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America's Gamble: Regime Change, Retreat, or State Collapse in Iran | Hamidreza Azizi
00:55:55
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- [00:01]
A
What's up everybody? My name is Demetri Kofinas and you're listening to Hidden Forces, a podcast that inspires investors, entrepreneurs and everyday citizens to challenge consensus narratives and learn how to think critically about the systems of power shaping our world. My guest on this episode of Hidden Forces is Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian scholar based in Europe with a PhD in religious studies from the University of Tehran who has lectured at several Iranian universities and serves as a Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International Security affairs and as a non resident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global affairs in Doha. He's also the author of a forthcoming book titled the Axis of Iran, Israel and the Struggle for the Middle East. This is the third episode in an ongoing series of conversations I've been hosting to track the US And Israeli military campaign against Iran as it unfolds in real time. In this conversation, Ramidreza and I discuss how the war has evolved over the first three weeks, examining the competing objectives driving US And Israeli strategy, where those objectives may be incompatible, and what the continued assassinations of large swaths of the Iranian leadership structure, including the most recent killing of Ali Larijani, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, means for the Islamic Republic's ability to manage both the military and political dimensions of the conflict. We also discussed the nuclear question, specifically whether the war has now made a nuclear armed Iran more likely rather than less, the divergent positions of the Gulf states and what Hamidreza sees as the key variables to watch if you want to understand where this conflict goes from here. If you want access to the transcripts and intelligence reports for this and other episodes, which include summary sections with key takeaways, you can access those by subscribing to our super nerd tier at HiddenForces. Subscribe, where you can also join in on the conversation by becoming a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community, which includes Q and A calls with guests, discounted access to third party research and analysis, and in person events like our intimate dinners and weekend retreats. And if you still have questions, feel free to send an email to infoiddenforces IO and I or someone from our team will get right back to you. And with that, please enjoy this extremely timely and highly informative conversation about the unfolding war in the Greater Middle east with my guest, Hamidreza Azizi. Hamidreza Azizi, welcome to Hidden Forces.
- [02:40]
B
Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure.
- [02:42]
A
The pleasure is all mine. I mentioned this to the audience last week in our episodes with Bruno Masais and Joshua Landis, that I'm doing something very unusual these days, which is I'm hosting these one hour long conversations or shorter that are meant essentially to update myself and keep the audience updated as this conflict between the us Israel and Iran keeps rolling along. And so this is the third in those series of ongoing conversations. You've actually never been on the podcast before, so this is different in that sense. So why don't we begin first just with a basic sense of your background. Tell us who you are, what your background is and what your expertise is as it relates to Iran and the Middle East.
- [03:27]
B
Well, I'm Iranian myself, living in Germany, working with the German Institute for International and Security affairs, or SWP as the German acronym goes, as a visiting fellow. I also work with Klingendaal Institute in the Netherlands and also as a non resident fellow with the Middle East Council on Global affairs, which is based in Doha. So my work focuses primarily on Iran's regional policy, but also Iran's foreign and security decision making. I have a book coming out in May on the Axis of Resistance, the network of Iran's non state allies and partners. So it is called the Axis of Iran, Israel and the Struggle for the Middle east, which was the project I've been working on in the past four years, actually. But before moving to Germany in 2019, I was assistant professor at Shahid Behrmann Iranian National University in Tehran. I did my PhD there in Eurasian Studies. Back then my work was primarily on Iran, Russia, Iran, China and Iran, Central Asia relationship. I have a book in Persian on China and Central Asia, which was based on my PhD dissertation. So this is the sort of compact way if I want to say about my background, actually.
- [04:52]
A
So we're recording this on Tuesday, March 17th. The episode will come out either the day after or two days after. The conflict will have by that point been going on for almost three weeks. What is important for us to understand about how it's evolved in the last two and a half weeks?
- [05:09]
B
Well, of course, as you know, there have been a lot of developments and a lot of dimensions, also a lot of surprises in this war. I think the single most important factor to analyze this war from my point of view is that it probably has not gone the way that especially President Trump expected and planned in the beginning, because all indications like the type of military reinforcement that the United States brought to the region on one hand, so the facts on the ground also on the other hand, the statements by US officials, especially President Trump himself, suggested that it was supposed to be a short term, very limited campaign, maybe aimed at decapitation to, you know, initiate either some sort of a Venezuela style regime transformation in Iran to bring to power some factions or people from within the system that would be more accommodative of the US Demands and be willing and open to giving some concessions on different issues, especially the nuclear, which has been the main focus of the United States, or to incentivize people to force to the streets and bring the regime down. Especially because this war is happening two months after widespread the mass protest, public protest in Iran, which resulted in the killing of thousands of people by the regime security forces. So there was this expectation that even if the kind of short decapitation leading to regime transformation scenario doesn't happen, there is the potential of regime weakening, incentivizing people to come to the streets. But as we are in the third week of the war of these have happened as some people, myself included, had expected. And it has to do with a lot of dynamics that we can delve into further. But I think it has already become some sort of a war of attrition, which was to my view, something that the Iranian special military planners, or better to say strategic planners, wanted and had planned for after the 12 day war last June that they had. So what I hear, what I see coming out from Iran, from official statements and also between the lines as well as expert commentary and so on, is that Iran had prepared itself for a longer war. Like I hear things like at least two to three months. And if we look at the pattern like evolution of the operational strategy of Iran in this war, it also somehow confirms that because they started by targeting U.S. interests and assets in the region, they went for energy infrastructure in the region, then they started disrupting the Strait of Almost. And now they are already talking about the potential next phase, which can involve the Houthis joining in, disrupting the Babel Mandav Strait and the Red Sea as well. So that's the way we can explain what has happened so far in these past 17, 18 days.
- [08:21]
A
So the US has given many different the White House has given many different reasons for this war. As you mentioned. One of those was Iran's nuclear program. Another was regime change. Yet another was to protect Israel, which derives from impromptu comments made by the Secretary of State a few days into the conflict that he immediately walked back. What is your sense of what the actual reasons are that explain the decision by the US to escalate its war with Iran so dramatically?
- [08:50]
B
Well, honestly, I really don't think that there was Any clear objective. There were a set of optimum options that were discussed, as you mentioned, but none of them constituted something that would be considered as a strategic goal from this campaign. You know, there were some hopes, it seems, that, as I said, either a regime change or a regime transformation would lead to, I think, less influence of China and on that matter, also Russia in Iran. So China being the single most important issue for President Trump, connecting each and every foreign policy move to that, even what happened in Venezuela in terms of kind of, how to say, a shrinking Chinese sphere of influence. So that logic applied to some extent to Iran as well, but that was very vague and kind of ill informed in terms of the actual dynamics in Iran, because the Islamic Republic, although relied on China significantly, and China actually in the past several years has become the economic lifeline of the Islamic Republic system. But he was never as an ally, for example, for China. So that's one thing. To keep in mind the argument that I really don't believe this was the US War, this was very much Israel's war. And Israel had and still has clear plans, not only for Iran, but for the broader Middle east, in which Iran is only one piece, maybe the biggest and most important piece, but one piece of a puzzle of the Israeli attempts to reshape the regional order after the October 7 Hamas attack and the war that came in the aftermath. So for the Israeli leaders, as much as a catastrophe and the human disaster the October 7th was, which I think everybody admits it was a human catastrophe, but it provided a strategic opportunity for Israel to go step by step, first to weaken what they saw as the regional arms of the Islamic Republic, Hezbollah, Hamas, I don't know, also to some extent, in a different way, Iraqi militias and so on. And then to hit the, as they call it, the head of the snake, which is the Islamic Republic itself. And it happened in the June war. So the June war, to some extent, I think, dealt with the most immediate threat that Israel felt from the Islamic Republic, which was its nuclear program. So it was deactivated effectively afterwards. But it didn't end the threats from the Islamic Republic in the sense that Israel wanted, especially given the missile program and also the continuation of its regional influence. So they wanted to get rid of this. And this brings me to the point that this war was very much based on an opportunity assessment, not a threat assessment by Israel, which was also somehow relate to President Trump and the Trump administration, which led to this campaign in the sense that, okay, the Islamic Republic is in its weakest state in decades since its establishment, external Pressure, domestic pressure. So now is the time to get the job done. So that was how I think Israel managed to bring Trump on board. But they do have different objectives. I think as much as President Trump wants to end this war, maybe in a kind of, in a manner that wouldn't disrupt global economy, and also more importantly, of course, for him, the US Economy, Israel is ready to go as far as it takes in order to initiate either some regime change or maybe better for Israel, a state collapse, a chaos for one, chaos that would guarantee that Iran is in the foreseeable future, maybe for decades, is not going to be able to pose any threat to Israel.
- [12:52]
A
Okay, this is great. Let's dig in here. So do you think that Israel communicated what the range of objectives that it would be satisfied with, honestly to the White House, that in other words, the possibility that Iran could Turn into Syria post 2012is something that the White House would be okay with, or was this war sold, do you think, in a way that was more amenable to what you would consider to be valid US Strategic objectives in the Middle East?
- [13:22]
B
Well, I don't know and I think there's no way to know that. But we can, of course, have some informed guesses. Right. And my informed guess would be that maybe the objective of a state collapse or chaos was not something that was presented as an option to, as a possibility. Better to say to President Trump, because that is certainly not something that President Trump wants. Because if we assume that what President Trump wants in a kind of bigger picture and in the broader perspective, is a stable Iran allied with the United States, out of Chinese orbit, that can help the United States in a longer term to contain the growing influence of China. That is not something that would be achievable. These, a fragmented Iran and the way that may satisfy Israel. This is one thing. Second, just yesterday I saw the comments by President Trump himself, basically saying that nobody would expect Iran to target its Gulf neighbors. So in a way, as if he is rather surprised by the turn of events, which really surprises me because many experts, myself included, of course, I'm based in Europe. I don't expect my work to impact as much the US Policymaking. But there were a lot of people very well informed, very well positioned to comment on these issues who had warned that because the moment is seen by the Islamic Republic as existential and the threat is felt beyond whatever they have felt over these past decades, they may really go to the extreme, which would include closing the strait as they did, targeting their neighbors as they did. So I would really, let's put it like this. I have a difficult time imagining that President Trump would endorse this military operation if he knew that it's going to lead to the kind of regional chaos that it has already led to, especially that, I mean, one that involves its Gulf allies. So I'm really doubtful that the actual objectives, or better to say, maybe the whole range of consequences, possible consequences, relate to President Trump to make a better and more informed decision here.
- [15:44]
A
So again, I mentioned at the start that we're recording this on Tuesday, March 17th. Israel reported this morning that it killed Ali Larijani, who was the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. He's someone who has spent decades at the center of the Islamic Republic's power structure and up until now has played an important role in helping to manage the political and strategic dimensions of the war with the US And Israel. What significance, if any, does this have on the conflict? And more importantly, who is in charge of Iran right now? Do we know?
- [16:19]
B
Well, that's the million dollar question, because there's two layers. One is the public, one of which Larijani and also Mohammad Bagar Ghalib, the speaker of Parliament, the faces. And on the other hand, there is a deeper layer which also consists of military and security elites. But the actual composition of those who are right now in charge, we don't know exactly. And we should keep in mind that decapitation operations continue as we speak. So we don't know when this episode is finished whether some other officials have been targeted. Right. But let's start with the significance of Larijani. He was a true insider of the Islamic Republic, and not just any insider, one that had kind of the experience of working at the core decision, strategic decision making circles at both military and political levels. So he was high ranking commander in the irgc, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He was for a long time the chief of the state tv. He was for some time the secretary of the National Security Council before he was reappointed recently. And at the time he was also the chief nuclear negotiator of the country. So he was in a sense also a diplomat. And he also comes from a very powerful family. His brother, Sadegh Amalil Arijani is senior cleric and the former chief justice of the country. And also his brother is an influential political figure. So I would say nobody currently has the same background in terms of, you know, familial connection to the security operators, military operators, diplomatic, you know, structure of the country, everything. So and by the way, what made his role even more significant was that he was reappointed by Khamenei as the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. So this is the main body in charge of coordinating strategic decision making, especially at the security and foreign policy issues, but also domestic. So after the 12 day war, he was appointed as the head of that council. And then there was another council which was established which was Defense Council, the head of which was Ali Shamhan Pani was also killed on the very first day of the US and Israeli strikes recently. So these councils are supposed to be in charge of decision making sure that there's going to be regime continuity even if decapitation happens at the top. And they did actually, because we saw that after Khamenei the system continued to function and still continues to function. But here's an important distinction we need to make some people, and I saw that Israeli officials also refer to Larijani as de facto leader of the country after Ali Khamenei. So this was not entirely correct because he was in charge of, I mean, he was taking care mostly of the political strategic side of things, but the military side of things was very much in the hands of Muhammad Bagar Ghalibov. So officially he is the speaker of Parliament, but he's a former IRGC commander who was also the police chief for some time. He's a very powerful figure within the irgc. So Ghadibov, together with Ahmad Vahedi, who's a. Was an ultra hard line figure currently working as the acting chief of the irgc. So these guys have been in charge of military planning. So in that sense, the short term impact is especially on when we speak about the war planning and war strategy. I think the short term impact is going to be limited. The actual impacts would be on how to end the war because Arijani also had a very significant, I mean, kind of a unique characteristic that he was able to connect the military side of the Islamic Republic to the political. So that would be essential if and when the Islamic Republic would decide to go for negotiated settlement, negotiated end of this war. So now what has happened, I think immediately after his death, if it is confirmed, is that the military elite, the hardline military elite, take charge of the politics of the war as well. And that's going to make things much more complicated. So this is a short term impact. In the longer term, of course, it's more difficult to say given the pace of the developments, but one can imagine that, I mean, two scenarios, one would be the consolidation of the military elite to continue further and lead to a full fledged military security state in Iran in the aftermath of the war. The other one would be some sort of fragmentation. Especially this second scenario would be more probable if the cavitation continues to include also people like Kalibov, those who are primarily military oriented, but at the same time have played political roles as well. So at some points we may end up with only military commanders, those who are only capable of and those who only know how to fight, not how to, you know, make peace or go for settlement. So that's going to complicate, I think, the end of the war. And also, as I said, in the longer term that might lead to some more risk, fragmentation, especially a device somehow maybe between the political and the military elites after the war.
- [22:07]
A
So there's an ongoing massacre of the leadership within the irgc. And of course now they're targeting Ali Khamenei's son, who is the new supreme leader. Apparently in recent reports, he almost escaped death. Again, I don't know how credible all this stuff that's coming out is. What do you interpret the objective of the US And Israel? As we already established, there may be competing objectives here, but to the extent that the United States is coming along for this ride, what do you interpret the objective of the United States to be in continuing to degrade its leadership? Does that suggest that they're not really interested in a final negotiated settlement? Do they think that eventually there will be so much attrition that whatever remaining elements are in Iran, they will just come to the bargaining table because they'll just cry uncle that they cannot continue to take any more pain? What is the operating logic here that's informing these policy making decisions?
- [23:06]
B
I think the Trump administration, President Trump himself absolutely wants a negotiating settlement. But what they see as a negotiating settlement and agreements to end the war I think looks very different than what the Iranian leaders have in mind and can see as an acceptable outcome. So that can explain why we see the continuation strategy. Because look, it happened on the very first day of war, right? Something like 40 key military and political figures, Ali Khameneidi, former supreme leader included, they were targeted and eliminated. And yes, that's what I also understand that his son escaped death, his condition is unknown. But in any case, so that happened on the first day. We didn't have that until today. Even when people like Laurajani himself, like Masood Pezeshkian, the president, like Abbas Arakchi the foreign minister, just on Friday they went to this Quotes force rally in Tehran among the supporters. So they went out in the public, but nothing happened. So I think here again, the distinction that we have to make between the goals and objectives of the United States and Israel matters because for Israel, I think decapitation and removing these layers and layers of, of leadership in Iran has been the objective all along. But maybe for President Trump, again, if we assume that his primary objective, as he has indicated a few times, actually was for the current leadership or now we can say former leadership to be eliminated in order for the path to be paved for more pragmatic people to come and take over and make a settlement with the United States. So that didn't happen. So maybe President Trump expected someone like Larijani, who's known to be pragmatic, of course, by the Islamic Republic standards, but more pragmatic, of course, than various figures within the irgc. So maybe President Trump expected him to kind of facilitate some sort of a negotiated agreement, and he waited for that. When that didn't happen, maybe he simply gave the green light to Israel to do what they wanted to do all along. And so this is the way I understand it at the moment.
- [25:38]
A
Do you think there's a factional distinction between factual, as in factions, not factual, as in facts, distinction between the regular armed forces, the Artesh, and the irgc? Because much of what I'm seeing in terms of news stories is that they're targeting members of the irgc. Is there a possibility that that's intentional and that they're trying to somehow leave what they would perceive to be more moderate elements within the leadership structure that they can negotiate with?
- [26:08]
B
Look, the army, or Artesh, as the Persian name goes, has been traditionally seen, but I would say not correctly, as more being on the side of the people, let's say, than the irgc. Because the irgc, as the name suggests, is a revolutionary, like back to the. I mean, derived from this Islamic Revolution of 1979. So the Islamic Revolution reward, and actually the actual translation of the Persian name is not Islamic Revolutionary Guard Force. It is the Guardians of the Revolution, the corpse of the Guardians of the Revolution. So the name is quite clear. They are there. They are designed to protect this system. But the army is seen more as nationalists. But over the years, this distinction has, to a great extent, you know, been eroded, I would say, because I know for a fact that especially at the higher command levels in the army, the, how to say, requirements in terms of ideological purity, let's say, ideological commitment to the system are as strict, if not more, as those within the irgc, and now, although of course we see more reports of IRGC headquarters and bases, etcetera, Being targeted, but on the other side, the army is very much involved actually in targeting Israel and also the Gulf states. Just a couple hours before this, this episode, I read the statement by the army, by Artesh, that they had conducted drone attacks against different, you know, positions in Israel. So it's still very difficult. There has been this idea of how to say, eroding, undermining the IRGC in order to pave the way for a more nationalist force to come. As an Iranian, I hope, but as an expert, I'm skeptical, actually.
- [28:05]
A
This was not a planned question, but since you did raise it, again, you are Iranian, what does this feel like for you?
- [28:13]
B
Well, that's the most difficult question, honestly, because I always need to make a compromise, let's say, between me being an Iran expert, which requires me to stay neutral in my analysis to the extent possible, and me as an Iranian who see my country, my fellow countrymen and women suffering as a result of first the regime suppression and now from a war. So it's been very difficult. And I must say that within the Iranian communities, both inside the country and especially abroad, I mean, the situation is very much polarized, you know, because there are people who supported this war and still support to some extent, because especially after the massacre on 8th and 9th of January, again, as I said, thousands of people were killed. There was a sense of frustration that any change from within the country would be possible. So that effectively led many people to look to outside for help. And this is still the case. But the longer this conflict goes on and the more kind of civilian casualties that we see every day, basically also civilian targets being hit, the more disillusions people in the country are getting, as far as I can see. So in a sense, I don't know if it is majority minority, but many people now feel that they are somehow between a rock and a hard place, between a regime that has been suppressive all along and is expected to be even more so if it stays in power after such a big security and existential crisis. On the other hand, foreign power, especially in this case United States and of course Israel as well, these foreign powers which claimed to be coming to Iranian people's aid and to help them liberate themselves from the Islamic Republic, now apparently pursuing other aims. So this has led to, as I said, some level at least of disillusionment and especially something that I must say, because again, as an Iranian, look, we grow up and we go to school with this very strong sense of nationalism, which is very much attached to the territorial integrity of the country. As a school kid, you read the history books, history of Iran, and you see the maps starting with Communid Empire and then the Parthians, Ashwani, then Sassanid, everything. And then comes a turning point, the invasion of the Arabs and the Islamization of the country, right? Then you have another attempt era, like hundreds of years, the country trying to re establish itself. And then we have the invasion of the Mongols. So there's a trauma, deep trauma in generations and generations of Iranians of foreign invasion which has resulted in that big territory of the Achaemenid Empire, which we saw the maps in our school books shrinking and shrinking and shrinking. And now with President Trump hinting at a potential occupation, for example, of the Khark island, or discussions about the potential occupation of the three islands in the Persian Gulf, which is disputed by the uae. So these can really lead to some rally around the flag, even among the people who resent the Islamic Republic to the bone. So this is actually the way I can explain the current mood. It's very contradictory. It's very frustrated. But it is what it is. As I see it, how do you
- [32:12]
A
feel when you see reports of the U.S. and Israel bombing UNESCO World Heritage sites or desalination plants?
- [32:21]
B
Let me make it a little bit more personal. I saw the first reports of Goleston palace being hit, being damaged as a result of the strikes. So that was very personal to me because that was the place where me and my wife had our first date. This is the sense of attachment that we have to these places. And again, as an Iranian, I know that many people share this. We are very much concerned about, for example, Persepolis, also about the tomb of Cyrus the Great, these places also being hit. I've been to Isfahan. I have a clear memory of all those beautiful places. And then I saw the videos of the destructions. Not destruction, the damage. Fortunately, it's not destruction yet. And it really hurts me, you know, I know that this is the feeling that other Iranians have. So this also kind of adds to that sense of traumatized nationalism, let's say, among many Iranians. So it's a difficult time, of course.
- [33:30]
A
I mean, the Middle east is the cradle of civilization, of human civilization. And I do feel like this is the most underappreciated aspect of this war. It was true also in Iraq, I think, because the US Is a Western nation and people, generally speaking, are not very historically educated. Not many people seem to really appreciate how much of our past we're really destroying in these wars and have been destroying, we don't seem to value it. So I just wanted to raise that as something that people should at least be aware of. Just a few more questions for you, Hamid. What's most important for us to understand about how the incentives and constraints of the various parties involved in this conflict are now evolving? What are those for the US And Israel, and what are those for the Iranians, do you think? I mean, we've kind of touched on these a little bit, but I want you to be explicit here.
- [34:22]
B
Well, what I can tell from the evolution of the Iranian thinking, they already seem to be satisfied what they perceive as their achievements in the war, which, on top of which is survival. So the fact that they have not only survived in terms of the regime being there, the political system capable of governing, also providing public services and basic goods, of course, in a very higher price than before the war. So this, they already see this as a sign of resilience on which they build on to continue this war. And they've been clear about their objective. Actually, their objective is not just for this war to stop, was for them to make sure that it's not going to happen again. And this has to do with a sense of suspension, if you may say, that was there after the 12 day war and up until this ongoing war started. So everybody, every single strategic thinker that I listened to or read in this period kind of was of the idea that this is only a matter of time, because it was just a pause. There was no formal ceasefire, there were no arrangements, there were no agreements. And the basic sort of reasons for which Israel and then the United States actually attacked Iran in June, they remain unresolved. You know, the nuclear program stops, but still there it can function again. The stockpile of highly enriched uranium is still there and missile production continues. Everything. So at this moment, what they want is to end the war in a way that it wouldn't lead to the same outcome, like after six or seven months for the conflict to resume. And they have seen this as a pattern, actually. The other day, Khalibov mentioned it clearly that we are not going to allow Israel to use pause to regroup, to refill its stockpile and so on, and then attack us again. Because they saw this in Gaza, they saw this in Lebanon, and then they saw it in their own experience of the 12 day war. So every time cease fires works, basically, in their view, cease fires always worked in the past two, three years as opportunities for Israel to get prepared for the next war. So now what they want is to continue it to the point and to increase the costs to the point that they can make sure that it's not going to happen again. And one way of doing that, as they do, is to globalize the war by kind of moves like closing the Strait of Hormuz. Because in the mindset of the Iranian leadership, Israel wouldn't attack Iran or wouldn't at least do it in this way overtly and comprehensively if they didn't make sure that the US Is fully on board. So they need the United States to be on board. So if they can make sure that no U.S. president in the foreseeable future is going to on board with Israel, they can make sure that this war is not going to happen again. And this is what they are doing on the side of Israel. As I said, the strategy seems to be to continue this. And one advantage that Israel has the Islamic Republic lacks is public support for this war. There's a lot of polls and surveys suggesting that majority of the Jewish Israelis support this war because they see Iran as an existential threat and they want to get rid of this. So at least for some time, the Israeli leaders and the Israeli society seem to be ready to pay the costs of this war. And as long as the Israeli government has that support, they continue to the point that either of these scenarios that I mentioned is materialized. Either regime change that would lead to something and even a regime change per se, I really don't think that is going to satisfy Israel. It has to be a regime change that would lead to a regime that would agree to not develop kind of strategic weapons, not pursue nuclear program, et cetera, et cetera. So I really don't buy those arguments that it is because of the ideology of the Islamic Republic. Ideology of the Islamic Republic is of course very important in cultivating ties with those non state actors that have threatened Israel, that's for sure. But in a broader perspective, Iran is a big country and the geography that it has, which gives it a very important geopolitical position, I think is always a potential threat for Israel. And they want to make sure that there's either a weak regime or a state in Iran or there's going to be a prolonged chaos in the country that would, as I said, guarantee that the country is not going to be a threat for Israel in the foreseeable future.
- [39:11]
A
So I'm still confused about the nuclear dimensions of this conflict and where concerns about Iran's nuclear weapons programs fit in the sort of Objectives of both the US And Israel, because from what I understand, Iran still possesses highly enriched uranium from multiple weapons. Nobody knows exactly where that material is. At least when Khamenei was alive, we had his fatwa prohibiting weaponization. That's died with him now. And the war itself, by destroying Iran's conventional deterrence, has given whatever regime remains its strongest incentive to dash for a bomb. Should we expect to see a nuclear armed Iran by the time we reach a new equilibrium? And is the only way that that doesn't happen collapsing the country into chaos? I mean, is it one of those two outcomes at this point?
- [40:07]
B
It can be. It can be. And I must say that already in the aftermath, even before the 12 Day War, but especially in its aftermath, there was, especially within the strategic experts community, there was this idea that had we possessed nuclear weapons, the war wouldn't have happened. So at least not in the sense that it would be an existential threat for first the regime. And also to some extent, as I
- [40:37]
A
said to the council, I mean, that's the obvious irony of all of this. Everyone knows that Israel and the United States would not have attacked Iran if Iran had a nuclear weapon. Iran knows that, which is why it wants a nuclear weapon. And so everything we do to try and prevent them from getting one makes them more determined to get one. That doesn't mean necessarily that if the US And Israel didn't attack them that they wouldn't get one. I mean, it just seems like an intractable, wicked problem and dynamic that these two blocks of countries have been caught in.
- [41:09]
B
Yeah, sure, you're right. I mean, look, I'm not an expert on the technical side of the nuclear program, okay? But what I know about the political side of it, Iran did have nuclear weapons research program up until 2003. But ironically enough, they stopped it out of the fear that when it was exposed. Out of the fear that or. No, actually it was before it was exposed because they were worried that after the U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan and then Iraq, Iran would be next and the nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons research would be used as an. And it was still in the nascent stages. They couldn't still rush for the bomb at that moment. So they were really worried that it could lead, it could invite attacks afterwards. As all we know, and that's history already, they were engaged in intensive talks, first with the E3, the three European countries, and then there was an agreement, the agreements broke, and then we had the JCPO after 10 years. President Trump, you know, withdrew from that. So I would say after 2003, the idea within the Islamic Republic leadership was that okay, it's too dangerous and also technically not possible for us in the short term to you know, go for weaponization. But let's use this threshold, the status, you know, that's right. Like they do have the capacity to like to enrich domestically and also like the so called everything. So theoretically in a short period of time, theoretically you can, you know, increase the enrichment level to the 90% which is required for a bomb. So to use that threshold status as a deterrence. All these years there was this argument that if the US or Israel attacks, we are going to weaponize. So what happened in the 12 Day War was that the attack happened, they didn't go for it and it turned out that it had to do with the one hand the technical difficulties of producing. So look, what I hear from those with technical knowledge is that even now they are capable of producing some rudimentary nuclear weapon, something like what the United States used in Hiroshima, Nakazaki in the Second World War. But the thing is that they don't have the means to deliver it, they don't have the bombers, etc. So they need to, if they want to weaponize, they need to work on something that be small enough to be able to be installed on missile warheads. So they don't have that capacity yet. And on the other hand there was this fear that the main nuclear facility is now destroyed after the 12 day war and the system in terms of intelligence being so penetrated, any move toward that direction would lead to a bigger attack. So they didn't do that, but the attack happened again. So I very much think that if the regime stays one way or another, especially with this hardline hardcore security oriented elites and Khamenei no longer there, and if they manage to preserve the stockpile of highly enriched uranium that they have, it is more likely than ever that they may go for weaponizing because they have already paid the costs. As simple as that.
- [44:46]
A
So the Gulf states are obviously not happy with how the war is impacting their economies. But there have also been leaked reports that Saudi Arabia, specifically Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has privately encouraged the US to continue aggressive military actions in Iran. I think the quote that's circulating is keep hitting them hard. I don't know how truthful these reports are and more to the point, if they are even relevant to the larger question of whether or not MBS would have been on board with this latest escalation had he been informed of it prior to February 28, what is your understanding of the position of the various Gulf states at this time?
- [45:28]
B
Well, first of all, it's important to note that on the issue of Iran and more broadly on kind of all sorts of strategic issues, there is no single Gulf position. So we have the gcc, but it's not like European Union that would decide on a consensual basis on foreign policy matters. And even within the European Union there's a lot of disagreements on very important issues like the war in Ukraine and so on and so forth. Within the Gulf, not only there are divergences in terms of strategic priorities, but increasingly competitions intra GCC competitions. So one stark example was the Qatar crisis in 2017 when GCC countries severed their ties with Qatar over the ties with Iran and also like Muslim Brotherhood ties and so on. So they managed to resolve that. But in the past few months since last year, there was an increasing competition between Saudi Arabia and UAE on all sorts of issues and all sorts of geographies from Yemen to Sudan everywhere. And they also are competitors when it comes to some investments in high tech, AI, etc. But of course now they are facing a common challenge. And this has led to GCC countries to close ranks. But I'm not sure it's going to remain as such. And even now, and despite the kind of indiscriminate strikes by Iran and all Gulf countries, we see that. I mean Oman has been to a great extent spared from that given its ties with Iran traditional role as a mediator, but more importantly because it doesn't host any major US base in its soil. That's also important to understand. So Oman is one thing. Then we have Qatar which is somewhere in the middle. The Qataris really don't want like this war to go on. They have been also trying to mediate, but they have been targeted as well. And on the other hand we have Saudi Arabia and the uae, both of which more rival, let's say with Iran. So what I know was the case before the war, Saudi Arabia especially, I'm not sure about uae, but Saudi Arabia especially was not really pushing for the war. They wanted also to rest because you know, at the end of the day, Mohammed bin Salman has its at his own 2030 plan and it was already somehow jeopardized by the geopolitical developments of the post October 7th and so on. So they really need stability. But I read the recent reports as okay, the United States, now that you have started this, don't leave us with this kind of how is injured tiger, because you will leave it's us who have to deal with this now that you are halfway through. So let's go ahead and finish the job. So still, I'm not sure about how exact those reports are, but I would interpret this in this line. Uae, A very important difference is that UAE has developed a close partnership with Israel. It is a signatory together with Bahrain of the Abraham Accords. So that's actually one of the reasons why the UAE is being hit most by Iran these days. And this is rather surprising to me, too, I must say, because the UAE has for years tried to, or had better to say for years tried to pursue a balanced foreign policy in the sense of, you know, they work with Israel on one hand, but at the same time, it was one of the main centers through which Iran could circumvent sanctions, allow their money, and bring the money back to the country. So Iran is 100% shooting itself in the foot as well. But I think that's because they felt that somebody is shooting to their head. So shooting in their foot, if it means that somebody else is going to hurt more, it's not going to be as consequential as it was in the past.
- [49:23]
A
So last question in closing, Hamid, what are the most important things that people should be paying attention to if they want to forecast where this conflict proceeds to next and whether or not we achieve some kind of resolution?
- [49:37]
B
Well, I think first and foremost, and this is something that I've been saying from day one and even before the conflicts, the single most important factor here is the person of President Trump. And we know that he can be very unpredictable. So Donald Trump's statements and positions, I think, is very essential in understanding how the US Is handling this. And I'm not saying that every single position, every single statement by President Trump has to be kind of people should take it at face value because some of it also has to do with trying to, for example, reassure the markets and so on. But how the person of President Trump decides to proceed or not is very essential. This is one. And second is to what extent decapitation campaign is going to continue and which officials it's going to involve. Like if we see it spilling over to people like Wadi Rabaf, like Ahmad Vaidi and so on, it can have a range of effects. On one hand, bringing to power even more hardliners from the. From what I call the young guards. But on the other hand, it may theoretically at least also pave the way for some more moderate factions who are not at the moment, within the system, are kind of Former insiders, somehow. So where this decapitation campaign goes and how it evolves also matters a lot. And then there's something kind of, in terms of military, technical side of things, and that has to do with the material capacity of each side to sustain this war. Because on one hand, we have a stockpile of ballistic missiles that Iran has, which is not infinite. At some points, they may have no more missiles to strike. We don't know the exact number. And then on the other hand, we have Israel and the United States, whose stockpile of. Of intercepting missiles also is limited. Yeah. So these are the main factors, I think, at the political level and operational level that matters.
- [51:51]
A
So shortly before we got on the air, Joe Kent, the director of the National Counterterrorism center, issued a statement that he was resigning as head of counterterrorism. We didn't have a chance to talk about this, but it seems to me that the Iranians, if they did have the capability to strike the United States, and I'm specifically talking about the US Homeland, not US Interests in the Gulf, that they wouldn't necessarily have followed through with it up until now. But it seems at this point that if they have the capability to do it, they may go ahead and do that. And I'm just curious what you think. Is this something that we should be concerned about here? That there could be terrorist attacks against civilian infrastructure and civilians in the U.S.
- [52:36]
B
look, in terms of actual capabilities, there is no way Iran can do any substantial damage to the United States. They don't have intercontinental ballistic missiles. They don't have anything basically that can reach the U. S. Soil. The only option would be, of course, as you mentioned, the kind of terrorist attacks, I think. Not necessarily. I'm not saying it's not going to be the case. The disclaimer, not necessarily ordered by Iran. But we shouldn't forget that Ali Khamenei was not just the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, he was the supreme leader of this whole range of Iraqi Shia militias who are not loyal to Sistani or they're loyal to Khamenei. He's the supreme leader of Hezbollah. He's also considered as a religious figure among the Shias in Pakistan, in Bahrain, and we saw already unrest in those countries as well. So two things, of course. One can be some organized ways of. Of attacks like terrorists, etc. By the Islamic Republic. But the other one would be lone wolves trying to take matter in their own hand. And there's really no way to understand if this is the plan or to what extent. What I know is that at this moment the whole system, the Islamic Republic, is very much has to very much concentrate on the home front, but afterwards, depending on how this war ends. So if it ends in a kind of settlement that would satisfy both sides, as difficult as it may appear at this moment, then it would reduce the chances for that, at least in an organized way. If not, then maybe in terms of
- [54:17]
A
probability Hamid, thank you so much for coming on. This was really educational for me and I highly encourage people to follow your work. You put out every day. You've been doing this since the first day of the war. You've been putting out these daily updates on how things are going. Is that the best way for people to follow your work, to follow you on Twitter, or are there other areas where they can get early access to your publications?
- [54:40]
B
I have my Twitter of course, and since the start of the war I am trying to have these daily updates as much as I can physically and mentally, to be honest with you, focusing on the Iranian strategic narrative so how things are perceived there. But I also have my online platform, substack based platform, Iran Analytica, where I publish longer form articles and analysis. So these are the two main places where I share my work and of course my LinkedIn also. But it's more or less similar to the content that I share on Twitter.
- [55:14]
A
Thank you so much for coming on and speaking with us.
- [55:16]
B
It was a pleasure. Thank you so much.
- [55:20]
A
If you want to listen in on the rest of today's conversation, head over to HiddenForces IO, subscribe and join our premium feed. If you want to join in on the Conversation Conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community, you can also do that through our subscriber page. Today's episode was produced by me and edited by Stylianos Nicolaou. For more episodes you can check out our website at hiddenforces IO. You can follow me on Twitter Ophinas and you can email me at infoiddenforcesio. As always, thanks for listening. We'll see you next time.