The human cost of Iran's war, with Yeganeh Torbati

Summary

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GZERO World with Ian Bremmer

Episode: "The Human Cost of Iran's War" with Yeganeh Torbati

Date: July 11, 2026
Guest: Yeganeh Torbati (Iran correspondent, The New York Times; co-author, Stolen: Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran)

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Episode Overview

This episode dives beneath international headlines about the Iran war—missile strikes, power struggles, closed straits, and shifting alliances—to focus on the lived experiences of ordinary Iranians. Host Ian Bremmer and Yeganeh Torbati discuss how the war and Iran’s repressive response to civil unrest have transformed public sentiment, exacerbated the economic crisis, and complicated questions about whether the regime has been strengthened or merely survived. The conversation balances an unflinching look at trauma and repression with questions about Iran’s post-war reality and future prospects.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. How Iranians Experienced the War

• The war, for many Iranians, began not with missile strikes in February, but with mass protests in early January—especially January 8th-9th—when millions demanded government change and were met with extraordinary violence. (02:23)

• This violence, with verified deaths of at least 6,500 protesters (04:16), was unprecedented in scale and left widespread trauma.

• Many Iranians initially hoped foreign intervention might usher in positive change, but now feel defeated and betrayed by both internal and external actors. (02:23, 06:21)

  "A lot of the Iranians I speak with just feel a sense of defeat and jadedness right now."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (03:40)

2. Why Protests Have Subsided—The Weight of Repression

• The regime’s brutal crackdown created deep trauma and fear, quelling subsequent protest movements and demonstrating tight control over the streets with pro-government rallies. (04:16)

• The economic crisis (rampant inflation, unemployment, infrastructure loss) persists as a driver of discontent, sustaining the risk of further unrest in the future. (05:50, 08:18)

  "It's nothing new for the Islamic Republic to use violence to suppress protests. But the scale of what we saw in January was orders of magnitude worse than even some of the most brutal responses in the past..."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (04:16)

3. The Trump Factor—Promises and Perceptions

• President Trump’s early war rhetoric, including his promise to "rescue the Iranian people" and pick the next supreme leader, was believed by segments of the Iranian population, especially youth, resulting in a profound sense of betrayal when it wasn't fulfilled. (05:50, 06:21)

  "I think a lot of people assumed, well, certainly something's gonna happen. I mean, no president would simply say something like that...And so...amongst some Iranians who believed...a sense of betrayal, that that promise really wasn't fulfilled."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (06:21)

4. Has the Regime Grown Stronger or More Vulnerable?

• In the short-to-medium term, Iran’s government appears strengthened: it survived direct conflict with the US and Israel, holds leverage via control of the Strait of Hormuz, and projects stability domestically (08:18).

• However, huge infrastructural damage, economic devastation (overall inflation ~70%, food inflation likely triple digits), and internal regime fractures indicate vulnerability in the long run. (08:18)

• Survival was the regime’s bar for victory, compared to much higher objectives of its adversaries.

  "For the Iranians, what they really needed...was simply to survive against two of the most powerful militaries in the world. And they have shown that they have done that."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (08:55)

5. Public Emotions: Patriotism, Outrage, and Confusion

• There’s deep resentment among opposition Iranians at both the regime and the US/Israel for civilian-targeted military action, often translating into disgust toward external actors, if not outright sympathy for the government. (11:19)

• Complex feelings mix opposition to the regime with pride in Iranian resilience against foreign intervention.

  "People also have a sense of pride and some patriotism and nationalism, and even if they oppose this government...there may be a part...that’s...almost a little bit proud..."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (11:59)

6. The New Regime: More Pragmatic or Repressive?

• With the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC’s apparent rise, there is speculation that the regime might shift toward economic pragmatism, possibly dialing down overt theocracy. (13:04–15:40)

• However, economic development doesn’t automatically mean more political freedom; key power players (e.g., Mohammad Baghr Khaliba) have histories of harsh crackdowns. (14:11)

  "That does not necessarily go hand in hand, though, with being less repressive."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (14:31)

7. What Do Iranians Want Now?

• Many Iranians initially supported regime change, but now simply want viable economic improvement—even at the expense of political liberties. Significant segments would not accept that trade-off. (16:17)

• Without significant economic reform, public dissent is expected to remain a latent threat.

  "...unless this government is able to somehow really address the most fundamental problems that the Iranian people face. And the heart of that is the economy."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (16:47)

8. Root Causes: Ideology, Corruption, Sanctions

• The regime’s resistance to openness is based on a historic ideology of self-sufficiency (anti-West/East), combined with entrenched corruption and vested interests among the IRGC, clerical foundations, and bazaaris. (18:09–20:47)

• Foreign investment threatens these power structures—leading to repeated clampdowns even when limited economic opening occurred (as after the JCPOA). (19:18)

  "...those interests, which are very powerful ones, are very threatened by a true opening up of Iran's economy."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (19:49)

9. State Control and the Internet

• The wartime shutdown and subsequent reopening of the Iranian Internet reflects strategic regime confidence and economic necessity—large portions of society rely economically on online platforms like Instagram. Still, the regime will not hesitate to sacrifice connectivity for control if needed (21:28).

  "...they had the domestic scene under control...there was some necessity as well in the government reopening the internet. But...if they feel having open internet...is a threat, they will shut that down no matter the economic cost..."
  — Yeganeh Torbati (21:28)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “There is a sense of trauma, shock, great fear still lingering…” — Yeganeh Torbati (04:16)
• "For the Iranians...to survive against two of the most powerful militaries in the world...they have done that." — Yeganeh Torbati (08:55)
• "I think Iranians are feeling a very confusing mix of emotions right now, and really nothing has been simple or easy for them..." — Yeganeh Torbati (12:14)
• “That does not necessarily go hand in hand, though, with being less repressive.” — Yeganeh Torbati (14:31)

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Key Timestamps

• 02:23 – War start viewed through January protests; early hopes and subsequent betrayal
• 04:16 – Scale and effect of regime's violent crackdown; trauma and fear in the populace
• 05:50 – Trump’s promises, young Iranians’ hopes, sense of betrayal
• 08:18 – Has the regime been strengthened, or is it more vulnerable?
• 11:19 – Civilian targeting in war and its effect on public sentiment
• 14:11 – Prospects for post-war pragmatism and economic relief, minus civil freedoms
• 16:17 – What do Iranians want now? Will discontent persist?
• 18:09 – Ideological and economic barriers to reform
• 21:28 – Regime confidence, the Internet shutdown and reopening

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Summary Tone & Takeaways

Ian Bremmer and Yeganeh Torbati offer a sober, compassionate, and analytical look at Iran’s post-war reality. Their conversation is frank about the brutality and the complexity, never lapsing into easy optimism or cynicism. Torbati’s insights, steeped in years of on-the-ground reporting, highlight the psychological and material wreckage encountered by millions of ordinary Iranians—a population simultaneously exhausted by violence, starving for economic relief, and confronted with a regime that is, for now, as powerful, paranoid, and cautious as ever.

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Transcript

[A]

Hello and welcome to the Gzero World Podcast. Here you can find extended versions of my show on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer and over the last several months, we followed every twist in the Iran war, missile strikes and ceasefires, the Strait of Hormuz closed and then opened, then closed again, and the effects on global markets and politics. But while the news kept moving, we One part of the story often got left behind, and that's the people that have been living through it. Iran is one of the world's most closed societies, making it difficult to understand what ordinary Iranians are experiencing and how they see their country's future. My guest today has spent over five years trying to find out. Yegana Turbati is the Iran correspondent for the New York Times and co author of Stolen Betrayal and Hope in Modern Iran. The book is the product of her reporting and tells the story of modern Iran through the lives of people who have lived the revolution, the repression and the hope for change. We discuss how Iranians experienced the war and why so many opponents of the regime now feel defeated, whether the government actually emerged stronger or simply survived, and why the country's economic crisis may ultimately matter more than anything that happened during this bloody conflict. She joined me for misstunpol.

[B]

Let's get to it.

[C]

The Gzero World Podcast is brought to you by our lead sponsor, prologis. Prologis helps businesses across the globe scale their supply chains with an expansive portfolio of logistics, real estate, and the only end to end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today. Learn [e-mail].

[B]

Yegon Tabarti, thanks so much for joining us today.

[D]

Thank you so much for having me, Ian.

[B]

We've spent so much time talking about the Strait of Hormuz, spent so much time talking about the deal, the memorandum. There's been much less Talk of the 90 million Iranian people who should be the focus, I mean, of those that you're talking to now. What are they thinking about the war? About what their country looks like coming out of it?

[D]

Yeah, I mean, look, obviously as you mentioned, it's 90 million people. There's sometimes 90 million different views on events. But I think for a lot of Iranians, this war didn't actually start in late February when the US And Israel attacked. It really started in January for them, and in particular January 8th and 9th, when hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of Iranians came out onto the streets to protest and to in large part demand a new form of government. And what they saw was a government that responded to them with military grade weapons, killing thousands of people in response. And ever since then, I think they have felt like a lot of Iranians, not all, but certainly sort of this deep desire for the government to change for some people, almost at any cost. And so for some portion of Iranians, when the war began in late February, there was a hope that perhaps the, even at great cost, this may lead to a better country, a better outcome eventually for them. And I think for a large portion of those Iranians, they feel a great sense of disappointment and even betrayal at what has actually occurred and what the regime has been able to gain out of this war in the last few months. A lot of the Iranians I speak with just feel a sense of defeat and jadedness right now.

[B]

Now, as you say, millions were on the streets and these weren't armed citizens. They obviously understood the risk that they were taking because they've seen this playbook before from the Islamic Republic. Why, months later, are we not seeing any more demonstrations? Why are we not seeing the kind of outrage to a regime that has proven that it can and will continue to be very brutal towards its own people? And the economic suffering, of course, has only gotten worse through this period.

[D]

You're absolutely right that, you know, it's nothing new for the Islamic Republic to use violence to suppress protests. But I do think the scale of what we saw in January was orders of magnitude worse than even some of the most brutal responses in the past. Even if we take kind of the most conservative estimate of the number of killings, around 6,500, which has been verified by one human rights group, that is still quite a bit more than previous rounds of protests in 2017, 2019, back in 2009 or 1999. So I think there is a sense of trauma, shock, great fear still lingering in the last few months. And then the regime has also gone to great pains to make very clear that it controls the streets during the war itself. And even a few weeks after the initial ceasefire in April, there were kind of nightly street rallies where supporters of the regime would come out with loudspeakers and music and chants, just kind of making clear that, you know, don't even think about protesting if you're against this government. There have been these huge rallies for different events. So it's been made very clear to opponents of the government that they have no place in Iran's public square right now. However, as you mentioned, the economy, which was the spark of these protests back in late December, has only continued to get worse. And I don't see right now that changing. And I believe that, you know, we're going to continue to see certainly discontent. And historically, in Iran, in the last decade, that has often led to street protests and demonstrations.

[B]

President Trump, at the beginning of this war, was very focused on the demonstrations, was very focused on all of the Iranians that were killed, tens of thousands, according to the Trump administration. I certainly don't have an exact number. You don't either. But it was pretty widespread. He said that he was gonna rescue the Iranian people. He said help is on the way. He would pick the next supreme leader. Not a lot of Americans believed him because he lies a lot. But the Iranians don't have that much experience with him. I mean, did the Iranian people believe him?

[D]

I think some portion of Iranians did. You know, often the people who are protesting are young people. They are 16, 17, 18 years old. And the people that we saw killed often were quite young. And so that's a generation that in any country is less jaded, is less cynical, maybe, one could say, is more naive and has less experience of the world. And so the idea that an American president will come out and say that help is on the way, we're locked and loaded. I think that generation, and then even amongst some people who were older and kind of had more experience in the world, I think a lot of people assumed, well, certainly something's gonna happen. I mean, no president would simply say something like that and be so really specific if they didn't actually intend to do something. And so I think, you know, I wrote about this at the time in January, and then later on, there is just this amongst some Iranians who believed what Mr. Trump. What President Trump. A sense of betrayal, that that promise really wasn't fulfilled.

[B]

Now, since the war started, we've certainly seen a lot of propaganda from the Iranian regime. All of these billboards that show that the Strait of Hormuz has been seized and grabbed by the Iranian regime. I mean, if I were just watching that, you'd think this is a government that looks a lot stronger and they were able to stand up to the Americans that hit them. But, of course, they've also taken not just significant military blows, but also significant economic blows to an economy that already wasn't performing. They've taken significant leadership blows. And a lot of the people that are now in positions of power don't have a lot of experience, don't have a lot of capacity. So I could frame a story that says that this is a stronger regime domestically. I could frame one that says that actually they're much more vulnerable now. How do you come out on that?

[D]

I think it's important to look kind of at the short to medium term and then potentially the long term. So in the short term, I think it's hard to argue with the idea that Iran has come out strengthened and certainly more confident. You know, they now have a source of leverage in the Strait of Hormuz that in some ways is much more powerful than any leverage that their nuclear program ever gave them. Because it's real, it has an immediate impact on the world economy. And as we saw in President Trump's comments regarding why he had agreed to the memorandum, it really can induce world leaders to make concessions to the Iranians because they don't want the global economy to crash. So I think it's really hard to kind of look at that set of circumstances and not conclude that Iran has come out ahead. Also, the outcomes that each side was hoping for were quite imbalanced. So, you know, the US Came in wanting perhaps regime change or at least wanting destruction of Iran's nuclear sites, ballistic missiles, conventional military, all of these things. For the Iranians, what they really needed to show that they were victorious domestically and then also to kind of their followers or supporters in the region was simply to survive and to survive against two of the most powerful militaries in the world. And they have shown that they have done that in the medium or maybe long term. I think there's real challenges. Major parts of the infrastructure have been completely destroyed. The economy is really in shambles, even more than it was in December. They're seeing overall inflation of 70% according to estimates potentially for food inflation, it's getting into the triple digits, unemployment, all of these kind of really structural problems happening. And then at the same time, we're kind of seeing at least some fractures within the regime even now over what the future should be. First of this memorandum and kind of any agreement with the United States. And then overall, do we let in foreign investments in order to grow, or is that a threat to the principles of the regime? And I think a lot of that is going to be playing out in the next few months and even years. So it's really hard to tell right now kind of what that future holds. But my sense is that once the sort of high of the post war victory period passes, Iranian policymakers and leaders are going to have to actually turn to governing. And that's something that's going to be much more difficult for them when the

[B]

US and when Israel targets civilian energy infrastructure and Some of that, of course, was done. And the Iran Iranian people suffer on the back of that. Or when there is a school, for example, that's hit, and investigations apparently believe that was a mistake, but by the United States and all these young girls are killed, is that something that is increasing support for this regime, however brutal, at the expense of the US and the Israelis that are attacking the regime? But of course, the Iranian people are also getting hit.

[D]

Yeah, it's really complex. Right. So there are plenty of Iranians who are so opposed to this government, to the Iranian government, but are really quite horrified at the conduct of the US Israeli side in this war. And in particular, you know, the strike that you mentioned in Minab on a school there, and also strikes on civilian infrastructure like steel plants and energy facilities that really just affect millions of people and the broader economy. I don't know that that translates necessarily into greater support for the government, for the Iranian government, but it certainly translates into almost a sense of disgust, I sense sometimes from some Iranians towards the US you know, but it's also complicated. People also have a sense of pride and some patriotism and nationalism, and even if they oppose this government, there may be a part of them that also is almost a little bit proud that, okay, well, we weren't able to be taken over by a foreign system or a foreign government. So I think Iranians are feeling a very confusing mix of emotions right now, and really nothing has been simple or easy for them, certainly this year, and certainly not over the last few years.

[C]

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[B]

So Ali Khamenei, the former supreme leader, I GUESS he was 86 years old when he was killed. His son not seen much at all in public, and certainly, if anything, has more of a chairman role than that of an acting leader. If it's the military, if it's the irgc, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that are more in control now, and if, at least in the near to medium term, they're exporting oil, the US Is in trying to normalize relations with them. Is there a scenario where this government becomes less overtly repressive, less theocratic, and economically starts to perform for a larger percentage of his citizens? There was always a minority of Iranians that were supportive of the regime because let's face it, there was a lot of money that flowed from the government through the Bizaris into a whole bunch of families that, you know, were like, okay, we can deal with this. Can you see that potentially helping a lot of rank and file, just average Iranians who aren't particularly political on a day to day basis?

[D]

I think, you know, there's a lot of different scenarios. I think it's possible that this government full of Revolutionary Guard generals who seem to be more in power now than before, perhaps becomes more pragmatic and perhaps also pursue some form of economic development. At least right now they're getting greater receipts from oil sales. Maybe that strengthens the Iranian rial and it kind of makes life a little bit easier for the Iranian people. That does not necessarily go hand in hand, though, with being less repressive. The person that Vice President Vance has been negotiating with, Mohammad Baghr Khaliba, the Speaker of Parliament, IRGC general. And he is someone who has like, from time to time tried to present himself as sort of a more modern guy, you know, wearing suits in his. In his presidential campaigns and not sort of like an old fashioned cleric. However, he's also been one of the harshest and kind of most enthusiastic supporters of crackdowns on the Iranian people as well during their times of unrest going back to 1999 and 2009 as well. There may be a scenario in which Iran's government in five years has dialed down quite a bit on kind of the religious aspects and maybe has allowed for at least restricted its nuclear program enough to continue to be able to sell its oil. But I don't think that necessarily translates into sort of greater political liberties or freedom of speech for the Iranian people.

[B]

So, look, the Iranian people, a lot of them, and certainly I've spoken with many very supportive of active policy of regime change at the beginning of this war. That is not where we are today. Trump made very clear the economic catastrophe that would pursue if the US Continued with its boycott of the Strait. What would the Iranian people want going forward? I mean, now that the Americans have given what the Israelis have given this a shot and essentially failed at so many of their war goals, what's the right strategy for the Iranians going forward?

[D]

Again, it's hard to speak for tens of millions of people, and we have to recognize that there are some portion of Iranian society that do still support this government, maybe 12 to 15 million people who continually vote for hardline candidates in the presidential election. And therefore we can kind of assume they are sort of the most loyal supporters of this government. But I think the Iranian people's dissent, at least from the research I've done, from my book and in my reporting, that doesn't appear to me like it's going to go away unless this government is able to somehow really address the most fundamental problems that the Iranian people face. And the heart of that is the economy. That's been the main issue they've struggled with in terms of delivering on since really the revolution. And it has continued and worsened up to today. And so if somehow this government is able to address that, then I think some portion of Iranians will be happy to live perhaps without political freedom, but at least having economic freedom. And there's many, many millions of Iranians who that would not be good enough for. But at least up to now, we have not seen this, this government in particular, be able to sort of set aside its policies towards the United States, its policies in the region, and kind of look for a new approach that might enable the trillions of dollars in foreign investment that Iran needs, according to experts, to really be able to reach its full potential and kind of rejoin the globalized world.

[B]

And if I had to ask you why they've not been able, and we look at the plausible explanations, incompetence, corruption, malfeasance and sanctions, how would you prioritize those?

[D]

I think one big issue is just simply an ideological one. So we have to remember this revolution. This government came into power in the middle of a century in which Iran had been economically exploited by world powers. That was kind of part of Iran's 20th century history.

[B]

This was the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, for example. Right. A big piece of the revolution. Yeah.

[D]

Even the tobacco concession in the early 1900s. This was sort of in living memory for the people who staged the revolution. And when this government came into power, one of their big focuses was self sufficiency. We're not going to rely on the west or the East. That strain has really continued. And we saw the former Supreme Leader Khamenei emphasize that. Now, a lot of what happened and, or was justified using that argument of self sufficiency was corruption and the taking and sort of hoarding of resources by particular entities, mostly the Revolutionary Guards, but also these big foundations that are controlled by the clerics.

[B]

The bazaaris.

[D]

The bazaaris, yeah, you know, these various boniads, as they're called. And those interests, which are very powerful ones, are very threatened by a true opening up of Iran's economy. If you have foreign investors coming in, that's going to necessarily dilute the control of, you know, the Guard, stake in some bank, for instance, would the Revolutionary Guards really be able to compete in an open market with some of the biggest and best companies from around the world? And I think we saw this really happening after the JCPOA was, was agreed in 2015. The, the first nuclear deal. There was a bit of an opening, not, not an enormous one, but there was an opening where some foreign companies could come and invest. And pretty much almost im we saw backlash from both Khamenei and the security state that answers to him, where people were detained, foreign nationals, dual nationals, people who had brought in foreign investments, and that really died. And then of course, President Trump pulled out of that deal, of course, in 2018. But I would argue that there were major internal domestic obstacles to that deal really reaching its full fruition. And so, you know, it's a combination of ideology and ideology that the revolutionaries, I think, came by honestly, and then also their own self interest and sort of desire for control and desire not to allow any sector of society, including the private sector, to really be independent of the government.

[B]

Final question I wanted to ask you is, you know, when this war started, one of the first things that the Iranian government did was shut down the Internet. And that's not surprising. We see that with a lot of repressive regimes, but they've since reopened it. And at a time where again, the economy's still doing badly and the ceasefire is in place, but there's still a lot of fighting, skirmishing that's going on. That implied to me a level of confidence on the part of this government that we can allow our people, who are pretty educated and have a sense of what's going on, to communicate with each other and also to hear from Western journalists of what's going on. How do you take that? How do you read that?

[D]

I think partially that's true. They felt like they had the domestic scene under control. They had been able to prevent any real protests from occurring during the war itself, and they had maintained control and kind of scared people. And then also there was just the economic reality. I mean, we saw Iran's tech sector, which was kind of at one point one of the most vibrant sectors in Iran, really suffering, undergoing layoffs, some companies shutting down, and they needed the Internet. And then a large portion of Iranians make their living on Instagram, whether that's advertising their businesses there or selling services or taking orders for their businesses, whatever it might be. That had all been cut off for months. And so I think there was some necessity as well in in the government reopening the Internet. But of course they've also shown that that's not their priority when it comes to what they believe is the self preservation. If they feel having open Internet and having people being able to communicate with each other and the outside world is a threat, they will shut that down no matter the economic cost to the country.

[B]

Jaeger Turbari, thanks so much for joining us today.

[D]

Thank you so much for having me, Ian.

[A]

That's it for today's edition of the Gzero World podcast. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZero

[B]

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[A]

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[E]

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