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Ending the Ukraine War: A Reset in U.S.-Russia Relations? | Andrea Kendall-Taylor & Michael Kofman
00:52:53
In of Hidden Forces, Demetri Kofinas speaks with Russia and U.S. national security experts Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman about the Ukraine peace talks between the United States and Russia, and whether they are part of a larger vision by...
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- [00:01]
A
What's up everybody? My name is Demetri Kofinas and you're listening to Hidden Forces, a podcast that inspires investors, entrepreneurs and everyday citizens to challenge consensus narratives and learn how to think critically about the systems of power shaping our world. My guests in this episode of Hidden Forces are Andrea, Kendall Taylor and Michael Kaufman. Andrea is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the center for a New American Security, where she specializes in Russian foreign and democratic domestic policy, authoritarianism and European security. Michael is a senior Research Scientist at the center for Naval Analyses and a Fellow at the Wilson center, where he focuses on the Russian armed forces, military analyses, security issues, and strategy. I asked them both on the podcast today to discuss the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Russia over ending the Ukraine war and their implications for the future of Europe and European security and US China relations, global commerce, and the forging of a new world order informed by realpolitik, economic reciprocity, and a much more transactional approach to American foreign policy. Between the first and second hour, Andria, Michael and I discussed the specifics of the ongoing peace negotiations in Riyadh, including the key factions involved in these negotiations, the critical objectives of both parties, mutual red lines, and whether these talks are about something much larger than just ending the Ukraine war and possibly represent the first in a series of agreements meant to reset the global order and American foreign policy for the 21st century. We also discuss U.S. russian and Chinese nuclear doctrines, the future of America's alliance structures, European defense spending, and much more. If you want access to all of today's conversation and you're not already subscribed to Hidden Forces, you can join our Premium feed and listen to the second hour of today's episode by going to HiddenForces IO. Subscribe all of our content tiers give you access to our Premium feed, which you can listen to on your mobile device using your favorite podcast app, just like you're listening to this episode right now. If you want to join in on the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces Genius community, which includes Q and A calls with guests, access to special research and analysis in person events and dinners. You can also do that on our subscriber page. And if you still have questions, feel free to send an email to infoiddenforcesio and I or someone from our team will get right back to you. And with that, please enjoy this incredibly timely and illuminating conversation with my guests Andrea Kendall Taylor and Michael Kaufman. Andrea Kendall Taylor and Michael Kaufman welcome to Hidden Forces.
- [02:55]
B
It's Great to be here.
- [02:56]
C
Thanks for having us.
- [02:57]
A
It's great having both of you guys. So Michael and I had a chance to catch up real quick. Before you joined Andrij, I was saying that I've been following his work since the onset of the Ukraine war, and he did a number of podcasts back then with Dmitri Alperovich, who's been on the podcast a number of times, including once right before the war. And, Andrea, you were introduced to me by John Wolfson, who's been on the podcast also. So we've been in contact over a few years as well. So I'm really glad we were able to do this, guys. And what prompted this conversation is an article you guys published not long ago in Foreign affairs magazine about Putin. And we're going to have a chance to talk about that because of the ongoing negotiations. But before we sort of talk about any of this stuff, I'd love to learn a little bit more about each of you. Why don't we start with you, Andrea? What's your background and what's your focus in American foreign policy?
- [03:42]
B
Yeah, so my background, I spent about 10 years in the US intelligence community. Most of that time was at CIA, but the last three years I was at the National Intelligence Council, where I was the Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia. And then I left the intelligence community in 2018 to come here to the center for New American Security, where I direct the Transatlantic Security Program. So we're following all things Russia, but also European security, NATO, European politics. Yeah. So that's me in a nutshell.
- [04:12]
A
Excellent. What about you, Michael?
- [04:14]
C
I worked in defense analysis and defense research in different roles, worked National Defense University, directed the Russian mill analysis team at the center for Naval Analysis, Modern Warrenstead, West Point. Now a senior fellow, Carnegie. But I've had a couple of fellowships, including at a Center for New American Security, where Andrea is and probably spent the better part of my life doing defense research and applied defense research in different roles.
- [04:39]
A
And you are. You are Ukrainian, right?
- [04:41]
C
Yeah, I'm from Ukraine originally. I moved to the United States in the early 90s at the very tail end of the Soviet Union. But I would say that personally and professionally, my formative years have all been spent in the United States.
- [04:53]
A
Has it been difficult at all that this war took place in your home country? How has that impacted your ability to sort of view the subject objectively and not get too wrapped up in it emotionally?
- [05:05]
C
Yeah, I think it's challenging. It's particularly harder at first. As a military analyst. You get inured to war. That's kind of your profession and what you spend most of your time looking at. But it was struggle early on, mostly because I know a lot of places and they're familiar to you and you have a degree of sentiment and personal attachment to them. I still do. But the end of the day job one is to try to stay objective and to kind of give the best analysis and advice you can, especially to folks here in the United States. Right. I spent quite a bit of time in Ukraine. People follow my work, I think know that I go there about every three, three and a half months or so. And I've gotten to know a lot of people there. Right. So I'm friends with a lot of these folks who are fighting a lot of people in various branches of Ukrainian security services. So there is a degree of personal sentiment and attachment, but I try to do my best to not have it bleed, you know, over my work.
- [06:02]
A
Yeah, I was shocked to learn that you were Ukrainian because I was so impressed at how sober your analysis was during those early months. So as we're recording this today, U.S. and Russian officials are meeting in Saudi Arabia in follow up talks as part of peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine after Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Secretary of State Marco Rubio met last week to kick off discussions. What do we know about the negotiating positions of each side? In other words, their relative strengths and critical objectives and red lines. Andrij, why don't you go first?
- [06:36]
B
I think it's fair to say that the Russian position really hasn't changed since the beginning of the war. And so they still seem to be making the same maximalist demands that they did from the beginning, which is kind of the full subjugation of Ukraine. And even after the first meeting in Saudi Arabia, which I should say, I mean, talk about negotiating positions, the United States continues to kind of take things off the table. So going into those talks that week Prior, you had U.S. secretary of Defense Hegseth speaking at NATO saying that Ukraine would not join the NATO alliance, that U.S. forces would not be responsible for maintaining peace in Ukraine as a part of any ceasefire or settlement, and that any kind of force, European force, that was operating in Ukraine, would not take place under the NATO umbrella. So the US Position, at least in my view, has been kind of weakening its leverage going into negotiations, taking things off the table. And I think Russia sensing that, has only upped the ante. So in my mind, Russia is putting things on the table, increasing its demands. So, for example, after the negotiations in Saudi Arabia, you had Foreign Minister Lavrov come out and say, well, that Russia would not make any territorial concessions, quote, unquote, concessions as part of the negotiation, nor would Russia accept any NATO countries forces fighting in Ukraine. So they continue to put things on the negotiating table. Also exceptionally remarkable that hours after the negotiations in Saudi Arabia, Russia orchestrated another major drone attack against Kyiv. So they don't demonstrate any interest in making any concessions or any good faith gestures going into those negotiations. They continue to maintain maximal pressure on the battlefield in Ukraine. And so it is really hard for me to understand what the United States exactly thinks it's going to get out of these negotiations, other than President Trump's priority, which is ending the war. And the big concern now is that the United States is going to be willing to make major concessions just to end the war.
- [08:51]
A
Michael, why don't you also answer and then I'll follow up with some questions to both of you.
- [08:55]
C
Yeah, sure. So I think it's clear that the Russian side seems to be, at least right now, for the moment, the better prepared side in terms of having clarity of what they want. They're pushing as a starting point the Istanbul framework. And if you recall, this is the framework early on negotiations at the beginning of the war that didn't lead to anything. And there they had pretty extensive demands in terms of Ukrainian neutrality, Weimar Republic style, set of constraints on the size of Ukraine armed forces, some specific constraints or inputs they want to Ukraine, domestic politics, language, laws, what have you. I think that if that's a starting standpoint, the demonstration is willing to acceptance rather favorable to Russia on the Euro side of it. It's clear to me that the administration is mostly motivated by trying to find an end to the war and a ceasefire and then trying to pursue opportunities both to Ukraine, but perhaps now to a large, larger stunt with Russia. There's just an early reading. Right. And Russia doesn't just want to get a victory out of this. They also want concessions on European security and some sanctions relief. And if they don't get direct sanctions relief, if they simply get a pullback on enforcement, it'll be more than sufficient, I think, for their ends. The challenge you have is that the US Wants to end the war. Right? Russia does not actually want to end the war. The practice wants a victory. Either wants Ukrainian capitulation, which it can't achieve on the battlefield right now, and simply not making the sort of advances that will lead to Ukrainian capitulation, at least in the near term, or it wants to some extent Western capitulation. By that I mean major concessions either on European security, but also bilateral concessions in U. S. Russia relations. Right. And that's what they're angling more towards right now. Why? Well, although Russia's advantage on the battlefield is not decisive. Right. They have the initiative and have had it for quite a long period of time in this war. And if you look at the current timelines, there's no obvious reason for why Russia should negotiate a ceasefire. Okay. And on top of that, the administration has gone pretty quickly from at first a non saying, kind of a policy slogan of piece to strength to very quickly moving to peace at almost any cost and on the shortest possible timeline, which unfortunately is driving the latter part. Right. If you're the motivated party that wants to make a deal, and for some reason it's urgent for you to make the fastest deal possible, then even if your hand isn't that weak, it's going to end up being weaker by virtue of the fact that you're the one more motivated to make this agreement. And I think Russian sense that, and they see it, and I see some of that coming out initially in talks in Riyadh, at least by what Wittikov said, that, you know, his guideline is that Istanbul communique. Right. And you sort of see the back and forth in public statements that suggest, at least right now, the Russians have the advantage in the conversation.
- [11:56]
A
What's driving the urgency on the part of the Trump team? And then when you answer that, I'm also curious to understand. So, like, if what's driving the urgency is primarily politics because this is a Democratic Republican, fair enough. What are the equivalent factions on the Russian side that create constraints for Putin in terms of ending the war, not ending the war, and coming to a negotiated settlement?
- [12:17]
B
I mean, I think one of the things the president has been really clear about the US President is like he wants to put an end to the killing. And that kind of line comes up over and over. He has a hugely inflated number of casualties that he gives, saying millions of people have died in Ukraine, which is obviously not true. But he is very fixated, I think, on ending human killing and suffering. And this is a little bit flippant, but I think people take it seriously, which is he has this fixation on winning the Nobel Peace Prize, that he wants to be a peace president, not a war president. I think he's very fixated on his image as being the one who can solve this problem and bring peace to Ukraine. It was incredibly notable to me to hear how many times Rubio and Witkoff and others, Vance, have said that it's only this president who can bring peace. This is the only person in the world who can do this. So there is this air of being a peacemaker and so forth. So in my mind, I think that really drives a lot of it. I guess, to me, it's hard then to understand exactly what drives the urgency that Mike is talking about, other than every day that passes, there's obviously more casualties. But I think the thing that this administration is not recognizing is a, that they don't have a good faith partner on the other side. I mean, you hear, number one, you'll hear Rubio saying, everyone has to make concessions. I haven't seen anything out of Russian actions or behaviors that indicates that they are in any way prepared to make concessions. And I think the other thing that they're really failing to grasp is that a bad end to this war will only bring future human suffering in the future. An end to the war at any cost is not going to be a durable end to the war, and we will find ourselves back in this predicament in the future. I guess the thing that makes me so concerned is that from Trump's perspective, maybe that's not so bothersome. As long as that future hostility doesn't incur under his watch. If it doesn't happen in the next four years, then Trump has the luxury of saying, well, it didn't happen on my watch. So that's something that makes me quite worried that, yeah, they just want a deal. They want any deal. And as long as they can maintain the peace for the next four years and you don't see a return of Russian aggression against Ukraine under Trump's, you know, then he's willing to kind of wipe his hands of it and walk away and get what he wants.
- [14:48]
A
Just one quick follow up there, Andre, before we go to Michael. Is it also fair to assume that your perspective is that there is not a larger strategic doctrine within the Trump administration in which this negotiations fit?
- [15:00]
C
No.
- [15:01]
B
I mean, I think that's an excellent point. And to me, I think we're starting to see the contours of what a foreign policy under Trump might look like, which is one that looks to adhere to spheres of influence. And, you know, I think it's still early days and we don't know exactly how all of this will be resolved. But a lot of these early indications do sit suggest that part of the improving relations with Russia is part of this larger move to carve up the world into three spheres of influence where Russia would have its say over, certainly its former near abroad. But Europe more broadly, China maybe will have a say over the Indo Pacific and Asia more broadly, while the Trump administration seems particularly fixated on North America. You'll recall that in his inaugural address, he talked a lot about the moreau doctrine, expanding U.S. borders. I think that explains a lot of the hostility that we're seeing targeted against Canada, these threats against Greenland and Panama. So he does seem to be particularly fixated with expanding U.S. borders, increasing U.S. power and influence within the Western Hemisphere, and perhaps content then to let the other great powers in his understanding of the world, have a say and a right and to do as they please over their respective spheres.
- [16:27]
A
So, Michael, your turn. The initial question was what's driving the urgency on the part of the Trump administration? And then I'm curious to understand what are the factions in Russian society? So, for example, how strong is the faction that views America as an existential threat that must be thwarted at all costs versus another faction that's concerned about the growing dependency on China that may be more interested in regaining access to Western markets for the long term? So, like, that's my question. What's driving the urgency in the US and then what are the factions in Russian society that might be driving urgency or no urgency for Putin?
- [17:01]
C
So I think on the US Side, Andrea has a very good take on it. I'm trying to think what I could add to her good comments.
- [17:10]
A
So you also feel that there isn't a clear strategy within the administration.
- [17:15]
C
So I think this administration has a clear outcome. They want what they don't have as a process. And it's actually the reverse of the previous administration, which had a process but no actual outcome. And I see in the Trump administration that they've decided that they want to end the war. I don't think they're fully cognizant of the fact that getting a document with the worst ceasefire on it is not an end to the war. And the war is about more than just Russia, Ukraine, it's about Russia trying to relitigate the post Cold War settlement and the security architecture Europe. It's a much bigger argument that we are having. Right. And that how you end this war has implications for that. Secondarily though, they don't have a process. Part of that is because they haven't staffed up the administration at all yet. Many of the people you would need these jobs, needs positions, the sort of supporting cast that you need to actually have a robust process, simply aren't there. And a lot of the expertise isn't there either. And maybe the mid level people that have been nominated haven't been confirmed yet. So when you get that, you have a very chaotic process with a bunch of folks competing to shape policy and not much in the way of buffering or interagency or any of this. And what they also don't have, clearly, is a process which is you go into negotiations, you want to have decent alignment between yourself and Ukraine, between yourself and your allies, and then go into negotiations with Russia.
- [18:38]
A
And.
- [18:39]
C
And they're doing it a bit backwards. Right. And they're basically going to negotiation with Russia. Of course Russians are prepared. They've been thinking about this for three years. Right. And we're of course, then going to be a lot less prepared. And the primary stakeholders like Ukraine and others are folks you have to engage with and align with first, because otherwise you could make a deal with Russia. You show the deal to Ukraine, they say, you know what, we don't want this deal, we'd rather fight. Right. Or you make a deal where you assume that Europe will continue materially supporting Ukraine or economically supporting Ukraine, but you haven't actually gotten that. Agreed. That's a part of the deal that Ukraine gets as a result for the concessions they make. But you haven't actually negotiate that with the parties that need to bring that to the table. So I'm just sort of observing it as it's been going. Yeah. Part of it, I think, is also, as Andrea said, Trump has a particular view of this war. It's not an accurate view, but nonetheless it's the view he holds. And these are the things he said during the campaign, these are things he said after he got elected. I don't know why people are surprised that he's doing them. This is sort of almost a bit of a puzzling question that folks are surprised by the fact that he's literally trying to do some of the things he said he was going to do. I think more they're surprised by how he and the administration are approaching them because the initial statements by Mike Waltz by Kellogg seem to confer a more traditional establishment approach. And very quickly that seems to have gone by the wayside. Right. And now you basically understand that what you're observing is a principal agent problem in politics. And it's very clear that a lot of these folks, at least right now, are more agents. And that the policy comes from the principle. And there's fundamentally one principle.
- [20:25]
A
And I do want to get your answer to the second part of this question, but I wonder if there's A sort of coordination problem in this administration, because it's not clear for people further down the ladder. It's not necessarily clear what the president wants, because the way Trump communicates and negotiates is often to contradict himself. Is that sort of an operational problem in this administration?
- [20:44]
C
Yeah, and it was on the last one, where folks basically say things and then they look over their shoulder to see if what they're saying is the actual policy. I think that's why you get to see this veering back and forth from some of the senior appointed officials, because they say something and then they're not fully sure if what they said is the policy they actually represent, because they're sort of checking to see if that's what it is, and then they might end up going back on what they said. I saw that with Hexaf, for example, about a week ago, where first he laid out the clear nos of what we won't do that Andrea enumerated. And then the next day he came out and said, well, okay, maybe these aren't hard. No, maybe we would do some of these things. I mean, he didn't say it that way, but he seemed to be trying to walk back what he said the day before.
- [21:30]
B
But it's also remarkable, I have to say, to see people who previously held very different views on Russia and their understanding of the Ukraine war now advancing very different policies and statements. So, I mean, there I. This is a whole nother podcast topic, but it is remarkable to see that everyone, I mean, Trump's control over these individuals and their fear of saying anything that might be at odds with the president is very clear. And they have totally changed their views and opinions to conform with this president's view of the world. Because I believe their calculus is that if they advance any different views or present different ideas to the president, that they will no longer be in their positions. So that is another pretty remarkable piece of this to see leaders particular, and I think at the top of my list would be Secretary of State Rubio, who previously held very different views of Russia and is now not even willing to say that Russia is the aggressor against Ukraine. It's a pretty remarkable turn of events.
- [22:40]
A
So I'd love to explore that as well. Andrija. So, Mike, the second part of my question was my interest in trying to understand what are the factions that hold power in Russia and how are they exerting influence on Putin such that in a manner that would have an impact on the course of these negotiations, similar to how, for example, let's say political expediency may be. I'm just using this as an example on the Trump side could be driving a sense of urgency. What are the countervailing forces on the Russian side?
- [23:08]
C
It's a good question. So we have to keep in mind first, Russia is a personal authoritarian regime, right, Where Putin's been in charge for a very long time job. One of regimes of this type is to eliminate any alternatives to themselves. So folks who often think that Putin is somehow endangered or has to worry or stay up at night about what will happen, how he sells us, I don't think that's the case. In terms of factions, the threat, if there is one, is always from the right. It's from people that are further to the right position wise, rather from anybody to the left. Over the last several years, Putin has eliminated much of the what remained of the opposition, exiled the rest. And to be honest, Russian liberal opposition exile spends about half of the time fighting itself rather than the regime. And I don't think it was really that big of a threat to the regime for a long time anyway. So the threat is typically from the inside and it's usually from populist forces and from the prospect that somebody from within regime might defect to challenge it down the line. Right. But again, systems like that do very, very good job at eliminating alternatives. That's how Putin stayed in power so long. I think the challenge for him, at least from my point of view, isn't so much that there are any pressures to end the war in Russia. There aren't. He does not have to mobilize the population. The economy is a somewhat mobilized economy if you look at defense industrial production, but it's not really a wartime economy. If you look at Russian defense spending, nominally at 6.3% of GDP, in practice it might be eight and a half. This is a small fraction of what the Soviet Union spent on defense in peacetime. Okay. It's a management level of defense spending. They are mostly contracting personnel. They don't actually need mobilization again because they are getting enough recruits on a monthly basis. So it's a war that you only have to fight in if you chose to take money to fight in. And that's what people do. But they are not seen as kind of politically relevant casualties. And it's not like young people are being pulled from Russian society to go fight in this war the way a war would become unpopular if you were taking 18 year olds over the course of three years. Right. And sacrificing them for this war of choice. And Imperial ambition. Okay. So from my view, the pressures there are low. On the economic side, the pressures are growing because Russia is having a hard time managing or at least balancing between different parts of an economic equation, at least from macroeconomic point of view, that they can't square very well. They get muddled through for a while, but there the pressure is growing. What I don't know is how that is perceived by Putin and the Russian leadership. Right. There's what the objective facts are, and those deeply fascinating and very important for analysts to look at. The question is, what do decision makers make of them? Because that's the more important question, and it's not easy to get in their heads. I think that Putin probably thinks that he has time at least through 2025, and so he is not motivated necessarily to end the war now. And it's not urgent for him. It's much more urgent for us for artificial reasons. And for Ukraine now. For Ukraine, I do think that the need to make a deal ideally this year is real. Not so a bad deal, but nonetheless, if you look at who has more time right now, it probably favors Russia a bit. Lastly, the way I would pose the question, mitry right now, not so much what are the big pressures on Putin? There are some pressures. There are military constraints, their economic constraints. Sure. And so if Russia's not winning decisively by middle of this year, their negotiating position actually begins to grow a bit weaker, certainly relative to their maximum demands. Right. To me, the question is much more, what does he want? Because he does not want to end this war without a victory. It's quite clear. And here we should go back to how this war began. He could have made a deal back in winter 2021, 2022, if you recall the two ultimatums that he issued. Folks were willing to negotiate. He could have pocketed a deal. But he wanted the war, he wanted the invasion. He had maximalist ambitions, and he generally wanted the war. The negotiations were not real. They were there to stall time, to stall for time, and to deflect blame for the outbreak of the war. But the Russians weren't serious about it. Okay, we have to ask the same question about current negotiations. Are they real? Yes, I think they are. Is Putin going to agree to end the war in a ceasefire? Probably not. He still has fairly maximalist aims in Ukraine. So going to agree the ceasefire without major concessions, without something that looks like a victory for him? I also don't think that's the case because he doesn't want one and he doesn't need one. Right now. And it's more about the fact of what he wants and less about the fact of what are kind of the internal pressures even. Even if he has some. Andrea might disagree, but I'd be interested in hearing her take too.
- [27:51]
A
I want to give her a chance. Just quick two questions. One is just a fact check. Do we know, do we have a confident number for the number of people that have been killed in the last three years in Russia as a result of their military actions in Ukraine and people injured, injury count on the Russian.
- [28:07]
C
Side, There's various estimates that are out in public. Usually there are official estimates from either governments that just give you the top line. And then there's pretty good counts by BBC Media Zone or what have you. It depends what you're looking for in casualties. I will be frank. Most people don't understand how casualties are counted or different casualty categories. So they're usually asking about a set of numbers where they themselves don't know what the question is that they're asking. And the way I would put it, what matters is killed in action, missing in action, and those who are seriously injured that you would group together as unrecoverable casualties. Okay. If you include dual casualties, that is everyone wounded, you will get a very expanded number that's not really meaningful because most people return to combat duty or a job afterwards. So you could count that as casualties, but it's not very useful as a figure. So the big number that's out there on total casualties, maybe 7, 800,000. That's not a useful figure to me. I think killed in action, I tend to be very conservative. So back on the kind of back of the knee calculations using open source numbers that BBC has done, basically looking at the confirmed, the deaths on the Russian side, maybe somewhere between 180,000, 220,000 killed in action and maybe that number a bit greater than that of seriously injured. So you're probably looking at 500,000 as of fair estimate.
- [29:47]
A
So I'm not a military analyst or a military historian. That seems like a huge number. And not only does it seem like a huge number, but it seems like a number that would cause popular discontent. So what explains the fact that so many people have either been killed in action or significantly injured such that they couldn't return to the battlefield, and it hasn't resulted in a big backlash against Putin. Putin, and it hasn't created an urgency to end the war. That's what I'm getting at. Right. Like it seems objectively speaking that the costs to the Russian society and to the Russian economy have been much greater than what the cost to America.
- [30:23]
B
It's an interesting question because I think one of the key lines of analysis about Putin and Putin's Russia is that he is not tolerant of casualties. You know, this when people were debating whether or not Putin was going to actually invade Ukraine, one of the things that you would hear is that, oh, he has an aversion to casualties. He would be worried about the domestic instability that it would create. And people would kind of look back to Afghanistan as kind of the key rationale when that became a major factor. And historically, you had civil society groups inside Russia. What is the group, Mike? Mothers of Soldiers. But that was a major kind of mobilizing organization, deep networks inside Russia. So it is, I think one of the things that analysts on Russia got very wrong is that Putin turned out to be much more tolerant and resilient to casualties. And one good explanation for that, there's actually some good political science research that talks about this dynamic. So of all authoritarian regimes, it's the personalist regimes, as Mike talked about Putin being a highly personalized leader, that are the most resilient to casualties, because by and large, these leaders can ensure that casualties are taking place in the least politically important groups in society. And that's been the story of Russia. It's been soldiers from the regions of lower socioeconomic groups, not ethnically Russian. So he's ensured that the politically most important Russians have not really been affected as directly by the war. And so he could kind of pass the costs off to these groups that wouldn't be the most prone to organize, mobilize, and be disaffected by the casualties. The other thing that Putin has done is to pay very large sums of money. The cost. And Mike can give the latest figures of how much soldiers are being paid to enter into the war, how much soldiers receive now, what families receive when you have sons that are killed in action. It has been a big wealth transfer mechanism where kind of the most kind of disadvantaged segments of Russian society have now seen very significant economic payoffs and benefits because of their service and oftentimes loss in the war. And I think, as Mike said early on in the war, it's always been a repressive regime, but they significantly ramped up repression against civil society organizations. Memorial, these mothers organizations, they've really been shut down and made it much harder for society to mobilize. So all of those factors, I think, have led to the resiliency and kind of the immunity that Putin has demonstrated to these high Casualty numbers.
- [33:18]
C
Let me jump in here as well and give a couple of answers based on the numbers. So first, when we look at the group composition, we find that Russia defrayed a lot of its casualties, first onto convicts, which are a notable percentage of the total losses, particularly in some of the bloody or battles in 2023. But assault groups comprised of term Z convict units are a notable percentage. Right. So these people signed up and volunteered from the presence. Second, starting from the original invasion, a significant percentage of the Russian invasion force and of the losses in 2022 were comprised of LDNR, the occupied regions in Ukraine's People's Republic. These are people that also took significant casualties, particularly in the first year of the war. In the last year and a half, the casualties have grown amongst the contract set of Russians who have signed contracts. Right. But if you look at probably the overall pool of casualties, you'll see that really you have a couple of big categories. You have the politically relevant casualties amongst the initial invasion force, the young soldiers and officers who were killed early on in the war. But then you quickly begin to see the casualties offset by LDNR and then by convicts. Then you see again, politically sensitive casualties following the partial mobilization, where they've got about 300,000, 310,000 men. But then those quickly got replaced by contract personnel and by convicts used in 23 through 24. Okay. And those individuals are those who signed up to fight for money and actually quite a few families, as you can tell from let's say a lot of open source information and not open source intercepts, encourages people to fight and even encourage them to sign up for sold groups where they carry the risk of being killed. But the payout's even much higher. Right. On top of the bonuses, money works and so these people sign up and they take these bonuses. Lastly, so this kind of casualty composition to explain, to kind of give a bit of greater fidelity, I think, to what Andrea was saying, that yes, these are not politically significant groups and they're not seen as politically significant, or at least they're not generating pressure from the public for Putin to end the war. Because the average age group of Russian casualties as we can tell, is around 35, 36. This is not a young person's war. And on the Ukrainian side, it's higher, it's in your 40s, right. So if it was 18 year olds and 19 year olds, yeah, you probably see a lot more mothers out there on the streets. Right. But when your average age is mid to late 30s, then it's a bit of a Different story. Okay, and second part, this can be a bit cold blooded of me to say, but look, on the one hand, these casualties for Russia are greater than all the casualties that Russia has taken in different wars since World War II. Right. If we look at different interventions, whether it's 1956, whether it's late 60s, whether it's Afghanistan or the post Soviet kind of wars of succession, as I like to call them. That's true. However, on the other hand, these casualties are basically one battle in World War II or World War I. And realistically for a three year large scale conventional war between a country with a population of 145 million people and a country that started with a population around 37 million people, these casualties are quite significant. But they're not that great. They're not as great as they sound. What's notable is that this is a war between two postmodern societies, right? So on the one hand, we can't overly extrapolate from casualties in World War II because the nature of societies was different back then. They were much more casualty tolerant. The birth rates were very different. You could lose a lot more people when the average agrarian household had six, seven kids. This also what gets into the manpower motivation issue. It's very different when you're dealing with two countries that actually have terrible demographic structures. Russia's is bad and Ukraine's is worse. And neither country actually has the family structure to replace the kind of losses, particularly amongst young people, that countries would have in the mid 20th century. It's important to remember these differences well in context. So the casualties are significant. They're not as much among young people. They are notable because they are taking place within two postmodern societies that don't have a high birth rate and have terrible demographics. But on the other hand, they're also not that great when you look at the overall population size, the scale of the war and the duration of the war, where you would have had this been potentially one campaign in World War I would have yielded this total casualty set. Right? So I debate this with myself. I'm just giving you a way to think about it. I'm sorry it's not a very easy and simple and short answer.
- [38:09]
A
No, it's great actually. I'm not as immersed in this in foreign policy and IR as you guys, but I actually haven't heard this really debated anywhere, at least readily accessible for me. So it was actually useful. So let's take a step back here. We've been talking entirely about the war in Ukraine. The effect that it's had on Russia and Ukraine. And to some degree, we've talked about US US Constraints in the peace talks. Let's zoom out a little bit here, because I want to play devil's advocate at some point, but I want to start with the question of why these talks are being held in Riyadh. So here are the things that I know, right? The three largest oil producers in the world, U.S. russia, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, also a critical player in the Middle east and a critical player for any kind of peace plan between Israel and Gaza, its occupation of Gaza and the larger proxy war with Iran. And also Saudi Arabia has good relations with both the US And China. What explains the choice of venue here?
- [39:06]
B
I can take a first stab. I mean, if you look over the last several decades of US Russia talks, historically, you would pick neutral cities in Europe thinking Helsinki or Stockholm, Budapest.
- [39:19]
A
Budapest seems like an obvious choice here. No, because it's got the right wing vibes.
- [39:23]
B
But my point was that at least with Helsinki and Stockholm is, well, surprise, they're now NATO members. So the number of cities where the United States and Russia have historically met that set is shrinking rapidly. Budapest, I don't know. I mean, Orban has not played any meaningful role in any of this conflict. Earlier on, as Mike talked about, Turkey has played an important role. So I actually don't know any of the backstory about why they didn't end up back in Istanbul. I'm not certain. So I don't know. It would be fascinating to know more, and maybe Mike does, but other than to point out the things that you just said. And obviously both Putin and Trump have historically good relations with the Saudis. But the main criteria has always been that it would have to be someplace neutral. And there's kind of a relatively short list of countries now that I think that meet that criteria.
- [40:19]
C
Yeah, makes sense. It's the intersection of the Venn diagram between countries with which both US And Russia are relatively friendly relations, countries that would be seen as neutral, and most importantly, countries that would be willing to do it. So when you look at those three circles, you don't get a lot. You get a lot in the middle. So that part makes sense to him.
- [40:39]
A
So this goes back to the question of what is the strategy? Is there a strategy? What is that strategy, if there is one? And I do wonder. It's easy to be critical, and I have been of Trump and the way that he sort of gesticulates. But I wonder if I were to take a devil's advocate point of view, if it's maybe possible that he's working on a larger strategic deal here. And is there any daylight? So let's just examine it from the Russian perspective. Obviously, this is not an ideal situation that they're in. They've become very dependent on their relationship to China. Is there any sort of daylight there or opportunity to cleave the Russians away from the Chinese, if not sort of bring them back into the Western fold anytime soon, at the very least, decrease their dependencies on China in such a way that that actually advances US Strategic aims in the Pacific.
- [41:27]
B
So this is the question that is debated over and over again. And I'm highly skeptical that the reason for this outreach to the Russians has anything to do with trying to peel the Russians away from the Chinese. And I think we talked about some of Trump's motivations about ending the war, about the Nobel Peace Prize, but I also think that there's just the plain fact that he has an affinity for strongmen and Putin has been at the top of that buddy wish list for a very long time. I think he is highly jealous of the power and influence that Putin wields within Russia's political system and he aspires to something similar for himself. So I think part of the background of this is that there's this natural affinity. And I have to say I can't play devil's advocate on this one. I think it is so egregious the way that he has shifted US Policy towards Russia on a dime and kind of just thinking. Just yesterday in the Union Security Council, to commemorate the three year mark of the Ukraine war, Ukraine and the Europeans introduced a resolution to condemn Russia's invasion and call on Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine. What did the United States do? We voted against the resolution, voting with Russia and a group of pariahs, basically. So I think North Korea, Syria, Central African Republic, Eritrea. So that tells you, in my view, how far the United States has come and how detrimental this is to our standing and our influence in the rest of the world. And so in terms of like, is there a larger deal at play? I mean, I think if there is one, I go back to my previous point about spheres of influence and that there is this belief that might makes right that the strong should be able to do as they please. I think that's what Trump wants for his role in the Western Hemisphere. If Canada should be a 51st state, great. We should have access to Greenland. Sure, why not? If we are the most powerful state, we should be able to do what we want. If it's the Gulf of Mexico? Nope, it's the Gulf of America. So I think that's his vision of the world, is that the strong should do as they please. And so by that logic, I think he looks at Putin's invasion of Ukraine as kind of fitting and being consistent with his view of the way that he views the world. So I guess I am highly skeptical that this was some grand plan of trying to peel the Russians away. I know people are talking about that and debating it, but I'm highly skeptical that there was even that much kind of logic or strategy at play.
- [44:05]
A
Let me just follow up on that to you, Andrija, and then we can go to Michael. Again, playing the devil's advocate here. It does seem to me, though, that as much as Trump may have an affinity for other strong men, he also wants to be the strongest. He wants to be the winner. And it's a curious decision to vote against the resolution to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, though it perhaps makes more sense if you think that that's a public signaling. Something's being signaled there for public consumption. But then in private, other conversations are happening, and that, just to be clear, you just don't buy that. You don't think that's really possible.
- [44:40]
B
I mean, the explanation we heard from Rubio was that we didn't wanna antagonize the Russians. I mean, come on.
- [44:46]
A
Well, that's the public. Yeah, I don't know.
- [44:47]
B
But, I mean, I don't know how to look at that any other way than to say that Trump wants a deal so badly. The desperation and the desire to kind of get along with the Russians, to try to work out a deal at any cost. I mean, it is just selling out to the Russians. And I think the thing that is so I don't understand their change in position. We used to talk about strength, peace with three things, and that seems to be out the window. And instead, it's concession after concession, this disgraceful voting at the UN Security Council. I don't understand the logic. I don't understand how they think that they're going to strike any durable peace with the Russians when we are basically kowtowing and conceding major issues before we even enter into negotiations. And if we do end up with some sort of agreement in which Russia has pocketed so many concessions. I mean, I think to get back to the Foreign affairs piece, the point that Mike and I make in the piece is that Russia will pocket those concessions and strengthen its position for future aggression against Ukraine and the wider West.
- [46:05]
A
Yeah, no, I mean, it is curious. It's curious why Trump attacked Ukraine and Zelensky ahead of these talks. One theory I had, but I think Mike already threw cold water on it, is that this might be some way for Trump to create space to maneuver politically for Putin. If, you know, sort of more hawkish factions on his right were putting pressure on him.
- [46:25]
B
I think you're ascribing way too much strategy and intent. I mean, really, what I think, and you've heard this from senior US Officials, is that he didn't like the way that Zelensky corrected him and has taken a harder stance. I mean, I think it's that petty and personal, and I think he felt the need to be the strong, decisive leader and try to put Zelensky back in his box, and that's the way that he did it. I don't think there was any grand play other than he didn't like it, he didn't want to be talked to that way, and so he went on, on the attack, and then he has to double down and he gets stuck in these positions, and it gets hard. If you're a strong, decisive leader, it gets hard to change course once you've gone down that path.
- [47:10]
A
Mike, do you have anything you wanted to add to that? And then I'll move us to the second hour.
- [47:13]
C
Yeah, I would say that so far, I think Trump's approach is not geo strategic and not really thinking in that way. It's much more transactional and economically oriented. And what I see is Russia's effectively seized on that, and it's bidding, proposing economic deals, resource trades. A lot of these are very unrealistic, as companies are not going to return to Russia and not going to rush to return to Russia.
- [47:37]
B
Mike, remind listeners to who was president in Riyadh. So it was obviously the head of the Russian Direct Investment bank, which is like a clear signal of the way that the Russians are approaching the administration.
- [47:49]
C
Yeah, they're pitching them business deals. Right. And they're basically trying to, in their mind, outbid Ukraine by offering greater opportunities. And they're also trying to position US Sanctions against Russia as a big opportunity cost for us, which it isn't. Even before those sanctions, if I showed you the net volume of trade between US and Russia was tiny, although it had some critical material categories in there, like titanium whatnot, things that are important to certain industries. But nonetheless, it was incredibly small. It was Europe that had the principal balance of trade with Russia, not us. Right. And there isn't, like, a rush to the door of companies just trying to get back into Russia. I'm sorry, you're not going to see this. So to me, Trump's approach is much more looking for wins right now and things that can be declared as wins rather than big picture strategy. I also think your question about Russia and China just isn't the way they are thinking about it and it wouldn't work anyway.
- [48:46]
A
When you're saying they're thinking about it, who is they?
- [48:49]
C
Russia, Trump administration, that is. I don't think they're trying to pull Russia away from China. I don't think that would work. And I've been very clear publicly on it that I think this is magical thinking. It's a misreading of Cold War history and I'm happy to get into why. But it's the sort of thing that briefs well and policy wonks can talk about and raise on articles, but doesn't work in practice. From my point of view, it's just not feasible. But I don't think they're trying to do that either. I think that from what I've seen is that Trump does have some guiding views and preferences. And the way I might summarize them, and I'm no expert on the Trump administration, but it's great power politics over alliance block politics. It's trying to end wars that he thinks are bad for everyone economically. Even if he doesn't have the correct perception of who started the war, why the war took place or what the consequences are for ending it. He's sort of prioritizing ending it in some way, shape or form, and it's pursuing more naked self interest that has interests over values over traditional allies. Maybe if we are trying to frame it more intellectually, the kind of old Lord Palmerston quote of there are no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, there's only permanent interests. Right. But I do find a lot of conversation we end up having on Trump administration is usually folks observing that someone's put a hole in the wall and they're trying to draw a target around it after the fact. And it's like post hoc strategiary and rationalization of what's taken place. So I'm always wary of that approach. And last point on just a little old tidbit on my previous answers regarding casualties, I hope everybody heard that discussion, understood that that's a dart being thrown at a wall by me and not stats that you should go to the bank with. So caveat empter. Please don't, please don't take that as Mike Hoffman gave a hard estimate on what the Russian casualties are. There's a pretty big cone of uncertainty on that.
- [50:45]
A
Yeah, thanks for that, Mike. So, guys, I'm going to move to the second hour. Here are the three things I'd like to hit on during that time. One is nuclear doctrines, Russian nuclear doctrine, US Nuclear doctrine. Also, we know China has been investing in building up their nuclear weapons arsenal. I'm also curious, even though it's clear that neither of you really think there's any kind of larger strategic approach going on here, of any note, I still wonder whether we're going to see one come out of not necessarily these talks, but in the next four years. And so it's another way of asking, are we witnessing both a new approach to foreign policy coming out of Washington that's going to endure across administrations? What is that going to be? And what sort of world order will that inform? Is this going to be something more like realpolitik in the 21st century? And also I want to have a conversation about European security and the future of Europe, because it seems like I think the one thing we can all agree on is that Europe has a lot of problems. For anyone new to the program, Hidden Forces is listener supported. We don't accept advertisers or commercial sponsors. The entire show is funded from top to bottom by listeners like you. If you want access to the second hour of today's conversation with Mike and Andrea, head over to HiddenForces IO, subscribe and sign up to one of our three content tiers. All subscribers gain access to our Premium feed, which you can use to listen to the rest of today's conversation on your mobile device using your favorite podcast app, just like you're listening to this episode right now. Guys, stick around. We'll go with the rest of our conversation onto the Premium feed. If you want to listen in on the rest of today's conversation, head over to HiddenForces IO, subscribe and join our Premium feed. If you want to join in on the conversation and become a member of the Hidden Forces genius community, you can also do that through our subscriber page. Today's episode was produced by me and edited by Stylianos Nicolaou. For more episodes, you can check out our website at hiddenforces IO, you can follow me on Twitter cofinas and you can email me at infoiddenforces. As always, thanks for listening. We'll see you next time.