History As It Happens: "From Bandits to Narco-Terrorists"

Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: Michael Nagle (historian, author of Chasing America's Long War on Terror)
Date: December 12, 2025

Episode Overview

In this thought-provoking episode, Martin Di Caro and historian Michael Nagle delve into how the language used by US leaders, media, and citizens to describe America's enemies—from Pancho Villa to Pablo Escobar to Osama bin Laden—has shaped foreign policy and justified military intervention for over a century. Drawing on examples from Nagle's new book, the conversation traces recurring patterns: how terms like "bandit," "savage," "terrorist," and "narco-terrorist" serve to dehumanize and delegitimize, enabling the US to skirt legal and moral constraints. Together, they unpack historical cases from the Philippines, Mexico, Nicaragua, and beyond, examining the consequences of military solutions, the roots of anti-US violence, and the enduring power of rhetoric in war-making.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Power of Language in Framing America’s Enemies

• Language as Delegitimization:

  • The terms used to describe opponents—"bandits," "savages," "narco-terrorists"—strip them of any legitimate cause and place them "beyond the pale."
  • Quote:

    "Language matters. The words US leaders, reporters and ordinary citizens have used to describe the enemy. Not only dehumanized, they delegitimized. As if they have no legitimate grievances or aims."
    — Martin Di Caro (03:30)

  • This justifies abandoning legal norms and human decency:

    "If America's enemies are beyond the pale, then the US doesn't have to follow the law either. A pattern that's been repeated in every failed intervention."
    — Martin Di Caro (03:41)

• Patterns Across Time:

  • Yesterday’s “bandits” are today’s “terrorists.”
  • The rhetoric justifying violence hasn’t substantially changed, only the labels.

2. Historical Case Studies: From Bandits to Narco-Terrorists

A. Pancho Villa and the “Bandit” Frame (Mexico, 1916)

• Villa was demonized as a "bandit" by American officials and media after the Columbus, NM raid, although he fought for poor Mexicans and local control during the Mexican Revolution.

• Official and press calls for his extermination:

  • General Nelson Miles: “...his bandits should be exterminated, and the quicker...are lined up in front of a wall and shot, the better off will be Mexico and the United States.” (05:28)
  • Editorial:

    “Cruel, perhaps, but highly efficient. And about the only way to accomplish the desired result, which is to get rid of Mr. Villa once and for all.”
    — Martin Di Caro quoting Olympia Daily Recorder (05:55)

• The fallout:

  • US launched the Punitive Expedition under General Pershing, but Villa was never captured.

• Key Insight:

  • The act of labeling rebels as mere criminals or “bandits” both obscures their political aims and legitimizes extreme countermeasures.

B. The Origins and Utility of "Narco-Terrorism" (1980s–Present)

• The 1980s saw the blend of anti-narcotics and anti-communist rhetoric, notably with Pablo Escobar.

• Quote:

  "This term would come to be applied to somebody like Pablo Escobar—personified in this individual, who, I argue in the book, for a time becomes the face of the longer running war on drugs. This will compel the United States to try to assist the Colombian government in his apprehension or his death..."
  — Michael Nagle (02:00, repeated and elaborated at 17:46)

• The term "narco-terrorist" justified covert military aid, training, and intervention in Colombia.

• Present parallels:

  • US actions off Venezuela’s coast today use the same justification language—labeling non-state actors “narco-terrorists” or “unlawful combatants” to circumvent legal process (11:43, 15:15).

C. The Continuing Pattern: Osama bin Laden and the “War on Terror”

• After 9/11, leaders described the enemy as existential and outside “civilization,” legitimizing extralegal responses (detention without trial, torture, targeted killing).

• Quotes:

  “This is the ISIS, this is the Al Qaeda of the Western Hemisphere.”
  — Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (06:27)

  "Another term or category that implies they're not protected under the laws of war or by any standards of basic human decency. So Hekseth is murdering them."
  — Martin Di Caro (06:43)

• Nagle questions why 9/11 was treated as an act of war, not a crime, and explores lost opportunities for a less militarized response (26:08).

D. Other Case Studies

• Philippines (Aguinaldo and the “Savages”):

  • Filipino rebels were labeled “savages” to justify harsh counterinsurgency after 1898.
  • Quote:

    "They're just a bunch of savages. They don't know what they're doing, they're not fit for self government. They don't have the temperament, the virtue..."
    — Michael Nagle (29:50)

• Nicaragua (Sandino as “Bandit”):

  • Augusto Sandino opposed US marines; labeled a common criminal, only to be later mythologized—his name lives on in the Sandinistas.

• Che Guevara (“Professional Revolutionary”):

  • Dismissed and belittled as a “professional revolutionary” when his ideology threatened US interests; failed at exporting revolution due to lacking local legitimacy.

3. Consequences of Dehumanization and Military Solutions

• Suppressing rebels by force rarely solves underlying issues; often leads to unintended blowback (e.g., 1980s Afghan jihad leading to global jihadism, Iraq and Afghanistan destabilization post-9/11).

• The drive to “kill the head” (Escobar, Bin Laden, Villa) is often symbolic, not strategic—problems persist or morph after their deaths (Escobar’s death failed to curb the drug trade [22:45], Al-Qaeda survived Bin Laden’s death [24:07]).

4. Is There an Alternative?

• Nagle and Di Caro question the effectiveness and morality of repeated military adventurism:
  • Why did 9/11 require a "war" and not a criminal investigation?
  • Are there ways to address grievances and crime without erasing the opponent’s humanity and political context?

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Language and Legitimacy:

  • "Examining historical actors, language, attitudes, and tactics provides an illuminating window into past perceptions while exposing a crucial connective tissue across these seemingly disparate threats and conflicts."
    — Michael Nagle (31:24)

• On Blowback:

  • "This gets back to the concept of blowback... you can't see at the time. The US policy in Afghanistan is a success. It accomplishes what the Carter and then Reagan administrations ultimately want—but it will set the stage to enable international jihadists..."
    — Michael Nagle (40:21)

• On Escobar and Demand:

  • "It was Americans who were supplying the demand for the product."
    — Martin Di Caro (19:48)

• On US Selectivity and Hypocrisy:

  • "The United States does business with bad leaders all over the world or just learns to live with them or manage the problem rather than trying to do regime change."
    — Martin Di Caro (17:07)

Important Segment Timestamps

• Understanding America’s Rhetoric:
  • (03:30–04:00) — The role of language in delegitimizing US opponents
• Pancho Villa, Bandits, and US Intervention:
  • (03:05–05:00) — Villa’s raid, the US military response, and public rhetoric
• The Invention and Use of “Narco-Terrorism”:
  • (02:00/17:46) — How the term was deployed from Escobar to modern justifications
• Escobar, US Policy, and the Drug War’s Effectiveness:
  • (19:15–24:07) — Escobar’s crimes, US response, and the (lack of) results
• War on Terror, Bin Laden, and 9/11:
  • (24:07–26:57) — Would a criminal approach have worked? What did war cause?
• Philippines, Savagery, and Torture:
  • (27:36–33:14) — US colonialism, Aguinaldo, and justifications for abuses
• Sandino and Banditry as Dismissal:
  • (44:28–45:36) — Sandino’s case and US labeling
• Che Guevara’s Failure and US Perception:
  • (46:16–49:55) — Why Che was feared and also misunderstood
• Student Attitudes and the Persistence of Military Solutions:
  • (51:54–53:30) — How those born after 9/11 see these continuing patterns

Thematic Takeaways

• Recurring Patterns: Language evolves, but US justifications for overseas violence remain strikingly similar across decades and continents.
• Justification for Exceptions: Once the enemy is cast as “terrorist” or “bandit,” US leaders and society permit—and even demand—the exceptional: intervention, torture, assassination, indefinite detention.
• Cycles of Forgetting and Relearning: Public memory fades; new justifications are found for old practices, and the “war”—on bandits, drugs, terrorism—never truly ends.

For Further Reflection

• To what extent does the language of war shape policy—and public consent—for intervention?
• Could alternative responses—focused on law enforcement, diplomacy, or demand reduction—be more effective, just, or lasting?
• How can recognizing the real motives and grievances of America’s opponents inform future policy and perhaps avert costly mistakes?

A rich, historically grounded dialogue that reveals the connective tissue between 19th-century interventions and 21st-century “wars”—and invites lasting questions about language, legitimacy, and the uses (and abuses) of American power.