← GZERO World with Ian Bremmer
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer
Lebanon's best chance for peace, with Kim Ghattas
00:37:45
As Hezbollah’s power weakens and Israel occupies parts of southern Lebanon, could the country finally reclaim its sovereignty? Or is it headed toward another war? Journalist Kim Ghattas joins Ian Bremmer on the GZERO World Podcast.
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- [00:02]
A
Hello and welcome to the Gzero World Podcast. This is where you can find extended versions of my interviews from public television. I'm Ian Bremmer. And as the world has focused on the straits around the Iran war, wondering whether United States or Iran or the Houthis would close the most important shipping lanes and drag the global economy further into the conflict, another front in the war has been opening in Lebanon. It's received only a fraction of the attention, but five months later, it is itself increasingly consequential for the future of the Middle East. Devastating strikes there by the Israeli military during the fighting against the Iranian backed group Hezbollah have left more than 4,000 dead already and over a million people internally displaced. A fragile ceasefire is now in place. But whether a long term peace can hold in Lebanon depends on a question the diplomats have been trying to answer for many years. Can Hezbollah actually be disarmed? For more than four decades, Hezbollah has been at the center of one of the Middle East's most dangerous rivalries. What began as a small militia grew into one of the world's most heavily armed non state groups, becoming both a dominant political force inside Lebanon and across the region. For Israel, Hezbollah represents one of the most immediate military threats in the region. For Iran, it has been the cornerstone of a strategy designed to project power in the Middle east without having to fight Israel directly. That uneasy balance of power largely limited conflicts over the years. But after October 7, 2023, and then after the US and Israeli strikes that killed Ayatollah Khamenei in February of this year, the conflict has entered a new phase. This time as Hezbollah attacked Israel in support of Iran. Israel saw an opportunity not just to contain the group yet again, but to fundamentally weaken it. And so they decided to undertake a massive offensive. If Hezbollah's military dominance crumbles, Iran then loses its most powerful regional ally. Israel would finally remove the threat that has defined its northern border for a generation, and Lebanon could begin perhaps a completely new political chapter. Or just as easily, this could become another temporary pause in one of the Middle East's longest running conflicts. As Iran says it will refuse to accept any deal in which Israel remains in southern Lebanon. Joining me today is Kim Gaddas, contributing writer at the Financial Times and the author of Black Wa. She was born and raised in Lebanon and has spent decades covering the forces that shape today's Middle East. Here is our conversation.
- [02:44]
B
The Gzero World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics, real estate and the only end to end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more@prologis.com.
- [03:10]
A
Kim Gaddis, welcome back to the show.
- [03:12]
C
Thanks for having me, Ian.
- [03:13]
A
We're going to talk about Lebanon, I promise. But Iran, of course is moving very quickly. These are very interconnected with where we sit right now. It is not just the Strait of Hormuz, but we've also seen very recently that the Houthis have announced a blockade. Sitting from your perch right now, who do you think actually has more leverage? Who is succeeding more or failing less in the war, the Americans or the Iranians?
- [03:47]
C
That's the million dollar question at the moment. I think that the, the scene is actually quite murky. We see the Iranians able to inflict a lot of damage on the global economy, but still not as much as they anticipated because oil is not at 250. It's rising, but it did not go into stratospheric numbers. They have leverage. They have the capacity with drones with some missiles to really cause damage for Gulf countries, not so much on Israel at the moment, which is interesting. But definitely the global economy and the economies of the Gulf who want to move away from this state of limbo that is very damaging for their image and their long term prospect. So that is the leverage that Iran has. But I would not overestimate the position that they're in. Their own economy is, you know, sinking rapidly. They're going to face their greatest enemy, the Iranian people in the near future. If the Iranians want to take to the streets again after the massacres of January. So the Iranians are not necessarily sitting pretty. They have the capacity to inflict pain, but they're also looking at their regional project that they've built over decades that is no longer serving them.
- [05:18]
A
They hear you talking about the proxy
- [05:20]
C
support, the proxies and allies like Syria. Right. So I think that is a story that is being under told at the moment. The impact of the loss of Syria for the Iranian axis, which provided a geographical continuous corridor from Iran through Iraq into Syria to Lebanon, that is no longer there. Hezbollah in Lebanon is still powerful, but it is very much weakened. As in it's down but not out as we say it is on the ground, it looks to be a spent force. There are no military battles in the south with Israeli troops. They have the same capacity to inflict damage with drones or missiles, but they're no longer a fighting force on the ground. And then in Iraq, what is happening in Iraq is also not great news for Iran. So that is the Iranian picture when it comes to the US they have the firepower, they have the capacity to inflict damage to Iranian infrastructure, but they haven't been able so far to get Iran to capitulate. And so it feels so far, or at this moment, that it's a battle of wills. Who will blink first?
- [06:37]
A
Well, we've seen more blinking, I suppose, from the United States so far in the early days, but perhaps more credibility with the willingness to engage in further strikes. Do you reset that question? Who blinks first when you restart the war a second time when the memorandum, when the ceasefire falls apart? Does what's happened before matter that much or not really?
- [07:04]
C
It matters in the sense that it does raise the question, if previous military confrontations, conflagrations did not lead to the result that either Benjamin Netanyahu or President Trump wanted the capitulation of the regime, why would it be different this time? So that is a very valid question. But what has changed over the course of the last year or so since the 12 Day War? And if you want to extend it back Even further to 2024, the first direct confrontation between Israel and Iran, is that Iran is indeed getting weaker internally, getting weaker in terms of how much it can sustain this, but it doesn't mean that it's lost the capacity to inflict damage. So the question does get reset when
- [07:55]
A
you say Iran is getting weaker. I mean, obviously their military has taken hits, but we also see and much of their leadership has been killed, but there's new leadership. Military seems to be in control. They orchestrated this state funeral for Khamenei, this former supreme leader. Millions of people came out in a
- [08:20]
C
country of 90 million.
- [08:22]
A
I mean, you know, a lot of people. Right. But I'm just wondering, like, what, what is your basis of assessment for saying that The. I mean, I understand the economy is in very big trouble. It was doing very badly before the war. They've had a lot of money come in from the oil that they've been able to export, for example, and then it was cut off again. What, what's the basis for assessing that the Iranians are in as a regime are in, and it would be very welcome news. But I just want to understand that.
- [08:50]
C
I think it can sound contradictory because I think that they feeling the pressure, they're feeling their inability to control the situation economically, internally, they're feeling the damage. And so they are, I believe, cornered also because their regional setup is not what it used to be. I think they're likely going to face the ire of their neighboring countries in the Gulf who are not happy about the current situation, upset at America to some extent for having dragged them into a war that is very damaging for them, but also sounding increasingly angry at Iran itself for having made them the target of its strikes. So Iran is not weak, but it is in a very tight spot, and it could therefore also lash out and cause further damage across the region in the next few days, weeks and months. So you do reset the clock on who blinks first. Listening to the Iranian foreign Minister over the weekend in a long interview, I sensed some desperation almost. I sense that he was demoralized, talking about the fact that we have to give negotiations a chance, even if it's only a 10% chance, because, you know, war is not going to lead to a positive result. Only diplomacy can do that. And so it does feel like they are realizing that they cannot rule over this country at this current state of the damage that is being inflicted.
- [10:37]
A
I mean, as we speak right now, despite the breakdown, both the Iranians and the Americans are still saying that they want to talk, that they want to engage in talk. So perhaps that is some light.
- [10:52]
C
Well, as you said it yourself, right, War is another way of political negotiation, and it's a very, very, yes, very costly. But what I want to inject into this is the Israeli element as well, which is that I expected when the MoU was signed and even before that, that we would see an escalation over the summer. And I wrote about a long, hot summer that would be awaiting the region, because I also never expected Benjamin Netanyahu to just fade into the sunset with these elections.
- [11:30]
A
He's not with his own elections coming
- [11:32]
C
with his own elections in October. He's not well in the polls. The other candidates are actually mostly campaigning to his right, including on Lebanon, which we will talk about on foreign policy,
- [11:43]
A
not on domestic policy, but on foreign
- [11:44]
C
policy, on foreign policy, Iran, Lebanon, et cetera. You know, criticizing him for having caved to American pressure and not continued with the war in Lebanon and Iran. So I anticipated that the, the escalation, the return to war would come from a trigger that Israel would bring to the table. But now we're seeing that President Trump is the one going into this escalation. And I suspect that it's for some of the same reasons that both men, both sides believe that they can still get a better deal by hitting Iran harder and harder.
- [12:26]
A
So let's switch to your native Lebanon, because of course, there is ceasefire, or
- [12:33]
C
as President Trump says, A ceasefire where people just fire a bit less. But it's not a full ceasefire, because that's my point.
- [12:39]
A
I mean, we are seeing plenty of. What do you call it, skirmishing, but the reality is people are still dying. And, I mean, it seems like in this Memorandum of Understanding, Lebanon was one of the more interesting pieces. You have the Americans and the Iranians signing an agreement that requires action from Hezbollah that they aren't a party to, requires action from Israel that they're not a party to. Right. I mean, this is another part. It's another front in the war. The Israelis are occupying territory Hezbollah has not disarmed. And the Lebanese government, I suspect, is very interested in actually getting the memorandum to become real. But they're less powerful than both of these other two actors in effectuating that. So how should we read what it was that these two sides are trying to get into agreement?
- [13:40]
C
Before I answer the question, if I may just highlight the incredible devastation that is being inflicted on south Lebanon, which is not getting enough attention, which is
- [13:50]
A
where the Israelis have been bombing and are presently occupying.
- [13:54]
C
They're heavily bombing, not just with artillery or missiles, but also with controlled demolitions. They plant explosives and they blow up whole villages. And their argument is that this is to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, but they're turning southern Lebanon into an uninhabited, unlivable buffer zone.
- [14:16]
A
Most of the 1 million displaced that we've seen in Lebanon as a result
- [14:20]
C
of that, As a result of that and a result of the threats against the southern suburbs of Beirut. So you have a million people who fled both the south and the southern suburbs. The latest Update is that 400,000 people have since been able to go back home since the ceasefire early June, either to the southern suburbs or parts of South Lebanon where the Israelis are no longer operating. But every day, Ian, every day, villages are being completely destroyed and made uninhabitable. The infrastructure, the water, the schools, the hospitals, everything is being leveled, and that is not getting enough attention. And as an aside, one of Netanyahu's opponents in the elections, Gadi Eisenkot, former chief of staff, is the father of what we call the Dahya doctrine, Dahya being the term used for the southern suburbs of Beirut. And in 2006, when Israel was also at war with Hezbollah, Gadi Eisenkot proposed to level whole buildings in the southern suburbs to defeat Hezbollah and teach Hezbollah a lesson. And unfortunately, at the end of that war, neither was Hezbollah defeated, and we had whole parts of Beirut that were destroyed. So that is what we're looking at when it comes to Lebanon in the future and Netanyahu's opponents. But as for the MoU, it's very important to point out that Lebanon did not want to be part of that MoU. Lebanon did not want to be part of the U. S. Iran negotiations. So Lebanon has its own framework agreement now, the result of direct negotiations between Israel and and Lebanon, which is quite unusual, which is very unusual. It's a historic first or second because we've had something similar in 1983 and those negotiations are very welcome in Lebanon. Although the resulting framework agreement has also been criticized by the Lebanese for giving away too much to Israel in the short term, Lebanon has very little leverage in these negotiations. The fundamental misunderstanding between the two sides is that Lebanon sees this framework agreement as a way to get an Israeli full withdrawal from Lebanon and Israel reads it as a long term lease on occupying south Lebanon until the Lebanese authorities disarm Hezbollah. And that idea that we're going to forcibly disarm Hezbollah and send Lebanese soldiers to fight Hezbollah militants who are also Lebanese, I think we need to move away from that. This is not going to happen. It is an idea that is prevalent in Israel and I've heard from, you know, thinkers and analysts in Israel that the thought in Israel is that since we have not been able to militarily defeat Hezbollah, then let's let the Lebanese fight it out with each other. And if there's a civil war, that's fine. That is precisely what we need to try to avoid. And that is precisely what President Joseph Aon is now in Washington discussing with President Trump.
- [17:29]
A
So is this essentially just gonna be used as a veto over Iranian stabilization by Hezbollah, by the Israelis? I mean, if at any point the Iranians were are unhappy with the environment, they tell Hezbollah they've got leadership control over them. You've got to engage in more strikes. If anytime the Israelis are unhappy with what the United States is doing with Iran, settlement towards some level of peace or a deal, whatever that means, then the Israelis are able to, you know, simply drive farther into Lebanon. Is that, is that the way we should be reading this right now?
- [18:11]
C
So what's interesting right this minute is as the MoU is falling apart, the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon are continu. And that is happening with US Oversight and a lot of US Encouragement. Marco Rubio seems to be very focused on trying to make Lebanon a success. They want a success in the Middle east and it could start with Lebanon potentially. I think, you know, we don't want to be Pollyannish or be too optimistic, but Certainly for the Lebanese, that is a hope. And it would be interesting if this is where the success begins, because this is where America's first big failure in the Middle east took place in the 1980s, when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. And then the US sent Marines in to stabilize the situation. Hezbollah was born and Iran founded its most successful export, Hezbollah exporting the revolution. So it's quite interesting that we've come full circle now. The Lebanese feel very much stuck between Israel and Iran. Iran, which has Hezbollah and Revolutionary Guards fighting its battle on its battles on Lebanese territory against America and Israel and Israel, which is, you know, as I said, devastating south Lebanon. And yes, using Lebanon as well to provoke further conflagrations in the Middle east up until a few weeks ago. Right now it feels as though there is a lot of pressure on Netanyahu to restrain himself and restrain the Israeli army in southern Lebanon, because pressure that
- [19:51]
A
has persisted even with the restart of direct military hostilities between the US and Iran.
- [19:58]
C
Absolutely. So far we are today, I don't know in a few days, but so far that has held. Again, with a caveat that there's still these controlled demolitions and explosions in southern Lebanon, but there is no large scale military camp bombing campaign by Israel against Lebanon at this moment as we speak. And so it indicates to me that Marco Rubio and President Trump would like to see a success in Lebanon and to some extent in Syria. We've heard them say that Israel should withdraw from South Lebanon and withdraw from the further buffer zone that they've created inside Syria to give these two countries a fighting chance to assert their sovereignty on their territory. But, you know, it's tall order.
- [20:53]
B
The Gzero World podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics, real estate, and the only end to end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more@prologis.com.
- [21:19]
A
There have been territorial encroachments by Israel for decades now in the west bank on the back of October 7th, and the war now in Gaza as well as in Lebanon and in Syria. And in all of those places, I mean, yes, the US at various times and the international community have said, you gotta get out. Do you think that there is an intention on the part of the Israelis to maintain some additional control of Lebanese territory as what they would call a buffer or for whatever reason, irrespective of
- [21:54]
C
where this is going, that is the fear that Israel would like to maintain A buffer zone in Lebanon along the border between Lebanon and Israel into the southern Beqah Valley, linking up with Mount Hermon, which they now occupy as well, and then linking into this buffer zone that they created in the Golan Heights. So that is a very neat buffer zone that would, from an Israeli perspective, help stave off any future. October 7th.
- [22:28]
A
If that were to happen, how many Lebanese people that were living in that territory would no longer be able to live in that territory?
- [22:34]
C
We're talking, you know, probably tens of thousands who would no longer be able to go back to their village. I believe we're Talking at least 60 villages or towns, but, you know, I don't know the exact numbers, but that is a sizable number for Lebanon, a country of 5 million. So when we talk about a million displaced, that's a bit less than a quarter of the population. What the Lebanese authorities are trying to do now, going back to the idea of the discussion about disarming Hezbollah, is to make the point that Lebanon needs a diplomatic success. The president needs a diplomatic success that he can sell to his citizens through the Lebanese people to demonstrate that diplomacy is the way forward for Lebanon, that diplomacy is the way that the state can be strong and the sole armed forces on Lebanese territory. And that is where pressure on Israel and concessions from Benjamin Netanyahu are going to be essential. And that is really the friction point now between the Trump administration and Israel. Benjamin Netanyahu is not going to give an inch before the Israeli elections, whereas President Trump would like him to deliver something. So what does that something look like, and how do we sell the prospect of diplomacy and promote the prospect of diplomacy for the Lebanese people as a way to strengthen the Lebanese state? And I think that the devastation that we've seen in south Lebanon has convinced a large majority of Lebanese, including those who may have supported the idea of resistance against Israel, that this is not the way forward.
- [24:25]
A
The other piece of this, which I haven't asked about yet is, you know, we did have, for, you know, a year, a large number of Israelis that were evacuated that were displaced from the north of Israel, they missed the school season, and there was nowhere near the level of damage to their infrastructure that we see in the south of Lebanon. But still, the percentages of are quite significant in the context of a country like the United States with hundreds of millions of people. And people don't understand necessarily how much the Israeli people, the Lebanese people, are experiencing these conflicts. And so here I understand you're saying the Lebanese people are tired and they understand resistance isn't a way. But you've got resistance. They're armed, and they're more capable militarily, even after all the Israeli strikes, than the Lebanese government.
- [25:15]
C
I disagree with that.
- [25:16]
A
You disagree with that?
- [25:17]
C
I disagree. It's very easy for a group, a militant group like Hezbollah, to launch a drone or to throw a missile. It doesn't require much to destroy. It requires a lot more to build. Right. And so I think what we're saying at the moment and what President Aoun is saying and what the Prime Minister of Lebanon is saying, Nawaz Salaam, the best team possible at this junction for Lebanon, the best team that Lebanon has had in leadership in decades, really, is we want to assert Lebanese sovereignty on the territory of Lebanon. We do not want an armed group to be operating as a state within a state. It has suffered substantial damage and setbacks over the last year and a half of war. It may still have weapons depots or some capacity. There are efforts to smuggle weapons into Lebanon which are now being interdicted. But between interdicting weapons, between stopping illicit flows of money, between declaring some of their activities to be outside of the law, as the Lebanese authorities have done, and essentially the crucial point is delivering tangible, positive results. Israeli redeployments, demarcation of the border, release of detainees who you know can be assessed as posing no security threat to Israel. Although, you know, the problem with some of this is that Israel has been made to be the last arbiter of when to redeploy or if Hezbollah has been disarmed or not. And that's why it's essential for Marco Rubio and President Trump to be involved in these discussions and put pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu, because the best way to secure that border is to have a strong Lebanese state on the other side.
- [27:07]
A
My follow up question is, irrespective of how strong Hezbollah is today, and as we were discussing with the Islamic Republic, obviously damage has been done. But at the end of the day, you're talking about a group that has effectively both governed a big piece of this country and also terrorized a lot of folks in Iran.
- [27:29]
C
You mean because they don't govern in Lebanon.
- [27:32]
A
So now when you look at Hezbollah, you have a group that occupies a position of de facto authority. How do you change that? I mean, they still have leaders, they still have arms. How do you actually change that?
- [27:48]
C
What I'm saying is that they are not what they used to be a year and a half ago.
- [27:52]
A
I understand that, but that doesn't mean that they don't exist. So what do you do about it?
- [27:56]
C
You constrain their capacity to operate. You crowd them out. You demonstrate that diplomacy works and delivers for the Lebanese people in terms of aid, in terms of improved relations with the U.S. when you have, in my assessment up to 70%, let's be not as optimistic, let's say 60%, 65% of the population of Lebanon that wants to move away from having a state within a state. I think you have to capitalize on that. It's not going to be an overnight solution the way that Israel envisages that you send in the army and you know, they have a big fight and Hezbollah is disarmed. That is not how it's going to work. That's not how it worked in other conflicts with the FARC or the ira.
- [28:41]
A
But does Hezbollah need to be a direct part of any negotiated settlement in order for it to work? Leadership of Hezbollah I think there are
- [28:50]
C
two ways of looking at that. You have to get them on on board or you have to constrain them. And so I think the position of the Lebanese side state is that they are the negotiating party, they are the state. So they need to get Hezbollah to understand the new regional outlook and the new rules in Lebanon, but they don't
- [29:15]
A
need to agree to it. In other words, as long you're saying you can do enough damage to them so it doesn't really mind, doesn't matter.
- [29:20]
C
No, you have to. No, you have to convince certainly their supporters and the Shia community in Lebanon that they are part of this country and that they are being taken care of by the state so that they no longer look to Hezbollah for education or hospitals and they look to the state. And that requires a lot of international assistance to the Lebanese authorities and government.
- [29:49]
A
But near term, if we're discussing a group of people, whether it's 20%, 30%, 35%, whatever it is, that are actively supportive of this radical faction political party, paramilitary organization which had once been described as the most powerful non state military in the world. I understand where you would like this to go. It makes a lot of sense. I have a hard time time imagining how in the next six months, in the next 12 months, you get to an agreement that any Israeli government, even if Bibi is out come October 27, which may or may not happen, would accept. They just say you don't have Hezbollah on board. And look at their ability to continue to use drones, look at their ability to continue to use rockets, and by the way, the asymmetric capabilities of organizations like this even as they get weaker, we are showing, can cause more and more damage. I'm wondering why we believe that near term, any agreement that doesn't directly involve Hezbollah saying, okay, we'll accept this is actually gonna work.
- [31:01]
C
It is going to be very difficult in the near term. I'm not saying this is on the schedule for next month, but it has been a story that's ongoing for four decades. And so you don't resolve that in a month or in one quick negotiation. I also think that part of the answer, as I said, lies in Tehran and how the Islamic Republic proceeds from here onwards. But some of it also lies in Lebanon and political negotiations inside Lebanon about what Hezbollah wants within Lebanon in return for agreeing to give up its weapons. Even if it won't say it out loud that it is giving up its weapons. There is a fear within the Shia community that they will be the underdogs again if Hezbollah does not have arms at its disposal to defend the Shia community. You may argue with that thinking or that worldview, but you cannot argue with fear. Right. That is a fear that we have to.
- [32:10]
A
It's a reality.
- [32:11]
C
It's a reality. And so that gets into some of the nitty gritty of Lebanese politics and what other communities are willing to concede or not in return for giving more power to the Shia community. In a country where the president is always a Christian, the prime minister is always a Sunni, and the speaker of the House is always the Shia, and Parliament is divided 50, 50 between Christians and Muslims. So that gets into some sort of, you know, internal Lebanese baseball about what is the setup that is possible that would make the community, those who still support Hezbollah, because I do think support is at its lowest, but also the party willing to acquiesce to maybe demobilization over time, what do you do with the hundreds of militants who will need a job? There's a discussion about integrating them into the Lebanese army. And others are saying, absolutely not. That would be like having an internal fifth column.
- [33:17]
A
This is a big Syria conversation, as you know as well. Yeah.
- [33:20]
C
And so all of this needs to be worked out over time. I'm not saying that it will necessarily be successful, but we have to start somewhere. And then the other player that we did not discuss not to get too much into the weeds of Lebanese politics, is the other big Shia party, which is led by the speaker of the House, who is looking at this and wondering how he can benefit and become the sole leader of the Shia community if Hezbollah is very much on the out. So we have at this point for Lebanon, the best opportunity possible to move away from years of fractured politics, states within a state, militias operating with impunity. And that is also helped by the fact that next door in Syria, we no longer have the Assad regime, which, which for five decades almost controlled Lebanon. And when it did no longer control, when it no longer controlled Lebanon, Iran did. So this is a moment of opportunity for Lebanon to move away from this control of outside parties. But how will Israel deal with this? Will it, will it continue to believe, whether it's Naftali Bennett or Gadi Eisenkoch or Netanyahu, that the only way forward, I think the international community needs to also, with President Trump, put more pressure on Israel and Gulf to listen to the proposal that is being put forward by Arab and Gulf countries. And we've heard this again and again from Mohammed bin Salman, but also very forcefully from the Jordanian foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, telling Israel, the Israelis, that there are 54 Arab and Muslim countries that are willing to guarantee Israel's long term security, peace and stability if it were willing to give something to the Palestinians in the form of a state or autonomy.
- [35:33]
A
But again, as you know, the Israeli population has only gotten farther from that, well, post much, much farther than that post 10-7-from where they were before.
- [35:41]
C
And so we have to.
- [35:42]
A
And so when you say the beginning that the alternatives to Bibi Netanyahu on foreign policy are not policies that one would consider progressive when it comes to the regional footprint of Israel or a two state solution with the Palestinian state.
- [36:04]
C
Naftali Bennett has spoken about Palestinian autonomy. The question is whether, you know, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would consider that a good basis to begin engaging with Israel or whether it's still not enough. We don't know enough from Gadi Eisenkot and where he stands on these issues, even as the father of the Dahi doctrine, which was then transferred to Gaza. But elections and a change in personality does allow for a new dynamic, just the way that we have Ahmad Al Shara in Syria, who's far from perfect, but. But it's a new dynamic just the way that we have Joseph and Nawaf Salam in Lebanon as prime minister. It's a new dynamic. So there are opportunities there. Look, Ian, I lived through 15 years of civil war in Lebanon as a child. And this is my fifth Israeli military campaign against Lebanon as well. That's a lot of war. And I can sit here and despair about the state of affairs, but I'm looking for the slivers of light, the slivers of opportunity. How can this work? I'm not a policymaker, but I hope some of my ideas make sense and are being heard by people who are in positions of power. I think also of the Iranian people who are stuck between the threat of more war, having their country destroyed or damaged by these strikes, and stuck between between that and a further entrenched leadership. I mean, they deserve a better future as well.
- [37:43]
A
Ostensibly, that was one of the reasons that the US Went to war that we have not seen.
- [37:47]
C
Well, there were so many reasons why
- [37:49]
A
the US Went to war. I mean, you mentioned January and many thousands were killed and so far to no avail.
- [37:57]
C
Absolutely. It's only getting worse.
- [37:59]
A
Kim got us. Thank you very much.
- [38:01]
C
Thank you for having me.
- [38:05]
A
That's it for today's edition of the Gzero World Podcast. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZero World? 5 stars only 5 stars. Otherwise, don't do it on Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.
- [38:27]
B
The Gzero World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics, real estate and the only end to end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more@prologis.com.