Bonus Ep! Russia-Ukraine War w/ Mark Galeotti

Summary

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History As It Happens – Bonus Ep! Russia-Ukraine War w/ Mark Galeotti

Date: September 17, 2025
Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: Mark Galeotti, Russian history & security expert (Mayak Intelligence), author of Forged in War

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Episode Overview

This bonus episode delves into the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, analyzing the grim military stalemate, failed diplomatic efforts, and the shifting roles of the US and Europe in shaping the future of Ukraine. Martin Di Caro invites historian Mark Galeotti for an expert, historically-informed discussion about why the conflict persists, what Vladimir Putin ultimately wants, and why Western responses remain muddled. The conversation also draws fascinating parallels and key distinctions with wars of the past, challenging conventional wisdom and exploring the war’s uncertain trajectory.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Status of the Battlefield

• No imminent Ukrainian collapse: Galeotti explains that while sudden battlefield collapses are unpredictable, Ukraine isn’t immediately in danger of catastrophic defeat. Russian advances remain slow, incremental, and costly.
  • Quote: "Almost certainly not... we're still thinking about it's a slow, Russian painful and bloody accretional advance... even if there is some kind of localised collapse, the Russians are very unlikely to be in a position to make the kind of deep penetrating exploitation of that collapse that would really change the situation on the ground." (Mark Galeotti, 03:33)
• Comparison to WWI: The conflict is likened to World War I—not because of style, but for its attritional, stalemated character, though Galeotti cautions against taking the parallel too far given today’s technology and dispersed battle lines.
  • Quote: "There's always this temptation to play the historical parallels game... But in this case... it's also a much more diffuse war... very, very long front line and relatively few troops per kilometer or mile of frontage." (Mark Galeotti, 04:44)

2. The “Russian Way of War” & Urban Battles

• The myth of endless Russian “meat assault” persists, but Galeotti notes that the most brutal, attritional fighting has been confined to battles over cities (e.g., Mariupol, Bakhmut), not across the entire front.
  • Quote: "This notion of meat assaults largely hasn't really manifest itself... the Russians are not looking for more meat grinders. They're looking to essentially be able to bypass and encircle cities at the moment... so they don't have to try and fight that kind of set piece battle." (Mark Galeotti, 07:13)

3. Diplomacy: Real Signals or Diversion?

• Russia post-Alaska summit: Despite public statements from Putin and his spokespeople about readiness for peace, actions and diplomacy indicate otherwise.
  • Quote: "He's certainly not signaling a particular sort of dovish propensity... he tends to escalate in the endgame... to negotiate from a position of not just strength, but extravagantly demonstrated strength." (Mark Galeotti, 08:52)
• Putin’s negotiating posture: Putin wants negotiations on his terms, with the Ukrainians coming to him, reflecting a belief that time is on his side.
• Trump’s ambiguous stance: Recent remarks suggest little new strategy or determination from the White House.
  • Quote: "If you listen closely there, it is apparent the President has no answers. Well, maybe historian Mark Galeotti does." (Martin Di Caro, 02:40)
  • Quote: "I think he's realized that worst case scenario is Trump no longer helps Putin. And so in some ways he feels liberated by that." (Mark Galeotti, 10:48)

4. Escalation Risks: Drones Over Poland and Romania

• Poland: Multiple Russian drones entered Polish airspace—Galeotti argues this was deliberate: "a combination of a test and a warning" to gauge European will and send a message as security guarantees for Ukraine are debated.
• Romania: Likely an accident due to electronic warfare, not a calculated provocation.
  • Quote: "Poland, a very different matter... all or most were decoy or reconnaissance drones... a test and a warning." (Mark Galeotti, 11:07)

5. Peace, Security Guarantees & Europe’s Coming of Age

• Beyond the Donbass: The war isn’t just about Eastern Ukrainian territory. True peace hinges on credible security guarantees, particularly from European powers, to prevent Russia from regrouping.
  • Quote: "Unless [Kyiv] feels it has proper security guarantees, it has no reason at all to talk to Putin... It is also a test of Europe's credibility." (Mark Galeotti, 12:37)
• Europe’s challenge: Years under the US security umbrella have left Europe unprepared to independently guarantee security—a major credibility gap.
  • Quote: "This is really a test of a still frankly adolescent Europe. It had infantilized itself so long by remaining underneath the American security umbrella and not taking its own security capacities at all seriously." (Mark Galeotti, 12:37)

6. Putin’s Ultimate War Aims

• Wants maximal gains, but is pragmatic: Galeotti asserts Putin desires as much as he can get—total domination if possible, but is realistically prepared for less, especially if forced into a deal.
• Non-negotiable for Moscow: No NATO membership for Ukraine is a red line.
  • Quote: "Putin is out for whatever he can get. At the point at which he feels he has to make a deal holding on to the territory he's taken, perhaps with that extra piece of Donetsk region... no NATO membership for Ukraine, I think that from his point of view is an absolute." (Mark Galeotti, 15:27)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Donald Trump’s Assessment:
  "But I'm not happy. I'm not happy about the whole situation. You know, it's interesting. It doesn't affect us because it's not our soldiers, but they're losing... between Ukraine and Russia, 7000 soldiers every single week. It's such a horrible waste of humanity." (Donald Trump, 01:36)
• On drawing historical lessons:
  "There's always this temptation to play the historical parallels game... often that's exceedingly illustrative. In this case, I think it's more that there is this regular pendulum swing of warfare between the offence and the defence." (Mark Galeotti, 04:44)
• On Europe’s crossroads:
  "This is really a test of a still frankly adolescent Europe... So can it actually support Ukraine to the point where there can be some kind of a deal?" (Mark Galeotti, 12:37)
• On Putin’s key red line:
  "No NATO membership for Ukraine, I think that from his point of view is an absolute." (Mark Galeotti, 15:27)
• On the persistence of attritional warfare:
  "That frankly counts as being as optimistic as I can bring myself to being at this current stage in the war." (Mark Galeotti, 16:34)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• 00:40–01:36 — Kremlin’s public statements & President Trump’s remarks on Ukraine
• 03:23–04:44 — Galeotti on battlefield stability, WWI comparison
• 07:13–08:17 — The reality and myth of Russian offensive tactics
• 08:52–10:29 — Galeotti analyzes Putin’s diplomatic signals post-Alaska summit
• 11:07–12:21 — Russian drones in Polish and Romanian airspace: risks and messages
• 12:37–14:33 — Debating real peace: territory, security guarantees, and Europe’s role
• 15:27–16:21 — What does Putin really want? Shifting ambitions and core demands
• 16:34–16:41 — Cautious optimism—unlikely collapse, but continued attrition

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Tone & Style Notes

The conversation is grounded in sober, clear-eyed realism, laced with scholarly skepticism, but avoids sensationalism or despair. Both host and guest use historical depth and contemporary analysis in a way that is both accessible and intellectually satisfying, challenging simplistic narratives and urging listeners to weigh long-term consequences and political realities.

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This summary omits advertisement and subscription promotions. For a full episode transcript or to subscribe, visit the podcast's main site.

Transcript

[Podcast Host]

This is a bonus episode of history as it happens. It's September 17, 2025. The Associated Press reports Ukraine expects to soon have $3.5 billion in a fund to buy weapons from the United States to help sustain its more than three year fight against Russia's all out invasion. The article goes on to say an end to the war appears no closer despite months of US Led peace efforts. So it seems like a long time ago, but it's only been 3, 32 days since the world's attention was fixed on Alaska for the big summit that turned into a big nothing. Vladimir Putin, through an interpreter, said he was ready to make peace, to make.

[Kremlin Spokesman]

The settlement lasting and long term. We need to eliminate all the primary roots, the primary causes of that conflict. And we've said it multiple times to consider all legitimate concerns of Russia and to reinstate a just balance of security in Europe and in the world on the whole. And I agree with President Trump, as he has said today, that naturally the security of Ukraine should be ensured as well. Naturally, we are prepared to work on that.

[Podcast Host]

And now, a month later, with the story having somewhat slipped from page one in the U.S. a Kremlin spokesman says Russia is still ready for peace talks. However, Moscow's raised so many objections to a potential deal that a deal is not in the offing. Instead, Russia is escalating air attacks on Ukraine and violating Polish airspace with drones. Here is President Donald Trump 10 days ago being asked what he intends to do about Russia.

[Donald Trump]

You have always said how good your relationship is with President Putin, but he's not really giving you anything that you want. Is that making you less trustful of him? Well, nobody was tougher in Russia than me. That has to do with the pipeline, as you know, Nord Stream 2 and lots of other things. But I'm not happy. I'm not happy. I'm not happy about the whole situation. You know, it's interesting. It doesn't affect us because it's not our soldiers, but they're losing. Now, I used to tell you 5000, they're losing 7000 between Ukraine and Russia, 7000 soldiers every single week. It's such a horrible waste of humanity. So, no, I am not thrilled with what's happening there. I will tell you, I think it's going to get settled. So I settled seven wars. This, I would have said, would have been maybe the easiest one to settle of all. But with war, you never know what you're getting. But we're going to get it. I believe we're going to get it settled. But I am not happy with them. I'm not happy with anything having to do with that war.

[Podcast Host]

If you listen closely there, it is apparent the President has no answers. Well, maybe historian Mark Galeotti does. He is an expert in Russian history and security at Mayak Intelligence and the author of many books, most recently Forged in War, A Military History of Russia from its Beginnings to today. Now, this bonus episode is coming to you free. If you'd like to get future bonus episodes as well as ad free listening to every episode of History As It Happens, please consider becoming a subscriber. For $5 a month, go to history as it happens.com to support this podcast bringing you insights from the best historians in the world. Mark Galeotti, welcome back to the show.

[Mark Galeotti]

Great to be back.

[Podcast Host]

So, let's begin. What is your assessment of the battlefield right now? Is Ukraine in danger of collapse anywhere on the front?

[Mark Galeotti]

Almost certainly not very difficult to predict because these collapses inevitably come as surprises and often it's a cascading surprise. One particular unit breaks and then that leaves a hole in a line. However, within the bounds of what we think is likely, no, we're still thinking about it's a slow, Russian painful and bloody accretional advance. Because even if they do make breakthroughs, this is not the old style of fast moving manoeuvre warfare. This is a war that is being fought by three guys penetrating a front line here, three more guys over there eventually accumulating. So in some ways, even if there is some kind of localised collapse, the Russians are very unlikely to be in a position to be able to make the kind of deep penetrating exploitation of that collapse that would really change the situation on the ground.

[Podcast Host]

This does sound, based on your first answer here, a little like World War I. But we don't want to overdraw that comparison. There were no drones in those days, no modern tanks or aircraft, but still World War I, you know, you didn't get many breakthroughs, there weren't many collapses, but when they did happen, they were sudden.

[Mark Galeotti]

They were. But again, I think that's because there is always this temptation to play the historical parallels game. And often that's exceedingly illustrative. In this case, I think it's more that there is this regular pendulum swing of warfare between the offence and the defence. And In World War I particularly, that was the age in which barbed wire, machine guns, rapid fire artillery and the like very much privileged the defence. But of course, only up to a point, and eventually exhausted military structures could and did collapse. But there was always that potential for manoeuvre warfare. In many ways, again, slightly caricaturing, but we are talking about generals who still remembered the cavalry era and therefore still thought that that was how wars were won, with that sudden dramatic slash forward of your dragoons. Now, in this case, what we're actually seeing is that even just the capacity of the Russians to be able to stage that kind of war has been degraded away. It's not just that the drones patrol this no man's land of killing zone, making it almost impossible to send armoured thrusts forward or even just large groups of soldiers. It's also the degree to which the Russians have had their armoured forces, which upon a time, the pride of their military burnt through to the degree that they don't even have them there. So, yes, it's a little bit like World War I, but more to the point, this is also a much more diffuse war. You know, World War I, the Eastern Front was very different, but on the Western Front there were these dense networks of trenches on both sides, these huge fields of barbed wire and large numbers of troops. Here it's actually a much more diffuse war. Very, very long front line and relatively few troops per kilometer or mile of frontage. So it's often actually a war of trying to bypass the other side and then spring some kind of a trap and accumulate enough troops to be able to move. It is something that is very different. And I think this is one of the key problems that Western militaries are having, is how to adapt to that. Yeah.

[Podcast Host]

Anyone who's been following the war, reading about the battles, there are no major titanic battles, as there were, say, in the First World War happening now. When you brought up the cavalry from First World War and the belief in the cavalry charge and the dramatic breakthrough, I thought of Sir John French on the British side and how that did not work out. There's also this, you know, supposed Russian way of war where you just keep throwing wave after wave of infantry to their deaths, hoping that eventually enough people get through.

[Mark Galeotti]

Yeah, I mean, that was always a bit of a myth, a bit of a sort of orientalizing, you know, Johnny Ivan, for whom human beings have no value and such like, there's some truth in it. But certainly this war, this notion of meat assaults largely hasn't really manifest itself. And when we think about precisely these kind of big set piece battles, they've almost invariably been around cities. They're about the whole business of trying to level a city. Whether it's Mariupol or whether it's Bakhmut. This is where the Real meat grinders have been fought. And it's quite striking at the moment that although cities remain the anchoring points of this war, the Russians are not looking for more meat grinders. They're looking to essentially be able to bypass and encircle cities at the moment, Pokrovsk being the sort of the primary objective, so that they don't have to try and fight that kind of set piece battle. So, you know, the Russians themselves, they realize that, yes, maybe their soldiers are considered more like human ammunition than we would find in a Western army, but even the Russians know they have to conserve their ammunition.

[Podcast Host]

Let's talk about diplomacy now and the ongoing efforts, such as they are, to end the war. Vladimir Putin didn't say much for a while after the Trump Putin summit in Alaska, but he did make some remarks recently when he was in in Beijing meeting President Xi Jinping, among other world leaders. He had messages for Ukraine, he had messages for the United States, for the Europeans. What do you make of his remarks? Because it doesn't sound like, despite what he says, right. If you read between the lines, it doesn't sound like he's ready for peace.

[Mark Galeotti]

He's certainly not signaling a particular sort of dovish propensity. The problem is, of course, that if one looks generally at Putin's style of negotiation, he tends to escalate in the end game, in that even if one looks at the escalation of air attacks on Ukrainian cities, they tend to come before pivotal political moments, because this is very much a style that essentially tries to negotiate from a position of not just strength, but extravagantly demonstrated strength. And my read is that from Putin's point of view, he's willing to entertain the possibility of a deal if it's a deal on his terms, it's very striking that very much he is at the view that, well, it's for the Ukrainians to come to me. I mean, even his suggestion that Zelenskyy should come to Moscow, so it's Ukrainians who should essentially be offering terms that he can accept or deny. Because when it comes down to it, he does believe that he's winning this war. And therefore, yes, he's aware that there are all sorts of problems looming, particularly about recession. I mean, it's almost impossible for the Russian economy to avoid sliding into recession by the end of this year. But at the same time, he knows that that's not a crucial constraint on his capacity to wage war and maintain his own power. So from his point of view, if he gets a deal, which is obviously it'll be an ugly deal from the Ukrainian's point of view that he can call a victory well and good. Conversely, if he doesn't, that's fine. He's perfectly happy to walk away from the process and continue fighting. Because I think one crucial thing that came out of Alaska, and it's interesting, something that I've heard from several people in Moscow who are connected to those circles, he concluded that he doesn't need to fear Trump.

[Podcast Host]

No, he doesn't.

[Mark Galeotti]

There had still been this idea that if Trump is truly alienated, that he could actually swing heavily in favor of Zelenskyy and provide all kinds of military support and the like. I think he's realized that worst case scenario is Trump no longer helps Putin. And so in some ways he feels liberated by that.

[Podcast Host]

Yeah, I'm not sure sanctions would in the end make much of a difference, but I agree that President Trump is, it doesn't look like he's going to try them. Neither Trump nor his special envoy Wyckoff really know what they're doing here. What do you make of the Russian drones penetrating Polish and also apparently Romanian airspace?

[Mark Galeotti]

I think the Romanian one was an accident. It was a Gharan strike drone. The very fact that it plowed into the ground away from anything else, I think suggests that it had either been mis targeted or more likely had its targeting systems scrambled by electronic warfare. This is one of the reasons why in the first part of the war, the Russians weren't really launching air attacks in Western Ukraine for the very reason that they wanted to avoid things going off course into NATO airspace. Poland, a very different matter. That many 19 drones. That's not an accident. That's not just inputting of accidentally mistaken targeting information or electronic warfare. Remember, these were not strike drones in the main. As near as we can tell, all or most of them were decoy or reconnaissance drones. And I think it was a combination of a test and a warning. A test just to see precisely how Europe would respond. But more to the point of warning, again, we come back to this point that at the moment the so called coalition of the willing, which is proving distinctly unwilling, is currently meant to be finalizing the security guarantees which is willing to offer Kyiv in the case of a peace. And that is the step at which Kyiv will decide whether or not to talk to Russia in any meaningful sense. At the moment, all eyes are on European conversations.

[Podcast Host]

There's more to this than the fate of the Donbass. Correct? It's not as simple as Ukraine decides, okay, we're not going to ever get this territory backed militarily. The donbass is yours, Mr. Putin, and that's it. There's more to the end of the war than that part of eastern Ukraine.

[Mark Galeotti]

Well, exactly. Look, from Russia's point of view, a lot of the debate about whether a deal can be struck revolves around, oh, can we trust Putin? Of course we can't trust Putin, but that's not the point. On the whole, you reach agreements with people whom you often can't trust. You need to build in safeguards. So what is to stop some kind of peace now just simply being a temporary armistice while Russia regroups? And that's where the security guarantees come in. And also let's be honest, from Kyiv's point of view, unless it feels it has proper security guarantees, it has no reason at all to talk to Putin. So this is about whether or not any kind of peace is a real lasting peace, however ugly. It is also a test of Europe's credibility. The Donald Trump approach has been more or less to say, I'm not interested in this war, I'll happily profit from it, please do come and buy American made kit to give to the Ukrainians. But I'm not going to spend a dollar and I'm certainly not going to exert my too much. So this is really a test of a still frankly adolescent Europe. It had infantilized itself so long by remaining underneath the American security umbrella and not taking its own security capacities at all seriously. So can it actually support Ukraine to the point where there can be some kind of a deal? And from Putin's point of view, he frankly wants to intimidate Europe. It's noteworthy that this comes at the same time as the ZAPAD military exercises in Belarus, which are pretty small. They're certainly not in any way a kind of a threat to NATO, but they're very much hyping things like this new experimental areshnik missile being involved and Putin himself saying that European troops in Ukraine without Russian agreement, Russian agreement which wouldn't be forthcoming, would be considered legitimate military targets. So it's very much this is Russia saying to Europe you want to support Ukraine. You think very carefully about how much skin you really have in the game because frankly we are willing to escalate this if you push us too far.

[Podcast Host]

Exactly. If Moscow wants to have a veto over Ukraine's self defense in the future. Well, as you say, the Europeans, if they're going to go ahead with this and actually really guarantee Ukraine security, that's the credibility issue. The other side has to believe it will really happen. This takes us Back to, say, 2016, when Barack Obama gave that famous interview to the Atlantic when he said, russia knows we're not going go to war over Ukraine. So me beating my chest and making threats is not going to make a world of difference.

[Kremlin Spokesman]

We're not going to go to war with Russia.

[Mark Galeotti]

The Ukrainians don't want that.

[Kremlin Spokesman]

We don't want that.

[Podcast Host]

So my final question to you, Mark Galeotti. Can we say that we know what Putin's aims, his ultimate aims are here today? Have they changed over the past three and a half years? Does he still seek to dominate the whole of Ukraine?

[Mark Galeotti]

Would he like to? Yes. But is he also rational enough an actor to appreciate that some things he's not going to get? I think that that's also the case. I mean, I think the honest answer is Putin is out for whatever he can get. At the point at which he feels he has to make a deal holding on to the territory he's taken, perhaps with that extra piece of Donetsk region, if he can persuade the Ukrainians to give it up, no NATO membership for Ukraine, I think that from his point of view is an absolute. And beyond that, whatever else he can get. So if he can, for example, see Ukraine's armed forces limited, I don't believe that could possibly be acceptable to the Ukrainians. But sure, he would like that. But I think again, it's this idea that he will push for as much as he can get, rather than that he has some fixed menu, and if you hit that magic menu, he'll make a deal, and if you don't, he won't. It's all a question of just how much pressure he feels himself under.

[Podcast Host]

And let's hope in the meantime, the Ukrainians do not experience a Caporetto to our earlier remarks about breakthroughs in the First World War, the Italian defeat at Caporetto. But as you say, you don't expect something like that.

[Mark Galeotti]

I don't. I don't. And that frankly counts as being as optimistic as I can bring myself to being at this current stage in the war.

[Podcast Host]

Thank you for listening to this bonus episode of History As It Happens. Go to history as it happens.com to subscribe through supercast so you don't miss any bonus content. And you won't have to listen to ads anymore either. And remember, my newsletter is free. Go to Substack and search for History As It Happens.