← GoodFellows: Conversations on Economics, History & Geopolitics
GoodFellows: Conversations on Economics, History & Geopolitics
Coercive Diplomacy: Venezuela, Iran, and . . . Greenland? | GoodFellows | Hoover Institution
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A
So we are going to run the country until such time as we can do a safe, proper and judicious transition. And it has to be judicious because that's what we're all about.
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B
It's Tuesday, January 6, 2026. And welcome back to Goodfellows, a Hoover Institution broadcast examining history, economics and matters of geopolitical importance. I'm Bill Whelan. I'm a Hoover Distinguished Policy Fellow, and I'll be your moderator today. Looking forward to a spirited conversation featuring three of my colleagues, whom we jokingly refer to as the Goodfellows. I'm referring, of course, to the historian Sir Neil Ferguson, economist John Cochran, and former presidential national security advisor, Lieutenant General H. Rob McMaster. Gentlemen, a belated happy New Year. And here we are only three weeks off and once again, the world is on fire here. Let's talk about two things that are going right well. We're going to talk about Venezuela, obviously, and time permitting, we will talk a little bit about Iran. If we don't get very deep into Iran, fear not, we have another show next week, so perhaps we can pick up where we left off. So let's begin with Venezuela and HR I turn to you because you have kind of a unique perspective here. When you were in the army, you served in Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein. So you've seen what it's like for a society to undergo this kind of change. But in 2017, there you were in the White House advising Donald Trump about matters of geopolitical importance. I took the opportunity and the time off, HR to read your excellent book Once Again At War with Ourselves. And I turn the Goodfellow's attention to page 204 and allow me to read this passage to you. Look at Neil Smiley. He loves it when we talk about our books. Here, quote, here's what you wrote. You're referring to then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. HR quote, before we left the room, Tillerson said, Mr. President, please don't say anything about military options for Venezuela. As we walk past the swimming pool on the way to the press pool, I said, rex, you know that he is a contrarian. And now the first thing he is going to say about Venezuela is that we are considering military options. Sure enough, when a reporter asked Trump about Venezuela, he said, venezuela is not very far away and the people are suffering and they're dying. We have many options for Venezuela, including a possible military operation if necessary. Asked if it would be a US Led military operation, Trump said, quote, we don't talk about it, but a military operation, a military option is certainly something that we would pursue. And then HR writes in parentheses. There were no military options under consideration. So HR, that was August of 2017. Here we are in January 2025. There was a military option. It was pursued. Two questions for you, my friend. Number one, what happened over that nearly eight years that led us to the military invasion? Secondly, I assume you approve of the choice of going in and taking out Maduro and his wife, returning him to the US for trial. But my question is, does this pass the McMaster standard, which is don't start something unless you have an exit strategy?
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A
Well, you know, there's a lot of consistency with President Trump between Trump 1 and Trump 2, because he used to say to me, hey, General, General, you know, we're all the way over there fighting in Afghanistan and Venezuela. It's just, it's right there. It's right there. So, so he would be in conversations with leaders in the region who were highlighting, you know, the devastating effect that Maduro had had on the Venezuelan population. You know, now we're up to 8 million refugees. But he was talking to people like Santos and Colombia, for example, and, or he was talking to Mexican leaders, you know, prior to Lopez Obrador coming in to Mexico, the PRI leaders in Mexico. And so he heard it from a lot of regional leaders. He learns conversationally like that. But I think what's happened is really with the Biden administration's decision not to secure the southern border and the continued exodus, mass exodus of Venezuelans, many of whom were coming into the country illegally, and Maduro was taking advantage of that to export much of his organized crime networks into the United States. This really just heightened Trump's desire to do something about this problem. Now what also you see with President Trump in this decision to launch this extremely complicated and highly successful raid to, to, to arrest Maduro and his wife, what you also see with him is he wants to make a deal first, right? So he, he thought that he could make a deal maybe with Maduro. He sent, remember, you know, Grinnell down as his, as his, as his special envoy initially to negotiate the release of some unlawfully detained Americans and then, and then also to get, you know, to have a conversation about, about some kind of an accommodation with Maduro. But Maduro turned out to be intransigent like the Iranians were intransigent when he tried to get a deal with them and then joined in, into the very successful IDF 12 day campaign with the strikes on the deep buried nuclear facilities. So I see a lot of consistency here, Bill, rather than a break from the past with President Trump, but the exit strategy.
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B
And I want Neil and John to weigh in here. Is this regime change? Are we putting in a new regime or are we going to see Maduro 2 0? So, Neil, do you want to take that?
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C
Well, I think, first of all, let's give some historical perspective going back even before 2017, because it's clear that when the National Security Strategy came out, it said something very important that many commentators missed, and that was its enunciation of the Trump Corollary. By putting the Western Hemisphere first in the ordering of priorities, the National Security Strategy broke new ground. But to me, the most remarkable thing was the expression in the Trump Corollary, because the Roosevelt Corollary dating back to 1904 was Theodore Roosevelt's assertion that the corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, that non American powers could not become involved in the politics of the Americas was that if a, a government in the Caribbean or Latin America was badly run, the United States reserved the right to intervene.
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A
To sort it out.
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C
So when that National Security Strategy came out in November, to me, that was the big takeaway. And it turned out not to take many weeks for the Trump Corollaries to be put into action. And I do think that that's a really important starting point for this conversation, because what do we know from the history of the Roosevelt Corollary? The history of the Roosevelt Corollary was that the United States repeatedly intervened in Haiti, in Nicaragua, in Panama, creating the state of Panama, in effect, and in Cuba. And each of these interventions had all kinds of complications. It's very difficult to come in and get rid of the president you don't like and then create the president that you do like and expect it all to run smoothly. So I think there are two points, really. One, you can't detract from the boldness and the immaculate execution. Hats off to the CIA, to Delta Force, and I think to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Kane. This has been an exemplary show of force. And it's hard to believe that any of America's competitors amongst the authoritarian states could do anything remotely as impressive as this. But, but as Colin Powell used to say, you break it, you do own it. It's not at all clear what comes next. And to answer your question directly, Bill, the administration does not seem to want to bring in the opposition, the legitimate democratically elected politicians who could govern, or at least would aspire to govern Venezuela. They want to deal with the remnants of the chavista regime that Maduro inherited from Hugo Chavez. And that is, I think, going to be a very tricky thing to pull off given the fact that that regime is shot through not only with corruption and criminality, but also with support from Cuba, from China, from Russia, from the bad guys. It's hard to believe that there really is a stable deal to be done with the remnants of the Maduro regime, in my view.
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D
Well, let me offer a gloomier forecast and this is a trial balloon to be shot down by my fellow goodfellows. First of all, yes, amazed at the competence and execution of our armed forces. HR your buddies really know what they're doing. 32 to 0 against the Cuban defenders of Maduro was spectacular. I think they have in mind the less they don't want another Iraq, they don't want another Afghanistan, they wouldn't mind another Libya. This was not a coup. We didn't orchestrate a coup. We didn't put somebody new in. It was not an invasion. There's no Americans on the ground. We didn't force a different order. We simply removed, removed one leader and, and left intact whoever's there. Well, I'm, I'm channeling Rubio here who seems like the architect of, of what's going on. And basically the lesson I'm seeing is, look, we don't care what happens in your channeling Trump outhouse country. They don't regard other countries very, very nicely. You can keep your little left wing kleptocracy if you want, so long as you kick out Cuba, Russia, Iran, China and sort of do what we say, other than that we don't care, go at it. Now. We're in a moment of great volatility and what I foresee here is the knives come out. Let's look at the players. There's the old regime which they now need to consolidate very quickly because they understand if they lose power, it's not going to be a pleasant little retirement in Dubai or a truth and reconciliation commission. It's going to be really unpleasant if they lose power. So they're going to fight like crazy. There's about a third of the country run by whatever we call narco, terrorist gangs. And they understand they need to control territory and get along with their government. They're going to fight like crazy. There's ordinary people who hate number one and number two, but you know, rising up is very difficult. There's the opposition group who has, of course, all the moral authority and the backing of all the aircraft carriers that Belgium can provide. I'm being sarcastic there, but they do also have the backing of the diaspora, who also hates the current regime. So they can put up quite a bit of a fight. So that looks like a recipe for civil war and chaos. And I don't see any likelihood of the US Putting boots on the ground and actually doing something, especially once the window of opportunity for a swift here's who's in charge. Get used to it. Has passed and that opportunity will pass very quickly. So that's the gloomy forecast. The one optimistic forecast I've heard is that the Venezuelans have a memory of democracy, prosperity, a functioning economy. So it's not like going into Afghanistan, which is essentially a medieval country, and saying here hold elections and everything's going to be fine, which was that's not going to happen. And especially the diaspora and the civil society still exists. So I do have hope that that can re emerge. But it doesn't look like it's going to be pleasant or have much US Intervention so long as they do what we want.
- [11:39]
A
On foreign hey, Bill, about your question, I agree with John and Neil. Really what you see President Trump doing is trying to pursue an alternative to really what would be necessary to affect a change in the nature of the government such that the Constitution's restored and the Venezuelan people regain their sovereignty. Sovereignty that they expressed their will in the last election. Over 70% of them voted Maduro out. But of course, he has the tools of coercion still, the armed forces and then these sort of brigades of brown shirts. And as John alluded to and Neil alluded to, this is essentially a criminalized patronage network that he sits at the top of. It is a narco terrorist network, but it's also a criminalized network that has created dependencies among a lot of Venezuelans on that socialist government remaining in power. That has to be broken for there to be real reform where what President Trump is doing is what is often termed coercive diplomacy or forceful persuasion, because he doesn't want to do what he regards as regime change, nation building. These are dirty words in his mind because he's viewing Venezuela largely through the lens of the difficulties that we encountered in Afghanistan and in Iraq and a misdiagnosis of what the lessons were in those wars, from my view. But to be successful in course of diplomacy, you have to have clear objectives. What are the objectives? They talked about behavior of the regime rather than the nature of the regime. It's narcotics trafficking. It's giving a platform for our adversaries in the region. It's the subsidization of far left political movements and what I would call progressive authoritarian dictatorships in the region, including Cuba and Nicaragua, for example. There are a whole list of behaviors that we want to change. So what are we demanding? And then the second is how do we create a sense of urgency among the elites there to meet our demands? What kind of punishment are we willing to issue? Remember, you said to the vice president, it's going to be worse for you than it is for Maduro, but are there other inducements being offered? But like John and I think, Neil, I don't see any fundamental change in, in the behavior of this government until the nature of the government changes. And the one thing that we didn't mention is there is also kind of an ideological dimension to this as well that runs through the Chavistas. And so I don't think they're going to fire themselves. I think it's going to take a lot more to get the outcome in Venezuela than I think we would want to see, which is sovereignty restored to the Venezuelan people.
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D
But HR we seem to tolerate narcotics, terrorist states all over the world, like everything from southern Mexico through Colombia parts of it. We tolerate horrendous undemocratic regimes in Yemen, Somalia, huge human suffering without interfering, so long as they're not bothering us in other dimensions. So I am completely with you on what I wish would be the case and I wish the democratic opposition takes over quickly, but I don't see the US Forcefully doing that and there's really no one to negotiate with in Venezuela.
- [15:03]
A
Well, I think what you're going to see is continued pressure on cash flow to the regime associated with the narcotics trafficking. That's why they're destroying the boats. And then also I think you're going to see the seizure of more, the more of these oil tankers. I think with Venezuela, it's clear that, you know, the, the, you know, the, the cartel that, that Maduro's the head of is interconnected with, the cartels in Mexico is a big part of their cash flow and their, and their abilities. You're alluding to, Jon, as you mentioned. I mean, they control 30% of the territory in Mexico and they control more than their cottage trafficking. They control about also 30% of retail fuel sales in Mexico as well. They're gaining more and more power. And I think President Trump, that's next on his list, he mentioned Petro in Colombia as well. And I think the way President Trump looks at this is that they're poisoning Americans. Right? It really is like his engagement against these cartels is, from his perspective, an America first approach. And he sees the poisoning of Americans as essentially acts of war. So I think you're going to see a lot more pressure on the Mexicans. What the Mexicans should do and they actually are doing is allowing a higher degree of cooperation with US Law enforcement. And I think increasingly it'll be military forces and advisors as well. The question is, does the Mexican government have the political will to take on the cartels? I think that's the big question, gentlemen.
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B
Why does the President keep talking about oil? I know that energy is a big part of the strategy and the MAGA vision, but when asked about Venezuela, rather than talking about human rights, rather than talking about drug trafficking, he keeps going back to oil.
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A
We're going to have our very large United States oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country. He loves to talk about oil. Okay, Even Syrian civil war, there's a lot of continuity here as well. But I would also say that when you look at what was a precedent for this, and maybe Neil will have some, and John will have some thoughts on this as well, which is the Panama invasion in 1989, you had the same confluence of issues. You had, really a narcotics trafficking head of state who was indicted by the United States, a criminal head of state. But also you had a country with significant strategic value. In this case, it wasn't oil, it was the Panama Canal. But in Venezuela, Venezuela sits on top of the largest oil reserves in the world. And so Trump looks at that and he says, do I really want Venezuela to be aligned with China, with Russia, to be underwriting the Cuban army's dictatorship in Cuba with shipments of free or low cost oil to Cuba, for example, he just put pressure on Mexico for the same thing. So I see kind of some continuities there. And it's really the strategic value of the country is, is what he sees and oil is, is the main reason for that.
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C
Two things. I mean, one is that, as HR says, this is how Trump rolls. There's always supposed to be a business angle, whether we're dealing with the Middle east or Europe or Russia.
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A
This is business.
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C
This is one of the leitmotifs of Trump's style. That's why I came up with the term of real estate politik as opposed to realpolitik, because for Donald Trump, realism is there's a deal to be done. But there's a strategic dimension too. Since Venezuela's oil resources were being accessed by China, rather than serving any benefit to the United States, you can understand the desire to put an end to that. And I do think we have to understand this Venezuelan move, not just in the context of the Western Hemisphere, but in its global context as striking a blow at a weak spot within the axis of authoritarians, in the same way that hitting Iran last year struck at a weak spot. And from the vantage point of Xi Jinping, this is galling from the vantage point of Vladimir Putin, too. Venezuela has been an asset for those guys. The question is, does this then legitimize their claims on territories in their vicinity, notably Ukraine, in the case of Russia, Taiwan, in the case of China. Just before this operation happened, just days before, the Chinese organized a huge naval and air display of force.
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A
Really. Live fire exercise, Neil, really, it was.
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C
The largest that we have seen in recent years in terms of its scale. So I think the other interesting question that we should talk about is where does this lead? Not just in Venezuela, because it's clear that the situation in Venezuela is very fluid and unstable. But. But there are all sorts of ramifications in the rest of the world. And not content with this extraordinary move in Caracas, President Trump then turns his attention to Greenland and sets the hair of the Europeans ablaze. Now, I think my own view is that this is something of a diversionary tactic and that we've seen this before. President Trump likes to raise flammable issues when he's doing something decisive. I personally be very surprised if the United States does anything remotely dramatic with respect to Greenland, beyond some possible diplomatic overtures. But I think this is a big global game that's being played here. And President Trump is good at this game, but his adversaries are also capable of playing it, too. And I wonder, HR if you expect there to be consequences that can't necessarily be controlled by the United States in the coming weeks and months.
- [21:45]
A
Hey, well, Neil, just first to your point about the degree to which this could be viewed as some kind of an equivalence with what China would want to do with Taiwan or with what Russia's done to Ukraine, I think this is where we have to get much better at, at our diplomatic messaging, our public diplomacy, to say, hey, look, this guy was an indicted criminal who stole the election from the Venezuelan people, who extinguished freedom there. And this is a unique circumstance. I wish we'd be better at that. But the more we just talk about the oil and these other issues, it really does really seed some of the high ground, at least for some people around the world. And then I do think that, that what's really happening here is something that's quite the opposite of what the national security strategy was. Remember, everybody was like, hey, he didn't talk about great power competition in the national security strategy. But what drew him, I think, in part to Venezuela is, as you pointed out, the fact that it had been a platform, a platform for Russia and China. What draws him to Greenland is the competition in the Arctic. With who? Well, with Russia and China. And so Trump is a lot less isolationist than maybe some of the people in his administration. And if you follow what he does right, instead of maybe what was just in that strategy or what he says from time to time, I think that's the right way to do it. I agree with you. I don't think he's going to do anything with Greenland. But I hope what this does is open the door for more cooperation with Denmark and with NATO to maybe strengthen our military presence there, you know, and go back to where it was maybe 20 years ago.
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D
I want to add a couple comments on oil drugs in Greenland. Of course, I don't think Vladimir Putin cares one bit of an Xi Jinping about legitimacy and interdefiner points of international law, as evidenced by their reaction. So I wouldn't worry about that too much. The oil is interesting, but I don't think we're going after for oil. The reports I saw heard is that this is basically how they sold it to Trump. Venezuela's oil will take a long time to come. On time needs a lot of investment under a stable regime. That's going to take a while to come. It's kind of funny. We would be, if anything, we would be subsidizing foreign imports, which are going to low cost and undercut the US producers in the Permian basin. Not exactly the usual Trump thing, but there's a sadness to this. The era of free trade meant that you didn't have to own countries, you could buy stuff when you needed. And going to the era when trade is used as a geostrategic competition forces countries to say, well, I need to own things by force, which is too bad, drugs, if that's the central issue here. The prospect of the United States using enough force to take back a huge swath of Central and Latin America that takes huge boots on the ground. The countries there don't have the forces to do it. The prospect of us starting a war like that and winning it seem very low. This is if I want to express a very unpopular opinion Our war on drugs is tremendously costly. Imagine drugs were legal in the US what would happen? More US People would be knocked out on drugs. That's the cost. There would be a lot less overdoses because we'd be getting cheap, free drugs, well made, well proportioned drugs. There would be a lot less crime because drugs would be free and a swath of the rest of the world. We'd undercut the narco terrorists and we could take back that swath.
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B
The rest of the world.
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D
The costs of our drug policy are very high. And if the alternative is we're going to go literally start a war with us boots on the ground, to take those areas back seems very costly. My last comment, Greenland. We ought to also go back to the old fashioned practice, Alaska, of buying things rather than talking about wars. There's 50,000 people in Greenland. $50 billion is cheap price for Greenland. That's a million bucks each. Staple it to a green card and a condo in Miami. I think we got Greenland in about 20 minutes. You know, there's a deal to be had there.
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A
I think he's got something like that in mind, honestly, I really do, John.
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C
Honestly.
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D
Well, I want to appeal to the real estate developer in Trump and say, why bother threatening the US Marines for the cost of sending one aircraft carrier up there, which would be about $50 billion. I'm making up numbers. You could buy the place outright.
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B
Neil, I'm curious about the Russian mindset these days. I don't know if you saw the tweet put out by the Russian foreign minister who blasted the United States for invading a sovereign nation, which I assume he's just irony impaired. But then there's a story the other day, Neil, which suggested that Russia offered the United States deal, kind of like the end of the Cuban missile crisis, where the Soviet Union took out the missiles from Cuba and we took out the missiles from Jupiter from Turkey. And the Russian proposal was that if we take our hands off Ukraine, they will take their hands off Venezuela.
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C
Well, I read the same report that this was thrown out at some point. I'm not sure how far that ever went.
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B
Right.
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C
And one must bear in mind that a lot of the commentary that we hear around these issues is pretty unreliable because in truth, what has gone on in the last few weeks, as HR will confirm, is unknown to journalists and cannot be known to journalists because it's in the realm of, of highly classified information. It'll be many years, really, before historians can say what happened. I'll give you a good example. Why did Trump decide Not to back the opposition because he felt he should have won the Nobel Prize. That is almost certainly nonsense. But it's the kind of thing that, you know, we'll get.
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B
That's kind of like Marine. That's kind of like Marine dad writing that George Bush went into the younger George Bush went into Iraq because he wanted to avenge the father. Exactly.
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D
Let me chime in on that one. It's obvious why Russia made that offer. Russia's got nothing to give. The idea that Russia has all sorts of spare military equipment, money and other stuff to send to, to Maduro is fanciful. In fact, this is a great moment. So the axis of evil is running out of money. Iran. What do they have to give the Venezuelans? Nothing. What do the Cubans have to give the Venezuelans? This is going to cut off a lot of oil to Cuba, which is, you know, going to get further that one. So with the exception of China, which is its own problems, you know, it's easy for them to say, well, we're going to, we'll offer something to you and, you know, we'll stop supporting Venezuela. A few X, Y and Z. That seems like a free offer.
- [28:28]
A
Yeah, it's important because Neil mentioned this too, about the axis of authoritarians. They call them the axis of aggressors. But you know what, really, I think we're seeing them in a profoundly weak position. And this is where I hope that President Trump kind of sees kind of what the reaction, the reaction that, that happened in China. They went to their highest level of cyber alert in China. They shut down any kind of message that had to do with Venezuela. And it sort of just a reminder that Xi Jinping likes to appear strong, you know, but who does he fear more than anything else? His own people? You know, how about the, the growing protests in Iran? They're not the same scale as they were after Mahsa Amidi's murder, but they're widespread and they're continuing. And then, Bill, you, you pointed out to us, you know, that they're, they're going to Pay, you know, IR stipend of $7 a month, you know, to try to placate him. I mean, so I, I think, you know, that that's, that is Iran really is in a position of profound weakness at this moment is their, their currency has collapsed. Tehran is running out of water. You know, and, and so I think, I hope that, what I hope is that President Trump will also realize that Putin is a position of, of profound weakness. Part of Putin's ruse with President Trump is that he's got something to offer us a great deal. You know, if we can work together on some big issues, economically, we can work well together. And he tries to portray strength, you know, like an overwhelming Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable, you know, so I hope that really what this, the weakness of, you know, really Maduro, the security around him, how we expose that, the ripple effect that we're seeing in these other authoritarian regimes also helps, you know, President Trump and others come to the realization that Putin is in a position of profound weakness. And in fact, this competition with the axis of aggressors and what Neil was calling Cold War 2, maybe we won already and we just don't even realize we've won.
- [30:17]
C
Well, I'd love to believe that we're winning Cold War two. I think it's a bit too early to draw that conclusion because the big one, the big showdown over Taiwan, has yet to happen. And I think that's going to be the real test of, of who has the upper hand, not what happens in Venezuela or even in Iran.
- [30:40]
B
All right, we have two minutes left here. So one final topic here for you. What next in terms of what country should be worried? Would you put your money on Colombia or your money on Cuba?
- [30:49]
C
Cuba? I think Cuba is really worth watching at this point. Marco Rubio is Secretary of State and national security adviser simultaneously. Nobody has done that since Henry Kissinger, and he's in a very, very strong position at this point. This whole operation has his fingerprints on it. He was the one who was out there doing the shows at the weekend, explaining the. The rationale, moderating some of what President Trump had said in his presser. And I thought it was highly interesting what Rubio said about Cuba. So I think Cuba is the very obvious next shoe to drop, and that regime should be very worried.
- [31:31]
D
Isn't the most likely for pressure from the US Mexico and Colombia, Cuba for internal, internal collapse? Are we going to really start up again on the 1960s efforts against Cuba? That's a question. HR are going to start again. Poisoning Castro.
- [31:55]
A
They poison themselves. Right. That economy's in collapse also based on the corruption of this dictatorship. And you know what? Venezuela was their lifeline. I mean, this is what's really important. We talked about kind of the upstream support for Venezuela coming from China, coming from Russia, also coming from Cuba with some security assistance and so forth. How'd that work out? Not really well for them and from Iran. But how about all the downstream support that Venezuela provides in the region? I mean, really a huge source of Support for the Cuban army in Cuba, that's gone. How about, how about Daniel Ortega? Daniel Ortega is in a really difficult position in Nicaragua. And then as you alluded to, I mean, Mexico is under pressure. You heard the President's statements about Petro and Colombia. Hey, there's an election there this year. I think what you're seeing, you're going to see is kind of a broader movement in the hemisphere as well, of a swinging of the pendulum back from the far left. There was a pink wave in the hemisphere in the last eight years or so, and it's going to swing back because of the failure of these far left progressive governments. Already failed in Peru, already failed in Chile. Petro is deeply unpopular in Colombia, as we've been talking about. Cuba, Nicaragua are in real positions of weakness. So I think that this could be a moment of opportunity. You saw Trump's support for melee in Argentina. Argentina finally may be able to stick with reforms long enough to finally turn the corner. And they're doing it with US Support, which could be a model like Chile was, you know, decades ago. So I feel pretty good about the hemisphere now. I mean, there's going to be more pressure on, on these governments, but there's also an opportunity at this moment to work with the US on some of these, these fundamental problems, economic problems, and the security issues associated mainly with narco terrorist organizations, as the administration has labeled them.
- [33:57]
B
So, Neel, a historical question. When the Japanese government transitioned in 1945, what American oversaw the effort?
- [34:05]
C
Well, that was, of course, General MacArthur's responsibility.
- [34:10]
B
So as we look at Venezuela, perhaps we should be considering a current or former general to help with things. Can we think of anybody who might want to spend some time in Caracas?
- [34:19]
C
But before we send HR to Venezuela, remember, the Roosevelt corollary meant not that we directly run those places, it meant that we determine who runs those places. So the Trump corollary is about finding a Venezuelan who can competently run Venezuela. And that, I think that's an important distinction here. When Trump says we run it, he doesn't mean an American general is going to run, is going to run Venezuela. He means we're temporarily in charge until we find somebody to run it better than Maduro was running it. And I think that's, that's a really important point. One last thought to add to that, because I don't think analogies with Japan, 1945 are at all.
- [35:01]
B
I was kidding, Neil.
- [35:02]
C
But, you know, it's worth saying this is a very, very different thing that's being attempted here now The Roosevelt Corollary produced, as I mentioned earlier, multiple American interventions, and the results were mixed. Nobody could say Haiti turned out brilliantly. And in the case of Cuba, it all ultimately ended in the disaster of the Castro revolution. I wonder if the Trump Corollary is going to go better. And I think maybe for the reason HR just gave, maybe it could go better, because I think Latin America is much more in the mood to go in the direction of democracy, markets, rule of law, what we're seeing in Argentina than was true back in 1904. So it might just be dare one suggested that this is part of a major shift in the region as a whole, and that this time it will work out better than it did the last time we brought the word corollary into diplomatic language.
- [36:03]
D
Let me offer one last addition to Neil's view. Their foreign support, sources of support have now dried up. You know, the axis of evil. Except for China. China might have some money, but it's not. And the whole point was we're not going to take that money from China. So. And their legitimacy has. Has dried up. Look at the plot that Scott's going to put up of GDP in Venezuela. And Milton Friedman's joke that if socialists took over Saudi Arabia, they would run out of sand is absolutely true. It's just a horrendous collapse. So that the 1950s, 1960s, you know, put on your red beret and how communism is going to lead to great wonders for the people is, I think, pre. Clearly false everywhere but some boroughs in New York City where they seem to want to take that on. And certainly Latin America has caught on. We don't want to live like Venezuelans and Cubans. Thank you very much.
- [36:54]
A
And one quick qualifier, too, to what we're talking about. I think what, you know, where interventions have been successful is when the US has provided the space for the people of those countries to then select their own leaders through, through. Through a democratic process. This is what happened in, in Panama in 1989, is what happened in Dominican Republic with Operation power pack in 1965. Now, it's important to consider the scale of these right in the Dominican Republic, as small as that is. We had 42,000 troops there. We had about 30,000 in Panama and Venezuela. Venezuela is 10 times the population, 12 times the land mass of Panama. So to do something like decisive would be massive. And this is why I think President Trump is trying what he sees as an alternative to a massive intervention, coercive diplomacy. But as we were discussing earlier, there are limits to what can be achieved with coarse diplomacy. Drawing on the great scholarship that a fantastic Stanford professor, the late Alexander George, did years ago, he did a fantastic book, the Limits, of course, of Diplomacy. And I have this great little pamphlet with me that he, that he did years ago called Forceful Persuasion. And he offers a very good framework, I think, for understanding what the Trump administration is trying to do. But also he offers really some warnings about the limits associated with course of diplomacy.
- [38:20]
D
Yeah, because HR course of diplomacy, you can get whoever's in charge to not talk to Cuba or China if you want. But as far as space for democracy to emerge, you've got a regime with all the guns and all the police and the state apparatus who understands the they are going to come to a horrible end if they lose power. You got narco terrorists who are well armed and they understand they're going to come to a horrible end. There's just no. To have the kind of peace you need to even hold an election would require immense US Military intervention. I don't see that happening.
- [38:52]
A
And if, and if I can quote our colleague Stephen Cochin, he says, hey, these authoritarian regimes, they don't have to be that strong. They just have to be stronger than any organized opposition. Yeah.
- [39:03]
D
North Korea.
- [39:05]
B
Okay. All right, gentlemen, let's move on to Iran. Sir Neil, I look at a country right now that is undergoing, I think it's in its 10th day now of domestic protest. 29 to 36 people have died, about 1200 people arrested. It's spread to 11 provinces around the country. I'm looking at a nation, Neil, that is undergoing a genuine economic crisis that John can explain to us. We're with its currency. I'm looking at a country that is going to have a hard time getting money from the outside. And I'm looking at a country that may very well face further military actions from the United States and Israel in the very near future. Question, Sir Neil Ferguson, Year after year we talk about this being the year that the theocracy is going to go under. Is this the year? And if you're the supreme leader or are you on the phone to Bashar Assad asking about real estate in Moscow?
- [39:53]
C
Well, HR already offered us a great segue with his Steve Kotkin impersonation, because the Iranian regime shows time and time again is that no matter how terrible it is, when it comes to economics, it is highly competent at repression. And we've now seen multiple protest movements ultimately snuffed out by the various police forces and security forces that the regime has at its command. And I won't really believe that the regime's in trouble until I see members of the security forces switching sides. I haven't seen that yet. So much as I would love to see the regime gone, I think you have to keep reminding yourselves. We've seen videos like this before of courageous Iranians taking their grievances to the streets, confronting the authoritarian regime. But time and again they're pushed back down, and often very brutally. The key question is what happens if Khamenei dies? This is a man known his late 80s. We know that he has a, a price on his head, at least as far as some elements of the Israeli government are concerned. I think it's not obvious how the regime copes when he dies because they don't have a succession plan. That I think is the thing that, that could make a difference at this point. It's, it's, it's his health, as it was the shah's health in 1979 that proved critical in bringing down his regime. I think going back to HR's point, it's possible that we could see an extraordinary sequence of events in the coming years. We must never rule out this kind of benign outcome where the United States reasserts its power self confidently and the authoritarian regimes turn out to be very weak. I urge everybody to read Steve Kotkin's excellent USA in Foreign affairs on this point. The authoritarians are fragile in many ways, and the challenge that they face from President Trump is one that is very, very threatening to their viability. Even Russia is much weaker than Putin would like us to believe. So, you know, HR, you may be right. Maybe Cold War 2 ends much more quickly than I think because these regimes turn out to be so fragile.
- [42:48]
B
Hr, would Trump be so bold as to pull a Maduro on the Supreme Leader?
- [42:52]
A
Well, I think that what's been very positive is that, is that he is, he's come out in support of the protesters and warned and warned the regime, you know, hey, don't go after the protesters. So I think there would be consequences. I don't know what kind of consequences, you know, he has in mind, but just that statement is important because important to remember last year was, you know, was a record year for executions of innocent people in Iran, the largest number since the revolution and the Civil War in 79 to 80. So I think, you know, I think it was important that President Trump made that statement and I'm sure he has some kind of consequences in mind. I think one of those consequences might be an initiation of a second round of a sustained Israeli campaign against what remains of their, of, of Iranian missile capabilities as well as Iranian military leadership. Remember the, the Iranian, the Israelis killed about 20 senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps generals during that 12 day campaign. So I, I think that's maybe what he has in mind is, is, is another campaign against leadership and probably that would also include going after their missile program, the remnants of their missile program.
- [44:12]
D
Yeah, you know, revolutions succeed, the security forces don't have to change side. They just need the guys in the streets. They have to say I'm not going to shoot any more civilians. And there comes that that moment can come. The one thing different than all the previous ones is we do have Trump's statement that he'll do something about it. We're not sure what, along with demonstration of especially Israel's capacity to go in and take out actual senior leaders, which could be the thing that provokes that moment to come.
- [44:45]
B
John, I know you love so called helicopter drops of money. Your thoughts on the Iranian plan. So the idea here is you're going to send about 80 million Iranians, the equivalent of $7 U.S. unfortunately, probably not U.S. dollars, but Iranian currency. And according to the New York Times, that would cover, quote, the equivalent of around 100 eggs, a kilogram of red meat or a few kilograms of rice or chicken at current prices in Iran.
- [45:08]
D
I am reminded of contemporary proposals to print government money and send it to people to cure affordability in the U.S. i mean, Iran's currency is falling because Iran, the government of Iran is out of resources and spreading money to cover its bills. And the more money it prints and hands out, the more the inflation goes up. There's only so much to go around and not enough. So it's kind of a funny plan and shows the level of their desperation.
- [45:32]
B
So here's the exit question for you. Is 2026 the year that the regime does go under and does it implode or does it need a shove from some outside force, I. E. US Israeli strikes?
- [45:45]
C
I think there will be Israeli strikes. There might even be additional US Strikes. I don't think it's the year the regime falls though, that I'm reluctant to predict because it doesn't feel like the base case anymore than in previous periods of popular protest.
- [46:04]
A
I, I think it depends. Neil's already mentioned, you know, Ayatollah, he's 87 years old. There could be an event, an event that triggers a much more broader uprising. I think a lot of riders are just waiting for that guy to leave the scene. And then also you could have another form of catastrophe. You know, Iran's prone to earthquakes, but they've created their own disaster with, as I mentioned, the water shortages in Tehran. I mean, the, you know, the Iranian president said, well, maybe we'll just move the Capitol. Well, so, I mean, I think there might just be a catastrophic failure of the government in this year as well.
- [46:40]
D
I would look forward not just one year, but we're also concluding the first quarter of this century, which started, remember, with jihad and Islamic terrorism and an axis of evil that was Iran, North Korea and Russia, along with our disputes against China. It hasn't been a great 25 years, but I think the next 25 years are going to be very different. China is the one that still seems to be chugging along, but the rest aren't doing that great. So sooner or later, Iran is going to fall and come back to normalcy. Let's hope it's sooner rather than later. But as North Korea shows, if they're willing to be ruthless, they can keep going a long time into abject poverty.
- [47:21]
B
So I see a 2026. It could be wonderful for democracy and freedom if Venezuela transitions, if we do something with Cuba and Colombia. Iran ends its horrible theocracy. Conversely, I see a frustrating 2026. And then Venezuela becomes choppy and complicated. Iran stays status quo. Are you guys bearish or bullish on this concept? In other words, could this, ironically, in the 250th anniversary of the United States founding, could it be a great year for freedom, or are you more in the camp of the status quo?
- [47:50]
C
Well, it would be wonderful, wouldn't it? And these things do happen. And let's not forget the 1980s. The oustra of Noriega from Panama was just a small part of an extraordinary story of political transformation that the United States led most obviously in Eastern Europe. But I think the problem is partly Eastern Europe because it's hard for me at this point to see the situation in 2026 getting better for Ukraine. I mean, I would love that it would, but it's highly unlikely because the odds are just against Ukraine in terms of manpower and firepower. I don't see China to come back to something we talked about earlier, about to enter a crisis. Even though one can see all kinds of problems in their economy, it doesn't feel like a crisis is. Is looming there. If anything, the question is, does Taiwan become a target for China this year or next year? And the last thing I'd add is, is let's not forget as we look ahead to 2026, that there is A sort of power of political gravity that affects all second terms in their second year. Because although we're excited by events in Venezuela, the public is not particularly excited about foreign policy compared with the bread and butter issues that they sum up with the, the word affordability. And so even although the United states is celebrating 250 years and we would love to see all the authoritarians crash down right on cue, there's another, a quite plausible scenario in which they hold on. The United States doesn't find a magic solution to the problems of Venezuela and the president's party then loses control of the House. I mean, that seems like a base case for 2026. Not very inspiring and exciting, but it's probably the more likely scenario than the they all lived happily ever happily ever after version.
- [50:03]
D
John, I'm bearish short run and optimistic long run. You heard my worries about where Venezuela seems very likely to be headed towards a year of chaos. And as Neil points out, we are in the, we're heading for the waning powers of the Trump administration. The Democrats will probably take over the Congress and, and this kind of muscular foreign policy may not continue. But over the long run, you know, Venezuela is now free of Maduro. And I think out of the chaos, likely something good will come. And, you know, same thing for Iran and other places and we'll see about China.
- [50:41]
B
Nita, even ask if you're an optimist.
- [50:44]
A
I have, but I think we should also really heed Aristotle and focus on what we can control. That involves recognizing kind of the limits of what you can achieve abroad, but also the possibilities. And I think what we can control is we can strengthen our own nation. How about reducing the vitriolic nature of our political discourse? I think what emboldens our adversaries is they see us as weak, divided and decadent. Well, let's prove them wrong strength in our country. I think there are a lot of positive indicators here with deregulation, with improvements in energy security, with the effect that artificial intelligence could potentially have on our economy. So, I mean, there are a lot of tremendous possibilities that we can control ourselves. And also one of those is our relationships with allies and partners abroad. I think we ought to maybe make this year a year in which maybe we restore confidence in the US Reliability internationally. And whereas we've been doing a lot of tough love, you know, with, with allies and partners in terms of responsibility, burn sharing and so forth. Let's emphasize maybe the kind of the love part of that is our. Because our interests and our principles kind of align, you know, so I just don't want us to miss opportunities in this next year because I think there are tremendous opportunities and we should focus on what we can control to take advantage of that.
- [52:01]
B
Well said. And what an eventful 2026 it's going to be. Gentlemen, a great conversation as always. I'd like to end the show on a note. I'd like to send a shout out to two friends of Goodfellows. One is our friend Ben Sasse, the former Nebraska senator who was on Goodfellows just last month not long after he was on our show. The senator put out a statement saying that he was suffering from stage four pancreatic cancer. We wish him the best. If that's not bad enough, it gets even worse. A few days ago, our colleague Victor Davis Hansen, who as an office right across from HR in the Hoover Tower, he revealed that he had undergone surgery for a cancerous tumor, which he characterized as the result of a, quote, nine month odyssey to diagnose a major problem. I am right around the corner from Victor's assistant. Her name is Megan Ring and she wears several bracelets on her right wrist, one of which is a very thin wrist that has written out in Morse code, pardon my language, here, you have to bleep this. It says cancer. And to me that summarizes this. So I wish the senator and the classicist a healthy recovery if at all possible. Gentlemen, your thoughts on Victor and Ben Sasse.
- [53:08]
A
Well, these are two men known for their intrepidity. They're taking on this disease with great courage. And I did have a chance to speak with Victor right before surgery. And you know, of course, his demeanor was exactly as you'd expect, you know, very, very, very stoic, courageous. And so obviously both, both of them are foremost in, in, in my thoughts and prayers.
- [53:32]
C
John.
- [53:34]
D
Likewise, wonderful, thoughtful people from which whom I've learned so much. Ben's. You got to read Ben's statement on Twitter. I, I only hope I'm able to say something as wonderful in my own time. So even the resident atheist on the show is offering his prayers to both wonderful men. Neil?
- [53:53]
C
Well, the good news is that I think Victor's surgery went well and the updates that I've received and I've been checking in pretty much daily are very encouraging. So that is some good news for all his admirers out there. For Ben Sasse, of course, it's a very grim prognosis, as he acknowledged in that extraordinarily moving statement that he issued. You know, one can pray for a miracle and it's needed here because he's a young man, younger than all of us, and he still has children in their teens. He also has so much more that he could still contribute to this country. So I'm still reeling from that news. It was a very heavy blow for us all, and especially, of course, for Ben's family. So as a former atheist and now devout Christian, I can only urge everybody who's watching listening pray for Ben and his family. Because this is one of those occasions when really, prayer is about all we've got.
- [55:06]
B
And let's leave it there, gentlemen. As I mentioned, Goodfellows will be back very soon and we'll probably pick up the RAN and some few other topics. Subscribe to us. That's one way to make sure you don't miss us. On behalf of the Goodfellows, Sir Neil Ferguson, H. Rob McMaster, John Cochrane, and all of us here at the Hoover Institution, we hope you enjoyed this episode and we'll be back soon. Until then, take care. Thanks for watching. Thanks for listening.
- [55:27]
D
This podcast is a production of the Hoover Institution, where we generate and promote ideas advancing freedom. For more information about our work, to.
- [55:36]
A
Hear more of our podcasts or or.
- [55:38]
D
View our video content, please visit hoover.org.