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GoodFellows: Conversations on Economics, History & Geopolitics
Trump’s 14 Points: Epic Fury or Epic Fail?
00:47:25
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- [00:00]
A
The alternative would be a worldwide depression. You know, the stupid people want to have a worldwide depression and they're stupid people. So you can only go so far, drive somebody into the ground and a lot of bad things happen. Number one, the strait would never open because they don't like floating billion dollar ships up and down a strait when there are rockets flying over them and mines all over the place. So the strait would never be open. It wouldn't be open for a long time. So we, we have a very hot stock market and we have a very starting to be a very low oil price.
- [00:44]
B
It's Wednesday, June 17, 2026. And welcome back to Goodfellows, a Hoover Institution broadcast examining history, economics and geopolitics. I'm Bill Whalen. I'm a distinguished policy fellow here at the Hoover Institution. I'll be your moderator today. And if you've been watching the show, you already know that and you also already know my next move, which is to introduce the stars of our show, the Goodfellows, as we call my honor to welcome back to our show the historian, Sir Neil Ferguson, economist John Cochran, and former presidential national security advisor, Lieutenant General H.R. mcMaster. Neil, John and H.R. are all Hoover senior fellows. So gentlemen, we're going to talk about peace in the Middle east today and then time allowing, get into perhaps Ukraine, maybe even Cuba. So let's get right to it, sir. Neil, I turn to you. There is an MOU to be signed on Friday in Switzerland. We haven't seen the MoU itself. The Trump administration not released it, but the Wall Street Journal did report earlier today it saw a Dr. Floating around at the G7 meeting. There are 13 points in all. And Neil, if you look at it, it's problematic from point number one, which says no more hostilities in the Middle east, including fighting in Lebanon, which may be news to the Israelis who are not part of this agreement. Then you go to item number three, Neil, which says the two parties will talk for another 60 days about what to do about Iran's nuclear program. You go down to item number eight, Neil, which says Iran will forego any nuclear weapon development down the road. So you can see this having all kinds of complications. So, Neil, here's the question. If you want to channel your inner journey. Lennon, who famously said what all we were saying is give peace a chance. What chance do you give of the MoU surviving?
- [02:15]
C
Well, first of all, the version I've seen had 14 points. None of these versions is definitive, but they all seem to be pointing in the same direction. And I can't help feeling that Woodrow Wilson's 14 points were better than these 14 points, which broadly are dreadful. Why is it dreadful? Well, it's dreadful because it's obviously been agreed in order to get the Strait of Hormuz reopened first and foremost. And even the wording there is strangely asymmetrical. It's kicked the nuclear issue into a 60 day process. You know, it's not going to get done in 60 days. And I think most importantly, there are four out of 14 points offering the Iranians sanctions relief and the unfreezing of their $100 billion worth of frozen assets. And some of that is right up front, the waivers for Iranian oil exports. This is a far cry from what the administration set out to achieve when it launched Operation Epic Fury. And the operation headline is likely to be Operation Epic Fail. If this is it. It might not be. Maybe there's a twist in the tail, but judging by what I've seen so far, these sure ain't Woodrow's 14 points.
- [03:56]
D
HR I agree, let's just be succinct about. I agree completely with Neil. That's a disaster. I mean, first of all, I mean the first line, as Neil said, you know, that including Lebanon, why the hell should the Ryans have any damn say about what happens in Lebanon? You know, and, and, and you know, I just, I just think this is, you know, this is, it's a disaster, you know, and I think it is, it is based on, you know, as Neil said, this, this drive to open the Strait and, and you know, I think it, it, it's the result of, of, you know, of not recognizing, you know, how damaged the Iranian regime was and what a position of advantage really. We were, we were, we were in the other thing that's striking and I'd love to hear what Neil and John think about this in YouTube. Bill is like there's no mention of Israel in there, right? So there's respect of territorial integrity of, you know, the United States and Iran wanted to be up by each other, but no mention of Israel, you know, who was, who was attacked by their proxies on October 7, but lit the ring of fire, enmeshed Israel in the six front war, right? And, and, and, and so, you know, what the hell. I mean, I, I think it's a disaster.
- [04:59]
E
Let me, my job is to be contrarian. So really, really luck while you guys talk on some. I've been really working hard while you guys talk to find something contrarian. And I must say to Neil, let's not praise Wilson too much. Those 14 points didn't work out so well either. That's a low bar as I read this deal. What? I mean, we've had a deal week. It's barely news that there's a deal here. It's clearly papering over deal. So what do we want? We're going to spend hundreds of billions of dollars propping up our sworn enemies to hold our noses open the Straits of Hormuz through the midterms, hold down the amount of missiles going back and forth to a tolerable minimum or tolerable maximum, whatever to. To an amount that can be called something quiet. Get through the midterms and Hail Mary the Democrats don't win the midterms and come back and do something serious afterwards. It's the only optimistic scenario I can see. Otherwise, we have thrown in the towel and, you know, been defeated by the Iranians and God knows what happens after that.
- [06:08]
D
Hey, just one other point here of the 14th point. The 14th point that the final agreement will be approved by the UN Security Council. Are you kidding me? I mean, so really, we are in a position of tremendous advantage, I think, where Russia and China were about to lose all influence in the Middle east because of the profound weakness of the Islamic Republic, their proxy and their partner, or if there have been a change in the nature of that government. But now we're going to invite them back in to have a say in the Middle East. It's just. Okay, come on.
- [06:41]
E
There won't be a final agreement. We're talking to.
- [06:42]
D
No, I think it's done. I don't think it's ever going to happen. I mean, really don't. I don't think this thing is going anywhere.
- [06:47]
E
I mean, I, you know, hold down the shooting for. To get through the midterms.
- [06:51]
B
Okay, let me, Let me play devil's advocate here. The alternative to peace is war. So, H.R. neal and John, if we went back to fighting, and President Trump has said earlier today that he'll go back to fighting if this doesn't work out. Where was the fighting getting us, gentlemen?
- [07:04]
C
Well, can I just say that, and I think I've been consistent about this, he should have now probably nine weeks ago, used military force to take control of the Strait of Hormuz. And he chose not to do that for, I think, bad reasons. The option certainly existed and I'm sure was presented to him by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the commander of centcom. But President Trump elected not to take the risk. Of course there's risk. There always is. But the Minute he did that and decided that instead it was going to be done through economic pressure. I think we were on track to something like this. So I think it's much harder to do that now, and it's even harder for me to envision it happening later this year. But I think that was a fatal strategic error because none of this would be happening now if the Iranians had not successfully asserted their control over the Strait, despite all the damage that had been inflicted on them in the first phase of the war. So we're, we're putting this ink to this Memorandum of Understanding, which I think we should call the Memorandum of Incomprehension, because I'm struggling like HR to understand how we got here. I think we got here because we decided not to follow through in what would have been a necessary second phase of the war.
- [08:32]
D
I don't know if you agree, HR I agree completely. And that's associated as well with the timing of the ceasefire, as the campaign was about to shift to opening the Strait, the ceasefire. And the President seems to be enamored of Field Marshal Munir, who was certainly doing the bidding of the Chinese, who were probably in a state of panic at that moment and desperately wanted a ceasefire. And so, you know, I think this is really, you know, really, it goes back to not following through, you know, and, you know, I'll tell you, President Trump, I mean, hey, you can give him credit for taking risky decisions. Right. He does. Right. Whether it's the Syria strikes and sustained campaign against Assad that we teed up for him of economic and sanctions so forth in April of 2017, or the South Asia strategy of 2017. But he has a really hard time sticking with decisions, you know, and, and, and people get in his ear and, and then, you know, he forgets the don't part of. Don't take counsel of your fears.
- [09:36]
E
Yeah. And don't overestimate your enemies. I mean, our blockade of Iran was working pretty darn well, too. And, and we are now removing that. And in fact, giving them the money up, up front, the first thing possible, undoes all of that economic leverage that we once had.
- [09:54]
D
It's 2015, you know, 2015. What did the Iran nuclear deal do? It gave them, it gave the Iran, it gave the Iranian regime, you know, the infusion of cash they desperately needed and got Ayatollah Khamenei, you know, up off the mat.
- [10:09]
C
This is going to be a bigger infusion of cash, potentially. I think this is going to be the hardest part for President Trump to sell and he seemed on the defensive at the G7 meeting on this issue because the easiest comparison to make right now is with the jcpoa. And you simply line them up and say this better than that or worse.
- [10:33]
E
Let me ask you about the nuclear thing though. The nuclear program is blown to bits, set back quite a lot. They have economic pressure. I would think they would take the money and number one, keep the economy going. Number two, get the security state up and running. Number three, start building, you know, conventional missiles with which to rain down annoyance on and more on their neighbors. But a nuclear weapon is still years away and was in fact set back by a lot of the destruction. Am I wrong this point?
- [11:04]
C
9 is Iran will maintain the status quo on its nuclear program. What does that mean?
- [11:10]
E
Well, that means working slowly towards doing it, but the capacity to do it must have been set back a good deal.
- [11:16]
D
Yeah, I agree with that. And you'll. Well, I mean, I don't know if they're smart or not. I don't think they're very smart actually. But, but if the Iranians are smart, they'll just do exactly as you said, John. You continue to deepen the magazines of, of, of the missiles and drones because that's. That worked great for them, apparently.
- [11:32]
E
And they keep talking nuclear because then we focus on nuclear and we ignore Lebanon, conventional support for terrorism and all the rest of it. So it's a great talking point for. Oh yeah, we got this nuclear weapon right over in the closet there. It's getting built any day now. And then we focus on that.
- [11:48]
C
But now there's built. Can I, can I play devil's advocate slightly differently from, from you? Because I, I think one of the things about peace agreements, or for that matter, mous, is that they're not really the whole story in a. Peace isn't just a piece of paper. The outcome is often the second and third order consequences of the war rather than anything that gets written down and signed. John had a little go at Woodrow Wilson's 14 points. Actually, most of the 14 points happened in the wake of the peace of 1918-19. The empires on the other side were broken up. The League of Nations was created even though the US didn't come on board. The thing that was fatally flawed was actually the treatment of Germany. And within 20 years, Germany was back on the war path. I think the law of unintended consequences always is worth bearing in mind here. So bad though this document looks today, and I think it looks bad, we agree on that. There are things that we can't foresee, in the weeks and months ahead, for example, there are people in the administration who think, I think, not completely crazily, that this regime in Tehran might be able to hold on under conditions of war. But how exactly will it look under conditions of peace? Trump and co will look very smart if the regime is in crisis before year end. There are other things that we can't predict that can come out of this. So before we consign it to the trash can or agree with all those people from the Obama and Biden administrations currently writing op eds saying how terrible it is compared with the jcpo, let's remember that things can happen after a document like this is signed that nobody quite bargains for. And in that sense, I don't think we should be too critical, nor should we with too much confidence dismiss this as an epic fail.
- [13:59]
D
I would say, though. I would say, though, Neil, the key is, is to follow up, as you're saying, to see what it really happens. And if the infusion of cash happens, it's bad, right? I mean, because I think we are where we are today because we got, you know, the regime up off the MAT in 2015 and because the Biden administration helped them revive after the very successful Trump won sanctions. Right? About $110 billion flowed into their coffers. Where did that money go? It went to Hamas, it went to Hezbollah, and went to Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It went to Assad's, their proxy army that was propping up Assad. It went to the Houthis, and it went to the Hostageabi militias. It went to their nuclear program, and it went to their missile and drone manufacturing. Hey, if we do that again, I mean, that would just be crazy that the one thing that could be possible, I don't, I don't know, is there, is there a Delsey Rodriguez deal with galob off or something? Neil, do you think, I mean, do you think there's something here about, like, an agreement to marginalize the IRGC or there's a fissure within the irgc and Galoba, who we know is, is more than anything else, you know, a corrupt actor who's lined his pockets and has offshore accounts that he would probably want to continue to access. And I think we probably have a grip on those accounts at the moment. Could there be something like that that's happening?
- [15:21]
C
Part of the thinking has been all along, and we've discussed this before, that there must be some divisions to be exploited in, in this regime. And they, they clearly exist. They're quite visible in Tehran the idea, I think, has been let's appeal to the corruption with money, with boundless amounts of Money. Numbers like $300 billion are being included in this document in the hope that their venality will undercut the fanaticism of the leaders of the irgc. I think that's the thinking. I think that's one reason why this document looks like super generous, considering President Trump was so critical of the JCPOA's carrots. But I think that's the logic, and one can't say with 100% confidence it won't work.
- [16:14]
E
If so, it will be because we get lucky. I mean, from this vantage point at least, it does not look like the US Is doing a lot to undermine the regime. Credit to the Israelis who understood that the central problem is the Iranian regime, period. But we now look like we're supporting the regime as we are supporting the regime in Venezuela. Once you sign a peace treaty and give them lots of money, you're basically saying, look, here's the deal. We help you stay in power, you stop shooting. And that's the other way of looking at where we are right now, as opposed to we work really hard to undermine you. So let's hope it happens. Neil, I'm completely with you.
- [16:47]
B
When this war broke out, there were two stated purposes. One, no nuclear weapons on the part of Iran. And secondly, we're going to compromise Iran's ability to shower the Middle east with missiles. As for a regime change, I don't think the President ever called specifically for regime change, gentlemen, but he always hinted at what he'd like to have, a regime he could work with. And then he sent another message to the Iranian people saying that if you decide to uprise, we've got your back. So, question, gentlemen. Where was the uprising and why did this regime manage to survive?
- [17:17]
C
Well, there was an uprising, and it was crushed by extraordinary brutality, claiming the lives of between 30 and 40,000 mostly young Iranians. And I don't think it was likely that there would be another in the aftermath of those events, certainly not under conditions of aerial bombardment by the United States and Israel. But remember, this is still a hated regime. Perhaps one in ten Iranians are still supportive of the regime. Everyone else hates it and wishes it ill. And that's the best hope that President Trump has, that when the shooting stops, the fundamental antipathy of the Iranian population towards the regime starts to come back as a force. And I think it will. I don't think that repressive regimes can simply keep on shooting their own people. So that's the key issue. I can't predict it, but I think we'd be unwise to rule out that this regime is actually hold below the waterline, but we just don't know how quickly it's going to sink.
- [18:20]
E
You know, the Israelis, until we stop them, their major tactic was to go after the irgc, go after the mechanisms of repression in the hope of unseen regime. And the North Koreans and the Cubans show that if you're willing to be ruthless enough, you can stay in power a long time.
- [18:36]
B
HR what about our Gulf friends, our Gulf allies? What, what is the view from Saudi Arabia? What is the view from Qatar? What is the view from the UAE and what's going on here?
- [18:44]
D
Well, we're going to learn more about this, I think, in the coming weeks. But I think what happened is many of those countries got, they, they got cold feet, essentially. I mean, they, they, they saw that their energy infrastructure was threatened. And when Operation Freedom, remember that nascent effort to escort ships out of the Gulf began, it was the Saudis, maybe others, the gutteris, who said, hey, you gotta stop that. Because what Iran threatened to do and telegraph that they would do is conduct massive attacks against Gulf oil and gas infrastructure. And they had already launched some of those attacks to signal that. And so they were reticent about continuing a forcible entry of the Strait of Hormuz. And then I think the Emiratis at first said, hey, we've got to finish the job here. Finish the job being continuing to progressively weaken the regime to the point of hopefully collapse. Excuse me. But then the reports are the Emiratis are already sliding money under the table to the Iranians. And so what you're having is the reaction to the apparent lack of US resolve to see the fight through, and that is encouraging a whole range of hedging behavior among the Gulf states. I don't know and John, I don't know what you're hearing, but I think that that's what we're seeing now is a return of if you turn on, hey, who's got my back? Does America have our back? No, we don't have, and they don't think we have their back. They're going to cut their own deals.
- [20:17]
C
And I think the other big story, HR is that this was already a problem before the war. It's got much worse. That's the rift between the Emiratis and the Saudis. There are really quite different strategies being pursued now by the governments in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. And I think when we try to work out what the longer run consequences are, I think there's a fundamental reconfiguration of the region happening right now for just the reason you give. And what does it imply? It implies that the United States is no longer as dominant as it was before as the provider of the most important public good, which is freedom of navigation. The US really failed to deliver that and it's left the Strait of Hormuz a much less certain place than it previously was. We talk a lot as if you just turn the tap back on, open the spigot and the tankers flow, it will be much, much slower to normalize than it was quick to shut down. So I, I think that's partly why you're seeing these hedging strategies. The Carter doctrine was that the United States should be supreme in the Persian Gulf. It has been until now, and I
- [21:34]
D
think it still is. We just decided to not, you know, to not do it. I mean, I. So this is not an irretrievable situation in my view, but it certainly is a setback in terms of US Influence in the Gulf. John. Sorry.
- [21:47]
E
Clearly a lack of will rather than a lack of means. But now we've shown the lack of will. And I would add to that the Europeans, for example, who might have been a little embarrassed initially at their reluctance to go along with this war. Granted we didn't ask them in the first place, but then we were a little peeved at them for not helping. And I think they're looking around and say, oh yeah, well maybe that was a good idea. And so, you know, they are no longer, I think, apologetic about not helping and feeling pretty good about themselves.
- [22:14]
D
Well, you know, there's a lot of uncertainty about this, right. You know, about this MOU and the, and what's going to happen next. But I think two things really are certain. One is that the supply chain associated with oil and gas from the Gulf is going to be adjusted right there to be new pipelines, new ways to access. Right. That energy. And there's going to be all sorts of pickup of slack capacity in other places already happening in the United States, for example. And the second thing is there is going to be innovation at scale in missile defense, drone defense and long range precision strike capabilities. And I'm sure there are already tons of contracts being signed by the Gulf states to infuse those capabilities into their armed forces.
- [22:59]
B
All right, exit question for the three of you gentlemen. 60 days of negotiations over nuclear programs takes us to August 19th. Neil, what happens on the morning of August 20th, action or talk 30 more
- [23:11]
C
days, they'll ask for an extension like students that I have known.
- [23:17]
D
HR I think so, too.
- [23:20]
E
Oh, yeah, there'll be something new will happen next week. This will be yakety, yakety yak with occasional missiles going back and forth through the midterms.
- [23:30]
D
And don't forget Lebanon. Don't forget Lebanon, because Israel will not hold back. I mean, I, I, I, they will not, Israel will not hold back. And what you're also going to see is really, I think, the case made by, you know, by Prime Minister Netanyahu and others directly to the American people and to Congress to say, hey, listen, what, I mean, how is this possible? You know, we're not even mentioned, you know, in this agreement except to constrain our ability to defend ourselves against Hezbollah. I mean, so that's, that's another aspect of what's, what's in the future here. And, and by the way, I think, you know, internal to Israel, because there's the election coming up. I think this is an area where, where Yair Lapid, for example, and, and, and, and Netanyahu are totally aligned.
- [24:13]
E
Yeah. And Iran will certainly test the limits to see what it can get away with. So it'll start by telling Hezbollah, hey, launch some rockets, send some drones. Let's see what happens.
- [24:22]
B
Have the three of you seen the movie the Candidate, starring Robert Redford as a Democrat who wins an improbable uphill race in California? That tells you how dated the movie is, but it ends with a great line, which is him sitting on the bed after he's won this improbable victory, and he turns to his guru, his campaign advisor, and he says, what do we do now?
- [24:38]
D
Wait a minute, wait a minute.
- [24:39]
B
What? So the question Donald Trump now, what do we do? The president's sending, again, mixed signals. He has said that Ukraine is, quote, unquote, next, he wants the peace deal with between Ukraine and Russia. He's also said Cuba is next, that he wants to deal with that island country. So, gentlemen, let's start with Ukraine. Neil? HR John, what's going to happen between Ukraine and Russia, noting that next Monday marks four years and four months since the fighting began.
- [25:04]
C
NEIL while we've been looking at the Strait of Hormuz or discussing AI, there have been some significant developments in the war in Ukraine. One of these is simply that the Russians at the front line have suffered reverses. It's been true since the beginning of the year that the Ukrainians have been killing Russian soldiers faster than Putin can Recruit them. The other thing that's happening is that Ukraine is striking back in ways we haven't previously seen with drones and their own Flamingo cruise missiles hitting targets in the Russian heartland, in and around Moscow, in and around St. Petersburg. And this means that the war has significantly shifted away from the stalemate that we saw last year and the year before. We begin to see signs of real trouble for President Putin. And Russians know it and they're complaining about it, which is why the Internet has largely been on social media have largely been shut down in Russia. So I think President Putin's position has significantly deteriorated this year while we've been looking elsewhere. And the problem that presents for President Trump is that the Ukrainians are not ready to sign up to the kind of peace deal that was being discussed late last year, which would have involved Ukraine giving up more territory in Donbas to Russia. When I talk to Ukrainians right now, their attitude is, no way, we don't need to. We're winning this thing. That's what's changed. I think it's exciting. It's another of these things that makes 2026 hard to predict. I mean, who knows, perhaps by the end of this year we'll be talking about the extraordinary crumbling of Putin's position. That would be another cost to celebrate and it would be another sign that President's luck is supernaturally good.
- [27:00]
D
HR yeah, hey, that's, I think it's great analysis. I agree completely. There is much, much more pressure on Russia for all the reasons Neil mentioned as well as, you know, now severe gasoline and diesel shortages in, in, in Russia. I mean, they're restricting the sale in internally. I think the other big difference is, you know, there's less us has less leverage. I mean, we still have a lot of leverage on Ukraine, you know, but, but, but, but Europeans have picked up a lot of the slack, you know, in terms of supporting Ukraine. And you know, I think Zelensky is smart. He's kind of pushing the advantage at the moment, saying, hey, I'm ready to talk to Putin anytime. You know, why does he, why didn't he come to, you know, why didn't he come to France for the G7 and so forth. I think that's exactly the right, you know, the right message for him at the, at the moment. And so now the other factor would be, you know, and John, maybe comment about this, like, what if, what if this, you know, 14 point MOU does result in the opening of the oil and gas and, and refined products spigot and, and then Oil prices go back down to where they were, $60 a barrel, you know, or maybe even less, right Then what happens to, to Putin and his financial situation? I mean, I think it could be devastating to him.
- [28:15]
E
Well, let me, let me ask you guys, because I can see this a little bit, but then I, I don't know where it goes. I think from what I can tell, it's, it's even worse than what Neil said. The Ukrainians are working hard to cut off Crimea, striking straight down to stop the supply of Crimea. Sounds like Crimea is getting no supply from anywhere. So suppose they, they break through, cut off Crimea, retake Crimea or completely isolate Crimea. That's a major advance in the war. Their long range strike ability, domestically developed is getting stronger and stronger. Russians can't use Starlink anymore. Russian air defenses seem to be fairly hopeless right now. So the domestic economy is cratering. There's. Yes, the military is falling apart. I see reports, now this may be propaganda, but I see reports of some fairly widespread surrenders. I'm almost starting to think this is summer 1918 on the Western Front, though that may be too hopeful.
- [29:13]
D
But that, how about, John, how about that? A couple weeks ago, Russians surrendered to a completely autonomous, an unmanned Ukrainian force of, of drones and ground robots.
- [29:26]
E
The new ground robots are really interesting, but now I worry about the wounded bear. So put yourself in Putin's shoes when this happens. You know, as the Iranians turned around and did, oh, we have something else to do here. We have a card to play. We'll close the Strait of Hormuz. This starts to threaten Putin's regime. I mean, losing this war would be really a regime threatening event. What does he do? And he could cause some real damage. In the Baltics, for example, the way of saying, you guys stop or else. He still has that card. And then as far as the US Right now, a US Broker deal, that's not even, you know, after what we just went through in the Persian Gulf, after not helping Ukraine, after refusing even to sell stuff to Ukraine, I don't think anybody's in any position to have the U.S. oh, yeah, you guys are great at negotiation. Come on in and help us do a deal. I think Ukraine is secretly hoping to win, but that's a big danger for everyone else.
- [30:23]
D
Bill, we should talk about one other thing here quickly. On topic that Putin already is escalating horizontally with the shadow war or gray zone conflict. How about trying to burn down Keir Starmer's house or the cutting of undersea cables, the bombing of warehouses, bombs on DHL aircraft, the drone incursions. He's trying to show that NATO's weak, right, and, and, and, and to, and to break confidence, he's making claims on, on, on Estonian territory, you know, and making noise about that. So I think this is, this is his game plan now, is to escalate horizontally and to, and to, you know, to use the specter of, of a broader conflict in Europe as a way to kind of get what he wants. And what does he want? He still wants the US to get behind terms for a ceasefire that are unacceptable to the Ukrainians and unacceptable to the Europeans. So this would be step A in breaking NATO apart and really doing permanent damage to the transatlantic relationship.
- [31:29]
B
Let's move on to Cuba. One last question about Ukraine and Russia. Four years and four months into this war, gentlemen. And what is the legacy of this war? Is it a geopolitical one, as with Finland, Russia underestimating its opponent, or is it military Russia fighting without data tactics?
- [31:43]
D
Yeah, I think there are a lot of lessons. I mean, first of all, the main lesson is it's a hell of a lot cheaper to deter war than to have to fight one. And what if we had provided Ukraine with the kinds of capabilities they have now earlier, the war probably never would have happened. The second, I think key lesson is that, hey, war is hard, and war is about the control of territory, populations and resources. We always want to kind of buy into this kind of pipe dream of easy war, right? But it doesn't turn out that way. And Russia, you know, made the same mistake you could say that Germany made when it invaded the Soviet Union. It looked at the map, but it forgot to look at the scale on the map. And this is. This is what Clausewitz calls, you know, the culminating point of an attack, right? Where you reach the point where your offensive power is no longer sufficient to overcome the defense. He also said the offense is the decisive form of war, but defense is the strongest form of warfare. And the Ukrainians were very effective in their defense, trading territory for causing more casualties on the Russians and then delivering what, again, Cloud woods called the best moment of defense, which is the flashing sword of vengeance, the counterattack against the Russians. And now it's settled down, as we've seen. Not settled down. It's still quite intense, but it quite closely resembles the Western front of World War I, except the means of warfare are quite different, associated with FPV drones, for example, while others are quite similar with mass artillery and so forth. So I think the other key lesson for this is that the transparency of the battlefield has made it very difficult to sustain offensive operations of any scale. And so the first phase of any next war will have to be to blind and deceive the enemy. And this would be with air defense capabilities against drones and other aerial systems. But the next war is going to go immediately, obviously, into cyberspace that it has already, but into low Earth orbit to take out some of these capabilities that, that make that battlefield transparent.
- [33:55]
E
I think, hr, you've got the lesson to the last half of the war, but I think that huge lesson was the first two months of the war, which is not about tactics, it's not about what's on paper. It's about the human organization of a military, which is. I'm going to invite you to say yes, yes, John, and tell me how it works. Because what we saw was the surprising rottenness of the Russian army. On paper, they still had the Soviet Union, they still had all that stuff sitting around. The US analysts were right. They should have been able to walk into Ukraine. What we missed is the incredible corruption of the Russian army, which is there to this day. They grab people off the streets, send them to the front lines, knowing everybody knows that they're going to die instantly. You know, a proper military is, is well organized, not corrupt. And the soldier on the front line knows that his commanders have his back. Just the rottenness of the human organization of the Russian army is, I think, the news and perhaps one of our hopes for the Chinese army as well. Hr, how do you lead?
- [34:57]
D
How do you agree? Agree? Hey, this is why, I mean, you guys, I think you guys thought it was crazy, man. But I'm telling you, they wanted day one of that attack. I said, hey, they failed already. There's no way they can do it. And, and what they. And so it's on the Russian side, the rot, as you mentioned. But hey, the Ukrainian army, you know, in, in 20, in 2022 was not the Ukrainian army in 2014. And the difference, the big difference was, you know, javelins and everything. But, but the big difference was the human dimension, the degree to which, you know, they had strengthened leadership, they had built cohesive teams that were confident in one another. Look at the defeat of the Russian paratrooper attack on the airfield, right? And the initiative that territorial defense forces took in that. So it is, I mean, you know, war is, war is human, right? And, and as, as John Keegan says, at the end of the face of battle, right, that, that, you know, what battles have in common is human. The struggle of men and women trying to Reconcile their instinct for self preservation with the achievement of some aim over which others are trying to kill them. And so what combat is, what battle is, it's about the disintegration of human groups. And what you want to do is make sure you have the training, the capability, the confidence that your group doesn't disintegrate and you have the confidence to disintegrate the enemy. And so what you saw is Russian units disintegrating during that offensive operation and cohesive, confident Ukrainian units fighting courageously.
- [36:21]
B
Okay, Neil, Cuba. We have indicted a former president, Raul Castro. We have imposed sanctions on the current president and his family. We are trying to choke the island economically. What's going to happen?
- [36:34]
C
Well, my guess is that it's going the way of Venezuela, that this regime is on the way out and it will be replaced, not necessarily by the ideal liberal democratic regime that Cuban exiles in Florida would like to see, but by compliant successor regime that will deal with Washington D.C. this seems pretty likely. It'll be a win for the President as well as I think from Sec For Secretary of State Marco Rubio. But it's hard to see how something doesn't give because they're fresh out of just about everything.
- [37:16]
E
John, I'm, you know, in, in Venezuela, Iran and, and Cuba, the, the US took a situation where we're stuck on the 50 yard line, brought it back to the other side's five yard line, just amazing, and then walked off the field. You know, imagine how different we'd be thinking about Cuba today if Dulce Rodriguez was running Venezuela, if the we had finished it up and the Iranian regime had been actually replaced. Trump's approval ratings are through the roof and you know, Cuba would have already had its revolution and new regime. So, you know, you know, perhaps I'll be just a little bit less optimistic than Neil. Yeah. Something changes when we find a new regime that we will do deals with and we'll be a little more compliant. No big change. I would hope finally for Cuba to recover, to be a normal country, but we got to twice. I guess I'm mixing metaphors here. We'll see.
- [38:15]
B
John, let's assume there is a friendlier regime and let's also assume that regime wants economic help and it wants a brain trust. And let's also assume that you and your Hoover economists go to Havana and help out. How would you help Cuba get back on its feet?
- [38:29]
E
Simple, simple. Get out of the way. Let people run businesses, let them use cash, real cash. It's pretty much all you have to do. And that, you know, that you can have it grow tremendously.
- [38:44]
D
The key thing, I think, will be, John, of the transition away from the Cuban army, essentially ownership of everything, you know, and, and not, you know, not creating kind of a class of oligarchs, such as those that arose in Russia, you know, in the transitional period that then, you know, puts into place another form of oppression and so forth. And I think the good news in Cuba and Venezuela is both those oppositions have decided to unite, you know, and, you know, Rosa Maria Paya, somebody I recently had on the Today's Battlegrounds podcast, you know, she's pretty darn optimistic about it. And, and, and the Venezuelan opposition, I just talked to it to a great guy, Hector Fuentes. He's on his way back to Ven. Venezuela from, you know, from here at Stanford. He's very optimistic about the transition there as well. So, anyway, I, you know, I think it's. It's important to, to recognize the need for a political transition, but also, you know, this economic transition. I mean, we have to, I think what. To make sure that the free market actually does. Does prevail. And, and that's the main, you know, the, the main aspect of the. The transition.
- [39:50]
E
What they own is worthless. So the important thing is the capacity to build new things that different people own as opposed to fight over the last crumbling remains of the Cuban economy.
- [40:00]
B
Resorts. John. That's what President Trump has said.
- [40:03]
E
Cuba, you know, look at the Godfather. What was. What was Cuba in the 1950s. Yeah. Be a fine defined future for Cuba.
- [40:11]
B
Or first place, maybe. Gentlemen, one day will be bigger than US Steel.
- [40:15]
D
We're bigger than US Steel.
- [40:18]
B
All right, on to our final last segment. Let's make it a fun one. And it is Neil Ferguson's beloved sport of soccer. 250 years after the Red Coats left Boston, an army has invaded Boston. It is the Tartan Army. Last seen marching in formation to Fenway park to take in a baseball game. Last seen drinking Boston dry.
- [40:37]
D
There was no beer. The Scots fans just drunk the place dry. And all they had was like, Bud
- [40:42]
B
Light and, oh, by the way, winning matches on the pitch. They defeated who, Neal? I think they defeated Haiti, didn't they? Won nothing. And having the match coming up, Neil, it turns out the Scots are fun people.
- [40:53]
C
Well, you only just heard the song that we sang. The last European Football championship, and I'm calling it football, not soccer, was no Scotland, no party. And it's true, the Scotland fans are, I think, the world's most fun. This is a change compared with my Youth, when we were certainly the world's most ferocious. I can vividly remember Scotland fans looting Wembley Stadium, where England play, or used to play a regular fixture against Scotland. So we've mellowed. Why have we mellowed? I think defeat has chastened us. Back in the 70s, Scotland genuinely thought they could win the World cup, and I certainly did. As a kid, it was repeated disillusionment that changed us. And now I think we approach it in a more ironical spirit, knowing that it's highly unlikely we'll get beyond the group stage. After all, we're in the same group as Brazil, not to mention Morocco, the reigning African champions. So I think my fellow countrymen have taken this in the right spirit. They've gone to enjoy themselves, for most of them. See Boston for the first time. As you said, drink it dry and remind the world that there is no more passionate football nation than Scotland. That's because the Scots have the highest per capita attendance at football games of, I think, any country. We love football. We're not as good at football as the Argentinians or the French, but we love it and we love to party.
- [42:30]
B
John Cochrane, where do your sympathies live vis a vis the World Cup?
- [42:35]
E
World Cup. Is there something going on? My sympathies lie with the Chicago Cubs.
- [42:43]
D
Hey, the United States. Come on, guys. United States.
- [42:45]
E
I'm a typical American.
- [42:49]
C
I am here on a mission. It's a kind of proselytizing, conversion mission. We all are trying to persuade Americans to play real sports that everybody else plays, instead of the weird ones that you took up 250 years ago when you stopped playing the real sports. And it's kind of. It's a struggle because you're very committed to these eccentric games like armored rugby, which you call football, and rounders, which you call baseball, and basketball, a game based on Native American activities for the winter months in New England. Nobody else really cares about these sports. The world cares about football. Get with the program, America. 250 years of going your own way. It's time to move on and play real sports. Start this year.
- [43:40]
D
Gosh, Neil, I'll tell you.
- [43:41]
C
I'll tell you.
- [43:42]
D
Need to get. You need to get back to North America, man. Something's happened to you. I mean, you've just gone.
- [43:47]
C
You're regressing another Scotsman to come to North America. Be careful what you.
- [43:51]
E
I want to agree with you because there's one nice thing, wonderful thing about soccer when you're young, because I. I spent some time in Italy when I was a kid, and you run out and play soccer with local. You can't bring your baseball bat, and it's lovely. You just go to the local pitch where we were just. It was a vacant lot and play soccer. You don't need a T ball and a coach and bases and all the stuff, or you don't need all the equipment of football. You don't need parents. Back then, America tries to ruin it. We have ASO soccer now. It's very popular. But then there's freezing parents sitting around drinking their lattes while coaches tell kids what to do. No, just go out to the. To the. To the vacant lot down the street from our house and see who's there. That was a wonderful experience.
- [44:32]
C
That's exactly right, John.
- [44:35]
B
So, Neil, one final World cup question, and I'm getting back to the idea of seminal favorites. Scotland is last in the World cup in 28 years. It would be incredible experience in the nation, obviously, if you won the whole thing, but what about Africa, Neil? I don't think an African nation's ever won the World cup, has it?
- [44:50]
C
That's right. And one of the best African teams, Senegal, took hiding at the hands of France just last night. But rest assured, Morocco will take on Scotland on Friday, and I can't help feeling that the party will doubtless be good. But I'm not sure what we'll be celebrating after the final whistle goes in that game. True to form, I imagine Scotland losing to Morocco and then pointlessly beating Brazil after it's too late for us to go on to the next round. I know I've been a bore on this subject. I apologize to my American friends who can't abide football, but I was brought up in a city that worshiped football, and it's an addiction that I just can't kick. You should really feel sorry for me the way you would if I was an alcoholic, because it's. It's like a disease. I tried to explain this in a column for the Free Press. The thing about football is it's an addiction, and it really mostly consists of pain. You spend most of the games you watch. If you're really supporting a team in an agony because it's either nil, nil, so nobody's winning, or you're one nil up, but that's still not very secure.
- [46:03]
D
Or.
- [46:04]
C
Or they're 1 nil up, in which case you're in real agony. It's football is pain. The great author Nick Hornby put it very nicely. So you're probably wise to avoid it, Americans, because you think life is the pursuit of happiness. Trust me, if you follow football the way I follow football, it isn't the pursuit of happiness. Not really.
- [46:25]
E
Cubs, we'll give you pain.
- [46:28]
B
There you go. All right, gentlemen, we're going to leave it there. Our next Good for those episode will be at the end of June, and our guest will be Rick Atkinson, the celebrated military author and historian. So this is going to be the HR McMaster Show.
- [46:40]
D
Try to tell him that the Revolutionary War was a skirmish. See how that turns out.
- [46:45]
B
There you go. And we'll get his thoughts on soccer, too. All right, gentlemen, great conversation as always. On behalf of the good fellows. Sir Neil Ferguson, John Cochrane, HR McMaster, all of us here at the Hoover Institution, hope you enjoyed the show. We'll see you soon. Till next time, take care. Thanks again for watching
- [47:01]
D
an army.
- [47:03]
C
And even if we don't wait.
- [47:05]
D
We were white. We were white. Steep clocks taunted on me. No skull and
- [47:20]
E
steep clocks.