1945: Hitler's War

Summary

History As It Happens

Episode Title: 1945: Hitler's War
Host: Martin Di Caro
Release Date: August 5, 2025

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Introduction

In this thought-provoking episode of History As It Happens, host Martin Di Caro delves into the tumultuous year of 1945, marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. The episode, titled "Hitler's War," features an in-depth conversation with renowned military historian Antony Beaver, exploring the profound legacies of Adolf Hitler’s regime and its enduring impact on contemporary international relations.

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Hitler: Architect of Destruction

Martin De Caro sets the stage by emphasizing the unparalleled influence of Hitler on the outcome of World War II and the shaping of the 20th century. Citing Ian Kershaw’s seminal work, De Caro asserts:

“Any assessment of the war's outcome 80 years on must start with him.” ([01:21])

Beaver elaborates on Hitler's central role, highlighting his dual obsession with reversing Germany's defeat in 1918 and eliminating the Jewish population:

“The causes of the second European War are not in doubt. It was caused chiefly by Adolf Hitler.” ([03:00])

He further explains Hitler’s strategic vision and the catastrophic policies that led to unprecedented destruction and genocide.

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Moral Choices and Historical Legacy

Antony Beaver discusses the moral complexity of the Second World War, noting its profound demand for ethical decision-making:

“No period actually demanded so many moral choices. And moral choice... is the core element in all human drama.” ([02:34])

This moral dimension is pivotal in understanding why WWII continues to captivate historians, writers, and filmmakers alike.

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Hitler’s Ideology and the Holocaust

The conversation delves into Hitler's genocidal ideology, particularly his infamous Mein Kampf. De Caro references Beaver’s analysis:

“Hitler's program to make Germany the dominant power in Europe had been made quite clear in Mein Kampf.” ([05:17])

Beaver discusses the evolution of the Holocaust, emphasizing the transition from mass shootings to systematic extermination via gas chambers, a shift motivated by both practical and psychological factors within the Nazi regime.

“The move from ‘Showa by bullet’ to ‘Shoah by gas’ was driven by the desire to make it easier on the murderers.” ([33:26])

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Comparisons to Modern Conflicts

De Caro and Beaver critically assess contemporary events, drawing parallels between Hitler’s actions and modern leaders like Vladimir Putin. They caution against overreliance on historical comparisons:

“As a historian, I spend more time trying to attack these historical parallels or undermine them rather than actually answer them, because... the Second World War was a war like no other.” ([10:43])
“We’re seeing similar acts again today.” ([21:05])

This discussion underscores the dangers of simplistic historical analogies and the importance of nuanced understanding.

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Lessons Unlearned: Genocide and International Will

The episode addresses the failure of the international community to uphold the ideals established post-WWII, particularly in preventing genocide:

“The world agreed in the UN Charter that countries would have an obligation to prevent genocide and other crimes against humanity.” ([18:12])

De Caro laments the ongoing conflicts and atrocities, questioning whether humanity is living up to its post-war commitments:

“So it seems that we've failed to live up to the legacies of 1945.” ([19:03])

Beaver concurs, highlighting the erosion of international norms that once deterred aggressive wars:

“We are back to the mentality of the dictator era of the 1930s. That might is right.” ([19:43])

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The Role of Propaganda and Public Perception

Beaver explores how Hitler manipulated public perception and exploited societal fractures to consolidate power:

“Hitler could see the weaknesses in others and exploit that through hatred and fear.” ([30:37])

He draws parallels to modern political tactics, where demagogues capitalize on public frustrations with globalization and economic instability to gain support.

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Genocide Definitions and Contemporary Relevance

The hosts engage in a nuanced debate on the definition of genocide, particularly in the context of current events in Gaza:

“The phrase genocide is overused and very much on both sides.” ([37:21])

De Caro emphasizes the urgency of addressing deliberate atrocities, advocating for international intervention to prevent further loss of life.

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Hitler’s Enduring Influence and Conclusion

As the episode wraps up, De Caro reflects on the paradox of Hitler’s complete failure juxtaposed with his lingering presence in modern socio-political discourse:

“He goes down in history as one of the worst villains of all time... Yet this terrible man is still with us.” ([41:28])

Antony Beaver concurs, acknowledging the complex legacy of Hitler and the continuous need to confront and learn from history to prevent future atrocities.

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Looking Ahead

Martin De Caro teases the next episode, which will feature historian James Holland to discuss "Unconditional Surrender," continuing the five-part series on the year 1945 and its profound impact on the modern world.

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Notable Quotes

• Martin De Caro:
  “Any assessment of the war's outcome 80 years on must start with him.” ([01:21])

• Antony Beaver:
  “The causes of the second European War are not in doubt. It was caused chiefly by Adolf Hitler.” ([03:00])
  “No period actually demanded so many moral choices. And moral choice... is the core element in all human drama.” ([02:34])
  “We are back to the mentality of the dictator era of the 1930s. That might is right.” ([19:43])

• Sam:
  [Promotional Content]

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This comprehensive episode provides listeners with a deep understanding of Adolf Hitler's role in shaping modern history, the moral complexities of wartime decisions, and the enduring lessons that remain relevant in today's geopolitical landscape.

Transcript

[Sam]

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[Martin DeCaro]

History as it happens. August 5, 2025. Hitler's war.

[Sam]

And we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe. We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now in a cloud of dust. And then through the clouds of the sk Fly by plane. Hitler flies to survey what he has done. The destruction of a nation. Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race. The Nazis kept the occupants of Buchenwald in filth and disease. Of the quarter of the prison population left alive when rescued by the Americans, thousands were beyond human aid. Easy death was the most that life could offer.

[Martin DeCaro]

Eighty years ago, the Second World War mercifully ended, casting a shadow over the rest of the 20th century, one that lingers to this day because of the legacies of aggressive war and genocide in Europe. The central figure was Hitler. His twin obsessions of reversing Germany's defeat in 1918 and getting rid of Germany's Jews. He plunged Europe into the depths of hell. Any assessment of the war's outcome 80 years on must start with him. That's next, as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Antony Beaver]

Well, I think it's fascinating the way that the Second World War has gripped our imagination, certainly gripped the imagination not just of writers, historians, filmmakers. And one needs to ask the question why? And I think it's largely because no period actually demanded so many moral choices. And moral choice, let's face it, is the core element in all human drama.

[Martin DeCaro]

In personality and power. His book on the most influential figures in Europe in the 20th century, the eminent historian Ian Kershaw writes, the Second World War and the Holocaust defined the 20th century as nothing else did.

[Sam]

The murder mill at Orduf brings out the full horror and bestiality of the Nazi scum. And General Eisenhower, a man hardened by the blood and shock of war, seems appalled at these unbelievable sights.

[Martin DeCaro]

Hitler was the chief author of both. It would be absurd to reduce such epoch defining, momentous events to the actions of one man. It would be equally absurd to deny Hitler's centrality to them. The motive force of his personality, says Kershaw, had been to prepare Germany to fight a second World War, to expunge the national humiliation of the first, and to eradicate the ethnic minority, the Jews, whom he nonsensically saw as the cause of that disaster and of every other ill to befall his people. He had made no secret of his intentions long before he ever became a contender for political power. In the midst of a complete crisis of state and society, the German political elite had nonetheless allowed this man to take supreme power in the country. In subsequent years, every agency of political power had bound itself inextricably to him, and millions of Germans, until the steep fall in his popularity in the last war years had cheered him and supported in different degrees the policies that led ultimately to the abys. And that is ian Kershaw, page 107, of Personality and power builders and destroyers of modern Europe. So the causes of the second European War are not in doubt. It was caused chiefly by Adolf Hitler. But while that is clear, there is still some mystery here that remains hard to understand to this day. Why did other statesmen underestimate or even trust Adolf Hitler? Why did so many Germans support him? Why did this man dedicate his life to destruction and mass murder, leaving a legacy so severe that a new international order was created to prevent another Hitler from incinerating the world again? And why, when all hope was lost, did he persist rather than surrender, taking down his country and millions of people with him?

[Sam]

Throughout the world, throngs of people hail the end of the war in Europe. It is five years and more since Hitler marched into Poland. Years full of suffering and death and sacrifice. Now the war against Germany is won.

[Martin DeCaro]

In the introduction to his 2012 book titled The Second World War, Antony Beaver writes, Hitler's program to make Germany the dominant power in Europe had been made quite clear in Mein Kampf, a combination of autobiography and political manifesto first published in 1925. First he would unite Germany and Austria, then he would bring Germans outside the borders of the Reich, back under its control. People of the same blood should be in the same Reich, Hitler declared. His policy of aggression was stated clearly on the very first page that although every German couple had to purchase a copy on marriage, few seem to have taken his bellicose prediction seriously. They prefer to believe his more recent and oft repeated assertions that he did not desire war. Adolf Hitler, people thought, did not desire war. Sir Antony Beaver will be here in a moment to kick off this five part series on 1945, marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. In upcoming episodes, we'll cover the Allied policy of unconditional surrender, the creation of the US national security state, the start of the global age, the American century, and other aspects and legacies of this world changing conflict. But we will start with the man most responsible for starting the war, at least in the European theater, a man who continues to influence international relations 80 years after his death. Just think of all the times you hear some leader today being compared to Hitler, such as Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin, or how many times you've heard about the lessons of Munich. We must not appease Saddam Hussein. Remember that one.

[Antony Beaver]

The voices, the voices of concern about what Adolf Hitler was doing were very few. There was not unanimity. There were all kinds of diplomats running around holding meetings with him. There were people saying, don't do anything. He'll stop. He won't do anything terrible. And as they occupied one country after another country after another country, it wasn't till each country was attacked that they stopped and said, well, maybe Winston Churchill was right. Maybe that lone voice expressing concern about what was taking place was the right voice.

[Martin DeCaro]

That was Donald Rumsfeld in 2002, drumming up support for the planned invasion of Iraq the following year because Saddam Hussein was supposedly as dangerous as Adolf Hitler. And it is also because of Hitler and the Second World War and the Holocaust that we have the word genocide and the warning, never again the world agreed in the UN Charter that countries would have an obligation to prevent genocide and other crimes against humanity. Well, take a look around and ask if humanity is fulfilling that obligation today. So as much as we may never want to think about Hitler again, he is still with us. Antony Beaver is one of the great military historians in the world. His books have appeared in 37 languages and have sold 9 million copies. I have been reading his work for years. Our conversation next.

[Sam]

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[Martin DeCaro]

Antony Beaver, welcome back to the podcast.

[Antony Beaver]

Good to be back with you, Martin.

[Martin DeCaro]

I have Volker Ulrich's Hitler biography here in front of me. He says in his introduction, people will never stop pondering this mysterious, calamitous figure. Every generation must come to terms with Hitler. He quotes Eberhard Jackel. We Germans were liberated from Hitler, but will never shake him off. Hitler will always be with us.

[Antony Beaver]

Yes, I think that is true. At the same time, things have changed quite a lot since 1945, when there was a large amount of denial in Germany. Many refused to believe the newsreel footage taken in the concentration camps. Germany went through different stages of facing up to the past, sometimes doing it better than others, and then even at one stage, seeing themselves as victims in 1945, with the massive crushing attack from the east by the Red Army. So it's very, very hard to generalize. But I think now, I mean, Germany more than any country, has got over the trauma. I don't think it is haunted as much by the past as it used to be.

[Martin DeCaro]

And Hitler's aims, what he hoped to achieve, his entire project ended in disaster, not just for the world, but for Germany itself. He didn't really care very much about the livelihoods, the lives of his own people. Nazism entirely discredited. The Holocaust still looms large over the entire world. Right. I guess what I'm getting at here is everything Hitler stood for and tried to achieve ended in disaster. Yet he's still with us. We're still afraid of him, if you know what I mean.

[Antony Beaver]

Well, I think it's fascinating the way that the Second World War has gripped our imagination, certainly gripped imagination, not just of writers, historians, filmmakers. And one needs to ask the question why? And I think it's largely because no period actually demanded so many moral choices. And moral choice, let's face it, is the core element in all human drama. But, I mean, there are many other aspects to the Second World War which we can't escape. The way that, for example, the mass media and politicians have always tended to make references to the Second World War. Sometimes this is taken far too far with comparisons, historical comparisons, which are very misleading and very dangerous. Every single crisis. Quite often a leader, particularly in Britain and the United States, might want to sound Churchillian or Rooseveltian, and they would make a comparison. And this, of course, is extremely dangerous. I mean, as a historian, I think I spend more time trying to attack these historical parallels or undermine them rather than actually answer them, because I think that it's made a big error in our understanding of history. Let's face it, the Second World War was a war like no other. And yet it's come to define our whole image of war itself. And we've seen this very much recently with the invasion of Ukraine and comparisons of Putin and Hitler and so forth. I mean, nobody makes worse comparisons with the Second World War than Putin himself. So I don't think that we should fall into that particular trap.

[Martin DeCaro]

A man who's obsessed with history, but he's a hack when it comes to understanding history. Let's talk about two aspects of the right lessons, the right warnings to learn. One aspect of this is, as you say, overdrawn comparisons. Everything is another Munich. The historian Timothy Snyder uses this analogy all the time, comparing Putin to Hitler and the so called appeasement of Putin to what happened in 1938 in Hitler and Czechoslovakia and Neville Chamberlain. I find that comparison to be really bad. How about you?

[Antony Beaver]

Well, it's, if you like, fairly close to home, because in fact, it was my wife's grandfather, my grandfather in law, Duff Cooper, who was the only minister who resigned from the cabinet over the Munich Agreement itself. And he resigned in protest.

[Martin DeCaro]

Wow.

[Antony Beaver]

I mean, the point is that, yes, there are of course superficial comparisons between the Sudeten Germans or whatever and Ukraine, but I mean, you know, as in many of these cases, it's entirely superficial. And as soon as you start to take it any further or dig deeper, you realize what a mistake it is. Well, what you really need to do is to learn the lessons. And there are some genuine lessons. I mean, the trouble was that before the First World War, even one of the most influential books at the time, the Great Illusion by Norman angel, and he was saying, oh, well, war is impossible in Europe now. States are so carefully, so tightly knitted together through communications, through commerce, that it's not worth anybody's while to go to war. Well, we made that mistake in 1914. We made that mistake again in 1939. And then we see Angela Merkel and Gerhard Schroeder making that mistake with Putin in the 2000s with the deals over energy and so forth. And we've also made many other mistakes. I mean, the British and the French, for example, could not believe that anybody could be stupid enough to want another war. And that's why they found themselves in such an exposed position when he did come to Munich and the negotiations over Czechoslovakia, partly because they had not actually warned their own populations, they hadn't warned the French or the British civilian populations of the dangers of which actually were presented at that particular time. And Chamberlain himself felt that with an extraordinary sort of arrogance and naivety, that somehow nobody would dare really to lie to him or promise peace when in fact they were planning for war. We know that Hitler actually felt disappointed at Munich because he was deprived of his war and of using the Wehrmacht for the first time in attacking Czechoslovakia.

[Sam]

The settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem which has now been achieved is in my view only the prelude to a larger settlement in which all Europe may find peace. This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler. And here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine.

[Antony Beaver]

Hello.

[Sam]

Some of you perhaps have already heard what it contains, but I would just like to read it to you. We, the German Chancellor and the British Prime Minister have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo German relations is of the first importance for the two countries and for Europe. We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo German naval agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another. Again.

[Martin DeCaro]

The assumption, and I'm not letting Neville Chamberlain off the hook, but the assumption of statesmen in that era was that other statesmen weren't trying to start a war.

[Antony Beaver]

Well, one has to understand Hitler's point of view here. And for that one really does need to go back to the earlier period. One's going to see what was motivating him. In the First World War. The greatest German achievement actually was the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. And this was when they had achieved the complete advance and had occupied almost the whole of Western Soviet, well, what became the Soviet Union, but the whole of the western part of the Russian Empire all the way down to Rostov on Don, virtually the whole of Ukraine. And this was because Germany was starving as a result of the British naval blockade of Germany. Now Hitler never forgot about this because for him, when it came to Lebenshalm and the need for Germany to be unconquerable in the future, this is why his real gaze was always fixed towards the east and the great breadbasket of Ukraine and the Black earth regions of Russia. But we also tend to forget for most Germans of the right wing nationalist variety, at that particular point, Germany didn't deserve to lose the First World War. In fact, they tried to believe that the, they'd never really been beaten in battle. This, I'm afraid, was a key element. And Hitler was really wanting to reverse the outcome of the First World War by fighting another one. Now the British and the French again could not believe that any war would be stupid enough to want anything like that to be repeated. And this is one of the reasons why they left it so late before they started their rearmaments well, yes, Hitler.

[Martin DeCaro]

Fought in the First World War. He was a messenger, but he saw all the death and destruction, and he came away with that with a different moral of the story than most other people who are horrified by war. Hitler thought war was kind of redeeming or it was the purpose of a great nation state to purify. Right. But I do want to touch now on another element of a current issue, and that is after 1945, the world agreed that aggressive war and crimes against civilians could not be repeated. We get the term genocide as a result of the Holocaust in World War II. But as president Harry Truman said at the Signing of the UN charter in San Francisco in 1945, he said it would take the will, the will of the world to prevent these things from happening again. It just wouldn't happen automatically if we.

[Sam]

Had had this charter a few years ago. And above all, the will to use it, millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die.

[Martin DeCaro]

And you look around the world today, Antony Beaver, and we see aggressive war in Eastern Europe and immense appalling human suffering, civilian casualties in Gaza, to name one place. So it seems that we've failed to live up to the legacies of 1945. It was an ideal, always an ideal, but we're not living up to that promise.

[Antony Beaver]

Well, I think it was very striking that this year, the 80th anniversary, we do see this sudden change. I mean, in many ways, one would almost describe it as a guillotine moment when normally when one era changes to another era, there are a lot of leftover issues from the past period. Here we've actually seen a very, very remarkable change. And it's not just because of President Trump wanting to realign. In fact, you know, he may be backtracking on some of the more outrageous or controversial things that he said straight away. We will see. But I think that the real problem is we've suddenly come to a moment when we realized the idea that the United nations embodied that sovereignty was sacred. The seizure of other country's territory was a crime. Now that has started to change again, and we are back to the mentality of the dictator era of the 1930s. That might is right. And this was very much Hitler's attitude. He managed to get away with far more because nobody could quite understand or believe anybody would be able to break their word quite so shamelessly as he did, for example, over Czechoslovakia and then the invasion of Poland. We're seeing similar acts Again today, what's.

[Martin DeCaro]

So distressing is the destruction of civilian life. So in your introduction to your book on the Second World War, Antony, you said Hitler's program to make Germany the dominant power in Europe had been made quite clear. In Mein Kampf, a combination of autobiography and political manifesto first published in 1925, you go on to say his policy of aggression was stated clearly on the very first page. Yet although every German couple had to purchase a copy on marriage. Wow, that's such a wonderful thing to read on your honeymoon. Right. Even though every German couple had to purchase a copy on marriage, few seem to have taken his bellicose predictions seriously. I know we've discussed this a little bit already, but I want to continue on this thread about how Hitler was underestimated after the fact. Some self serving explanations. How did we ever go along with this guy? How did we ever let him hypnotize us? Why didn't we take him at his word in Mein Kampf? Although there is the issue of, you know, he's writing this or dictating this from a jail cell. Why would anyone think this man would ever be in charge of Germany in 1925? Right. But you know what some of this obscures is that there were a lot of people who wanted to go along with what Hitler was saying and promising. They weren't confused, they were totally on board with him.

[Antony Beaver]

One has to remember first of all, of course, that it does go back to the horrors of the Russian Civil War, which actually started this vicious circle which was between left and right, between red and white, between fascist or Nazi and communists. What we tend to forget, and we've done it again to a certain degree with Putin. We fail to understand the mentality of dictators and especially those with militaristic leanings. The real problem, in fact, is what I would describe as democratic confirmation bias. We are so used to seeing democracy as if you like the natural order of things that we cannot imagine people switching to wanting dictatorship instead. But we're seeing this throughout the world of the rise of the right and especially amongst the young people. You know, it's not a question of sort of the left automatically winning the students or whatever. One has to remember that quite often in the 1930s, the surge in support for the Nazi party and for the fascists in Italy came from the students, those who in many cases after the war, one would have expected to swing to the left. This is, if you like, the frustration with democracy. And the problem we're seeing today is very much the result of globalization the recognition of many people that they have no control over their own lives and the politicians actually have no control really over the fate of their own countries. Their frustrations then tend to lead to want to have the strong man who will take them out of this swamp in Washingtonian terms or other equivalents, when they complain about the lack of progress, the living conditions, the shortage of jobs, the shortage of housing. I mean, we're seeing this all over the world. This is a major problem which I don't think that many governments are capable of solving themselves.

[Martin DeCaro]

Fertile soil for demagogues. Antony Beaver, what is your take on whether, had the Czech stood and fought in June of 1938 or September 1938, had the Czechs fought instead of capitulating whether a major world war could have been prevented?

[Antony Beaver]

The answer is I have no idea and I don't think anybody has any real idea. And I dislike counterfactual history. I agree it is right to ask the question, but it's impossible to make an answer. I mean, from point of view of anything. The British and the French were in no position to help their countries. Their populations could not believe that war was necessary at that particular moment. It took another year of showing the sheer determination of Hitler to overtake or to conquer large areas of Europe and especially Central Europe. The people started to realize that war could not be avoided. And that was when obviously, their attitudes changed. But in 1938, there was no question of the British declaring war on Germany at that particular stage on behalf of a faraway country of which we know little, as in Chamberlain's phrase. And the French were even less keen on the idea. I mean, the French, in fact then blamed the British for dragging them into the Second World War. When it came to 1939, the Czechs also would not have had really any support from Stalin at that particular stage. One has to remember 1938, it was fairly soon after Stalin's purge of the Red Army. He would not have risked war with Germany at that particular stage under any circumstances. I don't think the Czechs, even if they had decided to fight, would have been in any position really to defeat the Wehrmacht. They had good weapons. I'm sure they had determination. But in terms of the balance of power, the balance of strength, they didn't stand a chance.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. Later on, Czech President Edvard Benes believed. He said this later. He believed his country would have been destroyed if he had gone ahead with armed resistance rather than accept the transfer of the territory of the Sudeten Germans to the Third Reich. Zara Steiner wrote these two remarkable books about the interwar period. The second volume was the Triumph of the Dark, in which she deals with Munich. She wrote, in many respects, it was Germany rather than the Allied powers, that gain most from the delay. But she says decisions for war are rarely the result of counting men, weapons and aircraft. Statistics provide only part of the answer. Given their misperceptions of German power and the divided state of public opinion, one can understand why Britain and France chose to sacrifice Czechoslovakia to avoid what they believed would be the start of another war in Europe. No one could predict what its consequences would have been, wrote Zara Steiner. Ian Kershaw, your friend, has pointed out to me that the German military ran war games in June of 1938, and they concluded the Wehrmacht would overrun Czechoslovakia in 11 days. But maybe they were overly optimistic, just like Putin was. The point I'm getting at here is that Timothy Snyder, who I mentioned before, has stated this case that the world should have stood up stronger to Putin, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, because we can't have another Munich. But, you know, you can make a strong case about Putin without going to these historical comparisons. Guess what I'm trying to say.

[Antony Beaver]

As I said earlier, I don't believe in these historical comparisons, and I think they're very dangerous and very misleading.

[Martin DeCaro]

Some people say if only Hitler had known when to stop, he could have preserved a European empire for who knows how long. But he kept going. That also is a fallacy. His whole ideology was conquest. Can you talk a little bit about the role that Hitler's ideology played in starting this war? And the Nazis had something called the Hunger Plan for the East. Right.

[Antony Beaver]

The whole idea of the Hunger Plan, which was an idea for their colonization of the east, was truly horrific because it basically would have involved an estimated 30 million deaths through starvation, forcing the city dwellers of Leningrad and Moscow out and basically allowing them just to simply starve in the open, having destroyed the cities themselves. This actually would have made even the Holocaust look pale by comparison. The idea was creating this helot race amongst the Slavs. The Slavs would just be enough, would be kept alive so as to work the land for German colonial masters. Nazi paradise in the East. And this was very much fixed in Hitler's mind and in the mind of all of those Nazi ideologues who really did see this as their way of exerting a dominant power ready across the whole of Europe and beyond, even in the world itself.

[Martin DeCaro]

It was a social Darwinist kind of worldview. Yes, nation states could not peacefully coexist. You were either conquering or being conquered. And there was a racial hierarchy where certain people simply were not worthy of.

[Antony Beaver]

Life, which included those born German but with disabilities, incapable of, say, of looking after themselves, as well as those they believed who, for racial reasons, shouldn't really be allowed to breed. And this was a totally racist and genocidal view of humanity itself.

[Martin DeCaro]

From our vantage today, invading the Soviet Union seems like an insane idea. It was really the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. Had Hitler been smarter, he wouldn't have done that. But as we're saying here, I'm trying to establish the reasons why he felt this was necessary for the survival of the German race, the blood, and that he had to wipe out all the Jews and all the Slavs in the east. You said 30 million would starve to death. Was Adolf Hitler a good military tactician or strategist?

[Antony Beaver]

I think Hitler's great talent, if you want to put it in those terms, it was a diabolical talent, was to be able to see the weaknesses in others and to be able to exploit that. And he could do that through hatred and through fear. And Goebbels, for example, recognized very much that hatred on its own was not a laugh. And this was particularly true in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, that they had to prepare their soldiers as well as their civilian administrators to be totally ruthless in their determination to kill, to annihilate the Slav, but above all, the Bolshevik and the Jew in their own version of events. If you were a Jew, you were bound to be a Bolshevik, and if you were a Bolshevik, you were probably, probably a Jew. So that meant a sort of double category for killing. Now, I remember taking part in a major conference at Yad Vashem 15, whatever it was 13 years ago, on the turning point in the war and the turning point in the Holocaust. Everybody acknowledged that it really came in the autumn of 1942, the late autumn, when you had the intergovernmental declaration on genocide, even though the word genocide had not been invented at that particular point. But on the mass killing of civilians, the great question was Hitler had not necessarily planned the total extermination of all the Jews at the beginning of the war. But this came very much more into his mind, I think. And of course, although he left nothing written on this particular element, one can work from those who talked to him, who were guided by him, and let's face it, in those days, within the Nazi regime, it was called working towards the Fuhrer, people In many cases were imagining what the Fuhrer himself wanted, and that was the annihilation of the Jews. Certainly in Central Europe and in the Soviet Union it was this move from what the great Vasily Grossman, the Russian novelist, said, you know, was the Showa by bullet to the move to the Shoah by gas. Now that came about not through necessarily an order from the top, but it came about as a development of their campaign of extermination. Because it was Himmler who was horrified and shocked at the psychological effect on his own SS people who were carrying out the killing by bullet, the Showa by bullet, and the way that many of them were resorting to alcohol or going crazy. This was really, in a way, the origins of the mass move into the gas chambers of the killing camps.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yes, the gas chambers were developed to make it easier on the murderers, not on the victims. You bring up a very important point. I think it has value to understand this in today's world. This is the long debate among scholars such as yourself the intentionalist versus the structuralist or functionalist interpretations of the Holocaust. And I guess on the intentionalist side, people had argued that from the very, very beginning, Hitler had decided had a blueprint, even not just a dream, but a blueprint to physically exterminate all the Jews of Europe. I believe the structuralists or the functionalists have the better argument, and that is Hitler always believed Germany itself should be Jew free. But once he started to conquer more territory with millions of Jews, the genocidal process evolved, if you will, over time. Genocide is not a single event or a single decision. It is a process. There's no single date that any historian or single decision that's been identified. If I'm not mistaken, I don't think.

[Antony Beaver]

There was a blueprint right from the start. Because in many cases it was a question of either pushing them out or confiscating, making life so appalling for them within Germany and then Austria that they were going to leave of their own accord. And of course, but all of their possessions would be expropriated at that particular time. We then get onto the next stage. But again, you see, this is something which I'm sure we'll still be debating in another 10 or 15 years because there are no papers which will actually prove it one way or the other. Now, 1941, it was definitely by that winter that they started to think of what are we going to do? Because frankly, we have not conquered the Soviet Union in the way that they had expected. The whole idea of reaching the AA line, the Archangel Astrakhan line, more or less the River Volga, and being able to suppress Russia from that point of view, they had not achieved. And this is why the whole decision of genocide is linked in with the question of whether were they really going to be victorious in the Soviet Union. And I think one of the reasons for the acceleration in 42 towards outright genocide came very much from the secret fear that they were not going to defeat the Soviet Union in the end. One of the key turning points of the war, and certainly the geopolitical turning point of the war, came in December 1941 with the failure to take Moscow, the Soviet counter attack, and of course, the most important of all, the American entry into the war. So all of these elements meant that by 1942, the determination of Hitler, one can deduct that even if he didn't achieve total military victory, as I think subconsciously he had started to fear, then, the one thing he was determined to achieve was the extermination of the Jews. So the two are linked. But I don't think we're ever going to come to a completely satisfactory conclusion of deciding which of the two arguments or the camps. And to a certain degree, let's face it, it was a mixture of the two.

[Martin DeCaro]

I agree. I think both camps have something of value to add to this debate. And the Nazis never envisioned a future where Jews would play any significant role in their society. Whether they were all murdered or shipped out somewhere else, it was all about destroying them as a people. So given what we've been discussing about the process of genocide, what are your views on what's happening in Gaza? There is an enormous debate among historians of genocide, and not just scholars, politicians, commentators, aid groups, journalists. Have you weighed in on this debate at all?

[Antony Beaver]

The trouble is that the very phrase genocide is overused and very much on both sides. What we have certainly seen or are seeing on both sides is ethnic cleansing rather necessarily than outright genocide. I think what we're seeing in Gaza is horrific and terrifying. The use of the word genocide, as I say, is exaggerated and deliberately emotive. But at the same time, you know, for the attack of the 7th of October, there was, one could say, almost a genocidal element there, simply because they were killing anybody who was a Jew, not even one who was in uniform. They were killing civilians and even babies.

[Martin DeCaro]

I at first had been reluctant to use the term genocide, but I've changed my mind about that, especially of late. With a deliberate starvation, Israel is deliberately starving Palestinians. What is happening in Gaza is horrific and needs to stop. And the world does not have the will, namely the United States, and this goes for Biden and Trump, the will to put an end to it, to use the leverage that's available to pressure the Israelis to stop. That's just my opinion here.

[Antony Beaver]

I would agree with you there entirely. But, I mean, let's go back to the origins of the phrase of genocide. And when it was being debated in 47, 48 in the United nations, what was very striking, of course, was that the Soviet Union was determined that the definition of genocide had to be racial or national. They did not want it to be class based on class, because otherwise the killing of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and even the kulaks could have been classed as genocide.

[Martin DeCaro]

As you say, the definition of genocide was politicized from the very beginning. Powerful states wanted to reserve for themselves the authority to use massive amounts of violence, to, say, put down an internal rebellion and not be accused of the crime of crimes. My final question, did Hitler succeed in some ways? For instance, after the Second World War, the European states were now more ethnically homogenous, having been emptied of their minority peoples than they had been, say, after World War I. When you had all these new states where somebody now was suddenly living in Hungary, where they had previously lived in Romania. There was less ethnic heterogeneity.

[Antony Beaver]

Inevitably, some form of war was going to take place in Europe, even without Hitler, simply because of the way that the collapse of empires, above all, the collapse of the Austro Hungarian Empire. Empire. But even the Russian Empire and the German Empire, when the borders were redrawn at Versailles in 1918, 1919, there were many ethnic groups who were split by the borders. We saw that with Hungary, particularly in Romania and so forth, rather depending on which side you'd been on during the First World War. And this, of course, was one of the great excuses for the Nazis to demand the restitution of the Volksdeutsch, who should come back, that is, those of German origin or German blood, who should be reincorporated basically into the Reich, Heimins Reich. So from that point of view, yes, Hitler did achieve a certain degree in that particular way. When the Soviet Union collapsed, then some of these ethnic resentments came back to the surface. And we saw this particular issue in the former Yugoslavia and in other areas, and we'll still see some of these problems. I mean, you know, whether it's Moldova and other places. How do you define nationality? Putin has his own very definite view of nationality. Basically, if you have been a former member of the Russian empire, you know, that would even include Finland and Poland. And that, I don't think, something that any of those citizens would be prepared to accept for a moment.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. I did not mean achievement in a positive way. Of course. You understand that.

[Antony Beaver]

No, no, of course not.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. But I asked because Hitler's overall project was a failure. He brought utter catastrophe on Germany. He did not care about the German people. He had that social Darwinist outlook. They're not strong enough, so they deserve their fate. He goes down in history as one of the worst villains of all time, a mass murderer. The Jews whom he hated achieved their own independent statehood in 1948. Hitler would have hated that. Yet this terrible man is still with us. And I thank you, Antony Beaver, for helping us make sense of his horrendous legacy.

[Antony Beaver]

Thanks very much, Martin.

[Sam]

I wish that Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived to see this day. General Eisenhower informs me that the forces of Germany have surrendered to the United Nations. The flags of freedom fly all over Europe.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next episode of History As It Happens. Historian and author James Holland of the World War II podcast, we have ways of making you talk will be my guest and our subject will be unconditional surrender for the second episode in this five part series on 1945. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign up at history as it happens.com or just go to substack and search for History as it Happens.

[Sam]

Sam.