Winners and losers of the Iran war, with Kori Schake

Summary

GZERO World with Ian Bremmer
Episode: Winners and Losers of the Iran War, with Kori Schake
Date: May 16, 2026

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Episode Overview

Ian Bremmer interviews Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a seasoned former U.S. defense and security official, to explore the global repercussions of the Iran war. The conversation focuses on how the prolonged conflict and U.S. policy choices have shifted global power balances, tested U.S. alliances, emboldened adversaries, strained the U.S. military-industrial base, and raised deep questions about America’s future role in the international order.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. State of the Iran War and U.S. Strategy

• The war is at an uneasy stalemate after three months, with a fragile ceasefire ("massive life support" [00:29]).
• The initial U.S. war aims were sweeping—regime change, dictating Iran’s next leader, and extracting broad concessions—but have since narrowed amid poor execution and resilient Iranian resistance ([03:17], [04:36]).

Kori Schake [02:16]: “The President chose to do it and is doing it badly and is now calling into question America's trustworthiness as an ally, America's ability to accomplish strategic objectives, and America's ability to use military force effectively.”

Notable Insight:

• The administration’s lack of clear or consistent objectives has strained alliances and sown confusion among both Americans and partners ([03:17]).

2. Alliance Dynamics and Erosion of Trust

• Allies (especially European and Asian) are concerned by both Iran's nuclear potential and the unpredictable and “vindictive” style of the U.S. president ([04:07]).
• America's ability to align allies has eroded due to a failure to consult partners and an externalization of war costs ([04:07], [16:33]).

Schake [18:50]:

“The erratic and vindictive behavior of the Trump administration towards our treaty allies and our close friends is causing them to want to create an international order that shields them against American influence.”

3. Nuclear File and the Risk of Escalation

• After the U.S. exit from the JCPOA, the nuclear issue is a shared concern, but now no inspections or deal exist ([05:53]).
• Schake worries Iran is more incentivized than ever to “race” for nuclear weapons to deter further attacks ([08:08]).

Schake [08:08]: "If Iran already had a nuclear weapon, the stakes go way up for a potential attack on the country... that's the incentive to move fast and get across the threshold..."

4. The Strait of Hormuz & Energy Chokehold

• Both Schake and Bremmer agree the U.S. has bungled its position, leading to a standoff: U.S. blockades limit Iran’s benefit, but the U.S. is unwilling to escalate further and cannot restore commercial shipping ([08:29]-[09:59]).
• Schake frames the U.S.–Iranian standoff as a “Mexican standoff” that might only be resolved by negotiation ([10:08]).

Schake [10:18]: “The President's choices have left us in the situation where the obvious plays are either dramatic escalation... or humiliation, accepting that Iran is now in control of the straits and we have sacrificed free passage in international waterways.”

• The strategy now relies on dragging out negotiations and betting that economic pain on Iran will outweigh that of U.S. allies ([10:18]-[11:34]).

5. External Actors: China and Russia

• China’s growing assertiveness presents both a dilemma and an opportunity. Trump travels to Beijing seeking help on Iran, but this dependence highlights America’s strategic losses ([12:01]-[12:33]).
• Schake identifies a potential deal: China needs oil to flow, which could bring them to support freedom of navigation in exchange for concessions ([12:33]).

Schake [12:33]: “It’s also an important measure of just how much President Trump has lost in starting the war in Iran... he’s having to go appeal to China, America’s most powerful potential adversary..."

• Russia, meanwhile, benefits from high oil prices yet fails to gain on the Ukrainian front; Ukraine’s innovations may put future Russian gains in jeopardy ([14:07]).

Schake [14:07]: "If you put a snail on the Ukrainian Russian border in 2022, it would have made more progress into Ukraine than the Russian military has made."

6. U.S. Military Overstretch and Decline of Defense Prowess

• U.S. military operations have been “brilliant” tactically but lack strategic coherence, failing to achieve political goals ([16:33]).
• The U.S. defense industrial base is revealed to be shallow, prompting urgent calls for ramping up production jointly with allies ([16:33]).

Schake [16:33]: “Brilliant military operations that for lack of strategy don't add up to successful accomplishment of political objectives... It undercuts the value of American military prowess that we can’t win wars with the military alone.”

7. Allied Response: Fragmentation and Self-Reliance

• Increased allied defense spending is being redirected to their own industries, not the U.S., in part due to loss of trust ([18:12]).
• Allies like Canada now openly question U.S. reliability—a sharp turnaround from historical relationships ([18:50]).

8. Big Picture and Glimmers of Hope

• Despite America’s self-inflicted wounds, Schake expresses cautious optimism that American mistakes are fixable (unlike those made by authoritarian competitors) ([20:18]).

Schake [20:18]: “The wellsprings of American power, our system isn't necessarily good at having it right, but we're pretty good at getting it right, fixing our mistakes. And America's mistakes are fixable in a way that I think Russia's and China's and Iran's are not.”

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Massive life support.” – Donald Trump, describing the state of the Iran ceasefire ([00:29])
• Bremmer: "I've never seen one where I've been so confused about what the aims of the war actually are." ([02:48])
• Schake: "We have given the Iranian leadership every incentive in the world to race as fast as they can to nuclear possession..." ([07:08])
• Schake: "If you put a snail on the Ukrainian Russian border in 2022, it would have made more progress into Ukraine than the Russian military has made." ([14:07])
• Schake: “We benefit so much from being the center of an international order... Allies are calling that into question because we have called it into question.” ([18:50])
• Schake: “America's mistakes are fixable in a way that I think Russia's and China's and Iran's are not.” ([20:18])

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Ceasefire status, war's impact on U.S. stature [00:02]-[02:16]
• Shifting war aims, confusion over strategy [02:48]-[04:36]
• Allied alignment and nuclear issue [04:01]-[07:38]
• Iranian incentives for nuclear pursuit [08:08]
• The Strait of Hormuz crisis [08:29]-[10:08]
• U.S.-China dynamics on Iran [12:01]-[13:35]
• Russia’s position and Ukraine war update [13:35]-[15:46]
• Effects on U.S. military reputation, industrial base, and alliances [15:46]-[18:50]
• Schake’s hopeful outlook [20:18]-[20:55]

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Conclusion

This episode presents a sobering, often critical, but nuanced assessment of the Iran war's global fallout. Kori Schake balances sharp critique of current U.S. leadership with a belief in the resilience and adaptability of America’s institutions—offering an implicit challenge to both policymakers and the public to confront and correct strategic errors before they further erode U.S. global standing.

Transcript

[A]

Hello, and welcome to the Gzero World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my public television show. I'm Ian Bremmer, and today we are looking at how the Iran war is reshaping the balance of power far beyond the Middle East. Nearly three months in conflict has settled into a very uneasy stalemate. The ceasefire is holding mostly despite Trump saying it's on, quote, massive life support earlier this week.

[B]

Right now, it's on life support. They understand. These are all medical people, Dr. Oz. Life support is not a good thing. Do you agree? Diagnostic? I would say the ceasefire is on. Massive life support.

[A]

Iran, though, is betting Trump has little appetite for another escalation after declaring Operation Epic Fury over. Meanwhile, the economic pressure keeps building. Gas prices are nearing $5 a gallon in the United States, shortages are looming and global recession fears are growing. America's adversaries see an opening. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the war has been a gift. High oil prices are somewhat stabilizing Russia's economy. Western attention has drifted from Kyiv, and Patriot systems once meant for Ukraine, are now defending Gulf infrastructure. Beijing is watching, too. Heading into this week's Trump Xi summit, Xi has grown more assertive on trade and critical minerals and fentanyl. He knows the White House wants his help containing Iran and stabilizing the strait. For the White House, a president who promised quick victories now looks constrained by a conflict he can't easily resolve, while his adversaries grow more confident by the weak. Joining me to discuss the global fallout from the Iran war is Cori Shockey at the American Enterprise Institute. She served in the Pentagon, the State Department, and President George W. Bush's National Security Council. Let's get to it.

[C]

Khori Shockey, thanks so much for joining us today.

[D]

It's a great pleasure.

[C]

Tell me how you think about the war in Iran right now and its impact.

[D]

Well, I think the war is enormously consequential because we didn't have to do it. The President chose to do it and is doing it badly and is now calling into question America's trustworthiness as an ally, America's ability to accomplish strategic objectives, and America's ability to use military force effectively. I think it's extraordinarily damaging to American stature and the wellsprings of American power.

[C]

I mean, there have been wars of choice that have gone badly in the past for the United States, but perhaps I've never seen one where I've been so confused about what the aims of the war actually are. I mean, it seems to me that almost every week we've got a different explanation for what the purpose of this war has been, at least from President Trump, if not from the Israeli prime minister. How would you characterize it?

[D]

I think that's exactly right, Ian. The administration began with extraordinarily ambitious objectives, not just regime change in Iran, but that we would get get to select the next leader of Iran and that we would force their capitulation on a very wide ranging set of objectives. The president's lack of discipline, not just messaging discipline, but discipline in the choices he's making, has confused the situation, made negotiations more difficult, made public support more difficult, made allies trying to align their policy in support of us much more difficult.

[C]

Are the allies trying to align their policy and support the US Right now? Do you think that's the case?

[D]

Yes, I do. I think in particular, European and Asian allies also worry about a nuclear armed Iran. But the president, so petty and vindictive if, when not being consulted, they don't immediately align their policies to his, that it's making it harder for allies who also have domestic politics to navigate to support what the president's doing.

[C]

So, I mean, the war goals were very broad at the beginning. I mean, Trump did talk about regime change, you're right. And he did talk about taking the oil as well, which you didn't mention. But I mean, every once in a while that's come up. Certainly the war goals have narrowed substantially, I assume in large part because the war hasn't gone so well. Iranians have been more capable than the president at least had anticipated. The one war goal that has remained at least present has been on the nuclear file, where you say the allies are all aligned. If going forward, Trump were to focus on the nukes, what should he be trying to accomplish?

[D]

Well, he should be trying to establish the state of the Iranian nuclear program. Right. We don't have inspectors in the country. We don't have any reliable basis for understanding how much damage has been done, whether centrifuges are still functioning, for example. So an absolute requirement is understanding the status of the Iranian nuclear program and then constraining it in transparent and reliable ways.

[C]

The President of the United States unilaterally withdrew from the jcpoa, the original Iranian nuclear deal that had been constructed with both allies and adversaries with the intention at least of constraining that nuclear program. Do you believe that the ultimate outcome of this war is likely to be better, worse, or the same on the nuclear front as what the US had withdrawn from?

[D]

Well, I'm genuinely concerned that the outcome of the war could be worse than the JCPOA left the Iranian position in because Iran has now both demonstrated and remains in control of passage in the Straits of Hormuz. And that's an enormous strategic advantage, one that had never been tested or put in play before this war.

[C]

Accepted. I'll get to that. I want to talk about the Strait, but I'm thinking specifically about the nuclear point right now and what kind of nuclear capabilities the Iranians might end up with.

[D]

Well, so one of the main drawbacks of the JCPOA was the sunset clause.

[C]

And it's a 10 year close of the deal, right?

[D]

Yeah, it's relative short duration that precipitated the end of the deal. But now we have no deal. We have no inspections, and we have given the Iranian leadership every incentive in the world to race as fast as they can to nuclear possession, which might have been the only way that they could have prevented the current state of war between Iran, Israel and the US and evidently also some of the Gulf states.

[C]

Do they really have that incentive? And I ask in part because the Israelis have certainly shown that whenever the Iranians, whether they're developing advanced centrifuges or they've got nuclear scientists or they're moving towards a program, the Israelis are more than happy to hit them and keep hitting them hard. So I mean, do you really, do you really feel like the incentive is overwhelming for the Iranian government to move to a nuke now when they hadn't directly passed that threshold over the past years?

[D]

I do. Because if Iran already had a nuclear weapon, the stakes go way up for a potential attack on the country. And so that's the incentive to move fast and get across the threshold because that could well stay the hand of the US And Israel and other countries.

[C]

Okay, let's talk about the Strait. The Iranians long had potential influence over the Strait, but it'd never been actualized. Now we're in a very different position. The Americans have a blockade, but the Iranians have the ability to disrupt. If you were advising the President right now a role that you've had in the past, what would you be saying to deal with that reality?

[D]

Well, first of all, we should never have played ourselves into this position.

[A]

Understood.

[D]

But here we are easily anticipatable that the Iranians would make a move against the Strait of Formosa. And we should have taken in conjunction with the attacks on Iran itself, we should have taken steps to pre deploy forces so that Iran wouldn't have such an easy play to make. Now, where they are. I mean, the distant blockade is a smart American reaction. That is, we can prevent Iran from benefiting from having control of the straits, but we're not willing to escalate, which would be a substantial escalation and force openness of the strait. We can't make commercial providers run the risks of going through a potentially mined or potentially attack prone strait. And so we're at a Mexican standoff with the Iranians, which means we're going to have to negotiate some kind of arrangement that's not just in our interest, but also in their interests and to get them to release the chokehold on the strike.

[C]

So, in other words, pay the Iranians off. You don't believe that further escalation in this environment is the right choice for an American president?

[D]

Well, I think the President's choices have left us in the situation where the obvious plays are either dramatic escalation, which would require answering the question of how do we believe this escalation will prise the Straits out of Iran's grasp when 37 days of intensive military operations against Iran didn't produce capitulation. So dramatic escalation or humiliation, accepting that Iran is now in control of the straits and we have sacrificed free passage in international waterways? I think the President is fulminating against allies because he realizes he's painted himself into that position. And now I think his best move is drawing out negotiations for months on end and hoping that the economic consequences to Iran of keeping the straits closed are more damaging than they are to us and everybody we have externalized the costs of the war onto, including our closest friends and allies.

[C]

So prove that the Americans can take it for a longer period of time, something that the US has not had a great experience with historically.

[D]

Well, certainly not in recent years.

[C]

Yeah. So, look, as you and I are talking, President Trump is on his way to China. I'm wondering, given the influence that China has commercially and otherwise with Iran, and they just had the Iranian Foreign minister in Beijing, do you believe it is wise for President Trump to engage proactively with the Chinese on the Iranian file on Strait of Hormuz? And if so, what do you believe his position should be?

[D]

I do believe that the President should be engaging the Chinese to persuade the Iranians to settle for less than they are demanding. But it's also an important measure of just how much President Trump has lost in starting the war in Iran and pursuing it in the way he has, and that he's having to go appeal to China, America's most powerful potential adversary, for assistance in delivering us from a problem of our own creation. What he should ask the Chinese for is the return of freedom of navigation, because that would strengthen America's hand in the argument for Taiwan's status quo to be sustained. Something that the Chinese do not want. But the Chinese need to get oil through the Straits of Hormuz pretty urgently. And so there might be a deal to be made there.

[C]

I want to ask about Putin for a second. At the beginning of the war, there was a view that the Russians were benefiting energy prices, commodity prices, certainly a lot higher, suspension on sanctions. But it doesn't look that way on the ground in terms of the fighting between Russia and Ukraine. And I'm wondering after this victory day celebration, if you can call it that, where almost no leaders showed up and almost no military celebration was happening, how should we think about this war four years in?

[D]

Well, I think it's a strategic mistake of historic proportions that Russia precipitated the war by invading Ukraine. And it's also incredibly heartening to see the toughness, the grit, the resilience, the innovation of Ukrainians in protecting their sovereignty. You know, I really like the way the former British Admiral Tony Radican put it. If you put a snail on the Ukrainian Russian border in 2022, it would have made more progress into Ukraine than the Russian military has made. The sand is running through the hourglass for both Ukraine and Russia. They are both struggling with recruitment and retention. They are neither getting to fight the war the way they wanted to fight the war. And you see more rapid innovation by Ukraine, but more enduring, persistent adaptation by the Russians. Still, I think the economic strains on Russia begin to show Ukraine's ability, its demonstrated innovation of striking deep into Russian territory and targeting Russian energy facilities, that could be a war winning advantage for Ukraine. So the Russian choice to try and collapse Ukrainian independence is actually not only the genesis of Ukrainian nationalism in many ways, but it's also the destruction of, of Russia.

[C]

So look, you've focused a lot on the military of the United States, its relations, civilian, political, military relations. I do wonder now that you've seen this administration deploy the military very effectively in a more targeted way in Venezuela, much less effectively, at least to date, and in Iran. And we're also starting to see a lot of overstretch systems being moved out of the European front, out of the Asian front to reposition in the Middle East. Talk a bit about America's superpower militarily and how that is looking perhaps to both allies and adversaries around the world.

[D]

Well, what I think we are seeing is brilliant military operations that for lack of strategy don't add up to successful accomplishment of political objectives. And that has to be a worrisome sign to America's friends because it undercuts the value of American military prowess that we can't win wars with the military alone. Second lesson I think everybody's taking is a worrisome demonstration of just how shallow the American defense industrial base is and how necessary to build out into a common US And Allied defense production base in order to restock our own shelves and their shelves of needed munitions. And I think a third lesson is the demonstration of that the United States made a reckless set of choices on Iran and could make a reckless set of choices on the security of allies, in fact has made a reckless set of choices that is affecting the prosperity and the security of allies. We've just cut Germany's GDP growth in half because of the increased cost of energy. So we are externalizing the cost of choices we made onto allied shoulders. And that has to be a major breach of trust with America's allies.

[C]

And I mean allies for a long time, particularly in Europe, but also Canada, also Asian allies, they have not been involved in a true burden sharing of collective security. They've not spent as much on defense. Now they are. But increasingly I see a lot of those allies saying, well, as we're spending, we're gonna spend a lot more on ourselves and not spend on American military industrial complex as they had been. How does this choice look to you and to the United States long term strategically?

[D]

I worry that the erratic and vindictive behavior of the Trump administration towards our treaty allies and our close friends is causing them to want to create an international order that shields them against American influence. We benefit so much from being the center of an international order that makes us prosperous and secure. And allies are calling that into question because we have called it into question. We don't station troops on foreign bases to just to protect those allies. It is a fundamental enabler of American global power projection. And stabilizing Europe and Asia is not just good for Europe and Asia, it's good for the United States too. These are our investors. They are places where we invest. They are places that we care about being secure. And so calling all of that into question, causing allies like Canada that we have a 3,500 mile border with to question whether the United States is a threat to them is collapsing the international order that not only we built, we built for our own benefit.

[C]

Okay, Corey, you're bumming me out. Give me something positive you're thinking about right now in terms of where you think the global order is heading.

[D]

Well, I do think America's adversaries, even as they are benefiting from America's reckless choices, I would still rather have the American president's hand than Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin or the Iranian leadership's hand because the wellsprings of American power, our system isn't necessarily good at having it right, but we're pretty good at getting it right, fixing our mistakes. And America's mistakes are fixable in a way that I think Russia's and China's and Iran's are not.

[C]

Korishaki, thanks so much for joining us today.

[D]

It was a pleasure.

[C]

That's it for today's edition of the Gzero World podcast. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZero World 5 stars only 5 stars. Otherwise, don't do it on Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.