← Green & Red: Podcasts for Scrappy Radicals
Green & Red: Podcasts for Scrappy Radicals
Trump's Aggression Against Iran Continues, w/ Professor Eskandar Sadeghi (G&R 470)
01:09:23
Loading summary
Transcript89 lines
- [00:06]
A
Friend, a frequent guest, comrade. We're here with Iskander Sidi. Iskander is a specialist and expert in Iran and Iranian history. He is a professor at the University of St. Andrews School of International Relations, author of Revolution and Its Discontents, Political Thought and Reform in Iran. Frequent contributor to fancy journals like the New Left Review and the London Review of Books frequently. Recently, especially been a guest on all kinds of podcasts and radio shows and doing interviews, which is really cool because, like, so many of the interviews I see are with really kind of the, you know, establishment people. So I'm really glad that you're getting anybody and you're telling them different version than, like, you know, we're usually getting in the. In the mainstream press. So really, thanks again for, for chatting.
- [01:02]
B
Anytime, Anytime, anytime. I think the last time we spoke
- [01:06]
A
was about a year ago when the US Attacked Iran. And so I think we'll just like to start by with a little bit of kind of an update from then to now. That was a sustained attack. Trump at that time claimed he obliterated Iran's nuclear programs. And that was the kind of basis for it. That was the stated public reason. Right. We're going to get rid of Iran's nuclear program. Right. This is after Trump had abandoned the. The joint agreement on Iranian nuclear program that had been signed under Obama. So anyway, since then, for a time, we didn't really talk about Iran much. But then in the last few months, it's kind of erupted once more into, you know, kind of as a news item. A lot of that has to do with the protests in Iran. We still hear about the nuclear program, but do you want to just kind of talk about the aftermath of last summer's attack and how that led to where we are today?
- [02:02]
B
Sure. So, I mean, obviously in the June that was known now as the 12 Day War, Israel obviously launched a unprovoked attack called Operation Rising lion, and in sort of the first hours assassinated many senior kind of commanders in the Revolutionary Guards. They even attempted to assassinate one of the lead negotiators who very sort of. I mean, fortunately he survived. And this was obviously they attacked, like the days before Iran was supposed to meet with the United States, I guess, Steve Witkoff in particular in Oman, in order to continue negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program. And I think, like, reporting since then, I mean, like, in places like the Washington Post, like mainstream venues, makes it very, very clear that this was, as I said at the time, so I feel vindicated, was coordinated and was basically, in many ways a ruse in order to catch Iran off guard. And, yeah, obviously they availed themselves of really cutting edge military technology in order to kind of target not only the elite brass, the top brass of the Iranian military, but I mean, even those very close to assassinating the Prime Minister. And then I'm sure you saw there was also basically messages that were sent or leading figures within the Iranian state were called up and pretty much threatened that they and their entire families would be killed if they didn't record a video defecting. And this obviously didn't have an impact ultimately, but, yeah, undeniably, I mean, this was very, you know, it was very, very impactful attack. I don't think there's much doubt at this point that obviously the Israelis had considerable aerial superiority. Nevertheless, obviously Iran was able to launch a significant number of missiles and able to penetrate the Iron Dome defense system. And I think it's correct, and this has been confirmed, I guess, by people who are in the Trump orbit, that the Israelis basically pretty much asked for a ceasefire simply because they were unable to repel these missile attacks from Iran. And obviously Iran was then committed to inflicting a quite serious cost, which I don't think Israel had previously really experienced. So they hit the Weizmann Institute and a number of kind of high profile targets, even though the number of casualties wasn't very high. I think it was like about 30 or so. But in Iran it was about 1,000 or more people were ultimately killed. And then, I mean, long story short, I mean, since June, what we've seen is kind of increased sort of pressure on the part of the Trump administration. Obviously, we've seen Benjamin Netanyahu go back and forth multiple times to Washington more than any other foreign leader. I think, what is it, seven times since January. And clearly, again, coordinating, applying pressure, lobbying for a certain outcome, and I guess more aggression, more sort of a far more severe and aggressive stance and posture with respect to the Islamic Republic. So, I mean, that's what we've been seeing. And then obviously within Iran itself, the economic situation has been in many ways perilous and it's been worsening. And this is obviously the culmination of 14 years of sanctions. Obviously, with that brief respite, that brief reprieve following the 2018 JCPOA, and even then that agreement had its issues, but it was like a basis on which to build. But yeah, so Iran has basically been facing economic warfare and strangulation in a very severe way since 2012. Obviously, there's always been arms embargoes and, and these sorts of things and freezing of assets, et cetera. But yeah, it's really, really intensified 2012. And what we've seen is the accumulation of this kind of corrosive effect of sanctions on the domestic political economy inside Iran. And that's when we saw obviously these late December, these protests begin in relation to the 40% depreciation in the currency since the June war. And a lot of this has to do with the structural weaknesses in the Iranian economy as well, as I'm sure the Treasury Secretary, Scott Bessen, also probably who's made his money through currency manipulation, may well have also played a role in kind of pushing Iran further over the precipice, basically. And then anyway, These protests between the 8th and 9th of January basically really intensified in part maybe in response to a certain call from Reza Pahlavi, sort of the son of the late shah. And then there were these very, very significant protests over these two days. And then these were obviously very severely and brutally repressed by the state in which several thousand people, the stake claims about just above 3,000, other human rights organizations are claiming 7,000 so far. Yeah. And the reality is, I mean, yeah, it does seem there's probably in the figures around the several thousand. And this is where we are currently. I don't know if you want to kind of open up or not. Yeah.
- [08:12]
A
Were the kind of more recent round of protests, were those kind of initially prompted by the conditions you mentioned? Shortages, inflation, crumbly, infrastructure, corruption. I mean, was it initially kind of this kind of like a fundamental or. Because the US media tends to say it was about like freedom and liberty and all that kind of stuff.
- [08:34]
B
Yeah.
- [08:35]
A
And also while you're doing it, mention the role of Reza Pahlavi, because I know you've written about that as well.
- [08:40]
B
Yeah, yeah. Okay. So I mean, it's a complex one because on the one hand, what kind of process we saw depended sort of very much regionally. There was a lot of differences. So like in Tehran, you could say that there were people there who were definitely experiencing maybe socio economic grievance. But there are a lot of people who are very profoundly disgruntled with the Islamic Republic and want to see it gone. You know, who went in there, who participated in this protest somewhere like Loristan? I mean. Yeah, someone might like, you know, which again might very much dislike the Islamic Republic. But there was certainly this question of economic survival. It has the highest rates of unemployment. There's severe rural and provincial poverty which has massively increased, again in part due to sanctions and in part due to corruption and mismanagement and all these sorts of things. So really what we're seeing is in those protests, we see really the coming together of obviously political grievances, social grievances, and also profoundly socioeconomic ones and class driven ones, insofar as, I mean, I was mentioning this to you before we kind of started recording. And what we need to kind of understand is how obviously on the one hand we have economic warfare and some economic siege, which is very, very real, targeting Iran's oil revenues, you have secondary sanctions. So basically even a third country can't invest in Iran because they're going to basically be hit with insane fines by the Treasury. And basically they're told you can trade with the United States or you can trade with Iran and obviously they're going to choose the United States and also cut off from key payment systems like the Swift system. So it's basically impossible to conduct just basic economic activity and trade and things like this, which are then which basically on the other hand deepens. It only increases and intensifies inequality. And this depends regionally and really kind of vary across the country. And at the same time it kind of deepens these certain kind of clientelistic networks which. So people who are kind of close to the state, who have access to favored rates of currency or they basically have access to smuggling networks and things like this, they're obviously going to be massively empowered. They know how to navigate the system and they're close to political power and they know how to use that in order to advance their own kind of interest. But obviously that's going to be to the disadvantage of working class people, overwhelmingly the majority of the population. But this is the thing, like sanctions designed to do this. I mean, we don't need to. The architects of the empire are very frank and open about it. They say we are doing this and we've designed this policy in order to impoverish the population. So they will then rise up and we'll apply pressure to the state. This is what they're meant to do. If anyone has any doubts about this, I actually suggest they read. It's really a horrendous book. So Richard Nephew, who was previously in the State Department, is also in the National Security Advisor under Obama. He wrote a book called the Art of Sanctions and he literally is documenting in granular detail all of the measures that they took, how they designed sanctions policy in order to create maximum pain to the extent that they even targeted, for instance, chicken prices, the price of chicken and poultry around key Iranian holidays, to Create. And it says it like in black and white. I've actually got a piece which should be coming out with Phenomenal World at some point, which is kind of documents a lot of this in more sort of detail. But yeah, so just to not go on for too long. But like, I mean, these protests were clearly, you know, they're organic. They're a product of real like socioeconomic and political discontent and the fact that people just, you know, they see the state as dysfunctional and not working for them and as corrupt. And obviously they don't necessarily see the role that sanctions have played in bringing them to this point. I mean, that's the kind of the really pernicious thing about sanctions. Basically, they're invisible. They're not like bombs. But we know that even from the First World War, actually it was kind of the economic blockades which were far more deadly and killed way more people than either gas or aerial bombardment. I mean, they're truly deadly. So. No, so just, I would say it's a mixture of both. Right. And really what we see these sanctions have intensified class inequality, economic inequality profoundly. And then the ruling class within Iran has kind of, obviously some have benefited from sanctions, others maybe not so. But overwhelmingly the burden has been shifted onto working people and the middle class and that's why they're so angry. So that kind of explains the, the absolute like anti systemic, like rage at this system as a whole.
- [13:54]
A
Well, you know, you mentioned the, they're kind of candid about what they do. We see this in Cuba right now where like Trump just, you know, he kind of says what's on his mind and you know, clearly there's, there's no hiding that. What they're trying to do is starve Cuba out and either kill, kill a million people or, you know, hope that they overthrow the government or whatever. So you mentioned, and I don't like getting into conspiracy theory, but on this one it's really prevalent here in the west or at least in the U.S. right. Because you mentioned the organic nature of it. And you have a lot of people who are defending the, the Iranian regime and claiming that this is all, you know, a Mossad operation and so on. And I know, I think you've been caught up in that. You've had people criticize you. Right. I, I suspect there's probably white Westerners who've never been anywhere near. They're on it is. Or, or Australian pseudo lefty scholars. Diane Johnstone. But do you want to talk about like just kind of. I, I know you just mentioned it but just kind of. Just to kind of reiterate, like, the organic nature of this. Like, are there like. I know a few years ago there, there was like a lot of protest by women, right. And then I think there was another round. Are these kind of just spontaneous people going to the streets? Are there groups, community groups or civil groups who are kind of organizing them? Workers groups, anything like that? How do they actually take place?
- [15:25]
B
I mean, there is lots of. There's like worker organizing. There is like women's organizing. There are like various Kurdish groups, for instance, in civil society and Baluchi. So kind of, I guess, because obviously Iran is, you know, comprised of not just, obviously the Persian speaking majority, or perhaps not even a majority, but like. Bob, are you there? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Sorry. Yeah, yeah, no, no, no, no worries, no worries. So there is like an active. So I just wasn't sure if I was cut off. No. So, yeah, they clearly are like, you know, groups representing different issues and constituencies. Right. In civil society in Iran and kind of active and like, it could be everything from like oil workers and gas worker people working, like, in the oil refineries through to like retirees and things like this. And teachers. I mean, teachers organizing. There was a massive sort of national protest by teachers, which was, like, incredible, actually. So there's lots of these sort of protests which are kind of like quite frequent in Iran, actually. But then these big protests which basically spiral and become nationwide, I think they are largely spontaneous insofar as, I mean, again, it's like, where does the organizing, where does the spontaneity, where do they two meet? But I mean, when I'm saying spontaneous, I mean, no one's sort of planning to sort of launch this nationwide protest which basically encompasses 100 cities and towns and even small towns with like, populations of 20,000 people. So, no, I mean, so the big ones, I guess, were 2017, 2018, which again, was very much linked to, I would say, yeah, political grievances, socioeconomic pain, et cetera, which has been increasing and intensifying and increased sort of anger at. Yeah, just broad injustice, I would say, that was prevailing. Then in 2022, there was this, the Woman Life Freedom protest, which again was sparked by this young woman who was killed in custody or died in custody, who was killed in custody. And that was obviously led predominantly by women. But even that was very much like a coalescence of a lot of kind of regional discontent around, again, socioeconomic questions as well as questions around ethnic kind of oppression in Iran. So in places like Balochistan and Kurdistan, because they tend to be in border regions, they often don't really get the spoils of, like, they haven't enjoyed the dividends of development, really, and they tend to be really kind of under development. And many of them were actually, for instance, I mean, in Kurdistan, but also in the southwest, for instance, where Iraq actually initially invaded Iran in the Iran Iraq War. These regions, in a sense, they were never fully. Some of them were never fully really rebuilt after the war. So they're really quite deprived. They have terrible infrastructure and in a sense, like I said, the dividends of development. And this is not just an approach of policy. It's also because, like anywhere resources get sort of pulled into the capital and like the major cities, so they eat up and gobble up a lot of the resources and a lot of the wealth. And then obviously naturally. And that obviously then creates this cascading effect where you have more and more intensified kind of province to sort of capital, kind of or less developed areas and border regions and then migration to the cities. So it's a problem, not just political and policy one. It's like also like a developmental one and how development has actually been enacted in kind of Iran. But so, yeah, so you have these nationwide protests, these two massive nationwide protests in 2017, 2018, and then 2022. And then, yeah, this is kind of another, you know, and then you had also a major protest in 2019, which wasn't quite nationwide, but it was very significant because what happened is the rouhani government in 2019, they basically removed subsidies off petroleum, which then acted as a regressive tax on working class people who obviously really rely on it. And you can imagine peddlers or guys on motorbikes who deliver things or taxi services and things like this. It hits them. It's like vat, right? It hits working class people much harder. And that was another thing which sparked a major kind of protest, and that was quite brutally repressed. So. But this latest one, yeah, I think it's sort of all of these in many ways coming together. And so there was like initially protest in the bazaar and then again, which acted as like a trigger. And then that's what sort of leads it to spreading, you know, really countrywide, like over a hundred cities and towns. And that's not something which one can engineer. I mean, I think the question is, like, this is organic, it's real, and it's rooted in genuine forms of class oppression. Like the ethnic question in Iran, which still hasn't been fully. It hasn't been resolved. Gender Oppression. I mean, these are all real things, right. And it's rooted in that. But it's the question like, how then is this been catalyzed in many ways and exacerbated by kind of US policy? And then how does the US and Israel seek to kind of like insinuate themselves and take advantage of it. Right. To create maximum destabilization. So they can both be kind of true. Right. There clearly is like collusion between the US and Israel in order to try to take advantage of this and destabilize it and smuggling in Starlink and all these sorts of things. Obviously they claim that it's because they care about Iranians freedom, which is of course absurd. But yeah, we also really. And the reality is, I mean I have seen footage of people with rifles, clearly organized, with guns armed as well, who aren't from the state. So the degree of violence, I mean the fact that hundreds of, I mean obviously we have the catastrophe of a state which has killed thousands of its own citizens, which I think has to be like moral responsibility needs to be placed there and they need to be held accountable for that. And the people who ordered it and were chiefly responsible, that need to be held accountable because that's a crime, it's a horrendous crime of humanity against its own people. But at the same time there clearly are elements who sought to exacerbate, intensify this. And we know this because hundreds of security officials were killed like, as well. Like, and some of them were like parts of the Basij militia, some of them were just people who were trying to defend mosques, things like this. So, you know, and the reality is we really don't have the, we don't have a full picture and we might never have one. I think that's the important thing because even quite like high profile, like reformist figures inside Iran, they were even alleging that a lot of this was agent provocateurs by the state, which like again, one has to be super careful. I think, like we really don't know to what extent maybe the state was doing this to exacerbate so they can more quickly repress it. To what extent the Israelis, because we know the Israelis had assets on the ground as well. And I'm sure the CIA does as well because obviously what they did in the June war, I mean how they quickly, they used drones and other means to take out Iranian rocket launchers in order to sort of carry out assassinations. So again, it's a very difficult picture. And I guess the problem is conspiracy theory. Offers us a really simplistic kind of answer. Say, oh, it's all down to this or it's all down to that. And the reality is that we have multiple kind of social forces and agents, really, and political actors who are kind of very much battling things out in a complex kind of political economic structure, both domestically and then internationally. And a lot of people don't want to grapple with that. They just want the easy kind of answer.
- [23:08]
A
We're seeing that here with actually with Venezuela. It's pretty clear there were collaborators in Caracas when, when the US Came in. Is the leadership invoking kind of Israel in the United States as a way to kind of rally people? I mean, if, if. Yeah, I remember kind of going back to Saddam. We talked about that earlier too. Like, Saddam was not a popular leader. He really was a repressive dictator. Right. But it seemed that, like, he was able to invoke the United States to maintain some level of support. Are the, are the Iranian, is Iranian government doing that, saying, hey, you know, this is. Outsiders are coming in and we need to join together. Because I assume even among people who don't support the regime, there's this level of nationalism. Like, yeah, we don't like you, we'd like to get rid of you, but we don't want outsiders coming in.
- [23:54]
B
Yeah, I mean, I think, like, we did see like that happening in the 12 Day War. So, I mean, people didn't like, rise up to, you know, to stage or try to overthrow the government. And they obviously saw what the Israelis did. I mean, the Israelis bombed famously like Evin Prison, and they killed 70 people, including social workers and people visiting their relatives. I mean, I think a lot of people do see through that, and I think most people do. And even if they hate, they don't like the Islamic Republic. They're very skeptical about the US being able to kind of liberate them, quote, unquote. So there is that. But there is this other thing which is a bit uncomfortable and I struggle with it insofar as there is also quite among certain people. And again, one can't. Shouldn't generalize. And I should say, actually, so the government does have a strong base of support. And again, one has to always caveat this because obviously they channel huge amounts of resources into mobilizing these people and so on and so forth. But there are people who are genuinely kind of invested in the Islamic Republicans public. Right. And they come out, like when there's rallies and. And again, there's like, there is incentives in some instances, but There are people who are also genuinely committed, but there are people who, like. And it's quite widespread. I've seen this belief that, like, they do believe that the Israelis were just, were just like, targeting the state and they're not actually going to kill, like, ordinary Iranians. They're like, there are people who think this. Like, and it's not, I wouldn't say it's especially small. Like, there is, like, there are some people who do think this and they do think that because whatever, they're so disgruntled and they're so outraged by their current circumstances. And there's just like this pervasive, like, I don't know, I think it's like nihilism, really, and just like, apathy that they think, like, yeah, the US could carry a targeted strike and it's going to actually help bring democracy. There are some people who do think this, and they are in Iran. They're not just in the diaspora. So there are people who do think this. I mean, the question is, they might think this, but then will they actually do anything in terms of, to act on it? And I think most people know, right, they're not. I mean, they're going to weigh the balance of forces and they're going to see, okay, no, the Islamic Republic is still standing strong at this point, so we just have to tolerate it. And they'll vent and they'll scream to their relatives or with the taxi driver, but it doesn't necessarily have a political. It doesn't cash out in political praxis in any kind of meaningful kind of sense. Right. And then, yeah, but I do think that the majority of people obviously are just very fearful. I mean, the majority are kind of. They don't like the Islamic Republic. They also just see that the Islamic Republic is currently just has this real crisis of just governance. It just can't solve any of the major problems, whether it's about air pollution, whether it's about water scarcity and water insecurity, whether it's about just inflation and just economic deterioration. So there's also people like that, but they also are kind of trapped, right? They understand, like, an Israeli bombing campaign is not going to solve things. If anything, it could make things far, far worse. But Iran is kind of stuck. It's like in this impasse, which is, I think, again, I think it's largely by design because the United States really isn't interested in negotiations that would actually then lead to sanctions relief that would then obviously improve the economic situation. And unfortunately, we're still in this situation we're not like. Despite people talking a lot about multipolarity, the global financial system is still absolutely dominated by the United States. And that's just an undeniable fact. And if anything, the sanctions have forced Iran to become extremely, far more dependent on China. So that 90% of his oil and gas goes to China and the United States kind of has an agreement with China. And yeah, it can't force China to basically see, stop buying oil from Iran, but it does make Iran's situation very precarious. And, you know, and buying, you know, the aim to sell oil to China at a discounted rate isn't going to alleviate the deep problems in Iran's economy. I mean, it's just not right. So this is the kind of. I mean, again, it's a complex picture. I think Iran is extremely polarized. Like, it's like insanely polarized to the point where, like in the universities, you know, protests have started again. I mean, just while, like, very intense ones. Just while the USS Abraham Lincoln and then the Gerald R. Ford are basically coming, is now coming to the Persian Gulf to basically engage in gunboat diplomacy. Gunboat extortion is probably a better kind of term for it. And these intense protests, I mean, some instance, they were kind of shouting pro Pahlavi slogans, which is really shocking and disconcerting because the university was always in Iran as well, just like it is in many places. It was usually the site of much more radical political kind of energies. So that was one thing. And also they were even scenes of them burning the flag, the national flag, and then basically tearing down pictures of those killed in the June war. So I think there's just a profound sense of alienation where many people just anything associated with the state, they kind of really repudiated, actually, even amongst nationalists, they will repeat it, the Islamic Republic, but because they're very worried about the question of the Balkanization of Iran potentially if there was an invasion or a bombing campaign and then some sort of civil war broke out. So they still managed to hold onto this idea of territorial integrity. And this is something must be preserved at all cost. But that's something which has kind of been almost like it's been kind of used for a long time, both by the state in order to kind of suppress free discussion of lots of things and actually like a change in policy. So again, it's like, I think, like I said, what we really see is a profoundly polarized society, actually. And in the case of a war, yeah, I don't think people are going to be running out and like supporting the majority won't be going out and supporting the bombing campaign, but you probably will have like organized groups on the ground, whether Israeli linked or not. Not, I don't know, like, you know, they could just be people who hate the Islamic Republic trying to organize to take advantage of the situation. I mean, that's totally possible as well. So, yeah, it's pretty precarious.
- [30:22]
A
You mentioned the diaspora and, and you dropped Raza Pahlavi's name a couple times. You know, to be honest with you, like, until like two years ago, I didn't know he was still alive. So, I mean, talk about like coming out of nowhere. Right, but, and I read something, I don't think you wrote it, but maybe you did because I know you've written about Levy.
- [30:42]
B
Yeah, yeah.
- [30:42]
A
Essentially what I've read, the consensus is that the Iranians would never tolerate these kind of, especially these American Iranians coming in and taking over, like, no matter what grievances they, legitimate grievances they may have with the current regime. I mean, do you sense that there, there will be kind of a unifying, you know, against that?
- [31:07]
B
The problem, again, one was like, they, I think like, Iran is probably like one of the most like propagandized places in the world. I guess it's like maybe like Cuba in that regard. But so I do, I mean, like, it does seem that like there are some people and like reasonable people who I used to like, consider reasonable, who are increasingly kind of of the opinion that he is like the only alternative to the Islamic republic, which is, and obviously this itself is like the product of like, you know, like 15 years of just like intense propaganda by kind of foreign backed, like news channels in Iran that have been peddling this idea that, you know, the Pahlavi era was some kind of golden age and everybody was really wealthy and affluent and everything was like, fantastic and Iran was like, respect. Like, you wouldn't, like if you watch these channels, like, you wouldn't even know that like there was a revolution or why there was a revolution in Iran.
- [32:04]
A
This is in, in Iran.
- [32:06]
B
No, no, no, these are all, these are all in London actually.
- [32:09]
A
No, because, no, I heard people in la la. Iranians say that.
- [32:13]
B
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. No, you get a lot of that. You get a lot of that time. But I do think, like it has affected people. One is because, like the kind of lack of trust and in many ways, I guess, bankruptcy of state television in Iran. So then that in a sense has been filled that Vacuum has been then filled by these news channels, like propaganda stations, basically, which have then spun this really kind of crazy narrative. And get me wrong, there's a lot of people who think this is absolutely nonsensical and obviously think this is ridiculous. But there are. I would say that compared to maybe several years ago, there has been an uptick in kind of support, so support for Pahlavi and the return of the monarchy. But it's relative. But so, for instance, in a lot of those protests, the ones I was talking about, they were really brutally repressed. Again, a lot of people were talking about freedom. A lot of people were talking about death to the dictator. A lot of people. These were a lot of the slogans, but there were slogans as well, sort of saying, like, you know, this, like, one that was particularly pronounced was like, this is the last battle, Pahlavi will return. That was like a kind of a common one. And that was even said again in some of these university protests, which are kind of like, ongoing. So there is like, some of that. But the way I understand Pahlavi is that he's essentially like a kind of a scarecrow to just batter again to be used against the Islamic Republic by the Israelis.
- [33:48]
A
He is a Zionist.
- [33:50]
B
Yeah, no, he went to Israel. He, Netanyahu. He's being backed by the Israeli Information Ministry. They're promoting him. They're boosting him. They're, you know, on. On X, on all these sort of social platforms. They're massively kind of promoting him. But it does seem like he does have an increased following in Iran now for those reasons that I said, like the desperation, the sort of. And also, I mean, the Islamic Republic has kind of systematically. This needs to be said, the Islamic Republic has kind of systematically, obviously repressed and disorganized and circumscribed domestic channels, forces that have tried to challenge the Islamic Republic or called for reform. I mean, it's marginalized all of these, which, to be honest, there's a lot of regimes of this kind. Do they want to create extremities? So it's like, okay, it's either us or it's that. It's a bit like what Assad did when he released Islamist prisoners and things like that and sort of made it this choice between it's either us or it's like isis, and that's your only option. So you basically destroy anything in between. Right? And both sides, both extremities are invested in that policy. So just like the monarchists are very much invested in destroying anybody Any kind of internal opposition figure is somehow complicit or is somehow co opted by the Islamic Republic. So both sides are kind of invested in this. So no, I would say he's basically being used as a scarecrow in order to kind of gin up again discontent and kind of galvanize that potentially around this figure. But obviously as you saw with Trump's and even like Lindsey Graham who's one of the biggest warmongers in the United States and absolutely kind of cleaves to the Israeli line on these things. Even he said publicly at this, at the Munich security conference that yeah, we don't back kind of recipality. So I mean I don't think anyone, the cynical power politics, kind of the people in the smoke filled rooms who are making these decisions like in the Pentagon or in the CIA, I don't think they really take him seriously because he's been lobbying them since the revolution for backing and they basically have pretty much dismissed him as a not serious figure. He sees this as his great opportunity. And I think the key thing here is obviously the Israelis pushing him has been the decisive thing with the Trump administration. That's what's really kind of been set a different tone. Even though Trump has not dismissed him. But the fact that he's had so much more profile is because the Israelis have a clearly thought out, concerted strategy of pushing him as much as kind of possible. And I don't know if you saw one of his statements, he sort of said one of the things that he prefaced when obviously he takes power in Iran, will immediately normalize with Israel. That was like one of the first things that he sort of said. So no, he's absolutely like, I think I wouldn't even be surprised if a lot of his strategy is now basically coming right out of Tel Aviv. I think, I think he's basically controlled. I don't know if you saw there was even a picture of him with Miriam Adelson at the Munich security corners. So I think he's absolutely kind of like pretty much the Israeli kind of candidate and they're pushing him as much as possible. But yeah, I mean even if there is support and increased support from inside Iran, the idea that he has any chance of getting anywhere near power is. Yeah, for the, for the medium term to the long term is I think
- [37:19]
A
maybe he has some kind of an award he could give to Trump ahead of time.
- [37:22]
B
Yeah, maybe I don't think Trump want that one. But the thing, another thing that's kind of it I need to, I Need to. I should add, he's been sort of claiming for, like, decades now that he has, like, 50,000 people in the military who are ready to kind of swear filthy to him. And it's never materialized. It's never, ever, like, it's absolutely not worth anything. And he's a braggart, and he's like, you know, he just basically is trying to flog his kind of wares and see who will take them up, really. And the minute. The Israelis are certainly biting, for sure.
- [37:57]
A
I mean, what strikes me about him is, I mean, this has been almost close. We're going on 50 years that that regime's been gone.
- [38:02]
B
Right.
- [38:02]
A
And he's kind of reappearing. Like I said, I know he's still alive. It's interesting, though, because I think this kind of ties in Israel's support of Pahlavi ties into what Huckabee just said. Right, which was a statement that even Trump's people are kind of running away from where he's basically said, you know, Israel has a right to the entire region. How did that play? Inside terror, inside Iran?
- [38:26]
B
All right, well, I mean, I think they. I'm sure they. I mean, they amplify it, but I think they don't see it necessarily as impacting them. I think they probably will communicate more to, like, the Gulf states and. And, yeah, states like Turkey, who. With which they obviously have relations. Saudi Arabia, perhaps even. But I guess I think they really want to. I mean, Iran. And you saw this with Arakchee, the foreign minister, when he was recently in Doha. He was obviously, you know, they are obviously committed to painting Israel as the source of instability in the region. And they're very much, like, trying to convince Arab states in Turkey that actually that this is the case. And obviously, I think we know that's the case, but obviously, historically, I mean, you know, there has been, like, severe, like, distrust. And actually there was kind of bandwagoning on the part of the Arab Gulf states towards, obviously, with the US Obviously, but with the Israelis as well, against Iran to try and actually contain Iran. And that was kind of really, since, I guess, the Iraq War, that was the kind of the way things were playing out. I mean, you had increased, and this was then culminated in the Abraham Accords. And then this, obviously, before October 7th, this was meant to kind of culminate in a detente or normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. And obviously, the genocide in Gaza and all that has kind of obviously, very much disrupted all of that for the foreseeable kind of future. It Seems, but now there's sort of this idea of Greater Israel. I mean, what obviously the Israelis did in Syria following the fall of Assad, basically completely demilitarizing that state and then taking mount him on and like, you know, and basically de facto trying to annex more territory, plus what's going on in the west bank and then all of the violence which has been unleashed there. I think there is obviously fears amongst the Arab states in Turkey more now that Israel is unchecked. Israel is really the chief or primary thing that they need to worry about. I guess the question is, though, is, okay, they might know this, but are they willing to break with the United States in any which way in order to do something about it? And I think no. I mean, they'll make a phone call to Trump and they'll probably make their case and they might try to offer him some sort of inducements. But I think they all understand, particularly the Gulf. I mean, it's very close. I mean, Iran could send a couple of ballistic missiles and Dubai is going to be in trouble. I mean, it could destroy just decades of building up their tourist industry and all these sorts of things. So I think they understand how destabilizing this could be. And even the uae, which is obviously a very close ally of Israel, Lindsey Graham sort of said that MBZ pretty much Mohammed bin Zayed did everything that was asked of him and more and working hand in glove with the Israelis. But they came out very strongly and said, no attacks will be launched from here. We will have no sort of part in this sort of thing because they understand how detrimental it'll be. But they're not able to, I don't think, ultimately, I mean, you know this better than me. I mean, they're unable to persuade the American sort of, I mean, sort of national, sort of the military industrial complex or with the American administration to not sort of proceed and not sort of take this forward. And obviously, the Israelis have a lot more sort of power of persuasion than the Gulf states. Very kind of clearly, I mean, as is clear from, you know, obviously how things have transpired and obviously, you know, the fact that they're even now kind of complicit in many ways in the Gaza genocide and the fact that they're being brought into this farcical board of peace and et cetera. So really, you know, like, what leverage do they have to kind of apply to the Trump administration to persuade them from doing this, let alone, you know, I mean, and again, they probably think that their relationship with Trump and, you know, the Qataris buying him this, you know, gifting him this $300 million plane and all the rest of it somehow buys them immunity. I mean, I guess they'll understand sooner or later that it really doesn't. Which I guess, to be fair, when the Israelis did attack Qatar, actually, this did actually create some friction. Right. And then Trump lent on Netanyahu to basically apologize. But I think that's as far as it goes.
- [42:55]
A
Yeah, I was just going to. I was thinking about the regional context of this because again, to kind of go back to Cuba. Cuba has no allies because it's small. Right. And there's really no to do that. Iran's different. Iran is a big country. It has oil, has an army. And granted, the US has, you know, this kind of really overbearing force in the region. But one thing I've read recently, and this may just be bluffing, is that, you know, Iranians have said we may attack kind of these peripheral targets or these proxy targets. You know, is that a consideration? I mean, does.
- [43:31]
B
You know, when.
- [43:32]
A
When a couple years ago, you and. And our good friend Nate weren't talking about the axis of resistance. Right. Which.
- [43:38]
B
Yeah, yeah.
- [43:38]
A
But is there a possibility that if the United States does try to kind of make this, turn this into a war, that there will be some, you know, kind of resistance?
- [43:50]
B
Yeah, I mean, like Ayatollah Khamenei of the Supreme Leader on. He did say very clearly this time that if they attack Iran, then they will kind of regionalize the conflict, basically. And I think this probably. I mean, whether they will or not, I'm not entirely sure. But I do think if they've learned the kind of lessons since October 7th, then they kind of should have understood that the kind of tit for tat kind of approach, you know, this sort of, you know, Israel strikes the consulate in Damascus, then Iran sort of launches a choreographed kind of and signaled in advance kind of attack which then can be repelled. And then similarly, I mean, obviously, following the assassination and bombing and killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, then again, they did a more a bolder attack. But still, it was all very much about trying to restore deterrence rather than, I guess, trying to regionalize the conflict to raise the ante, because I think they were concerned, they were worried about raising the ante to such a degree that that would actually then necessitate a far more kind of aggressive sort of posture on behalf of the US But I guess they've seen that hasn't really paid off because obviously it's only really just kind of emboldened the US really. And the Israelis, I mean, it hasn't determined. And the Israelis, obviously, they know that they pretty much got unqualified backing by the United States. But it hasn't, obviously it hasn't, it hasn't really checked. The United States hasn't slowed or halted ongoing kind of aggression. And if anything, I think, whereas they kind of might look to the strategy pursued by the Houthis whereby the Trump minister did throw a lot of them, but then they actually retaliated very, very forcefully and then the cost and all these sorts of things just, they determined that it was no longer worth pursuing and they reached a kind of modus vivendi with the, with the Ansar Allah in Yemen. And maybe Iran is thinking something similar this time. They will really have to respond in a much more kind of costly way, whether that's mining and the Strait of Hormuz, whether it's striking far more forcefully at US Air bases and actually even inflicting US casualties. So it is costly for Trump. I mean, they're probably weighing up again, multiple, just like the Trump administration is weighing up multiple kind of scenarios or multiple things that they could do. They could do a more measured strike or an all out one or pursue regime change. Iran is definitely probably weighing up if they do a sort of more calibrated versus a far more kind of encompassing and broad ranging kind of attack, which really kind of will create a huge amount of instability regionally in the Persian Gulf region.
- [46:47]
A
I think at this point something's inevitable, probably sooner rather than later inside Iran. And you know, I'm assuming you read the media, what are they expecting? Are they expecting kind of limited strikes? Are they expecting something big? Is there any sense of like what, what they think the next step is?
- [47:08]
B
I mean, I think they are expecting like war. Yeah, they're pretty convinced, I mean, more than last June. Yeah, yeah, I think so. Yeah. No, I think they're expecting a much more serious attack. And I think, I mean, from what I understand, like Ayatollah Khamenei has also appointed successors like multiple down the chain. He's appointed also people to take over the sort of command and control in all the different sort of areas of the military and air force, the navy and so on as well. So I think they're pretty much expecting for something along the lines of, again, much more widespread decapitation effort actually, and they're prepared for that. So whether that actually happens we have to see. But I think they are prepared for that. And they think that's a very likely possibility. And I think they are committed. I mean, at least the current leadership. Obviously, if Khamenei dies, then things could completely, could change quite significantly. But I think the leadership, as it stands, is prepared to inflict a serious cost this time on, like, the US and those who are seen as complicit in this attack. And like I said, because they just see that the previous attempts at calibrated response has just not actually worked. If anything's emboldened the U.S. and Israel,
- [48:28]
A
well, inside the U.S. which is something I've always looked at fairly closely. We're in this situation where there's real bipartisanship here. The Democrats aren't saying anything because they're all in on it. I mean, Hillary Clinton was and Biden was and Kamala Harris was, and whatever reservations you're seeing actually are coming from the military. Right. Even, like Kane, you know, raising Cain. Dan Cain, who's nuts.
- [48:52]
B
He's.
- [48:52]
A
He's nuts. But even he said, like, we can strike them, but doing more than that is, is probably not. Not feasible. And Trump has said, oh, no, he doesn't believe that at all. So you're in this weird situation where kind of, in a lot of ways, the only, I'm not going to call it moderate, but the only kind of force for less than total destruction is, like, the U.S. military. Inside the U.S.
- [49:19]
B
There's like the real danger of groupthink, I think, like, really taking hold. Like, I guess, particularly following the kidnapping of Maduro in Venezuela and then thinking that Iran is somehow, like, analogous to that and this kind of transferred and, like, riding off that hubris. And I even, like, there's no sort of, from what I understand, there's like, not even like a nuclear, like, expert in, like, the room, like, kind of discussing, like, you know, what it all means. Even they don't even have the expertise. It's pretty much just, I guess, these rather, like, loyalist appointees. Right.
- [49:57]
A
Trump fires, like, in, in the Caribbean. He's fired every commander who's, you know, questioned in any way. You know, what they're doing in Venezuela. He'll just fire people.
- [50:07]
B
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, I mean, it's like, I mean, so this is why I think, yeah, I don't think it's going to be the most expensive bluff in history. Right. I think, like, I mean, again, I'm not a military expert, from what I understand, and you can, you can tell me if I'm wrong. But moving this much kind of firepower, I mean, it's costing like billions of dollars, right?
- [50:26]
A
Oh, God, yes. Yeah, yeah.
- [50:27]
B
And it's like something at this point kind of does need to happen. It's just, it's the extent, it's the scale of it. Right. It's the scale of the attack at this point.
- [50:35]
A
So last summer they used, I think more than half of the bunker busters they had, which cost, which was an expenditure of hundreds of close to billion dollars, I believe. And that's like the US Media is cheerleading this as well, right? Yeah. Bret Stephens in the New York Times. And you know, so I mean, this is kind of, you know, essentially the Zionists are just, you know, changing Hamas to Iran, you know.
- [51:03]
B
Yeah, yeah. I guess the thing is like, he, I mean, I do see by, I guess, more level headed, let's say talking heads or those who are kind of also adjacent to like, I know, the State Department or the American national security state. They are. Some people are saying this is like a war of choice. Right. And they're kind of saying that this is like Trump. I mean, like, why are we even doing this? Because, you know, the American public isn't overwhelmingly, you know, basically behind this in any way.
- [51:34]
A
Not at all. They're not, not even close.
- [51:36]
B
There's no thirds or more. Yeah. There's no terrorist attack. There's no, there's not even any risk of Iranian nuclear breakout because you know, obviously like we said at the beginning, they, Trump said he obliterated the nuclear program. And even then when they attacked the three nuclear sites in Iran, it was very clear, like Netanyahu in cabinet meetings saying that Iran is years away. And obviously this has been an ongoing thing for decades now that Iran is, you know, six months away, a year away from nuclear breaking.
- [52:00]
A
Who was it the other day? It wasn't basing. Somebody said Iran is rebuilt 60% of its nuclear capacity and like it's a week away or something like that. Like they say this and you should be laughed at. I mean, it's so preposterous. And yet to get to your point, like, I've been thinking that myself. Like, what, what's the motive for this? Like what? Like, like we said before, we got like, you can get what you want far short of this. Like you can always get what you want, right?
- [52:28]
B
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, they're not, I don't, I honestly don't think they're interested in a nuclear agreement at all.
- [52:33]
A
Oh, no, no, no.
- [52:34]
B
Yeah, yeah.
- [52:35]
A
And of course it was hilarious because they floated for a while that like, they're there to Protect human rights because of the protests.
- [52:40]
B
Right.
- [52:41]
A
When. And then, you know, they're killing people in Minnesota. So that didn't, that didn't work very well.
- [52:46]
B
No, no, no, of course, like, I mean, like, again, it's very transparent. I mean, even before the Operation Midnight Hammer, you had Tulsi Gabbard who came out with the national security kind of intelligence estimate and was sort of saying that, you know, no decision towards weaponization has been made. And this obviously goes back to 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. And this is like kind of well established, but then it was immediately reversed. And then she's been pushed to the margins really ever since then, she's been really kind of marginalized and I guess trying to get back into Trump's good graces. But yeah, I mean, obviously then they carried out the Operation Binn that Hammer claimed that it was obliterated. And Iran is even in talks with obviously the iaea, despite the fact that there's been a lot of speculation whether it was actually compromised and whether they leaked things and Iran actually alleged that they leaked the names of scientists to the Israelis and Western intelligence. And again, we don't know whether this is true or not, but this was the allegation. So, yeah, there's not even any pretense that this is about a kind of an imminent threat or 45 minutes, famously in the UK this dodgy dossier and claiming that Saddam could strike Europe with 45 minutes prior warning, which is obviously all kind of fabricated stuff. So there's not even any pretense anymore, which I think is obviously the new way in which sort of US empire is operating today. I mean, there's not any even need to kind of dress it up in the language of like kind of liberalism, you know, or sort of, you know, the international sort of rules based order. And all of that has been pretty much shunted aside. So, no, it's difficult to dean exactly why this happened, I guess. You know, I think, I'm sure, like the Israeli factor and probably his donor base and people like Miriam Adelson and Larry Ellison and various others probably are very much important in pushing this. I mean, his consumption of Fox News, I know he just sort of was sharing this segment by Mark Levine about you have to basically pursue regime change. I mean, the thing with Trump, which is always curious, I recall his comments regarding John Bolton and he was like, which I don't know if you remember, he was sort of saying, oh, this guy's really nuts. He just wants war all the time. So I would use him as a way of kind of scaring my opponent. But I do think when Trump does say, when he goes this far, usually he kind of does tend to follow through. And again, I think so much momentum has been built up at this point that he's going to follow through. And the question then is, how does Iran respond? And if Iran responds very, very forcefully, will that cause him to back down or will that cause him to double down? I mean, and on that, I'm still. I mean, I don't know if you have any insight. I'm really unsure on what path he would take there on that, because it could cause him to kind of back down up to a point and say, but again, if a lot of American personnel were injured or killed, then that, again, could create impetus and then he could rally sort of nationalist fervor maybe around that potentially. I mean, we would have to see.
- [55:58]
A
Well, it's funny, Kane, actually, that was one of his points. A lot of Americans could be killed. It's funny you mentioned Bolton, because after that, Trump said all Bolton wants to do is kill people. Like, you know, he doesn't care about human. He just wants to kill people. Right. You know, I saw a headline the other day, and unfortunately I didn't pursue it.
- [56:14]
B
Did.
- [56:14]
A
Did Starmer, like, refuse base rights or something like that, or refueling or something? Or.
- [56:20]
B
I, I.
- [56:20]
A
There was something about that I think
- [56:21]
B
they were quite apprehensive about because they didn't know. But I think they did actually take, if I'm not mistaken, F15s. I might be wrong on that, but they basically had flown them out from US Bases in the UK to basically where they were closer to Iran. And also he wanted to use. Trump wants to use Diego Garcia as potential launching pad, like they did with these. They did in Operation Midnight Hat. Well, they isolated, actually, they did it from the United States. But he wants the operation, he wants the option of Diego Garcia as well to be used. I think the British government has been. Doesn't really want to be dragged into it as well. So he was trolling.
- [57:01]
A
This is really off off topic in a sense, but the British are taking, like, the Epstein stuff way more seriously. Right. Is that affecting the relationship with Israel at all? Because that's kind of one of the old stories of this. You know, in the US we keep hearing that Epstein was a Russian agent, which, you know, I'm not sure, but. But obviously he was way closer to Israel than anyone else. And the British do seem to be taking that way more seriously.
- [57:27]
B
Yeah, I don't think the Israeli Factors, really.
- [57:30]
A
Okay, I'm just curious.
- [57:32]
B
No, no, it's more. The main thing which has really created a lot of controversy is obviously like, I guess Andrew Windsor Mountbatten, where his name is, obviously that the royal family being directly kind of implicated, but also Peter Mandelson who obviously was appointed by Dharma, who was kind of like a kind of key figure in like New labor and the Blair project and so on. Right. And then remained a kind of really important Labour grandee. And he was also like a very important person who was, you know, supporting the Labor, Right. The right of the Labour Party to neutralize Corbyn and sort of the Corbyn, like insurgency within the Labour Party. But the main thing which is, you know, obviously he was arrested, detained was because he was basically, yeah, compromised. He was basically giving government like, you know, secrets and like. Like almost like things were insider trading. Right. Like actually leaking information about potential buyer bailouts and the fact that the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown was about to resign and feeding this to Epstein. So it's more on his abuse. I mean, who knows if it will hold at all, but it's more on his abuse of public office, basically. That's the thing which is just came
- [58:44]
A
to me because there are kind of elements in the U. S generally more leftist who are trying to kind of make this about Israel as well. And I just wondered if there. Yeah, like that is a couple. Couple more things. I really appreciate this as always. You know, is there kind of a mobilization going on inside Iran right now? A preparation, you know,
- [59:05]
B
militarily?
- [59:06]
A
You mean like militarily and like the population? Are they kind of like preparing people like shelters? Is the military mobilizing? Yeah, yeah. I mean, is there a national mobilization of some sort going on?
- [59:19]
B
I wouldn't say there's a national mobilization. I'd say the government is obviously preparing and has been doing drills in the Persian Gulf. And there was recently an FT leaks of this Iranian sort of buying kind of. Again, it won't really make an impact, I think, with respect to an Israeli Russian attack, but buying various kind of military kits from the Russians and various deals on that sort. So I think there have been drills as preparation. There's been efforts to rebuild the air defense systems, things like this. There's been a fair bit and I guess rallying amongst those who are in the Revolutionary Guards, who are in the BASIJ and the wider military. So there has been some of this and there has been significant kind of preparation. But actually, yeah, I don't think more nationally, I don't think There has been, I mean people are preparing insofar as maybe they're buying like staples and vital kind of sort of equipment and things they'll need if the electricity goes out, if water and things like this. People are preparing. But yeah, I mean one of the things that characterized the June war, I mean it was a surprise attack. So I hope they were criticized for actually a lack of really having plans in place. Actually there's a lot of kind of criticism about this and so people were just told to kind of, you know, go to the subway. I was sort of, as I was telling you earlier, but this time around. Yeah, I mean, I would hope so. But I haven't actually seen much evidence that they're actually preparing amongst the wider kind of population for a coming kind of war. I think also they probably don't want to spark panic as well. It's probably another thing which they want to sort of keep a lid on it up to a point as best they can.
- [61:08]
A
Finally, last thing, we don't expect the other Gulf states to, to actually oppose the U.S. but if something does happen and it does expand, is it conceivable that the Gulf states might step in to try to negotiate an end to it? To, to say okay be. Because you know, if this spills out, you know, who knows? There, there are kind of, I don't know, is it possible that like the so called Arab street would kind of rise up against these other states? I mean there's a lot going on there. Is it conceivable that these other Arab states who aren't necessarily close to Iran would step in and say okay, enough?
- [61:41]
B
Yeah, I mean they, I mean so Oman and Qatar have been always very quiet and Turkey actually recently have been very kind of proactive in trying to like de. Escalate and avoid this because they understand it's going to be like bad for the region as a whole. It's going to be massively destabilizing. Obviously Iran shares a border with Turkey. This could lead to a massive like outflux of people and again that's going to be. And they've already sort of absorbed people from Syria and things like this and it's extremely destabilizing and obviously it's very costly and sort of has a high cost internally in a place like Turkey and then again like small states like Qatar and the UAE obviously, yeah, they understand it's going to be really bad for them economically, potentially. And it could have really kind of serious repercussions because they count on stability and obviously they rely on a lot like Western direct investment and so on and so forth. So, yeah, I mean, I think they wouldn't really be able to do much more than actually just lobby and try to actually call the Trump administration and really try and insist that this is having a really. This is having a devastating cost. I guess the question is whether, I mean, the reason why Trump is moving this huge amount of firepower is because I guess he's been told, or he's being maybe told by those around him that we can potentially contain any sort of counter strike from Iran if we have this amount of firepower. And I think actually a lot of this thing of stringing out the negotiations was about buying time, just like it was prior to the June war, a lot of this buying time to sort of get as much kind of every. All the forces they need in the region. And maybe he's been given assurances by those who are willing to kind of feed him what he wants to hear that this would suffice potentially. And then maybe he's giving these assurances to the regis of, no, we will be able to defend you and we'll be able to insulate you from the cost of this. And, yeah, I mean, you know, in the best of times, you know, lots of things go wrong in military maneuvers and military operations of this sort. Right. Let alone on a kind of a state like Iran where it's really, you know, it's unknown and like, you know, they could potentially, Iran could be really overwhelmed. I mean, you know, this amount of firepower that the United States commands is, Is really, you know, it's unparalleled in history, like, you know, in the history of humanity, really. Whereas, you know, Iran has developed impressive asymmetric capabilities. But it's like a middle power with like, it's been under sanctions for decades and like you said, doesn't have, you know, it's not like the Warsaw Pact or something. It doesn't have, like, you know, allies or a major superpower which is, you know, has a nuclear weapon that can ultimately, you know, back it. I mean, it doesn't. It's, you know, which is part itself a legacy of the revolution itself, that it wanted to kind of be independent and wanted to strike out. This whole approach was neither east nor west, you know, so it is quite isolated. But, yeah, like I said, these Gulf states in Turkey, at best, they will be lobbying Trump to try and bring it, to contain it. And sooner rather than later, they're not going to be. It's very unlikely that they have any leverage whatsoever to sort of either stop this or ask him to stop it earlier if he feels that it's basically doing what he wants it to do. I mean, you see this with him a lot actually. When he sees an opponent weak, he really does try to push it to the extreme. So if you remember, even in the recent protests in Iran, he was saying, encouraging people to go and take over the institutions. Right. And I'm sure if that wasn't put down by the state in a brutal way, he would have continued to encourage it and then he may be emboldened even further and so on. So it's really as far. I mean, he's emboldened to the degree to which he can actually get away with it, in which he doesn't actually have obstacles directly in his way. That's the thing. So that's why I think the Iranians have decided that we have to basically throw everything or as much as we can really reasonably, because we have to really kind of just like put a line in the sand at this point.
- [65:51]
A
Well, maybe it'll be delayed a few days because I don't know if you saw the news, the Gerald Ford sewage system broke down today.
- [65:56]
B
I saw this.
- [65:58]
A
And there are stories which haven't been confirmed, probably aren't true, that the soldiers are sabotaging, I'm sorry, the sailors on, on the, on the ship are sabotaging the sewage system because they don't want to be there. You never know. And if you study, like I've studied
- [66:10]
B
military, it's the newest, it's the newest aircraft. Yeah, yeah, the biggest.
- [66:15]
A
I mean, I've studied enough about the military that that's always possibility. I mean, a lot of these guys, you know though, so you never know. But well, you know, let's hope, hope of the best. I hope you and the people you know in Iran are doing well. I can't imagine the stress. But it's, it's always great talking with you about this stuff. I really appreciate it because you know, so much, like I said so much of what I read and you know, I know enough about it to kind of spot the, and spot who knows what's going on. And so it's really great. And I know that I'm sure you're gonna catch some hell because you didn't offer a full throated defense of the Iranian government and so on.
- [67:00]
B
So they didn't make it easy. Yeah, well, they make it easy too. But no, but, no. Again, thanks for having me on, bub.
- [67:07]
A
It's always, oh, no, no, No, I really appreciate it and thanks so much. And oh, I forgot to mention at the start too, you've just. You wrote a new introduction for Fred Halliday's book, right?
- [67:20]
B
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [67:21]
A
Fantastic.
- [67:21]
B
Dictatorship and Development. Yeah, we issued a new edition, so we'd like extended as well his writings after the revolution. But yeah, I thought that book Dictator and Development on the Panama era got a lot of. Yeah, it got a lot of bad. Like it wasn't treated fairly, I think, in a lot of the histography. And it sort of remains one of the, like, still like, very good, kind of, I would say, Marxist accounts of the, you know, of the Iranian state in the Palaviera.
- [67:47]
A
So, I mean, I don't know that topic that well. You know, I read it in grad school and so forth. But Halliday's book was always like, kind of important to me. So that's really great to, to bring in a lot of these old folks who've been just kind of credited or, you know, ignored. I think one of the discredited are really vital. I mean, like, when I taught, like I had people reading stuff that probably people had been reading in 2530, I actually had a Holiday's book on my, my reading list and.
- [68:11]
B
Okay, okay.
- [68:12]
A
People like that, you know, so that's really.
- [68:14]
B
You're one of the few. Because there's like this in the contemporary scholarship, there's like been this. I mean, we were talking a lot about Pahlavi and then how in a sense he's all of a sudden found some support and he's being backed by the Israelis and all these sorts of things. But there has also, in the scholarly literature, there's been a kind of like Pahlavi revisionism. I mean, there's even people who are trying to talk about like Pahlavi studies, I mean, and all these sorts of things. So that book was important for me, like also as an undergrad, I remember reading it and I remember like really enjoying it, but then I remember sort of like thinking about it more and more as I saw this quite problematic trend in a lot of the writing, a lot of the historical work that was being done on the, on the 70s, basically.
- [68:59]
A
Yeah, yeah, that's fantastic. No, it's, it's great. And you're, you're the go to guy for this stuff. So I really appreciate it.
- [69:05]
B
So, pleasure.
- [69:09]
A
This is Bob Bazingo going solo today in the Green and Red podcast with Iskander Siddiqui. If you want to know anything about what's going on in Iran. Check him out. Check out his writings. Like I said, most recently in the London Review, Books in New Left Review, a lot of podcasts.