Loading summary
Transcript123 lines
- [00:00]
Libsyn Ads Host
Marketing is hard, but I'll tell you a little secret. It doesn't have to be. Let me point something out. You're listening to a podcast right now and it's great. You love the host. You seek it out and download it. You listen to it while driving, working out, cooking, even going to the bathroom. Podcasts are a pretty close companion. And this is a podcast ad. Did I get your attention? You can reach great listeners like yourself with podcast advertising from Libsyn Ads. Choose from hundreds of top podcasts offering host endorsements or run a pre produced ad like this one across thousands of shows to reach your target audience audience in their favorite podcasts with Libsyn ads go to libsynads.com that's L I B S Y N ads.com today
- [00:43]
Martin DeCaro
history as it happens. April 14, 2026American Suez ships pass peacefully
- [00:51]
Narrator
through the Suez Canal as negotiations continue on operation of the waterway.
- [00:55]
News Reporter
At the Portsmouth Naval Base, Britain prepares for the worst in the Suez crisis.
- [00:59]
Historical Narrator
Israel has invaded Egypt. Britain and France have declared the canal in danger.
- [01:02]
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The United States was not cons in any way about any phase of these actions.
- [01:06]
News Reporter
France and Britain issue a 12 hour ultimatum that all fighting must cease.
- [01:10]
Martin DeCaro
Powerful countries trying to impose their will on a weaker enemy who's taking control of a waterway critical to global commerce. It's a military mismatch. But the attacker's plan ends in fiasco, accelerating their decline and exposing the limits of power as a new world system emerges. It happened in 1956 in the Suez Crisis. Is America experiencing its Suez moment today as Iran holds the Strait of Hormuz? That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.
- [01:42]
Donald Trump
Combat operations continue at this time in full force and they will continue until all of our objectives are achieved. We have very strong objectives.
- [01:53]
Salim Yacoob
Anthony Eden was not able to think very rationally when it came to the subject of Nasser. Overall, though he was a man of considerable erudition and knowledge. He actually had studied the Middle east and knew a fair bit about it. And he was also eventually amenable to reason. I mean, he recognized that he had made a terrible blunder and that he had lost the confidence of the US Government and also significant support at home. There was something redeemable about the cast of characters, or at least there was something about how Eden conducted himself at the very end that I don't see an analog in the current President of the United states.
- [02:38]
Martin DeCaro
In late 1956, something truly remarkable happened in secret. Great Britain, France and Israel plan to invade Egypt, regain control of the Suez Canal and force Egypt's nationalist strongman Gamal Abdel Nasser from power.
- [02:52]
Narrator
Riding a new crest of popularity over the Suez crisis is President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's clever, ambitious strongman. Frenzied, cheering crowds greet Nasser wherever he goes in Egypt. By playing to Egyptian patriotism, Nasser has shifted his people's attention from their hunger and poverty problems which Nasser has failed to solve in Suez. He has created a crisis and an emotional weapon to stir the passions of 23 million Egyptians.
- [03:21]
Martin DeCaro
It might have succeeded, except the United States did not go along and instead pressured its allies to withdraw. President Dwight Eisenhower came down on the side of Egypt's sovereignty.
- [03:32]
Dwight D. Eisenhower
It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before the United Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto operating, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just end to this tormenting problem.
- [03:47]
Martin DeCaro
For Great Britain and France, the Suez crisis exposed their weakness. They were no longer great powers. As William Cleveland wrote in a history of the modern Middle East. Of the three invading states, Britain was most severely damaged by its role in the Suez affair. Not only had Britain resorted to the heavy handed imperialist tactics of earlier years, but it had been forced to abandon its military operation by pressure from two demonstrably stronger superpowers, the US and ussr. The epitaph for Britain at Suez was provided in the London Times description of the effect of Prime Minister Eden's decision to invade. He was the last British Prime Minister to believe that Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis which proved beyond doubt that she was not.
- [04:30]
News Reporter
Waterway has precipitated a new crisis in the already tense Middle East. Cracked French units are embarked at Marseilles bound for a joint staging area with Great Britain on Cyprus, less than an hour's flight from Egyptian ports, where they are prepared for seizure of the canal by force. Simultaneously, Britain reinforces its garrison on the island for the same eventuality.
- [04:51]
Martin DeCaro
Today, the United States is in a somewhat similar bind in a war of choice against a weaker enemy, Iran, but one that has imposed its control over the critically important Strait of Hormuz. And there doesn't seem to be any way President Trump can reopen it.
- [05:05]
Donald Trump
And in any event, when this conflict is over, the strait will open up naturally. It'll just open up naturally. They're going to want to be able to sell oil because that's all they have to try and rebuild. It will resume the flowing and the gas prices will rapidly come back down.
- [05:22]
Martin DeCaro
His latest try is a US naval blockade designed to force Iran to concede. The New York Times reports the president seems to be hoping that the blockade will heap new pressure on Iran after direct talks between US And Iranian officials in Pakistan over the weekend failed to end the war. Andy suggested that other countries would join the effort, but there are so far very few volunteers. Only Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel publicly supports the idea, so it is too early to know if the crisis in the Persian Gulf today will end the same way for the United States as the Suez crisis ended for Britain and France. Israel would eventually grow more powerful and repeatedly defeat Egypt on the battlefield in the decades after 1956. But it is already obvious that President Trump, Netanyahu and the war's cheerleaders badly miscalculated. They are isolated just as the aggressors of 1956 were.
- [06:16]
Historical Narrator
One aim of the Allied action is to safeguard the canal, and the Egyptians have sunk several ships in the channel in an attempt to make it unusable. Allied aircraft were able to frustrate this plan to some extent by sinking the block ships before they could be towed into their most effective position.
- [06:33]
Martin DeCaro
Salim Yacoob is a historian at UC Santa Barbara and an expert on US Involvement in the Middle east in the post war era. He is the author of Containing Arab Nationalism, the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle east, published in 2004. Tap subscribe now in the show Notes to skip ads, get early access and enjoy all of our bonus content or go to historyasithappens.com Ryan Reynolds here from Mint Mobile.
- [06:57]
Ryan Reynolds
I don't know if you knew this, but anyone can get the same Premium Wireless for $15 a month plan that I've been enjoying. It's not just for celebrities. So do like I did and have one of your assistant's assistants switch you to Mint Mobile today. I'm told it's super easy to do@mintmobile.com
- [07:13]
Mint Mobile Advertiser
Switch upfront payment of $45 for 3 month plan equivalent to $15 per month Required intro rate first 3 months only then full price plan options available, taxes and fees extra.
- [07:24]
Martin DeCaro
See full terms@mintmobile.com Salim Yacoob welcome back.
- [07:28]
Salim Yacoob
It's great to be with you. Thank you for having me.
- [07:30]
Martin DeCaro
It's been a couple of years. The first time you were on that episode was titled When Reagan Pressured Israel. It was about the 1982 Lebanon War. Maybe this episode should be When Eisenhower Pressured Israel, Britain and France.
- [07:45]
Salim Yacoob
There you go.
- [07:46]
Martin DeCaro
A lesson that teaches us what is possible when the US takes a leadership role. But before we get to Ike, let's start in 1953. Just set up some of the background here to the Suez Cris. There's a revolution in Egypt. The free officers, something called the Revolutionary Command Corps, I believe the rcc. The monarchy is overthrown, a republic is established, and Gamal Abdel Nasser prevails in a power struggle. He's basically a dictator. On the eve of the Suez crisis, would you say?
- [08:16]
Salim Yacoob
Yeah, it was actually in 1952, in July, an overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy, which had been very subservient to Britain. A major part of that whole uprising was rejection of British domination of Egypt. Britain had been the dominant imperial power in Egypt since the 1880s. It occupied the Suez Canal Zone and dominated Egyptian politics in all kinds of ways. And so you have this generalized uprising that occurs, and it culminates in the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy. King Farouk is forced to abdicate. You have a group of officers who take over. And at first, Gamal Abdul Nasser is not right at the forefront. He's definitely the moving force behind the scenes. But the figurehead is this guy named General Nagib, who is the nominal leader of Egypt for the next couple years. And then in 1954, Nasser eases him out, essentially becomes the head of state, you know, first prime minister and then as president.
- [09:23]
Martin DeCaro
I saw there was a plebiscite instead of an election. A plebiscite where Nasser won 99.9%. And I wondered who was the 0.1.
- [09:34]
Salim Yacoob
Yeah, one always wonders about that in those kinds of situations. So, yeah, it's. I mean, Nasser was genuinely popular, you know, a revered figure both in Egypt and eventually throughout the Arab world. But the regime was not an observer of strict democratic procedure. And I'm sure there were many people who. Who felt a certain pressure to vote the right way.
- [09:56]
Martin DeCaro
So we're eight years after the end of the Second World War and the era of decolonization is getting underway. Is Arab nationalism or Pan Arabism, is that becoming a strong force here? Because that was Nasser's worldview, Right? Arab sovereignty.
- [10:12]
Salim Yacoob
Absolutely. I mean, that had been a gathering force, you know, since earlier in the 20th century. But it really takes off after World War II in the general atmosphere of decolonization that's prevailing throughout the world and against the backdrop of Britain's decline as an imperial power. It remains the dominant force in the Middle east, the dominant Western power in the Middle east for several years after World War II. But it's clearly on the decline. And that creates opportunities for people throughout the world and especially the Middle east to assert their nationalist inclinations. There's a growing sense that the Arab people constitute a single people with a common destiny, and they should either band together and turn themselves into a single large Arab superstate, or if not that, then at least coordinate their efforts and fight for their own interests in common
- [11:13]
Martin DeCaro
with one another and escape the embrace of Western imperialists. Right. That's a big theme.
- [11:19]
Salim Yacoob
Absolutely.
- [11:19]
Martin DeCaro
To do with the Canal, that and.
- [11:21]
Salim Yacoob
And this is seen as a related issue, combat Zionism.
- [11:25]
Historical Narrator
Yes.
- [11:25]
Salim Yacoob
You have the formation of the State of Israel in the late 1940s with not so a great deal of British support at that time, although Britain had played a key role in pushing the Zionist movement along earlier in the. In the century, but with the significant US support. So there is this perception that Israel is this Western creation, it's a spearhead of Western imperialism that the Arab people need to oppose. So certainly it takes the form of combating U.S. policy toward the region and also the policy of other Western nations that are seen as supporting Israel.
- [12:00]
Martin DeCaro
The establishment of Israel was known as the disaster of 1948 in Egypt. And already, just briefly here, Saleem, already by this point, Palestinian commandos are going from Gaza into Israel on commando raids. Guerrilla raids. Right. That's a problem.
- [12:16]
Salim Yacoob
Yeah. It's a very interesting and complex process. It's taking place both from the east and from the west. You have Palestinians who have been displaced by Israel's creation. In Jordan, in Syria and in the Gaza Strip, there are actual commando groups conducting raids into Israel to conduct sabotage, to murder civilians or military personnel.
- [12:43]
Historical Narrator
For many years, even the village schools in the frontier settlements have known that at any moment death may be looking over their shoulder. Israeli patrols have been permanently on the watch for any move from the Egyptian side, for Israel's Arab neighbors have never been reconciled to her existence. Every few weeks, the farmers daily round has been interrupted by sudden clashes for which neither side has been without blame.
- [13:10]
Salim Yacoob
And in some cases, you have individual acts, ordinary Palestinians who are trying to get back into Palestine to retrieve some property that they lost when they had to flee, to visit graves of their ancestors and family members, or maybe just to look at their lost homes. And so you've got this complex and unorganized or largely unorganized phenomenon of Palestinians going into Israel in an unauthorized way. This is treated by the Israeli government as a serious security threat. What you have is escalating series of Israeli raids against Arab targets, particularly in Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. The escalation of those military efforts draw the Egyptian government, in the case of Gaza more centrally into that process where at first the Egyptian government was trying to prevent the Palestinian raids from taking place. Part of what Israel is doing in launching raids into Gaza basically persuade the Egyptian government to work harder at that task.
- [14:13]
Martin DeCaro
Yes, that's been a. Through the decades, the Israeli idea, disproportionate use of force against the host government, so to speak. We're seeing that in Lebanon today. And the Egyptian military is not very strong at this moment. And it does eventually look for better weapons, somebody to sell weapons, which we'll return to in a bit because that's part of the background to the Suez crisis. Absolutely. One of Nasser's first priorities is deal with a long and vexing relationship with Great Britain which as you said, is on the decline. We're in the era of decolonization and they reach an agreement. The Brit and the Egyptians do a treaty in 1954. Tell us about that.
- [14:52]
Salim Yacoob
Britain, as I said, was occupying the Suez Canal Zone. It has a military base there, many thousands of troops. That was a real sore point going back decades. I mean, Egypt was by this time nominally independent. In order to gain independence from Britain, it had to agree to allow the continuation of British occupation of the Suez Canal Zone and submit to other forms of British domination. And there's a very strong national consensus in favor of getting the British out. And the British realize that they need to have some kind of a modus vivendi with the new Egyptian government. They can't continue the status quo. And so there's a recognition on their side that they need to give some ground. And so what you have is this agreement in 1954 where the British agree to withdraw their forces from the Suez Canal Zone in two years time. As a result of this negotiation. They do retain some rights to re enter the Canal Zone or re enter Egypt. If Egypt is threatened or attacked by a certain, you know, by various countries that are specified in the agreement. It's close to a full evacuation of British forces, but with some stipulations.
- [16:02]
Martin DeCaro
This is quite an achievement for Nasser to have the British agree to leave and also France too. There were French interests in control of the Canal Company. It was built by Egyptians but controlled by the British and the French. What was the French interest here?
- [16:17]
Salim Yacoob
They were quite centrally involved at the beginning. It was the French government that conducted a lot of the diplomacy with the Egyptian government in the 19th century. And at this time was an Egyptian government that was under, essentially under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. The French, they negotiate with the Egyptians for the right to build this canal and then a company is formed that eventually is dominated by British and French shareholders. And so the company is foreign owned. At least there's this fiction or this theoretical notion that the canal is part of Egypt's sovereign territory. But just for all practical purposes, it's up to this foreign owned company to operate the Suez Canal.
- [17:00]
Martin DeCaro
And the British and French didn't believe the Egyptians are capable of operating the canal, Right?
- [17:05]
Salim Yacoob
Well, certainly that is what they said. Well, it's a pretty complicated operation. You don't want to get in over your head. Why don't you leave it to us? We know what we're doing.
- [17:13]
Martin DeCaro
The French had just been defeated. We mentioned 1954, the year that the British and the Egyptians signed a treaty to have the British evacuate or finally pull out of Egypt, the base there. The French had just lost the battle of Dien bien phu in 1954. So the French project in Vietnam ends in disaster.
- [17:32]
News Reporter
The place is Dien Bien Phu in French Indochina. The year is 1954. The Lonely Jungle outpost surrounded by communist guerrillas and accessible only by air is doomed, just as the once mighty French colonial colonial empire in Southeast Asia is doomed.
- [17:52]
Martin DeCaro
And the French immediately say, you know, we're going to try this again, but in a different country, Algeria, which was actually a department of France. And that war goes into the 1960s. But I guess my question here, Salim, is both the French and the British Empire. I mean, this is the beginning of the end for both, right?
- [18:10]
Salim Yacoob
Sure. And the French are in a weaker position in the Middle east, in the broader region of the Middle east and North Africa, than the British are overall. The French had been a dominant power in Lebanon and Syria, but they were essentially forced to liquidate those ventures at the very end of World War II under combined US and British pressure. When it comes to this broad region we're talking about, they're essentially confined now to North Africa. And so, yes, they had the colony in Algeria and they had colonial presences in Tunisia and Morocco. Now both Tunisia and Morocco gained independence in 1956. So they're really holding on to Algeria. That's where they're making their last stand. But that, of course, ends up in failure in 1962.
- [19:00]
News Reporter
Algeria broods under ominous clouds of tension after a ceasefire between France and Muslim rebels brings momentary peace. The day the truce was announced, announced after months of negotiations. Algiers and Iran were quiet, but quiet only because of a general strike.
- [19:16]
Martin DeCaro
Man, it takes a long time and a lot of blood spilled, but it does happen.
- [19:19]
Salim Yacoob
Absolutely.
- [19:20]
Martin DeCaro
So I think what makes the Suez crisis. So interesting to study is that you can see one world fading away and a new world or a new system coming into play. So old European imperialism is dying. Arab nationalism, as you mentioned before, Arab nationalism is becoming a force. And now in the 1950s, Cold War interests enter the picture. So Nasser does not want Egypt or other Arab states to be subservient to Western interests. He wants them to be fully independent and sovereign, non aligned. Non aligned. In the emerging Cold War, the United States wants to contain or keep Soviet influence out of the Middle East. And the United States does this through British influence, although it might be waning through a series of agreements called the Baghdad Pact. Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq and Britain all signed interlocking Series of Agreements, 1954, 1955. Nasser refuses to join, so Egypt is not part of the pact. He also was able to influence Jordan and Syria to stay out of the pact. Again, this is a Cold War alignment. So how does the United States, how does Great Britain react to Nasser pushing back on this, what you might call a treaty? But I guess he obviously, Nasser can obviously see that this is just a way of extending US influence in the Middle east when he might want to reach out to the Soviet Union at some point.
- [20:49]
Salim Yacoob
Yeah, I mean, I think it's important to recognize that the Baghdad Pact actually represents a division between the United States and Britain, where it's primarily a British initiative, although the British see it as fitting into a larger American plan. When the Eisenhower administration took office in 1953, it started out with this notion of a northern tier alliance, which would be the countries that are the Middle Eastern countries that are close to the border of the Soviet Union, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan. They would form an alliance strongly anti Soviet, that would be linked to NATO. And then at some future date, Arab countries would be invited to join. What the British did was they took that core idea, but they put Iraq into it. So they signed an agreement with those three countries I mentioned, but then also added Iraq to it and even called it the Baghdad Pact. And it was essentially Britain's effort to renew a treaty that it had with Iraq earlier in the century that had essentially withered away. And it was also its way of trying to regain its footing in the Arab world. The Americans were not happy about this. They saw this as plunging this issue into the perilous politics of inter Arab rivalry at a much too early stage, before the Americans had had a chance to prepare the ground. Suddenly this new pact which gets formed in 1955, becomes a very bitter issue in inter Arab politics with Nasser accusing the Iraqis of stabbing the Arab world in the back by aligning with the perfidious British. But now that the pact has been formed, the United States is determined to prevent it from collapsing. So it does lend diplomatic and logistical support to it, but it refuses, at least for the time being, to join the pact itself for fear of getting itself involved in these treacherous politics. And that's an issue of some tension between the United States and Britain. The British really want the Americans to join. The Americans refuse. But as you say, Nasser is essentially waging this diplomatic and other kind of war, you know, using subversion and propaganda and all that kind of stuff against the pact. And he's in particular going against Iraq and Jordan because there's this effort on the part of Britain to lure Jordan into the pact as well, because Jordan and Iraq are both part of the same Hashemite dynasty. And so Jordan is under severe pressure. And there's all kinds of really difficult moments when, for example, in 1955, toward the end of the year, Jordan briefly considers joining the Baghdad Pact. And then there's this really ferocious domestic revolt against the idea, spurred along not only by Egypt, but also by Saudi Arabia, because even though Saudi Arabia is a conservative monarchy, it's bitterly hostile to the Hashemite dynasty. So another element of this is that the Baghdad Pact is being attacked, at least rhetorically and financially, by the Saudi royal family.
- [24:03]
Martin DeCaro
And I appreciate your remark there, because the first few countries were not Arab countries. Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, but yes, Iraq, Syria, Jordan. And what was in it for them? Well, countries that were willing to participate in this alliance, if you want to call it that, got generous U.S. military and economic aid, again, as a way of keeping Soviet influence out of the Middle East. At least that's the vantage from Washington. Obviously, Nasser was a big no on that one.
- [24:32]
Salim Yacoob
Absolutely.
- [24:32]
Martin DeCaro
And this helps ruin relations with Britain and the United States. So that when Nasser goes asking for weapons. I mentioned before how the Egyptian military was not very strong here. The United States doesn't want to sell Nasser weapons. So he goes to where?
- [24:50]
Salim Yacoob
Nominally to Czechoslovakia, although the power behind this deal is the Soviet Union. In 1955, concludes a pretty substantial arms deal. It's a barter of Egyptian cotton for Soviet arms. Yeah, this was. There was this brief period Nasser was trying to persuade the United States to sell him substantial amounts of military hardware. And the Americans were. They wanted to keep Nasser favorably oriented toward the West. And so they. They strung him along for a little bit and made some various proposals. But the amounts that they were willing to sell. And the kinds of restrictions that they insisted on attaching to those arms sales, where, you know, American advisors would be on hand to oversee, you know, the use of the weapons and the training, all that kind of stuff, those restrictions were seen as unacceptable from the Egyptian standpoint. It's important to understand that there was a transformation in Soviet policy that occurred in this period where, you know, Joseph Stalin had been the Soviet leader until his death in 1953. For most of his time in power, he was not that interested in forging alliances with Arab countries. He saw them as being under the sway of governments that were irredeemably subservient to the West. And even. Even nationalist movements, he tended to dismiss as, you know, bourgeois nationalists. They were not the right kind of revolutionary force. With his death and with the eventual emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as the unquestioned leader of the Soviet Union, it takes a year and a half or so for that to get sorted out. So by the mid-1950s, you have this new conception of Soviet diplomacy, where the Soviet Union is much more open to dealing with movements and governments that are not themselves socialist or communist, but if they are sufficiently suspicious of the west, then they are seen as suitable clients. And so in that context, the Soviet Union is making a pretty aggressive diplomatic push into the Arab world, wooing governments like Egypt in Syria to forge economic and military agreements and thereby draw them closer to their order.
- [27:05]
Martin DeCaro
Because Nasser wasn't a communist.
- [27:07]
Salim Yacoob
No, no, he was not communist. He actually was quite brutal and ruthless in suppressing the Egyptian Communist Party, but he was insistent that Egypt not be forced to take sides in the Cold War. The idea that countries like Egypt, emerging nations, now that they're gaining independence and have a stronger voice in world politics, they should be free to conduct cordial relations with anybody they wish, have good relations with both the United States and its allies and the Soviet bloc, and not be forced to choose between the two. Khrushchev of the Soviet Union is a bit more amenable to that, where he's not insisting that countries that have good relations with the Soviet Union also shun the West. Whereas the policy pursued by the Eisenhower administration and especially by the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, is very much of the. You're either with us or you're against us.
- [28:02]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, I was just about to say this arms deal is big. It really irritates Dulles, Eisenhower, and from the Soviet point of view, as you said, this is not about ideology. This is about having a base in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- [28:17]
Salim Yacoob
One way of Looking at it is that the Soviets have much more to gain and not much to lose. Whereas the United States and its allies feel they have a whole lot to lose, they tend to be a lot more jealous when it comes to efforts on the part of previously Western leaning nations to forge close relations with the Soviet Union.
- [28:36]
Martin DeCaro
So we have the treaty between Britain and Egypt in 1954, the Baghdad Pact controversy, where Nasser does not want to join. He then has this arms deal in 1955 with Czechoslovakia, but of course it was a Soviet Egyptian arms deal through the Czechs. And relations between Washington and Cairo are not great. So Nasser still has other priorities. He wants to develop the country's agricultural base. And one way to do that is to build a second dam across the Nile at Aswan. And he wants a loan from the World bank. And it looks like he's gonna get it until because of this burgeoning animosity between the two sides, until the United States and Britain say, screw you, you're not getting the loan.
- [29:22]
Historical Narrator
Right?
- [29:23]
Salim Yacoob
I mean, it may be worthwhile to take a second to discuss why this is so important to Egypt. Because if you can control the flow of the Nile, you can not only have more effective irrigation, but you can also develop a hydroelectric energy. And so this is really crucial to Egypt's development as its population is exploding and it's finding itself increasingly challenged in its effort to feed all of its people. And yes, as you say, initially, the Egyptians are in conversation with the United States and Britain over Western financing. Both the British and the US Government recognize the importance of this project. It'd be good for Egypt and it would link Egypt more closely to the West. And so it would be an important geopolitical achievement to have this dam constructed under Western auspices. But as you say, Nasser is behaving in ways that are increasingly antagonizing the United States. I mean, he's already really alienated the British government through his subversive activities and propaganda against the Baghdad Pact. And so by this time, the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, has developed almost a pathological hatred of Nasser, where it's difficult for Eden to think straight. When the subject of Nasser comes up. The Americans have a more nuanced view. They still recognize the value of keeping Nasser's friendship or at least avoiding his outright hostility. But they're becoming more and more unhappy with the way he's behaving. They don't like his arms deal with the Soviet Union. They also are offended by Nasser's decision to recognize Communist China at a time when the United States is trying very hard to shun the People's Republic of China. And also, it is important to mention the Arab Israeli dimension here because there was an effort on the part of the Eisenhower administration to broker some kind of a diplomatic deal between Egypt and Israel that could form the nucleus of a broader Arab Israeli settlement. And in fact, in 1955 and into 1956, there are pretty serious initiatives where at least indirectly, Nasser is brought into conversation with David Ben Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister. I mean, they're not meeting face to face, but a US envoy is shuttling back and forth between Israel and Egypt, relaying proposals about the possible basis for a diplomatic settlement. For a while, Nasser was going along with this and behaving in a somewhat cooperative way. But then in the spring of 1956, he rather abruptly pulled out of those negotiations and made it clear that he wasn't interested in pursuing them further. And the reason seems to have been the kind of flack he was getting from other Arab leaders and especially Iraqi leaders. This was payback for them. They were so infuriated by Nasser's attacks on them for joining the Baghdad Pact. When it became known that Nasser was thinking about some kind of a deal with the Israelis that was then an opportunity for them to get back at him and say, ha, look at this paragon of Arab nationalism. Here he is cavorting with the Zionists. You can't trust him. I mean, I guess it was more the fear that that kind of critique would really take off. It was just. It was just murmuring at this point. But Nasser pulls out of those negotiations. I did not know that really sets off the Eisenhower administration.
- [32:49]
Martin DeCaro
I did not know that about Ben Gurion and Nasser because Israel and Egypt have had a peace treaty for so long now. And maybe some of my younger listeners are just not aware of the burning animosity and desire for revenge that existed in some parts of the Arab world at this point for what happened in 1948.
- [33:10]
Salim Yacoob
Oh, yeah, absolutely. This was just a few years earlier. So, yeah, feelings were very, very raw.
- [33:16]
Martin DeCaro
So, yeah, I can see why they would see Nasser as betraying the cause by speaking through intermediaries with Ben Gurion. And I can also understand why the Eisenhower administration was annoyed when Nasser pulled out of the talk. So no loan for the Aswan Dam. We finally arrived in July of 1956. Egypt needs money. How's it gonna raise the revenue to build the dam? Nationalize the Suez Canal and what, charge a toll? Is that the.
- [33:46]
Salim Yacoob
That's the idea, yeah. You nationalize the Suez Canal Company. And then. So now the Egyptian government is operating the canal and it charges tolls to all ships passing through it. And this is, of course, a major international waterway, an artery of global commerce. The idea is that it would use those tolls to help finance the Aswan Dam.
- [34:07]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, I use charge a toll because those words are in the news today. Sure, the straight of horn moves. But yeah, it wasn't that Nasser wasn't going to allow other countries to use the Suez Canal. He needed it for revenue. I want you to address here why the British and French were so annoyed at this because they'd still be allowed to use the canal. They would just maybe have to pay more. I guess they'd have to pay more for it, but go ahead.
- [34:30]
Salim Yacoob
I just wanted to add, in addition to using toll revenues to finance the Aswan Dam, the Egyptians also got support from the Soviet Union because now that the Western powers were no longer interested in financing it, the Soviets stepped in and eventually they. It was the Soviet Union that provided the funding for the construction of the Aswan Dam, which ended up costing more than a billion dollars. But, yes, so now you've got Egypt, the Egyptian government in control of the canal. And from the British perspective, this is intolerable because they see themselves as the guarantor of maritime passage through that waterway. If they're no longer playing that role, then you know what the British Empire for at all. And so it's just, it's a.
- [35:19]
Martin DeCaro
And they need the oil.
- [35:20]
Salim Yacoob
It's a gut punch to the British. It really hits them where it hurts, just in terms of their sense of prestige and international respect. Now also there is the argument that they make that, okay, now that Nasser has control of the canal, he could block it. And you know, that would wreak havoc on the world economy. And Western Europe is overwhelmingly dependent on oil that is shipped through the Suez Canal. And something close to 70% of the oil Western Europe consumes passes through the canal. So the British see this as completely intolerable. And so they immediately start essentially beating the drum, saying this is out of the question, this has to be reversed in some way.
- [36:00]
Martin DeCaro
Did Anthony Eden want to kill Nasser?
- [36:03]
Salim Yacoob
Yes. I mean, that was in the context of this earlier crisis I mentioned, late 55 into early 56, when Nasser is propagandizing against the Baghdad Pact and he's putting all kinds of pressure on Jordan, which is a major client state of Britain. Eden says to Anthony Nutting, who was a diplomat who later wrote a book about this, in the first version of Nutting's book which came out in the late 60s. It was I want to see him destroyed. Eden saying I want to see Nasser destroyed. And then years later, Nutting added the word that Eden used, which I wasn't willing to publish at the time was murdered. So Eden is really, really down on osser tap.
- [36:45]
Martin DeCaro
Subscribe now in the show notes to skip ads or go to history as it happens.com. The R B Tour starring Usher Raymond
- [37:07]
Donald Trump
and Chris Brown uniting two of R
- [37:09]
Salim Yacoob
B's defining signing hit makers Chris Brown and Usher Raymond. Sign up for artist presale access@raymond browntour.com
- [37:18]
Mint Mobile Advertiser
what would you do if your online store converted 36 more shoppers? You could take 36 more vacation.
- [37:24]
Salim Yacoob
Another pina colada.
- [37:25]
Mint Mobile Advertiser
Yes, please. Open a new retail location with 36 more square feet.
- [37:30]
Martin DeCaro
Fantastic.
- [37:30]
Mint Mobile Advertiser
Hire 36 more help.
- [37:32]
Martin DeCaro
You're hired and you're hired.
- [37:34]
Mint Mobile Advertiser
Shopify has the world's best conversion checkout, up to 36% better than other e commerce platforms. What you do with those extra sales is up to you. Switch to Shopify today@shopify.com setup and get a $1 trial. Shopify.com setup we're just a couple of
- [37:49]
Martin DeCaro
years after Mossadegh in Iran nationalized the Iranian oil industry and infuriated the British. Yes, the British then go to the United States and say, help us out here. We want to get rid of Mossadegh. And the CIA is involved in a coup to get rid of the democratically elected leader of Iran. Iran over oil. So I'm assuming the British want to turn Nasser into another Mossadegh here.
- [38:13]
Salim Yacoob
Pretty much, yes. I mean, and that's what the British are hoping will happen is that they will get American support for some kind of initiative. Precisely. What form it takes is to be determined to remove Nasser from power. And as you say, just a few years earlier, they had done this in Iran. It's important to recognize, however, that by this time, I mean, Eisenhower looks at the situation in Egypt very differently from how he viewed the situation in Iran. And a lot of it may come down to the perception of the leader, the. The nationalist leader in each case. In the case of Mossadegh, Eisenhower shared the British view that Mossadegh really was kind of a weak, unstable, completely untrustworthy figure whose leadership of Iran was disastrous and very dangerous. And you also have to recognize that Iran is right up against the border of the Soviet Union at this time. And the Soviet Union had just a few years earlier engaged in certain kinds of aggressive behavior with regard to Iran during World War II. Soviet British and US troops had occupied Iran in order to maintain the Lend Lease supply line to the Soviet Union so that it could keep fighting against Nazi Germany. After the war ended, the British and the Americans withdrew their troops, but the Soviets refused for some months to do so. And they put pressure on the Iranian government to give them an oil concession. Through a number of complicated diplomatic maneuvers that I don't. We don't need to get into the Western powers. And the Iranian government did succeed in persuading the Soviets to withdraw. But that was in the recent background. This event, you know, it's in the late 40s that this had occurred. As you get into the early 1950s, there's this real fear that the Soviets could once again interfere, not just diplomatically or through subversion, but through actual military means. And so there was this real sense that Mosaddegh is just a disaster. He has to go. If he stays any longer in power, there's a real danger that the Soviets could take over Iran. So by the time you get to the Suez crisis, it's a few years later. Nasser is clearly part of a much broader Arab nationalist movement. Egypt is not on the border with the Soviet Union. There doesn't seem to be this imminent threat of Soviet takeover anytime soon. And Nasser is, for all of his sins, from Eisenhower's perspective, a more stable and reliable figure.
- [40:43]
Martin DeCaro
So late July, the canal is nationalized by Nasser and the war, the invasion doesn't happen right away. There are months of negotiations that take place here which are really important to note because the Soviet Union had an admirable position. Egypt, for the Egyptians, they were on the side of allowing the Egyptians to continue to control the canal. The Western position was have an international consortium or some kind of international body in control of the canal. But Nasser says no, he's uncompromising about this.
- [41:16]
Salim Yacoob
And here's where you see the difference between Britain and the United States, where the British are saying, this is really intolerable. We've got to do something. And the Americans are saying, okay, this is unfortunate. We don't like the idea that this nationalization has taken place. This is a waterway that is so important to global commerce. We think it would be preferable if there were some kind of international control imposed over it. And so the position of the United States is, let's see if we can persuade the Egyptians to agree to some broader international framework for the management administration of the canal. And the British are saying, well, okay, they go along with it and in fact, host a couple of conferences in London. But essentially they're paying lip service because they don't really have faith that this is going to result in anything that they will like. And indeed the Egyptians are maintaining their position that this is an Egyptian sovereign asset, that they get to control themselves. The negotiations are ultimately fruitless. So in that context, the British start thinking of more forceful ways to solve this problem. And here you need to recognize that there are other countries that are determined to act against Nasser. And they are, of course, France, because the French are already very upset with Nasser for the kind of support that he has been lending, mostly rhetorical and diplomatic, but some logistical support to the Algerian rebels. And so they want him out of the picture. The Israelis, of course, they had this ongoing conflict with Egypt and their increasingly alarmed by the fact that Egypt has purchased all these weapons from the Soviet Union. It's a relatively recent deal, it's still being implemented. But the Israelis are fearful that if they wait too long and you know, the Egyptians actually take possession of these weapons, get trained in their use, then Egypt will form a much more formidable enemy.
- [43:12]
Martin DeCaro
But in a throwback to old imperialist tactics, the British and French and the Israelis, they collude secretly. They collude secretly, The Israelis will invade and then the British and French will say, oh, there's a crisis in the Canal Zone, we're coming in to solve it.
- [43:28]
Salim Yacoob
Exactly.
- [43:29]
Martin DeCaro
And what's really astonishing about this episode was how quickly the plan unraveled. Not militarily, it mostly succeeded. It was US pressure and international outrage in favor, even though a lot of people did not like Nasser in favor of Egyptian sovereignty.
- [43:47]
Salim Yacoob
Yeah. So I mean the basic idea, secret plan is as you describe it, the Israelis will attack Egypt in the Sinai and advance toward the Suez Canal.
- [43:57]
Historical Narrator
At last, without warning, Israel strikes. General Mashade, one eyed commander in chief, orders the tanks into action. Israeli forces sweep across the frontier into the Egyptian desert while Premier Ben Gurion declares general mobilization.
- [44:10]
Salim Yacoob
And then the British and French will step in and in the guise of neutral peace loving powers will step in to say, oh, this is terrible, we can't allow this to continue. We have to make sure that the Suez Canal is not drawn into this conflict. So they will insist on a ceasefire, insist that each country withdraw its forces 10 miles on either side of the Suez Canal. Now it's obvious that the Egyptians are not going to agree to this because the Suez Canal is in their own sovereign territory. They're not going to agree to some British and French demand that they withdraw their troops from a canal that's in their own on their own soil. The Israelis will, of course, accept this, and then that will give the British and French a pretext to intervene with their own forces on the side of Israel and in so doing, finish the job. Finish the job. Nazi from power. Regain control of the Suez Canal.
- [45:05]
Martin DeCaro
Was it immediately apparent that this was a transparent plot?
- [45:09]
Salim Yacoob
Yes, because the ultimatum that the British and French issued shortly after the Israeli attack began was absurd on its face. Israelis are approaching the Suez Canal, and the British and French step in and say, okay, both sides withdraw to 10 miles on either side of the Suez Canal. It would be as if Canada had invaded the United States and started moving southward. And then some outside power stepped in and said, okay, both sides, Americans and the Canadians, withdraw to within 10 miles of the Ohio River. Right. The Americans say, Ohio River. What are you talking about? Ohio? That's part of our territory. We're not going to withdraw south of the Ohio river so that it can be taken over by some foreign country. So it was just absurd on its face. Virtually everybody who had a brain could see that this was not disinterested, selfless move that the British and French were presenting themselves as making.
- [46:07]
Martin DeCaro
And Eisenhower wasn't informed ahead of time. I can understand why he wouldn't have gone along with it, but he doesn't jump on board after it starts. And he uses US Influence at the United Nations.
- [46:18]
Dwight D. Eisenhower
United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions, nor were we informed of them in advance. In the circumstances of I have described, there will be no United States involvement in these present hostilities. I therefore have no plan to call the Congress in special session. Of course, we shall continue to keep in contact with congressional leaders of both parties. It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before the United Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto cooperating, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just end to this tormenting problem. In the past, the United nations has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed. We believe it can and that it
- [47:10]
Salim Yacoob
will do so again. You know, the. The conspirators had essentially assumed that Eisenhower would not be happy with what had happened, would not take active measures to reverse it, because he was already very unhappy with Nasser, because he wouldn't want to repudiate a move taken by his Western allies, and also because he was about to stand for reelection. The 1956 election was about to take place, and there was this assumption that he would not want to defy the Israelis at that crucial moment. And so he would however, grudgingly, essentially allow this attack to continue and maybe not participate in it, but certainly not oppose it as forcefully as he ended up doing. But much to the chagrin of the attackers, Eisenhower does very forcefully oppose it.
- [48:01]
Martin DeCaro
Here's another echo in today's headlines. Just as Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz after the start of the war, Nasser has some ships sunk in the canal. Right. To close it during the war.
- [48:13]
Salim Yacoob
Right. I mean, because, you know, militarily, Nasser is not really in any shape to resist, even the Israelis alone, and certainly not the British and French when they join the fray. What the British French do after issuing this ultimatum and Nasser rejects it, is then they start landing paratroopers and preparing an amphibious invasion of Egyptian territory. You know, Nasser doesn't have many military cards to play, but he does have control of the canal. And he basically takes a bunch of old decrepit ships, loads them up with cement, and sinks them in the canal, blocking it. Nasser does actually do the thing that the British warned he would close the canal and making it unusable for international shipping. And this is a real disaster economically for Western Europe because, as I said, it's overwhelmingly dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf passing through the Suez Canal. Now oil tankers have to sail all the way around the southern tip of Africa and then back up to the Atlantic to ship oil. And that, of course, lengthens the. The route by a huge factor, causing all kinds of shortages and disruptions. And so there's a major energy crisis occurring throughout Western Europe as a consequence of this war.
- [49:36]
Martin DeCaro
So a rare moment in Cold War history. The United nations and the Soviet Union see eye to eye at the UN Security Council resolution is passed demanding a withdrawal. Right.
- [49:46]
Salim Yacoob
A Security Council resolution is proposed. Now the British and French have the ability to veto it.
- [49:52]
Martin DeCaro
That's right.
- [49:53]
Salim Yacoob
They are permanent members. And so that gets blocked. But then there's action taken at the General Assembly. General assembly, where you have a resolution that doesn't have quite the same teeth as a. As a Security Council resolution, but nonetheless, there's a vote condemning the attack on Egypt. You know, insisting that the attackers cease their military operations and pull out of Egypt and authorizing the formation of UN peacekeepers to occupy key portions of the disputed territory once a ceasefire has been reached.
- [50:28]
Martin DeCaro
UN peacekeepers in Gaza happens. You know, sometimes I forget that Britain and France are on the Security Council. But. But this episode in history is why people today might say, why are Britain and France still on the Security Council? Well, back in those days, they could still kind of claim to be a world power, but not really.
- [50:46]
Salim Yacoob
But yes, but the point you make is the key one, which is that for that General assembly resolution, the United States and the Soviet Union are voting side by side against America's two closest European allies and against another country, Israel, that many Americans have a very strong emotional attachment to.
- [51:05]
Martin DeCaro
So the British and French leave in December of 1956. The Israelis leave Sinai in March of 1957 to return a decade later after the Six Day War. The consequences here, this is really why I wanted to speak to you. It took an hour to get to it, but that's all right. We had to tell a story first. Sure. Because today people are saying this could be the American Suez, a tipping point, where if it doesn't necessarily accelerate US Strategic decline in the Middle east, which is always hard to tell while it's happening. Decline is always more apparent in retrospect. But it does show, though, the limits of power. The limits of power. The United States has not been able to impose its will on Iran. The British and French failed spectacularly here. And would you say, Saleem, that this does accelerate their strategic decline in the region? Maybe it was already.
- [51:58]
Salim Yacoob
Absolutely. Because, you know, the British made a series of declarations about what they would not tolerate and what would not stand. And it turns out that those things did stand and they had to tolerate them. Right. They were unable to continue their military operation because of the diplomatic and economic pressure that was placed on them by the United States. And. And then having failed in this very conspicuous way, they lose a huge amount of prestige. You don't see an immediate evaporation of British power in the region, but what you do see is over the next 15 years or so, a pretty steady decline, and at certain points, very rapid decline. There are places, for example, in the Persian Gulf region or in near Yemen, where the British, at certain points in the 1960s, just. Just make these decisions that they can no longer continue holding the line, and they. They pull out and grant independence to the Arab nations that remain. But by the early 1970s, the British were completely, completely out. By the early 70s, they were. They were out.
- [53:06]
Martin DeCaro
And that's okay. Are Britain and France doing poorly today because they don't control the Suez Canal anymore? No. Are they worse off today because they lost their colonial empires? I would say no.
- [53:19]
Salim Yacoob
Obviously, people have very different views of this, and many may feel a certain nostalgia for an era when Britain and France were much more dominant. But, I mean, there were special circumstances. They were able to patch up their relations with the United States and remain very much within the Western alliance and continue to benefit from the overall security umbrella that the United States provided. So in that sense, the cost of their loss of empire, while certainly significant in key areas, was not existential the way it might have been had they not been allied with a great power like the United States.
- [53:57]
Martin DeCaro
And my point here is that if the United States, and it's impossible to know for sure where this is all going, as you have already mentioned, the United States has said a number of things may not stand. And it, it's pretty clear that they will stand, mostly because the aims are not achievable. But whatever happens now, I think you can already see that this is a strategic loss for the US and if it results in the US having to pull back hard power, I mean, there's always soft power. We can restore our soft power influence. Having to pull back hard power from the Middle east, that is okay. And it could be okay for the other countries in the region. The GCC states might find a modus vivendi with Iran on their own.
- [54:42]
Salim Yacoob
Sure. I mean, I would tend to agree. I mean, a lot depends on what kinds of settlements we reach on these very pressing issues. Most immediately the question of Iran's nuclear ambitions. You know, we've still got the Israel Palestine issue and the violence that Israel has been visiting on Lebanon. I would argue of that in many respects the United States has been a pretty negative influence on all of this, especially the Israel Palestine dispute where the United States has provided Israel the diplomatic and other cover that has enabled it to continue its occupation for nearly 60 years now. So you could argue that a decline of US Power in the region could have a beneficial impact. But who could say for sure? I mean, to know it's not as if other great powers are necessarily more moral or ethical than the United States. It's just depends on which issue arises to the fore and is embraced by a power as being of overriding importance.
- [55:48]
Martin DeCaro
Sure, Israel could find another place to buy weapons, for instance, and will hold on to the west bank, the settlements on the west bank, no matter what. I mean, I happen to think that's not necessarily the case. The US does have some leverage to exert there, but we're in the realm of predicting here. But go ahead.
- [56:04]
Salim Yacoob
We do still face the very alarming situation of Trump being the president. I talked about how Anthony Eden was not able to think very rationally when it came to the subject of Nasser. Overall, though he was a man of considerable erudition and knowledge. He actually had studied the Middle east and knew a fair bit about it. And he was also eventually amenable to reason. I mean, he, he recognized that he had made a terrible blunder and that he had lost the confidence of the US Government and also significant support at home. And so in relatively short order, you know, by January 1957, he steps down as Prime Minister and allows Harold Macmillan to take his place, you know, also of the same Conservative party. And Macmillan quite effectively restores the Anglo US Relationship. There was something redeemable about the cast of characters, or at least there was something about how Eden conducted himself at the very end that I don't see an analog in the current President of the United States. As far as the naval blockade is concerned, what's the end game?
- [57:13]
Martin DeCaro
Is it to force Iran back to the negotiating table? Is it to open up the straits so the gas prices ultimately come down?
- [57:20]
Donald Trump
Maybe everything. I mean, both of those things, certainly, and more. We can't let a country blackmail or extort the world because that's what they're doing. They're really blackmailing the world. We're not going to let that happen. And you know, the amazing thing is we don't. Can you believe, leave this. We don't use this trade. We don't need this trade. We have our own oil, gas, much more than we need. We have more oil and gas in Saudi Arabia. Think of this. We produce more Saudi Arabia and add Russia to it, substantially more. And by next year we'll have double that amount. So we don't need it, but the world needs it. And many ships are heading to our country right now as we speak to load up with the best. Really? I guess you could say somebody said the best and sweetest. I don't know exactly what sweet is, but when it relates to oil, it's a good thing. But they're coming to our country right now. There are many boats coming to our country now. It could very well be. This is going to be settled before that. We've been called this morning by the right people, the appropriate people, and they want to work a deal. They would like to work a deal.
- [58:29]
Martin DeCaro
On the next episode of history as it happens, who was Julio Duhay? If he were alive today, he might read the following and approve that the US and Israel bomb petrochemical plants, steel manufacturing, pharmaceutical factories, universities, schools, hospitals, banks, seaports, airports, part of the power grid, bridges, railroad, shops, homes and more in Iran. The legacy of Julio Duhay. Next, as we report history as it happens, make sure to sign up for my free newsletter, just go to substack and search for history as it happens.