Podcast Summary: “China’s Last War”
Podcast: History As It Happens
Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: David Finkelstein (Chinese military and security affairs expert, CNA)
Date: February 17, 2026
Overview
This episode explores the recent turbulent developments within China’s military leadership, focusing on Xi Jinping’s sweeping purge of top generals and the murky internal workings of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The conversation delves into the historical context of China’s last direct military engagement—the 1979 war with Vietnam—and examines the question of whether China is prepared for a major conflict, especially over Taiwan, despite not having fought a war in nearly five decades. Insights are provided by David Finkelstein, a veteran analyst of Chinese affairs.
Key Discussion Points & Insights
I. China’s Recent Military Purge
[01:16–02:41]
- Xi Jinping’s extensive removal of top generals has destabilized the highest echelons of the PLA.
- Of the six generals Xi handpicked for the Central Military Commission in 2020, only one remains in place ([04:16]).
- Nearly all senior commanders appointed at the start of 2023 are now gone, leading to uncertainty over Chinese military readiness.
Quote [02:18] – Martin Di Caro:
"China's leader Xi Jinping is purging his military's leadership, raising doubts about the readiness of the People's Liberation Army. China has not fought a war since 1979."
II. China’s Last War: Vietnam, 1979
[03:38–04:54]
- In February 1979, China invaded Vietnam in response to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, a Chinese client state.
- The conflict exposed serious weaknesses in the PLA, including poor leadership, outdated tactics, and ineffective communication.
Quote [04:54] – Martin Di Caro (summarizing Miles Yu):
"The war exposed the People's Liberation Army's humiliating ineptitude and shocking backwardness… Many PLA commanders did not know how to read military maps… the PLA high commanders inexplicably preferred close hand-to-hand combat..."
- The PLA suffered heavy losses and has not engaged in major combat since.
III. The Nature of Xi’s Purges
[11:48–15:09]
- Xi’s Motives: Could be signs of consolidating power or genuine attempts to root out corruption.
- PLA’s Opaqueness: Leadership shifts are difficult to interpret due to the closed nature of the system.
- Types of Offenses:
- Endemic corruption (kickbacks, sale of positions, illegal contracting)
- Resistance to reforms
- Abuses of authority
- Potential false readiness reports
- Rumored formation of internal factions
Quote [12:32] – David Finkelstein:
"Corruption, a ubiquitous situation in the PLA over the years, that Xi Jinping is dedicated to eradicating... there may have been some forms of what I call systemic offenses... abuses of authorities... possibility of operational shortcomings or false readiness reporting..."
IV. PLA Modernization and Reform
[22:13–25:19]
- Xi Jinping fundamentally restructured the PLA, breaking from its 1950s Soviet-inspired model.
- Created five new joint war-fighting commands, improving potential for modern, joint military operations.
- The PLA is building a blue-water navy and, for the first time, established a foreign base in Djibouti in 2017.
Quote [22:13] – David Finkelstein:
"Xi Jinping has put his personal stamp on the PLA... [and] used his political muscle to put the Chinese military through its most thoroughgoing and unprecedented reorganization since 1949."
V. The Question of Taiwan
[28:22–33:38]
- Taiwan is viewed by Beijing as the final unresolved wound of the “century of humiliation”; its return is non-negotiable for Chinese national prestige.
- While Xi prefers to resolve the issue peacefully, China will not renounce the use of force.
- Taiwan is not a US treaty ally, and US policy remains one of “strategic ambiguity.”
Quote [31:45] – Martin Di Caro:
"So it's historic and it's national prestige... Is it strategic... or is it ideological?"
Quote [32:08] – David Finkelstein:
"The Communist Chinese desire for Taiwan long predates the emergence of TMSC as a chip producer... it's a matter of national honor..."
VI. Can China Really Fight?
[35:02–38:11]
- Despite modernization, no current Chinese military personnel have real combat experience; their last war was in 1979.
- The PLA’s true military readiness is untested.
- The United States remains the world’s most combat-tested force, respected by PLA professionals.
- PLA’s power is potential, not proven.
Quote [35:27] – David Finkelstein:
"Frankly, Martin, the short answer is you cannot know... until a military is actually deployed and employed, it's very difficult to assess whether it can bring all of the parts together... you won't know that until it happens."
Quote [38:11] – David Finkelstein:
"...we in turn need to have a healthy respect for the PLA's combat potential... given how far they've come in 40 years of focused and funded military modernization."
VII. South China Sea & Regional Tensions
[39:06–40:33]
- China uses its navy, coast guard, and maritime militia to assert claims in the South China Sea, sometimes harassing the Philippines (a US treaty ally) and other states.
- Such tensions have led to dangerous encounters and could potentially draw in the US.
VIII. The Need for Diplomacy and Unresolved Strains
[40:33–46:05]
- US–China relations have soured due to Chinese domestic and foreign policies unpopular with key US constituencies (e.g., intellectual property theft, militarization of the South China Sea).
- Communication between US and Chinese militaries persists through mechanisms like the Military Maritime Cooperation Agreement.
- China benefits from the rules-based international order, despite sometimes disregarding unfavorable rulings.
Quote [41:10] – Martin Di Caro:
"De-escalation seems necessary and that's only possible with good diplomacy... we can compete, we can prepare for war... but there also has to be better relations at the same time."
Quote [48:19] – David Finkelstein:
"China's point of view is that hey, we're not looking to destroy [the world order]. We just want to adjust the world order to make it more reasonable—reasonable for us..."
Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments
-
Finkelstein on Military Readiness [03:08, 35:27]:
- “Until a military is actually deployed and employed, it’s very difficult to assess whether it can bring all of the parts together… and still press on to achieve its assigned tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. You won’t know that until it happens.”
-
On PLA's Institutional Transformation [22:13]:
- “Xi Jinping has used his political muscle to put the Chinese military through its most thoroughgoing and unprecedented reorganization since 1949.”
-
On Taiwan and National Prestige [32:08]:
- “It's a matter of national honor for the mainland... Taipei is a significant element in Beijing’s officially cultivated narrative of aggrievement.”
-
On Modern Geopolitics [38:11]:
- “We in turn need to have a healthy respect for the PLA’s combat potential, given how far they’ve come in 40 years...”
-
On US-China Diplomacy [41:10]:
- “De-escalation seems necessary and that's only possible with good diplomacy.”
Timestamps for Important Segments
- [01:16–04:54] — Setting the scene: Contemporary military purge & China’s last war (Vietnam, 1979)
- [07:06–09:21] — Finkelstein’s China background; China’s early 1980s transition
- [11:48–15:09] — Theories behind Xi’s military purges and PLA opacity
- [22:13–25:19] — Massive PLA reorganization under Xi
- [28:22–33:38] — Historic and strategic stakes of Taiwan
- [35:02–38:11] — Can the PLA fight and win a war? Potential vs. experience
- [39:06–40:33] — South China Sea disputes and risk of escalation
- [40:33–46:05] — Deterioration of US–China relations and need for managed competition
- [48:19–49:51] — China and the international order
Tone & Style
- The conversation is analytical yet accessible, mixing historical depth with up-to-the-minute policy discussion.
- Finkelstein brings cautious expertise, consistently noting areas of uncertainty and the limits of available knowledge about China’s leadership.
- Di Caro bridges deep historical context with pressing political questions, guiding listeners from past to present.
Conclusion
The episode paints a nuanced, sobering portrait of uncertainty and opacity at the heart of the world’s biggest military, raising vital questions about regional security, U.S.–China relations, and the enduring consequences of history for contemporary geopolitics. While China’s military power is growing, its effectiveness remains untested, and diplomatic engagement is as critical as ever in ensuring today’s rivalries don’t turn into tomorrow’s conflicts.
