President Trump's power-first foreign policy with CFR's President

Summary

---

Podcast Summary: GZERO World with Ian Bremmer

Episode: President Trump's power-first foreign policy with CFR's President
Date: February 14, 2026
Host: Ian Bremmer
Guest: Michael Froman, President of the Council on Foreign Relations

---

Overview

This episode delves into the dramatic transformation of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump’s second term. Whereas “America First” once implied retreat and disengagement, Trump 2.0 is marked by assertive—often unilateral—uses of American power to reshape international norms and relationships. Ian Bremmer and Michael Froman, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and former U.S. Trade Representative, discuss what this means for the world order, America’s allies and adversaries, and the future of global governance.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The New Trump Doctrine: Power-First, Rule-Last

[00:02 - 04:12]

• Trump’s current term has broken from past policies—abandoning restraint in favor of direct, sometimes unpredictable action.
• E.g., floating ideas of “colonizing Panama and Greenland,” bombing Iran, capturing Venezuela’s leader.
• Froman: The world is “adjusting to Trump’s view of globalism—not happy, but responding.”
• Nations now expect transactional, unilateral American behavior rather than rule-based diplomacy.

2. The Weaponization of Tariffs & Erosion of International Norms

[03:14 - 08:07]

• Trump uses tariffs as a quick lever—not just for trade but for fentanyl, migration, political, and even military leverage.
• Froman: “The Trump administration has basically said they're willing to break agreements, break commitments, to use tariffs as a tool for just about everything...” [05:32]
• Other nations, outside China, largely adapt rather than retaliate, fearing U.S. economic might.
• Growing global “permission structure” for countries to act unilaterally, diminishing the force of global systems that the U.S. originally helped create.

3. The U.S. as Challenger, Not Defender, of the World System

[08:07 - 09:50]

• U.S. now seen as a “challenger,” not the defender, of world order—Froman stops short of calling it “revisionist,” but admits America disregards old rules when convenient.
• U.S. is not alone; other countries (e.g., China) are also advancing competing models.

Memorable quote:

• Froman: “We’ve gone from being the defender of the system to the challenger of the system. ... What we have said is that the old rules don’t necessarily need to apply to us in every instance.” [08:15]

4. Europe’s Predicament & Rising Fractures

[09:20 - 14:13]

• Europe is described by some, including French President Macron, as under “rupture”—with the U.S. potentially seen as adversary.
• Froman: Europeans still rely on the U.S., even as they chafe against American moves. Alignment remains due to overlapping security/market interests.
• Trump favors a “strong Europe,” but on a nation-state basis—opposed to more EU integration.
• Discussion on Europe's long-term weakness: demographics, lack of innovation compared to U.S./China.

Highlight:

• Froman: “He (Trump) wants them to be stronger on defense... not every country needs its own tank, not every country needs its own air defense system.” [12:45]

5. Comparative Innovation: U.S., China, & Europe

[14:13 - 15:31]

• U.S. and China lead in innovation, especially in sectors like biotech and semiconductors.
• Froman: “In biotech, we've seen very significant increases in innovation coming out of China... Now it’s about 30% of new patents.” [14:28]

---

6. Geopolitical Flashpoints—Deep Dives

Venezuela

[15:31 - 18:18]

• Trump’s dramatic arrest of Maduro—an “awesome use of force” (Froman)—but regime remains in place.
• Froman expresses skepticism about long-term benefits: “We left the regime largely in place... the same criminal regime that existed before.” [15:57]

Cuba

[19:10 - 21:31]

• Little change in decades; Froman sees potential for U.S. action inspired by the Venezuela precedent, but notes higher legitimacy/credibility challenges.
• Domestic U.S. politics (esp. Miami/Florida) would likely support assertive action.

Iran

[22:16 - 24:39]

• Talks ongoing, with U.S. military action on the table as leverage.
• Iranian regime faces existential dilemma—enrichment vs. regime credibility.
• Froman: “My best guess is there may be a limited military action—not to decapitate, but to create more leverage.” [24:08]

Russia/Ukraine

[25:07 - 29:44]

• War grinds on, U.S. shifts pressure to Ukraine as Russia seems willing to absorb costs.
• Effective European-government mechanism: use Russian frozen assets to buy U.S. military supplies.
• Froman: “Sanctions aren’t having necessarily the debilitating effect the West had hoped.” [27:36]
• Summing up the tragic logic: Pressure falls on Ukraine to capitulate, with the U.S. prioritizing quick resolution.

U.S.–China Relations & Taiwan

[29:57 - 33:46]

• Temporary stability, but both sides want to avoid escalation—especially given China’s leverage in critical minerals/pharmaceuticals.
• Tensions muted for now; major summits scheduled.
• Uncertain long-term U.S. commitment to Taiwan—Trump more transactional, less hawkish than his advisers.
• Froman: “At some point ... the US might be willing to evolve in its language about what its commitment to Taiwan is.” [33:17]

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Ian Bremmer, on Trump 2.0: “This is not a president who is stepping back from the world stage. This is a president who wants to turn it to his will. And he's cast aside eight decades of global rules and norms in the process.” [00:57]
• Froman on the new international order: “We have created a permission structure ... for countries to act unilaterally, regardless of their international obligations.” [07:06]
• On Venezuela operation: “... really an awesome use of force and on the ground and creative ways... but a lot was put at risk to arrest somebody, right? We've left the regime largely in place.” [15:57]
• On China’s innovation: “If you go back five or ten years, none of the major new patents in biotech were coming out of China, and now it’s about 30%.” [14:28]
• On Russia/Ukraine: “The sanctions aren't having necessarily the debilitating effect that I think the west had hoped.” [27:36]

---

Timestamps for Important Segments

• 00:02 – 04:12: Framing Trump’s second term approach
• 05:02 – 06:43: Trade policy contrast: Obama vs. Trump
• 08:07 – 09:50: Is the U.S. now a revisionist power?
• 10:57 – 13:36: Trump’s view of Europe and European defense
• 14:13 – 15:31: Global competition in innovation
• 15:57 – 18:18: Venezuela operation analysis
• 22:16 – 24:39: Iran negotiations and U.S. military posture
• 25:07 – 29:44: Russia/Ukraine—stalemate implications
• 29:57 – 33:46: U.S.–China relations and Taiwan question
• 34:07 – 35:08: Lightning round: Underappreciated countries and leaders

---

Lightning Round: Global Standouts

[34:07 - 35:08]

• Most underappreciated country: Singapore—“punches above their weight” in international debates.
• Leader with more potential: Japan’s new prime minister, who now holds a massive supermajority and could play a larger international role.

---

Tone & Language

• Conversational, sharp, and at times wry—echoing the frank, analytical and slightly skeptical tone both speakers adopt.

---

Summary

Trump's second term has inverted America’s role on the global stage. Far from disengaging, the U.S. acts assertively, often flouting the collaborative rules it once championed, sending shockwaves through alliances and adversaries alike. Allies adapt out of necessity, international norms are eroding, and global order is, in Froman’s words, being “challenged.” The world’s resilience is tested in Venezuela, Iran, Ukraine, and Taiwan, with costs and consequences not yet fully known. For now, everyone must adapt—because, as this episode concludes, the rules have changed, and the uncertainty is here to stay.

Transcript

[A]

Hello, and welcome to the Gzero World Podcast, where you can find extended versions of my conversations on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today I'm going to try to make sense of President Trump's chaotic foreign policy approach a little over one year into his second term. It would be an understatement to say that Trump 2.0 has little in common with the President's first term in office. Back then, he touted an America first foreign policy that was focused on securing the border, ending forever wars, and letting the world sort out its own problems. This time around, President Trump has leaned into the kind of presidency he once spurned. He carries around a list of all the wars he's ended. He wants to turn Gaza into a beachside resort. And he has talked openly about colonizing Panama and Greenland. He bombed Iran. Well, that one he's done before, too. And he even captured Venezuela's leader. This is not a president who is stepping back from the world stage. This is a president who wants to turn it to his will. And he's cast aside eight decades of global rules and norms in the process. But will he succeed? Joining me to discuss all that and More is former U.S. trade Representative and the current President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Michael Froman. Let's get to it.

[B]

The Gzero World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics, real estate, and the only end to end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn [e-mail].

[A]

Mike Froman, thanks for joining the show.

[C]

Thanks for having me.

[A]

We talk about big global issues and I guess I want to start with the. What is surprising you most now from America's foreign policy in the world that you really didn't think you would have been saying just a year ago?

[C]

Well, just a year ago, I probably would not have said that Greenland would have been the most significant foreign policy issue discussed in January at Davos. But President Trump certainly put that on the agenda and made it a major change.

[A]

Get off the age.

[C]

And then took it off the agenda. And when it was on the agenda, it squeezed out just about everything else. Ukraine, China, Venezuela. Anything else going on in the world?

[A]

Yeah, okay, that was absurd. But nonetheless, how about something that's sustainable, something that you think is going to actually persist?

[C]

So I think I'm surprised by how much the world is adjusting to Trump's view of globalism. And they are incorporating it. They're not happy necessarily about it, but they are adjusting and they are responding to the Trump administration's exercise of power.

[A]

Exercise of power in a more transactional and unilateralist way.

[C]

Yes, exactly.

[A]

And how do you see them responding?

[C]

Well, I think right now, Iran responding by engaging further in negotiations with the US with the threat of further military action. Even if you look back at the trade wars of 2025, US imposing very significant tariffs on the rest of the world then as a starting point for negotiation. But the rest of the world, with the exception of China and maybe a little bit Canada, didn't retaliate, sort of adjusted to it. And I found that they were more concerned about the relative tariff rates than they were about the absolute rate. So Malaysia cared a lot about not having a significantly higher rate than Vietnam.

[A]

Which is a fair thing for them to be concerned about, right?

[C]

Absolutely. But I think had you asked me a year and a half ago, I would have said, you know, if the US imposes somewhere between 10 and 50% tariffs on other countries, we're likely to face a lot of retaliation. And the reality was China just had to show that they could retaliate and the US Back down. And the other countries didn't really retaliate. They adjusted to it.

[A]

And is that because the United States is just so big and credible and hitting you unilaterally, that if you're not China, you feel like you've got nowhere to go?

[C]

I think Trump admitted, I think President Trump establish credibility that he was willing to use tariffs as much and as often and as far as he needed to, and if they were welcome to retaliate, he would just raise the tariffs even further and they would become prohibitive at some point.

[A]

So, I mean, Mike, before running the Council on Foreign Relations, like I knew you as U.S. trade rep. Right. And so if I think about that role in the Obama administration, you looking back on Trump now and saying, geez, like, because you were thought of as a fairly tough guy. The Japanese, I remember when they were talking about Roman, they're like, he's hitting us really hard. Are you looking back and saying I didn't actually beat these guys up nearly as much as I should have?

[C]

Well, I think back then we were focused on what could we get through negotiations. And I was hitting them hard and previous USCRs hit them hard in terms of what our demands were of them and the hard things we wanted them to do. This administration's hitting them hard by hitting them hard and raising tariffs. And I sometimes joke with my successors that it would have been a really easy job to be USTR if I could have used tariffs like this with credibility and to impose them on other countries because they have successfully brought them to the table.

[A]

And that was something you wouldn't have even considered.

[C]

Correct. Because, because we had international obligations. In some of the cases we have bilateral free trade agreements and we're raising tariffs on those countries. In other cases we have. Well, in all cases, we have World Trade Organization WTO commitments and we've broken those commitments and raised tariffs on other countries. And so, yeah, the Trump administration has basically said they're willing to break agreements, break commit to use tariffs as a tool for just about everything for trade purposes, to talk about fentanyl, to talk about migration, to talk about political issues, to retaliate against European countries, potentially for sending a small contingency of military forces to Greenland to shore up NATO's role in Greenland.

[A]

So my presumption is that you are challenged by these strategies, if we can call them that, because you think it's going to cause a lot of damage long term.

[C]

So I think that there have always been a role for tariffs when, for example, there have been unfair trade practices and you go through the process of determining what those unfair trade practices are, what the level of retaliation ought to be and impose them. The Trump administration has ignored all that and just jumped to using them whenever they needed any degree of leverage over.

[A]

Another country, and not just on economic issues, on any issue, on a political issue, on a security issue, you name it.

[C]

India buying Russian oil. It could be any number of issues. It is the president, he made that clear in his words, the most beautiful word in the English dictionary and a tool that he can use for just about any purpose because it's easy to ratchet up and ratchet down. You don't have to think about going through dispute settlement processes and getting an outcome from the World Trade Organization or from some panel of experts. You just ratchet it up or ratchet it down as you see fit. Now, the question is, to your point, long term, what are the ramifications of this? I think most trade experts worry that, well, we've created a permission structure more generally for countries to act unilaterally, regardless of their international obligations. Sometimes that might be through the use of tariffs or other trade actions. Sometimes that might be through the use of military force, as we've done vis a vis Venezuela. And what kind of world will we live in if other countries in fact, copy our approach? Because for a long time we were the, we helped create the World system after World War II. We defended it, we promoted it, we got other countries to agree to it. And when countries would try to challenge it, we would take action to ensure that the rules were upheld. Now we are seen as one of the challengers. And does that create a permission structure for other countries to challenge it as well?

[A]

So if you were outside of the United States right now, looking in, would you describe the United States as a revisionist power today?

[C]

Look, I think we've gone from being the defender of the system to the challenger of the system. I'm not sure revisionist is the right way of looking at it, because that suggests we have some new world order that we want to impose. And I'm not sure we've thought through it completely. In fact, I'm pretty sure we haven't. What we have said is that the old rules don't necessarily need to apply to us in every instance.

[A]

You would have called the Russians revisionist over the course of the last 10, 20 years. Right.

[C]

I think China has been a revisionist power in part because they've put forward alternative models, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, Global Economy. They're trying to put forward a different model of world order than existed since the Second World War. I think Russia's been sort of a challenger. Yeah, I mean, they've gone back and they've revisited certainly the notion that Ukraine as being an independent country separate from Russia, separate from the former Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. So they have revisited that question, but I don't think they have a revisionist view of the world as a wholeness.

[A]

So Mark Carney came out during Davos. You and I were there. We were in the same room with him on several occasions with the whole rupture speech. Now, French President Emmanuel Macron has gone farther right, talking about the United States directly as an adversary, wants to basically dismantle Europe again. If you were a European leader today, if you were a Canadian leader today, would you see the United States as an adversary?

[C]

Look, I think Prime Minister Carney was right to call it a rupture, because it is a big disruption of everything we have known for the last 80 years, purposefully to raise questions that heretofore have been closed, that we thought were solved, and now we have to wrestle with those questions again. I think President Macron probably goes too far, he does go too far to view the US as an adversary. The French, the Europeans may not like everything that this administration is doing, but their national interests, including their security interests, are still quite well aligned with the United States. And I think the fact that just last week there was a ministerial in Washington of countries coming together to talk about critical minerals just shows how countries are willing to hold their nose, come to Washington, work with the United States because it's in their national interest to do so. They're not doing it to do anybody a favor. They're doing it because they recognize that they need to reduce their dependence on China as well. I think when it comes to Europe, I think the president's been pretty clear he actually would like a strong Europe. Now, his view of what a strong Europe is is perhaps different than some of what the current leaders think it is. But he's been.

[A]

He does not want a strong European Union.

[C]

Correct. I think he views the whole European project of giving up sovereignty in various areas to Brussels, for Brussels to regulate behavior within the nation state as anathema. I think he feels he believes very much in the nation state and deals with Europe oftentimes on a nation state basis. But he wants them to be stronger on defense.

[A]

Defense, yes.

[C]

He wants them to be more productive. He wants their economy to grow and to be a strong market for US Exports, among other things. Things. He has a different view on some of the issues around free speech and the role of right wing parties in Germany and places like that. But I think it's not that he's anti Europe. He is skeptical and critical of the European project as it's been known for the last three or four years.

[A]

The United States is a state of scale, checks and balances, but nonetheless, China is a state of scale. Lots of power, not so many checks and balances. Trump does not want Europe to be a state of scale. That would be a strong competitor.

[C]

I don't know about that. No. I think you wouldn't mind it being an entity of scale, for example, on defense, not just spending 2% or 3.5% or 5% on defense, but spending it well, spending it on scalable defense industries, which is going to require very hard decisions in Europe about national interests and where they can be combined in order to reach scale. So that not every country needs its own tank, not every country needs its own air defense system. You know, they need to have rationality across their defense base. And so I think that's an area where he'd like to see.

[A]

You want to see comparative advantage in defense? Well, you sound like a trade guy.

[C]

Yeah, I think he would rather have them be able to bear a bigger portion of their own defense, including by spending the right amount of money, but also on buying the right things. And so, you know that's going to come from us, particularly in the short run when they don't have the capacity to produce a lot of these weapons. But over time, I think having having a strong Europe is in the United States interest, even in Trump's world. Now, he has, again, different views than President Macron and several other European leaders when it comes to certain of the values and the European project of giving up sovereignty and regulating. But to be fair, within Europe, look at the Draghi report, look at the letter report. There's a lot of discussion within Europe about the need to deregulate, to devolve, to deal with some of these issues, as well as to combine where it makes sense to combine for scale, like capital markets, which they've never really been.

[A]

Able to do, because the big geopolitical story of the last 20 years. Right. That people haven't talked enough about is Europe's getting weaker.

[C]

I think that's right. I think that's right. They face a demographic challenge, as do a lot of industrialized countries, including the United States, without sufficient immigration. But on productivity, on innovation, the fact that so much of the innovation, let's say, in the digital sphere is done in the US To a certain degree in China, not in Europe, is astounding. Europe is still strong in certain areas, pharmaceutical innovation, areas like that. And the question is, what does Europe need to do to be really a driver of global innovation? And that's in all of our interests.

[A]

Now, I'm surprised that you said so much of the innovation is done in the United States, to a certain degree in China. That implied that China was. It's there, but it's kind of marginal in innovation compared to the United States. You wouldn't say that. No.

[C]

And I think it depends sector by sector. So, for example, in the biotech area, we've seen very significant increases in innovation coming out of China in a relatively short period of time. If you go back five or 10 years, none of the major new patents in biotech were coming out of China, and Now it's about 30%. And they're investing a tremendous amount in the sector. And they've got a lot of innovation, and they're capable of doing clinical trials much more quickly and much cheaper than we're able to do it here in the United States. And so I think there's an area where we need to watch because it's been an area of advantage for the United States and to a certain degree, Europe and China is well on the march when it comes to semiconductor chips, I think they are still behind the United States when it comes to innovation.

[A]

Why they need the H2 hundreds.

[C]

Exactly. And while they're working hard and investing a lot to build their own indigenous capacity there, I think we still very much have an advantage. And if you look at the major platforms, they've got their own indigenous platforms, but when we look at some of the global platforms, they tend to from the United States.

[A]

Now, we've talked a lot about comparative economic power. We haven't talked as much about some of the geopolitical conflicts that we're seeing in the world right now. There's so many to discuss. I want to leave Greenland aside, but I do want to ask, for example, about Venezuela, about Iran, about Russia, Ukraine, maybe go through them quickly. Venezuela, so far, only a few weeks in, seems to be going okay for the Trump administration. Is that reasonable to say?

[C]

You know, I think that is reasonable because we can analyze whether it was worth devoting this amount of military activity. First of all, we should commend the military for, you know, incredible, incredibly successful action, really an awesome use of force and on the ground and creative ways, innovative ways of using cyber attacks and other ways to execute this without the loss of any American soldier. But a lot was put at risk to arrest somebody, right? We've left the regime largely in place and the regime is the same criminal regime, corrupt regime that existed before. What we have done is get control of their oil exports. And if that's the limited, if the mission is defined as arresting Maduro and taking their oil exports to where we want to get them, and we will.

[A]

Sell them some broader political leverage as well, clearly.

[C]

Yes, but I think in terms of moving them towards reform, domestic reform, democracy, Democracy. It's a longer term project. Secretary Rubio has laid that out.

[A]

He has said that.

[C]

And by the way, I think that's not unreasonable. They didn't want the de Ba' athification of Venezuela. Whether they did enough or whether they empowered or disempowered the opposition, I think time will only tell. But hopefully over time, we'll see Venezuela return to a real democracy and the Venezuelan people will have an opportunity to speak and to vote and take their country in the direction that they want to take it in. So there's a lot more work to be done. But for right now, Maduro's in jail, oil is being controlled, and thus far, I think I agree with you that the Trump administration's limited short term objectives.

[A]

Are being achieved because the democrats immediately were talking about, oh, regime change and they shouldn't be doing that. And of course, this isn't regime change at all. It's a very different kind of exercise of military power. Much more limited, no boots on the ground, much less expense. But use your power to try to get what you want.

[C]

Well, quite a bit of expense for the arrest of one person. Now, for example, if this regime stays forever, this kind of regime stays forever. I think we can ask ourselves, well, was that the right use of American power? What did we get out of this? If Venezuela is still a highly corrupt country involved in criminal action, whether it's coming to the United States or going to Europe, it's still bad for the system. I think we have to ask ourselves whether the outcome was worth it.

[A]

Now if I were to compare the amount spent to get to bring Maduro to justice with say, I don't know, Osama bin Laden seems low compared to.

[C]

A ten year war. Ten year war.

[A]

No, I'm just thinking about regime change in the American conception of we don't like what that regime is doing. Here's what the decision is and the blood and treasure, the loss of human lives on both sides.

[C]

I think we have learned a lot from the Iraq and Afghanistan examples about what we don't want to do. And the question is now what do we want to do? So for example, does this increased pressure that will be created on Cuba lead us to take action in Cuba on Cuba or wait for Cuba to collapse on its own? And what will happen then? And how will the US make sure that? It's interesting.

[A]

And that's where I was about to go because you know, with Venezuela, you know, illegitimate election steals power, seen as an international terrorist exporting instability across the region. None of those things have that truth in Cuba.

[C]

No, there hasn't been an election to speak of free and fair election in Cuba for some time. No democracy there to speak of. And they do export, on one hand, they export a lot of nurses and doctors around the world. They also export a lot of military and intelligence officials around the world, as we saw in Venezuela.

[A]

Yes, indeed, a lot of them were killed.

[C]

A lot of people. A lot of the 100 that were killed were Cubans. And so I don't think they are without responsibility for exporting instability. But I think the question is over this long period of time that we have hoped that the Cuban regime would change. It's only been 65 years or so. Are we on the verge of something meaningful happening in light of what's happened now in Venezuela?

[A]

But I guess what I'm asking is if the Americans had a shot of taking out senior leadership in Cuba the way they did in Venezuela, do you believe that the ramifications of that, in terms of the legitimacy of the action, in terms of the regional response, are they likely to be far greater than in Venezuela, where, let's face it, I mean, both given the military success, but also given the nature of the regime and the nature of the individual, the blowback? That has not been very significant.

[C]

It has not been very significant. And I think you're right. There are other countries that would question the credibility of a US Action there. On the other hand, I think this has been such a longstanding issue that this has been a regime that has been deeply oppressive of any opposition, has really eliminated any opposition, has expropriated property, et cetera. There's a lot of, I think, reason to say, okay, this is unfinished business of the Cold War. And I could see the Trump administration saying, we want to finish it.

[A]

Well, I could see the Trump administration saying a lot of things. I mean, go to Greenland, but go to Panama. But I'm just again wondering about the international reaction, the domestic reaction for all of these things.

[C]

Well, domestic reaction, I think would be.

[A]

Largely positive because of Miami and Florida and. That's right.

[C]

And I think just in the US Lexicon here, the US History that Cuba has been sort of a sore that has been out there, that has never been fully addressed.

[B]

You're listening to the GZERO World with Ian Bremmer podcast, your weekly geopolitical deep dive into the world's biggest news stories, featuring in depth conversations with global leaders and newsmakers. To get more of GZero's insights on global politics every morning, sign up for our free newsletter gzero [e-mail].

[A]

So let's then go to Iran, where I mean, seems to be a little bit more urgent for the Trump administration right now. In the last few days, if you just listen to Trump, it seems like he is getting more optimistic about negotiations bearing fruit. Many administrations have found that that's more challenging than they've initially thought. But right now, does it look like to you that we are heading towards military action?

[C]

Well, on one hand he's expressing optimism. On the other hand, they announced, I believe, that they're considering setting a considering secretary group there because if the negotiations don't proceed sufficiently well, they want to be prepared to take whatever action they're planning to take. Look, I think that there's an existential issue for the Iranian regime as to whether they are willing to give up up enrichment completely. They weren't willing to give it up before. If they give it up now, they are admitting that they have their strategy and their allocation of resources for the last 30 years has been mismanaged. And that's going to further undermine the credibility of the regime. Maybe they're under such threat of military action and their proxies are weakened. They have no air defenses, Their missile program has been hurt.

[A]

They were blown up last year and they couldn't do very much. Exactly.

[C]

They've shown that the United States and Israel are willing to take action that previously had not been taken. They may feel so much under pressure to consider something they've never been willing to consider before, but they may not be. And if the agreement turns out to be not much better or more than the JCPOA that Trump tore up, then one's going to ask what was this all for?

[A]

So your best guess right now, do you think it's likely that, that there will be a negotiated agreement or that it's going to be a military action?

[C]

My guess is there may be a limited military action. I'm sure I'll be wrong about this in one form or another. But my best guess is there may be a limited military action not to decapitate, but to create more leverage. But to create more leverage. At some point there may be an agreement. I'm wondering what the face saving measure on enrichment is for the regime, and I'm not sure what that looks like, whether there is some Gulf enrichment mechanism or something that they're able to offer that allows them to save face.

[A]

Because, Mike, additional support for that argument is that the Israelis are saying how important it is that the ballistic missile program is on the table. That's hard to get done. But if that were part of those limited initial strikes, you do potentially square that circle.

[C]

That's right. That's right. And Israel has been very concerned that that missile program is being rebuilt after the attacks of last year. I think there's less concern that the nuclear program has been significantly rebuilt after the attacks. But the ballistic missile program is an area of concern. Okay.

[A]

Russia, Ukraine, only been going on for almost four years now. Continued efforts, primarily by the United States to get to a ceasefire. Trump is now saying gotta be done by June, which is not quite the 24 hours he initially thought or the.

[C]

Two weeks that it always seemed to be two weeks away.

[A]

So he's kicking the. It's getting harder, obviously. Obviously he's getting more frustrated. He's sharing that frustration publicly. Yeah, The Ukrainians are having a harder time fighting. They're having a harder time raising resources. The Russians should have a harder time fighting given what they're throwing at it so far. It doesn't seem to be affecting them domestically. Do you think that we are heading towards an inflection point or is it just generally grinding on and grinding on for the foreseeable future?

[C]

Well, it's grinding on, but hopefully towards an inflection point. So it's a non answer to your question?

[A]

Well, it's an answer.

[C]

I mean, I think week by week there will be continuing to be huge casualties, particularly on the Russian side, but on both sides I think you're right. The Ukrainians are tiring of war. They very much want to reach a peace agreement. They've wanted that for some time. And I think they're quite willing to make territorial compromises de facto, if not de jure, to secure a real peace, provided they've got the necessary security guarantees that have credibility on on the other side. I think this mechanism that we have in place where the Europeans use the loan against the Russian frozen assets to buy American equipment to provide to the Ukrainians is a pretty good one. It's sort of a win, win, win for the United States.

[A]

Yeah, no American taxpayer dollars.

[C]

No American taxpayer dollars. Good exports. I guess we're reducing our trade deficit in that regard and support for our military industrial complex as well, and support for Ukrainians very importantly. But whether or not that's going to secure any real change on the ground remains to be seen. You said the Russians seem to have really quite a strong appetite or ability to absorb pain.

[A]

I mean, the Biden administration really did believe that these sanctions were going to have a much greater impact on them in the short term. They were wrong.

[C]

Now, when people look under the covers, there is reason to believe the economy is in more dire shape now than it was a year ago. But Russia's gone through a lot of dire straits in its history economically. And you know, I'm told I haven't been to Moscow in a long time, but I'm told if you go to Moscow or St. Petersburg, you would know that there's a war going on, the stores are filled, the people are walking around.

[A]

Tucker crossing around brought all that news to us.

[C]

Indeed, indeed. So the sanctions aren't having necessarily the debilitating effect that I think the west had hoped and the casualties don't seem to be having the political ramifications that you alluded to. And that happened in the Afghan war. Ultimately that led to Russia's withdrawal from Afghanistan. And so it's a little hard to see how any of that is going to change Putin's calculation. And I think that's the remaining issue, is that Trump is increasingly realizing that Putin doesn't really want to end this war anytime soon and is willing to sacrifice men and treasurer and the state of the economy and his standing in the world to keep it going, which.

[A]

Creates the really saddest conclusion, which is that President Trump recognizing that, is now putting much more pressure on Ukraine because he sees that they're the weaker ones that are more likely to capitulate, irrespective of how courageous or how unfair the.

[C]

Meritocracy the merits of the argument.

[A]

Absolutely.

[C]

No, I think that's right. And look, I think Ukrainians are willing to make certain compromises. I think it's gone on so long and there's been so little progress on the battlefield, so little positive progress. If anything, they're losing a little bit of land each week or each month that they are willing to make certain compromises if they can get the security guarantees. So I think now, I think the burden shifts to Europe and the United States to make those security guarantees as meaningful and as credible as possible to help the Ukrainians get to a position where they're willing to. To compromise on territory.

[A]

And getting the Americans to be a part of that continues to be a challenge.

[C]

Yes. And whether the Americans are on the ground or not, or providing support from beyond intelligence support, other kinds of support, or permission for the use of our weapons in various ways, I think that all I think is to be worked out. I don't expect American troops to be on the ground in Ukraine under this administration, but Europeans. There seems to be a coalition of the willing within the European forces to deploy troops as a tripwire.

[A]

And to be fair, Biden would have had a hard time deploying troops as well.

[C]

I think that's probably right. I think if there was a NATO contingency, it would be one thing. This is going to be a coalition of the willing of some other sort. But I think there might have been more willingness in that context to deploy American troops in some way or another.

[A]

We'll push Jake on that. So end with the big kahuna here, which is the US And China. Obviously, everyone's excited in the Trump administration about the upcoming trip to Beijing. They've just announced that Xi Jinping is going to come to Washington by the end of the year. Most challenging, most fraught, most important bilateral relationship seems to be more stable for now.

[C]

Correct.

[A]

How short is the for now, in your view?

[C]

I think there's an interest on both sides for extending it as long as possible. You know, get through this year, maybe get through the next year, I think on the US Side, having realized how much leverage China has in its choke points over critical minerals, and that's just really one of several sectors where they.

[A]

Have pharmaceutical, pharmaceutical, critical infrastructure, you name it.

[C]

Yeah, exactly. So it's one of many. But that, I think, caught the attention of the administration and the desire not to escalate at the risk that the Chinese could have escalation dominance here and so keep things on as steady a path as possible on the economic side. And you saw in the national defense strategy words like balance of power, good, strong economic relationship, all sort of really relatively positive language about where they wanted to see the US China relationship go, emphasizing stability, even as they reinforced the defense of the first island chain and stated that the US Was committed to that. So no change of policy in that regard. But the language towards China has evolved quite substantially from it being the pacing threat for our US Military or even, as the Trump administration characterized it in the first term as a potential adversary. So there's a pretty significant evolution there. And I think China has every interest in maintaining stability as it continues to build out its military. Its economy is doing just fine. It's got a $1.2 trillion trade surplus with the rest of the world. It's exporting less to the United States, but it's managed to make up for that and more in other markets around the world. And so it's feeling pretty confident right now.

[A]

And so when you think about the longer term Taiwan question, where do you go?

[C]

Well, look, I think China would rather not have to attack Taiwan in order to absorb it, but I think we have to take President Xi, as it were, to take him seriously that he wants this resolved during his tenure. Now, I guess the, the bad news is, the good news is his tenure is extended. It's infinitely extendable or extendable for some period of time. And so I don't think the 2020.

[A]

That was why he ended term limits is he didn't want to have to go to war over Taiwan. He's a peacemaker.

[C]

He's a man of peace. Maybe we should put him up with a Nobel Peace Prize.

[A]

It wouldn't be the first time something has happened in that direction. Yeah, yeah.

[C]

But I do worry over the long run what the commitment of this administration is to Taiwan. You've got a lot of China hawks in the administration, whether it's secretary, Rubio, Bridge, Colby, others who have long been strong defenders.

[A]

The president is not one of them.

[C]

He's not been out there in the same way. His rhetoric has been quite subdued on the subject. And I worry that at some point when the issue of a grand bargain comes up, that the US Might be willing to evolve in its language about what its commitment to Taiwan is. And provided that it gets either something else very significant on critical minerals or on exports, or that it gets some secure access to semiconductor chips over the long run.

[A]

Okay, quick lightning round for you. I just want to get your quick reactions on a couple quick questions that's coming out of my head. What is the country right now that is not getting the attention that it really should be globally for the work that they are doing to improve their lie internationally?

[C]

Singapore, because so Singapore always.

[A]

They used to get a lot of attention, obviously.

[C]

What's that?

[A]

They used to get all sorts of.

[C]

They used to get a lot of attention and for good reason, because I think they punch above their weight for such a small country. They contribute very significantly intellectually to thinking through where should the international system go, whether it's trade or security, and certainly the whole evolution of the Indo Pacific region.

[A]

But now the Gulfies are outshining them. Is that the point?

[C]

I think that's right because they don't have the while it's a very wealthy country, it's very small and so it certainly doesn't have the wealth of the Gulfis.

[A]

Okay, last a tougher one. Who is the leader out there that has so much more potential that they're not living up to?

[C]

I think the new prime minister, not relatively new prime minister of Japan could prove to be a major global leader. And she, I think is she's just gone through an election where she's gotten a very significant mandate domestically and I think now has the potential to play a much bigger role internationally.

[A]

Massive majority now for the lcp.

[C]

Massive supermajority.

[A]

Yeah, super majority. Quite surprising. Mike Froman, thanks so much for joining us.

[C]

Thanks for having me.

[A]

That's it for today's edition of the Gzero World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZero World 5 stars only 5 stars. Otherwise, don't do it on Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.

[B]

The Gzero World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics, real estate and the only end to end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn more at prologis. Com.