here. One of the things that we're seeing is that the Trump administration understands that diplomacy, the use of military force and the use of economic sanctions are not alternatives to one another. They are complementary tools in your toolbox as a policymaker. And so it's quite right that having inflicted this devastating military blow on Iran, there should now be an attempt to talk once again to them about the terms of the unconditional surrender, the abandonment of their nuclear arms program. And that is how it should be. One of the things that was so frustrating about the Biden administration was the way in which sanctions were seen as an alternative to the use of military force. They're not. They never are. This is one of the key lessons of history. They are necessary in some cases, but never sufficient. Daddy's HOME so one of the most interesting things about the NATO summit is the way in which the assertion of American power in the Middle east underlined the importance of the increase in defence spending to which the Europeans have committed themselves. And I cannot overstate the fact, and the importance of the fact that they just committed to increase their defence spending to 5% of GDP. When, and just a few years ago, before President Trump began to apply the pressure that has been so successful, many of them were spending less than 2%. So something has changed in a very profound way. It's going to have second and third order effects, not least presumably to improve the performance of the German economy. But this is because of the pressure that Donald Trump has applied. Without Trump, the Europeans wouldn't be doing this. And that's the thing that Europeans find it very hard to accept. In fact, I was speaking with a group of Germans and others just last night and I reminded them, however much you may dislike President Trump and certainly your media give the impression that you can't stand him and the polling supports that, you need to thank him because the revival of European defence capability is almost entirely due to the pressure that President Trump has applied. So he, he got a well earned and very Trumpian triumph, the way he was flattered by Mark Rutte and the other NATO Europeans. But, you know, he earned it, didn't he?
[22:32]
Moderator/Host
Some of it, though, was from the pressure applied by Vladimir Putin and the Europeans waking up to it. I want to ask you guys a question. Did the ceasefire come too soon? I mean, Trump actually told the Israelis to turn the bombers around. I gather the Israelis were going after the Revolutionary Guards and some of the other parts of the support of the regime. Was that a mistake? And second, the Wall Street Journal had an article today speculating that the Abraham Accords may actually be, may actually suffer here because, for example, the Saudis don't need to team up with Israel against Iran because Iran seems to be a paper tiger anymore. HR Especially what Do you think of both of those questions?
[23:09]
John Cochran
Yeah, well, you know, I don't know. I don't know about, you know, what targets remained. It seemed that, that Israel had had plenty of time to work down their top priority targets, you know, associated with the leadership. We didn't talk about the scientists. Right. This is really important. These 14. These were the top 14 scientists that set the program back. The infrastructure associated with not only, you know, not only the nuclear program itself, but, but the missile program and the drone factories and the entire supply chain associated with these and some of the leadership targets within the rgc, such that now the leaders of the Iranian armed forces come from the conventional military, as we're mentioning. And I think that might be kind of a setup for a hope and an evolution of the nature of the government such that it ceases its hostility. And then also I think, you know, they can turn it back on if necessary. I think now might be the right time to offer these incentives. I think I, I hear from some of my friends in the GULF that the UAE and Saudis are putting together a $30 billion nuclear program, you know, civilian nuclear program deal for Iran, that, that, that they would, they would sign with Iran in exchange for zero enrichment and I'm sure a very intrusive inspection and verification regime to ensure the dismantlement of any existing elements of a nuclear program and probably the missile program. I'm sure the missile program's on the table, too. You know, that's got to go. So we'll see if the regime takes it. The other thing that I think, you know, at this time, so by shutting the bombing off now, you can say, I think, you know, I know we think about this, Neil. I would say, hey, say, hey, I'm ready to talk to your transitional government. You know, I don't want to talk to the same people. I want to talk to your transitional government. So let me know when you got that together.
[24:59]
Sir Neil Ferguson
I think the interesting thing here is precisely the role of the Gulf states. The reason that, that President Trump reigned in Prime Minister Netanyahu is clear. While the Israelis have every incentive to wreck the regime, they don't care if Iran plunges into chaos as long as they don't have to deal with Khomeini and his nuclear scientists. But it's not the first time in the history of the Middle east that the United States has restrained Israel at the moment when Israel seemed on the brink of outright victory. That's what happened in 1973, too. Because if they'd been left to their own devices, the Israelis would have entirely destroyed the Egyptian army. It was Kissinger who said, stop, we want this war over now so that we can negotiate before you've done that. And I think in the same way President Trump has said, hold it right there, because we have a negotiation. And there are other interested parties. However you may feel about the future of Iran, the Gulf Arabs do not want to be next door to a total scene of chaos. You must remember that the most extreme Islamists want chaos because they believe that out of chaos, the Islamic State, the caliphate can arise. So that's what makes the Saudis and the Emiratis very nervous. And I think it's highly interesting to me that they clearly want there to be some kind of move towards diplomacy now rather than an escalation in which Israel achieves a total victory and Iran plunges into chaos with who knows what consequences.
[26:31]
Moderator/Host
But we're all keeping the Ayatollahs alive in doing that. It's an interesting and interesting paradox.
[26:37]
John Cochran
Yeah. You know, what's, what's unclear, you know, some of the targets that, that, that Israel struck were, were the tools of repression, you know, the BEs, capability, some of the police stations. So I don't know how that's going to play out. But I just want to highlight Neil's point is so important, Right. I mean, I think they have two ideas in mind. Remember when, when Zarqawi, who was leading Al Qaeda in Iraq and initiated the sectarian Civil War in 2004, he said that he was pursuing the Afghan model. And what he meant by that is he wanted to jumpstart a civil war, like the civil war in Afghanistan from 92 to 96, after which the Taliban emerged. And, and then also they're looking at Libya, you know, a country of 6 million people, right, that is still in chaos. And, and now you've got, you know, Iran's a country of 90 million people, right? So I think, I think this is a really important point. There is a great deal of concern about, about fragmentation in, in Iran also. This also analogous to the Syrian civil war, right? Syria shattered like a light bulb, you know, so, yeah, what comes next is always important. And trying to shape that is we have limited agency here to do that. I think we ought to try our best.
[27:47]
Bill Whelan
I hate to play the role of the heel here, but we're up against a hard out. HR's got to run, John's got planes to fly and so forth. So let's leave with one quick question for each of you. Just tell us one thing. You're looking at in the days and weeks ahead. HR you go first.
[28:00]
John Cochran
The one thing I would like to see is more messaging directly to the Iranian people to say to them, hey, listen, we had to do these strikes. We had to do these strikes because of the nature of your regime, a regime that has so much blood on its hands across the region, but blood on its hands inside of Iran as well. And I think we ought to be very direct and as effective as we can in bolstering opposition to the regime and clarifying what our intentions were and clarifying that we care about the Iranian people.
[28:29]
Moderator/Host
Yeah. Is this one and done? We've made our point. Back to the usual. Or is this no, we're really not going to let them have a nuclear. Nuclear weapon. And if the Iranian people rise and wish to have a new and serious government, will we support them this time around? Let's hope so.
[28:47]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Well, I won't be looking at the Middle East. I'll be looking first at Moscow and then at Beijing. It seems to me pretty clear that things are going very badly for Vladimir Putin, badly in the sense that he no longer really has much sympathy from President Trump. I understand from sources close to the president that he really chewed Putin out when Putin had the. Had the rashness to offer his diplomatic services and he was told, I don't need help with Iran, I need help with you. So I think if you watch, he.
[29:28]
John Cochran
Said, why don't you mediate Russia, Vladimir? Yes.
[29:31]
Sir Neil Ferguson
Yeah, yeah. So watching what happens next with respect to Ukraine is important because Putin is now in a much worse position than he was in just six months ago. Moreover, think about this. Germany is rearming. In what century has that been good news for Russia? None. So there's something going very wrong indeed when the consequence of your foreign policy is that NATO commits itself to 5% of GDP and the leading player in the rearmament of Europe is Germany. So I think watch carefully to see what happens next. Putin made a very unreasonable maximalist demand in response to a peace deal that he should have taken. Now he's in quite a spot of difficulty, I think, and he's reduced to attacking civilian targets. I was talking to Dmitry Koleba, the former Ukrainian foreign minister, just a couple of days ago. He made the point that while we were focused on the Middle east, the Russians switched to outright war on civilians. That may be a sign, in fact, of military desperation, because things are not, in fact, working out at all well for Putin's war. Secondly, Beijing, ultimately, this is a strategic game against the four axis powers. As we've often discussed, the biggest risk to President Trump's grand strategy is that a Taiwan crisis develops, which would be, of course, a far, far more difficult proposition from a military standpoint than taking on Iran because China is a formidable economic rival, technological rival and has nuclear weapons. So we've got to watch carefully to see what plays out in Beijing. I think they are looking at this and the probability of a move on Taiwan has gone down significantly this year. Indeed, they continue to struggle with their military leadership and its obvious shortcomings and corruption. But this is not just a one year game. This game is going to be played out over the rest of the Trump administration. And at some point, as we've often discussed on this show, it'll be the Taiwan crisis that we are talking about. And a lot depends on how far American deterrence is being re established, not just in the Middle east, not just Eastern Europe, but globally. If it's re established globally, this Taiwan crisis may never happen. And then we'll look back on that piece I wrote back in January about the Reaganite aspect of the second Trump term. Peace through strength is back and I have to say that's the best news I've heard this year.
[31:54]
Bill Whelan
And gentlemen, we'll leave it there. We'll have a full episode of Goodfellows in the near future. So looking forward to it. On behalf of the Goodfellows, Sir, Neil Ferguson, Lt. Gen. H.R. mcMaster, John Cochran, thanks for joining us today. We'll see you soon. Until next time, take care. Thanks again for watching.
[32:08]
John Cochran
Fly well, John. Fly well.
[32:10]
Moderator/Host
Thank you. If you enjoyed this show and are interested in listening to more content featuring HR McMaster, subscribe to Battlegrounds also available at hoover.org battlegrounds.