Churchill’s The Second World War, Part Twenty-Nine

Summary

---

Hillsdale Dialogues

Churchill’s The Second World War, Part Twenty-Nine

Host: Hugh Hewitt
Guest: Dr. Larry P. Arnn, President of Hillsdale College
Date: July 27, 2026

---

Overview

This episode of the Hillsdale Dialogues delves deep into Winston Churchill’s The Second World War: Their Finest Hour (Volume II), focusing on the collapse of France, the crisis over the French fleet, Anglo-American correspondence, and the rhetorical and statesmanlike qualities Churchill exhibited during this gravest period. Dr. Larry Arnn and Hugh Hewitt explore Churchill’s leadership, his reflections on the necessity of strength, the dangers of unchecked military authority, and the lasting lessons for both wartime and contemporary foreign policy.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. National Will, Exhaustion, and The Necessity of Limited War

• Comparisons Across Eras:
  Hugh Hewitt begins by drawing parallels between the post-WWI exhaustion of France and similar cycles in American history after long wars, questioning whether Trump’s more limited use of force against Iran is a necessary corrective.

  • “When Reagan arrived after Vietnam and after Carter, he had to start again to rebuild sort of American fighting will...” (00:29)

• Arnn on Limited and Necessary War:
  Dr. Arnn underscores Churchill’s prudence and reluctance about war:

  • “You don’t do it for a demonstration. You do it because you have to. And you’ll be less likely to have to if you’re ready to do it. So that’s the old wisdom, right?” (01:57)

2. Civilian vs. Military Leadership Decisions

• Churchill’s Skepticism of Generals as Statesmen:
  Discussion centers on French General Weygand’s overreach and Churchill’s unease with military men making political decisions.

  • Hewitt: “I read in Churchill great skepticism of generals stepping into the role of statesman.” (04:25)
  • Arnn: “Nobody gave General Weygand responsibility for the future and being of France, but he effectively exercised that authority for a time, and that it was just wrong.” (04:25)
  • Churchill admired Clemenceau, the civilian leader who rose in crisis, contrasting that with contemporary French leadership’s lack of will. (06:29)

• Leadership and Will:
  Churchill notes that France would have needed a Cromwell, a Clemenceau, a Stalin or a Hitler—not out of moral admiration, but as exemplars of indomitable will in crisis.

  • “Capacity married to Will, married to a country that's got the ability to rise to the occasion.” (06:29)

3. The French Fleet Crisis: Diplomacy and Hard Decisions

• Churchill’s Dilemma with Admiral Darlan and the French Fleet:
  As France collapses, Churchill is desperate to ensure the French navy does not fall into German hands.

  • “He begins to lobby Darlan, who’s the chief of naval operations... He says to Darlan, we got to have the French fleet. We got to have the French fleet.” (08:31)

• The Roosevelt Correspondence:
  Churchill’s crucial letter to FDR (June 15) seeks to appeal to American interests:

  • Arnn: “He appeals to Roosevelt entirely on the basis of the interest of the United States of America.” (09:15)
  • Churchill worries about being able to command the British fleet if Britain itself is invaded or collapses. (09:36)

4. Roosevelt’s Position and Sea Power

• FDR’s Reluctance and Realpolitik:
  The hosts discuss FDR’s careful positioning prior to US entry into WWII and his reluctance to publish encouraging cables to France.

  • Arnn: “It’s a good thing that we were reluctant to go into that war. We were reluctant to go into the First World War too. And we went into both of them upon being attacked.” (16:04)

• Sea Power’s Strategic Importance:
  Drawing on Mahan’s theories and recent events in naval technology, Arnn ties the historic importance of control of the seas to both WWII and modern threats from China and in the Strait of Hormuz. (18:09, 21:39)

5. Technological Change and Lessons from Ukraine

• Discussion of drones, unmanned vessels, and technological disruption in modern warfare, comparing developments in Ukraine to WWII innovations.
  • Hewitt: “Ukraine’s a surprise... The ability that they demonstrated with drones is a remarkable surprise. I mean, world change.” (20:44)
  • Arnn: “Having a superior military at the cheapest possible cost is urgently needed to any republic like ours.” (20:44)

6. Statesmanship and the “Finest Hour” Speech

• Churchill’s Leadership in Crisis:
  Churchill’s June 18 “Finest Hour” speech rallied a battered Britain.
  • Arnn: “...the peroration of the speech at the end is if the British Empire should last a thousand years, men will still say this was their finest hour. Remember that. That's kind of a doleful prediction, too. This is the peak. What comes later is lower.” (24:05)
  • His creed: “Nations that die fighting rise up again. Those that surrender tamely are gone forever, he was prepared to live by that creed himself.” (24:05)

7. Destruction of the French Fleet at Oran

• Harsh Necessity:
  Churchill orders the attack on the French fleet to prevent its capture—a wrenching but essential act to secure British survival.
  • “Churchill was very reluctant to do that... And now he’s going to sink their ships... Churchill regretted it deeply. On the other hand, there’s a lot of evidence that it had a big effect on Franklin Roosevelt.” (28:20)
  • Hewitt: “Here was this Briton, which so many had counted down and out... striking ruthlessly at her dearest friends of yesterday and securing... command of the sea. It was made plain that the British War Cabinet feared nothing and would stop at nothing.” (30:49)
  • Arnn: “You’re going to have to act like a winner if you’re going to win.” (31:35)

8. Churchill’s Rhetorical and Prophetic Gifts

• Set-Piece Rhetoric vs. Off-the-Cuff Words:
  The hosts highlight Churchill’s mastery of rhetoric—a quality they argue is rare in today’s politics.

  • Hewitt praises: “The gift of rhetorical flourish, boy, it’s rare. FDR had it, Reagan had it. I think President Trump sometimes has it in conversation, but not in set piece rhetoric.” (33:26)

• Memorable Churchill Phrases:
  Arnn shares:

  • “I really think that you, Lloyd and Amory ought to be able to lift our affairs in the east and Middle east out of the catalepsy by which they are smitten. Who writes that?” (33:26)
  • And the famous Canadian Parliament quote:
    “We have not traveled all this way across the oceans, across the mountains, across the prairies, because we are made of sugar candy.” (31:35)

• Churchill’s Prophecy:
  Already foreseeing Hitler’s eventual turn against Russia, Arnn observes, “He’s forecasting the future in their darkest hour. Might be their finest hour. But he's saying, you know what, if he doesn't get this island, he's going to attack Stalin. And he's exactly right.” (34:00)

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Will and Responsibility:
  Arnn: “Strength is urgently necessary. But Churchill was fond of saying kindness is better than strength. But you actually need some strength in order to be kind.” (07:08)

• On the Problem of Military Commanders as Political Leaders:
  Arnn: “Nobody gave General Weygand responsibility for the future and being of France, but he effectively exercised that authority for a time, and that it was just wrong.” (04:25)

• On Nations that Fight vs. Surrender:
  Arnn: “Nations that die fighting rise up again. Those that surrender tamely are gone forever, he was prepared to live by that creed himself.” (24:05)

• On Difficult Choices in War:
  Arnn: “You’re going to have to act like a winner if you’re going to win.” (31:35)

• On Churchill’s Rhetorical Mastery:
  Arnn (quoting Churchill): “I really think that you, Lloyd and Amory ought to be able to lift our affairs in the east and Middle east out of the catalepsy by which they are smitten.” (33:26)

---

Important Segments & Timestamps

• [00:29] Contemporary Parallels: Rebuilding National Resolve Post-War
• [01:57] Limits and Necessities of War—Churchillian Restraint
• [04:25] Civil-Military Relations During Crisis in France
• [08:31] The French Fleet Crisis & Churchill’s Appeals to Roosevelt
• [16:04] Roosevelt’s Hesitance and American Entry into WWII
• [18:09] Sea Power: Mahan, Modern Navies, and American Strategy
• [20:44] Modern Technological Shifts: Drones and Lessons from Ukraine
• [24:05] Churchill’s “Finest Hour” Speech and its Impact
• [28:20] The Oran Episode: Sinking the French Fleet
• [30:49] Strategic Impact and Roosevelt’s Calculus
• [33:26] Churchill’s Unique Gift of Rhetoric
• [34:00] Churchill's Prophecy: Forecasting Hitler’s Eastward Move

---

Tone & Style

The exchange is engaging yet scholarly, blending historical analysis with contemporary application, and consistently emphasizing Churchill’s combination of rhetorical brilliance, tenacity, and principled restraint. Dr. Arnn speaks with admiration for Churchill’s clarity and statesmanship, connecting lessons from history to issues in the present.

---

Summary Takeaway

This episode compellingly illuminates how Churchill’s actions during the darkest days of 1940—his moral resolve, suspicion of unchecked military authority, painful strategic decisions, and stirring rhetoric—not only steered Britain through survival but also modeled the kinds of statesmanship and prudence relevant for all democratic nations in moments of existential threat. The episode closes with an appreciation of Churchill’s prophetic insight and rhetorical power, promising to further examine these themes in the next discussion.

Transcript

[A]

Every week, Hillsdale College President Larry Arne joins Hugh Hewitt to discuss great books, great men and great ideas. This is Hillsdale Dialogues, part of the Hillsdale College Podcast Network. More episodes at podcast Hillsdale. Edu or wherever you find your audio.

[B]

Good Morning Glory and Evening Grace America. That music means it's the last broadcast hour of the week. That means it's time for the Hillsdale dialogue. Dr. Arne and I are done celebrating the semi sesquintennial and we're back into Churchill's World War II memoirs, volume two, their finest hour. Last week, Dr. Arn, you were talking about Churchill's comment to the French that those nations that die fighting rise again. And you were also talking about how the French collapse may have been in part linked to the exhaustion of the French Republic after World War I. I am curious. It occurred to me when we were talking, I want to ask you about it this week. When Reagan arrived after Vietnam and after Carter, he had to start again to rebuild sort of American fighting will. And he did it with Grenada, and then George H.W. bush did it with Panama, and then George W. Bush. We went to war for 20 years and we're exhausted again and we got out ignobly from Afghanistan in 2021 in a haphazard, disastrous, and deeply humiliating retreat. What do you make of the idea that Donald Trump is rebuilding the American capacity for force with this battle with Iran in a way that is necessary, limited, precise and deadly when it's unleashed?

[C]

Yeah, that's it. Limited. We, we fell into a period unique in American history when we were the only superpower, and so we thought we could do anything. And you mix that up with the principles of liberal imperialism, which include statements like we can't be safe until the world is free. My favorite is Colin Powell saying, when we invaded Iraq the first time after they had attacked a neighbor and the neighbor appealed to us for help, it means we can do that if we want to. But he said if you break it, you own it, and that means that we have to fix it, right? Well, Trump hasn't said anything like that. What he said is we're going to stop them threatening us and our neighbors, and we're going to do what it takes to do that. And that means that it's up to us how far we go. So that's limited. Right. Because you can't study Churchill carefully without understanding his constant reluctance about, and fear of, about war. He, you know, you don't, you, you don't do it for a demonstration. You do it because you have to. And you'll be less likely to have to if you're ready to do it. So that's the old wisdom, right.

[B]

And I think it's interesting that you bring up, and that's not in our notes or our outline, General Powell, who of course became Secretary of State Powell, but he was a general. He's a military man. Because Churchill has a. Not a jaundiced eye, but a skeptical eye about generals making policy. And it comes up in this chapter, chapter 10. General Weygand, who is their boss of bosses, their number one general. He decides. He decides. The general decides that it's time to quit. And Churchill says he used his supreme political position far beyond the limits which his professional responsibilities, great as they were, were justified or required. He asserted the right of a soldier to dominate the duly constituted government of the republic, as did Marshal Patan. And I sense in Churchill a. I don't sense. I read in Churchill great skepticism of generals stepping into the role of statesman. Am I right about that?

[C]

Well, if they get elected, right. They have to become statesmen. Right. But the idea that they get to decide, remember, that's a thing in human affairs, in every human organization. People have a job, and they think because of that job they can control more than that job. And they try to control things for which they don't have responsibility. Nobody gave general weigh on responsibility for the future and being of France, but he effectively exercised that authority for a time, and that it was just wrong. And what Churchill thought was, you know, Churchill is a follower of the principles of the Declaration of Independence. And what do they say? The purpose of a government is to defend the rights of its people, and it gets its authority from their consent. Well, nobody consented to Vagon making those decisions. He just happened to have supposed at least control of the military. And so there was nobody. I mean, I. I mentioned last week that Victor Hansen writes about the amazing effectiveness of Britain in the Second World War, how much they got out of themselves. Right. And they mortgaged their future to do it. And Churchill didn't want to do that and always called it the unnecessary war. But now you're in the dang war, and somebody's got to command all the efforts of the nation toward victory. That's what he did. Well, there wasn't anybody at the top ready to do that. Churchill meets the son of Clemenceau from the First World War. The Tiger, they called him. And at the end of the First World War, Clemenceau took power, and he did do that. And Churchill marveled at that and admired that very much and did that himself later. Well, this son of Clemenceau Churchill records in these chapters that we're reading, he had the spirit of his daddy in him. And Churchill thought that was missing at the top.

[B]

Well, he said Renault was not up to it. And this is a quote. France would have needed a Cromwell, a Clemenceau, a Stalin or a Hitler. And that's a silent reflection on himself. Capacity. Married to Will, married to a country that's got the ability to rise to the occasion. As Victor Davis Hanson noted, he's not complimenting Stalin or Hitler's moral character. He is recognized. And I'm sure he's not a big fan of Cromwell, but is recognizing. What Machiavelli put down as the essential ingredient?

[C]

Sure, there's that charge against Donald Trump, the old one about the Playboy interview where he congratulates the Chinese on their strength. Well, he also says in that same interview that they're horrible, their policies are horrible. But, and see, here's what I think is the distinction. Strength is urgently necessary. But Churchill was fond of saying kindness is better than strength. But you actually need some strength in order to be kind. And so, you know, when you take a responsibility like that, if Hillsdale College fails, it'll be my fault. Right. And that's why, that's where I get my authority from the mission of the college, from its well being and from the people I work with. And I have to use it only for that. And it means that while I have the job, I'm stuck. Something goes wrong, it's my fault. Well, if you take that attitude, then you might be capable of command in an urgent situation. I've never been in a situation as urgent as the ones we're describing here. But all of us face in life urgent situations and we have to discharge our responsibilities. That's what our authority, whatever it is we have is for.

[B]

That's so. Yeah, that's well put. Let's talk now about the French fleet. Because it's a little known aspect of the war, but Churchill had spotted it not long after he became Prime Minister, after Chamberlain stepped down, he begins to lobby Darlan, who's the chief of naval operations. He's in command of the French fleet, but he's an admiral, he's not a minister. And he says to Darlan, we got to have the French fleet. We got to have the French fleet. And Darlan says to him, of course you'll get the French fleet. Well, France is collapsing and Churchill sends out his IOU for the fleet and Darlan doesn't deliver. He said I had become the Minister of Maritime. What does that mean? What was he trying to do there?

[C]

Bargain. So first of all, a very pregnant letter in these chapters is the letter that Churchill wrote to Roosevelt on the 15th of June.

[B]

Oh, yes.

[C]

And I, I invite people to read that and see that Churchill appeals to Roosevelt entirely on the basis of the interest of the United States of America.

[B]

Yep.

[C]

He says if their fleet goes bad, that's a grievous fact. But what will be become of our fleet? I would never surrender our fleet to the Germans. But will I be in charge if there's an invasion? You have to think about that because the British fleet was bigger than the American fleet at the time. And if you put it together with the French fleet and he points this

[B]

out and the German fleet and the German.

[C]

Way bigger. That's right.

[B]

And so don't go anywhere, America. We'll come back and talk about fdr, Churchill, the considerations that went into everything. The Hillsdale dialogue is underway. All things Hillsdale at Hillsdale, Eduardo. And everything. All the hillsdale [e-mail]

[D]

Every American knows that we won our independence. Far fewer understand what it actually took. Revolutionary America, a feature length documentary from Hillsdale College, tells that story the way it deserves to be told. For 150 years, the American colonists built something the world had never seen. A people who governed themselves. When Britain tried to take that away, the founders risked everything. Their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor. Against all odds, they won. Revolutionary America is a feature length documentary produced by Hillsdale College, featuring expert scholars, historical documents, stunning cinematography, it's verified hot on Rotten Tomatoes and it's free. Hillsdale College put revolutionary America on YouTube because the truth about the greatest political achievement in human history belongs to every American. No subscription, no cost, just the story of how we became free. Find Revolutionary America now on Hillsdale College's YouTube channel.

[A]

Hey there, it's Scott Bertram, host of the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. On this week's program, we talk with Donald Hodel, former Secretary of Energy and former Secretary of the Interior in the Reagan administration. We discuss the leadership lessons he learned working for President President Reagan and his new memoir, called to Serve. And Stephanie Laubach from the physics department here at Hillsdale discusses her research into nanotechnology and magnetism. All that this week on the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. Find it at podcast hillsdale. Edu or wherever you get your audio.

[B]

I'm Hugh Hewitt with Dr. Larry Arn, President of Hillsdale College talking about Winston Churchill's World War II memoir. We're talking about the fleet and the very delicate dance of memos between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt at the time.

[C]

Dr. Arne, another very delicate thing, because, you know, first of all, these memos are really great to read because you got to remember Churchill's writing these things when he's traveling four times to France during the collapse of France and after he's been Prime Minister since the 10th of May, and all this is over by the middle of June, and he writes these memos to the French, to Roosevelt. The most important memos he wrote were to those two parties. And the French say to him, we want you to release us from our obligation not to make a separate peace. That's hard. We're collapsing. We're suffering there. We're disorganized. They are going to take over France and subject the whole of the France to the Gestapo. And we don't want that. We can make a deal to prevent that. Release us. Think of the strength of that appeal. And what does Churchill reply once? He gives a reply twice. He gives it once, and he says, we are never going to waste any time recriminating against France, whatever it does. But this is not the last battle that will happen in England, and you should exhaust your resources all the way down to North Africa if you must, to carry on the battle. Then they retire, and Churchill. And who's with them? Beaverbrook, his good friend, who gives him a huge Churchill compliment in this chapter, always a good man under pressure, and Lord Halifax, a reformed appeaser, there with him. And they retired to the garden and talk for half an hour and then come back. Churchill comes back and gives the same answer. And he gives that answer in writing again later. And then he tells Roosevelt he gave that answer, that, in other words, I didn't agree with them to release them from a pact, that we made a blood pact not to make a separate peace because we are going to fight on and they should too. And that, you see, that's. Aren't those. They are cataclysm.

[B]

What do you make of. Of FDR in this exchange? For the benefit of the audience, FDR writes France encouraging them not to surrender and not to give up the fight. And Churchill, although it's very. I went full Straus in here, tried to read it three or four times to figure out whether or not Winston Churchill was willing that FDR had agreed to publish the telegram or whether FDR had actually agreed to publish the telegram and changed his mind. I can't decipher it. So I can't say for certain whether or not FDR said, go ahead and publish my telegram because Churchill thought it would buck up the French. And Reynard thought it would buck up the French because FDR is saying, fight on, fight on. And then FDR says, oh, the State Department says, I can't publish the telegraph. What did you make of that by fdr? I thought it was disappointing.

[C]

No, it's a good thing that we were reluctant to go into that war. We were reluctant to go into the First World War II. And. And we went into both of them upon being attacked. Right. And that's. And we didn't have agreements in advance of either of those wars that we would come to the defense of those countries. Roosevelt wanted to. And the reasons he wanted to are in that memo that Churchill wrote him. When Churchill and Roosevelt began writing each other, they write each other as former naval persons. Roosevelt had been Assistant Secretary to the Navy. And so you have to make a link, if you can, between the thought of the American Founders, the authors of the Declaration of Independence, and this policy in the Second World War. And that link is broken in part because Franklin Roosevelt was a modern liberal. Reinterpreting the Declaration of Independence into something else. I argue. Right. That's a big argument.

[B]

Right.

[C]

We're not making it here. But it's also maintained because Roosevelt reads about what's going to happen to America if the seas are dominated by hostile powers, and that becomes a prospect that's open. Right. Roosevelt was. He was Assistant Secretary of the Navy. And you know, the great explainer of British power is a man named Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was a 19, late 19th, early 20th century figure at the Naval Institute in America. And he wrote the Influence of Sea Power on History. And it's a very powerful book. And it's still fundamental to strategic thinking in west today. And China too.

[B]

Yep.

[C]

And what does it say? It's the, the cheapest, fastest way to, to move good goods around the earth is by sea. And so sea power matters a lot. It mattered very much to the founders of the country. And so Roosevelt knows that. Right. And we've always been for freedom of the seas. We always had serious navy from the Revolutionary War on. And, and so to have that under the hands of a continental power, I mean, it's just a fact that the Chinese navy is bigger than ours today and China has a multiple of our shipbuilding capacity today. That's a serious fact.

[B]

Did you notice though, Dr. Arne, that when our Apache helicopter went down. We dispatched a drone made by Saronic and it looks like, God forgive me, I hope I don't offend the PT boat people. It looks very much like a PT boat from World War II or a fast swift boat from Vietnam. But it doesn't have anyone on, just goes and picks up our pilots. That's a revolution.

[C]

Well, there's a very good, I just got it this morning. I haven't read it all yet, but there's a man named Dennis Blair who was a big naval commander in the Pacific and he's published an article about the question can China take Taiwan? And he says there's just a lot of developments that make that very doubtful now and we can't rest on our laurels. But you know, I mean, one of the things that's been displayed in Iran is that we have made a lot of progress against these and with these drone weapons and in knocking them down, not having to spend a $2 million weapon to knock down a $30,000 drone. And so there's a lot of innovation going on right now. A lot of it comes from Andarelle. And that's Palmer Lucky's company. And that's just awesome to me.

[B]

It's awesome to me too. And they're in Ohio, Dr. Not Michigan. They're in Ohio. We'll come back. Hopefully I'll evade some anti Ohio Talk from Dr. Arne. Don't go anywhere, America. Welcome back America. I'm Hugh hewitt talking with Dr. Larry Arn about the new technologies of war everywhere. A lot of it comes as well from Ukraine. I'll remind you, four years ago when the Russians invaded and we thought it would be a two week war, you made the comment. And then history has surprises like this Zelensky fellow, Ukraine's a surprise. And the ability that they demonstrated with drones is a remarkable surprise. I mean, world change.

[C]

Yeah, yeah. And they're getting a lot of help and we're helping them. Yeah, well, a lot of people are and probably especially us. And you know, we're learning from that. And it, you know, we, it, it's a sad commentary that we're in danger all the time now. Right. And for much of American history that wasn't true. And we're safer than anybody, at least anybody powerful. But we've got, we're subject to immediate attack and that means being ready and having a superior military at the cheapest possible cost is urgently needed to any republic like ours.

[B]

Let me also, we're talking about naval power and man, the Strait of Hormuz Demonstrates again that what seems like a fight far away with a country we don't know much about, Oman and UAE and Iran, is actually about the world's health. You can't allow international waterways to be dominated by a maligned power, by any power, unless it's the Panama Canal and they own it, or we own it and gave it to them. You can't let the Straits of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz or any of the narrow waterways, the Taiwan Strait, be dominated by one power or the whole world suffers. That's why I think you mentioned that our constitution specifically doesn't say anything about a standing army, says we are to provide and maintain a navy. That's in the constitution.

[C]

Yeah, that's right. Yeah. They didn't see that's put a point. Right. First of all, as I say, all proper reasoning about international security and foreign policy begins with the interest of the United States. Well, we are a net oil exporter and we hope to remain so. I hope we do. But we're also a huge oil importer and that has to do with refining capacity and kinds of oil and which kinds we can refine and which kinds we produce and don't produce. And those are sticky problems. Right. And so, you know, the world oil has a world price and we got to buy a lot of it. And so, yeah, the interest of the United States is wrapped up in this. And the Strait of Hormuz turns out to be a very sticky problem. And we will see because we haven't. We haven't. We have won the war in Iran so far. We will see how it comes out.

[B]

Let me go back to last week and then bring it forward. You mentioned last week that Churchill wrote the prime ministers of the Dominions. In that letter, he wrote to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, quote, hitler will have to break us in this island or lose the war. He then, on June 18, gives this remarkable speech. We don't have the audio of it, which is the finest hour speech. Do you have an account of how the British people reacted to that speech?

[C]

Yeah, Minnie, it was that. That is the one where, like it is. First of all, he did broadcast the speech. That is the one where people were now focused on the problem. You know, in other words, when the war started, nobody knew what to expect, you know, and then to be losing on such a scale and so fast, that violated the pace of the First World War, which, you know, they lost some battles in the beginning, but within three weeks that settled down into trench warfare. France didn't surrender in what, six weeks, how long it took. So they're getting used to that. And then he gives a speech. And it's worth noting, you know, the peroration of the speech at the end is if the British Empire should last a thousand years, men will still say this was their finest hour. Remember that. That's kind of a doleful prediction, too. This is the peak. What comes later is lower. And that means that Churchill, against his will and never willing to do that another time in his life, was putting all the chips on the table. That when he said to the French, nations that die fighting rise up again. Those that surrender tamely are gone forever, he was prepared to live by that creed himself.

[B]

And he, in fact, did live by that creed. He put all the chips on the table. More with Dr. Arn coming up on the Hillsdale Dialogue, all things hillsdale@ hillsdale.edu. stay tuned.

[A]

This show is a part of the Hillsdale College Podcast Network. If you like what you hear, please subscribe to your favorite. You'll get brand new episodes of all your favorite shows sent right to your device. And you'll help us know that you're out there listening. Never miss another episode by going to Podcast Hillsdale. Edu subscribe. That's Podcast Hillsdale. Edu subscribe or click the Follow or Subscribe button on Apple podcasts Spotify or YouTube. Hey there, it's Scott Bertram, host of the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. On this week's program, we talk with Donald Hodel, former secretary of energy and former secretary of the interior in the Reagan administration. We discuss the leadership lessons he learned working for President Reagan and his new memoir called to Serve. And Stephanie Laubach from the physics department here at Hillsdale discusses her research into nanotechnology and magnetism. All that this week on the Radio Free Hillsdale Hour. Find it at Podcast hillsdale. Edu or wherever you get your audio.

[B]

Welcome back, America. I'm Hugh Hewitt. We're talking about the French Navy with Dr. Larry Aaron, President of Hillsdale College, which is why he then goes on and he's very harshly critical of Admiral Darlan and very full of praise for de Gaulle. De Gaulle he calls the constable of France. It's a fine turn of phrase. He also says about Darlan, and he's such a beautiful writer. I had his great grandfather. Darlan is the admiral of the French navy. His great grandfather had been killed at the Battle of Trafalgar, October 21, 1805. So we're going back a long way from 1940. Churchill says, I therefore Thought of him as one of those good Frenchmen who hate England, which is a fine turn of phrase, but it's a nice way to distinguish between French who are defeatist and French who just hate England. But he asked to bomb, and I don't think many Americans know this now. Larry Arne. The Brits had to destroy the French navy. They had to seize it wherever they could and scuttle it wherever they had to. It's really kind of a remarkable episode in history.

[C]

Churchill was very reluctant to do that. Remember, the British navy and the French navy have been training in common for. Since 1905, roughly. So there's no British officer who doesn't know the French navy and regard it as their closest ally. And now he's going to sink their ships. And Churchill tells. In this book, he tells the story in the. In the French North African port of Oran is where the French navy went to under Darland's orders. Churchill tells about the negotiations between. Is that in this chapter? I'm kind of lost where we are now.

[B]

Yes.

[C]

Yeah. So it's in the book. He tells the story of the negotiations and the British commander comes and says, I need you to give us these ships or scuttle them. And the French, and it's very civil, they're allies and they negotiate for several rounds. And the French admiral is conferring back and then he tells him not going to do it. And the British says, we're going to sink your fleet. And they do. And that's a terrible thing. Churchill regretted it deeply. On the other hand, there's a lot of evidence that it had a big effect on Franklin Roosevelt because he. Remember in that thing we talked about where Roosevelt won't publish his statement? Well, he, he really couldn't, you know, because he, he, he didn't have the authority to go to war. He didn't have the authority to help. But he's also hearing from the French and the French don't sound like people are going to keep on, and they didn't. Right. And so when he sees Churchill, and he later sent Harry Hopkins, who lived with Roosevelt in the White House for many years, very close to him when he sent him to talk to Churchill. And when he saw this destruction of the French fleet, he thought Churchill minted, that they were going to keep fighting. And therefore this is a enterprise we might invest in.

[B]

Page 213, he writes, the elimination of the French navy had as an important factor almost at a single stroke, by violent action, produced a profound impression in every country. Here was this Briton, which so many had counted down and out, which strangers had supposed to be quivering on the brink of surrender to a mighty power arrayed against her, striking ruthlessly at her dearest friends of yesterday and securing for a while to herself the undisputed command of the sea. It was made plain that the British War Cabinet feared nothing and would stop at nothing. This was true. He's right about that. If you kill all your friends, you're not gonna. You're not gonna stop.

[C]

Yeah, here we go. You know, I used to keep on my wall a war photograph of Abraham Lincoln, and next to it, a war photograph of Winston Churchill. And beneath each of them, quote, and the quote from Lincoln was, you don't fight wars by throwing, by blowing rose water through elder stalk squirts. And the quote, the quote from Churchill is in the Canadian Parliament. He, in the middle of the war, he said, we have not traveled all this way across the oceans, across the mountains, across the prairies, because we are made of sugar candy. And in other words, yeah, this guy's formidable. This guy's conquered Europe. We're not nothing either. And that is very important. After Alamein, first really big land battle that the British won, Churchill celebrated that and said, you know, we know that our soldiers are prepared to die for their country. They can also kill for their country. And that, in other words, you're going to have to act like a winner if you're going to win.

[B]

You do indeed have to act like a winner if you're going to win. Stay tuned. Dr. Arnold will be right back after the break. All things Hillsdale at Hillsdale Edu, including their fabulous new course on the Odyssey. Welcome back, America. I'm Hugh Hewitt. Dr. And we're about to talk about the rhetoric that is used, deployed by Churchill. Well, the, the ability of his message is really quite extraordinary. The gift of rhetorical flourish, boy, it's rare. FDR had it, Reagan had it. I think President Trump sometimes has it in conversation, but not in set piece rhetoric. Do you disagree with that? He's not a set piece rhetorician.

[C]

Yeah, Churchill is. That's right. Churchill is. I mean, Churchill prepared everything right, but he prepared it. But then, in addition, there are these many times when he just waxed eloquent, like, here's a phrase that I liked. He writes to some of his colleagues. I really think that you, Lloyd and Amory ought to be able to lift our affairs in the east and Middle east out of the catalepsy by which they are smitten. Who writes that

[B]

the last thing I want to mention this week he writes to Smuts a day two weeks after his finest hour. Smuts is running South Africa. If Hitler fails to beat us here, he will probably recoil eastwards. Indeed, he may do this even without trying. Invasion. I just wanted to point out he's a brilliant man. He's forecasting the future in their darkest hour. Might be their finest hour. But he's saying, you know what, if he doesn't get this island, he's going to attack Stalin. And he's exactly right.

[C]

The so this chapter ends. I'm going. I'm going to go find it. The sentence really great. I can't find it, but it's and it would all come to be.

[B]

We will come back next week to talk to Winston Churchill's remarkable gifts of prophecy and rhetorical skill, but most importantly, of statesmanship. Dr. Arne thank you.

[A]

Thanks for listening to the Hillsdale Dialogues, part of the Hillsdale College Podcast Network. More episodes at Podcast hillsdale. Edu or wherever you find your audio. For more information about Hillsdale college, head to hillsdale.edu eduardo.