Army of Europe

Summary

History As It Happens: Episode Summary - "Army of Europe"

Release Date: March 14, 2025
Host: Martin Di Caro

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Introduction

In the episode titled "Army of Europe," host Martin Di Caro delves into the enduring and evolving concept of a unified European military force. The discussion intertwines historical perspectives with contemporary debates, particularly in the wake of geopolitical tensions involving Russia and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Through interviews with esteemed historian Kevin Ruane and archival audio clips, the episode offers a comprehensive exploration of why the idea of an "Army of Europe" has persisted since the early Cold War era and why it remains both relevant and contentious today.

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The Timeless Debate: European Military Unification

Martín Di Caro opens the episode by setting the stage for a discussion on the perennial idea of a European army. Referencing President Emmanuel Macron's recent speeches advocating for a true European military force, Di Caro highlights the resurgence of this concept amid contemporary security challenges. He notes Macron's stance that "Europe cannot be protected without a true European army" (Timestamp [00:37:00]).

Key Points:

• Historical attempts to create a European army, notably the European Defense Community (EDC) in the 1950s.
• Current proposals by European leaders to establish a joint intervention force or a truly unified European military.
• The complexities of sovereignty, strategic control, and integration with existing structures like NATO.

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Historical Context: The European Defense Community (EDC)

Historian Kevin Ruane provides an in-depth analysis of the EDC, tracing its origins to the immediate post-World War II era. He explains how the devastation of Europe's military capabilities led to proposals for a unified defense mechanism to deter Soviet aggression.

Key Points:

• Formation and Purpose: The EDC was conceived as a supranational military force comprising six European nations—France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg—to ensure collective security under NATO's umbrella.

  "The principle of the European army is accepted by the United States." — Kevin Ruane ([10:02])

• Challenges and Obstacles: The plan faced significant resistance, particularly from France, which was wary of ceding sovereignty and preventing a resurgence of German militarism.

  "The French are anxious about German rearmament." — Kevin Ruane ([35:50])

• Treaty of Paris (1952): The EDC treaty was signed but ultimately failed to be ratified by France in 1954, leading to a crisis within NATO and the eventual establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) as an intergovernmental alternative.

• Legacy: The failure of the EDC underscored the enduring tension between national sovereignty and supranational military cooperation, a theme that persists in today's discussions.

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Contemporary Relevance: Macron, NATO, and the Trump Administration

The episode draws parallels between the 1950s EDC debates and current initiatives led by figures like Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Zelenskyy, amidst shifting dynamics within NATO and changing U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration.

Key Points:

• Macron's Advocacy: Macron argues that European reliance on NATO and the U.S. is insufficient in the face of modern threats from Russia, China, and shifting American priorities.

  "The armed forces of Europe must be created. An army of Europe." — Emmanuel Macron ([03:51])

• Trump's Impact on NATO: Former President Trump has voiced dissatisfaction with European countries' defense contributions, threatening reductions in military support unless European nations increase their defense spending.

  "If you don't pay, we're not going to protect you." — Donald Trump ([57:27])

• European Response: Faced with potential U.S. disengagement, European nations are considering greater military cooperation and increased defense budgets to assert greater autonomy in their security arrangements.

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Analysis: Obstacles to a Unified European Army

Historian Kevin Ruane elaborates on the persistent barriers to establishing a European army, emphasizing issues of national sovereignty, differing threat perceptions, and institutional inertia.

Key Points:

• Sovereignty Concerns: Nations are reluctant to cede control over their military forces to a supranational entity, fearing loss of autonomy and the potential for conflicting national interests.

  "Who would control it? Who would decide its strategic purpose?" — Martin Di Caro ([02:45])

• Divergent Threat Perceptions: European countries often have varying assessments of threats, particularly between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, complicating unified defense strategies.

  "It's not clear any of the European states are going to send their sons and daughters into Ukraine to defend it." — Martin Di Caro ([13:27])

• Historical Lessons: The failure of the EDC serves as a cautionary tale about the difficulties of balancing national interests with collective security ambitions, a lesson relevant to current efforts.

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Conclusion: The Future of European Defense

Martin Di Caro and Kevin Ruane conclude the episode by reflecting on the likelihood of establishing a unified European army in the near future. While acknowledging the pressing need for Europe to enhance its defense capabilities, they express skepticism about replicating the EDC's supranational model given contemporary political landscapes and entrenched sovereignty concerns.

Key Points:

• Intergovernmental Cooperation vs. Supranational Integration: The likely path forward involves increased intergovernmental military cooperation within frameworks like the EU, rather than a fully unified European army.

  "What the present situation requires is not a long-drawn out replica EDC, it requires something else." — Kevin Ruane ([50:47])

• Role of NATO: NATO remains a central pillar of European security, with the United States' continued, albeit evolving, support being crucial amidst debates over European autonomy.

• Public and Political Will: Successful advancement towards a European army would necessitate broad public support and political consensus among member states, challenges that remain significant.

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Notable Quotes

• Emmanuel Macron:

  "The armed forces of Europe must be created. An army of Europe." ([03:51])

• Kevin Ruane:

  "NSC 68 posits the Soviet threat predominantly as a military threat. It therefore posits the response of America and its allies. In a like sense, it's got to be a military response." ([28:21])

• Donald Trump:

  "If you don't pay, we're not going to protect you." ([57:27])

• Martin Di Caro:

  "It's hard to know. Donald Trump changes his mind every 60 seconds." ([18:53])

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Final Thoughts

"Army of Europe" offers a nuanced examination of the complexities involved in forming a unified European military force. By juxtaposing historical attempts with current geopolitical shifts, the episode underscores the enduring challenges of balancing national sovereignty with collective security needs. As Europe continues to navigate its role on the global stage, the lessons from the past remain ever pertinent, informing present-day strategies and future aspirations.

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For more insights and historical analyses, tune in to future episodes of "History As It Happens" every Tuesday and Friday.

Transcript

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[Martin DeCaro]

Vote history as it happens March 14, 2025 army of Europe Men with courage.

[Historian]

And vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom. It was indeed a fateful moment, and France was divided on the question of the European army plan. NATO is growing stronger and free Germany adds to that strength.

[Kevin Ruane]

Macron's calling for a new European army, Pan European army to defend against Russia, China and America.

[Emmanuel Macron]

I really. I really believe that time has come. The armed forces of Europe must be created. An army of Europe.

[Martin DeCaro]

Going back to the early days of the Cold War, the idea of a European army has been kicked around but never realized as there were then. Too many obstacles might stand in the way today. Who would fill its ranks? Who would control it? Who would decide its strategic purpose? From Rene Plevin to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, an army of Europe remains a dream out of reach. That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Kevin Ruane]

The Europeans have prioritized since the late 40s, butter over guns. I think they have relied on NATO. They've almost outsourced a great deal of their security to the United States. Within NATO. They have periodically, as I've said earlier, come under tremendous pressure from different administrations in Washington to do more. And they have done some more, but never as much as the United States would like. But that was always just enough for the United States. As long as the USA and the EU had the same threat perception of Moscow and everything it stood for during and after the Cold War. I think a reckoning has Been coming for a long time.

[Martin DeCaro]

In a primetime speech On French television 10 days ago, President Emmanuel Macron said, it's past time for Europe to rearm. You may remember that in 2018, he called for the creation of a European army. Today, three years into Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with US Support seemingly unreliable in this age of Trump, Macron says he will confer with France's allies about using his country's nuclear deterrent to protect the continent. Interpretation provided by France 24 television because it's not just the Ukrainian people who.

[Kevin Ruane]

Are fighting bravely for their safety, but.

[Martin DeCaro]

It is our very security that is under threat. Having a country invading their neighbor with impunity, that is a dire message for.

[Kevin Ruane]

The rest of the world, saying that.

[Martin DeCaro]

Peace is under threat around the world. And on a similar note, here is Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference a month ago.

[Emmanuel Macron]

Right now, Ukraine's army, supported by global aid. Thank you so much. Is holding back Russia. But if not us, then who will stop them? Really, let's be honest now. We can't rule out the possibility that America might say no to Europe on issues that threaten it. Many, many leaders have talked about Europe. That needs its own military, an army, an army of Europe. And I, and I really, I believe that time has come. The armed forces of Europe must be created.

[Martin DeCaro]

So the idea of a European army is back in the news. Although it is not new, it's almost as old as NATO.

[Historian]

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Iceland, Canada and the United States. War is not inevitable. We do not believe that. There are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or another. In our own time, we've seen brave men overcome obstacles that seem insurmountable and forces that seem overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom, war or peace. I have no doubt which they will choose. The treaty we are signing here today is evidence of the path they will follow.

[Martin DeCaro]

A year after NATO was established in 1949, French Prime Minister Rene Plevin offered a plan for a handful of European states to build an army, not to defend Ukraine from Russian aggression in those days, but to defend Western Europe from possible Soviet aggression, which it was presumed would have started with an invasion of West Germany. Then the front line in the emerging Cold War.

[Historian]

Russia had swallowed up eight European countries without firing another shot. Great Britain and the United States protested that these countries had been coerced by threat of force and that Russia had broken her treaty. But Russia ignored the protest.

[Martin DeCaro]

But the French were all also worried about German soldiers. West German soldiers as the Truman administration insisted on rearmament just five years after it took most of the world to defeat the Third Reich. But the envisioned European Defense Community was stillborn, rejected by the country that proposed it, France.

[Historian]

And France was divided on the question of the European army plan. Monsieur mondes, France. The premier was obviously under pressure for a statement to the press. The British ambassador, Sir Gladwin Jebb, attended the session. As anticipated. The result was French rejection of edc. A vote was not taken, but it was decided to pass on to the next business.

[Martin DeCaro]

That was in 1954. The following year, West Germany gained its sovereignty and entered NATO. The ceremonies took place on May 9, 1955 in Paris, formally welcoming the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

[Historian]

I'm confident that this new foundation of the future relationship between the Federal Republic and the members of NATO will be a strengthening factor also for German democracy.

[Martin DeCaro]

This story is the subject of this podcast episode. The subject may be old, but the issues are fresh. What role should Europeans play in European security? What is the nature of the threat coming from Moscow? Who would control the European army? Who would fight in it? These questions were raised in the early 1950s. They are being raised today. You know, the United States was on board with the idea of a European army in the early 1950s. Today, the Trump administration and other critics from across the political spectrum want Europe to take the lead role in its own security. And this is a major change in the American stance. Let's remember in 1989, on his first trip to Europe as president, George H.W. bush insisted that even with the future of the Warsaw Pact in doubt, NATO would stay in business with the US Helming the ship. Europe would not be left to the Europeans.

[Historian]

And the alliance will prove every bit as important to American and European security in the decade ahead. The importance of the alliance and its democratic underpinnings is the message I now take to Europe. NATO has been a success by any measure, but success breeds its own challenges. Today, dramatic changes are taking place in Europe, both east and west.

[Martin DeCaro]

35 years later, and despite his public blustering, it seems unlikely President Trump will yank the US out of NATO altogether. But he has made it clear defending Ukraine is not a U.S. priority.

[Donald Trump]

You should have never started it. You could have made a deal. I could have made a deal for Ukraine. That would have given him almost all of the land.

[Martin DeCaro]

Everything.

[Donald Trump]

Almost all of the land. And no people would have been killed and no city would have been demolished and not one dome would have been knocked down.

[Martin DeCaro]

Is it a European priority? And if so, how will the willing European states do it? Establishing a supranational army, the dream of Macron and Zelenskyy. Well, it's a long shot for the same reasons it failed in the 1950s. Kevin Ruane is a professor of modern history at Canterbury Christchurch University and a BI fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge. He is an expert on the Cold War and 20th century international relations, the author of the Rise and Fall of the European Defense Community. Kevin Ruane, welcome to the podcast.

[Kevin Ruane]

Yeah, it's a pleasure to be with you.

[Martin DeCaro]

Joining us from the United Kingdom, who knew that a book you wrote 25 years ago would suddenly be back into fashion? Right.

[Kevin Ruane]

Well, there you go. If you hang around long enough in this business, everything comes round again.

[Martin DeCaro]

I guess a book about the European Defense Community, long defunct. That aside, we're going to get into the history here. Let's just talk briefly about the current moment. We're recording this on March 13th. By the time people listen to this, weeks or months later, who knows what will have happened? But as of this moment, it does not look like Russia will accept the US proposed 30 day ceasefire. Even if a ceasefire happens, who knows if it will lead to some kind of enduring or stable peace in Ukraine? Because there is this outstanding issue and it's related to the history we're going to talk about, and that is Ukraine's long term security. Who is going to guarantee it? Do you expect any European states will ultimately guarantee Ukraine's security and how they even do that?

[Kevin Ruane]

Well, there's been a lot of talk, I guess this is why I'm here. That's why my book has come back. There's been a lot of talk in the last 10 days or a fortnight about a European army. And that is in response to the rising fear, nay, panic that the Trump administration is going to pull the plug on NATO, is going to pull the plug, at least in some way, shape or form on this long standing US Commitment to European security. So there's been a lot of talk on the European side suddenly in a panic way about needing to do more. That's almost, I think, hopefully signaling to the Trump administration that we hear you, we are now going to do more. And so it's in that context that there's been talk about a European army, some kind of, well, it's not really been defined, some kind of integrated European force, an EU army, if you like, so that's one part of it. The other part of it is this has all been brought to a head by what's going on in Ukraine. If there is to be any kind of ceasefire or even a peace settlement, absolutely. Ukraine is within its rights to want that somehow guaranteed. And here is an opportunity, I think, for the Europeans to both satisfy the Trump administration by saying, hey, look, we can do something really meaningful in defence terms and to actually bolster what I think a lot of Europeans will still regard as the front line of their security at the moment, which is Ukraine, by putting in a force of some kind. And the talk is out there at the moment. It is the other side of this issue of maybe a force, a peacekeeping force. I've seen it called a reassurance force in the last couple of days of maybe 100,000, 150,000 troops. So all these things are kind of tangled up. Talk about a European army, talk about a reassurance force, but mostly talking about the Europeans doing more.

[Martin DeCaro]

There seems to be a divergence right now, as there was in the very, very early stages of the Cold War, about what the threat is and how to defend against it. And the divergence today may be that the Europeans are more concerned or more frightened about their security against Russia than the Trump administration is. What are Putin's long term ambitions after Ukraine? Is he going to meddle with other parts of eastern Europe or NATO's eastern fringes? I really don't have a good answer to that. But clearly it seems to me that Europeans see Ukraine in a different light than the Trump administration does. But at the same time, it's not clear any of them, meaning the European states, are going to send their sons and daughters into Ukraine to defend it?

[Kevin Ruane]

Well, no, as we're recording this, aside from the fact that it's not looking great that the Russians will accept the ceasefire proposal, that's true. What's also coming out of Russia today is a refusal to accept a peacekeeping force in Ukraine. So we'll just have to wait and see how that story develops. But on your wider point about threat perception, it is not new for US administrations post 1949, when NATO is effectively founded, to be complaining and getting angry and dissatisfied with the Europeans for not doing more. I found quotes going back reflecting on this from eisenhower in the 1950s, where he's using phrases like, I'm sick and tired. That's what he was. I'm sick and tired of the Europeans demanding we do things for them that really they should be doing for themselves. From Eisenhower Right through into the 60s, 70s and onwards. It is the pattern that the United States feels the Europeans should be doing more within NATO, maybe, and the European Community more widely. And yet the Europeans, when they're under that pressure from Washington to do more, to spend more of their GDP or to commit just militarily in a, in a more meaningful way, they do just enough to satisfy the United States, which calms down for a period of time, and then the pressure mounts again. But there has been no, to my mind, no serious consideration given, even in the era of the agonizing reappraisal of John Foster dulles in the 50s, of actually turning their back on NATO, of walking away from commitments to European security, because at the end of the day, the United States recognized that Russia in and after 1949 was an enemy state or the Soviet Union was an enemy state. And if it wasn't an enemy, it was hostile. If it wasn't hostile, it was untrustworthy. And therefore it would be cutting America's nose off despite its face, to pull those kind of plugs. What we've got now is at least prima facie a Trump administration that is not necessarily regarding Russia as the enemy, a Trump administration that's kind of applying a moral equivalency to what's going on in Ukraine, that Ukraine is as bad as Russia, which is not the case. One is a victim, one is an aggressor.

[Donald Trump]

You've allowed himself to be in a.

[Emmanuel Macron]

Very bad position from the very beginning of the war.

[Donald Trump]

You're not in a good position. You don't have the cards right now with us. You start having cards right now, you.

[Kevin Ruane]

Don'T have your playing cards.

[Donald Trump]

You're gambling with the lives of millions of people. You're gambling with World War Three.

[Kevin Ruane]

And suddenly, for the first time, other than maybe in the, I don't know, there was a period with Bill Clinton and Yeltsin where I don't think Russia was regarded as, as the enemy. I think really, for the first time, a US Administration is not seeing the threat the same way the Europeans do. And therefore the American government is not seeing the solution and the future in the same way as the Europeans are. So I think, yeah, we've reached a kind of very, very significant, maybe historical, historic moment, really in, in post war Atlantic relations.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's a great point. Because during the Bill and Bora show of the 1990s, on a different climate.

[Kevin Ruane]

This partnership opens the door to cooperation.

[Historian]

With all of NATO's former adversaries, including.

[Kevin Ruane]

Russia, Ukraine and the other newly independent.

[Martin DeCaro]

States Cold War was over. The Soviet Union is gone. The United States and Russia, I mean, they were in earnest, trying to work together to integrate Russia and to have Russia become a stable, peaceful, democratic, capitalist country. We all know the experiment failed catastrophically. Right. The 1990s end with Putin coming into power. But today, yes, you're right. And I didn't put my question so well about that divergence in ideas. Eisenhower, for all his complaints, understood that, especially in the early years of the Cold War with the blockade of Berlin and all that was happening, that European security was tied to American security or American security was tied to European. Today, the Trump administration does not apparently view Europe as an important center of strategic thought anymore. They want to pivot to Asia to bring that one back. Right. They want by potentially pulling Russia away from China, by getting Ukraine out of the way. Ukraine is an obstacle. It is a hindrance. Let's get it out of the way and focus instead on China by luring Russia away. But I don't see how that's going to happen, and I'm not very good at predicting the future. But it doesn't look like Russia will be convinced that its interests lie away from Beijing. And then we'll move on to history. If you want to address that remark.

[Kevin Ruane]

Yeah, sure. Just one thing to top and tail what we've been discussing so far. I think when you go back to Eisenhower, in fact, in the period that we're about to discuss, in the early to mid mid-1950s, when Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, his secretary of state, would talk publicly that if the Europeans didn't get their act together and unite properly and make their requisite military contribution to the common good, America might have to undergo an agonising reappraisal of its links to Western European security. They didn't really mean it. Eisenhower was NATO's first supreme commander. He was a NATO man through and through. Dulles got it as well. So those threats contained, in my judgment, at least, an element of bluff. The Trump administration, when it's making threats and that, it's not even talking about an agonizing appraisal. It's talking about a reappraisal. Reappraisal. I suspect they may well mean it.

[Martin DeCaro]

It's hard to know. Donald Trump changes his mind every 60 seconds.

[Kevin Ruane]

So, yeah, the most consistent thing about him is his inconsistency. But like financial markets, I think international historians need a bit of consistency to get their teeth into, but it just ain't there.

[Martin DeCaro]

Another piece of depressing news. Looking at the stock market but that's a different story for a different day. Well, you know, in the early 50s, late 40s, Europe's armies had been devastated and the continent had been devastated. Today Europe has, according to an estimate by Bruegel.org, a piece of analysis that I shared with you, one and a half million active duty military personnel, and that includes the United Kingdom, which is no longer part of the EU. And it is estimated that it would take 150,000 European troops to effectively deter Russia either in Ukraine or along Eastern Europe. Maybe we'll return to the present moment at the end here. So let's go back into history then. And this idea of an army of Europe, a European army coexisting. Tried, yeah, has been tried coexisting with NATO or working with, integrated. I mean I'm never, not quite sure how that would have worked had it actually happened. You know, Macron has brought this up, he brought it up before the full scale war started in 2022, having an army of Europe. The idea has been around, but its origins lie in the immediate post war, surprisingly shortly after World War II had ended. So why don't we start really at the beginning? We'll begin in the beginning. What are the origins of the idea that Europe might need a supranational army?

[Kevin Ruane]

Well, the origins of this European concept I think can be located in East Asia. It's the Korean War that starts it really in a serious sense. So the Korean War breaks out in June 1950. North Korea, communist North Korea attacks non communist South Korea once more. Civilians struggle for survival as thousands abandoning their homes again trudge southwards behind the lines. Seoul once again becomes a fortress while the big guns keep the enemy at bay.

[Historian]

In Washington, President Truman declares that U.S.

[Kevin Ruane]

Foreign policy is not a political issue, but one of survival.

[Historian]

Our foreign policy is not a political issue. Our foreign policy is not a political issue. It is a matter of life and death.

[Kevin Ruane]

The world starts looking to East Asia and I think if people know their Korean War, they'll know kind of what happens next. But the main point is, aside from a U. S, A u. N. Stroke, U.S. intervention on behalf of South Korea, all the focus is on East Asia. There was a sense in Washington at the time, Truman's Cold War Washington, that this could be a cunning plan by Stalin, that while America and its allies are distracted by what's going on in Korea, the Red army will cross into Western Germany and head to the English Channel. And what is there to stop the Red army in Europe? If this is a classic distraction the answer, not very much. And so some rapid calculations are done in Washington. Washington, The United States is prepared itself to commit substantially to Western European security in terms of sending more US conventional forces to add to occupation forces already in Germany. It calculates that Britain and France and all its other Western allies, these are now technically NATO allies by 1950, well, they should rearm like crazy as well conventional military block to Soviet aggression if it was coming. But after all that, there is still a huge discrepancy between Red army power and US led Western European power. And suddenly, September 1950, the Americans turn around to their European allies, principally France and Britain, and say, hey, we think we need 12 West German divisions at which French, you know, the jaw hits the ground. And five years after the end of the Second World War, the United States is proposing to, to France and Britain to rearm Germans. And it doesn't really matter if they're our Germans, if they're good Germans, if they're West Germany. It is a quite shocking proposal which will go down very badly in Western European public opinion, especially in France. But not just France. And it's Cold War necessity. It is gapped filling conventional European defence. And of course, if you bring West Germany into the military fold, you are able maybe as well to mount a forward defence in Europe based on, not on the Rhine anymore, but maybe on the River Elbe so you can push your defences further, further east. And finally, if you're going to do all that, you have to give Germany or West Germany its sovereignty because you can't expect German soldiers to fight and die for you if they're not technically free. So a whole lot of stuff is bound up with that. And the Americans say, okay, the Europeans come back and tell us how you're going to do this. We don't mind how you do it, but you need to find that manpower.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. As you say in your book, the Rise and Fall of the European Defense Community, Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, stressed that the dispatch of US forces to Europe, the establishment of an integrated North Atlantic defense structure and the appointment of an American to the position of supreme ally commander in Europe, the conversion, in other words, of an alliance into a permanent defense organization, NATO, depended on acceptance of West German rearmament. So the French respond to this with their idea for a European army. But Kevin, I just want to roll the clock back a little bit because what you said is really interesting how quickly developments took place in 1949. April 1949 is when the North Atlantic alliance is signed.

[Historian]

NATO, if there is anything certain Today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace. President Truman's dramatic announcement that Russia has created an atomic explosion sends reporters racing for Flushing Meadow, where Russia's Vashinsky arrives to.

[Martin DeCaro]

August of 1949 is when the Soviets test the atom bomb. And then you mention how in 1950 the Korean War begins. But before these key developments, the Americans were not convinced the Soviet Union posed a military threat to Western Europe. And let's remember where the dividing line was then. Right down the middle of Europe. Right, because you had already Soviet domination. Even if you don't have the Warsaw Pact quite yet, you do have Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. So think of, you know, everyone can open up a map on their browser or their phone as they're listening to this. Don't think of Ukraine as the so called front line here. Think of Germany split down the middle. George Kennan, he thought the Europeans were wrong to believe that the Soviets were gonna attack, militarily, attack Western Europe. Right?

[Kevin Ruane]

Yeah. I think it was Kennan's view up to and including 1949 that the Soviet Union was more likely to use or means short of war, to extend its power and influence. It was going to subvert, it was going to use political and economic and social and ideological methods. And you've got a very strong Communist Party in France, you've got a very strong Communist party in Italy and, and, and who knows, you know, sort of those countries could go communist internally in certain ways. Of course, the Marshall Plan as well was designed from 1947 to improve the economic condition of Western Europe and therefore to eliminate poverty and hopelessness and despair, which are the kind of things that Communism was thought to breed in and you know, sort of make people grasp for extreme political solutions. But I think two things in late 1949, these are the two classic moments in Cold War history. In 1949, the Chinese victory in the Chinese civil War coming hard on the heels of the Soviet atomic bomb, the first successful test of a Soviet nuclear weapon four years after the Americans used their first atomic bombs against Japan. Those are kind of twin disasters at the end of 1949 from an American Cold War strategic standpoint, because suddenly there's 500 million more communists and almost overnight than you thought were there as China, as People's Republic was born in October 1949. And also your great enemy, the Soviet Union, which has already got a massive Red army, now has a nuclear capability. And those two major upheav, plus the way a Very agitated American Congress and public opinion reacts to them. Produces a Truman administration deep delve into its national security strategy. And it produces in April 1950 a revised containment policy that's come down to us as Cold War historians. By its codename, it's National Security council document number 68. And this really is a break from the Canaanite view of how the Soviet Union was likely to behave. Because now the Soviet Union has the capacity to be a military threat. It's got a nuclear weapon and it's got a huge Red Army. NSC 68's authors, Kennan has already broken with the administration. So he's not really part of this is saying because it's got the capability, we now need to assume it will be a military threat. And so any subtlety and sort of nuance to American containment policy kind of, kind of shifts in 4950 and the policy that America will have in its back pocket when the Korean War breaks out, when the general war scare ensues later in 1950 is this more militarized concept of global containment.

[Martin DeCaro]

NSC 68, one of the most important national security memos or documents in US history. Right. In a one sentence description, the militarization of containment. Right.

[Kevin Ruane]

Because NSC 68 posits the Soviet threat predominantly as a military threat. It therefore posits the response of America and its allies. In a like sense, it's got to be a military response. The other thing NSC 68 does, by the way, is it turns the truman doctrine of 1947, which was meant to be a global concept. Truman said America would go anywhere, anytime, any place on the world, seemed to help people being threatened. And yet the truman doctrine from 47 onwards was really focused on Japan and Asia. It was kind of compartmentalized. NSC 68 globalizes containment and it militarizes containment.

[Martin DeCaro]

Minor mini digression. You mentioned the communists in Italy. The United States meddled in Italian elections in the 1950s. Correct. To prevent communists from winning elections.

[Kevin Ruane]

The big medal was 1948. And I think once that was a successful medal and a bit in France as well. You didn't have to meddle quite so deeply. But okay. But yes, there was a real concern that Stalin didn't need to send the tanks into Western Europe. He could just wait for, you know, certain countries to. To go commun within and then conclude, I don't know, alliances with the Soviet Union. Grant the Soviet Union military base rights in Italy and France, for example. So that was the real anxiety, I think in the late 40s you mentioned.

[Martin DeCaro]

The Marshall Plan was designed or one of its purposes was to take away the appeal of communism. In Truman's 1949 inaugural address, he's talking about the United States has a responsibility to donate knowledge, technology and science to the developing world.

[Historian]

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

[Martin DeCaro]

He understood in the developing world, socialism had an appeal. I'll go back now to 4950, but I just say.

[Kevin Ruane]

Yeah, could I just say on that? The lesson of the 1930s was that in conditions of great economic downturn, economic depression, hopeless, desperate, unemployed, hungry, homeless people will be prey to the siren songs of extremism. And you can see how the Great Depression impacted Don Weimar Germany. Suddenly, it's not just the Nazis making great strides from 1929-30 onwards. On the right, the actual communists on the left are making great strikes. It's the middle doesn't hold. When you get to the late 40s, the Truman administration era of the Marshall Plan, they looked at Western Europe. Homeless, depressed refugee populations in countries of democratic processes, happy, content people who have enough to eat a house over their head, a future that they can look forward to. I think the conclusion in the United States was these are not the kind of people that would vote Communist. And so therefore it was a form of social and economic containment.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, I'm glad you're emphasizing that, because if we're going to draw parallels or comparisons, people have to remember what Europe was like after World War II. Today Europe's a prosperous, despite any problems it has, is a prosperous continent that should do more to defend itself for its own sake, not just for political reasons. Maybe we'll return to that, as I mentioned at the end. But, you know, as you said, this call for 12, only 12 West German divisions to help, as you wrote in your book, ameliorate the imbalance between the Red army and the Western forces and permit a forward strategy in Europe based on defense of the Elbe rather than the Rhine. So, you know, when I learned that Margaret Thatcher was initially opposed to German reunification in 1990, I asked someone, well, why would she be opposed to that? And the person answered, 1945. And I said, really? That was 45 years after the Second World War. She was still concerned about a powerful, unified Germany. So just think, as you said before, what European states must have thought when the United States is talking about rearmament of West Germany just five years after the defeat of the Nazis. So the French, to get to the main gist here, the French, their Prime Minister, Rene Plevant, he has an idea on how to deal with this. Okay, the United States are coming in with a Supreme Allied Commander and they're going to send their forces here to protect us. They want to rearm Germany, but we just can't have the risk of unleashing German aggression again. Who was Rene Plavant? What was his plan?

[Kevin Ruane]

Yeah, that's the dilemma. When the Americans present it, they say all the things you want from us. Supreme Allied Commander. It's going to be Eisenhower, by the way. And that goes down well in Europe. More US Troops in Europe. We'll put the O into NATO. Remember, the North Atlantic Treaty is a piece of paper in 1949. The Americans are saying, we're going to turn it into a real thing. The Europeans want all this, and the price is you've got to accept West German rearmament. The French in particular, take the lead. Rene Pleven, who's just the French Prime Minister at that point, but he's strongly advised and counseled by one of the leading brains of European federalism and supranationalism, of the European idea, Jean Monet. His view is, how do we give the Americans what they want, I. E. Rearm Germans and yet at the same time make it sellable to our own public opinion five years down the line from the end of the war, which would be very, very raw about Germans? And how more seriously do we ensure that we're not accidentally creating a new future German threat to Europe? We're giving guns back to Germans. We can't countenance creating a national German army. And the solution that's arrived at it becomes known as the Pleven Plan, even though it should be the Monet Plan. He's the politician he fronts up. It is for a European army that will extend the supranational principles that informed the emergence only a few months before of the European Coal and Steel Community. It will extend the supranational concept to the area of military defense. The Cold and Steel Community has France, West Germany. What will be what? The Federal Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The Six. I'll refer to the Six for short and probably again as we move along. So the Six pull their coal and steel.

[Martin DeCaro]

No Great Britain. No Great Britain in there.

[Kevin Ruane]

Britain is not part of it. Britain stays outside of it. Because as Ernie Bevin, the British Labor Foreign Secretary says the Durham miners won't have it. So Britain stays outside the coal and steel community. But that's partly to tie France and Germany together. And what do modern armies need? They need coal and steel. Well, what if it's not in your national control? It's a supranational thing. It's all part of rehabilitating Germany and building a new Europe. That is extended to the idea of West German rearmament. So the European army will see the six contribute in the Plevin Plan concept. Whatever forces they have in Europe will go into this mixing bowl and you will create a euro, a combined European army. But these soldiers will no longer wear a French uniform or a Dutch uniform. They will wear. To the extent they get this far of thinking about it, they will wear a European uniform. It will be a supranational European army. But the Europeans don't want it. They'd rather not do this. It's forced on them. A supranational solution is the only way to get Germans rearmed, but in safety.

[Martin DeCaro]

The French want to supervise German rearmament. Right. But Eisenhower is the supreme Allied commander. So I guess I'm confused here as to how this was going to all work. It obviously didn't. It ran aground on the concerns you just articulated. Giving up your sovereignty to some kind of federation, whether it was the European Economic or the coal and steel community, an economic model or a military model, the edc, European Defense Community. So how would it have worked with NATO?

[Kevin Ruane]

To you, and I may be looking back, the quick solution is to say, the Federal Republic of Germany, let's give you back your sovereignty. Konrad Adenauer is committed to his policy of vest integration. He wants to root his country in the Western alliance system. He's a good guy. Everybody is supporting him on the Western side of things. Why not just let West Germany into NATO? Answer. NATO is an alliance of fully sovereign states. And NATO, the way it's constituted, you know, is not designed to put any limitations on what any of its members can or wish to bring to the table. What worries the French in particular about just letting the West Germans into NATO as a West German military unit is that, you know, what's to stop that West German army doubling in size? What's to stop it seceding from NATO? What's to stop it being used as a springboard to. To push a new form of German expansionism at some point in the future. So the way you insure against that is Germany does not come into NATO as a sovereign state. Instead, it joins this grouping, this European army, let's call it a euro block of six, where the German contribution is melded with the other five contributions. And that euro block block is then given to Eisenhower and Eisenhower is told to dispose of it how he wants. So you can control the future, the shape, the nature of German rearmament, you can police it within the framework of a European army. You cannot police West German development militarily if the Federal Republic just goes into NATO.

[Martin DeCaro]

So a treaty then is agreed in 1952, but it has to be ratified. And the French, the ones who proposed the EDC, they're the ones who ultimately rejected in 1954. This was a four year saga. And then the French ultimately reject it. So what did it all come to in the end? 4 years of lots of wrangling and acrimony.

[Kevin Ruane]

Yes, yes, you're right. Look, the principle of the European army is accepted by the United States. 1951 US troops will come to Europe. Eisenhower will take up his position. Everything seems great. The Europeans continue to develop and fine tune their plans. And you're right. Yeah. In May 1952, a treaty is signed in Paris, the Treaty of Paris, which forms what has become now called a European Defense Community, the edc. It's a kind of recalibration of the original Plevin Plan. Very importantly, almost the next day, the British, French and Americans go off to Bonn and they sign something called the Bonn Conventions with the Federal Republic, because you can't have West German troops and then West Germany joining NATO, albeit under the auspices of a European army, the edc, if you don't give West Germany its sovereignty. And so therefore the bond conventions are about freeing West Germany and they're signed as well. But there's an important bit of coupling going on here. West German sovereignty. The bond conventions cannot be realized until the European Defence Community Treaty is ratified in the parliaments of all six signatories. So it's not just a West German military contribution that hinges on unanimous ratification. It is the future sovereignty of West Germany. And that is super important. People forget these days that if Adenauer cannot deliver West German freedom to the greatest extent possible, different siren songs are coming out of Moscow saying, saying, we believe in a united Germany, we believe in a united, neutral Germany. And so Adnan's policy of rooting his country in the Western alliance can unravel if things go wrong. Public opinion in Germany, West Germany could be seduced by the prospect of a neutralized future. And of course, if you're America or Britain or any of The Western Allies. Your great fear is a reunited Germany, ostensibly neutral, but through a process of diplomatic osmosis being sucked into the Communist bloc and the whole of Germany now grafted onto your great Soviet enemy. So an awful lot is riding on these two 1952 treaties. But to cut to the chase plot, spoiler, after two years of wrangling, it is the French that will ultimately fail to ratify in August 1954 the EDC Treaty. That means the West German sovereignty thing can't happen happen either. Why do the French turn on their own creation if you like? Well, first of all, they didn't want this in the first place. It was imposed on them back in 1950. Number two, there is an enormous appetite, funnily enough, in France for West German rearmament in any way, shape or form. But thirdly, there is definitely not great appetite in France for West German rearmament if it means France giving up sovereignty over the army of Napoleon and everything that it stands for and means symbolically in France. So supranationalism is a problem as well. Another problem is Britain is not in the European Defense Community. The UK does not want to be part of any federal or supranational construct.

[Martin DeCaro]

And at that point the UK and the French were the only two countries in Western Europe with large militaries. Had suffered some serious blows too in the war. War.

[Kevin Ruane]

The British are prepared to support the EDC from the outside. You know, they do almost everything short of joining it. But I think, I think those are the things that really turn the French off, that by 1954 they don't want to lose control of their army. They're anxious about German rearmament. The French national assembly votes it down and pitches the Western alliance into a tremendous crisis. It's a short lived crisis because a solution will be formed. But it was a very rocky moment in the life, not just of the edc, which you said at the beginning was defunct. It was never funked. It could never be defunct because it was never funked thanks to the French. But it's a real crisis in NATO and NATO is really new. It's only five years old, it hasn't bedded in properly. And the Western Europeans are always fearful of some kind of isolationist undertow coming across the Atlantic or the Americans moving to what the Eisenhower administration sometimes called peripheral defense, defense which is no troops in Western Europe at all, but maybe using bases, military bases, air bases in, in Spain, in the uk, Iceland for all I know. So yeah, it's a huge ruction in.

[Martin DeCaro]

1954, these concerns about ceding your sovereignty, they are alive today. Ceding your sovereignty to a supernational organization or army that could then get involved in a war against a nuclear armed Russia. Well, what if we don't want to send our sons and daughters to defend Ukraine against a nuclear armed Russia? I'll just remind everyone that in 1966, a decade and a half after this period, we're talking about, because of concerns about sovereignty or whatever, Charles de Gaulle, the President of France, withdraws France from NATO's Integrated Military Command, a move driven by his vision of an independent European power and concerns about U.S. dominance within the alliance. Not the leapfrog into the 1960s. But I just want to return to a point you made about West Germany at the time. Yes, Germany was an occupied nation, and as Ian Kershaw points out in his marvelous book the Global Age, the opposition, social Democratic leadership and a sizable proportion of German opinion continue to entertain the idea of German neutrality and reunification even then. So, yeah, these were real concerns at the time. And you know, the passage of 80 something years, they may seem, seem quaint today, but these were real concerns then.

[Kevin Ruane]

Could I just say, please, I know there's a danger for listeners that we, we are whizzing around, but if you go right back to 1950, don't think that the West German people, the people of the Federal Republic, were keen on rearmament. They weren't. Or remilitarization. And in fact, Adenauer goes out on a limb and he, he sells a West German military contribution, sells German soldiers in uniform once more by saying, if we do this, we get our sovereignty. This is the price we pay. And of course, 1954, when the French throw the whole thing out, they're not just throwing out the edc, they are potentially sending a wrecking ball through Adenauer's policy of rooting West Germany in the Western alliance. It's a crisis for that reason. It's a crisis in NATO. And by the way, the reason you wanted those West German troops, troops in the first place four years earlier, hasn't gone away. You're still alarmed by the differential between Red army conventional strength and the Western powers in Western Europe. So it's all, it's a bit of a calamity.

[Martin DeCaro]

However, it does get resolved positively and in fairly short order because West Germany does remilitarize, does get its sovereignty and does enter NATO. And maybe the time was right, the Korean War was over, Stalin was dead in 1953. Pointing to Kershaw again at conferences in London and then in Paris. In September and October 1954, NATO members agreed to end the occupation of Germany, although Allied troops would remain to accept West Germany as a sovereign state and to incorporate the Federal Republic into NATO. May 5, 1955. West Germany attains its state sovereignty a decade after the end of the Second World War. Four days later it formally joined NATO. All this stuff reversed in short order. That's kind of surprising.

[Kevin Ruane]

It gets reversed because the EDC was super complex and the sovereignty issue that you mentioned was bound up with it. So all six member states have to give up control of their armies. That's especially hard for the, for the French. You could say, oh well, the French gave up their sovereignty over their coal and steel industries when they agreed to go into the coal and steel community in 1950. Well, funnily enough, it turned out that as a symbol of national identity, of history, of tradition, of meaning, of, of everything, armies are more important to your sense of sovereignty than coal mines and steel mills. And that's what the EDC ultimately proved. Its successor is something called the Western European Union. They just love their acronyms and their abbreviations. So the EDC becomes the W, the EU in very short order. But the point is the British take the lead. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary in resolving this European defense crisis. And he puts forward not a supranational or a federal complex solution, but an inter governmental solution. There's something already existing called the Brussels Treaty, from 1948. It's the Benelux countries, Britain and France, five of them. Eden says, let's bring West Germany into the Brussels Treaty and call it the Western European Union. It's intergovernmental, there's no federalism there. But within that grouping we can all of us accept certain limitations on how we go about our military business, which would include West Germany and the West Germans would accept that. In addition, Conrad Adenaude, in one of the most incredible acts of self abnegation as a, as a national leader, isn't told to. He volunteers not to build a German army beyond the 12 divisions. He agrees that Germany will not develop nuclear weapons or chemical weapons or biological weapons. He places his own limitations. And so this grouping, formerly the Brussels Pact, widened, It's called the WEU. This is a grouping that then can support NATO. NATO. West Germany can enter NATO as it does in May 1955. It enters with no discrimination as an equal, which is what Adenau needs and what sovereignty requires in, in West German politics, West Germany enters NATO. But the French and other smaller European powers are reassured because the WEU has placed certain limits on German rearmament. And more than anything else, unlike the edc, the British, the big hitters are in the WEU because it's an intergovernmental, not a supranational organization. So you put all those things together, and there's urgency as well. It's all done very quickly because I think the Europeans are panicking now about the American reaction. Will they cut off aid? Will they have had enough of the Europeans playing around, not taking things seriously? Echoes of Today, in the end, is put together very, very quickly, and the scenario plays out precisely as you. As you said a few minutes ago.

[Martin DeCaro]

And the UK was in NATO at that point, about 15, 16 countries strong. Today, NATO is, I don't know, 30 countries or so. Most of Europe is in it.

[Kevin Ruane]

32.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, 32. Most of Europe is in it. So I'm going to read a headline. I said we'd circle back to current times. I'll read a headline here, a couple of sentences from a story from the BBC's website. French President Emmanuel Macron has warned that Europeans cannot be protected without a true European army. On a visit to the former Western front in Verdun, he said Russia has shown it could be a threat and Europe had to be able to defend itself better alone. He proposed a joint intervention force for crisis missions previous to this. Now he wants a true European army. Germany's chancellor backed the idea of an intervention force, but said it would have to be part of a structure of defense cooperation. The uk, while in favor of such an intervention force, is opposed to a European army because of a potential risk of creating a parallel structure to NATO. But guess what, Kevin? This article is from 2018. Now, Macron just recently delivered a speech on French television talking about how Europe needs to remilitarize and needs to come together with some kind of maybe European army. But I just don't see how these issues that date to the 1950s, control, coordination, coexistence with NATO sovereignty, will be resolved today in a different context. The context is Ukraine, not Germany.

[Kevin Ruane]

It depends what Macron and not just Macron, but lots of people and including Zelenskyy mean by a European army.

[Emmanuel Macron]

Many leaders have talked about Europe that needs its own military, an army, an army of Europe.

[Kevin Ruane]

If we're talking about, you know, the perfect blending and melding, you know, a supranational success to the edc, that ain't gonna happen. You know, you could think of at least half a dozen countries that just wouldn't touch that with a barge Pole within, within the eu. It's just incredibly, yeah, incredibly complicated. What the present situation requires is not long drawn out replica edc, sa. It requires something else. It requires the Europeans in the first instance to satisfy the Trump administration that it is prepared to take on more of, you know, more responsibility for its own security. And I think a lot of what we're hearing over the last couple of weeks is not playing to the gallery as such, but is certainly the kind of thing that you think the Trump administration wants to hear. We're prepared to raise GDP across the EU on defense spending from what is it currently 2 or 2.2%. It can go up to 3.5. I've seen the economists say that it should be going to four or five. I think probably the EU could manage that. And in an old fashioned phrase, that might be a sprat to catch a macro or at least to keep the macro with you. In other words, that might be enough for the Trump administration to feel okay, now they're beginning to pull their weight in the way we want. Because what you don't want is some drastic schism, the end of NATO, the end of any United States military or security aid assistant with Western Europe. So I don't see a complex supranational successor happening anytime soon. What I do see is greater within the EU framework, intergovernmental military cooperation. And it may be led by the big players, by Poland, by Germany and France, and from without, about by the uk. But I can't see a European army anything like modeled on, on the defunct. Go back to your great phrase the totally defunct edc.

[Martin DeCaro]

I mean, what other continents have this conversation? Is there a Central American army? Is there? I mean, I'm comparing apples and oranges, of course, but you get my point. There's no South American army or I don't know, Asian army, I guess. I mean there's no NATO army army. NATO is its members who have militaries that are coordinated with each other under U.S. leadership. I think the answer here, at least on paper, I mean how it's executed, how many European forces ever make it to Ukraine or wherever? On paper the answer is a European led NATO or a NATO where Europe is stronger relative to the US position. If in fact the Trump administration is going to pursue a policy where, where the US no longer plays a dominant role in NATO. I don't think they're going to pull out from NATO entirely.

[Kevin Ruane]

No. But yeah, I think you're right in the way you've assessed it there. And we do keep coming Back to sovereignty and the importance of national armies to sovereignty. Let's just say there was an EU army. Let's just. Okay, it's not complex and supranational, but, but there is a lot more interlinkage than there currently is. And let's say it's not, not 27 countries all blended together and of course you've got, you've got some neutrals anyway, but let's say six, seven, eight countries. I think the phrase has been bandied around, hasn't it? You know, those who are willing, so, so within the EU framework, those willing to come together, come together. But ultimately who decides when this EU army should be deployed, where it should, should be deployed? Who has that strategic oversight? What kind of integrated command structure will there be? Because it would require those seven or eight countries to surrender sovereignty to some centralized EU military body. And yet everything we've learned from the history of the EDC is that, I don't know, governments and the polity behind them, the public opinion behind them, you know, is Polish opinion going to be entirely happy about Polish boys being deployed in a very dangerous situation by a decision made by, I don't know.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, exactly.

[Kevin Ruane]

Who somebody happens to be from France or Italy or whatever it might be.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. Complicated by the fact that it goes.

[Kevin Ruane]

To the core of, of, of of nationhood here and it's very difficult to see it being overcome.

[Martin DeCaro]

Complicated by the fact that there's a hot war going on right now. Maybe if some kind of long term ceasefire or truce make this situation easier.

[Kevin Ruane]

Here, a peacekeeping force, a reassurance force that could be dominated by some of the eu, bigger military hitters, plus the UK no longer obviously in the eu they could play a role. But although today the news coming out of Moscow is that Putin won't accept what, you know, sort of that kind of commitment, land commitment on Ukrainian territory, that would be one potentially doable, constructive way that the EU can up its military posture. The other ways are increasing that percentage of GDP and figuring out ways where you can combine and cooperate on a more intimate military level than has here to been required. Because with my Irish passport, proud as I am to still be a member of the European Union, I think the Europeans have, have prioritised since the late 40s, butter over guns. I think they have relied on NATO, they've almost outsourced a great deal of their security to the United States. Within NATO. They have periodically, as I've said earlier, come under tremendous pressure from different administrations in Washington to do more. And they have done some more, but never as much as the United States would like. But that was always just enough for the United States as long as the USA and the EU had the same threat perception of Moscow and everything it stood for during and after the Cold War. I think a reckoning has been coming for a long time. I think so many US Administrations have been down on the Europeans for not doing more. And now the reckoning is coming. It's a wrecking ball. It's a reckoning ball. It is Donald Trump. And of course the tragedy is the first house on the street to be wrecked could be Ukraine, which would be terrible. I really, really can't believe it's going to come to that. But I think a reckoning has been, has been on the cards for a long time. But I don't see a supranational federalized European army of 27 states. I don't even see it of six states or five or four willing states happening anytime soon. But certainly the EU militarily needs to step up to the plate a bit more.

[Donald Trump]

Look, NATO has taken advantage of our country. The European countries took advantage. I want to use a word starting with an S, but I don't want to do it because I see some young, very good looking children in the audience and I assume they're watching on television, but they took advantage of us on trade and then they took advantage of us on our military protection. Of the 28 countries at the time, only eight countries were paid up. We were paying the difference. And I went to them, I said, if you don't pay, we're not going to protect you. And they said, do you mean that? I said, I mean that. And the next day, billions of dollars poured into. The reason they have money right now to prosecute. What they're doing with helping Ukraine is because of the money I got them.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next episode of History as it Happens, we'll delve into the history of usaid, the Agency for international Development that has been dismantled by the Trump administration. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign up [e-mail] or search for History as it Happens on substat.