3 Years of War: Origins

Summary

History As It Happens: Episode Summary

Title: 3 Years of War: Origins
Host: Martin Di Caro
Release Date: February 21, 2025

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Introduction

In the third episode of "History As It Happens," host Martin Di Caro delves into the intricate origins of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Titled "3 Years of War: Origins," the episode features insightful discussions with esteemed scholars Michael Kimmage, Serhii Plokhy, and Vladislav Zubok. Through a blend of expert analysis and historical context, the episode explores the factors that led to the war, the role of NATO, and the underlying ideologies shaping Russia's actions.

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Breaking News: The Current State of War

The episode opens with Martin providing a brief update on the current situation:

“Breaking news overnight. Russia has attacked Ukraine and its people, upending security and stability in Europe.”
— Martin Di Caro [01:39]

This sets the stage for the ensuing analysis, emphasizing the gravity and immediacy of the conflict.

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Impact of NATO and Diplomatic Efforts

NATO's Role and Russia's Concerns

Vladislav Zubok remarks on Russia's stance towards NATO:

“From the perspective of a historian, I really am not so surprised that this war is happening, and NATO has very little to do with that.”
— Vladislav Zubok [02:22]

Serhii Plokhy adds clarity on the end of the Cold War era:

“The Cold War days are over. The Cold War is over. The Cold War is over.”
— Serhii Plokhy [02:45]

The discussion highlights that Russia's motivations transcend mere NATO expansion, rooted deeply in its imperial history and desire to maintain regional dominance.

Diplomatic Efforts and U.S. Involvement

Michael Kimmage critiques the Trump administration's approach:

“The Trump administration's overtures to the Kremlin are supposed to end an endless war in Eastern Europe...”
— Michael Kimmage [01:46]

He underscores the administration's mixed messages and lack of coherent strategy in addressing the conflict, pointing out the absence of Ukraine in diplomatic negotiations.

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Historical Context and Ideological Underpinnings

Putin's Ideology and Historical Interpretation

Vladislav Zubok delves into Vladimir Putin's historical mindset:

“Putin now takes these ideas from 19th century and tries to run policy on the basis of it in the 21st century. And he destroys, of course, good part of Ukraine, but for Russia itself he ends up in a ditch.”
— Vladislav Zubok [35:15]

Serhii Plokhy expands on the imperialistic views influencing Putin:

“One of those ideas is that Ukrainians are not supposed to exist as a separate nation, that Ukrainians are part of the Russian nation. That's a classic pre-1917 Russian imperial thinking.”
— Serhii Plokhy [40:51]

Conservative Utopia and Modernization

Martin Di Caro reflects on Putin's dual approach:

“The phrase is conservative utopia. It's something in the mind of Vladimir Putin, and I think the way that those two things interact is just looking at it very dryly is quite fascinating...”
— Martin Di Caro [49:38]

He emphasizes Putin's obsession with history and his efforts to modernize Russia for geopolitical dominance, blending past imperial ambitions with contemporary strategies.

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The Role of European States and U.S. Deterrence

European Responsibility and Security Burden

Vladislav Zubok discusses Europe's evolving role:

“Old Europe was extremely reluctant to in any way take sides in the war... there is a major change, a major shift of historical proportion, but they're not even close to being able to take care of the security of Europe on their own.”
— Vladislav Zubok [16:47]

U.S. Deterrence and NATO's Stability

Martin Di Caro expresses concerns over U.S. actions:

“The US plays a crucially important role in deterrence, and there are two layers to that...”
— Martin Di Caro [19:23]

He warns that any reduction in U.S. commitment could weaken NATO's deterrent effect against Russian aggression.

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Contingency and Structural Factors in the War's Origin

Historical Continuum and Structural Realities

Vladislav Zubok highlights the deep-seated desire for control over Ukraine:

“There is a long continuum... a Russian desire, effort, will, to control Ukraine. So that's not particular to the last 30 years.”
— Vladislav Zubok [54:48]

Contingent Events Influencing the War

Michael Kimmage and Vladislav Zubok discuss pivotal moments like Viktor Yanukovych's flight in 2014:

“The largest contingency is Viktor Yanukovych's choice to flee Ukraine in the third week of February 2014...”
— Vladislav Zubok [55:43]

This event set off a chain of reactions that escalated tensions and contributed to the current conflict.

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Potential Paths Forward and Future Implications

Possibility of Peace and Future Relations

Marting Di Caro speculates on the potential for a peace deal:

“He [Putin] certainly will try to present whatever happens on the battlefield at the negotiation table as victory...”
— Vladislav Zubok [55:53]

Serhii Plokhy remains cautiously optimistic about future partnerships:

“Russia is not the enemy of the United States. As a matter of fact, after our meeting today, I'm convinced it can be a strong partner and friend.”
— Serhii Plokhy [57:56]

However, both scholars acknowledge significant barriers to achieving meaningful improvement in U.S.-Russian or European-Russian relations without substantial shifts in current policies and perceptions.

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Conclusion

In "3 Years of War: Origins," Martin Di Caro orchestrates a comprehensive examination of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict's historical roots. Through the expertise of Michael Kimmage, Serhii Plokhy, and Vladislav Zubok, the episode elucidates the complex interplay of historical ambitions, ideological convictions, and geopolitical strategies that have perpetuated the war. The discussion underscores the importance of understanding these multifaceted origins to navigate potential resolutions and foster lasting peace in the region.

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Notable Quotes:

• Vladislav Zubok: “What we see here is a classic case of the disintegration of one of the largest world empires.”
  [02:22]

• Serhii Plokhy: “The Cold War days are over. The Cold War is over. The Cold War is over.”
  [02:45]

• Martin Di Caro: “The annexation of Crimea... is deeply damaging over time to Russian interests in the region.”
  [02:53]

• Michael Kimmage: “...the war was not inevitable, but neither was it unforeseeable given the continuum of Russian imperial history.”
  [01:46]

• Serhii Plokhy: “Ukrainians are not supposed to exist as a separate nation, that Ukrainians are part of the Russian nation.”
  [40:51]

• Martin Di Caro: “It's a version of tough love. So it's an effort to push Europeans...”
  [19:23]

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This detailed summary captures the essence of the episode, providing listeners with a comprehensive understanding of the discussions and insights shared by the hosts and guests.

Transcript

[Martin DeCaro]

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[Michael Kimmage]

Vote history as it happens February 21, 20253 years of war Origins this partnership.

[Serhii Plokhy]

Opens the door to cooperation with all of NATO's former adversaries, including Russia, Ukraine and the other newly independent states.

[Michael Kimmage]

We are concerned about the changes that are taking place in NATO.

[Serhii Plokhy]

We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his sou.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Russia's decision to send troops into Crimea has rightly drawn global condemnation.

[Martin DeCaro]

Breaking news overnight. Russia has attacked Ukraine and its people, upending security and stability in Europe.

[Michael Kimmage]

Today I heard, oh well, we weren't invited. Well, you've been there for three years. You should have ended it. Three years. You should have never started it. You could have made a deal. The Trump administration's overtures to the Kremlin are supposed to end an endless war in Eastern Europe started three years ago when Russia invaded Ukraine, a war of aggression meant to swallow its neighbor. The war was not inevitable, but neither was it unforeseeable given the continuum of Russian imperial history, a story weaponized by its 21st century czar, Vladimir Putin. That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Vladislav Zubok]

From the perspective of a historian, I really not so much surprised that this war is happening and NATO has very little to do with that. But why it is not happening in 1991 or 1992? Because what we see here is a classic case of the disintegration of one of the largest world empires.

[Serhii Plokhy]

The Cold War days are over. The Cold War is over. The Cold War is over.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Russia is a Regional power.

[Martin DeCaro]

The annexation of Crimea, which as we all know was popular in Russia, and Putin thinks of it as part of his legacy, is deeply damaging over time to Russian interests in the region.

[Michael Kimmage]

By the time you listen to this podcast, a truce or armistice or maybe even a peace treaty will be signed ending the largest European war since 1945. As I speak into this microphone, events are moving quickly. Negotiations have begun without Ukraine to end the Russo Ukrainian war, now entering its fourth year. The Trump administration's overtures to Moscow were accompanied by appalling rhetoric From Vice President J.D. vance, who only mentioned Ukraine in passing twice in his speech at the Munich Security Conference. Less a speech than a rant about Europe's internal political problems. The threat that I worry the most.

[Martin DeCaro]

About vis a vis Europe is not.

[Michael Kimmage]

Russia, it's not China, it's not any other external actor. And what I worry about is the threat from, from within. The retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values, values shared with.

[Martin DeCaro]

The United States of America.

[Michael Kimmage]

And President Trump, from his moral abyss, said Ukraine, not Russia, was responsible for the war. He insulted President Volodymyr Zelensky, who responded that Trump is a victim of disinformation, essentially a Russian dupe. You should have never started it. You could have made a deal. I could have made a deal for Ukraine that would have given him almost all of the land.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Everything. Almost all of the land.

[Michael Kimmage]

And no people would have been killed and no city would have been demolished and not one dome would have been knocked down. Well, these and other statements by the administration's team of negotiators indicate they may not make too many demands on Russia. We'll see. But it does seem unlikely that any peace deal will hold without the involvement of Ukraine or the European states such as Poland, who have an interest in curbing Russian aggression.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Everyone should know, and I think the United States administration knows, that it is also an important and necessary message to Putin that he cannot count on a reduction of the support because otherwise he would not do the necessary compromises. And so I think a strong Ukraine, which gets our support, a strong message to the, to the Russian president that the support of the United States and of Europe will continue. And then the request for a fair peace that is not a dictated peace is what we should look for and what we can achieve.

[Michael Kimmage]

Germany's Olaf Scholz. This is the first episode in a three part series marking the third anniversary of the full scale war. Understanding how we got here is vital to the cause of peace. How can any war be settled if we don't understand its origins. Understanding motivations is critical. For instance, the NATO issue. Let's rewind 24 years. June 2001. President George W. Bush in his first meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin. A news conference in Slovenia. A Russian TV reporter asks both men about the wisdom of expanding NATO to the east. Pardon the slight hum in this audio. First you'll hear Bush, then Putin speaking through his interpreter.

[Serhii Plokhy]

You talked about the expansion of NATO. Thank you. I did. I said I thought that was a wise thing for NATO to expand so long as nations met their obligations and fulfilled their met what's called the map process. I said yesterday in Poland, I felt like a secure border for Russia, a border with safe and friendly nations is positive. And I expressed my government's position very plainly. And the president, of course, had a reaction, which I'm sure he'll give you right now.

[Martin DeCaro]

She has his leisure.

[Serhii Plokhy]

Yeah, I'm going to lay it out for you. I'm going to lay it out for you. Look, I'm going to read to you. I'm going to read to you something which is recently declassified. This was printed a while back, but there's a document attached, addendum documents which were secret, copy, declassified. It was top secret. Look, here it is. This is a note of the Soviet government from 1954 sent to the countries of NATO. Here's what it says. The leadership holding to its inalienable policy and taking into account all the tensions. The Soviet government announces its intention to enter into discussions with NATO countries about its participation in NATO with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And this was the answer. Look, here's the answer. There is no need to stress the completely unrealistic nature of such a proposal from the Soviet Union. That's the answer that NATO gave. So what we're talking about here, do you remember about a year ago, I think, somebody asked the question about what's your attitude? Is it possible that Russia is going to join in NATO or not? I said, why not? And right away, Mrs. Albright, former secretary, said she was someplace on a trip to Europe. She said, look, we're not talking about this right now.

[Michael Kimmage]

Now, it's impossible to imagine such a scene today, given Putin's hardline position and his obsession with keeping Ukraine out of any Western alliance, which is Ukraine's right as an independent nation. But NATO is only one piece of a larger puzzle that we must solve to understand how this war came about. Speaking of the Munich security conference in 2007, Putin was there delivering a warning to the West. He said NATO Enlargement represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust and we have the right to ask against whom is this expansion intended? But Putin addressed much else besides as he declared an end to the idea of a unipolar world. He said, however, one might embellish this term. At the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision making. It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within. He is obviously referring to the United States there now. Putin's speech amounted to a wholesale rejection of the US Led order, the post Cold War security order in Europe from which in Putin's view, Russia had been unfairly excluded. So Russia would now play by its own rules to try to regain great power status, and that would mean Ukraine would not be free to go its own way. Michael Kimage is director of the Wilson Center's Kennan Institute here in Washington. From 2014-17 he was on the Secretary's Policy planning staff at the State Department where he held the Russia Ukraine portfolio. He is the author of the War in Ukraine and the Origins of the New Global Instability. And Serhii Ploki is an expert on Ukrainian history at Harvard and the author of the Russo Ukrainian the Return of History, which I read to prepare for this podcast. I read Michael Kimmage's book last year. Michael Kimmage, welcome back.

[Martin DeCaro]

Great to be back with you.

[Michael Kimmage]

Martin and Serhi Ploki, welcome to the podcast. Your first time on. It's great to have you here.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Well, it's a pleasure to be on the podcast.

[Michael Kimmage]

We'll discuss the arguments you make in your book about the origins of the war in a moment. But let's begin with what just happened at the Munich Security Conference. I learned from Michael Kimmage once that the most famous speech ever given at that conference was in 2007 by voice Vladimir Putin declaring an end to the age of unipolarity. And now the second most famous speech in the history of the Munich Security conference, Vice President J.D. vance and his unsettling remarks to an audience of European elites. But I think we should focus on what he had to say about Ukraine, which was not much. He did not have a coherent plan yet for how to end the war and how Ukraine will end up after some kind of settlement here. What were your thoughts on Vance's speech as it pertains to Ukraine and the war.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Like many people probably in the audience in Munich, I expected that there would be a plan, that there would be some clarity, and that there would be simply more attention paid to Ukraine. So on that level, that was a disappointment. So all of that suggests to me that there is no clear plan. There are probably opportunity for people both in Washington, depending on where their position is, for President Zelenskyy, who certainly was at Munich and then proceeded to go to Saudi Arabia, for Zelenskyy and his people, to influence maybe the direction of American thinking in that regard, where Zelenskyy said that, of course, Ukraine would not accept any agreements unless Ukraine is at the table.

[Michael Kimmage]

Michael Kimmich, is it possible to have a peace deal or an armistice? Peace is another matter, an equitable, enduring peace versus just a truce. Is it possible to have this without Ukrainian input?

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, I think the clear and simple answer to that question is no. And at the same time that it's very important to analyze what is and what is not. In Vice President Vance's speech at Munich, it is the case that there is an ongoing relationship between the government of Ukraine and the Trump administration. There is back and forth, and there will be in the weeks and months to come. So I don't think, for me, the concern, whatever was signaled and symbolized in the VAN speech, I don't think the concern is lack of dialogue. We'll give you kind of two general points that I think of in terms of this particular moment. One of them is outlining a potential possibility, and the other is outlining a concern that at least I have about how things are being done at the moment. And I think that what President Trump has afforded himself, you know, we'll recall also that in the second inaugural address, there was no mention of Ukraine as well. And that's a kind of parallel with the second inaugural and the VAN speech at Munich. What President Trump has afforded himself by not putting a plan out in public and not stipulating what his agenda is or criteria or negotiating points are, is he's given himself a huge amount of freedom and latitude. So he has all kinds of open space diplomatically. He's not really committed to anything. And if this comes to pass in the course of the negotiations, he has the virtue of surprise. And unlike many moments in the past, he is forcing President Putin to respond to him at the current moment, and this could change at the current moment, it is President Trump who's setting the tone and Putin who has to respond. So I think all of that describes I'll emphasize the word potentially. Potentially an opportunity in the situation for negotiations to go somewhere. I'll move now to the concern that I have that. And it echoes what Serhi said a moment ago. Diplomacy is very often about process. Ukraine is the primary agent in this war. Europe is an extremely important agent, not less important than the United States in terms of provision of support to Ukraine. And certainly the interests of the war considered concern Europe more immediately than they do the United States. So in terms of process and format, there really is no way that any of this can be conducted without Ukraine and without Europe. I don't think that that's really what the Trump administration is up to, that they're going to do this completely solo. But it's all going to depend for its success on process and consultation. So the speed of everything at the moment, to me, is a concern. And secondly, you know, I put out a piece in Foreign Policy a few days ago to this effect, which it appears the Trump administration didn't listen to. I would have preferred a much more private approach. I think it might have been fine to push in private for some of this diplomatic activity, but not to set so many benchmarks in public. And by having a meeting in Saudi Arabia, by doing that so publicly, it does create expectations that then either are going to be met or not met. And so you're sort of pulling yourself along in the process faster than it may make sense to go. So the opportunity is the latitude that President Trump currently has, which is very considerable. And the concern I have is about process and tempo.

[Michael Kimmage]

In the world of podcasting, this does happen. We are speaking, recording our conversation on the 17th. The meeting in Saudi Arabia is the 18th, but this podcast won't be published until February 21st. So that said, Serhi, go ahead.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Yes, I agree with Michael. It's one thing to conduct consultations in private, which is certainly not just expected. It is absolutely necessary. And another thing, have formal negotiations announced and. And having them on that level without any participation of allies in Europe or Ukraine, the country that, of course, is de facto at this point, US Ally. So that is a concern.

[Michael Kimmage]

Another issue that came up at Munich was the potential benefits or drawbacks of European states shouldering a larger security burden. A European state taking on the primary responsibility of defending Ukraine. Europe is a prosperous continent. Why is that such a thorny issue? I mean, shouldn't European states, at this point, Serhi. Be able to do this?

[Vladislav Zubok]

Yes. It's long overdue for Europe to treat the defense of the members of the European Union and European states in General, to treat much more seriously the US Nuclear umbrella, but also security de facto guarantees that are provided through NATO. This is something that turned Europe into really economic superpower and strategic, at least in military terms, a dwarf. And that has to change. I think that the realization of that is certainly something that is already happening in Europe. The major problem and issue is that it would take for Europe some time to build up its industry, to build up its armed forces, to figure out the configuration in which de facto alliance within NATO, outside of NATO, would be happening. Europe as of today is certainly not prepared to take any, or at least without the United States be able to fully protect itself, itself. As Michael said, Europe contributed in a major way to supporting Ukraine, both financially, but also in terms of supply and weapons and ammunition and ammunition and so on and so forth.

[Michael Kimmage]

More so Eastern Europe when it comes to supplying weapons and helping with refugees than what you call old Europe in your book.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Old Europe certainly was very reluctant to in any way take sides in the war, the big war that started in 2022. That was extremely, extremely slow, very difficult. And in my book, I quote the words of mayor of Kyiv, Mr. Klitschko, who because of his boxing career has this, his name has world recognition. And certainly he lived in Germany, very popular in Germany. And he said after the first supply of the helmets that came from Germany and there was nothing else, he said what we should expect next, whether it would be pillows or not, slowly, because of the leadership shown on the one hand by the United States, but also by Baltic states, by Poland, old Europe reluctantly showed up. So they are there. There is a major change, a major shift of historical proportion, but they're not even close to be able to take care of the security of Europe on their own.

[Martin DeCaro]

Two things come to mind. I think that there is an effort on the part of the Trump administration to create insecurity in Europe. I think that that's maybe being over interpreted at the moment as a break in the transatlantic alliance or a kind of abandonment of Ukraine. I don't see that as the Trump White House position, but I think there's the sense that you have to create insecurity and almost fear in Europe, which I think Vice President Vance succeeded at doing in his Munich speech for the sake of getting the Europeans to move. In their analysis of the Trump administration's analysis, Biden and almost all previous American presidents were far too indulgent of Europe for exactly the in the dynamic that Serhi was just outlining a moment ago, where a lot of the commitments were American and Europe was sort of lagging behind on security. You know, this is just an interpretation. I don't know exactly how the Trump administration thinks on these points, but I think it's a version of tough love. So it's an effort to push Europeans, and this has happened in the past in the first Trump administration, it could happen again that this is the starkest presentation of the American position and that the US May move a little bit more to a moderate position, balancing certain commitments with the Europeans in terms of defense and security of Ukraine. So it's their way of pushing, and we'll see what the results of that will be. That's the first point. Second point, though, is one that I would want to impress upon the Trump administration if I would have the chance to do so. The US Plays a crucially important role in deterrence, and there are two layers to that. There's, of course, deterrence within NATO, the NATO member states, but there's also, I would say, deterrence as it's being played out on the battlefields of Ukraine. So as a pressuring move to kind of threaten less US Participation makes, I think, a kind of sense. But if the US Were seriously to pull back, then the deterrent effects of just the overall transatlantic posture would start to diminish, and one simply doesn't know what Russia would do under those circumstances. So there's a lot, and it has to do with nuclear deterrence on one level, but there are many other forms of deterrence that are very, very significant. And one worries that it's a bit like a Jenga tower, that if you would pull out some of the American capabilities for whatever reason, that the whole edifice would not be able to stand. So that is a responsibility that any US Administration would have. Trump or Biden, I don't think that they're unaware of that in the White House, but they're obviously willing to play with elements of that or play with the messaging around elements of that for the sake of getting greater European participation. But best case scenario is that the shock of the Munich speech does compel Europeans to do things that they might not have considered doing a week ago. And we have a statement from the British prime minister about providing British troops on the ground in Ukraine, which had been a trial balloon floated by Emmanuel Macron very theoretically a few months ago. It feels more real at the moment, and perhaps that, in turn will convince the Trump administration that they're accomplishing something with their tough love. But they will also remain very committed to deterring Russian aggression and the spread of Russian military power in Europe, sort of along the old Cold War containment lines. But it's those two points that come to mind. A pressure campaign against Europe, to be sure, but the sheer drama of the US really changing its position and what that could mean for deterring Russian military power.

[Michael Kimmage]

There's already talk of the Trump administration wanting to possibly, again, this is just talk, withdraw U.S. forces or NATO forces from the states in Eastern Europe like the Baltics. These things have to be handled with care. But we know the Trump administration or President Trump himself likes to have these public negotiating tactics. Right?

[Martin DeCaro]

Just that. As a very quick footnote, Martin, that US Force presence in the Baltics is symbolically very important at the moment. But what's more urgent is provision of US Intelligence to Ukraine, targeting assistance with Ukraine, and whether or not there's going to be another supplemental. So front and center in this story is a little bit less Europe, which is not under attack at the moment. Front and center in the story is really the nature of the US Commitment.

[Vladislav Zubok]

To Ukraine, if I can add, we talked about new Europe being different from old Europe. And Baltics are part of new Europe who are leading this European effort with regard to helping Ukraine. And the percent of GDP that they're spending on military is higher than it is in the United States. So the Baltics and Poland are natural allies of the United States in that regard, holding Russia back, but also trying to push Europe, old Europe and Europe as a whole in the right direction. Just removing troops from that region would have also really negative impact of the sort that Michael just described, but also on the political level as well, because you are basically punishing your closest allies in Europe at this point.

[Michael Kimmage]

There are 600 US troops in Estonia, according to the US embassy in Estonia. Just looking that up online here. I have one other question about what's happening now. I'll address it to Michael Kimmage and then we'll dive into some of the history. This question is historically related. It is something that we have discussed on the podcast many times before NATO. So Pete Hegseth, the new secretary of Defense, made some public remarks about, sorry, Ukraine is never going to join NATO. Michael, I wasn't aware that anyone actually expected Ukraine to ever join NATO. So why was this so shocking to some ears?

[Martin DeCaro]

I think there are a couple of things to say in this regard. You know, the first and most obvious is that this is what Russia wants to hear at the moment. That's of course not impossible in a set of negotiations, that there could be concessions made or one could say things that Russia wants to hear. But the obvious question is why do that at the outset with nothing in return that you're getting? At the very least, you would want to try to earn something with those remarks. I think I understand why for Trump world, that was important to say because they see it as a statement of fact, a kind of statement of reality. Let's sort of clear the table and show our cards clearly. But in the context of very quick to begin negotiations, that's certainly one question to ask. Secondly, and this is a bit more on the technical side, it's certainly within the capacity of various heads of state or foreign ministers, ministers of defense, secretaries of defense to make these kinds of statements. But the open door policy of NATO is in the founding documents of the NATO alliance. So I don't know how you get it out of those founding documents. I guess you could say it's not the intent of the United States to do this at the moment, but to be too sweeping about it becomes something of a contradiction of fact. I guess you could change that policy, but that's never been done. I think thirdly, and this is where the absence of Ukraine from Vice President Vance's speech and from President Trump's inaugural address is of concern, it has been a strong desire on the part of Ukraine to join NATO. That doesn't mean that the United States is going to grant the wish. But there are questions of domestic politics in Ukraine, morale on the part of Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainian civilians. And so if that's the position, if everybody kind of knows it, why say it now? And why do it at a moment where there does seem to be a high level of transatlantic tension when there may be negotiations with Russia? So I think those are all the questions to ask. But, you know, it's the kind of thing that American Secretary of Defense can certainly say. You know, President Trump has reiterated that message on the campaign trail and, and elsewhere. So it's not shocking, but it's hard to understand, or at least for me, hard to understand the tactics of saying it at this moment. And in that context?

[Michael Kimmage]

Well, it's in the Ukrainian constitution joining NATO and Donald Trump. The larger context here is that he has blamed the war for the NATO issue, which is not correct. Long before President Putin, they said there's no way they'd allow that. This has been going on for many, many years.

[Serhii Plokhy]

They've been saying that for a long time.

[Michael Kimmage]

It's one of many issues that have led to the ruination of US Russian relations. And also Trump has yet to criticize Putin's war of aggression. In his remarks about the coming peace negotiations, he's placing the entire burden on Europe and Ukraine, not Russia. So Serhii Ploki, in your book we'll start at 30,000ft. Why do states act? The opening chapters of your book on the historical origins suggest at least this is my reading of it, that if not a hot war, some level of hostility or conflict between Russia and the West, Russia and Europe was very likely, if not inevitable. Considering Russia's authoritarian retrenchment after 1999. We can even maybe go to 1993 when Yeltsin had the tanks fire on the Russian White House. Russia's authoritarianism versus Ukraine's move toward democracy and pluralistic politics and toward the West. So we had these two countries diverging in their post Cold War path. So this is a long way of introducing a question. To what degree did the form of government determine or influence each state's behavior here in Russia's ultimately hostile and hot war aggression against Ukraine?

[Vladislav Zubok]

Yes, there has been a lot said about expansion of NATO and allegedly Russia's war in Ukraine. In response to that, from the perspective of a historian, I really not so much surprised that this war is happening and NATO has very little to do with that. But why it is not happening in 1991 or 1992? Because what we see here is a classic case of the disintegration of one of the largest world empires after the British Empire. The Russian Empire was the largest one and it's contingency. So the question was how it happened that they didn't fight in 91, 92. That's the question that I am asking in my book. What we see is the Russia behaves like most of the old metropolis of the major empires. It tries to wage a war to keep control over its possessions, former possessions, in this case not colonies, but the territories that it controlled. And the fact that Ukraine developed democratic form of government doesn't help Russia to achieve its goal. On the one hand, it's much easier for Russia to deal with the autocrats in the region, like Lukashenko in Belarus. So you make deals with those strong men, you bribe them, get some guarantees from them, and you move on. You take over informal or formal control of the country or territory. When you deal with a democratic state, like it was the case in Ukraine, you can make 1000 deals with President Kuchma, with President Yanukovych, but then Maidan comes to the fore, the society rebels and all your deals, all the money that you invested, actually go away. That's one reason why Russia is not happy about Ukrainian democracy. Another reason is that if Ukraine can be a successful democratic state, and you say that Russians and Ukrainians are one and the same people, and you say that Russia can't be run in any other way but autocratic way. Democratic Ukraine in that case undermines the legitimacy of your autocratic regime in Russia. If Ukrainians can do that, why Russians cannot do? And that's a big threat, that's much bigger threat than NATO can actually present to the regime in Kremlin. The democratization of Russia itself. So this is second point and the third, the last one is that as a democratic country, Ukraine actually has a chance of joining European Union and potentially NATO. European Union is a club of democratic states. Russia as autocratic state, forget the territory, the size, because it's not democratic, it can join the European Union. So undermining or killing democracy in Ukraine helps to put authoritarian ruler in charge. Another Lukashenko, protect the regime in Moscow and preclude the Ukrainian escape to the west and join in the club of democratic nations. A lot of support for Ukraine today depends on Ukraine being democratic, at least rhetorically. A lot of people saying about that. The question is raised about elections during the war. So in one way or another, the democracy is an important part of Ukraine's strength on the international arena, its ability to attract support.

[Serhii Plokhy]

Russia has tended to view the expansion of freedom and democracy as a threat to its interests. The opposite is true. Free and prosperous societies on Russia's borders will advance Russia's interests by serving as sources of stability and economic opportunity.

[Martin DeCaro]

I would focus in on taking everything Serhiy has just said and focusing in on one particular point when it comes to Russian decision making, which to me carries Russia beyond. I don't know if there's such a thing as conventional autocracy, but from autocracy to something closer to dictatorship. And at this moment in our news media, there's a lot of rhetoric about Russia winning and Russian strategy working. And I would very much want to challenge that through a particular interpretation which really rests on Russia being a dictatorship. And just as the exceptionally heavy handed nature of Russian foreign policy, which I think a more balanced Russian decision making process would not enable, I want to use three examples here in chronological succession. So the annexation of Crimea, which as we all know was popular in Russia and Putin thinks of as part of his legacy, is deeply damaging over time to Russian interests in the region, it alienates Russia from populations in Ukraine that might have been at least more neutral before the annexation of Crimea. It creates a whole host of security problems for Russia and practical problems about water supply to Crimea and other things that are difficult to resolve for Russia without the resort to future military force. I think it will be looked back upon. I say, maybe with a degree of optimism from the present moment, but we looked upon as a very, very bad move on Russia's part, a move that compelled all kinds of other mistakes, but the heavy handedness of it is the striking feature. Secondly, and this has only become clear in the last couple of weeks or months, the complete reliance on Bashar Al Assad in Syria, which is very similar to the reliance that Russia had on Yanukovych in Ukraine. It's not that Yanukovych was a Russian creation, but there was a working relationship there. And when Yanukovych fled the scene, Russia no longer had many formal levers of influence in Ukraine. And we see the same pattern repeating itself in Syria. It's the kind of move that a dictator like Putin makes because of the gain that he felt he could get from the relationship with Assad. But Assad falls, and there's no legitimacy to the Russian presence in Syria. And then finally, the Russian invasion in 2022 of Ukraine, which I believe rather firmly will and already is over time, be catastrophic for Russia. And if Russia is able to solidify the current line of contact through negotiation and diplomacy, you know, what does that mean for Russia in terms of the expenditure of how many lives? 700,000, 750,000 Russian lives, enormous amounts of materiel, broken relationships with many countries across the world for the sake of what? For the sake of this much more square mileage or kilometers of territory in Ukraine, I see no ways in which that really advances Russia's health as a country. Strategic interests, et cetera. And so I think that this dictatorial autocracy is really going from failure to failure in its foreign policy. And a more balanced political system would at least provide criticism of that. But that's not possible in the Russian system because Putin is so insulated. But I'm especially concerned to make that argument now that people are kind of presenting Putin, as has happened a few times in the past, as this strategic genius, which I do not believe him to be.

[Michael Kimmage]

Yeah, what the hell is Russia winning? The depopulated and destroyed parts of the Donbass? If Russia claims to have annexed these areas, does that mean Russia now is responsible for paying for their reconstruction and making them livable parts of the Russian Federation? It's estimated that there are now only 6 million people left in all of the occupied territory. That's about 20% of Eastern and southern southeastern Ukraine is, according to the New York Times, as of last June.

[Vladislav Zubok]

What Putin is doing would be and is possible only in the conditions of autocracy and bordering on, really dictatorship. The war on Ukraine, the big war on Ukraine in 2022. The majority of Russian elites actually were surprised by what happened. I have no doubt that the Russian course will be corrected. But in the conditions of this authoritarian dictatorial power of one man, that can happen only when that man actually is not in office anymore. That's how correction historically is taking place in Russia. Stalin's death, the removal of Khrushchev, the death of Brezhnev and rise of Gorbachev. And there is a pattern that because there is no normal process of replacing the leadership, the elite, every next leader that comes to power, he, and it's always here, not only corrects the course, but also tries to destroy his predecessor. Khrushchev was trying to do that with Stalin. Brezhnev certainly was viewed very negatively by Gorbachev. Gorbachev was considered to be the worst thing that could happen to Russia and to the Soviet Union by Yeltsin and so on and so forth. So there will be correction in the conditions of absence of democracy. That can happen only with the change, with the change of the Supreme Leader.

[Michael Kimmage]

Michael, if you want to respond to Serhi, but answer this question first. When it comes to succession, Putin's a fairly old guy. He's in his 70s. Does he not have any children?

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, this is, you know, I mean, I think he has two daughters, and then, you know, I think a couple of other families here and there, about which there's been a bit more publicity recently. But I'm not sure if you're asking the question in a kind of metaphoric way, has he. Has he cultivated or nurtured anyone to take over his. His position? I don't see it. It's a feature of Putinist autocracy that Putin himself, who's sort of half man of action, half man of intelligence and half mediocrity, Putin is surrounded by people who are almost complete mediocrities, whether you're talking about Dmitry Medvedev or as we've seen in the course of the war, the military command in Russia and figures like Prime Minister Mirchustin and others, these are just very mediocre figures. And that must speak to Putin's insecurities or his sense of how he has to distinguish himself from the people around him. So I'm not aware of him grooming really anyone is very difficult to imagine. But to give you an adequate answer to the question, if from anywhere, then certainly from the FSB and the security services. And that's, you know, the institution that gave Putin his political power to begin with. It's certainly an institution into which he's poured enormous resources. And if you had to look anywhere, I think you would have to look there. Not to the military. And I don't know what politics is in Russia at this point. There's no functioning parliament, to be sure, or political institutions or political parties. But from the domain of Russian politics, whatever it is, I see nobody who could kind of rise up and come and replace Putin. Of course, we could go back to the Prigozhin affair of the summer of 2023 to speak of a kind of bastard child of Putinism, this sort of paramilitary forces and, you know, strange structures that have arisen in Russia as a result of the war and the way that the war has been funded and fought and. And maybe that's where a kind of anti Putin could come from. But, no, it's not a system that seems, on the level of leadership, really able to replicate itself. And that puts us back perhaps to where the Soviet Union was in the early 1950s with the death of Stalin, and how long it took for that. That system to find a pathway forward.

[Michael Kimmage]

It's not a hereditary monarchy. So if he had a son who was, I don't know, 50 years old, apparently he doesn't. I'm not sure that that person, his son, would get the job or even want the job. But let's return, though, to Putin and ideology and the arguments in Serhi's book about the origins of this war. Because this subject has fascinated me over the past three years, the notion of Putin's ideology. I've said many times, and I'm not an expert on this, but I don't see any ideological system underpinning Putinism, especially not at first, when he was consolidating his autocracy. To me, it was about the restoration of Russian state power, Russian greatness, simple patriotism. Serhi, your book made me reconsider my position because it seems that Putin's ideology is history, or at least his understanding of Russia's historical role, historical power, and how that then influences behavior today. So I've started this section of the conversation talking about why do states act? Are they acting based on their interests or based on some deep layer of ideology buried in their society? We're an autocracy, so we act this way. Really, these things interact with Each other. Is Putin's ideology some kind of ex post facto construction used to justify his foreign policy? Or does he really believe what he says about history? And maybe you should tell us a little bit about what his historical interpretation is while you answer this question.

[Vladislav Zubok]

Judge Cannon, after whom the institute that Michael directs, he wrote first in 1946, dispatch that was called Long Telegram in 1947 published a very important influential article on the sources of the Soviet conduct. In Kennan's view, there were two key sources of the way how the Soviet Union behaved During World War II, at the beginning of the Cold War. The first was related to Marxism and Marxist ideas. Another was related to to the Russian imperialism. What we witnessed at the end of the Cold war and in 1992, that Marxist part just disappeared. And what left out of this canon's interpretation was Russian imperialism. Not just Putin, but significant part of Russian elite felt to be betrayed by some sort of communist ideology. The way in which the Soviet Union was constructed and looked for the glorious past. And that glorious past was in Russian imperial history before 1917. That's where Putin gets his ideas. The bridge between the Russian imperial ideology and Putin and elite. Around him is the Nobel Prize winner writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who was transmitting or adapting to this Soviet and then post Soviet era the ideas from Russian imperial past. If you look today at the map where the Russians are in the Crimea, in southern Ukraine and in Donbass, that map comes directly from the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn from 1990s where he was saying that these are historical Russian lands, they have to be part of Russia. So this is imperial understanding of history. And for Putin mission, his mission in history because he is now what, close to quarter of a century in power. His thinking is about the way, how he will be presented in the Russian history textbooks. His idea is to make Russia great again, which the way how he imagines that is within the context of the former imperial ideologues and imperial ideas. And one of those ideas is that Ukrainians are not supposed to exist as a separate nation, that Ukrainians are part of Russian nation. That's a classic pre1917 Russian imperial thinking. So Putin now takes this ideas from 19th century and tries to run policy on the basis of it in the 21st century. And he destroys of course good part of Ukraine, but for Russia itself he ends up in a ditch.

[Michael Kimmage]

He is the world leader who may spend the most time lecturing, discussing, arguing, formulating history. Michael Kimmage, do you agree that it's Putin's interpretation of history that colors what he perceives to be Russia's interests.

[Martin DeCaro]

Absolutely. It's true that he's history obsessed. There are of course, lots of contradictions in this. It goes without saying that he is a combination of a fanatic and a hack when it comes to history. And here you have all kinds of complexities about the Russian imperial past and the Soviet past, where the role of the church seems very difficult to figure in both and yet seems to sort of function that way. And then you have Putin blaming Lenin for in effect giving too much territory or too much space to Ukraine and his sort of complicated ideas about the Soviet Union, and yet his not quite reverence for Stalin, but willingness to walk in Stalin's footprints and that then of course, the whole the rendering into mythology of the Second World War, which is sort of integral to Putinist politics, and the celebration of May 9th Nazis in Ukraine, that as well, and a kind of Second World War matrix that's applied to all kinds of things. And Putin is somebody who's himself from Leningrad, St. Petersburg and the obsessions with the Russian imperial past. And the sort of wisecrack that Foreign Minister Lavrov had, that Putin's real advisors are Ivan the Terrible and Catherine the Great and Peter the Great is a mordant commentary on all of that. The only thing I would add to that, and I don't think think it's in tangent with anything that Serhi just said a moment ago, is that Putin is in every respect a 21st century leader. So by saying that Putin is obsessed with history, I wouldn't want to suggest that Putin's gaze is too retrospective. It is that, but it's also a very forward looking gaze. And that's about the Russian relationship with China and that's about the turn of Russia in the 1990s, from a kind of post Soviet economy to crony capitalist state heavy economy. And I think in Russia's diplomacy over the last couple of years, you've seen very vigorous efforts to make inroads into Latin America, into the Middle east and to Africa. And all of that is about building up foundations and structures of Russian power that are intended to be used in the future. So absolutely history obsessed. It's part of the darkest side or one of the many dark sides of Vladimir Putin. The obsessive willingness to do violence in the name of writing historical wrongs, as he would put it, or addressing historical grievances, but really not in a way that's meant to bring Russia back into the 19th century, but has a Kind of modernizing quality for Russian foreign policy. You know, Putin is that speaking of history, that sort of classic Russian leader who modernizes for the sake of geopolitical power. As long as we remember that the geopolitical power is at the essence of the vision and the history is kind of the trappings of it. I think we get the proportions right. He's a leader interested in history for the sake of being a leader, not for the sake of the history.

[Michael Kimmage]

We don't have time to go over all the intricacies of Russia and Ukraine, the people, the language, the culture, the geography, the territorial conquests of the past several hundred years, except to say that, yeah, it's true that Russia did dominate this part of the planet for some time, but that ended in 1991. Time to move on, Vladimir. But to Michael Kimmage's point, Serhi, he doesn't talk about old Russia. The formulation is new Russia, capital n New Russia. What is new Russia?

[Vladislav Zubok]

There is more than one new Russia. Of course, the new Russia that was used the most was the name of the imperial province in what is today southern Ukraine and Crimea. And that name and the old maps were brought to the fore, to the light of day, trying to justify Russian rights for Ukraine, in particular southern Ukraine. Then, of course, there is this Russia that Putin is trying to build. It's not just part of Ukraine, but Russian state as a whole. I want to build on what Michael just said about Putin coming from St. Petersburg and being a classic tyrant who modernizes for the purposes of being able to wage the war and achieve geopolitical goals. The irony is also that another guy from St. Petersburg, who founded the city and who was this modernizing despot, he is known also in Russian history for, quote, unquote, opening the window in Europe. And what is happening with Putin now is actually closing this window in Europe in many ways. Oil and gas trade that started at the time of Ostpolitik in the early 1970s now comes to an end 50 years after detente started in Europe. A huge reorientation toward China, sort of rebuilding the alliance that existed between China and the Soviet Union in the 1950s. I think that it would be difficult, almost impossible, for him to reorient Russia and Russian elite that since time of Peter I, since the early 18th century, oriented itself toward Europe, reorient them culturally and otherwise toward China. Because if you ask Russians with any sort of means whether they would prefer spending their holidays in Beijing versus Paris or London, the answer would be, of course, very clear, or where they want to park their money in Switzerland, in London or in Beijing. Again, the answer would would be very clear. So it is a historical shift that he is trying to arrange here. I think that there would be a pushback on the part of Russian elites and Russian society vis a vis too close ties to China once Putin is not in charge anymore.

[Martin DeCaro]

Martin, if I could just add one very quick footnote. It's a phrase from one of Serhi's books, but not the Russo Ukrainian War, but from an equally wonderful book titled the Lost Kingdom, which is a history of Russian foreign policy. And I would recommend it to any of your listeners who's trying to get an understanding of Russian motivations and the wellsprings of Russian action in recent years, because it provides the deep history for that. But the phrase is conservative utopia. I hope I'm not getting it wrong, Serhi, but it's something in the mind of Vladimir Putin, and I think the way that those two things interact is just looking at it very dryly is quite fascinating that there's an extreme conservatism of going back, an urge to restore, reclaim, regather the Russian lands, as Putin would put it. And at the same time there's this utopianism about a kind of sickly utopianism, but nevertheless something that's there. And in that sense he's a leader who's quite unlike, I don't know, Erdogan might be a little bit similar, but I can't think of many leaders on the world stage who have that quality of being invested in a creation of a conservative utopia.

[Michael Kimmage]

Like all national origin stories, the one that Putin tells has a mix of facts and myth. And for a while I've been grappling with this question. How much of this does Putin actually believe? Or is he just saying it for public presentation in order to justify what he wants to do in the foreign policy realm? Well, I'm convinced now that he actually does believe all of these things, or at least he's come to believe them all over the years. His interpretation of the Russian past and which lands properly belong in Russia. I think he actually does believe it. I can't be sure of that. I've never sat him down on a couch and psychoanalyzed him. But we'll wrap up here and I'll invoke Michael Kimmage, your book Collisions, which we discussed one year ago for my podcasts about the second anniversary of the Russian invasion. Beneath the level of ideology, at ground level, the events and the developments. And Sara, you cover these as well in your book. The events, the Developments, the incidents that have happened over the past 20, 25, 30 years, war was not inevitable. Looking back on it from our vantage today, the democracy versus autocracy framing it can look like some level of conflict was inevitable. Russia, the autocracy trying to squash Ukraine from becoming a democratic nation. But on this road to war, the milestones, even as late as 2011, Michael Kimmage, Obama and Medvedev are signing a treaty, the New START Treaty. In other words, the story wasn't entirely negative. It wasn't just a straight line towards war. Who knows, a year, two years, three years from now, there might be an opening for better US Russian relations. I don't know. Maybe I'm being too optimistic.

[Martin DeCaro]

If you engage historians in this kind of conversation, as you're so gifted at doing, Martin, I think what we're prone to emphasize, we historians, is contingency, and we do want to have respect for that in this situation. To me, the largest contingency is Viktor Yanukovych's choice to flee Ukraine in the third week of February 2014, because I do think that that sets in motion a series of developments that were not foreordained and that seemed to have been very difficult for every relevant country in power to navigate and to manage. The United States was at a loss for what to do at that moment. Ukraine was in disarray when Yanukovych left, and I think Russia was, if not surprised, was sort of provoked into certain kinds of action by that that it might not have considered a few months before or under other circumstances. And so that's very important. And if you have those contingencies, then it certainly means, as you're suggesting, Martin, that there will be many such contingencies in the future and that they could make the story, as it's been in the last couple of days and as it will be, I think, for the next couple of months, a story of very unexpected developments. But I wouldn't want to be too, in a sense, too committed to the place of contingency in all of this without, of course, acknowledging inevitability. I think that there are just two principles to bear in mind. And one is that there is a long continuum, which Serhii and many other historians have documented, a long continuum of attitude and of strategy and of action that have amounted to a Russian desire, effort, will, to control Ukraine. So that's not particular to the last 30 years. That's embedded in hundreds of years of history, history of the Soviet Union, history of the Russian Empire. And that's not a contingency That's a deep structural reality of the situation and is essentially important for understanding what happened in 2014 with the first iteration of this war and then again 2022 with the second iteration. And if we have a failed negotiation and a failed peace, there will be a third iteration and it will also stem from that circumstance of a Russian will to control. And secondly, I'll sort of conclude on this point, since it's your last question to us for this conversation. Martin. There is a story of neglecting Ukrainian nationhood, statehood and Ukrainian interests. That's a story that you can tell in Washington. It's also a story that you can tell across Europe, where there has been a high level of comfort with what I describe in the book as half steps and half measures. This goes back to the Budapest memorandum in which Ukraine's security was promised but not guaranteed, or the Bucharest NATO summit in 2008, where membership in NATO, going back to that question, was promised to Ukraine but not delivered in Bucharest.

[Serhii Plokhy]

We must make clear that NATO welcomes the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine for their membership in NATO and offers them a clear path forward to meet that goal.

[Martin DeCaro]

2014 Minsk diplomacy, where European powers say that there's going to be a strong effort to restore full Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty. And yet, even when that didn't come to pass, European countries were willing to normalize relations with Russia. And that, to me, is a very important structural feature of this story as well. Half steps and half measures when it comes to the inclusion of Ukraine in Europe and to full respect for Ukrainian nationhood and statehood. And so in a way, those two structural circumstances, this half steps and half measures, on the one hand, a Russian will to control, on the other, they really vex the contingencies of the last 10 years. And that's how I would put the pieces together. The contingencies are there, but these structural features also shape the outcome of the story.

[Michael Kimmage]

How about Putin as an opportunity? Maybe he'll see an opportunity here to get out from underneath the disaster that he has caused while still being able to declare victory publicly.

[Vladislav Zubok]

He certainly will try to present whatever happens on the battlefield at the negotiation table as victory. Putin is someone who is really well known to the world after being quarter of a century in power. And we know that after quote, unquote, peace deal, he would come back and attack. I don't see him changing that sort of behavior. That was the situation in Chechnya. There was the second Chechen war. There was the situation certainly in Georgia, where eventually he was able to install a pro Russian government. After the Crimea, he returned and came back to Ukraine. So that's where I see him being opportunistic. But other than that, I think that he will continue on that path. And as long as he continues on that path, I can't imagine not only a stable peace in Ukraine, but also any sort of meaningful improvement of European Russian relations or US Russian relations. There can be efforts. There will be attempt of some sort of quick fix, but medium to long term, I don't see that happening. Once the stable peace in Ukraine is achieved, then there will be an opportunity. But that opportunity will very much depend on where Russia will end up vis a vis China, because the biggest issue for American policy is, of course, China. And in that sense, that Russian position vis a vis China would also that will be an important factor influencing whether there can be good American Russian relations in the future or not.

[Serhii Plokhy]

Russia is not the enemy of the United States. As a matter of fact, after our meeting today, I'm convinced it can be a strong partner and friend.

[Michael Kimmage]

On the next episode of History as It Happens, Part two of this series. Our guest will be historian Vladislav Zubak. Russia in the world. That is next as we report History as it happens. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign [e-mail].