Who’s Actually Running Iran? with Abbas Milani | Hoover Institution

Summary

GoodFellows: “Who’s Actually Running Iran?” with Abbas Milani

Hoover Institution | April 17, 2026

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Episode Overview

This episode of GoodFellows features a focused exploration of contemporary Iran: who is truly in control, how the regime's power structures are evolving under extreme pressure, and what prospects exist for reform, regime change, or continued instability. Abbas Milani, Hoover Institution research fellow and co-director of Iran's Democracy Project, joins host Bill Whelan and the GoodFellows—Sir Niall Ferguson (historian), John Cochrane (economist), and H.R. McMaster (former National Security Advisor)—to analyze the fragmented Iranian leadership, the role of the IRGC, economic collapse, and implications for both the Iranian people and international strategy.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Who Is Running Iran? (02:41)

• IRGC in Control: Abbas Milani argues that Iran is now under a "military dictatorship," with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) holding de facto power. The Supreme Leader (Khamenei Jr.) is either incapacitated or sidelined.
  • “I think Iran is now, in every sense of the word, a military dictatorship... the IRGC is in charge.” (Abbas Milani, 02:41)
  • The top leadership includes “Vahidi, Zolkar, Reza... Safavi”—all with long-standing backgrounds in both militancy and corruption.
• Leadership Succession & Prospects: There is skepticism about a figure emerging who could both lead Iran and align with U.S. interests.
  • The possibility for regime alteration (shallow changes for regime survival) is seen as likelier than true regime change.

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2. Factionalism and Fragmentation within the Regime (06:02, 07:14)

• Three Types or Blurred Lines?
  • American officials suggest Iran’s leaders are fanatics, politicians, or the corrupt. Milani instead sees overlap—most are all three, or two at least.
    • “That kind of a differentiation doesn’t make sense to me... This is a corrupt ideological regime. They’re now more corrupt than they’re ideological.” (Abbas Milani, 07:14)
  • IRGC’s public statements emphasize their intention to prevent a ‘Bonapartist’ (strongman) takeover not aligned with their interests.
• Internal Struggle for Survival:
  • Infighting is evident, especially as economic woes multiply and oligarchs (including Khamenei’s son) jockey for survival and wealth.

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3. Regime Survival, Foreign Policy, and Prospects for Change (12:30, 14:51, 17:58)

• Corruption vs. Fanaticism:
  • There’s hope that corrupt leadership is more “buyable” than ideologically driven counterparts, yet the panel cautions that face-saving displays are essential for any negotiation to be plausible internally.
    • “Corrupt people can be bought... But you need a face-saving way out.” (John Cochrane, 10:16)
• Economic Collapse as Regime’s Achilles Heel:
  • The regime faces unemployment, inflation over 50%, currency and banking crises, and asset seizures.
  • “You can’t take more than $7 from your own account in a bank in Iran... Unemployment is on the rise. Inflation is at least above 50%.” (Abbas Milani, 12:30)
  • The IRGC’s economic power is vast, but pressure on IRGC and regime assets should be the West’s preferred strategy.
    • “I never thought that attacking is going to solve this problem. Hitting them economically, freezing the assets of the IRGC... that to me was the way to go.” (Abbas Milani, 14:51)
• Regime’s Response:
  • The regime threatens dissenters at home and in the diaspora (property confiscations, direct threats to families).

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4. The Strait of Hormuz and International Leverage (16:32, 17:58)

• Leverage Tactics:
  • Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz is described as a last-ditch existential maneuver and perhaps also a means to extract concessions.
  • Abbas Milani warns that unfreezing assets or reducing pressure as a quid pro quo for reopening the Strait would only prolong IRGC rule.
    • “To cave to that idea to me is absolutely counterproductive. I don’t think they will go for it. The problems are fundamentally economic.” (Abbas Milani, 17:58)

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5. The Iranian People: Sentiment & Prospects for Uprising (22:09)

• Uprising and Regime Paranoia:
  • The regime’s brought in proxies from Iraq, Afghanistan, etc., to shore up security, reflecting real fear of an uprising.
  • Signs of unrest are growing, but regime repression is fierce. Internet shutdowns and nightly intimidation campaigns are documented.
    • “This regime is electing people... They literally have this remarkable plan... if a regime is consolidated... it doesn’t need to constantly bring in people from outside.” (Abbas Milani, 22:09; 24:38)

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6. The Policy Fork: Regime Change vs. Management (25:11, 26:55)

• West’s Choice:
  • Is the U.S. goal real regime change, or simply to secure tactical concessions (e.g., open straits, reduce missile attacks)?
  • “That is a very dirty deal. That looks like where the US is going because of the short run costs.” (John Cochrane, 25:11)
  • Milani criticizes decades of U.S. inconsistency and lack of strategic vision for Iran, especially post-Nixon.
    • “No administration... has had a strategic thinking. What do we want to do with Iran?” (Abbas Milani, 26:55)

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7. Limits of American and Economic Leverage (29:06)

• Collapse Isn’t Easy:
  • Ferguson and Cochrane note that pure economic sanctions rarely collapse regimes. Iran’s porous borders and Chinese/Russian support give it resilience akin to North Korea or Venezuela.
  • “It’s quite hard to collapse a really large economy... there’s goods already coming in from Pakistan, for example, and the Chinese are not going to let these people go down.” (Sir Niall Ferguson, 29:06)

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8. Advice for the U.S. and Forecasts (32:34)

• No Quick Collapse, but Regime is Doomed:
  • Milani warns against expecting rapid change. He suggests the regime, unlike the Nazis, faces a far larger, more reform-minded public, but persistent regime change is still years away.
    • “I don't think it's going down in days or months... this regime in its current form cannot survive.” (Abbas Milani, 32:34)
  • A negotiated “Pinochet/South Africa” outcome—where elites retain some wealth but cede power—is possible, but robust, wiser opposition is needed.

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9. Recommended Information Sources on Iran (34:16)

• On Media Polarization:
  • Milani urges audiences to “read as much as you can, multiple sources,” noting the vast disconnect between Western headlines and realities on the ground.
  • “You can't have Middle East peace without a democratic Iran. I absolutely believe that.” (Abbas Milani, 34:16)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Iran is now, in every sense of the word, a military dictatorship. The IRGC is in charge.”
  (Abbas Milani, 02:41)
• “This is a mafia-like regime that is going to try to stay in power. But like all mafias, once there is that much money involved, there is infighting.”
  (Abbas Milani, 07:14)
• “It's the economy, right now... that's their Achilles' heel.”
  (Abbas Milani, 12:30)
• “The regime itself said they have lost $2 billion in companies. Many of them led by women. Any policy... that excludes defending the rights of the people against this regime... is mistaken.”
  (Abbas Milani, 17:58)
• “That is a very dirty deal. That looks like where the US is going because of the short run costs.”
  (John Cochrane, 25:11)
• “No administration...has had a strategic vision [on Iran]... since Nixon.”
  (Abbas Milani, 26:55)
• “You can’t have Middle East peace without a democratic Iran. I absolutely believe that.”
  (Abbas Milani, 34:16)

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Key Timestamps for Crucial Segments

• 02:41 Who runs Iran: IRGC and the sidelining of the Supreme Leader
• 07:14 Fanatics, politicians, and corrupt: Overlap within Iran’s elite
• 12:30 Iran’s collapsing economy and the regime’s vulnerabilities
• 14:51 Why asset targeting matters, not just sanctions
• 17:58 Strait of Hormuz: leverage, limits, and Western response
• 22:09 Evolving public sentiment, regime paranoia, and prospects for uprising
• 25:11 West’s policy fork: regime change vs. tactical deal-making
• 29:06 Why regime collapse via sanctions is difficult
• 32:34 Prognosis: regime’s future and possible transition scenarios
• 34:16 Advice for following Iran in the West

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Tone and Style of the Conversation

Consistently rigorous yet accessible, often laced with wry humor and clear-eyed skepticism. The panel is united in its critical view of both the Iranian regime and past Western policy, balancing analysis with moral conviction (especially regarding the plight of the Iranian people). The technical depth is blended with analogies and historical context, making the discussion both intellectual and engaging.

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Final Takeaways

• Iran is in a period of acute crisis: ruled by the IRGC, driven by internal fragmentation, and fundamentally undermined by economic catastrophe.
• Western policy stands at a crossroads: choose between transactional deals that prop up a decaying regime for short-term calm, or adopt a principled, strategic policy that supports Iranian society’s aspirations for change.
• Any durable solution must factor in the Iranian people, whose desire for normalcy and prosperity remains the greatest force for eventual transformation.
• Critical, multi-sourced information is essential, as on-the-ground realities and Western portrayals often diverge sharply.

Transcript

[H.R. McMaster]

We've had a number of substantive discussions with the Iranians. That's the good news. The bad news is that we have not reached an agreement. And I think that's bad news for Iran much more than it's bad news for the United States of America.

[Bill Whelan]

It's Thursday, April 16, 2026. And welcome back to Goodfellows, a Hoover Institution broadcast examining history, economics, and geopolitics. I'm Bill Whelan. I'm a distinguished policy fellow here at the Hoover Institution, and I will be your moderator today. But before we get to the show, I'd like to say on behalf of my colleagues that we look forward to seeing you here at the Hoover institution on Wednesday, April 22, for our live show and the reception after we're done filming, where you'll get to meet the Goodfellows. The only bad news I have to report is that the show is now sold out, but we take that as a positive because we are thrilled at the response. And again, we're looking forward to seeing you here at Hoover on the campus of Stanford University on the 22nd. Now on with the show and our first order of business, which is meeting the aforementioned Goodfellows. In case you're watching this show for the first time, our three good fellows, as we jokingly refer to them, are the historian Sir Neil Ferguson, the economist John Cochran, and former presidential national security advisor, Lieutenant General H.R. mcMaster. Guys, good to see you. On this Thursday, we're going to go back to some familiar turf and talk about Iran, but from a different perspective. Today we want to talk to a Hoover colleague who actually knows the country very well. That is Abbas Malani. Abbas Malani is a Hoover Institution research fellow and co director of Iran's Democracy Project. He's also the Hamid and Kristina Moqadam, Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. Abbas Malani's expertise is US Iranian relations and Iranian cultural, political and security issues. And we're going to tap into that knowledge to figure out what this conflict looks like from the Iranian perspective. Abbas, welcome to Goodfellows.

[Abbas Malani]

It's a pleasure to join you and the Goodfellows.

[Bill Whelan]

Let me start the conversation, then I'll turn it over to the fellows with two questions folded into one. Abbas, I look at the government in Iran right now, and I'm somewhat confused. There is a supreme leader who we haven't seen or heard from since he was given that title. He reportedly was seriously wounded in the same air attack that killed his father, the first Ayatollah Khamenei. It seems the irg, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, is deciding when and where to fire missiles. Meanwhile, you have peace talks in Islamabad where the Iranian delegation was led by the nation's foreign minister and parliamentarian speaker. So two questions. Abbas. Who is running the country? Secondly, as you look at the current list of players, is there any individual you see who could take over and run the country in a direction that would be to the United States suiting? In other words, could the outcome here be regime alteration, as Sir Neil would call it, or is the end outcome going to be regime change?

[Abbas Malani]

I think the group that is running the country, the institution that is running the country, is the irgc. I think Iran is now, in every sense of the word, a military dictatorship. There are occasional references to Khamenei junior Is so far merely perfunctory. No one knows whether in what capacity he's alive, if he's alive. So I think it's the IRGC that is in charge. And there are a few of them that we know are in command, including Vahidi, which is one of the most notorious of these commanders. Zolkar, another one of these very notorious commanders. Reza, who by all Accounts is a PhD in economics. I apologize to all the economists of the world, but he's a true imbecile and was an imbecile when he was a commander of the irgc. Almost put him on trial for crimes because he sent thousands of young Iranians to assured death because of his idiocies. He is one of them. Safavi is another one. So it's a very small kite. Coterie of Islamists, almost all of them were involved in terrorist activities before the revolution. They were part of a small group of terrorists. So I think they are in charge increasingly. And I wouldn't be at all surprised if they do what Neil suggested, that they will have a regime alteration, that they will change their tune because to me, their sole goal is survival.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Abbas, can I ask you a question? A senior US official said to me recently, we think there are three kinds of people in the leadership. There are the fanatics, there are the politicians, and there are the corrupt. I told this to my wife, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and her response was, tell him they're all fanatics. What is your view?

[Abbas Malani]

My view is that all are, in some parts, one of these three characteristics. The person that is now deemed to be the favorite candidate to negotiate with, Kali Baf, is arguably one of the most corrupt. He's clearly one of the most opportunistic, and he's clearly survival. Survivor, the rest of them too. So I think that kind of a differentiation doesn't make sense to me. What makes sense to me is that this regime, in my view, has been beaten militarily badly. They know how badly they have beaten. They know how their infrastructure has been damaged. They know how their economy is collapsing. And they are trying to make every effort possible to make a deal with the United States to get out of this impasse. But because they're bullies, because they have ruled as bullies for 47 years, they can't be appearing to be making concessions. So they want to make concessions, but declare it as forcing it down the throat of the US And Israel.

[H.R. McMaster]

Boss, on the kind of fragmentation of the regime, there have been these reports, I don't know. You would know much better than I, than I do, that, that the IRGC leadership told the delegation of Pakistan, hey, come home. And. And they were angry for a number of reasons, including Orochi and Golubov saying, well, maybe they would be willing to stop support for terrorist organizations and militias, you know, across, across the Middle east and including Hezbollah. And, and, and so this fragmentation, does it create an opportunity? Is kind of the first question. What opportunity does it create? The second is, I think we agree, we've talked about this. There can be no enduring peace with Iran. There can be no enduring security for the Iranian people until there is a change, a fundamental change in the nature of the regime. How could that happen? Through fragmentation and a portion of the regime turning against the others, these combinations of these three groups, or can the people, do you think, because the regime is in this weakened state, can you see a path toward forcing a change in the regime?

[Abbas Malani]

Well, I think signs of fragmentation are there already and in several different ways. In one sense, when talk of discussions between the US and, and Kaliboff reached the media, the IRGC issued a very harshly worded statement, threatening statement. Very little attention was paid to it in the Western media. To my surprise, the IRGC basically said that there is a Bonapartism and the concept they use is Bonapartism, a concept that comes from the Marxist tradition, primarily from Gramsci's writings. And that's when a system goes in crisis and some Bonaparte like character, Napoleon like character, comes and shuts everybody down and rules. They said there is a Bonapartism coming, but it's not an individual, it is us. US and the people of Iran. So clearly they were worried that Galiwa might be trying to make a deal, side deal with the US and they shut down even before they went to the meeting. I think there is other elements within the regime like Rouhani, the ex president who has been even before all of this, essentially offering himself as someone who's willing to make a deal with the US and change the course of direction. My sense is that he was so open about it and Zarif the foreign minister were so open about it that Khamenei's order to absolutely brutally murder anyone who came to the streets according to them in three days, 3177. Everybody says it's multiple. That was to make sure that kind of a deal doesn't happen. In other words, no one from within the regime can make peace with the Iranian people who then can make a peace with the us So I think that fragmentation has happened but the IRGC so far is in command. And to me again to go back to what Neil was saying and quoting Ian Hersey, who knows this region well, who knows Islam is extremely well. This is a corrupt ideological regime. They're now more corrupt than they're ideological. They want to keep property rights they own. The IRGC literally controls at least half of the Iranian economy. Whoever sits in Khomeini's place, whether it's the IRGC de facto or de jure, gets their hands on 100 at least billion dollars of assets. We're not talking about small change. This is a mafia like regime that is going to try to stay in power. But like all mafias, once there is that much money involved, there is infighting.

[John Cochran]

So you've turned to economics which I like. But it looks like there's two roads that we're talking about here. One is the regime, some form of the regime stays in power and we find a way to let them make a deal that involves a little bit less annoying their neighbors to put it politely. But they get to stay in power and, and to that end corruption is good as opposed to fanaticism because corrupt people can be bought and, and we have a lot of money to offer. You've made a very good comment that of course they need a face saving way out. And part of making a deal is to let you know, any used car dealer knows you make that. You say oh boy, you got a great deal out of this while you're fleecing them. Unfortunately, I'm not sure our administration is very good at letting other sides feel like they won self confidently. So that's too bad. The other direction, of course what we're all praying for is real regime change. The IRGC goes anything better comes in it might be for a while, the regular military, it might be Shah, and so forth. So my first half of my question, I am getting to a question, Neil, is, you know, what hope is there for toppling the regime or allowing the Israelians to topple? You understand the internal mechanisms of Iraq far better than we do. You need somewhere to run too. You need some event that makes the internal security services stop shooting their own people. But that would, I think we would all love to see that. And we're all kind of baking good with the other one. And the second part of that question is, so our current strategy is not military, we're blockading the Strait of Hormuz and, and hoping that economic pressure does it, which seems like a step we should have taken a while ago. But on the other hand, that stops their oil exports. But Venezuela, North Korea, Cuba have gone on for a very long time with absolutely rotten economies. So I wonder whether economic pressure alone will do the trick.

[Abbas Malani]

I think pointing to a very important issue, I think maybe the critical issue, what I think will topple this regime, is the economy. It is the economy that is their Achilles heel, because the economy is on the verge of collapse. The financial system is on the verge of collapse. The banking system, the second biggest bank, went belly up a few months ago. And amongst themselves in their inner fighting, we learned how rapacious everybody is and was, including Khamenei's son, who was one of the apparently powers behind the throne of this corrupt conglomerate, Mr. Ansari, who owns 440 million euros worth of assets, buildings in London, who was one of the most rapacious of these. So I think it's the economy right now. You can't take more than $7 from your own account in a bank in Iran, atm, you can't make more than maybe about $100 from your account. Even that is impossible to get. Unemployment is on the rise. Inflation is at least above 50%. So there is this remarkable level of incompetence, corruption and economic challenges and anger in the people. And the regime knows this. While it is making constantly these conciliatory gestures toward the west, towards Europeans, towards their allies, allies in the region that they had bombarded. They hit United Arab Emirates, which is one of their most important, important places for money laundering, for circumventing the sanctions. They hit United Arab Emirates more than they hit Israel with drones and missiles. In spite of all these gestures, let's be nice again. Every day, virtually every day, the Iranian regime is threatening the people of Iran. They will kill you if you come out.

[John Cochran]

Is There a strategy that targets the assets of the IRGC as opposed to just trying to impoverish ordinary people.

[Abbas Malani]

I have said that this is the way to go all the time. I never thought that attacking is going to solve this problem. I thought hitting them economically, freezing the assets of the irgc, freezing Khomeini's assets, freezing the assets of the oligarchs like Ansari, closing some of their network in remarkable soft power network that they have created through Europe, through the us, through Canada. The number of schools, the number of seminaries that they have set up where they teach to promote all of these ideas, that to me was the way to go. But they need to make concessions to get the economy running. They need hundreds of billions of dollars of investment. And that is what is going to get done. And that's why they keep threatening the people of Iran. They just announced 400, a name of 400, a list of 400 names of people who live in diaspora, mostly journalists, some athletes, some artists who have said anything against the regime. And they're confiscating their properties. They're now sending, I know directly they're sending texts from Iran to people in Canada, in the United States, in Europe that don't participate in these demonstrations against the regime will go after your family in Iran. That's a regime that is frightened of its people and knows. And thus some of the headlines I read in papers that Iran is the new superpower of the region. That Iran is at the height of his power to me is flabbergasting.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

But Abbas, there's one thing that is true and that is that they were able by retaliating against their Gulf neighbors and by closing the Strait of Hormuz, to exercise some leverage despite the economic collapse, which I completely agree with you about, and despite the utter military defeat that was inflicted on them. And I think the worrying thing now must be that in order to get the strait reopened, we might end up relaxing the economic pressure, in fact unfreezing the assets and appealing to their corrupt side. That might mean that the net result of all of this is that the IRGC or remains in power, the economic spigot is reopened and the Iranian people lose out once again. How should the US government proceed now? Because I think we're an absolutely critical juncture. If you think the stock market knows anything, you'd think that the crisis was over. But it isn't over because the strait's still closed. And all we've done is close it further by stopping Iran from shipping oil to China. What's the right move next. I find it quite hard to answer that question myself. So I'm eager to hear from you.

[Abbas Malani]

Well, I think it is a very hard question. On the strait of Hormones, there is a very interesting interview with Mr. Shamhani, who was Harmony's top military advisor, who was in charge of this national security committee that they have. And they asked him, this is after the shorter war between before this war, they said, how come you didn't close the strait of hormones? You kept bluffing the journalists, Iranian journalists. He said we weren't bluffing, but we will close the strait of hormones when it is the last thing we do. This is when we are existentially threatened. So they knew from the moment that Khomeini et al were taken out that they were now in that existential mode. So they went to the end game from the beginning. And then they realized maybe they can make money out of this, maybe they can begin charging money. And to cave to that idea to me is absolutely counterproductive. I don't think they will go for it. I don't think China will go for it. I don't think United Arab Emirates would go for it. Saudi Arabia will certainly not go for it. And Iran has a claim that has no patient law. Iran is one of the countries that has access to the Strait of Hormones. Oman has as much access as Iran had. So to me that is a non starter. One of the things that again, I'm surprised it wasn't in any of the demands that the Trump administration made about to Iran. And we haven't seen the documents. We have seen what is leaked about the documents. There isn't a single mention of defending the people of Iran against this regime. Any deal that is made with this regime, in my view, has to include language from the Trump administration that we promised these people that we'll come to their help. Now we have their back. You can't continue killing these people. You can't continue threatening them. You can't continue doing the things that they're doing. They have shut down the Internet for a thousand hours. People live on that. The regime itself said they have lost $2 billion in companies, many of them led by women. So any policy of the US of the Trump administration that excludes defending the rights of the people against this regime, because I have no doubt the Iranian people will take care of this regime because the regime can't solve the problems that Iran has. And the problems are fundamentally economic. And the economic problems, contrary to what regime apologists say, were not created by the sanctions they were exacerbated by the sanctions.

[H.R. McMaster]

Yeah. Hey, Abbas, you're making such an important point here. I think, and this has been, I think, an element of our approach that has been most disappointing to me is that, is that some of the language was insensitive to the, you know, to the tremendous opportunity and maybe the moral responsibility to come down on the side of the Iranian people. This is an impossible question because Iran is not monolithic or homogeneous. But how have you seen the sentiment of the people evolving since the beginning of this war? And if the, if the Iranian people are to be able to kind of muster the courage again to, to face, you know, the machine guns and everything else they had to face in January, what are some of the signs that kind of a, an uprising is beginning, you know, in terms of strikes or BASI and RGC members is not going to work, you know, or portions of the country or more portion, certain portions of the country more susceptible to, to really having the people take control away from the state and its tools of repression. Could you kind of maybe give us an idea of how that the sentiment has evolved and then what the prospects are, you know, for the people, you know, seizing an opportunity?

[Abbas Malani]

Well, one of the consequences of the closure of the Internet is that it's very difficult to get first hand information. I think that's one of the reasons they've shut it down so well before. I had much more access in terms of talking to different people and getting a sense of what is on the ground. I and everybody else is more limited. But if you look at what the regime has been doing, you get a sense of what's going on. Within the last two weeks, the regime has brought in thousands of Hashd Al Shabi, Kataib, Fox and Mutual Zaynabiyun and marched them in the streets, had them talk into television and saying, we are here to help support the regime. They have talked about opening the border and bringing Shiites from Afghanistan to essentially fill in where the Iranian people are disappointing them. Bertolt Brecht famously said, the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party is dissatisfied with the people of Germany. They have elected the new people. This regime is electing people. They literally have this remarkable plan. Those to me, indicate that they see signs of a potential explosion. That's why every night, virtually in neighborhoods in cities, that people had gone to the street from around 11 o', clock, they send their goons into streets on bicycles, motorcycles, cars, shouting, hey dad. Hey dad. Long did Lapper will kill anyone, you know, threatening in a sort of Nazi like brown shirt, like going into Jewish neighborhoods before they were attacked. So to me that's the most empirical evidence I have seen that they very much anticipate and fear that uprising.

[H.R. McMaster]

And just, just quickly for our viewers, I was struck by the reports of US A10 attack aircraft attacking Hashtashabi. These are, these are Iranian created supported militias in Iraq, inside of Iraq as they were marshaling to come into Iran. So they are drawing on external proxies, right. For additional,

[Abbas Malani]

not just hasht al Shabi, literally as I said from Iraq, Hash al shabi from Iraq, Fatim from Afghanistan, Zaynabiyun. The Iranian Shiites that were sent in Syria to fight on behalf of Assac. They are bringing them all back. If a regime is consolidated and sure of its own oppressive apparatus, it doesn't need to constantly bring in people from outside and say we got these to come after you.

[John Cochran]

Here's where I think there's the real fork in the road. You mentioned that we'll try to negotiate with them, to promise to treat their own people well. And I can imagine how long those promises would be kept. But America faces a choice. Is our goal to unseat this regime completely and bring in something new or is our goal to lower our own costs, Short run costs in a small amount negotiate with them. Which means some promises mostly about not lobbying missiles on your neighbors and opening the straits for a while. But that means supporting them, that means giving them money, that means not helping all the people who want to unseat them. That is a very dirty deal. That looks like where the US is going because of the short run costs. My own fear is not, not so much for the effects on Iran, but the long run effects of, you know, of keeping them in power and becoming in essence helping them stay in power because it's too expensive to do the others. I think HR would tell us we could take the Straits of Hormuz in about 48 hours if we only gave him a tank and some friends to do it. So the, the overwhelming military and economic ability for us to do it seems there just the, the will seems sure. So would you counsel go for it, do what it takes to get rid of this regime or would you counsel the direction we're taking now? Ah, that's too much of a pain in the ass. You know, like the Venezuelans, we'll just negotiate, buy them off, let them keep their properties in London so long as they don't cause us too much trouble and, and try to keep the cameras off as they murder their own people.

[Abbas Malani]

I think again you have put your finger on the most important, in my view question that the west needs, the US needs to decide, they need to have a strategic decision on Iran. They haven't had that. No administration in my view after the revolution, Democrat or Republican, has had a strategic thinking. What do we want to do with Iran? Is Iran possible ally of the United States or the West? Can this regime be lured into becoming a law abiding state rather than a cause? Or is it as dangerous as someone like me says and we need to help the Iranian people get rid of these things. The US had a policy on Soviet Union from 1946. No administration, none that I know of. The last administration that in my view had a strategic vision on Iran was Nixon. The Nixon doctrine basically said we need Iran. Iran is our key ally. Iran is the ally of Israel, Israel is our key ally and we need to keep this regime regardless of the tensions we have with them. They fought Iran tooth and nail on oil, Nixon administration, they fought him on the nuclear issue, but they kept their alliance.

[John Cochran]

So let me ask my fellow, the American specialists here, would it not be much better politically in America? I mean imagine we go into the midterm elections and we have a messy deal with Iran. The Democrats, the economists and everybody says what a terrible thing this was for Trump to do it. Although we've moan the grass very successfully

[Bill Whelan]

versus

[John Cochran]

an actual victory. One of our great enemies for decades is now gone. I would think that America and those in charge of America right now would be much better off seeing this conclusion rather than a face saving negotiation and kick the can down the road a little more.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Don, the problem is that we know from history if you want to collapse a regime like this, you can't do it purely with air power or indeed with naval power. The regime has a lot in common with the Nazi regime. The combination of fanaticism and corruption which Abbas talked about earlier. But how did you decapitate the Third Reich? You needed the Red army to be in Berlin and only then did the fanatics begin to commit suicide and the rest hand themselves over to justice. There's no administration that's going to commit the ground forces that would be necessary to achieve certain regime change. I think that's a problem. HR will have thoughts on this part 2. Collapse in the economy feels doable. Except that as we discovered with Russia, it's quite hard to collapse a really large economy economy even one that's in this case teetering on the brink of hyperinflation. Why? Because it has borders we can't control. There's goods already coming in from Pakistan, for example, and the Chinese are not going to let these people go down because the Iranians are a critical part of the Chinese axis of authoritarians. The Chinese are selling them weapons, sending weapons, maybe giving weapons, which they never did to Russia. They did dual use, but not weapons to Russia. The Chinese support for the regime is more overt than we have seen. And so it's not clear to me that we can, with the means at our disposal, collapse the economy enough to cause the kind of revolution that I think would happen if there were no food at all. I mean, there comes a point when, regardless of the price level, there just is no food. And when you get to that point, then it's very hard for a tyranny to remain in business. But I don't think we can get them to that point. I think they can still keep the basic show on the road. And so that's the dilemma for policymakers. The nobody wants to commit large scale ground forces because that would be Forever War 3.0. Nobody can bring the economy tumbling down just by American levers. And therefore you're left with the following problem. Every day the Strait of Hormuz remains closed creates a bigger headache for the economy that starts to really hurt ordinary Americans, not right now, but in a couple of weeks and certainly in a couple of months. So you can't leave it like that for too long or it's going to be utter carnage in the midterms. The electorate's already mad enough about affordability. Wait till they see 4% inflation, which is perfectly conceivable under these conditions. That's the dilemma.

[Bill Whelan]

Abbas, we have just a couple minutes left. Let me ask you this question. The Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessant, was at the White House yesterday talking about various things, including taxes. He got asked the obligatory question about when the price of gasoline is coming down. He did something clever. He said it could be days, weeks, months. In other words, I'm not a cleric, I can't see the future. But as we look at the future of this regime, what is your advice, Abbas, to the United States, to Israel, in terms of how it should be couching this conflict, in terms of expectations, should they be saying the regime is going down in a matter of days, weeks, months, or should they say years?

[Abbas Malani]

I don't think it's going down in a matter of days or months, but I think they should say this regime can't. This is my belief, this regime in its current form cannot survive. That's I think the difference between this regime and, for example, the Nazis. Iran does have a very vast reservoir of people who want to change. They don't want to make a radical revolutionary change necessarily. They want a society. They want a new Iran where they can live normal lives and the Iranian culture, the Iranian economy can reach its full potential. There might be at some stage some within the regime who realize, like people did in South Africa, like Pinochet did in Chile, that the status quo is untenable, that they will make a deal to give up much of their power or some of their power and keep their property and live to enjoy the fruits of their corruption. I see that as possible. That requires a wiser opposition that we've had. The opposition hasn't really been willing to follow this path and see whether it is possible to go through this regime through an intermediary state.

[Bill Whelan]

Finally, Abbas, our good fellow audience is very information hungry. Could you recommend a few places they should go to follow what is going on in Iran, keeping in mind these are probably people who don't speak Farsi.

[Abbas Malani]

Well, my suggestion is that look at multiple sources. It has become I truly have never seen the Western media is so polarized, both epistemologically, politically and journalistically. Some of the headlines that I read in some of the most important papers in England and France and here are so discordant with what I know about the reality in Iran. So my sense, my suggestion is please read as much as you can, multiple sources, and believe that Iran is a pivot. You can't have Middle east peace without democratic Iran. I absolutely believe that. And I think the people of Iran want to make that. And wise policy is to help Iranians reach that point and Iranians, I mean, Iranians in diaspora, Iranians, 10% of Iranians now live in diaspora.

[Bill Whelan]

Abbas Malani, thanks for joining us today. Hope to have you back on Goodfellows in the future with hopefully good news to report from Iran.

[Abbas Malani]

I hope so.

[H.R. McMaster]

Thanks, Abbas. Thank you.

[John Cochran]

Excellent.

[Abbas Malani]

Thank you.

[H.R. McMaster]

All right.

[Bill Whelan]

On the second portion of our show, gentlemen, a few odds and ends for you. Let's begin in, of all places, Hungary, which I don't think we've talked much about in our six years doing Goodfellows. Over the weekend, the good people of Hungary went to the polls and they now have turned out their prime minister, Viktor Orban. He's out of a job after 16 years as well. Prime MINISTER Sir Neil, I turn to you, is this a referendum on Orban being a little long in the tooth and out of touch with a disgruntled electorate, or is there a bigger story here about Maga losing its touch in Europe?

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Well, there's a huge story here. This is a tremendously important development because many people thought that it wouldn't and couldn't happen that Viktor Orban had, in effect, become a fascist dictator and wouldn't let go of power. This kind of thesis has been quite often aired, but now we know that he's not a fascist, he's a populist, and therefore can be defeated in an election that was pretty free. Very high turnout, I think close to 80%. Not voting for a candidate of the left, mind you, because the winner is not ideologically very different from Viktor Orban. That's important. The reason that Orban was thrown out, I think, was principally something we've been talking about already on the show, corruption and the perception that there was a kind of deep hypocrisy to Orban's populism. There's another interesting thing here, and it's about Orban's own future. I think he's going to. And his cronies, too, are going to face some serious legal action in the coming weeks and months. So this show ain't over and we'll be hearing about Orban again. But it reminds me of a conversation I had with him quite a few years ago now, I should check, but it was pre pandemic. So at least six years ago, I was in Budapest and I met him and I said to him, you know, no one is ever going to really believe in what you say you're achieving in Hungary, where he portrayed himself as pursuing a very distinctive course until you lose an election. But if you can lose an election and show that you're willing to bow to the will of the people, your claims will be so much more credible. And I remember saying it and thinking to myself, we will find out if he's just going to be one of these Erdian types, like the Turkish president, who'll never let go of power until they carry him out feet first. Now, it turns out that Orban was an Erdian and actually did bow to the will of the people. I think that is a good thing. And there's the bonus benefit that there's no longer a veto exercised by Hungary on the loan that the European Union has wanted for some time to make to Ukraine. And so this makes a meaningful difference to the situation in Eastern Europe as well. So I think it's great news and I wish his successor the very best of luck. He's going to need it because he's inherited quite a mess.

[H.R. McMaster]

And even, hey, I'd say even beyond that, Neil, I mean, to get two thirds of the votes. And that was, that was the mark for the people of Hungary because they wanted to reverse elements of kind of the state capture, you know, that, that Orban and his party had organized over many, many years. And so it's important for that reason that the people are still sovereign in Hungary. And they expressed that through the results of this election. And the second thing, though is it's a compelling counterargument against the catastrophism that democracy's over and this idea that you have to try to engineer outcomes in elections that cut against the popular will. And I think you saw that in the Netherlands also, and the outcome of that election. So, hey, I think this is tremendously important in a number of ways. And then also I would say the guy was a panderer to Putin and Xi Jinping. How did that play out in the country that revolted against the Soviets in 1956? Hey, it didn't, it didn't float with them, you know, so I think it's, it's also a, it's a, it's a good shot back at Putin, who I think lately has been encouraged by the tensions between, between Europe and the United States over the war in Iran and, and, and, and his hopes for breaking apart NATO, for rending the transatlantic relationship, I think have been significantly diminished by the outcome of the Hungary election.

[John Cochran]

I would add this has lessons for Europe more generally. The cordon sanitaire, the exclusion of anything from the right is something we can't talk about, is shown to be one

[Abbas Malani]

of those many

[John Cochran]

habits of center left in Europe that didn't make much sense. This rightward shift in European voters and electorate is not towards an authoritarianism. They're not looking for the strongman. They're looking for some sensible policies in the place of fairly unsensible policies. But they want democracy, freedom, rule of law, all of those things that we all cherish. And that's kind of what's exposed here now. Europe's having trouble digesting it. They're trying to portray it as a great victory of the left. And as Neil pointed out, Magyar's policies are one iota to the left of Orban. In fact, had he won against anyone else, it would be decried as the end of democracy and the right wing shift and here come the Nazis again. But there is this sort of sensible middle of European politics which is ascended. And I think the standard elites should perhaps starting to wake up and pay attention to that fact.

[Bill Whelan]

Our second item. HR this one's for you. War Secretary Pete Hegseth has asked Army Chief of Staff General Randy George to step down and take immediate retirement. An anonymous source telling reporters, quote, it was time for a leadership change in the Army. Question for you, HR Big deal, little deal, no deal at all. And I could historically point you to, HR to all sorts of examples of Lincoln and Truman and other presidents firing generals in the middle of conflicts.

[H.R. McMaster]

Yeah, I think it's a big deal for one reason, and that is, I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding about the chain of command. The chain of command comes from civilian leadership to senior military officers who do what their civilian bosses instruct them to do. You know, and I think what's happened is that Secretary Hexith, with the vast number of these personnel changes, is fighting a rear guard against phantoms. Hey, you won the election. You've got military leadership there that is professional, that is committed to support, defend the Constitution, that recognizes, hey, the military should never be a check on executive power. That was what our, our founders were most concerned about. So, you know, I think that this idea that there's a loyalty test, as you mentioned, Bill, it's not, it's not unprecedented, right? I mean, you know, when, when, when John F. Kennedy came in, he thought the old guard over there in the Pentagon from under Eisenhower that, you know, that they, that they were not going to support his policies. So he brought Maxwell Taylor out of retirement and put him in a senior military advisor in the White House to largely kind of supplant the advisory responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs. Then he installed Taylor as the chairman, again out of retirement. So it's not unprecedented that there is this kind of idea that I need my people there. Lyndon Johnson said to the jcs, hey, I'm like a coach I used to know, and you're my team. You're all Johnson men. Well, actually, they're all Constitution men. And I think politicians need to understand that, you know, and, and, and then finally with this, I don't know what the reality is about these promotionalists and, and, and removing, you know, women and minority officers from the promotion list. But there was, there was a problem under, under the Obama administration, there was a problem under the Biden administration of pursuing equality of outcome instead of equality of opportunity. And that was, that was, I don't think that was beneficial to minority officers, to women officers either, you know, because then if something is promoted, you're like, oh, yeah, I know where that person got Promoted, which is not true. These are extraordinary officers. And so now they're like everything in the Trump administration. There's an unequal and opposite reaction. And the problem is that both the advocacy for kind of a radical social ideas or political agendas under Biden and the Obama administrations drugged the military, was trying to drag the military into partisanship. We don't want the Trump administration to do the same thing. Hey, hands off. Hands off the military. So I just think that it's a big deal for that reason. But as you mentioned, it's not unprecedented and I think it ought to be framed under, hey, you know, the military is not partisan. I mean, I don't know any partisan generals or admirals. I don't know any woke generals or admirals. I don't know any extremist generals or narrators. There's this kind of crazy narrative out there where the military is being used like other institutions do to score partisan points. And the danger is that will diminish. Maybe Americans trust or some Americans trust in that institution.

[Bill Whelan]

All right, gentlemen, our Goodfellows producer, slash game master Scott Immigrant has come up with yet another game for us to play. We're going to call this one Winners, Losers, or Too soon to Tell, The Iran War Edition. I'm going to give you the name of an individual and you're going to tell me if they are a winner, a loser, or too soon to Tell vis a vis Iran. Let's start with U.S. president Donald Trump. Neil?

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Too soon to tell. And by the way, that will be my answer to all these questions. We do not know as we are having this conversation, how this turns out. There's a ceasefire. The missiles have stopped flying, drones have stopped flying. But the Strait of Hormuz is still, to all intents and purposes, closed. And so it's not yet clear how this turns out. And rarely is it clear at this stage in a war. Where are we six weeks in how it's going to turn out. So my answer is the same to all these questions. It is too soon to tell.

[Bill Whelan]

Gentlemen. Anybody else want to go in a different direction? Neil?

[John Cochran]

Well, A.J. you want to go next?

[H.R. McMaster]

Oh, I agree. Too soon to tell.

[John Cochran]

And I'll add but according to the depends on Trump said early in the war I want America to win wars again. If we win this, if by the midterm elections the Iranian regime is gone, yet Trump gets a solid win. Anything else? And I think the forces of this is all a mistake. Gas prices are high. Mean it's a loss for Trump.

[Bill Whelan]

All right, our second individual, U.S. vice President J.D. vance. Neil, you're gonna say too soon, but maybe explain what Vance is juggling here, Neil, in terms of his political interests.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Well, I think it's rare that a vice president gets sent to a meeting like the one that just happened in Islamabad. That would typically be an assignment for a Secretary of state or perhaps a national security advisor, since we have the same guy doing both jobs right now. It's unusual that it was not Marco Rubio, but it was J.D. vance. The risk for Vance is very, very clear. If this all turns out badly, then it'll be his name and his face that people associate with it. The Machiavellian school thinks that Secretary Rubio has pushed Vance into this position with malice aforethought. But that seems unlikely to me since it could equally well turn out fine for Vance. That's why I say it's too soon to tell. If we look back on the Iran war as a tremendous act of strategic courage that led to regime change in Iran, I wholly agree with John. All concerned will look like geniuses. If, unfortunately, the regime is able to cling on and the economic costs start to really impact voters, then everybody's going to look like they screwed up. So Vance is in the same situation as President Trump. He stands on a kind of knife edge of history. I think he has done a good job. I think the Islamabad negotiations are difficult. It was right for it to be the US that broke off the top when it was clear the Iranians weren't making sufficient concessions. But that is just the first inning. And I wouldn't be at all surprised if Vice President Vance were back in Islamabad in a relatively short time to resume these negotiations.

[John Cochran]

I'm going to disagree with that because I think no one's going to remember that Vance went to Pakistan, but they will remember that Vance was the no forever wars. I don't think this is a good idea guy. So actually, if it's turns into quagmire, I think his Stock within the 2028 Republican debate about do we retreat? Isolationism versus engagement.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Well, that's possible, John. But remember, although he had his doubts, we know that he said in the critical meetings you got to go hard and fast. So I don't think he's in a position to say I was against it until I was for it, because that's a line that's never worked terribly well in American politics.

[Bill Whelan]

HR Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

[H.R. McMaster]

Yeah, Too soon to tell again, you know, the default. But. But hey, again, it depends on the outcome of the Iran war, but it really depends on the outcome of what's happening in Lebanon right now with Hezbollah. I think we have to really highlight how very, very significant this is, that there are now direct talks initially brokered by the US between, between Lebanon and Israel. It is against the law in Lebanon to talk to Israelis, you know, and so this, this is the beginning of maybe what could be a road to the diminishment of Hezbollah's influence even further and maybe the ultimate disarmament of Hezbollah and this what might be what gets, you know, finally Lebanon to arrest its downward spiral and rebuild what should be a beautiful and thriving country. So I think if Netanyahu pulls that off, it would be quite significant.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Couple of quick points. I think he is, of all the people on the list, Bill, the one most likely to be a winner at this point because of the extraordinary damage that's been inflicted on Iran and because the Iranians have been forced to concede a separate process over Lebanon. That is a big concession that the Iranians have made. Although they have talked all along about this axis of resistance, the fact that the Lebanon issue has been separated from the main questions of the Iran US talks, that's a concession by the Iranians. So I think Bibi is on track to be the person who is most likely to win, though it's too soon to tell.

[John Cochran]

I'll just for the sake of fun, I'll disagree because otherwise this should. Gets boring. I remember October 8, 2023, we just discussed DiBi's future and none of us thought it was very bright. And it's remarkable how well, how well he's done since then. But I do remember that democracies are not very grateful to people who win wars. What did the UK do to Winston Churchill for having won World War II? They turned against him immediately. And even if, you know, what Israel has achieved is just amazing under Netanyahu, but nonetheless, when things conclude, even with a pretty darn many, many advances for Israel, never distrust the Israelis, ability to tear each other to shreds, things fall apart. So I think converting this into a solid political gain after the war is over will be very difficult. And I forecast it probably won't happen.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

And Bibi has to face it like he has to face elections. He has elections to come before October, so that'll be the, the moment of truth in terms of Israeli domestic politics.

[H.R. McMaster]

Oh, just a quick point. Since John brought up Churchill, you know what he and Neil, you want to comment on this? What Churchill said about the Suez crisis. Right. I would not have dared. I think he said something like that. But if I had dared, I would not have dared stop. And I think that's kind of the situation that Netanyahu and President Trump are in together.

[John Cochran]

Neil has this brilliant essay on how this is America's Suez crisis, which is what's pushing me towards the hawkish attitude I have evidenced throughout this show that if you back up now, then you are as important geopolitically as the UK Was after Suez.

[Bill Whelan]

All right, I have two more, and we will mercifully end this game after that. NEO the European trio of Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron and Pedro Sanchez.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

I think they're highly likely to come out of this worse off whatever happens, because alth they have struck all kinds of poses that are popular domestically, given the unpopularity of the war and the unpopularity of President Trump. As I keep trying to remind my European and British friends, when the smoke clears, you are still entirely reliant on the United States for your security. Without the United States, you don't have deterrence. And your dependence on the US Is even greater than it used to be because of your reliance on, on what people call the US Tech stack, and especially, of course, the artificial intelligence part of it. So I think they're going to end up looking extremely weakened when President Trump is able to vent his full spleen. He is furious about their behavior, and I think they're underestimating how much that's going to cost them.

[John Cochran]

Just to pile on to Starmer, you know, this was an anniversary of the Falklands War. And comparing Thatcher to Falklands and Starmer in this case, eventually, oh, yeah, I guess we'll send you an aircraft carry. It turns out we only have one that faintly works and it makes it halfway there before, you know, Margaret Thatcher

[Bill Whelan]

hurt Britannia rules the waves.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Well, Margaret Thatcher had occasional disagreements with Ronald Reagan, I think for the think of the case of Grenada, but she kept them private because she understood how extraordinarily important the relationship with the United States was. Wars. And this is something that I'm afraid Keir Starmer has forgotten and he'll pay a price for it.

[Bill Whelan]

HR do you want to add the European love fist?

[H.R. McMaster]

Well, you know, I just, I just did an interview with Anders Foe Rasmussen. If I unplug the today's Battleground series, and we agreed that we both have to step back toward each one another, you know, and I think that we could see some concrete steps in that connection, especially if it does get to more of an enduring ceasefire and a sustained effort to patrol and keep open the Persian Gulf in the Straits of Hormuz. That will be done with a multinational task force that will include European nations as part of it.

[John Cochran]

But Trump wants the Europeans to take over the Strait of Hormuz and even China. But do the Europeans have any capacity to do anything about the Strait of Hormuz?

[H.R. McMaster]

Yeah, they do. They do. They've got, they have. They have, they've got it. They've got a missile frigate for, and they have some, some of their, some of their ships are better configured to do this. You know, the polls and the French, the UK have pretty significant min sweeper capability. So, yeah, I mean, they, they provide. And, and you know, we do exercise, as mentioned before, like every year we do like an exercise, you know, sometimes up to 30 nations on keeping the straight of Horu open. This was not a, you know, a problem that was unanticipated.

[Bill Whelan]

All right, and finally, Xi Jinping.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Neil. Well, this again is a difficult one to judge right now because Xi Jinping has options, and these options include making a move with respect to Taiwan. Most experts, and we have plenty at Hoover with whom I've discussed this, think that he won't do that, that he'll wait and watch the United States get embroiled in another Middle Eastern war and look to the elections in Taiwan in January of 2028, hoping that the Guomindang win. He's cultivating their leader. She was just in Beijing. So that's the base case. But there is a tail risk, and I'd love to hear HR's thoughts on this. And the tail risk is that they're keeping a careful count of the number of tomahawks that have been fired, the patriots that have been used up, the depletion of the arsen of precision weaponry that the Iran war has caused. And there must be some people in Beijing saying if we don't take advantage of this moment, we may never get a better moment again. Not, I think, for invasion or even blockade, but for some move that pushes the envelope on Taiwan's autonomy, particularly its commercial autonomy. So this seems to me the key question. We won't know if Xi Jinping is a winner or loser until we know whether he's willing to take risk. My gut feeling is that if he does nothing, if he waits, he's going to discover two years down the line that time really wasn't on his side, because two years from now, I think indopacom is going to be in a much stronger position than it is right now to deter Chinese action. So again it's too soon to tell but he has some agency here and he's got to make one of the biggest, perhaps the biggest decision of his whole career.

[H.R. McMaster]

Yeah, I agree with Neil. It is a pivotal moment. You saw the news just today about new steps to mobilize the industrial base and to increase the production rate for munitions and weapons systems. I mean there's a great essay in the Journal today about with Steve Feinberg is doing within department defense which is really significant. We mentioned it, you heard it first year on Goodfellows as we were talking about, you know, how finally, finally the Pentagon is really reforming in a fundamental way. And so I do think this creates this idea of a closing window of opportunity, an idea I think that Xinping may have already always had in his mind but I do think it still is valid to say hey, that decision point for him is coming in 2028 associated with the Taiwanese election. I think that's probably the most consequential pivot in connection with either a DPP victory in which case I think he ratchets up coercion in a significant way or a KMT victory which he will then try to use to get annexation by invitation.

[John Cochran]

And I would just add so the war in Iran has I think really broken through everybody that I don't talk to the military as much as you do, hr but certainly the idea that drones are important and we need to do something about it, especially when we have concentrated high value ships as our main thing. That boy oh boy, is everybody on board with that one. And also disruptions to international trade I think now are suddenly a little more salient which of course an invasion of Taiwan would stop Pacific trade. And all of you who wanted China to stop its exports, well, China stop its exports and China would realize it would stop its exports. So if anything I think this would push them towards less military but more blockaded economic. They need to do something that does not stop global trade. And good luck to them on figuring that one out.

[Bill Whelan]

Okay gentlemen, onto the lightning round. All right, John, we are starting with you. It is April 16, which means that you all were up late last night working on your taxes. Yes or no, John? I was looking at analysis by a company called Postal. They're a virtual mailbox and compliance service. They claim that individual tax returns cost American taxpayers $146 billion in time and out of pocket expenses. They also claim Americans are spending 2.1 billion hours filing out their Form 1040s. That's 12 hours per filer John, is there a way to build a better mousetrap?

[John Cochran]

Oh my God, yes. And most other countries of the world do that. You know, the insane complexity of our tax code, especially as you gain a little bit of wealth, is just a national crisis. But we're focusing on the wrong question. It's like people who measure the effects of regulation by the number of pages in the Federal Register. It's the damage that the tax code does economically, the amount of effort that's put into avoiding taxes, arranging taxes and so forth, as opposed to building better mousetraps, building better companies and so forth. Stupendously high marginal rates combined with Swiss cheese of deductions that just, that hurts the economy. That is orders of magnitude bigger than the pain in the ass of filling out the forms.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Neil. Oh, I completely agree with John. If we could get back to the principles of taxation enshrined in Adam Smith's wealth of Nations. Simplify, simplify, simplify. What a blessing it would be. And economically, hugely beneficial. It's one of the things I talked about in the book the Great Degeneration. One of the symptoms of degeneration is excessive complexity of legislation and regulation. So amen to everything. John said.

[John Cochran]

I've just been quick. You want to taxes a flat 20% VAT and throw everything else out. That's one example of what we could do. And the economy would boom and the government would get more money.

[Bill Whelan]

Okay, one final item, gentlemen. Since the last time we did our show, Artemis 2 went deeper into space with man than ever before. But my question to the three of you. Where's the excitement? Where's the parade? Where's the hoopla?

[H.R. McMaster]

I would just say, hey, I think that one of the people who gets a lot of credit for this should be Vice President Pence. Mike Pence, who put together a space Council and Trump won and I think fundamentally resurrected the space program and modified it significantly by expanding the private and public cooperation in connection with space. And of course emphasizing security in space, recognizing it as a contested domain, but also kind of reinvigorating our ethos of the exploration in space. So credit to Mike Pence for really getting the resources behind a solid strategy for space.

[John Cochran]

So I'll disagree just because that's my job today. An unbelievably expensive boondoggle that does what we got done in 1967. A huge disposable rocket that sends a one time use capsule up so that four people can have a fantastic tourist experience at a cost rivaling that of the California High speed train. And similar benefit. SpaceX is on its way to sending people to the moon for actual reasons. Not national prestige project. The last thing we need is national prestige project. How about actually build a freeway for something less than hundreds of billions of dollars per mile? That would be a great national.

[Bill Whelan]

Okay, California high speed rail, John, is going to spend at least $126 billion and nobody has been on that train yet. The train hasn't got an inch. So let's give NASA credit. Neil, I'll give you the last word here is I think you want to push back against my characterization.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Well, I've been saying for a while that we're sort of subconsciously reenacting the Nixon presidency. And this just clinches it for me because we kind of got it all going on. We got an energy price shock as big as the 1970s coming down the pike at the speed of an oil tanker. Then we've got a scandal that just won't go away. I still don't really know what the first lady was talking about last week, but Epstein seemed to figure he's the Watergate in the drama and then we go to the moon again. So it's all kind of perfectly Nixonian. I, I'm grateful to NASA, but as you say, John kind of did this then.

[H.R. McMaster]

So we need to bring back some old school funk.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

All we're missing is the soundtrack. And hrm. Counting on youth.

[Bill Whelan]

Tang for everybody. Gentlemen. All right, you got a bounce here. But before we go, I want to point out one thing. Another year, another honor for our colleague, Sir Neil Ferguson. Earlier this week, the Liberty Fund announced that our jolly good Fellow is the 2026 honoree of the George F. Will Award for the Advancement of Liberty in a Free Society. Sir Neal receiving this honor for his efforts in deepening our understanding of the free society, individual liberty and the human condition. Neil, you want to take us out by just telling us how wonderful this award is and what it's going to be like to be on the stage with George Will.

[Sir Neil Ferguson]

Well, I'm immensely grateful to the Liberty Fund for the award because it gave me the chance to have a conversation with George F. Will, one of the institutions of American journalism who consistently writes brilliant essays. Never afraid to take the contrarian lines. It was just a treat. It was one of those events that you live sort of in dread of. I'm always slightly filled with dread at the prospect of an award because I'm afraid of its being embarrassing. And you know that British people fear embarrassment above death, but this was in no way embarrassing. It was just a lovely occasion. Fantastic people. One of my kids was able to be there. And I'm immensely grateful to Mitch Daniels and everybody at Liberty Fund for giving me an absolutely unforgettable night. And George Will was his usual acerbic and brilliant self. I hope somebody taped the conversation. It was a lot of fun.

[Bill Whelan]

Gentlemen, that's it for our show. Great conversation as always. Look forward to the live show on the 22nd. Seeing you there in person. And all our viewers, we look forward to meeting you then. So take care. Until next time. Look forward to seeing you. Thanks again for watching us,

[John Cochran]

Sam.