Did You Say Monroe Doctrine? Oh, Donroe!

Summary

History As It Happens – “Did You Say Monroe Doctrine? Oh, Donroe!”

Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: Jay Sexton, historian and professor at University of Missouri
Date: January 9, 2026

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Overview

This episode dives into the history, meaning, and transformation of the Monroe Doctrine—a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere—and its new, controversial iteration in the form of the so-called “Donroe Doctrine,” as invoked by President Trump amidst the recent U.S. invasion and occupation of Venezuela. Host Martin Di Caro and historian Jay Sexton unravel the evolving symbolic and practical applications of the doctrine across two centuries, highlighting its contradictions, adaptations, and the ongoing tension between imperial ambition and purported ideals.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Monroe Doctrine—Origins and Early Intent (1823)

• Original context: Articulated by President James Monroe as an annual message to Congress, not as a formal doctrine, policy, or statute.
  • Europe was told it could not intervene or recolonize the Americas (02:51–03:56).
  • No enforcement mechanism: The U.S. lacked the military might and depended on British naval power to underwrite the doctrine (14:22–15:25).
• Jay Sexton:

  “All Monroe said in this address to Congress was what America's rivals at the time, the monarchies of Europe—Spain and France in particular—what they could not do... It didn't say anything about what the United States would do if European powers intervened. It didn't prescribe future policy.” (10:15)

• Not designed or intended as lasting “dogma” (11:20).

2. Transformation and Reinterpretation

• The doctrine morphed in purpose, pulled into different directions by subsequent generations:
  • Used proactively by President James K. Polk to justify the Mexican-American War and territorial expansion (13:12–14:22).
  • During the Civil War era, the doctrine fueled rhetoric against European (especially French) intervention in Mexico, but the U.S. itself remained focused on its own internal conflicts (16:34–18:38).
• Sexton:

  “It's negatively framed: Europe cannot do this. Doesn't say anything about what the United States can do. So it's a blank canvas.” (13:12)

3. From Principle to Imperial Tool

• Shifted from an anti-colonial Enlightenment ideal to a symbol of American hegemony and intervention:
  • Spanish-American War (1898): The anti-imperialists invoked Monroe to argue against annexation, while imperialists felt emboldened to become colonial power themselves (21:50–23:34).
  • The Roosevelt Corollary (1904): Teddy Roosevelt reshaped the doctrine to justify U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere, specifically when European powers sought repayment from Venezuela (25:57–27:28).
• Sexton:

  “He [T.R.] starts to formulate the ideas...which essentially states that since European powers cannot intervene in the Western Hemisphere to reclaim debts or restore order, the United States has to do it for them.” (27:19)

4. U.S. Interventions, Corporate Interests, and The Banana Wars

• Early 20th-century interventions (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Central America) driven by regional instability, strategic concerns (e.g., fear of German presence during WWI), and American business interests (United Fruit Co./Banana Wars) (28:01–29:44).
• Sexton:

  “Anytime you have an intervention in a region, it's normally not just one thing, but it’s when multiple factors in the equation all add up to a sum that justifies intervention. That’s what you get.” (28:52)

5. Good Neighbor Policy and Shifting Tactics

• FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy (1930s): A reaction against costly, unpopular direct intervention, favoring reciprocal trading agreements and alliances (29:44–31:25).
  • FDR’s own words reinforced a non-expansionist ideal:

    “We seek no conquest. We stand for peace.” (31:25)

• The policy did not mean abandonment of influence, just a change in methods.

6. The Doctrine in the Cold War and Beyond

• During the Cold War, explicit mention of the Monroe Doctrine became rare; interventions justified instead as part of a global struggle against communism (35:46–36:48).
• The doctrine resurfaces in political discourse when there is a fractious domestic environment or perception of rival spheres of influence re-emerging (36:48–39:09).
• Sexton:

  “The doctrine flourished in domestic political combat... Election years. Somebody's like, I'm going to be a big defender of the Monroe Doctrine. And then the opponent has to be like, no, I'm going to be a bigger defender…” (38:17)

7. The “Donroe Doctrine” and 21st-Century Imperialism

• Trump administration’s Venezuela policy is more a throwback to 19th/early 20th-century raw imperialism than adherence to original Monroe principles (04:22–05:33; 39:09–42:33).
  • Open admission that “we’re taking as much oil as we want, for any purpose.”
  • Secretary of State Marco Rubio outlines a stepwise process: destabilization, quarantine/seizure of oil, then “recovery” with U.S. and Western business access (05:33–06:37).
• Sexton:

  “It does look like the 19th century. I mean it looks a lot like the Roosevelt corollary. ...What’s most striking about the Venezuela business is it seems like we’re flying by the seat of the pants...That's a dangerous, risky move.” (39:43–41:52)

8. Evolving Perceptions—Latin America, Symbols, and Legacy

• Once regarded in Latin America as a liberal Enlightenment principle, the Monroe Doctrine is now widely viewed as a tool of “Yankee imperialism” (02:01; 42:33).
• Sexton:

  “Don’t pin that on Monroe. ...In the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine...was seen as a sort of liberal symbol of enlightenment and there was a lot of traction for it there. So these things change over time.” (42:33)

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Martin Di Caro on Trump’s new version:

  “President Trump is touting a new era of US Dominance over the Western Hemisphere, starting with his invasion of Venezuela, where he now says the US Will be in charge indefinitely, taking as much oil as he wants for any purpose... The Don Ro Doctrine. Wait, did he say Dunro, not Monroe?” (01:17)

• Jay Sexton on the doctrine’s amorphous legacy:

  “It's been a really amorphous, shape-shifting thing across time... not because we’re bad at doing history...but it's because it’s been a really amorphous, shape shifting thing across time.” (09:42)

• On Roosevelt’s bravado and the cult of “manliness” in foreign policy:

  “Over time, those most likely to invoke it, ...the sort of chest thumping bravado of Teddy Roosevelt, it is about asserting a certain image of manliness, but of power and authority and thereby stigmatizing domestic political opponents who disagree with that as weak...” (39:43)

• On the 21st-century political context:

  “Spheres of influence are back, man. ...Monroe Doctrine coming back shouldn't be a surprise in the 21st century because it looks more like...the 19th [century].” (38:35)

• FDR's vision of hemispheric peace:

  "The noblest monument to peace...is the boundary that unites the United States and Canada... What made it? Mutual trust, and to extend the same sort of mutual trust throughout the Americas was our aim..." (43:37)

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Timestamps – Major Segments

• 02:01 – Jay Sexton on the changing Latin-American perception of the Monroe Doctrine
• 03:50–04:48 – Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine” compared to 19th century imperialism
• 06:37 – Rubio outlines new U.S. policy phases in Venezuela
• 09:13 – Sexton explains original intent and context of the doctrine
• 13:12 – Polk’s reinterpretation for Manifest Destiny and Mexican War
• 14:22–15:25 – The irony of Britain’s role; U.S. as weak enforcer
• 16:34 – French intervention in Mexico and Civil War-era politics
• 21:50–23:53 – 1898 war, imperialists vs. anti-imperialists
• 25:57 – Roosevelt Corollary and Venezuela debt crisis
• 28:01–29:44 – Early 20th-century U.S. interventions, business interests
• 29:44–31:25 – FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy
• 35:46–36:48 – Cold War and eclipse of the explicit Monroe Doctrine
• 39:09–41:52 – Trump’s Venezuela occupation as “retro” imperialism, comparison with history
• 42:33 – Legacy, symbolism, and ideology of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America

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Conclusion

Through a brisk, engaging, sometimes wry conversation, Martin Di Caro and Jay Sexton trace how the Monroe Doctrine—once a makeshift warning to Europe—became a flexible instrument repeatedly re-forged to meet the demands of American power, ideology, and domestic politics. The latest “Donroe Doctrine” represents not a radical break, but a reversion to older, more openly imperialist traditions, now justified with less pretense and even less subtlety—closing the loop between history and current events in the Western Hemisphere.

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For a deeper dive into any period or policy change, refer to the detailed timestamps above or queue up the full episode.

Transcript

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See if you [e-mail] ad not reviewed or approved by Novo Nordisk History as it happens January 9, 2026 the Monroe or Donroe Doctrine. The United States just attacked Venezuela's castle.

[Jay Sexton]

In a new interview, Trump's saying, we're at war with people that sell drugs. We're at war with people that all.

[Unnamed Interviewee (possibly a political commentator or historian)]

The way back dated to the Monroe doctrines. And the Monroe Doctrine is a big deal, but we've superseded it by a lot, by a real lot. They now call it the Don Row Document. I don't know.

[Martin DeCaro]

President Trump is touting a new era of US Dominance over the Western Hemisphere, starting with his invasion of Venezuela, where he now says the US Will be in charge indefinitely, taking as much oil as he wants for any purpose. He decides. The Don Row Doctrine. Wait, did he say Dunro, not Monroe? Time to revisit high school history class. Well, don't worry, this won't be boring. Next, as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Unnamed Interviewee (possibly a political commentator or historian)]

Monroe Doctrine. We sort of forgot about it. It was very important, but we forgot about it. We don't forget about it anymore. Under our new national security strategy, American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again.

[Jay Sexton]

18:23 A lot of people at the time were talking about Spanish America, what we call Latin America as sister republics, that there was a political association, an ideological connection that transcended the religious and racial differences of the time. I mean, one of the things people might be surprised by is that, you know, in Latin America today, of course, the Monroe Doctrine is associated with, you know, Yankee imperialism. It's a bad thing to invoke it because even people that are inclined in Latin America to like the United States, you know, think it's kind of noxious. It is a symbol of imperialism. But in the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine, I mean, it was seen as a sort of liberal symbol of enlightenment.

[Martin DeCaro]

In his message to Congress in 1823, President James Monroe spelled out why the United States would be more connected to its own hemisphere than to the Old World with its endless wars and problems. He said, in the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our own defense. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. Monroe went on to say, we owe it therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, such as France and Spain, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere, he said, but with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other matter their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. Fast forward about 200 years, and the.

[Unnamed Interviewee (possibly a political commentator or historian)]

Monroe Doctrine is a big deal. But we've superseded it by a lot, by a real lot. They now call it the Donro document. I don't know. We built Venezuela oil industry with American talent, drive and skill, and the socialist regime stole it from us during those previous administrations, and they stole it through force.

[Martin DeCaro]

After ordering the invasion of Venezuela and the kidnapping of its authoritarian leader, Nicolas Maduro, President Trump did not try to dress up this act of aggression as anything other than an oil grab.

[Unnamed Interviewee (possibly a political commentator or historian)]

Massive oil infrastructure was taken like we were babies, and we didn't do anything about it. I would have done something about it. America will never allow foreign powers to rob our people or drive us back into and out of our own hemisphere. That's what they did.

[Martin DeCaro]

And in a new interview with the New York Times, he says the US Will be running Venezuela's oil industry indefinitely. This is what he referred to as the Donroe Doctrine, a new era of outright dominance of our southern neighbors. For their own good, of course, here is Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

[Marco Rubio]

As we move forward, we'll describe our Process, which is a threefold process in Venezuela. I've described it to them. Now, step one is destabilization of the country we don't want to destroy, descending into chaos. Part of that stabilization and the reason why we understand and believe that we have the strongest leverage possible is our quarantine. As you've seen today, two more ships were seized. We are in the midst right now and in fact about to execute on a deal to take all the oil they have, oil that is stuck in Venezuela. They can't move it because of our quarantine and because it's sanctioned. We are going to take between 30 and 50 million barrels of oil. We're going to sell it in the marketplace at market rates, not at the discounts Venezuela was getting. That money will then be handled in such a way that we will control how it is dispersed in a way that benefits the Venezuelan people, not corruption, not the regime. So we have a lot of leverage to move on the stabilization front.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, we'll see how that goes, how much any cooperation between Venezuela and Washington lasts.

[Marco Rubio]

The second phase will be a phase that we call recovery, and that is ensuring that American, Western and other companies have access to the Venezuelan market. A way that's fair. Also, at the same time, begin to create the process of reconciliation nationally within Venezuela.

[Martin DeCaro]

What the Trump administration is doing does not really adhere to the Monroe Doctrine, at least not its original intent. But as we're going to discuss in this episode, the Monroe Doctrine's purpose evolved over the past two centuries. There were periods when the United States directly and violently interfered in Latin America. There was something called the Roosevelt Corollary. And there were times when the US was less domineering, as in 1977 when President Jimmy Carter announced the Panama Canal treaties ceding control of the Canal to Panama.

[Franklin D. Roosevelt (voice reading historical quotes)]

But the treaties do more than that. They mark the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness and not force should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the world.

[Martin DeCaro]

While Carter tried to emphasize human rights in his foreign policy, we know Donald Trump does not care about human rights or democracy in his own country, let alone Venezuela. As he admitted, it's about natural resources. The Dunro Doctrine, then, is not new. It is old fashioned imperialism. Historian Jay Sexton is an expert on the Monroe Doctrine and in the political and economic history of the 19th century at the University of Missouri. He is the author of A Nation Forged by A New American History. Our conversation next. Are you tired of listening to ads? Want to keep the narrative flow going? Tap subscribe now in the show notes or go to historyasithappens.com and sign up. Jay Sexton, welcome to the podcast.

[Jay Sexton]

Great to be here. Thanks for having me.

[Martin DeCaro]

Your first time. So you're a college history professor. You're not a eighth grade. I mean, that's where everyone learns about the Monroe Doctrine, right?

[Jay Sexton]

Yeah. And everyone still has PTSD from their high school history test trying to cram what was the Monroe doctor? And they always confuse it with Manifest Destiny and Monroe Doctrine. Fair enough.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, those two things got combined at one point by James K. Polk.

[Jay Sexton]

Right?

[Martin DeCaro]

Maybe we'll get to that in a little bit. Now, I kid because I think everyone has heard. Well, I shouldn't say Everybody. How about 99% of Americans who've been through a public school system or private school have heard of the Monroe Doctrine. But President Trump brought it up the other day. He called it the Monroe Doctrines, plural, and then the Donroe Doctrine. And I've actually had a couple of my own friends email me saying, isn't that about this, that and the other thing, I'm not quite sure I remember it. Is Trump misrepresenting it? So that's why you're here. What does the Monroe Doctrine say? What did it mean at the time? Who was President Monroe's audience?

[Jay Sexton]

Well, hey, before I answer that, my favorite story about the Monroe Doctrine was in the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. An advisor to JFK looked at him and said, hey, you gotta invoke the Monroe Doctrine here. And he turned to him, he says, oh, the Monroe Doctrine, what the hell is that? So he clearly, it resonated. He remembered it from that high school test.

[Martin DeCaro]

But it wasn't Spain that put the missiles in Cuba. Not anymore. Maybe in the 19th century, had there been missiles, Spain would have been in Cuba. But go ahead.

[Jay Sexton]

Yeah, yeah, no, that's right. So we've all heard of it. We all don't know what it is. And I think in part, that's not because we're bad at doing history these days, but it's because it's been a really amorphous, shape shifting thing across time. But you asked about the original 1823, long before it was even called the Monroe Doctrine. This was just a, a message to Congress, an annual message, what we now call a State of Union Address. Back in those days, the President didn't give a speech, just like submitted a report to Congress.

[Martin DeCaro]

I prefer that, by the way.

[Jay Sexton]

You know why we did it that way back in those days is because the speeches were deemed to be Monarchical. It was like, you know, kings gave speeches, presidents just issued the report. All Monroe said in this addressed to Congress was what America's rivals at the time, the monarchies of Europe, Spain and France in particular, what they could not do. Spanish Americans are of course rebelling against Spanish rule. And Monroe said, hey, European powers cannot intervene in the new world. They can't try to reestablish the Spanish empire. That's it. That's all that the Monroe's message was. It didn't say anything about what the United States would do if European powers intervened. It didn't prescribe future policy. It was just one president stating in a message to Congress what Europe couldn't do. So it's quite an unlikely beginning to this like nationalist symbol that has persisted, you know, more than 200 years later.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, did Monroe believe it should last forever?

[Jay Sexton]

No, absolutely. I mean, this is how it's so different from something like the Constitution where, you know, they had doubts that the Constitution would last as long as it has. But you know, they're trying to craft something that would be durable and stand the test of time. Monroe and his team, when they're drafting this, this is just like their annual report. You know, they've done it the year before, they're going to do it the year later. There's no intention here to make this a binding dogma of nationalist foreign policy.

[Martin DeCaro]

But it did take hold. So it must have meant something to people who followed Monroe for a reason.

[Jay Sexton]

Part of why it took hold was that Monroe was a popular president. He was the last Founding father president, you know, the last president to have fought in the revolution. He was like at Valley Forge with George Washington. He knew all of the original kind of architects of the American republic. So he was like a touchstone to this distant past. He also presided over time of American politics in which though there was factionalism, there wasn't quite yet like a two party system, formal political debate and engagement. So this was imagined as a time of consensus, the last act of the revolutionary generation. And he kind of rides the wave of that. And that's one of the reasons why this routine message gets dogma status a few decades later.

[Martin DeCaro]

So the perceived or possible threat from Spain or France to recolonize their territories that they had lost, that fades soon enough. Right. But new threats or new possibilities are on the horizon or eventually materialize. Right. And is that why the Monroe Doctrine, as it was eventually called about 30 something years later, is that why this idea, it's not a statute, it's Not a treaty. Is that why this idea remained popular? There were new threats or new possibilities?

[Jay Sexton]

Precisely because it's open ended. I mean, it's negatively framed. Europe cannot do this. Doesn't say anything about what the United States can do. So it's a, a blank canvas. You have this popular symbol associated with a founding father president and subsequent politicians pick it up and run and they take it in very different directions. Absolutely, in very different directions. And so you're saying in part it could be a response to external threats. And I think that's definitely one strand of when you hear Monroe talk in the 19th and indeed 20th century. But it's also when a president or Secretary of state senses opportunity. And in fact, the very first president to reach back to sort of exhume the 1823 message, dust it off and put it to use, is James K. Polk in the 1840s. And he uses the doctrine, he turns it into like a proactive, assertive call for US Control of Mexican territory. So he's using this as justification for the war against Mexico in the 1840s and the annexation of northern half of that country, including California.

[Martin DeCaro]

We'll jump ahead on the timeline here, but another question about 1823. The United States had no real navy to speak of, Right? The United States was relying on Great Britain to enforce this, is that right?

[Unnamed Interviewee (possibly a political commentator or historian)]

Yeah.

[Jay Sexton]

That's the total irony of the Monroe Doctrine is first, the discussions that lead Monroe to state what he states in his 185223 message. Those are actually kickstarted by Great Britain. And the British minister is asking the United States if they want to jointly act to prevent or issue a statement warning France not to intervene. So Britain's behind it in that way. But as you say, the real way that Britain is involved in this story is that it's the power of the Royal Navy that prevents the French or the Spanish or some constellation of European monarchies from intervening. So British power lies behind this nationalist symbol. But that gets totally forgotten as the 19th century unfolds and the United States begins to imagine itself as a much more powerful nation than of course, it had been.

[Martin DeCaro]

You know, sometimes I have to read an entire book before doing an interview. Other times I'll read an encyclopedia article or two. To help me out here is from Britannica Encyclopedia. The US did not invoke the doctrine nor oppose British occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1833 or subsequent British encroachments in Latin America in 1845 and again in 48. As you said, Jay, it was President Polk Reiterating Monroe's principles, warning Britain and Spain not to establish footholds in Oregon, California, or Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. Polk reinterpreted the doctrine in terms of the prevailing spirit of Manifest Destiny, whereas Monroe had only said the Western Hemisphere was no longer open to European colonialism. Poke now stated, the European nation should not interfere with projected territorial expansion by the U.S. next here on the timeline is 1865. I think you've written a book about this subject, right? The US government in 1865 helping then Mexican President Benito Juarez overthrow Emperor Maximilian, who had been installed by the French government. Tell us how the Monroe Doctrine was applied here.

[Jay Sexton]

Well, there's a really rich story about the Monroe Doctrine in the era of the American Civil War. What listeners should definitely know about this is that as we're having our civil war in the north and the south, there's the massive civil war in Mexico at the same time. In fact, it begins in the late 1850s. Unlike our civil War, the Mexican Civil War is internationalized. The French intervene, they fully intervene in the 1860s. Allied with Mexico, conservatives actually establish or re establish a kind of monarchical imperial political system with the reign of Maximilian that you referenced. Now, this is only possible because the United States is divided and distracted by its own civil war, but it becomes a really big issue in Union politics during the war itself. And a lot of the critics of Abraham Lincoln, from both the Democratic Party and from the Radical Republicans, they latch on to this and they say, you know, you got to do more to stop monarchy from being reintroduced into a neighboring nation. In Mexico, Lincoln and his Secretary of State Seward, they never actually use the phrase Monroe Doctrine. They like one war at a time. We can deal with this after we beat the south, fair enough, but becomes this big domestic political issue. And then after the war is when you see the beginnings of a more assertive U.S. policy to hasten the end of the Maximilian regime. But even then, you do not have intervention when you have private actors, you have private arms shipments, but you don't have, like American diplomatic intervention or military intervention. This is a new regime. The Republicans are not like the old Democrats at James K. Polk. They don't want to grab more land from Mexico. They want to profit from a new commercial and economic relationship, new mineral rights, that sort of thing, railroads. So it's the beginning of a new form of US Empire.

[Martin DeCaro]

What was the concern about Maximilian being on the other side of the border?

[Jay Sexton]

The traditional idea that monarchies and republics could not coexist, even though Maximilian, though an emperor is actually kind of liberal by like 19th century monarchical terms. No matter. It was still seen as something that would pose a grave threat to the United States. Don't forget, this is the same time when people are starting to say the United States should annex Canada or make another bid to annex Canada, that you can't have a member of the British Empire with allegiance to the Crown on your northern border. So there's this big anti monarchical resurgence in the 1860s. It doesn't really lead to much in terms of a more aggressive foreign policy, but it leads to a lot of Monroe Doctrine talk.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's interesting because Monroe's initial vision had nothing to do with dominance, outright dominance of the hemisphere by the United States. But it seems within a generation or two, if not boots on the ground, imperialism, there's already this notion that this is our hemisphere, meaning it's Washington's hemisphere. And the presence of meddling European colonial empires is a threat to the US national interest, if not the safety of the country, but to the US national interest. Let me hear echoes of that now.

[Jay Sexton]

Yeah, and I mean, part of how you get there is of course, just the transformation of the nation's economy, industrialization of the North. So now foreign policy isn't just about, you know, annexing, taking territory. It's now about access to markets, now about capital investments, crossing borders. It's about building railroads, mineral rights. I mean, that's the big revolution in American foreign policy in the days of the Civil War. I mean, we all, we tend to not think about the Civil War's importance in the space time continuum of US foreign relations, but it is absolutely pivotal. It's like before 1861, something I can't remember off top of my head, but something like 4/5, 3/4 of the Secretaries of state are slaveholders and all the staff and embassies or consoles outside the United States are pro slavery Democrats. And then at the drop of a hat, that completely changes. The next two secretaries of state all the way to 1877 are New Yorkers. They're representative of Wall street interests and industrial power. There's a real profound shift that happens in the days of the Civil War.

[Martin DeCaro]

Other than James McPherson's book Battle Cry of Freedom that has a chapter or so about the global implications of the Civil War, which was about not having any European powers recognize the Confederacy, I don't know anything about the global aspects of the war. So maybe I'll add that it's my ever expanding reading list. Jay so it seems like there were periods of the Monroe Doctrine, the first period that we're discussing here in the 19th century, maybe bookended by the Spanish American War, 1898. How is this a Monroe Doctrine war, if at all, and the United States comes into possession of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines?

[Jay Sexton]

Well, I think you have to distinguish between the causes and the origins of the war and then the consequences. So you could see it as a Monroe Doctrine war in terms of how the United States is seeking to hasten the end of Spanish colonialism. Like finally, this is the question, of course, in 1823 that was lingering. It's still there in 1898 because you have Cuba, you have a few other isolated outposts, but the United States has always wanted this. But once the war starts and once the United States wins the war, then the whole terms of the debate change. Then the question is, okay, what are you going to do with the remnants of the Spanish empire and not just Cuba, but Puerto Rico and Guam and the Philippines? And here's where you see something, I suppose, a little bit unexpected, and that is, if you're looking at that big debate, it's called the great debate between the imperialists who advocate taking over Spain's empire, and then the anti imperialists who want nothing to do with that project. If you look at that debate, the people that are talking about this, the doctrine, are the anti imperialists, not the imperialists. The anti imperialists. They're old timers. They're looking back to an imagined past in which they think the United States had been a sort of unalloyed anti colonial power. And they think assuming colonial control of the Philippines in the Eastern hemisphere would be, you know, in contradiction to the Monroe Doctrine. It's exactly what the doctrine warned against. So you see the doctrine becoming a symbol not of like Hulk style aggressive hegemony, but of anti imperialism. Very unexpected outcome in 1898.

[Martin DeCaro]

We'll stay out of your hair. You stay out of our hair. But the imperialists are saying, no, we can replace one colonial overlord with us. Although I guess Americans have always chafed at being considered a colonial power. We've never really viewed ourselves that way, although we were the US was, I.

[Jay Sexton]

Should say we were. But that's also one of the unexpected things is, and it doesn't last long, but there is that moment in 1898 and thereabouts where, you know, if you look at some of the statements of the imperialists in American politics, Alfred Thayer Mahan, you know, Teddy Roosevelt Beveridge, senator from Indiana, I mean, they sound a lot like old school British Imperialists, and they're not ashamed about it. You know, Henry Cabot Lodge says we have a record of conquest and colonization that is the envy world. He says that in 1898. And they say things like, if Britain can rule over India, we can rule over the Philippines even better. But that's an ephemeral moment and it doesn't have very deep popular or political support. And the imperialist, especially once you have the insurgency in the Philippines, which turns bloody and costly and is a quagmire, they find themselves on their back foot. And I think this is why you see Teddy Roosevelt reaching into the bag of tricks and pulling out the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 when he issues his corollary. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, what he's actually doing, and it's justifying US Intervention in the Caribbean, but he's taking the political symbol used by his opponents and he's recrafting it, retooling it on behalf of a project of imperial intervention. So there's a lot of shape shifting and swapping of this symbol in this era of kind of volatility in U.S. foreign policy.

[Martin DeCaro]

You anticipated my next question and whether the Roosevelt corollary ushered in a new era of the Monroe Doctrine. Let's start, though, with how this came about. It was in response to an incident involving Venezuela and European interference there. What happened in Venezuela? What were the European countries angry about? And what did Roosevelt say? What was the corollary? That's a three part question. Go ahead, Jane.

[Jay Sexton]

Well, no, it is a great question and it is unexpected. Venezuela, actually, there's a through line. Venezuela is a really important place in the history of the Monroe Doctrine. But what you're talking about is in 1902 and 03, Venezuela, this might sound familiar. It's under the control of a strong, armed authoritarian leader. He's called Castro. He doesn't have very deep popular support and he's wrecking the Venezuelan economy. He's borrowed a lot of money from European powers and they want to get repaid and he's not repaying them. And then they start blockading Venezuelan ports and threaten to lob cannonballs into the cities. And this is obviously a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Now this is when Roosevelt enters the story and he has a lot of sympathy for the European powers. I mean, he thinks of the United States as a part of the imperial club, but he doesn't want them intervening in America's sphere of influence. So he starts to formulate the ideas which will later become the corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, which essentially states that since European powers cannot intervene in the Western hemisphere to reclaim debts or restore order, that the United States has to do it for them. And this is the pretext for what will be a series of US Interventions and indeed occupations, protracted wars of occupations over the coming decades in the region.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, this does usher in a new period when you consider, say, Haiti. Woodrow Wilson sends the Marines in to Haiti and 19, I don't know, 15, 16. And they were in there 20 years. What was the impetus for these occupations? Was it business interests, Fear of, well, national security, the physical safety of the United States? I mean, there were so many, we can't cover them all. Generally speaking, there was incursions into Mexico. I just mentioned Haiti, a lot of these. What were we trying to accomplish?

[Jay Sexton]

Part of the answer is simple. It's just there's real instability in the region, political and economic. So it's an unstable region, and that is, of course, a risk to American security. The second thing to say, you talk about Haiti, I think that is 1915. You talk about Santo Domingo. That's 1916, I believe, Dominican Republic. You have interventions in Central America in the same period. This is all in the context of World War I. There is the beginnings of the fears that Germany is a rival, that German power is something that needs to be reckoned with. And of course, the Germans have designs to have coaling stations, naval bases in the region. So there is a geopolitical rationale as well. There are business interests. Absolutely. I mean, it's Wall street capital interest, investments. Don't forget about the fruit companies. I mean, these are often called the banana wars because of the interests of major players like the United Fruit Company. Anytime you have an intervention in a region, it's normally not just one thing, but it's when multiple factors in the equation all add up to a sum that justifies intervention, that's what you get. And I think that's what you had in this case.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, we do have to talk about these in general tones because we don't have enough time to cover every aspect of 200 years of US foreign policy in the hemisphere. You mentioned United Fruit. So they were around even in the early 20th century, not just the 1950s with our bends, because I'm actually planning a. An episode soon to talk about Arbenz and Chiquita Banana, then known as United Fruit. So they were a force in the early 20th century.

[Jay Sexton]

That's right. I mean, you know, fruit companies, major, major players. No question about it.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, they wouldn't want instability because it would jeopardize their agricultural holdings. Okay, so Franklin Roosevelt comes along and he wants to change this pattern of violent direct boots on the ground interventions, right? He has something called the Good Neighbor Policy. What was the Good Neighbor policy? How did that alter diverge from the Monroe Doctrine?

[Jay Sexton]

The Good Neighbor policy, I mean, it has its origins in a State Department memo, a report called the Clark memoranda, late 1920s. And they're kind of assessing this new Roosevelt corollary and all these occupations and coming to the conclusion, hey, this isn't worth it. We're investing a lot of resources, we're putting boots on the ground. It costs a lot of money. It's very politically unpopular at home, by the way. I mean, people do not like imperialism in the United States. You mentioned that earlier. And part of it is an amnesia like oh, we forget about what we've done. But also people just don't like to pay money to occupy Caribbean countries. That's not a winner electorally. So for all those reasons, FDR and his team formulate the good Neighbor policy and it's about backpedaling from the full blown occupations and it's about finding different, more effective methods of pursuing American interests. It's like let's negotiate economic, reciprocal trade, trade agreements. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull in the FDR administration, he's all about these reciprocal trade agreements. Let's have political alliances, let's get what we need short of imperial proxy rule and intervention. That's the Good Neighbor policy. And it proves to be effective better than what came before it in the.

[Franklin D. Roosevelt (voice reading historical quotes)]

Field of world policy. I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor. The neighbor who resolutely respects himself and because he does so, respects the rights of others. The neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of agreements in and with a world of neighbors to a measurable degree. The practice practice has succeeded and the whole world now knows that the United States cherishes no predatory ambitions. We, we are strong but less powerful nations know that they need not fear our strength. We seek no conquest. We stand for peace.

[Martin DeCaro]

You mentioned the anti war constituency, anti imperial constituency in the United States. You know, today I think that attitude or that worldview is more popular now than it say was after 9 11. Problem is you don't see it much represented in Congress. For instance, not to digress here, but I think it was today on the day we're recording this. What I mean, Congress did, or the Senate did a war powers resolution about Venezuela and it barely passed. And even some of the Republicans who voted for it aren't anti war. They just want Congress to be able to have a say the next time we decide to go back into Venezuela and pound it into submission. So, you know, I'm reading this biography of Zhygmyev Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security advisor. Just so happened to come across this today as I was getting ready to speak to you. Ceding control of the Panama Canal was part of Carter's agenda to take a lighter touch toward the Third World. It also fit into Brzezinski's idea the US should abandon the long standing Monroe Doctrine. Was that an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine? The Panama Canal treaties, if any agreement.

[Franklin D. Roosevelt (voice reading historical quotes)]

Between two nations is to last, it must serve the best interest of both nations. The new treaties do that. And by guaranteeing the neutrality of the Panama Canal, the treaties also serve the best interest of every nation that uses the Canal.

[Jay Sexton]

Oh, not really. I mean, it's a method of how would US authority be administered in the Panama Canal Zone? I mean, we weren't in the days of Jimmy Carter completely relinquishing the Canal. And of course there's still a US presence there. So I wouldn't say it would be abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, though, of course, hey, that was a big political winner in the 1980s. I mean, the Reagan team, I think Donald Trump himself, young Donald Trump, leveraged that, that issue. It became a big thing in American politics. Still angry about it, but it wasn't absolutely still angry about it. Still angry about. Of course, now there's, there's new elements to it, isn't there? There's elements of concerns about either a rival Chinese canal in Nicaragua, which has always been the dream of a second canal, or Chinese influence and control of the ports on either side of the canal. So there is a sort of Monroe concern in the modern day politics of the Panama question. Sure. But the Russians, the Soviets in this earlier era, I think they had kind of a schizophrenic attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine, because on the one hand, yeah, they wanted to erode America's grip on these strategically vital areas like Panama. But on the other hand, they rather liked the idea of a precedent for having free reign in their own sphere of influence. I mean, think about the Brezhnev Doctrine, rolling the tanks into Eastern Europe whenever there's the threat of an anti communist or pro democratic movement. So spheres of influence have suited America's geopolitical rivals. If you're talking about Soviets, haven't always Liked the idea of the Monroe Doctrine in the region.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, I did kind of skip over the Cold War. Monroe Doctrine or not, the United States repeatedly and often in covert operations, intervened in Latin America to fight real or perceived Soviet encroachment in the Western Hemisphere. Support for Marxist revolutionaries, what have you. I mentioned Arbenz before. There was also. Well, this is in the Western Hemisphere, the coup in Iran in 1954, where Eisenhower was convinced wrongly that Mossadegh in Iran or that Arbenz. I mean, that these were Commies that were dangerous to the United States. That was not true about the Brezhnev Doctrine. I mean, that brings us to the era of detente. The critics of detente said we cannot recognize a Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe, although it did exist, and there was nothing really the US could do about it directly, militarily. We can go on a long digression, if you'd like, about the Cold War there, but that's an interesting point you made about how the Soviets saw the Monroe Doctrine as almost giving them a license to do what they wished in their area.

[Jay Sexton]

The other thing to say about the Monroe Doctrine in the days of the Cold War is that it is used to justify every now and again deposing a leader within the region. Guatemala, Cuban missile crisis. But by and large, the trend line is, you know, American statesmen stop talking about the Monroe Doctrine. They stop invoking it. And it's for the obvious reason that after 1945, you know, American foreign policy is not about a sphere of influence. It's about setting up a global system that advances America's international political, economic interests. And sometimes, you know, you're going to have to intervene across, you know, in the outer hemisphere in Asia, sometimes you have to go to Guatemala, but you're doing it for the same reason, because it's a global struggle against communism. So you see, the Monroe Doctrine really drop off the map. It's not really talked about. That's why John F. Kennedy is like, what the hell is that? You know, he kind of remembered it, but didn't really remember it. It doesn't really come back until this recent era, until all of a sudden the spheres of influence are back, man. You know, they're back. I think the other reason why it comes back into play in more recent times is that if you look at the history of the doctrine, and this goes all the way back to the 19th century, it's most commonly occurring, appearing in American politics when the parties profoundly disagree about the future direction of the country and how the country fits into the world disagree about foreign policy. So you have the Cold War consensus. And I know a lot of people, oh, you know, politics has never stopped at the water's edge. Well, it certainly did in the early Cold War relative to what happened in the 19th century or today. And the doctrine flourished in domestic political combat. This is another way of telling its history is, you know, election years. Somebody's like, I'm going to be a big defender of the Monroe Doctrine. And then the opponent has to be like, no, I'm going to be a bigger defender because this is the real Monroe Doctrine. And then they have a big defiance fight, fight about what it means. So for both those reasons, sphere of influence politics and a divided, fractured domestic political system, the Monroe Doctrine coming back shouldn't be a surprise in the 21st century because it looks more like in those structural terms like the 19th.

[Martin DeCaro]

Interesting. You know, I did not know that about JFK and he was a student of history and he surrounded himself with intellectuals that he didn't recognize that, well, who knows, maybe in the midterm elections this year, the Monroe Doctrine or related issues will be on the agenda. I'm pretty sure that'll be the case if we're to believe the current administration saying we're going to be in Venezuela indefinitely. So we can wrap up here. Jay, what do you think of the Dunro Doctrine? I mean, this sounds just like old school imperialism to me and they're not even trying to pretend it's about anything else at this point. We're going to go into Venezuela and take the oil.

[Jay Sexton]

That is the first thing to say is it's the retro rules of the road now apply. It does look like the 19th century. I mean it looks a lot like the Roosevelt corollary. It looks like that in substance. But don't undersell how important the sort of style and the culture of the Monroe Doctrine. I mean, over time, those most likely to invoke it, you know, the sort of chest thumping bravado of Teddy Roosevelt, it is about asserting a certain image of manliness, but of power and authority and thereby stigmatizing domestic political opponents who disagree with that as weak, weak, soft on national security. So I really think that it harkens back to the imperial Monroe Doctrine in its style as well as its substance. But one more point here on this, and I don't want to give Teddy Roosevelt too much credit, but you know, in the early 20th century, I mean, like the interventions or not, that's not my point, but my point is that there was a, A, a Clear sense of evolving an emerging kind of State Department and military apparatus to formulate a coherent strategy and to attempt to balance costs and benefits and interests and ideals, to juggle those things and try to walk that tightrope. It was thought out. In other words, it didn't mean that it worked, but there was a strategy there. What's most striking about the Venezuela business is it seems like we're going by the, you know, flying by the seat of the pants on this improvisation. Improvisation. That's a dangerous, risky move. And I say that not knowing. Not having access to classified documents about Venezuela today, but just knowing how complex and difficult those occupations in the early 20th century were in this region, how many moving parts there were, how destabilizing imperial intervention is. I mean, of course it's meant to stabilize, but it destabilizes a place in new and oftentimes unexpected, unanticipated ways and violent ways, too.

[Martin DeCaro]

There's a lot of fighting.

[Jay Sexton]

Absolutely.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. Well, you know, there are some echoes or parallels. For instance, with the Roosevelt corollary. It was European powers who thought that Venezuela owed them something, their debts. So they show up with gunboat diplomacy. In this case, President Trump and his minions say that. That Venezuela stole our oil. And there's an attitude or an underlying assumption or entitlement through all of this, and that is the United States may do as it pleases in the Western Hemisphere. And if we choose to respect our neighbor's sovereignty, it's because we just decide to do that now, not because we have to. That's my opinion.

[Jay Sexton]

But don't pin that on Monroe. I mean, I agree with that. That. But I think that that wasn't the original intent to the extent that there was one of 1823. In fact, 1823. A lot of people at the time were talking about Spanish America, what we call Latin America, as sister republics, that there was a political association, an ideological connection that transcended the religious and racial differences of the time. I mean, one of the things people might be surprised by is that, you know, in Latin America today, of course, the Monroe Doctrine is associated with Yankee imperialism. It's a bad thing to invoke it, because even people that are inclined in Latin America to like the United States think it's kind of noxious, it is a symbol of imperialism. But in the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine, I mean, it was seen as a sort of liberal symbol of enlightenment, and there was a lot of traction for it there. So these things change over time, as.

[Franklin D. Roosevelt (voice reading historical quotes)]

You say, in the whole world of the Western Hemisphere, our Good Neighbor policy has produced results that are especially heartening. The noblest monument to peace, the noblest monument to economic and social friendship in all the world, is not a monument in bronze or stone. It is the boundary that unites the United states and Canada. 3000 miles of friendship with no barbed wires, no guns, no soldiers, and no passports on the whole frontier. What made it mutual trust, and to extend the same sort of mutual trust throughout the Americas was our aim can be sustained only by scrupulous respect for the pledged word.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next Episode of History of as It Happens In President Trump's invasion and oil grab in Venezuela, there are echoes of what happened to Guatemala in the early 1950s that did not involve oil. It was bananas. That is next as we report History as it Happens. New episodes twice a week. And make sure to sign up for my newsletter. It comes out every Friday. Just go to Substack and search for History As It Happens. Everyone deserves to be connected. That's why T Mobile and US Cellular are joining forces. Switch to T Mobile and save up to 20% versus Verizon by getting built in benefits they leave out. Check the math@t mobile.com switch and now T mobile is in US cellular stores. Savings versus Comparable Verizon plans plus the cost of optional benefits, plan features and taxes and fees vary.

[Jay Sexton]

Savings with three plus lines include third.

[Martin DeCaro]

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