Before and After Hamas

Summary

Podcast Summary: "Before and After Hamas"

History As It Happens with Martin Di Caro
Guest: Nathan Brown (Professor, George Washington University)
Date: October 7, 2025

---

Overview of the Episode

This episode of "History As It Happens" marks the second anniversary of Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel and explores the organization's trajectory before, during, and after its rise to power. Host Martin Di Caro interviews Middle East expert Nathan Brown to trace Hamas’s evolution and discuss the realities of the current conflict, the possibilities of peace, and the uncertain future of both Hamas and Palestinian resistance. The conversation draws on historical context, political analysis, and broader changes occurring in the Middle East, attempting to answer what might come "after Hamas."

---

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. The Latest Peace Proposal & Defining Peace

[09:46–13:16]

• Context: On the second anniversary of the 2023 Hamas attack, President Trump unveils a 20-point peace proposal seeking, amongst other things, the release of hostages, Hamas’s disarmament, and ceding power.
• Defining Peace:
  • Brown points out that, for now, “peace” simply means a cessation of violence—hardly the comprehensive settlement many envision.
    • “Over the short term it will probably just be a cessation of the Israeli military campaign. That's not really peace, but it's what people are longing for, just an end to the scale of killing and destruction.” – Nathan Brown [10:02]
• Vagueness of the Proposal:
  • The plan is described as vague, with all involved parties (Israel, the US, Hamas, Arab states, Europeans) appearing to agree, but actually holding conflicting interpretations, and with “big holes in the agreement.”
    • “Essentially, what we've just got right now is a beginning of diplomacy among parties who still have very contradictory interests.” – Nathan Brown [12:57]

2. The Decimation and Future of Hamas Leadership

[13:26–15:16]

• Leadership Loss:
  • Hamas’s internal structure has been virtually wiped out; many leaders are dead, and the group functions now as a more underground guerrilla organization.
  • The future form of Hamas is deeply uncertain, with divisions between Gaza-based and external leadership.
    • "Almost anybody who was anybody in Hamas prior to October 2023 is dead. So we don't really know what kind of movement will emerge from this." – Nathan Brown [14:30]

3. Historical Analogies: 1982 Lebanon and Unintended Consequences

[15:16–18:11]

• PLO’s Exile in 1982:
  • The Israeli invasion of Lebanon resulted in the PLO’s leadership exile, which unexpectedly led to a shift toward diplomacy and internal Palestinian self-organization.
  • Brown argues that similar unintended consequences could arise from attempts to force Hamas into exile today.
    • “What we should learn from that is that the situation right now is plunging to the unknown… There will be developments in Palestinian society which won't be visible, I think, perhaps for years to come.” – Nathan Brown [17:19]

4. Palestinian Society: Search for Alternatives and Despair

[18:11–18:48]

• Old Politics vs. New Sentiment:
  • Widespread Palestinian frustration with both Hamas and Fatah; however, no clear alternative leadership has emerged.
    • “These are eight track tapes. This is a technology of the 20th century, but no alternative has emerged. … How that will express itself is anybody's guess.” – Nathan Brown [18:26]

5. Will Armed Resistance End?

[18:48–22:02]

• Internal Dynamics:
  • Given massive losses, future Hamas leaders are likely to be those with a militant record, favoring continued armed resistance.
  • However, a hypothetical (if unlikely) scenario exists: Hamas dissolving into a unified Palestinian state, aligning with long-standing demands for a single governing authority.
    • “The voices within the organization that will say we have to return to our roots will be the more powerful ones.” – Nathan Brown [20:07]
    • "If I were an American diplomat ... I'd say to Hamas, okay, you will dissolve yourself into a Palestinian state. Let's talk about how that happens.” – Nathan Brown [21:39]

6. The Nature of Revolutionary Movements

[22:02–24:23]

• Hamas: Idea vs. Organization:
  • Hamas’s durability is attributed to its organizational strength more than to ideology alone.
    • “Hamas has always been, yes, there are ideas in Hamas, but their secret to success has been their organizational strength… This is a level of destruction which no other movement in Palestinian history has ever stood up to.” – Nathan Brown [22:32]

7. Arab States and Geopolitical Shifts

[24:23–27:57]

• From Armed Struggle to ‘Global Mafia Politics’:
  • The episode discusses how Arab states, over decades, have shifted from antagonism with Israel to practical dealings—driven by concern for regional stability more than by solidarity with the Palestinians.
  • The Abraham Accords marked a change to individual Arab states normalizing relations with Israel, but this trend now faces skepticism due to Israeli military policies.
    • “If anything, the momentum now is a slight bit in the opposite direction. ... Israel is now as much a security worry as a security partner for those states.” – Nathan Brown [27:17]

8. The One-State Reality

[27:57–30:42]

• No Two-State Solution:
  • Both Israelis and Palestinians increasingly see the two-state solution as dead; even the Trump plan only briefly mentions a Palestinian state.
    • "We want to live our lives, we just want normal lives. And that seems out of reach. So you're really dealing with a situation in which I think you not only have a one state reality, but there are no realistic plans to anything better or different.” – Nathan Brown [29:51]

9. Fading of Radical Islam and What Comes Next?

[30:42–35:13]

• Decline of Radical Islamism:
  • The appeal of radical political Islam is waning, particularly among the youth, while a deep identification with Palestinian national identity endures.
    • "It's probably fading. ... What will replace it? I suggested before, there's a real strong grasping to Palestinian national identity, but it's not coupled to any kind of ideology, any kind of strategy whatsoever.” – Nathan Brown [33:00]
• A Period of Searching:
  • Likely future: A prolonged, directionless phase marked by the search for new forms of resistance or political organization, analogous to the PLO’s period of dormancy in the 1980s.

10. Israel’s Tactical Approach and Lack of Long-Term Vision

[35:13–36:25]

• Managing Palestinian Politics:
  • Israel’s short-term tactics (including once tolerating Hamas as a challenge to the PLO) contrast with a lack of long-term strategy regarding Palestinian aspirations.
    • “The Israelis have been very, very tactically adept, but I don't think there's a real strategic vision on how to deal with the Palestinians.” – Nathan Brown [35:38]

11. The Burden of Occupation and the West Bank’s Despair

[36:25–38:50]

• Absence of Current Uprising:
  • Despite severe provocations in the West Bank, intense despair and exhaustion have prevented a violent uprising—for now.
    • “The level of despair is just so great. I would be surprised if it's quiet forever... People are just reeling under this and thinking: How do I get to school? How do I move around? How do I get a job? What's my future in this?” – Nathan Brown [37:00]
• The Right to Self-Determination:
  • Brown closes with a passionate reminder of the daily indignities and injustice faced by Palestinians:
    • "Look at the world through their eyes. It is not fair that a Palestinian child cannot grow up in a state of their own… It's not right to prevent Palestinians from farming their lands or restricting a student's ability to move around the West Bank or displace Palestinian families from their homes. Neither occupation nor expulsion is the answer." – Nathan Brown [38:10]

---

Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On the Defining of Peace:
  "What people have usually meant by peace is some kind of comprehensive Israeli Palestinian settlement ... That's what people have meant by peace. And in that sense this isn't really a peace proposal that we've got from Trump.” – Nathan Brown [10:14]

• On Unpredictable Consequences of Conflict:
  "What we should learn from [1982] is that the situation right now is plunging to the unknown. ... There will be developments in Palestinian society which won't be visible, I think, perhaps for years to come." – Nathan Brown [17:19]

• About the Organizational Strength of Hamas:
  "This is a level of destruction which no other movement in Palestinian history has ever stood up to. So that's why I think Hamas survives on the resilience of its basic organizational structure.” – Nathan Brown [22:39]

• On Feeling of Futility and Despair in the Occupied Territories:
  “We want to live our lives, we just want normal lives. And that seems out of reach.” – Nathan Brown [29:49]

• On Generational Change:
  “These are dim memories for them. These are eight track tapes. This is a technology of the 20th century, but no alternative has emerged.” – Nathan Brown [18:23]

• On the Declining Appeal of Radical Islamism:
  “Political Islam ... that project is over, and it's over for Palestinians.” – Nathan Brown [33:06]

• On the Palestinian Struggle:
  "The Palestinian people's right to self determination, their right to justice must also be recognized. And put yourself in their shoes. ... Neither occupation nor expulsion is the answer." – Nathan Brown [38:15]

---

Key Timestamps

• 09:46: Martin Di Caro welcomes Nathan Brown and opens discussion on defining peace.
• 10:47: Examination of the peace proposal’s vagueness and contradictory interests.
• 13:54: Analysis of who/what remains within Hamas post-2023.
• 15:16: Drawing historical lessons from the 1982 PLO exile.
• 18:11: Discussion on the exhaustion with old Palestinian politics and absence of a new alternative.
• 19:39: Possibilities for the future of armed resistance and potential other directions.
• 22:02: The transformation of movements—Hamas as phenomenon.
• 24:23: Regional and international currents shaping events post-Arab normalization.
• 27:57: The "one-state reality" and loss of faith in two-state solution.
• 30:42: Fading trajectory of radical Islam and new search for Palestinian national expression.
• 36:25: Occupation’s impact on Palestinian daily life, West Bank developments.

---

Episode Tone and Style

The conversation is analytical, historically grounded, and somber, with moments of passionate advocacy for understanding the Palestinian experience. Brown’s style is reflective and cautious, repeatedly noting the unpredictability of social and political outcomes in the region.

---

This summary encapsulates the episode’s rich historical framing, sharp analysis of the current crisis, and forward-looking (if uncertain) exploration of Palestinian and regional futures—making it essential listening for those seeking to understand the unfolding “before and after” reality of Hamas.

Transcript

[Nathan Brown]

Morning Zoe. Got donuts. Jeff Bridges, why are you still living above our garage? Well I dig the mattress and I want to be in a T mobile commercial like you teach me. So Dana oh no, I'm not really prepared. I couldn't possibly at t mobile get.

[Martin DeCaro]

The new iPhone 17 Pro on them.

[Nathan Brown]

It's designed to be the most powerful iPhone yet and has the ultimate pro camera system. Wow, impressive. Let me try. T Mobile is the best place to get iPhone 17 Pro because they've got the best network. Nice. Je free. You heard them. T Mobile is the best place to get the new iPhone 17 Pro on us with eligible traded in any condition. So what are we having for lunch? Dude, my work here is done. The 24 month bill credit on experience beyond for well qualified customers + tax and 35 device connection charge credit send and balance due if you pay off earlier Cancel Finance Agreement. IPhone 17 Pro 256 gigs 1099.99 A new line minimum 100 plus a month plan with auto pay plus taxes and fees required. Best mobile network in the US based on analysis by Oklahoma Speed Test Intelligence.

[Martin DeCaro]

Data 182025 Visit t mobile.comad Free listening and receive bonus content and access to the entire catalog of 500 episodes by going to historyasithappens.supercast.com subscribe to History as It Happens Premium History as it happens October 7, 2025 before and after Hamas.

[Nathan Brown]

President Trump has unveiled a new 20 point peace plan for Gaza. After his White House meeting accepted by.

[Martin DeCaro]

Hamas, his proposal calls for the release of all remaining hostages. But if Hamas rejects your plan, Mr.

[Nathan Brown]

President, then Israel will finish the job by itself.

[Martin DeCaro]

On this second anniversary of the Hamas attack on Israel, a 20 point proposal to end the war is on the table. It calls on Hamas to give up power and disarm. Nearly 40 years after this radical movement committed to Israel's destruction came on the scene, there was a time before Hamas. Are we now looking at a future without it? And who, if anyone, would then lead Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation? What form would such resistance take? Or is that era coming to an end too? That's next as we report History As it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro. The Israeli Palestinian conflict is one of the greatest tragedies and most difficult problems of our time.

[Nathan Brown]

But it can be solved. A Middle east no longer victimized by flood, fear and terror. A Middle east where normal men and women lead normal lives. Who are Hamas?

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, its name is an Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement. It's sworn to Israel's Destruction and its base is Gaza.

[Nathan Brown]

Really kind of. Two different trends emerge. One I call political Islam. That said, hey, we can get what we want through the political process. We can push in public life, run for parliament. We may never win an election, but we'll be able to convince people, put pressure on governments. It was a political process project. And that basically ended with Egypt in 2013 and then some other things in the region. And again with Hamas's victory in the 2006 election, looked like it was part of it. That project saying we can do this through the political process is over and it's over for Palestinians. Then there was what I would call the really radical project that says, forget trying to reform politics. We've got to overthrow existing regimes.

[Martin DeCaro]

In 1987, the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, began. A response to the unbearable conditions of life under Israeli military occupation for two decades. Its enduring symbol, a teenager throwing stones at Israeli forces.

[Nathan Brown]

They have to stop all this nonsense of the riots, of throwing stones, of wounding people. It's useless. The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, told his country's parliament today that Israel would resort to an iron fist if necessary to stop any attempt to form an independent Palestinian state in the Israeli occupied territory. They have been tear gassed, beaten, jailed.

[Martin DeCaro]

Without trial and expelled.

[Nathan Brown]

They have had their houses blown up and they have been killed. However, they are no closer today to achieving their objective, a state of their own.

[Martin DeCaro]

From this cauldron emerged a new movement that took Islam as a way of life. Hamas. Its 1988 charter stated, there's no solution for the Palestinian problem except by jihad. Its goal, to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine. Hamas deep origins went back decades in the history of the Muslim brotherhood. In the 1980s, its older Palestinian cohort was committed to religious study and charitable, while the younger generation sought confrontation with the Israelis. At a time when political Islam was emerging as a force across the greater.

[Nathan Brown]

Middle East, Ayatollah Khomeini returns to a country teetering on the brink of civil war. Khomeini was being helped down the steps of his chartered Air France jet to set foot on Iranian ground for the first time in 15 years.

[Martin DeCaro]

As the historian and journalist Paola Karidi puts it in her 2009 book titled From Resistance to Government. The Muslim Brotherhood was asking itself with increasing insistence the crucial question concerning its participation in the resistance. Namely, had the time come to add military activity analogous to that undertaken by other Palestinian factions to the socio religious work the organization had been engaged in for decades, she says. It was the weakness of the PLO at the time that acted as a dampener in the discussion that took place between the younger generation of the Brotherhood and both within and beyond the occupied Palestinian territory. The decision to establish an operational branch of the Palestinian Brotherhood was made in the immediate aftermath of Operation Peace in Galilee in 1982. That was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and of the ensuing occupation of southern Lebanon, which had struck the hardest blow of all against the PLO and forced Yasser Arafat and the organization's leadership to abandon the bases built in Beirut for an even more difficult exile.

[Nathan Brown]

But in the past 12 years, the PLO has had more than just a home here in Lebanon. They've run the affairs of the 700,000 Palestinians living in this country almost like a government. In effect, the Lebanese have allowed the PLO to build a state within a state.

[Martin DeCaro]

The images of the PLO's rout in Lebanon and of Arafat abandoning Beirut in August 1982 played an important role in convincing at least part of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to go beyond the religious and cultural dimension and to push for direct confrontation with the Israelis. She goes on to say the internal crisis of the Palestinian world epitomized by the PLO's weakness was at any rate only one of the forces driving a process, the emergence of political Islam that went well beyond the confines of the west bank in Gaza. Rather, it was part of a region wide phenomenon that united Gaza City with Cairo, Ramallah with Damascus, Kuwait City with other Arab capitals, within which the student movement reached a level of politicization similar to European universities had experienced a few years earlier. It was precisely within Arab universities, including Palestinian institutions during the 1970s, that the new elites that would have a radical impact on Middle Eastern history were forged. These are the years immediately after the defeat of Arab forces in general and of Nasirite Pan Arabism in particular in the Six Day War of 1967 as well as the years after the Arab Israeli war in 1973.

[Nathan Brown]

It is an all out war. That's how Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan describes an invasion of the Golan Heights and the east bank of the Suez by Syria and Egypt.

[Martin DeCaro]

So those shifts that was happening some 40 years ago and it was about 20 years ago in 2006 when Hamas won parliamentary elections and took control of Gaza the following year after a short civil war against Fatah. Today, Hamas future is difficult to discern as a movement, as a government, as a set of ideas within a changing Middle east, one where Arab states want to make peace with Israel not destroy it. It is said that ideas cannot be killed, but movements do come and go, and it would appear that Hamas's time is over, its crusade of armed resistance having failed to liberate the Palestinians, it's ruled in Gaza with an authoritarian iron fist. Nathan Brown is an expert on Hamas. He teaches courses on Middle Eastern politics at George Washington University. He first appeared on the podcast shortly after 1072023 to discuss Hamas's origins and its 1988 charter. Our conversation next morning Zoe got donuts.

[Nathan Brown]

Jeff Bridges why are you still living above our garage? Well, I dig the mattress and I want to be in a T Mobile commercial like you teach me. So Dana oh no, I'm not really prepared. I couldn't possibly at T Mobile get.

[Martin DeCaro]

The new iPhone 17 Pro on them.

[Nathan Brown]

It's designed to be the most powerful iPhone yet and has the ultimate pro camera system. Wow, impressive. Let me try. T Mobile is the best place to get iPhone 17 Pro because they've got the best network. Nice.

[Martin DeCaro]

Jeffrey, you heard them.

[Nathan Brown]

T Mobile is the best place to get the new iPhone 17 Pro on us with eligible traded in any condition. So what are we having for lunch? Dude, my work here is done. The 24 month credit is on experience beyond for well qualified customers plus tax and $35 advice connection charge credits and a balance to do if you pay off earlier Cancel Finance Agreement. IPhone 17 Pro 256 gigs $1099.99 and new line minimum $100 plus a month plan with auto PayPal taxes and fees required. Best mobile network in the US based on analysis by Ooklev Speed Test Intelligence data 1H 2025 visit t mobile.com Nathan.

[Martin DeCaro]

Brown welcome back to the show.

[Nathan Brown]

Thanks for having me back.

[Martin DeCaro]

So let's begin with a current peace proposal. Briefly, considering Gaza is a desolation. Now to borrow a term from Tacitus, how do we define peace in this context?

[Nathan Brown]

Well, over the short term will probably just be a cessation of the Israeli military campaign. That's not really peace, but it's what people are. A lot of people are longing for, just an end to the scale of killing and destruction. What people have usually meant by peace is some kind of comprehensive Israeli Palestinian settlement which would integrate Israel as a normal state into the region, create some kind of way for Palestinians to have their rights respected and to have their individual human rights but also their national rights respected. That's what people have meant by peace. And in that sense this isn't really a peace proposal that we've got from Trump. What we've got is a list of bullet points and it's very, very vague on what people have meant by peace in the past.

[Martin DeCaro]

So this is a fluid situation. We won't spend too much time on the negotiations that are happening now, because by the time people listen to this episode, we don't want it to be dated. But some of what is in the 20 point proposal had already been agreed to by Hamas, some of it ignored. If you listen to the critics of the Israeli US Approach here, for instance, Hamas had already agreed to give up power and hand over governance, if you will, to a technocratic board of Palestinians. But no one is quite sure who that would be. There's also the issue of Hamas disarming. Would Hamas give up power? Would it surrender?

[Nathan Brown]

So Hamas has never really been about governing. They certainly seized control of Gaza. Well, they entered elections in 2006, wound up with a majority, which they weren't bargaining for when they entered the elections, found themselves governing, there's a brief Civil War in 2007. They wound up in control of Gaza. They were very, very clear that's not the end of the road for them. That is a step on the road. So giving up power was something that they've always been willing to talk about, in a sense. There have been previous attempts to negotiate a reunion with the West Bank. Those weren't really all that serious on both sides. But Hamas was always willing to put its role in Gaza on the table. So there's nothing new there. With regard to the plan itself, what I would say is that, you know, you seem to have this story that's been accepted, that Trump has got this plan that the Israelis have agreed to, the Europeans have agreed to, the Arab states have agreed to, and Hamas gave. Yes, but to. And actually, I see things a little bit differently. There's not even really clear plan. Right. So this is a bunch of elements and it's not quite clear how they'll work together. Trump negotiated one thing with the Arab states, which they agreed to and then changed it to get the Israelis to agree. And then as soon as Netanyahu agrees, he begins to attach conditions to this. And then the Europeans basically take this tack of humoring Trump, saying, you know, you're such a great president, this is such a great idea. We're in on this too. And then Hamas says, well, there's stuff in here we don't like, but we really appreciate your efforts to wear in in the beginning. So in a sense, what you have is a situation where everybody says they're agreeing, but they're agreeing to completely different things and rejecting things that are there. And then there are big holes in the agreement. So essentially, what we've just got right now is a beginning of diplomacy among parties who still have very contradictory interests. Hamas has given up some real things in this agreement, but it's also got real things, and that's the same for every other party. We'll just see how far that can be pushed.

[Martin DeCaro]

And if President Trump imposes a deadline, maybe put an artificial barrier in front of a negotiating process, that might take time. This might need more than a week or so. At the very least, we hope for a return of hostages, a return of Palestinians who've been imprisoned by Israel during the conflict, and an end to the bombing at the very least. I mean, that's the indispensable first step here. I mean, who is left in Hamas today? We say Hamas. I mean, a lot of their leaders have been killed. Who's left?

[Nathan Brown]

Well, that's a really good question, and I think it's something that people haven't really grappled with. So Hamas has been governing Gaza and basically had a free hand there from 2007 to October 2020. It was basically a lot of it was operating above ground. It had known very, very experienced leaders. There's also an external leadership. There's some leaders in Israeli prisons, and there's a sort of an underground on the West Bank. What has happened since October 2023 is that some of the external leaders have been killed. But an awful lot of the movement in Gaza, the leadership, foot soldiers, just enormous casualties. And Hamas has gone from basically running a party state to being a Guerril organization, semi underground or able to operate only in pockets of Gaza where Israel is not actively pursuing operations. In terms of personnel, it's a different organization. Almost anybody who was anybody in hamas prior to October 2023 is dead. So we don't really know what kind of movement will emerge from this. We have some sense that there is a little bit of tension between the Gaza leadership and the external leadership, but beyond that, we don't really have some sense about Hamas is operating now, and certainly not how it will operate if there is a ceasefire that actually takes.

[Martin DeCaro]

Hold and who the alternative would be. So can we learn anything from the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which ended in an agreement with Arafat and the PLO agreeing to go into exile?

[Nathan Brown]

Our purpose will be to assist the Lebanese armed forces in carrying out their responsibility for ensuring the departure of of PLO leaders, officers and combatants in Beirut from Lebanese territory under safe and orderly conditions.

[Martin DeCaro]

And then the PLO lost touch with life inside the occupied territories and was unaware really of what was going on there. When the first intifada broke out in 1987.

[Nathan Brown]

The first intifada was sparked by the deaths of four Palestinians in December 1987.

[Martin DeCaro]

Anything that we might learn from that episode here, I mean, would Hamas agree to go into exile?

[Nathan Brown]

So I think there's one thing we're unlikely to learn, but one thing we should pay attention to. The one thing that we're unlikely to learn is what would happen if Hamas went into exile. Because, no, I don't think they would do that. That would be a huge humiliation and defeat for them. They already have an external leadership, very, very active and powerful within the movement and has all kinds of experience. But the leaders in Gaza, if they actually left, that would be seen as a sur. This is a territory that they hold. Their message to Palestinians is, we will always be there for you. And if they left, I think that would be decimating to the organization. However, what 1982 showed was, I think, the importance of unintended consequences. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to throw out the PLO, which they effectively did. They got the leadership to leave to Tunis, but what happened after that, nobody expected. So it led, for instance, the PLO to really embrace a two state solution in a way that kind of like hinted at before. It led population on the west bank to say, okay, they're in Tunis, we've got to run our own affairs and begin to organize themselves much, much more effectively. It changed Lebanese politics, it changed Israeli politics, it changed Palestinian politics in ways that if you'd gone back to 1982 and asked people, what do you think you're doing? None of them would have anticipated that. What we should learn from that is that the situation right now is plunging to the unknown. We don't know what kind of Hamas will emerge. We don't know what kind of Israeli leadership will take over here. And perhaps most important, we're dealing with a Palestinian society in Gaza that has got to be so fundamentally and deeply traumatized from the extent of destruction and death. Every school, every university, medical facilities destroyed, and a West bank that has been seeing similar things happen on a slower or less scale. There will be developments in Palestinian society which won't be visible, I think, perhaps for years to come.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, they may be looking for an alternative to Hamas. Maybe ordinary Palestinians are sick and tired of these guys.

[Nathan Brown]

I think a lot of Palestinians are sick and Tired of the old politics. Fatah, Hamas, plo, Pennsylvania, especially the younger Yugo in Palestinian society. These are dim memories for them. These are eight track tapes. This is a technology of the 20th century, but no alternative has emerged. So what we will have likely is perhaps a and atomized and a society full of people in despair. But not people who've given up on being Palestinian, not people who've given up on politics. They just have no organized expression. And how that will express itself is anybody's guess.

[Martin DeCaro]

So we'll move more into these deeper issues here. But since you mentioned, or I brought up 82 and the unintended consequences when Arafat and his movement was exiled, and then they turned toward diplomacy and engagement with Israel, recognition with Israel. There was a faction within the Muslim Brotherhood who said, hey, we're going, going to take up the banner of armed resistance now if the PLO won't. And that was Hamas, which was formally established in 87, 88. But there have been debates and factional divides inside and outside Gaza. Which way the Muslim Brotherhood should go, armed resistance or not. Are we seeing possibly, Nathan, an end to the embrace of armed resistance? It has failed. I don't know if Hamas's hardliners would agree with me, but. But are we seeing maybe an opportunity here for a different way, a different idea to emerge?

[Nathan Brown]

I think we're seeing different possibilities. And again, a lot of this is guesswork. It's more likely Hamas will go in the opposite direction within the organization. It's been decimated so much. My guess is anybody who wants to put themselves forward in the movement from this point forward will do so based on what they did during the war. So that'll be a badge. Their military record, I think, will give them credibility within the organization. The other thing that I think will change argues perhaps for a continued violent Hamas after it took power in 2006 and 2007. Hamas was governing, which was never really part of its mission. And now they are jettisoning that. It was never essential for them to do that, but it was an important part of what they did. And now they're going to return to being an underground organization. And they're not going to be an underground organization that is just handing out Qurans. They're going to be an underground organization that's doing something. So my guess is the voices within the organization that will say we have to return to our roots will be the more powerful ones. There is one other possibility, and I think it's not likely, but it's something that's been missed. One of the things that Hamas has said when it's asked about disarming or decommissioning or these kinds of words, it says, look, that's not an international task. That's not something you can ask of Hamas. That's something for a legitimate Palestinian leadership to do. So when there is a Palestinian state, then we'll dissolve into that Palestinian state. And that's actually something that they rejected in the past. It has always been Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazen, the Palestinian president, who has said, one authority, one gun, Hamas, hold whatever positions you want. But you can't be an armed movement. You've got to basically be part of the Palestinian national movement. We now have a state of Palestine. You've got to agree to that. So the possibility, the rhetorical possibility of aligning itself with that Palestinian state that Abbas says he heads is there. I don't think it's likely that Hamas will follow that path, but I think if I were an American diplomat and I was seeking to translate a temporary ceasefire into something long term, I'd really grab onto that possibility. I'd say to Hamas, okay, you will dissolve yourself into a Palestinian state. State. Let's talk about how that happens.

[Martin DeCaro]

You know, they say ideas cannot be killed, but movements do come and go. Maybe it's hard for some people to imagine Hamas becoming less militant or dropping its commitment to armed resistance, accepting Israel, but there was a point in time where people assume the same out of the plo. Right? And even Israeli leadership as well was never going to be able to negotiate with these people until they started negotiating with them.

[Nathan Brown]

Them. Yes. Let me go back to the premise of your question. You can't kill ideas, but organizations come or movements come and go. Hamas has always been, yes, there are ideas in Hamas, but their secret to success has been their organizational strength. I mean, look at this movement. It's really in many ways the most successful, sustained Palestinian movement ever. And look at what has survived for the last two years. This is a level of destruction which no other movement in Palestinian history has ever stood up to. So that's why I think Hamas survives on the resilience of its basic organizational structure. But the direction that it goes, it's governed, it's run in elections, it's boycotted elections, it's launched attacks, it's engaged in ceasefires and so on. What the real question will be is what kind of organization emerges from this? And when you know what kind of organization, you'll have a little bit better.

[Martin DeCaro]

Sense of how it will behave, its entire existence. Though, has taken place in the context of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. And if there were to be some kind of long term resolution to that conflict, Hamas's raison d' etre would disappear. Or maybe not. I mean, this is, as you say, somewhat guesswork, especially on my part. I'm not an expert here, but I do have Paola Karidi's book on Hamas that was written about, I don't know, 10, 15 years ago. And she's talking about the before and after of movements, and specifically with regard to Hamas. She says the before and after in the history of Hamas itself tells an important story. From Islamist resistance movement to an organization that directly administers power, whether by its own choice or otherwise, from movement to institution, from opposition to government, from armed struggle to reentry into mainstream politics. Aren't there broader currents here that are important, that might influence events? The other Arab states want to see an end to this madness as well. Some of them have already recognized Israel and the Abraham Accords.

[Nathan Brown]

Yes. I mean, I think greedy is right. There certainly is a history of movements being on the edge or outside, rejecting a political system, kind of converting themselves into political parties and then becoming normal parties. I mean, essentially, that's the history of social democracy. It's the social democrats, even to some extent of Christian democrats. That's kind of what happened in those cases. There were strong political systems and electoral systems that managed to sort of incorporate them. That's what's always been missing. In the case of the Arab world for Islamist movement. We saw some movement in that direction by various Muslim Brotherhood movements in the 1990s, early 2000s, and Hamas seemed to be following that trend when it ran in the 2006 elections to sort of convert itself into a political party. But then the entire Palestinian political system broke. Now is a current context in which there is extremely strong Arab pressure, not simply from countries that don't like Hamas, like the UAE or Egypt, but even from Qatar, even from Turkey, telling them, you've got to do this, you've got to tell Trump, yes, find a way to tell that man. Yes. That certainly has had some effect on how the movements behaved short term. I don't see it as creating a strong enough political system to contain Hamas. So it certainly affects their tactics, it affects their short term behavior. I'm not sure it affects how they see themselves right now at their essence as an organization.

[Martin DeCaro]

What I'm getting at is one of my recent guests used the term global mafia politics. It's not about peace, it's about the deals. So we've seen decades now of armed resistance to Israel. Used to be done by nation states like Egypt and Jordan, and there were peace treaties there. Maybe we're seeing today not necessarily a love for Israel, but a recognition, as I said earlier, that this has failed. It's time to move on. There are deals to be made.

[Nathan Brown]

Yes. I mean, in a sense, that's been a long time in coming. You can look back to the years after 1967 to see some key Arab states really coming to the realization privately and obliquely, Israel's there to stay. How do we deal with it? I mean, Jordan did that, Egypt did that. And then in the early 2000s, you have the Arab Peace Initiative, which is the Arab League as a whole, basically telling Israel, okay, we'll accept you in the region if you create a Palestinian state and solve this thing fairly. And so that's been the thrust of Arab diplomacy at this point, really for a quarter century. What's new about the current moment? I should say what's new about the Ibrahim Accords is that that changed from sort of an offer that was on the table from the Arab League to individual Arab state, saying, well, we'll handle the Palestinians later. And actually moving ahead, if anything, the momentum now is a slight bit in the opposite direction. Taking a look at Israel and saying, okay, we thought we could do deals with it, we thought we could integrate them into the region. No, we don't really like what they do, but we don't like what Iran does, what Turkey does and so on. We'll deal with them as a normal state. And then with essentially this last summer with the attack on Iran, and then more recently with the attack in Qatar, they're beginning to say, wait a second, this is a Frankenstein. This is a country that knows no bounds, that sees military solution to any kind of problems. And that the Qataris, who had a big American base, close American security relationship, and have had direct dealings with Israel at this point for three decades, if they can get bombed, maybe this is a country that needs to be hemmed in, taken into control. Israel is now as much a security worry as a security partner for those states.

[Martin DeCaro]

I hear in your answer the notion that if the Arab world or if the greater Middle east believe it can move on without dealing with the Palestinian issue, well, that was mistaken. But you know, Ian Lustic just on my show a couple episodes ago said there is no two state solution right now. There's a one state reality. So, yes, the Palestinian issue does need to be dealt with, right? I mean, the Abraham Accords tried to put it off. And some people interpret the Abraham Accords through the lens of 10, 7. Gaza blew up, or Hamas blew up the status quo as a way of preventing further normalization between, say, Saudi Arabia and Israel. So that wasn't so much a question. Nathan. I guess I'm having trouble seeing where this all goes next because a Palestinian state just seems like a distant possibility. Netanyahu himself says there will never be a Palestinian state.

[Nathan Brown]

Yes. And the odd thing about the Trump plan is that it mentions a Palestinian state almost in passing. So it' still seems to be holding that out. The idea that there's a one state reality didn't originate in the United States. It didn't originate among Americans or Europeans or anything like that. I began hearing about it from Palestinians in the second intifada with the collapse of the Oslo process. They said, look, we're living in a one state reality. It's not a solution. But that's it. And a two state solution, most Palestinians haven't, and I would say most Israelis haven't believed in it at this point point for a generation. And when I say they haven't believed in it, there's two groups, there's one group, both among Palestinians and Israelis who say that's not what we want. But there's a larger group that says that's not possible. The other side would never accept it. It just won't work. So the disengagement from the two state solution is one that the participants, I think, have been living with at this point for a couple decades at a minimum. It's nothing new. What I think the current moment demonstrates is not simply that there's a one state reality, but there's no real path to anything better, anything that looks more stable. And if you listen to the Israeli right, in a sense, that's what they say. They say they don't quite use this language, but this is a forever war. Palestinians will never accept us. We're going to be having to do this indefinitely. And Palestinians, if you ask them, it's actually before October 7th. But I would ask people, what is it that you want? One state, two states and so on. And the answer, we want to live our lives, we just want normal lives. And that seems out of reach. So you're really dealing with a situation in which I think you not only have a one state reality, but there are no realistic plans to anything better or different. And the Trump plan tries to paper that over with vague talk of Palestinian national aspirations and Palestinian state, but no real path to even finding A path to get there there.

[Martin DeCaro]

So we've been talking a little bit about how movements come and go. I've spent time on my show recently talking about how periods begin and end and you could be moving into a new period in history and that takes place on many different levels. So I want to ask you now about the wave of militant Islam. Some historians point to the origins in the 1970s with the Islamic revolution in Iran. I have Steve Kahl's book here, Ghost wars and early in the book he references what was happening in Pakistan at the time. Jamaat e Islami, which was an emerging Islamic political party, the rise of the Wahhabists in Saudi Arabia as well, and all the oil money they received after the oil boycott in 1973 staged by OPEC. Call says by the end of the 70s, Islamic parties like Jama' at had begun to assert themselves across the Muslim world as the Kurt corrupt failing reigns of leftist Arab nationalists led youthful populations to seek a new cleansing politics. Clandestine informal transnational religious networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood reinforced the gathering strength of old line religious parties such as Jama'. At. This was especially true on university campuses. Radical Islamic student wings competed for influence in Cairo, Oman, Kuala Lumpur, when the Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran and forced the American backed monarch, the Shah to Flee early in 79.

[Nathan Brown]

Since there have been no opposition political figures to whom the masses could turn, they looked instead to their holy men for political leadership. He tells them the Shah should be arrested, tried for crimes against the state and ousted and that a Muslim state should be established.

[Martin DeCaro]

His fire breathing triumph jolted these parties and their youth wings, igniting campuses in fevered agitation. Khomeini's minority Shiite creed was anathema to many conservative Sunni Islamists, especially those in Saudi Arabia. But his audacious achievements inspired Muslims everywhere. If radical Islam is fading, right, we saw its rise a half century ago. If it is fading, what will be the basis of the next Palestinian nationalism?

[Nathan Brown]

I don't know and I don't think anybody, anybody does know.

[Martin DeCaro]

Do you agree that?

[Nathan Brown]

I think I know where to look, yeah.

[Martin DeCaro]

But do you agree that radical Islam, this idea is fading as a popular idea among young Arabs?

[Nathan Brown]

Probably. So in the period after the period that Steve Gaul is talking about, really kind of two different trends emerged. One I call political Islam, said hey, we can get what we want through the political process. We can push in public life, run for parliament. We may never win an election, but we'll be able to convince people, put pressure on government so it was a political project. And that basically ended with Egypt in 2013, and then some other things in the region and again with Hamas victory in the 2006 election, look like it was part of it. That project saying we can do this through the political process is over, and it's over for Palestinians. Then there was what I would call the really radical project that says, forget trying to reform politics. We've got to overthrow existing regimes in our own country or global jihad. Those were the really radical movements. And again, they're sort of marginalized, bankrupt. They have the success in Syria, but the success in Syria partly comes from trying to now present themselves as just a normal political, political movement, rather than an Islamist or a radical or an Al Qaeda offshooter or that sort of thing. So that project is over. However, what will replace it? If you talk to younger Palestinians, I suggested before, there's a real strong grasping to Palestinian national identity, but it's not coupled to any kind of ideology, any kind of strategy whatsoever. So I think what we may be in for will be a period and maybe a prolonged period looking something like you referenced before the PLO's exit from Beirut in 1982, the period between that and the first intifada in which you won't necessarily see anything above ground, but you'll see Palestinians trying to figure out, how is it we deal with this situation? What is it that we need to do? I think it's premature to see how that will come out. Whether it will have an Islamic inflection or not, I don't know. I suspect not. But I think it will have some kind of expression of Palestinian nationalism that may take violent form, but that will be about expressing Palestinianness in a way that the current Israeli state can't manage. Will challenge them in some way. What kind of movement, what kind of platform, what kind of strategy. I think that'll only emerge over the next five, ten years or so because.

[Martin DeCaro]

Israel has always tried to manage Palestinian nationalism or Palestinian movements. For instance, when Hamas was emerging in the late 1980s, it was more of a religious and charitable movement, right? And the Israelis discreetly supported it because it looked like these guys are just gonna concentrate on education, literacy, charity, and attend mosques and leave us alone. And this is a way of splitting the Palestinian leadership, right? Weakening the plo.

[Nathan Brown]

The Israelis have been very, very tactically adept, but I don't think there's a real strategic vision on how to deal with the Palestinians. So there's different kinds of impulses on the part of Palestinians. Let's link up with this global solidarity movement. Let's link up with the Palestinian diaspora, let's link up with Israeli citizens who are Palestinians engage in small scale guerrilla activity. Those are the kinds of discussions I think that Palestinians have. And I think the Israelis are so focused on defeating Hamas right now. Essentially extending their control over the West Bank, I think undermines the old Palestinian leadership that already has lost all credibility that they're not really alert to longer term social developments that will ultimately determine what form the struggle takes in the next phase.

[Martin DeCaro]

Last question here. Some have pointed out that it is unrealistic to expect whether it's Hamas or whoever, to just surrender and say we will never take part in violent resistance again as long as our lands are being occupied by the Israeli army army. The argument being all people have a right to resist the occupation of their lands. But are you surprised then in the west bank given what's going on there with the Jewish settler terrorism in many cases and the IDF just standing there while Palestinians homes and villages are looted or burned, that there hasn't been a violent uprising in the West Bank? Are you surprised by that?

[Nathan Brown]

I'm not so surprised because as I say, the level of despair is just so great. I would be surprised if it's quiet forever. That is to say, in the current stage, right now people are looking what's happening in Gaza. People are looking at what's been happening not simply in settler attacks, but in the destruction of some refugee camps or parts of refugee camps in the West Bank. People are just reeling under this and thinking how do I get to school? How do I move around? How do I get a job? What's my future in this? With all these doors closed, sooner or later there will be some sort of upsurge of activism. I just don't know know what form it will take. But the Palestinian people's right to self determination, their right to justice must also be recognized. And put yourself in their shoes. Look at the world through their eyes. It is not fair that a Palestinian child can cannot grow up in a state of their own, living their entire lives with the presence of a foreign army that controls the movements, not just of those young people, but their parents, their grandparents every single day. It's not just when settler violence against Palestinians goes unpunished. It's not right to prevent Palestinians from farming their lands or restricting a student's ability to move around the west bank or displace Palestinian families from their homes. Neither occupation nor expulsion is the answer.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next episode of History as it happens. Bob Ames, Ryan Ronald Reagan in the two State Solution. Remember, sign up for my weekly newsletter. Go to Substack and search for history as it happens.

[Nathan Brown]

Hey, this is Sarah. Look, I'm standing out front of a.m. p.m. Right now and well, you're sweet and all, but I found something more fulfilling, even kind of cheesy. But I like it. Sure, you met some of my dietary needs, but they've just got it all. So farewell. Oatmeal so long. Use strange soggy Break up with bland breakfast and taste AM PM's bacon, egg.

[Martin DeCaro]

And cheese biscuit made with cage free.

[Nathan Brown]

Eggs, smoked bacon and melty cheese on a buttery biscuit. AM P M Too much Good stuff.

[Martin DeCaro]

Marketing is hard, but I'll tell you a little secret. It doesn't have to be. Let me point something out. You're listening to a podcast right now and it's great. You love the host. You seek it out and download it. You listen to it while driving, working out, cooking, even going to the bathroom. Podcasts are a pretty close companion. And this is a podcast ad. Did I get your attention? You can reach great listeners like yourself with podcast advertising from Libsyn Ads. Choose from hundreds of top podcasts offering host endorsements, or run a pre produced ad like this one across thousands of shows. To reach your target audience in their favorite podcasts with Libsyn Ads, go to Libsyn ads.com that's L I B S Y N ads.com today.