← History As It Happens
History As It Happens
Cornered Ayatollahs
00:37:11
Note: This episode was recorded hours before President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between Iran and Israel. Over the decades and in the face of Western pressure not to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, the Islamic Republic of Iran has...
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- [00:01]
Adrian
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- [00:28]
Martin DeCaro
History as it happens. June 24, 2025. Cornered Ayatollahs.
- [00:34]
Ayatollah Khomeini
Ayatollah Khomeini returns to a country teetering.
- [00:37]
Gregory Brew
On the brink of civil war.
- [00:42]
Tulsi Gabbard
The government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation which it has itself created. We did not, repeat, did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages because.
- [00:56]
Ayatollah Khomeini
America negotiated from position of strength and principle. We have stopped the spread of nuclear weapons in this region. And when you threaten the region and Israel, you threaten America.
- [01:07]
Gregory Brew
We will keep confronting you on human rights and terrorism.
- [01:11]
Adrian
And make no mistakes. We will never allow you to acquire a nuclear weapon.
- [01:17]
Intelligence Community Analyst
The IC continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon. And Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003.
- [01:26]
Martin DeCaro
The US has joined Israel's war on Iran by bombing heavily fortified nuclear sites. President Trump says the ayatollahs have no choice but to give up the program. But it seems doubtful the Islamic regime will capitulate and give up something that's become a potent symbol of nationalism and resistance in its decades long, often violent, often strained relationship with the West. That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.
- [01:53]
Ayatollah Khomeini
Iran has never given up its quest for nuclear weapons and and the missiles to deliver them.
- [01:58]
Israeli Military Official
Tonight, I can report to the world that the strikes were a spectacular military success. Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated, showing the world.
- [02:12]
Martin DeCaro
That American deterrence is back. When this president speaks, the world should listen.
- [02:20]
Gregory Brew
I will note that in the early 2000s, Iran pursued a nuclear weapon when it was concerned that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was doing the same. So this has been something Iran has pursued in the past. But having the program has been an important element for Iran politically, economically and strategically for a very long time.
- [02:37]
Ayatollah Khomeini
A red line should be drawn right here before Iran completes the second stage of nuclear enrichment.
- [02:46]
Martin DeCaro
Just about 90 days ago, the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard testified before the Senate about threats to US Interests across the globe. And this is what she said about Iran.
- [02:57]
Intelligence Community Analyst
Iran continues to seek expansion of its influence in the Middle East. Despite the degradation to its proxies and defenses during the Gaza conflict, Iran has developed and maintains ballistic missiles, Cruise missiles and UAVs, including systems capable of striking US targets and allies in the region. Tehran has shown a willingness to use these weapons, including during a 2020 attack on U.S. forces in Iraq and in attacks against Israel in April and October 2024. Iran's cyber operations and capabilities also present a serious threat to US Networks and data. The IC continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003.
- [03:46]
Martin DeCaro
Now, last week, President Trump was asked about Gabbard's testimony, and he responded, I don't care what within days, the president, who promised to keep the country out of unnecessary wars, joined Israel's war on Iran with the stated aim of annihilating that country's underground nuclear facilities.
- [04:03]
Israeli Military Official
Iran, the bully of the Middle east, must now make peace. If they do not, future attacks will be far greater and a lot easier.
- [04:12]
Martin DeCaro
Bunker buster bombs are dropped on the Fordo facility, which was built about 300ft under a mountain, its existence revealed to the world by Barack Obama in 2009.
- [04:22]
Ayatollah Khomeini
Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear power that meets the energy needs of its people. But the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program.
- [04:34]
Martin DeCaro
Six years after that, Iran agreed with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the jcpoa, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to limit Iran's nuclear program to peaceful purposes. Donald Trump tore it up in his first term. And now here we are in mid-2025 with another war to worry about. As I was getting this podcast ready, there was breaking news. Iran fired retaliatory missiles at a US Base in Qatar. No Americans were wounded. The Iranians, according to the New York Times, notified the US Ahead of time to minimize casualties. You know, the history of U. S Iran relations since 1979 contains plenty of terrible, violent moments right from the start. There is the hostage crisis in Iran.
- [05:21]
Tulsi Gabbard
There have been new threats against the.
- [05:23]
Ayatollah Khomeini
Hostages, threats inspired by the new United States policy that does not any longer.
- [05:28]
Tulsi Gabbard
Rule out the use of force.
- [05:29]
Martin DeCaro
And things got strange in the 1980s when the Reagan White House concocted a scheme to free hostages by selling Iran weapons through Israel.
- [05:38]
Tulsi Gabbard
The Iranian revolution is a fact of history. But between American and Iranian basic national interests, there need be no permanent conflict.
- [05:46]
Martin DeCaro
And if you open up historian John Gazvinian's book America and Iran to page 3, hundred ninety. You'll find some strange twists involving Israel, too. In the 1990s, when Israel began to portray Iran as the top security threat, it was a staggering contrast to the attitude Israel had taken toward Iran throughout the 1980s. For the first 10 years of the Iranian revolution, Israel had lent quiet support to Iran, even pushing the United States to develop warmer relations with the Ayatollahs. In 1986, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres had written directly to President Reagan, urging him to keep the pipeline of American weapons sales to Iran going for as long as possible and pleading for the United States to pursue a broader strategic relationship with Iran. In 1987, Yitzhak Rabin called Iran Israel's best friend, and you may also recall that after 9 11, Iran agreed to police its eastern border with Afghanistan to stop the Taliban from escaping. Yet the overall picture here is one of hostility. It's 2012, and Netanyahu is holding up his infamous cartoon bomb at the UN General Assembly.
- [06:58]
Ayatollah Khomeini
By next spring at most, by next summer, at current enrichment rates, they will have finished the medium enrichment and move.
- [07:08]
Martin DeCaro
On to the final stage as Israel and Iran vie for regional hegemony. Israel is backed by the most powerful nation. Iran has few friends willing to help it, its clerical regime clinging to power and to the nuclear program despite all the trouble it's causing. Historian Gregory Brew is Eurasia Group Senior Analyst in Iran and Energy. He is the author of the Struggle for Iran and Petroleum and Progress in Iran. His Twitter or X Accountbrew 24 is a must. If you're interested in learning more about what's happening in the Middle east, our.
- [07:44]
Adrian
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- [08:15]
Martin DeCaro
Gregory Brew welcome back.
- [08:17]
Gregory Brew
Thanks for having me back.
- [08:19]
Martin DeCaro
So I've been reading things like this from the New York Times. Along with the repression of dissent, Iran's nuclear program had become the ultimate means of defense for the inheritors of the Iranian revolution that began in 1979. The nuclear program, the article says, has been the symbol of resistance for the last two decades. Seems this program is a hindrance now, to say the least. Why is it so important as A nationalist symbol in Iran.
- [08:51]
Gregory Brew
Well, the first thing I would note is that the nuclear program in Iran predates the Islamic revolution. It actually began under the shah in the 1970s. And the nuclear program has served a number of purposes. One is the development of energy and the advancement of technology. Iran, the Iranian government, views nuclear power as a symbol of technical progress and technical achievement. And so it's an important source of prestige. It was both for the Shah's government, but also for the Islamic Republic, domestically and internationally. Also, I mean, it deserves to be noted Iran is a prodigious producer of oil and gas, but it does have an interest in developing, developing a diverse energy mix. And nuclear power has long been of interest to Iran's government, again under the Shah and also under the Islamic Republic. There is of course also this security element, the strategic element. Iran, again under the Shah and under the Islamic Republic, has been conscious of being surrounded by powerful enemies, both in the Arab world, in the Middle east, but also since the revolution against the United States and Israel. Iran does not have any strong allies. We've seen illustrations of that during this recent war. There are no regional states that are, for lack of a better term, on Iran's side and the Iranians are conscious of this. So to develop a nuclear program, to develop a nuclear threshold, the ability to develop a weapon has been an important part of Iran's security posture for a long time. I will note that in the early 2000s, Iran pursued a nuclear weapon when it was concerned that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was doing the same. So this has been something that Iran has pursued in the past. But having the program has been an important element for Iran politically, economically and strategically for a very long time.
- [10:36]
Martin DeCaro
It's multi layered and we can even do the deep origins of it all back to the atoms for peace Eisenhower, 1950s to seek an acceptable solution to.
- [10:46]
Tulsi Gabbard
The atomic armaments race, which overshadows not only the peace but the very life of the world. It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace. The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military buildup can be reversed, this greatest of defense destructive forces can be developed into a great boom for the benefit of all mankind. United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability already proved is here now.
- [11:35]
Martin DeCaro
Today, more recently, however, now in the face of war, Iran being attacked by two nuclear powers that have Far more military power than Iran has. It's been said that the regime itself sees holding on to this program as the key to maintaining power.
- [11:53]
Gregory Brew
So what we've seen over the last 12 months has been a significant degradation in Iran's regional position, right? The collapse of the Axis of Resistance proxy network, the degradation of Hezbollah, Iran's most important ally. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and then Israel's direct strikes last October. And then of course, this war over the last two weeks has exposed Iran as vulnerable. And this is something that the Islamic Republic is very conscious of. It is even more conscious, however, of how foreign threats may morph into internal threats. The Islamic Republic is facing a legitimacy crisis and has been for a long time. The economy is very poor, both because of sanctions, but also because of internal mismanagement. The regime is corrupt and corrupted. There's a lot of self interested, self dealing. The small circle of elite surrounding Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps control much of the country's economy. Much of the wealth has been funneled into the hands of very few. The middle class has been squeezed. And then of course, there are long standing sources of unrest and discontent over repression issues such as the Hijab law, press censorship, the limits of political expression, general repression. These are all in the mix domestically and have given Iran's leadership concern that the regime is under general threat, perhaps not of imminent collapse, but of a long term disintegration in its position. So developing a nuclear deterrent is going to be, I think, of increasing interest to the elite, given how this war has exposed vulnerabilities, given how the regime is feeling threatened externally and internally. There is this idea, and you see it come up in Iranian commentary all the time. There is this idea that you can either be Libya or you can be North Korea. You can surrender your nuclear program as Gaddafi did, in exchange for sanctions, relief or recognition or whatever, and then years later, you fall from power. That the west intervenes and forces you to fall from power and the country collapses, disintegrates again. This is the Iranian perspective. Or you opt to be North Korea, you develop a nuclear weapon, you become an international pariah, you become isolated, but you survive. No one, as you see this written especially in hardliner publications, no one is thinking about bombing or assassinating Kim Jong Un. We're going to see more of this come out of Iran when this war ends. We've already seen some of it, but we're going to see more of it for certain in the months and years to come.
- [14:15]
Martin DeCaro
That is one possible unintended consequence of the war Israel and the United States initiated against Iran that will push it toward going nuclear. You mentioned the term before nuclear capability. It seems since the collapse of the JCPOA that the regime has wanted to stay in kind of this middle ground, or maybe you want to call it a limbo or something. They're not giving up the program entirely, but they hadn't made a decision, despite many lies to the contrary, had not made the decision to go nuclear, but they wanted to have that capability. And now the lesson they might draw from this war is that there's no point in trying to negotiate with these powers. Let's just go. Because the only card they have left to play is, is the bomb. This deterrent that states believe they will have once they are a nuclear power. Deterrence, Gregory Brugh can be an illusion. I mean, states still get into hostilities even though they have nuclear weapons. Some argue that the, the wars don't go too far because of that nuclear deterrent. But if Iran were to pull out of the npt, take its nuclear program underground and try to develop not just one bomb, I think you posted on Twitter or X that they have the capability of doing 10 bombs. Wouldn't that trigger a larger military response from Israel and the United States?
- [15:33]
Gregory Brew
So I think we do need to be conscious of timelines here. Before this war began, there was a vigorous debate over how long Iran would need to develop a weapon if it chose to develop a weapon. Obviously, we've seen conflicting reports, and at this point it's a bit of a moot question whether Iran wanted to build a bomb before this war. I'm of the opinion that given the damage that's been done to the program, it will take quite a while to rebuild. If Iran wants to rebuild it in secret and in entrenched locations to protect it from renewed assault from Israel and the United States, as it is likely, I think, to do, then that will take even longer because they will need to rebuild everything that was above ground, below ground, and that will take some time, and they'll need to do it away from the prying eyes of both the iaea, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United States and Israeli security services, which I think, as we've seen, are quite capable of determining what's going on inside Iran and have been for some time. On whether developing a weapon triggers an even more intense US Israeli response, that will be a tremendous risk. But I will say from the point of view of the regime, perhaps not of Khamenei but of some of the regime's leadership, that is a risk that they've already seen and miscalculated on. The calculation was that developing a threshold status but remaining open to negotiation would be enough to avoid military escalation. They have now seen that that is not the case.
- [16:51]
Martin DeCaro
Exactly.
- [16:51]
Gregory Brew
So the argument will be we need a bomb first and we need to get there and we need to get there soon. If we have to do it while enduring new US and Israeli action, then we will do so because we've already seen that they're willing to attack us even if we don't develop a weapon. And I would also note, you know, there is great danger to Iran, to the Islamic Republic, to the Islamic regime in taking this course of action. From their point of view, there could be even greater danger in doing nothing because if they invite the idea that Iran remains vulnerable, then they invite renewed military action. And if the goal of the United States and Israel is not regime change now, it could very well become regime change again. From the perspective of the leadership of the Islamist.
- [17:33]
Martin DeCaro
I've disagreed with people who contend that the clerics are suicidal, meaning they're trying to get a bomb just so they can instantly launch it into Israel. No, they want it for the, the perception of deterrence. I also said before, nuclear weapons don't prevent all wars from happening, but they could prevent wars from going too far. India and Pakistan recently got into a four day war that was rather frightening. And then they, they pulled back from the brink when it comes to Iran's military power and its investments, if you want to call it that, in these terrorist proxies in the Middle East. It goes back to the 1980s with Hezbollah in Lebanon. They've been spending decades and a lot of money building up their weapons capacity, their missiles, long range, medium range, short range. Their proxies all exposed as pretty hollow over the past 12 months. What happened?
- [18:26]
Gregory Brew
It speaks to how these ideas are developed in theory, but then they're placed under pressure in practice. In other words, the idea of deterrence, as you noted at the beginning of the conversation, is just an idea, right? It's a theory. I would pivot your question a little bit and I would say that it's not entirely Iranian weakness, more so than Israeli strength and Israel's willingness to absorb risk, especially in the aftermath of October 7th. October 7th was a security disaster for Israel from the point of view of Israeli leadership. It required not just a response against Hamas in Gaza, it required a regional response to restore what they saw as their shattered deterrence the thinking is, if Hamas can do this, what is to stop other actors? Again, this is the Israeli perspective. So Netanyahu, the Israeli prime Minister, and the Israeli security establishment being more willing to push the envelope, at first gradually, but then increasingly with greater assertiveness, greater risk acceptance. This puts the Iranians in a very, very difficult position because their whole strategy was built around avoiding direct escalation and direct confrontation. That's why they had their proxies. That's why they've developed standoff capabilities, their missiles and drones. And it's why they've developed a nuclear program that only reaches a threshold status rather than a. Rather than a weapon. So this strategy ended up being a bad one once Israel became willing to escalate directly. And if you go back to April of last year, following the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, the Iranians made a big and risky decision. They decided that they were going to attack Israel directly with missiles and drones in response to this, in the thinking that it would restore deterrence. In reality, it appears to have had the opposite effect. It appears to have demonstrated to Israel as well as other regional actors that Iran was something of a paper tiger, that Israel, if given significant US Support, is, if not immune, then quite well prepared to manage the threat of Iran's missiles and drones. And this suggested that the capabilities were very lopsided, that Israel and the US had decided advantage that they could press against Iran in the event that diplomacy failed or in the event that a crisis appeared inevitable. So this is, you know, it's built on the back of October 7, an increased risk willingness among the Israeli leadership to do things that they would not have considered possible just a few years ago. And also Iranian miscalculation and the Iranian failure to maintain deterrence against a direct strike.
- [21:05]
Martin DeCaro
I was about to say it turned out to be provocative, which often happens in the history of conflict. We're doing something. We say this is defensive or we have a right to retaliate. And the other side doesn't quite agree with your interpretation of your violent action against them. Historically, as we alluded to earlier, the regime was seeking to construct a nuclear weapon or had a weaponization program. The origins of it are somewhat mysterious because it was happening in the 80s and 90s, and there's the AQ Khan network, et cetera. In the 90s and into the early 2000s, Iran was doing this, and then the program ended. Do we know why it ended at that time? Was it as simple as the Ayatollah, the same supreme leader who is Running the country now, Right? He issued a fatwa.
- [21:53]
Gregory Brew
The short answer to that is the United States. Iran's decision, or the Supreme Leader's decision to greenlight a nuclear weapons program was primarily built around the sense that Iran's security position was becoming compromised following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, but also in the wake of evidence suggesting that Saddam Hussein in Iraq, who of course had invaded Iran in the 1980s, was developing a nuclear weapon. So the thinking in Iran was, if Iraq has a bomb, we need a bomb too. And we need to accelerate our understanding of the technical aspects of developing a weapon should it become necessary to build one. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, the threat of Iraq building a bomb vanished. So the need for Iran to develop a bomb no longer became prominent. There was also a sense in that context nuclear diplomacy with the Americans, or diplomacy with the Americans in general, was going to be a factor moving forward. And this meant that actively pursuing a weapon came with considerable risk because they were worried that the Americans would find out, which eventually they did. So those were the decisions, those were the motivations, both behind pursuing a bomb, or at least beginning substantive work on the elements of a bomb and then reversing that decision in 2003.
- [23:08]
Martin DeCaro
And it was Obama in 08 or 09, it had to have been after 08 who announced to the world that the Fordo Complex existed, which had been a secretary.
- [23:19]
Ayatollah Khomeini
We are here to announce that yesterday in Vienna, the United States, the United Kingdom and France presented detailed evidence to the IAEA demonstrating that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been building a covert uranium enrichment facility near Qom for several years.
- [23:40]
Martin DeCaro
You know, Iran has not always operated in good faith here, of course, but you know, they're also saying probably we had to hide all this stuff because we didn't want to get bombed.
- [23:49]
Gregory Brew
You know, the way to think about it is this. The intelligence suggested that Iran was not actively pursuing a weapon and had not been actively pursuing a weapon since 2003. At the same time, Iran has not at all been forthcoming about its activities. It has not addressed long standing issues that the International Atomic Energy Agency has had with its past nuclear activities. The context of the US exiting the JCPOA in 2018 in reimposing sanctions. That's important context.
- [24:19]
Israeli Military Official
In just a short period of time, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorists will be on the cusp of acquiring the world's most dangerous weapons.
- [24:29]
Gregory Brew
But Iran has no reason to have such a large stockpile of 60% uranium, if in fact its goal is to have a civilian nuclear program. And then of course, Iran is a regional actor that has been disruptive, that backs proxies, that takes advantage of collapsing state security in places like Syria and Yemen, that looks for openings to expand its strategic posture, its influence in the region. These are all things that the. Yeah, Iraq. These are all elements. These are all things that the United States and Israel and other regional actors have to be conscious of. I mean, there is a reason, Martin, that this campaign against Iran's nuclear program has elicited so little condemnation from anyone.
- [25:12]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, Iran is isolated. I wanted to ask you about that. Where are its. Well, it doesn't have allies. It's never really been chummy with the Arab states in that part of the world. Right. But Russia doesn't want to really get too deeply involved here, what's going on.
- [25:26]
Gregory Brew
So Iran is isolated, but it's isolated, particularly around this issue and the issue of its nuclear program. Its development of this nuclear program has been a long standing source of regional concern along with its proxy activities. Iran being bombed by Israel and being weakened by Israel is something that the Gulf states in particular don't look upon with disfavor. No, a reduced threat from Iran is good for the Gulf, it's good for Gulf security. They're conscious of what the Iranians might do if they're pushed into a corner. That's something that they're hedging against.
- [25:57]
Martin DeCaro
Or if the regime collapses, that would bring chaos. But go ahead.
- [26:00]
Gregory Brew
You know, not just regime collapse, but the threat of regime collapse, the threat to the regime that this war is an existential one, that is something that not just the Gulf but European states and then of course, Russia and China are all very conscious of, as well as I should say Turkey. Turkey is especially concerned about a regime collapse or a scenario of partial regime collapse in Iran because Turkey has quite significant economic ties with Iran. Turkey imports close to 20% of its natural gas from Iran through pipeline system. A partial collapse in Iran would threaten the movement of refugees, would threaten unrest among Iran's Kurdish population in the northwest. These are all issues that Ankara takes extremely seriously. So the weakening of Iran and an outcome of this war where Iran has to spend the next five to 10 years maybe focused on internal reconstruction rather than power projection is kind of the best case scenario for everybody involved. And it could end up being the best case scenario for Iran as well. Having launched these long campaigns to expand its regional influence and to build this sort of empire of proxies, and to have seen it all crumble so quickly will likely cause a reconsideration of Iran's strategic posture and also of its strategic priorities.
- [27:12]
Martin DeCaro
Overreach. The west overreached during the war on terror. And Iran, taking advantage of the fact that Saddam Hussein was no longer around, overreached in the region as well. In the last few minutes, we have Greg, a couple of more questions here. I just want to share just one other remark, though, about the somewhat mysterious origins of Iran's nuclear plans from the Columbia center for Nuclear studies. Beginning in 1987, Iran received nuclear plans and imports, such as centrifuges from unknown foreign entities. Many suspect these originated from the aforementioned Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan's underground nuclear network. Iran then began in the 1990s entering deals with North Korea involving missiles. And this analysis says due to the antagonistic relationship that much of the Western world has with these two nations, details of their exchanges are largely unknown, which is another reason why diplomacy is important in bringing countries insofar as they're willing into the circle, you know, the international community, community of nations to talk to them. So on that note, do you agree with the argument that Trita Parsi, John Ghazwinian have made that in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, the US Victory in the first Gulf War over Saddam Hussein in Kuwait and then George H.W. bush's push for a larger region wide peace deal in the Middle east that could potentially bring in Iran, potentially solve the Israeli Palestinian issue, that this is when Israel feared they could lose US Backing or US Influence, and this is when Israel started to tell the United States, no, Iran is an existential threat. Now, Saddam might be weakened, the Cold War might be over, the Soviets might be out of the Middle east, but now you have to focus on Iran. They're the bad guy. Do you agree with their, their analysis?
- [29:07]
Gregory Brew
As you know, Martin, my training is as a historian, so I do like to take the long term view most of the time. But I actually think there are compelling arguments around why this was kind of a short term development or a development that emerged just in the last sort of 12 months, perhaps even less. I think we should look at two things. One, the surprising success that Israel had at weakening Iran regionally, the campaign against Hezbollah, the strikes against Iran last October, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, which no one anticipated, certainly not Israel. Also a development, incidentally, which Israel really didn't have a whole lot to do with, but which has benefited Israel, and then the election of Donald Trump, a Republican president. Now, while we all saw over the last several months his interest in diplomacy, a Republican president who is overwhelmingly seen as being very friendly to Israel and very supportive of Israeli interests. And then finally, an Israeli Prime Minister who has spent his entire career focused on the problem of Iran. The threat of Iran to Israel.
- [30:09]
Ayatollah Khomeini
I spoke about it in my first term in office as prime minister, and then I spoke about it when I left office. I spoke about it when it was fashionable and I spoke about it when it wasn't fashionable. I speak about it now because the hour is getting late.
- [30:28]
Gregory Brew
There was a view coming into 2025 that Iran was vulnerable, that Israel had the means at its disposal to cripple the nuclear program, not destroy it. It would need the US for that, but that it also had a US President who would be comfortable with that kind of action and who could also potentially support it in the context of a war. The exchanges last year where Iran fired missiles at Israel and drones, it brought home to Israel, the Israeli leadership, the significance of that threat and how much worse that threat could become if Israel didn't act fast. Right. We saw, you know, there were lots of headlines over the last six months or so about Israel pushing for a strike, pushing for a strike, wanting to strike Iran. Now, the missiles were a big reason for that because the concern was that if Iran was given too much time to rebuild and to expand its missile stockpile and its arsenal, then in time it could develop a large enough arsenal that could overwhelm Israeli air defenses. That has been a somewhat overlooked aspect of Israel's strategic thinking in the context of this crisis. I grant that there are longer term reasons for this war, but there were also some pretty significant short term factors. And then the final one being Trump had an opportunity to negotiate a deal with Iran. He chose to take a pretty maximalist position, and he chose to negotiate in a way that didn't generate a whole lot of progress. Right. There were five meetings with the Iranians. The most that came out of it was a U.S. proposal for a new regional consortium. So there was a window for diplomacy. A lot of analysts, including myself, were noting that it was probably pretty small and that space for escalation was likely going to increase. I don't dispute the sort of broader arguments, but I would draw attention to the fact that there was a lot pushing this kind of crisis this year. Maybe it wasn't getting the attention it quite deserved, but it was in the mix, so to speak.
- [32:21]
Martin DeCaro
And despite Israel's influence over US Foreign policy, plenty of Americans in the foreign policy establishment, the commentariat, who have wanted to get at Iran since 1979. My final question to you is lesser questions, more of forcing you to put your historian's hat back on. Gregory Brugh, I'll just share with you a few lines from John Gazvinian's book America and Iran. This is in the aftermath of the Cold War, the US Victory over Saddam in Kuwait, and the idea that, you know, with all that optimism at that point, that a peace, a larger regional peace was possible. Ghazvinian writes, for the first time in history, Israel did not have to worry about outright military confrontation with the Arab world. But for the first time in history, Israel was also not able to benefit politically by positioning itself as an indispensable ally for the United States against the threat of Arab radicalism. Israel, therefore needed a new radical threat to position itself against and to rally American public opinion against, and Iran was the obvious candidate. And Ghazvinian goes on to say how during the first 10 years of the Iranian revolution, Israel had supported Iran. It pushed the United States to develop better relations with the Ayatollahs and even wanted what took place in President Reagan's Iran Contra scandal, selling the weapons, the missiles to Iran through Israel.
- [33:39]
Tulsi Gabbard
America's long standing goals in the region have been to help preserve Iran's independence from Soviet domination, to bring an honorable end to the bloody Iran Iraq war, to halt the export of subversion and terrorism in the region. A major impediment to those goals has been an absence of dialogue, a cutoff in communication between us.
- [34:00]
Martin DeCaro
But then that all changed in the 1990s. Yitzhak Rabin said Iran is Israel's best friend in 1987, was singing a much different tune in the early 1990s.
- [34:10]
Gregory Brew
So I would note this. The ideology of the Islamic Republic, particularly the hardline faction that coalesces around Khamenei, that Khamenei leads, that he supports personally as well as politically, is anti Zionist and is anti Western. We cannot separate those facts from our reality. Iran is generally, and Khamenei himself has generally handled Iran's foreign policy with a degree of pragmatism and a degree of caution. But pursuing and maintaining a very aggressive rhetorical stance against the state of Israel and against the United States has been a frequent obstacle to diplomacy.
- [34:47]
Martin DeCaro
Death to America, I think, is the slogan. It's pretty drastic, yeah.
- [34:52]
Gregory Brew
Yes. And obviously, you know, rhetoric is rhetoric, politics is politics. But there is no, you know, specific reason why Iran and Khamenei need to maintain that line beyond maintaining the political imperatives of the Islamic revolution. When Khamenei dies or is incapacitated, there could be a shift. There could be a change. I don't think it's going to I don't think the regime is going to drop its anti Zionism. I don't think it's going to drop its anti Westernism. But this crisis is likely to compel the regime to think critically about continuing to confront Israel the way that it has. Given what Israel has been able to do, given what Israel has done in dismantling Iran's proxies, and given what Israel has successfully done in damaging Iran itself. Right. There is going to be a greater consciousness of the disparity. And as we noted in our conversation, it could very well propel Iran towards developing a nuclear weapon. But it could compel Iran to develop a somewhat more cautious and more pragmatic stance on confronting Israel directly.
- [35:56]
Martin DeCaro
Or it could capitulate, as Trump has been demanding, which is not negotiating. When you demand, the other side just capitulates. That's not a negotiation.
- [36:03]
Gregory Brew
But some might say is one of the reasons why I don't I haven't really been very bullish about diplomacy, and I'm not going to be very bullish about diplomacy in this context. Capitulation is too great a humiliation for Khamenei and for the regime. They will resist anything that appears to be capitulation. They won't aggressively embrace escalation. As you note, they're not suicidal. But to capitulate, to be seen to give up to foreign pressure, is too great a humiliation for the leadership.
- [36:29]
Israeli Military Official
With all of that being said, this cannot continue. There will be either peace or there will be tragedy for Iran, far greater than we have witnessed over the last eight days. Remember, there are many targets left. Tonight's was the most difficult of them all, by far, and perhaps the most lethal. But if peace does not come quickly, we will go after those other targets with precision, speed and skill.
- [37:00]
Martin DeCaro
On upcoming episodes of History As It Happens, we will stay with us, Iran and Israel. I also have an episode coming up with Sean Wilentz about how Democrats are lost in the wilderness. All that and more new episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. You can sign up free at history as it happens.com also find us on Facebook. Just search for History as it Happens.
- [37:31]
Gregory Brew
Sam.
- [37:56]
Martin DeCaro
Sa.