Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (2:37)

Communist East Germany officially dissolved and became

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (2:40)

part of the Federal Republic of Germany. So far we still have a firewall in German politics where all major political parties say we will not cooperate with the AFD The AFD is way too extremist. It's radicalizing right. Since its foundation 2013, it has only become more radical and has actually been called by the German intelligence an extremist domestic organization. So it really is not your typical European right wing populist party. It is much more radical, much more radical than that, becoming ever more radical. But the problem is that it's also leading in the polls.

Historical Narrator / Archive Voice (3:22)

The headquarters of NATO are in Paris and the body that directed affairs and is the North Atlantic Council.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (3:28)

A decade after the Nazis final defeat in 1955, West Germany joined NATO.

Historical Narrator / Archive Voice (3:36)

Today we have in our midst as Germany's representative, one of the most prominent architects of modern German democracy. The ties between the Federal Republic and the Western world have now been formed, formally sealed.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (3:53)

The country's first post war chancellor, Conrad Adenauer, firmly rejected the idea of turning his country into an independent military power, according to historian Liana Fix in an essay for Foreign Affairs Paris, where Conrad

Historical Narrator / Archive Voice (4:07)

Adenauer of Germany, John Foster dulles of the US and Pierre Mondes France signed the 14 Nation Pact. Upon ratification, a rearmed Germany joins the defense alliance for Western Europe.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (4:19)

And then decades later, as the Cold War wound down, some feared the power of a reunified Germany. But Fick says the country adopted an approach of military restraint and identified itself as a civilian power, one that was trustworthy and non threatening.

Historical Narrator / Archive Voice (4:34)

Tear down this wall.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (4:38)

Suddenly the most forbidding symbol of the Cold War came tumbling down.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (4:43)

Well today German leaders must once again reassure their allies they don't need to become rivals, although not necessarily because of the dark past.

Historical Narrator / Archive Voice (4:53)

In a cloud of dust. And then through the clouds of the sky by plane, Hitler flies to survey what he has done. The destruction of a nation, Poland, divided between the Nazi Germans and the Soviets.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (5:05)

Not many really believe Germany is rearming to conquer Europe. Rather different forms of rivalry and competition could damage European unity as Russia hammers away at eastern Ukraine. I will share a link to the essay by Leanna Fix in the show notes to this episode and in my weekly newsletter. Go to substack and search for history as it happens to sign up. So this subject may be old, but the issues are fresh. European rivalries the difference today is that Germany's neighbors welcome the rearmament drive. The problems lie in how it is done and the potential future implications whether future German governments might be trusted. Leanna Fix is a historian and political scientist. She teaches at Georgetown University and she is a Senior Fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations, whose official publication is the aforementioned Foreign Affairs. Liana Fix welcome back.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (6:00)

Thanks so much. It's good to be back.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (6:02)

First time you were on the subject was what would Russian leadership look like after Putin? Well, we're not after Putin yet. The war now, we aren't four years in entering its fifth year, and that is causing problems for Europe insofar as if the United States is not going to lead the way here, then can Europe coordinate a defense of Ukraine? Can Europe cooperate on any number of issues? So if you had asked me to name the top three countries by military spending, I would have said, of course, United States number one. A distant second is China, then Russia. I would not have immediately guessed Germany as number four. Talk to us about how this came about.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (6:45)

Yeah. Germany is the fourth largest spender. It was since 2024. Already the fourth largest spender. Germany will be in 2029 at 162 billion euros defense spending, which is actually not that far away from what Russia spends this year on its defense. In the narrow definition of defense. Just to give you the comparison, how big Germany's spending is, it would be at that point in it will be as much as the British and the French defense spending combined. So that is really a huge jump for Germany. And it's also a big story for Europe that suddenly Germany is outspending everyone in Europe. Obviously, it started in 2022 with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Many of your listeners may remember that Germany already back then, promised a Zeitenwende change of times, a rearmament, greater German engagement in European security. But what has really changed for Germany was not Putin's invasion of Ukraine. It was the election of Donald Trump. It was November 2024. And then the fear that once Trump came into office, he could undermine or even abandon NATO, which led German policymakers to finally, finally open the floodgates of German debt spending. Germany has been very strict about this for many years for defense.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (8:07)

Well, the United States is not abandoning NATO or abandoning Europe. It wants Europe to do more. And Donald Trump will be out of office in three years. So there's more to this than just Trump, right? I mean, this is going to be going on for the foreseeable future, is that right?

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (8:21)

It is. And I don't think that Europeans really believe that it is just about spending more and that just the risk of Donald Trump abandoning the Europeans is fully contained. Of course, we had a great NATO summit where Europeans promised to spend more. Of course, there's a whole debate about burden shifting and burden sharing. But part of the reason why Germany is rearming is because they know they have to defend Europe against Russia, especially if the United States is not providing what it has provided in the past. They also know very well that NATO's mutual defense commitment is not only about U.S. capabilities, about the number of U.S. troops and soldiers stationed in Europe, but also about the political will of leaders to come in. And that is really especially after the, what I would call the transatlantic crisis over Greenland. That is what Europe leaders are not sure about. Will Donald Trump have the will to come to the defense of Europeans? And that's why this has been the real, the real turning point for Germany and why Germany has started to spend so much.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (9:22)

There have been calls for Germany to spend more on military for many years before it actually happened. Even the Green Party, many people might identify as a, not a pacifist, but more of a peaceful or non belligerent party. Even the Green Party was calling for more military spending. Right. What is Germany buying?

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (9:38)

So for that, Germany is mostly buying new equipment. Part of that is replacing equipment that has gone to Ukraine. But part of that is new equipment, air defense in particular. Germany is also reinvesting in tanks because Germany sees itself as the biggest conventional army in Europe. And of course, you're absolutely right. I mean, this is all for the defense against Russia, but the defense against Russia seemed less urgent under a Biden administration than it seems under a Trump administration. And so that's why the feeling of vulnerability, especially in Germany, which is now the nuclear power, has really increased. We also see that Germany is investing in long precision strike missiles, which is basically from a German perspective, the best that it can get below nuclear weapons to establish some kind of deterrence with Russia that Russia knows. Look, Germany might not have nuclear weapons, but we have long range precision strike missiles that can hit targets in Russia. So that's how the Germans are thinking right now about their own defense and deterrence and about Europe.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (10:43)

What are the Germans worried about? Russian missiles because the Russian tanks aren't anywhere close to Germany. Russia is stuck in the Donbass for four years, still hasn't even conquered that territory at an enormous cost. I mean, Russian military capabilities are far below what Putin and others hope they would be. So what is Germany so concerned about when it comes to Russia?

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (11:04)

Yeah, it's certainly not that Russia will be in Berlin with tanks the day after tomorrow. But the fear is that Russia might try to make a fair complete in the Baltic with a small land grab, that Russia might provoke European countries with drone swarm attacks into NATO territory and that again, the United States might not come to the help in the way the Europeans would expect and that it is up for the Europeans to defend themselves. There has just been a war game which became very prominent because the Wall Street Journal reported about it. There's just been a war game conducted in Germany by the newspaper Die Welt, where the European NATO allies were confronted with the fair complete. Russia was seizing Lithuan Lithuanian town and trying to establish a corridor to Kaliningrad. The Americans were not coming to the help, and not surprisingly, the Europeans were not able and not willing to fight back and to reconquer territory that Russia has occupied in a very quick move without 48 hours. So it's not really the concern that Russia will invade Germany. It's more the concern that Russia can move closer to Germany's borders, that Russia can basically neutralize opposition, especially in central and eastern Europe. In the end, Europeans will have no alternative but to appease Russia if they can't stand up with military strength.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (12:24)

So the Article 5 guarantee in the NATO treaty lacks credibility.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (12:29)

Absolutely. The Europeans know that if Russia tries to test the article 5, there's a fair chance that they might be successful again. The big question is, what do Europeans do? Would they be willing to go into an open fight with Russia, even over a small territory or a corridor that Russia might establish in order not to come to that point? Europeans see their rearmament really as a way of re establishing deterrence with Russia, even without the United States.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (12:56)

So one of my favorite historians, Liana, is Christopher Clark. He said something once that I always think about and it helps as a podcaster who's talking about the intersection of past and present. Clark said the subject may be old, but the issues are fresh. And the old subject here is all those Europeans can't coexist tore each other apart in two world wars. So the concern today isn't necessarily that European countries are going to go to war with each other again, but it's can they cooperate? As I mentioned at the top, can they coordinate? Can they figure out how to defend Ukraine? What would a security guarantee be worth if no one wants to send their troops in there to fight the Russians, should it come to that? So my question here is German rearmament is about deterring Russia, but Germany's neighbors, who would presumably benefit from that, are also worried about German rearmament. We know the history of German militarism, but again, that's, that's 1945. That ended supposedly. So what is the concern among Germany's neighbors?

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (14:02)

First of all, Germany's neighbors will all say we love Japanese rearmament And finally Germany is doing what we have asked them. Finally they are spending. They're doing this for us, they're doing this for Europe. Europe, we love it, we welcome it, it's great. But behind closed doors there's not really a fear about a militarist Germany as it has been in the past, apart from if right wing extremists would come to power in Germany. The alternative for Germany, that's a different story. We'll get to that in a bit.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (14:30)

We'll talk about that.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (14:31)

But I put that to the side for the moment. Assuming that Germany stays under centrist political leadership. The question for Europe's neighbors is really a question of balance. There have been in the past concern, concerns about German dominance. For example, in the financial crisis, remember when especially southern European member states were concerned that Germany was just calling the shots and instead of pulling its weight, it was throwing its weight around. And in the past there was a clear division of labor in Europe where Germany had the economic might and France had the military might. Again, that is going to change, which is not easy for France's identity as a great power in Europe. Poland is concerned that Germany might listen less to the concerns of smaller member states. And they wondering how is Germany going to embed this kind of military power and capabilities in Europe? Because in the past you had, whenever Germany became stronger after reunification in 1990, for example, you always had a deeper European integration as a response to that. For example, Germany was giving away the Deutsche bank and introducing the euro, tying itself closer to Europe. Some would say that also established some kind of German dominance with the euro. But there was always this idea, if Germany gains power, it needs to be further integrated and embedded into Europe to make sure that the balance of power in Europe doesn't become unstable.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (15:56)

So it sounds like these are jealousies or issues of national prestige and not actual security concerns.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (16:05)

Not at this point. It's more a question of concern about political dominance by Germany. Right. That at the end, in all areas where up member states have weight and power and influence, Germany will be the number one. And that basically means that you can't say no to Germany anymore because Germany is calling the shots on all issues.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (16:24)

As you explain it in your essay, it's the way in which Germany is building up its military exclusively contracting with German firms.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (16:32)

It's not exclusively contracting with German firms, but it's largely contracting with German firms. Now other countries are doing that too. There is a very strong home bias in European defense. So you don't really have a European defense industry. You have national defense industries, but no one is rearming on the scale that Germany is doing. So actually, that would be a great opportunity with Germany's rearmament, to invite more collaboration to make sure that we have a European defense industry that Germany is a part of and not just the national defense industries. That's something where German politicians are saying, well, look, we need to strengthen our defense industry because we need the jobs. Germany's an economic crisis, and it has been for a long time in economic stagnation. So there's not a lot of openness in among German politicians to these arguments. They basically say to the European neighbors, look, you asked for that, so why do you complain now? And also, why would you not trust us? Or why would you be afraid of German dominance? We are doing this for you. We have a brigade in Lithuania, and everyone can have a piece of the cake. The armament pie is big enough. Everyone will benefit from that. But just offering a piece of the cake is obviously not the same as making sure that Germany is closely integrated and embedded into Europe and is not bec a dominant power. And that's sort of the fine line to walk. It's not about German militarism in sort of the centrist political leadership scenario, but it is about still saying no to Germany. And can this then in the end make it more difficult for countries in Europe to work with each other? Because at some point, France and Poland might have the tendency to work against Germany rather than with Germany, you know, to counterbalance German power.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (18:13)

Yeah, I don't have an answer for that. Because Europe. What's Europe? The EU has what, 25, 26 different states that have different interests. They may align it sometimes, but they also have different interests. Is Hungary an ally of some of the other Western, say, Western European states? Hungary seems more tilted towards Russia these days. And of course, the United Kingdom is not in the European Union, but still you have all these different countries. How are they supposed to cooperate on everything? Maybe that's the issue.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (18:43)

It is. But just to say one thing, I think there has been remarkable progress on cooperation in the last 80 years. Right. I mean, the way how the EU works today is completely different from the 50s or the 60s. So there has been. Europeans have established ways of cooperating with each other, but it's a very delicate

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (18:59)

balance because when it comes to sending soldiers to, say, Ukraine or the Baltics to spill the blood of your own citizens, it's, I guess, easier to, I don't know, cooperate on agricultural tariffs, I don't know. Than it is.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (19:14)

Yeah. No, that's true. It's true. And I mean, that's the question. That's the reason why, for example, this war game that I just mentioned had such strong feedback. Because in that war game, the German brigade in Lithuania, which is actually meant to do exactly that, to spill their blood for Lithuania and for the territory of Lithuania, they didn't do that. In the back of the minds of Baltics or the Poles, it's always like, okay, can we really trust the Germans? Not in the end just to tell them, brigade, withdraw, come back, don't fight. Don't go into a fight and go into a counterattack. It is meant to be a tripwire force. It's fantastic. What's happening in terms of trust and cooperation because of Russian aggression and the fear of Russian aggression. But as you say, I mean, those are always nation states, and they always have to think about their own interest first. And they always have to think, what's the degree of trust that we can afford to have for our own security?

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (20:07)

Difficult issues. Well, as you wrote here, Berlin does need to build up its military. The continent is in danger, and no other European government has the fiscal capacity that Germany can bring to bear. But you write, Berlin must recognize the risks that accompany its strengths and restrain German power by embedding its defense might in more deeply integrated European military structures, as what happened after the Second World War under Adenauer and then coal after reunification. I don't know a lot about Frederick Mertz. He's not a towering figure like those other two historical figures I just mentioned at hinge points in history. I mean, what is his view on this? Is he for integration?

Historical Narrator / Archive Voice (20:50)

In the era of great power rivalry, even the United States will not be powerful enough to go it alone. Different friends. Being a part of NATO is not only Europe's competitive advantage, it's also the United States competitive advantage. So let's repair and rewind Transatlantic Trust together.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (21:22)

I know that he has read that piece in Foreign Affairs.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (21:26)

Oh, he did.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (21:27)

But there is a very lively debate among German policymakers. Are those fears exaggerated? And you just need to have a little bit of sensitivity in dealing with your neighbors, and it's going to be fine. Overall, in sort of the political mindset, I do think Friedrich Metz is an interesting figure, and I actually do think he can become a historical figure at some point. I think that's what the former German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz wanted for himself. He wanted to be that historical figure that responds to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But he failed because in the end, he too much believed in the promise of US protection of Joe Biden. And he didn't really see the signs of the time. He didn't really see that things are changing in the United States. Friedrich Metz is different. He's a convinced transatlanticist. He's from western Germany. He is like a disciple of Konrad Adenauer. But he understands what's going on. He understands that the changes in the United States are not going to go away and he understands the stakes. So the way how he has allowed for Germany's rearmament through debt financing at the beginning, just when he was elected as a Chancellor, even before he was elected as a chancellor, was nothing less but historic. And he has this funny rivalry with Angela Merkel. Right. I mean they really for a long time were arch enemies because Angela Merkel became chancellor for 16 years, although Friedrich Metz thought it was his place to have right. He wanted to be the Chancellor and she elbowed him out of politics for a really long time. And now he has his come back and has become more resilient and perhaps to some extent also more far sighted about where politics are going.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (23:04)

Angela Merkel, 16 years, that's longer than Adenauer who was in power for 14 years. You know, it's Merkel. Her legacy has been tarnished. In retrospect, I don't know if that's fair or not because she thought doing business with Putin would tame him. She's not responsible for Putin's behavior, but I guess her outlook hasn't aged well, as the kids would say today.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (23:25)

Yeah, I mean, I think there's been a little bit of Merkel bashing, especially after she published her biography because she did didn't bend the knee and say, oh my God, I'm so sorry, I did everything wrong. And that's what people wanted her to do. In the end, it has been a typical mechanism to put just all the blame on Angela Merkel because it's easy to do. But in reality when it comes to Russia, it was the German business community. It was a cross party consensus that Germany needs Russia. Angela Merkel was actually the most far sighted on Putin. She understood what he is about. She just didn't saw the political room for maneuver to change anything about the direction that Germany was. But to be fair, I think there were many more to blame. It's just that she combines those who are anti migration are anti miracle. Those who are critical of Russia policy can blame everything on Merkel. So her reputation has suffered more than she deserves.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (24:21)

The conversation continues. Tap subscribe now in the show notes to skip ads. So After German reunification or when that idea was accelerating, Margaret Thatcher was initially against it. It was the late 1980s. So 45 years after World War II. She lived through the Blitz. And the Second World War was not a distant memory for people then. And the fear, of course, was German militarism, German revanchism, that a unified Germany would be powerful again and we could have another war. That seems crazy from our vantage now in 2026 because we know that Germany's been a peaceful country. However, as you note in your essay, the alternative for Deutschland is this far right party and it may be in power soon in Germany. As astonishing that may sound to people, do they have revanchist aims? Would they potentially use this rebuilt military for something other than deterring Russia?

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (25:22)

So far we still have a firewall in German politics where all major political parties say we will not Cooper the AfD. The AfD is way too extremist. It's radicalizing. Right. Since its foundation 2013, it has only become more radical and has actually been called by the German intelligence services an extremist domestic organization. So it really is not your typical European right wing populist party. It is much more radical, much more radical than that and becoming ever more radical. But the problem is that it's also leading in the polls. It's almost on the same level or even above the level of the conservatives, of conservatives.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (26:02)

Why is it the immigration issue?

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (26:04)

It's the immigration issue. It's the economic issue. It's a feeling of lack of reform in Germany, of stagnation. It's a fear of change. Obviously, the whole international environment is changing. There's sort of a mix of issues that go into the AfD voters. And especially the AfD is very good at presenting themselves as the only party that presents an alternative to the mainstream. And when it comes to Germany, Germany's military rearmament. The AfD has traditionally always been in favor of Germany's rearmament. So what they always wanted is to have an independent military, powerful Germany. They want to get Germany. And it sounds a little bit softer in their election program, but that's sort of the idea behind it goes very much back to Carl Schmitt, to the Nazi thinker. Carl Schmitt's ideas about the United States does not have a place in Europe. Germany and Russia are natural partners. Germany should move out of these integrating structures, structures like NATO in the eu, and become independent, have a dependent armament industry, have an independent military power. That's sort of what they want. And many don't realize that or don't know that they think just because the AfD is against Ukraine support, they might also be against defense spending. The question is what would they want to do with that power? In the past you would hear comments about Poland, for example, from AfD representatives which have been, I wouldn't say reverential, but which had a very tone that way you could say, well that certainly not what we would expect of respectful

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (27:33)

as far as like the borders that were created after the Second World War.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (27:38)

Well, at least the AfD has very close.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (27:41)

Poland shifted to the west and took some of German territory because the Soviet

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (27:45)

Union and the AfD has very close ties to those Germans who had to flee Poland at that time. Right. So I think it's really not far fetched for the AfD to at some point, if they are in power to make it dentist weapons just claims. I wouldn't go as far as to say that they would, you know, move on that and you know, we could have never imagined the United States claiming Greenland. I wouldn't be surprised if the AfD wouldn't try to bully or curse neighbors both to the east and to the

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (28:14)

west because just think of the damage that issue would cause even if nothing happens. I mean, look what happened with Greenland. It caused a two week or longer uproar where no one could talk about anything else than how crazy it is the United States is talking about taking over Greenland. The idea that a German political party would make irredentious claims about Poland, given the history there of the.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (28:37)

Well, that's the other thing. The AFD doesn't really care about that history. Right. One of its political leaders, Garland once said, you know, that's only a small part in Germany's 1000 year history. Right. So they usually try to downplay that historical part. But of course you're absolutely right. I mean it would lead to such an immense loss of trust. And that's actually one of the scenarios that the polls are worried about. They are like, well okay, Germany and France are offering us closer cooperation. France is offering a more European nuclear umbrella. But what if the AFT comes into power in Germany with that military budget and Le Pen comes into power in France and they might not even work together like each other. Obviously that's for Poland like a horror nightmare scenario. Right. That's difficult to just discard and to say no, the firewall will hold forever given that the AfD has been constantly rising in the polls.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (29:30)

Last subject here, Liana, a larger issue, something that troubles me about all of this. Rearmament. I understand It's a damned if they do, damned if they don't scenario. Some have said that Germany should have been doing this earlier because look what happened, right? Russia invaded Ukraine. But there are always drawbacks or costs. When a country or a continent decides to rearm, it distorts your domestic economy. It can foment distrust among your neighbors. You know, what we're doing for defense looks to someone else like an offensive move. They're building up an offensive army, not a defensive army can make a society more militaristic, places a society on a permanent war footing. The United States has been on a permanent war footing for decades now. And all this is very bad for liberal democracy and all for what? Right? Russia is stuck in the Donbass. Easy for me to say. I'm sitting here and Washington, Washington, I'm not in Poland or the Baltics, what have you. Can you address that issue? Are Germans concerned about the costs of rearmament? Not just dollars and cents, but those other issues I mentioned?

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (30:34)

Yeah, let me put it this way. If even Germany, with its long history and tradition of seeing itself as some kind of pacifist power after 1945, which of course it never was, but which is sort of the self identity of Germans, if even Germany, that has such a difficult relationship with military that for decades have seen military power as sort of an evil per se and not just an instrument of power, if even Germany sees the need and the majority of Germans see the need that you need to have some kind of defense, I think then it's fair to say there is some kind of risk level because Germans usually don't tend to be the ones who are exaggerating this and are the first ones who are saying like, well, to the arms, to the contrary, it's super difficult for Germans to move out of their comfort zone of military power is not the solution, and so on. And given that even Germany feels the need to move out, I think tells us something about the times that we are living in. And of course you're right, Russia is stuck in the Donbass. But that doesn't mean that they cannot pose a threat to Europe. That doesn't mean that there aren't daily sabotage attacks, assassination attacks taking place in Europe. That doesn't mean that Russia couldn't send drone swarms into Europe, that Europe could not defend itself again, that Russia couldn't make a land grab in the Baltic or even in Poland. That would bring Russia closer to Germany. Russia is not the military power that it wants to be, but Europe is even less so and so that creates a dynamic where the downsides of rearmament are increasingly seen by many as necessary.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (32:14)

Sure. It's just. It's hard to reverse that. Even if, say, the Russian threat abates at some point point, Putin dies, a different government comes into effect, a peace deal is reached in Ukraine, Russia loses the war in Ukraine, whatever it might be.

Libsyn Ads Narrator (32:27)

I don't know.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (32:28)

I'm not trying to predict the future here. But it's still difficult then to reverse all that military spending. The United States is not fighting any major war right now. And the Pentagon's budget is going up to a trillion dollars. It's going up instead of down.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (32:42)

That's a very good question. I mean, the counter example to that would be the end of the Cold War War, when, very quickly, also because of rearmament, Germany downsized its army again. Right. And basically forgot about military power. And the size of the German army went down from 500,000, together with the GDR, with the East German army, almost 600,000, I think, to 200,000 as it was. So if there would be a moment where, you know, we suddenly would have a Gorbachev in Moscow again, or at least someone who is more like, you know, a Brezhnev, someone you can make arms control again, someone who would be interested in having some kind stability in Europe and would not be on this aggressive war path as Putin is. I think especially Germany would be one of the first to say, well, look, we have to adapt. And I think they've done that in the past. So I'm less concerned about especially Germany or even Europe suddenly becoming this militaristic society, because I think in European and German culture, the tendency is rather to not be that than to be that. And the fact that they are becoming that. I think it's not only Russia, but it's also the fear of and just global conflict returning to world politics and

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (33:54)

the global order unraveling.

Liana Fix (Historian and Political Scientist) (33:55)

Yeah.

Historical Narrator / Archive Voice (33:56)

As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, we may need to adapt our commitment under the Brussels Treaty so that we can make some reductions in the level of British forces in Germany, although I believe the needs of collective defence will require us, like the United States and France, to keep sizable forces there. But there must be no doubt that Germany will be a part of NATO. This offers the best security for Europe as a whole. Your strong and categoric assurances on that essential point, Chancellor Cole, have been a tremendous encouragement. I'm going to set out tonight, briefly some proposals which could make that summit a major step towards the creation of a great alliance. For democracy, which would stretch from the Atlantic to the Euros and beyond.

Podcast Host (Martin DeCaro) (34:53)

On the next two episodes of History as it happens, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is entering its fifth year. We'll look back on four years of war and more with Michael Kimmage, Mark Galeotti and Nina Khrushcheva. Become a subscriber to Today, or if you already are one, go to historyasithappens.com and refer a friend.