History As It Happens

Four Years of War: Late Putinism

Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: Nina Khrushcheva (Professor, New School; author and project syndicate editor)
Date: February 27, 2026

Episode Overview

This episode explores how Russia has transformed in the four years since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, focusing on the evolution of Putin’s regime—what Nina Khrushcheva describes as “late Putinism.” The conversation delves deeply into whether Russia is now a dictatorship or a totalitarian state, the shifting boundaries of repression and social life, the invention of a new state ideology, and how wartime has reshaped society and politics. The discussion is anchored by historical context, cultural manifestations, and the pervasive sense of living in an “Orwellian” reality.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Defining the Present: Not Yet a Totalitarian State

[07:33 – 09:52]

• Khrushcheva clarifies that while Russia is profoundly repressive, it is not fully totalitarian:
  • “Russia actually is not a tyranny yet…It is a restrictive authoritarian police state. But there is a difference between totalitarian and authoritari[anism], because in totalitarian ideology belongs to the state and everybody is part of that ideology. There is no individual life in open space.” — Khrushcheva (07:33)
  • The state controls media and suppresses dissent, but “normal life” still exists: people go to restaurants, Western fashions/music remain, and social life carries on in parallel with government propaganda.

2. Changing Controls & Climate of Fear

[03:09 – 09:52, 10:31 – 14:57]

• The last four years have brought:
  • Initially selective repression: not total, some avenues for expression remained (VPN, YouTube, etc.)
  • A growing climate of fear—people self-censor, mutual suspicion.
  • Accelerated clampdowns, especially on internet tools (WhatsApp, YouTube, Signal facing blocks).
  • Paradoxically, some pop culture (e.g., Harry Potter, Western goods) remains in use, often as subtle protest or subversion.
• The ambiguity of the law creates unpredictability and traps not only dissidents, but also former loyalists.

3. Living in an Orwellian Reality

[10:59 – 14:57]

• Khrushcheva repeatedly references Orwell’s 1984 as a blueprint for contemporary Russia:
  • “Russia today is very real George Orwell. And you really sort of live in that absolute absurdity when demands of the state are so insane that you cannot even imagine that they are not fictional.” — Khrushcheva (10:59)
  • Bans on things like Harry Potter are enforced even as young Russians continue clandestinely to enjoy them.
  • “One of the examples...‘1984,’ first of all, it’s the most sold book in Russia now, but it’s also the most stolen book in Russia now. And it’s being stolen and sold together with the Russian constitution.” — Khrushcheva (12:56)
  • Constitution formally forbids state ideology, in contradiction to current reality.

4. From Social Compact to Greater Repression

[14:57 – 19:01]

• There was initially a “deal”—accept the state’s position on the war, enjoy your private life.
• As the war drags on, repression intensifies even for state loyalists and “patriots.”
  • “Patriotic” influencers now face scrutiny and can be labeled “foreign agents.”
  • “So now it’s being more and more blocked to the point that there would be no entrance of any other information into Russia precisely because the war is now dragging on. Putin has no desire to finish it unless it is on his terms.” — Khrushcheva (17:56)
• Societal normalcy grows harder to maintain, especially near war zones.

5. Inventing an Ideology

[21:02 – 27:07]

• Unlike the Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia began without an explicit ideology—now, one is being cobbled together to justify the war.
  • Patriotism, “traditional values,” anti-Western sentiment are foregrounded.
  • Even rationality associated with the West is sometimes condemned.
  • Young people resist: “The more it is pushed on us, the more we are not going to follow it.” — Khrushcheva (24:24)
• Discussion of youth subcultures, English signage as protest, daily life normalized despite wider restrictions.

6. Historical and Cultural Contradictions

[27:07 – 29:37]

• The regime’s anti-West rhetoric ignores Russia’s deep cultural connections to Europe.
  • “Pushkin is ours and we are just going to use [that], if you are patriotic, you use Pushkin…Pushkin was a global writer.” — Khrushcheva (28:03)
• Attempts to exploit or cancel culture (on both Russian and Western sides) create further contradictions.

7. Origins and Aims of the War

[29:37 – 39:23]

• Why did the war begin? A blend of “civilizational” claims, geostrategy, grievances over NATO/economic pressures.
  • Putin sincerely believes (and fears) the West, via Ukraine, aims to destroy or weaken Russia.
  • “If I were Putin…I too would be thinking, with all the declarations that is made from the west and through Ukraine, that the Western power is out to get me, that the Western powers are gonna use Ukraine to take me out…” — Khrushcheva (33:12)
  • Historical statistics: Pre-2014, most Ukrainians opposed NATO; after Russian incursions, opinion flipped—another unintended consequence.
• War has “ruined” Russia’s international prestige and only deepened NATO presence and unity.

8. A Pyrrhic Victory

[40:03 – 42:16]

• Even if Russia “wins” territory, it inherits a devastated, hostile population.
  • “What are they winning? They’re winning a wasteland…It is this kind of the Russian conundrum is that you think you’re going to move forward, but actually you’re moving backward.” — Khrushcheva (41:12)
• Contrast with Cuban Missile Crisis: lack of diplomatic restraint; Putin reacts as KGB “colonel,” not pragmatic statesman.

9. The Future: How Might Putinism End?

[44:00 – 46:08]

• The regime’s current trajectory (deepening repression and war) is “not sustainable”—but history shows that unsustainable systems can persist for some time.
  • The state’s intensifying repression is a direct response to latent unrest—preemptively “nipping in the bud.”
  • “For every Stalin in Russia, there is a Khrushchev…Putinism will be over. Something will remain, but that Putinism of Putin will be over. We just don’t know when.” — Khrushcheva (44:58)
• Mass upheaval is rare in Russia; if change comes, it’s likely from elite splits, not grassroots revolution.
  • “…The paradox of tyranny: you’re so afraid of the consequences of the fallen tyrant that you adjust and excuse yourself by sort of supporting or tolerating that tyrant.” — Khrushcheva (46:13)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On authoritarianism vs. totalitarianism:
  “There is a difference between totalitarian and authoritarianism…Russia…sort of normal life, restaurants, Western fashions, Western music continues to exist, together with…patriotic pronouncements…” — Khrushcheva, [07:33]
• On living in Orwell:
  “Russia today is very real George Orwell…demands of the state are so insane that you cannot even imagine that they are not fictional.” — Khrushcheva, [10:59]
• On youth resistance:
  “The more it is pushed on us, the more we are not going to follow it.” — Khrushcheva, [24:24]
• On the war’s futility:
  “What are they winning? They’re winning a wasteland…with a population that is going to hate you anyway.” — Khrushcheva, [41:12]
• On the end of Putinism:
  “For every Stalin in Russia, there is a Khrushchev…Putinism will be over. Something will remain, but that Putinism of Putin will be over. We just don’t know when.” — Khrushcheva, [44:58]
• On the paradox of tyranny:
  “You’re so afraid of the consequences of the fallen tyrant that you adjust and excuse yourself by sort of supporting or tolerating that tyrant.” — Khrushcheva, [46:13]

Timestamps for Important Segments

• 00:54–03:09: Setting up the episode—Putin’s rise, promises, and the long war
• 07:33–09:52: Defining the regime—authoritarian, not (yet) totalitarian
• 10:31–14:57: Living in Orwell, selective repression, cultural contradictions
• 17:56–19:01: Repression spreading to loyalists, blocking “foreign agent” influence
• 21:57–24:29: Construction and contradictions of “Russian ideology”
• 29:37–33:12: The memory of WWII, roots and consequences of the war in Ukraine
• 34:20–39:23: Geopolitical context of the war, shifting Ukrainian attitudes toward NATO
• 40:03–41:12: Pyrrhic nature of any potential Russian victory
• 44:00–46:13: The future—will Putinism end in revolt or elite coup? The cyclical nature of Russian politics

Tone & Style

Martin Di Caro’s interviewing is measured and incisive, often referencing history and seeking clarity. Nina Khrushcheva is both analytical and wry, mixing personal observation with broader philosophical reflections, and has a strong sense of irony when describing Russian contradictions and absurdities. Both situate present events in long historical and cultural perspective.

Summary Takeaways

• Russia’s descent into repression is incremental but accelerating, with a unique ambiguity between autocracy and totalitarianism.
• Wartime circumstances have both intensified crackdowns and led to a forced invention of national ideology, but resistance, particularly among youth, endures in subversive and quotidian ways.
• Putin’s war, intended to restore prestige and resist the West, has had the opposite effect—deepening isolation and undermining Russia’s position.
• Change may not come quickly, but history suggests the end of “Putinism” is inevitable, even if its residue lingers.

For listeners seeking profound and nuanced analysis, this episode provides an engaging, historically grounded exploration of contemporary Russia under late Putinism.