Martin DeCaro (1:32)

This is a German supplied Gepard air defense system.

Jeremy Suri (1:36)

Ukraine has dozens.

Martin DeCaro (1:37)

German government confirms it will send its Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine to aid.

German Defense Official (1:42)

In the war against this amount. We are currently preparing a package worth 2 billion euros. It will contain missile defense systems, state of the art radar technology and ammunition.

Martin DeCaro (1:53)

Out of the destruction of war and disgrace of Nazism, a new Germany emerged after 1945. Democratic, prosperous and peaceful. Another seizure came in 1983 when the Wall came down and Germany was reunified. It was the end of history until history came back. Russia invaded Ukraine and today Germans fear their rearmament may imperil their way of life. That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

Jeremy Suri (2:22)

They are part of the war in Ukraine and much of what they achieved was as an anti war society. A society that sought to deter other conflict but not to be actively involved in warfare. And we know in the United States, Martin, that balancing military needs and democratic Needs. It's always very difficult.

Narrator/Documentary Voice (2:47)

Next day, a quarter of a million New Yorkers hail.

Martin DeCaro (2:50)

May 1949, New York City. A ticker tape parade for the retiring US General Lucius Clay, the traditional highway of heroes. Clay was the military governor of Germany after the Second World War, overseeing denazification and reconstruction. He led the Berlin Airlift of 1948.

Narrator/Documentary Voice (3:06)

As the red noose is drawn closer about the western sector of the capital, switches are pulled on generators and the fuel famine forces drastic power cuts. Berlin becomes a city of darkness as all ground communication is severed and industry comes to a standstill. But the Western allies fight back with an airlift of 450 flights daily, carrying thousands of tons of food into the beleaguered capital, flying an air corridor threatened by Red fighter planes.

Martin DeCaro (3:32)

In May of 49 he retired, his administrative brilliance no longer necessary in Central Europe because West Germany, the Federal Republic, was born. Here is Clay addressing New York City Hall.

Narrator/Documentary Voice (3:44)

It is impossible to forget and it is difficult to forgive. We all remember that Germany started the aggressive war which has brought the world to to the conditions which we have seen during the past four years. One has only to revisit Buchenwald and Dachau to remember the extreme cruelty of the Nazi regime. A people who have been subject to such a regime cannot be restored.

Jeremy Suri (4:23)

To.

Narrator/Documentary Voice (4:24)

Democracy overnight, nor by oppression they can be led back to democracy. And today they need the helping hand of the freedom loving democratic people of the world.

Martin DeCaro (4:39)

As historian Ian Kershaw writes in the Global Age, his book about post war Europe, the pivotal country in the stabilization and democratization of Western European politics was unquestionably West Germany. At the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, stability had been far from guaranteed. The new state had been a product of defeat and Division until 1952 when it was granted sovereignty in foreign affairs. It remained technically an occupied country and only gained full recognition as a sovereign state in 1955. It had no armed forces, it had no established political system. Its ideological divisions ran deep. Its very recent Nazi past left it intensely morally damaged. The strongly distrusted by its European neighbors as well as the United States and Soviet Union and facing the problem of integrating in a new democracy millions of refugees and expellees, as well as the many citizens who had at one time avidly supported Hitler's dictatorship, including those directly implicated in its crimes against humanity. Kershaw goes on to say, crucial above all the successful consolidation of democracy in West Germany were two factors. The first was the extraordinarily rapid and strong economic growth. The economic miracle as it was labeled that enabled Germans to improve their standard of living beyond anything they might have imagined possible at the foundation of the Federal Republic. The second reason, says Kershaw, why democracy could firmly establish itself in West Germany by the mid-1960s was the Cold War.

Narrator/Documentary Voice (6:15)

Under Chancellor Adenauer, Germany had its first free parliament for 16 years. But its future was bleak. The heart of Europe was ailing. Germany was split in two. The eastern half, firmly in the communist grip, had all the trappings of the police state on the Nazis old stamping ground. Unter den Linden. Berlin echoed again to the rhythm of the jackboot.

Martin DeCaro (6:35)

Less than a half century later, communism collapsed. The Berlin wall fell in 1989, astonishing.

Narrator/Documentary Voice (6:42)

News from East Germany, where the East.

Jeremy Suri (6:43)

German authorities have said in essence that the Berlin Wall doesn't mean anything anymore.

Martin DeCaro (6:48)

Despite serious doubts it could be done so quickly. Germany reunified it's official Germany is now.

Narrator/Documentary Voice (6:55)

One country of 80 million.

Martin DeCaro (6:56)

Historian Jeremy Surrey, in a substack post titled the Revenge of History in Europe, says when the communist East German state collapsed, the Federal Republic expanded into that territory, financing its reconstruction and integrating it into a vibrant democracy. Germany's longest serving post Cold War chancellor, Angela Merkel, came from the former East Germany. But Surrey says German successes in building democracy and prosperity are now in peril. Russia's invasion of Ukraine shattered the country's security news.

Jeremy Suri (7:25)

Overnight, Russia has attacked Ukraine and its people, upending security and stability.

Martin DeCaro (7:31)

Suri is a historian at the LBJ School of Public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He recently visited Germany and says he found a defensive and insecure country. Its leaders feel attacked by Russia and abandoned by the United States. He goes on to say that many of its citizens have lost confidence that the system which thrived for the last 75 years can survive the rest of this decade. They fear the pressures of war will destroy their economy and degrade their democracy. Jeremy Suri will be here in a minute. Now. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, in remarks at NATO headquarters in Brussels this week, reminded the world his country is serious about dramatically increasing military spending to help Ukraine.

German Defense Official (8:13)

We will continue to strengthen Ukraine's air defense with new contracts on the delivery of another two IRIS T air defence systems, including a large number of guided missiles as well as shoulder fired air defense missiles. We will supply high end anti tank weapons, communication devices and modern handheld weapons. We will also launch a comprehensive project to modernize weapon systems already delivered to Ukraine and to extend their service lives.

Martin DeCaro (8:42)

And public opinion is shifting too. Polls suggest two thirds of Germans now support reintroducing mandatory conscription, which was abolished 15 years ago. These are dramatic changes in a country that after 1945 put its militaristic and genocidal behavior, its embrace of Adolf Hitler behind it, rejoin the community of nations and accept responsibility for all it had done. Our conversation with Jeremy Suri Next morning Zoe got donuts.

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Narrator/Documentary Voice (9:46)

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Jeremy Suri (9:48)

Us with eligible traded in any condition.

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So what are we having for launch?

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Dude, my work here is done with.

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Martin DeCaro (11:11)

Jeremy Suri, welcome back.

Jeremy Suri (11:13)

Good to be with you Martin.

Martin DeCaro (11:14)

As always with me. Again, I think this is history as it happens 3.0 at this point, you.

Jeremy Suri (11:22)

Know, you just keep adjusting and improving like fine wine.

Martin DeCaro (11:24)

Martin, you were just in Germany and you wrote an essay on your substack Democracy of Hope, about what you witnessed there. I find German history, well, I think most of us find German history fascinating, how this country rose from the ashes of what it did in World War II, war of aggression, the Holocaust, to become a dependable and prosperous democracy in the center of Europe in a peaceful era after 1945, at least in Europe. But you saw an identity crisis when you were there.

Jeremy Suri (11:54)

What happened, first of all, what you said is absolutely true, and we should take pride in this because the United States was part of this story. We were not the most important actor, necessarily, the Germans were. But we played a major role after World War, working with Germans and other Europeans in rebuilding in Western Europe something that really had not existed before. We were rebuilding a functioning economy, but rebuilding it as a liberal, democratic, capitalist economy. And if you look at Germany in particular, it goes from ideological extremism, hate and violence to one of the most peaceful countries in the center of Europe, one of the most prosperous countries, one of the countries most committed to the United States and, and to the defense of Western societies against communism. It is one of the great successes. And Germans who are born, especially after 1960, they lived through some disruptions in the late 60s and early 70s, but they live in a more democratic, prosperous Germany, in a more democratic, prosperous, secure Europe than their predecessors ever did. And that's real. That's real nation building. That's real democratization. So it's a great success. And as a Jew, it has always made me optimistic to go to places like Munich. I spent a lot of time in Munich as a scholar, a place that was the home of Nazism. And to see a society that's so different, that's converted itself, that's changed itself. The challenge right now is that success has gone so far that many people forget the work that went into it and forget that it can be undone. And why do I fear it might be undone? And I don't think we're going to go back to the Nazi era. But why might this be undone? Well, in the context of the war in Ukraine, Germany is now put in a position, especially with the United States pulling back for much of its support from Ukraine of taking a lead. And so Germany now has to militarize its society as it has not before. They're talking about going back to major conscription. They're building up their military production capabilities. They are part of the war in Ukraine. And much of what they achieved was as an Anti war society, a society that sought to deter other conflict but not to be actively involved in warfare. And we know in the United States, Martin, that balancing military needs and democratic needs, it's always very difficult. And the Germans don't have experience with that.

Martin DeCaro (14:12)

When the United States might have had guns and butter for a short time, but not even longer, I think they took away the butter. When it comes though to Europe and their own defensive military capabilities, some would argue that this is long overdue. They should have been doing this a long time ago. Mark Galeotti was recently on my podcast. He used the term infantilization. Europeans infantilize themselves. But I guess in a German context though, considering the history militaristic Germany.

Jeremy Suri (14:43)

I regret the use of the term infantilization by a scholar I highly regard because I think that's condescending American garbage to say that it's like they're condescending to us because we don't have a social welfare state like theirs. They've built a remarkably successful society with a large military. The Bundeswehr was actually created at the urging of the United states in the mid-1950s. And yes, they have spent a lower proportion of their GNP on defense than we have. But look at the world we are policing and look at the space they're operating in. And we have used our greater military spending to have more say in many respects in an area distant from us. We've always had command over NATO. I don't think the Germans have underspent. I think they could do more under certain circumstances. But you know what I really like the trade offs we had where we built a democratic Germany, a Germany that was secure, that we helped to secure and that made our economy more prosperous and theirs. That was a far better trade off.

Martin DeCaro (15:41)

Than where we are today, going back to 1945. At first the idea of rearming Germany or even having a Federal Republic, this wasn't clear right off the bat because there was supposed to be a settlement of post war Germany and it was never really settled. It was carved up into zones of occupation. And not to go over the early years of the Cold War all over again here on a relatively short podcast, but the result was the Federal Republic and NATO there and not a wehrmacht like in 1939, but a German military of a kind. Right?

Jeremy Suri (16:15)

The idea was western Germany would be a secure magnet and an anchor for economic development in Europe. And it's one of the most enlightened things American policymakers ever signed on to, which was the notion that our enemy now had to be an entity that we rebuilt, at least in the west, to create something that would be better for them and better for us. This was enlightened self interest. There were many in the Roosevelt and Truman administration, including Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau, who believed that actually Germany should be pastoralized, that it should be kept weak. And it was the enlightenment of people like Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, George Marshall, also Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, and prior to that, of course, Commander American forces during World War II, Dwight Eisenhower. It was their enlightened understanding that we needed a strong, secure, wealthy Germany for the western part of Europe that we cared about to be strong and secure and wealthy. And for us as a country, the United States, because of our economic and cultural partnerships, to be strong, secure and wealthy. And that was the investment that we made. And that's what the Federal Republic was about.

Martin DeCaro (17:19)

So in your substack article, you comment, as you've just said here, that Germans, politicians, media commentators, think tankers, they're a little uncomfortable about spending more on the military, becoming a more militaristic, if that's the right term, or just having a larger military budget because it might mean having to cut back on the social welfare side of their spending. But there's something else going on here, too, that you witnessed, and that is a feeling of insecurity, fear that Russia might actually go after Germany at some point. Is that right? Why would anyone believe that?

Jeremy Suri (17:53)

Yes. So I'll give you a very direct example of this when you fly out of the Berlin airport, as I did. It's not the largest airport in Germany. Frankfurt and Munich and Hamburg are bigger. But the Berlin airport is obviously significant, important airport. It's the capital. They are dealing with major security worries of Russian drones. Russian drones did interfere with the Copenhagen airport just a week ago. They're concerned about drone interference. They're concerned about hacking. They're concerned about what has happened a few times in Europe where planes have been thrown off course or disrupted air travel has been disrupted by Russian activity. They're seeing that in Poland and Copenhagen. They're expecting it in Berlin. So that's a direct act of war that they're experiencing. And if Putin were to take control of Ukraine, I don't think he will anytime soon, but if he were, he would be 500 miles from Berlin. Imagine if Putin were in northern Canada with his army, what we would feel like. So they are feeling very insecure, more insecure than I think Germans have felt since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Martin DeCaro (18:57)

Well, I know it's Easy for me to say sitting here in Washington, but Russia can't even get out of the Donbass.

Jeremy Suri (19:02)

I don't think the German worry is that they're going to conquered by Russia. The German worry is that they are going to be interfered with, that they're going to be terrorized by Russia. Why do they think that's going to happen? Because they're on the side of Ukraine.

Martin DeCaro (19:17)

So in this context of Germany spending more on the military attitudes changing about the role they must play in a security context in Europe because of the weight of their history. Right. A militarized Germany is something no one wants to think about in the shadow of 1945. In that context. I think there are other countries that are dealing with this as well. Will our country now be on a permanent war footing? Is this the new Europe? We have to look forward to the central and eastern half of Europe for the foreseeable future. An aggressive Russia, a revanchist Russia and will be on a permanent war footing.

Jeremy Suri (19:54)

I think that's exactly the worry. And it's had a really detrimental effect on Ukraine. Quite obviously Ukraine is overdue for an election. They should have an election. And whether you like Zelenskyy or not, if they're to remain a democracy, they need to have an election soon. But they can't have an election under these conditions. So right there you see what was a semi functioning democracy being replaced by a militaristic state. And we're seeing much of that happen through the region. And that's really dangerous for the future of democracy and for the future of capitalism, to tell you the truth.

Martin DeCaro (20:22)

So in Germany, the centrist and left leaning politicians are the ones who are more in favor now of, as you put it here, budget breaking, expenditures on military equipment, AFD alliance or I'm sorry, alternative for Germany. They're the far right party that is often compared to, I don't know, modern day neo Nazis. Are they pushing for more military spending?

Jeremy Suri (20:44)

No. I mean, that's the irony of this, that you have the left which was most critical of military spending throughout the Cold War, now seeing this as necessary. They're part of a coalition government. But even before that it was a left Bundeskancellor, Chancellor Scholz, who talked about a turning point toward more military spending. The far right party is pro Russian. They've actually been declared an extreme party by the police. Even though they're in government. They had to move offices because they were spying, using their offices to spy their position. The AfD, the Alternative for Deutschland is that the German government should cooperate with Putin and that he's justified in moving into Ukraine, or at least that they should somehow allow him to take part of Ukraine as he wishes. And that's a real problem because they're attracting support from people not who are pro Russian, but are fearful that the spending on the military will take money away from social programs, which it will. And so they're attracting people not for a pro Russian position. They're attracting people because of the domestic costs. But that then lends credence to those who are trying to support Russia.

Martin DeCaro (21:51)

We touched on this already, but I want to return to it now. And that is the burden of history or the influence of history. Germany worked very hard and it did take time, it took generations for it to to fully reckon with its past. And Germany is considered a model country when it comes to that today. Would you agree on that?

Jeremy Suri (22:08)

They're not perfect, but they have done a very good job. And there's a wonderful scholar who I hope you'll have on at some point, Susan Nyman, who's written comparing how Americans have dealt with their history, the history of the Civil War they've written about and other issues in slavery and how Germans have dealt with the history of the Holocaust. And they've done better, though not perfect, they've done a lot better.

Martin DeCaro (22:26)

So given that are Germans. So given that it still seems though that Germans are still struggling with this or they feel like they can't betray the progress they made and going this route, more military spending, becoming the security infrastructure of Europe is somehow a betrayal of that progress.

Jeremy Suri (22:45)

Yes, I do think so. I think there are two ways in which a lot of Germans I talk to scholars and politicians are being pulled at the same time. Some of them believe that the notion that you could remain a non militarized world power was naive. This is the kind of realist argument and that they need to now develop more military capabilities. But they also believe that their success has been because they were able to avoid those costs and those negative cultural effects. This is not to criticize the military, but it is to say that when you emphasize violence and you emphasize force, that has a cultural effect in your society, particularly when you have a history of being a militarized society. And they are very conscious of that. And quite frankly, there are things they see in the United States, as much as most Germans really love the United States and love who we are as a society, there's such strong affection. There are things in our society that they don't like that they associate with Militarism, gun culture, vigilante violence, all of that is not acceptable in their society. We see it every day in our society. They don't want to go that route.

Martin DeCaro (23:54)

Yeah, we're numb to it. Let's use the metaphor of the pendulum and we can get in here. The post Cold War period when East Germany and the Soviet tanks are now gone, you know, you don't have to worry about them crashing through the Fulda Gap or the Brandenburg Gate or whatever it was. The excessive optimism of the 1990s. Although in many ways that period has worked out pretty well. Almost all the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are still democratic and prosperous. Hungary being an exception. But let's just say excessive optimism in 1990, the end of history, to borrow Fukuyama's application of Hegel and the idea that there won't be another war in Europe. Who'd be so stupid to start another war? Is this the pendulum swinging too far in the other direction now? Is this an overreaction to what's happening in Eastern Europe, Ukraine?

Jeremy Suri (24:42)

I don't think it's an overreaction to that. I do think the way we're seeing the pendulum swing, many of the countries who were self critical of what we were doing in the last 10 to 20 years have now seen that there's a real value in defending Western society. That's the positive side of this story. There's been a renaissance of understanding that there is something fundamentally different about what these Western societies have done and that that's worth defending. But the problem is there's also a very difficult choice that has to be made as to what you won't do. So you can now do this. And I think where we've seen this is what I'm writing my new book about. Where we've seen a big shift is there was a faith. This is part of the Fukuyama argument that people imbibed, even those who criticize Fukuyama, that sort of the direction of the world was naturally toward democracy, to liberal democracy and capitalism, especially in Europe. Now actually, most Europeans think the direction of the world is toward authoritarianism. And they're holding the line that they're holding the line against a Putin, Orban, Trump authoritarianism.

Martin DeCaro (25:42)

You know, that type of threat does not come from outside your own borders, though. I mean, Russia didn't force Orban to become an authoritarian the way he.

Jeremy Suri (25:51)

Right, Yeah. I mean, Germans refer to it as a populist authoritarianism that they see in their own right in the AfD, that we were just Talking about. You see this in Marine Le Pen's party in France. Far right parties are very strong. And I'll tell you what really shook Europeans. People on the left and the right told me this the whole time I was there. And you can read this. Also in the press is when JD Vance, our vice president, went to the Munich security conference and gave a speech. It's available online. I encourage your listeners to read it it where he talked about how the United States really didn't see itself in his eyes, identifying with the liberal Democratic parties, and that actually they had to give more space to the far right.

Martin DeCaro (26:28)

The threat that I worry the most about vis a vis Europe is not Russia, it's not China, it's not any other external actor. And what I worry about is the threat from within, the retreat of Europe from some of its most fundamental values, values shared with, with the United States of America.

Jeremy Suri (26:47)

And so for them to see the United States supporting far right parties, the very things we built the German constitution to be against, that really shook our German friends.

Martin DeCaro (26:58)

That's something else. I mean, everyone knows that to have a functioning government in West Germany after the war, former Nazis, people who are members of the Nazi party for any number of reasons had to be part of the new government. You needed judges, police officers, detectives, what have you. But. But that's different than what you were just saying here. Yes, you write here. Business and high tech leaders in Germany are redirecting their investments from civilian consumption to military deployments in Ukraine. Scholars and media personalities are condemning the cowardice of past leaders demanding unconditional commitments from the German public to fight Russia. Artists and journalists are feeling the pressure to get on board. That's really disturbing. Militarism. Not just military spending, but militarism.

Jeremy Suri (27:42)

Those examples I give, I won't give the details because these are private conversations, but they were specific things I saw repeatedly. I met with a whole group of tech entrepreneurs. They seem like they could have been living in Austin or in Silicon Valley. They have companies they have formed in Ukraine and in Berlin and they're building drones and they're building stuff on the spot. And then I talked to scholars who and media personalities who were calling in public people cowards for not supporting this. And then I talked to artists, including a document, a very prominent documentary maker who said he felt you couldn't now voice. It was very hard to choose a position that wasn't pro war or anti war. Most people are kind of not either of those things. Right. Same in the US Most people are not one Side or the other. But the polarization that we feel, they're feeling a similar kind of polarization.

Martin DeCaro (28:28)

Well, and Germany's not at war directly anyway.

Jeremy Suri (28:30)

No, no, that's right. That's exactly right.

Martin DeCaro (28:32)

Well, you know, I mentioned Gagliotti's remark that I know you took exception to about the infantilization, whatever the word choice. His point I think is important, that European countries should do more to defend themselves. They are a prosperous continent. The thing is there's no such thing as Europe. We're talking about individual countries. So unless all of this is coordinated in some way, I can see why there might be some concern there. If Germany's going to do it, they're going to probably want Poland to their east to do it as well. You have Hungary, that's not really on board with this, right? They're more pro Russian. Can you address that?

Jeremy Suri (29:05)

Yeah, well, I mean, so one of the challenges they have now, it flows perfectly from your excellent point is now they're all trying to ramp up military production. First, the United States, we're short of supplies, so what we're making, we're keeping. But second, they also, if they're gonna spend money on military production, they wanna spend it in their own countries so they can put people to work. Right. They don't wanna have people working in Seattle for their. They want people working in Munich for them. But what's happening, because there's not a coordinated European entity, is each country, particularly France, Germany, Britain, they're making their own stuff and they're making stuff that's not compatible with what their neighbors are making. And so it's very hard then if you have three different versions, four different versions of a system coming into Ukraine to get those systems to coordinate. And you're getting a lot of duplication of effort. We're seeing that in drone production, we're seeing that in aircraft production and tank production. In fact, in many cases they coordinate better with the US Than they coordinate with each other.

Martin DeCaro (30:01)

Well, this is the kind of thing that needed to happen prior to a war going on. But without a war, there's no incentive to do it. Right. People were lulled in to complacency. It reminds me of something the great Andrew Bacevich wrote in a New York Times article in 2013. So prior to 2014, that is the year that Russia annexed Crimea. Bacevich said in 2013 that the United States should begin a decade long process that would end in 2023 with the US out of NATO. And that would give Europe, the European countries, which were then at peace. There was no Russian invasion of any kind. 10 years to get their acts together. I mean, was he wrong?

Jeremy Suri (30:40)

Yeah, of course he was wrong. I love Andrew, and I'm glad you called him the great Andrew Bazovich. But of course he was wrong. Imagine how much worse this would be now if we didn't have NATO. I find it very strange.

Martin DeCaro (30:50)

Well, US out of NATO. There'd be a NATO just of Europe.

Jeremy Suri (30:53)

No, there'd be no NATO without the United States. States, Right. I mean, you know, so that's part of the point. The Europeans are dependent on us, but the world is filled with different kinds of dependencies. And, yes, they could do more, but everyone who says they could do more wants them to do more, but not too much more. Do we want them to have nuclear weapons? I mean, the French and the British have a small force. Do we really want German nuclear weapons? There was a discussion of that in the 1960s, just as there was a discussion of Taiwanese and South Korean nuclear weapons. And the United States promised a shield, a defensive shield for these countries in one form or another, so that they wouldn't go nuclear. You know what? I think that was a good idea, Martin. If we pull out, you're gonna see that happening again. So how far do we want them to go? I think what we want is within the NATO structure with American leadership. We want these countries, yes, to be spending a bit more. We want them to be adding more personnel, more skills. But if NATO's going to work and we're going to get all the benefits from it, we in the United States are gonna have to pay part of it, too. We benefit disproportionately. Right now, Ukrainians, with more support from Europeans than Americans are fight war in Europe. They're helping us. Of course, we should be paying for part of that.

Martin DeCaro (32:01)

How are they helping the United States? I don't mean that flippantly, and I don't mean to minimize either the horrors of what's going on over there. But to a lot of Americans, it doesn't matter who controls Kyiv.

Jeremy Suri (32:12)

I think they're helping the United States in two ways. Let's start with a sort of material, economic way. Europe is still one of the most important trading partners for the United States, after Canada and Mexico. And a Russia that is dominant in the center of Europe, Will. Putin has said this will interrupt American trading privileges with that part of the world. It will make it much harder for us to coordinate with them, and that will be a big cost to our economy. Big, big cost to our economy. So that's the most material element of it. But then there's the security side of it as well. We are in a world now where the United States, Russia and China have different views in many regions of the world, whether it's the Middle east, whether it's East Asia. European partnership is crucial to us in the space of intelligence and diplomacy. The United States advantage in the world is our friends. The Chinese can actually build. A lot of the stuff we built is that we have more friends and who have been better friends for us over the last 70 years than our European brethren. And why we would want to lose those friendships, which is what would happen, happen with Putin's increased influence in Europe. Why we would let that happen would be devastating to us.

Martin DeCaro (33:20)

Most of these countries aren't interested in what Russia has to offer, though there.

Jeremy Suri (33:24)

Are far right parties that are interested.

Martin DeCaro (33:26)

In that, and that's how the interference would take place right through those parties. And they just lost in Moldova.

Jeremy Suri (33:31)

But so what you would see is what Putin wants to do is create a sphere of influence that limits American access. And so he would do that. He probably wouldn't really try to do that in Germany, but he would try to do that in Poland, in Estonia, in Latvia. He's talked about rebuilding the Russian empire.

Martin DeCaro (33:45)

His stated all along has been to split the US from the European allies. The. The headline of your substack article is the Revenge of History in Europe. We're talking about the move toward more military spending in these places and maybe a more militaristic society or societies that are on a more permanent war footing. I find it disturbing or unsettling as well. But as you say, I mean, history came back. The idea that there'd never be another war in Europe again, while reality has imposed itself, itself. People overstated Russian decline in the 90s and then underestimated Russian comeback. Yes, since.

Jeremy Suri (34:23)

So all true. All true. All very well said. It's the revenge of history because there's always the revenge of history. This is, in a sense, what we always know as historians, that history is like archeology. The old layers don't go away, they're still there. And those weeds, they pop up, up. And so what I'm saying in the piece and what I'm arguing is not that we can go back to the 1980s or the 1950s. You can't go back. The war in Ukraine is not going to end anytime soon. And even if it did, all of these dynamics would still be there. What I'm making a plea for is that we learn from history and take some lessons and don't make it an either or. Germany will have to militarize more as it is, but it has to do that and think about doing that in a way that preserves what it achieved as a democracy, not simply what is militarily expeditious.

Martin DeCaro (35:14)

Right now, one of the great false hopes or disappointments of the post Cold War period was Russia not joining or being integrated into the West. And we don't have time to get into all the reasons why that did not happen. But the Russia we have today is probably going to be the Russia for the foreseeable future. There's no Jeffersonian Democrats waiting in Putin's wings to take over the country. The extent of Russian expansionism or Evanchism, and how that may change based on how the war in Ukraine ultimately ends, that's conjecture at this point. But I think we agree that the Russia we see today is going to still be a menace in the eastern part of Europe for the foreseeable future.

Jeremy Suri (35:52)

And I'll give a very good example then of what I'm talking about. It's a mistake that a politician I highly regard made one of Angela Merkel. And I think she was an excellent chancellor in many ways. But one of the mistakes she made was to tie Germany's economy so closely to Russian gas. And I think one of the lessons from history should be that if we're going to preserve German democracy as it was built after World War II, it cannot be dependent on Russia. And so Germany must build alternative energy sources and other areas so that it is not dependent on Russia, because dependence on Russia historically has fueled militaristic conflicts between Russia and Germany. And so avoiding that is a good thing.

Martin DeCaro (36:32)

I just recently watched a documentary on Netflix about the Cold War. It was called Turning the Cold War. It was great. And the last couple of episodes were about the end of the Cold War and the peaceful revolutions of 1989, 90, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union. And I gotta say, I got a little emotional. The scenes of millions of people, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, all the former Eastern Bloc taking to the streets and demanding their freedom, and mostly bloodlessly. There was some blood spill, but they got it. And just to see that true jubilation. I was a teenager when this is happening, but I vaguely remember it. The idea that history was really moving in the right direction, juxtapose that this gloominess today. But the story is not all.

Jeremy Suri (37:23)

No, no, not at all. I mean, there have been actually remarkable achievements. Right? I mean, the Standard of living in Europe is higher than it's ever been. Education levels in Europe are higher than they've ever been. We have avoided war in Western Europe. We've had peaceful transitions of power to right and left governments. Europe has made progress on many environmental issues too. There are all sorts of things. My generation of American scholars has grown up with closer relations with European scholars than probably any other generation. So there are a lot of good things that have happened. That's exactly why we need to preserve this. Our expectations were excessive and there were things we didn't do to achieve what we wanted to achieve fully. But you know, I would take what we've achieved in the last 20 years versus almost any other period in history. It's been a glorious 20 years. Imperfect, but glorious. But that's what makes this current moment so worried, because we seem not only to be jeopardizing that, we seem to have forgotten why it was so important.

Martin DeCaro (38:20)

Democracy has been on the retreat in many places. You're the historian here. There were what, three or four main periods of democratic expansion. The last one was post1989, the European countries and others. Right now, it's hard to see that happening in many places.

Jeremy Suri (38:35)

I hope it will reverse. I hope we're stimulating the antibodies. But we've seen a movement toward authoritarianism, I think because of economic inequality, new technologies, archaic nature of certain democratic institutions. Institutions. I mean, I've got to say, I know we're talking about Europe, but when you go to Europe, you realize how much more advanced they are than we are in the way they vote. We still vote. In 19th century way. They vote on weekends when it's a national holiday, everyone gets to vote. You don't have to go through the same elaborate local registration process. There are all sorts of ways in which they are so much more advanced than us, but in other ways, they're behind us. Their economies are much more archaic than ours. And so part of what we're dealing with are institutions that need to be updated.

I (39:14)

For over 40 years, the United States led the west in the struggle against communism and the threat it posed to our most precious values. This struggle shaped the lives of all Americans. It forced all nations to live under the specter of nuclear destruction. That confrontation is now over. The nuclear threat, while far from gone, is receding Eastern Europe. Europe is free. The Soviet Union itself is no more. This is a victory for democracy and freedom. It's a victory for the moral force of our values.

Martin DeCaro (39:55)

On the next episode of History as it happens. Hannah Arendt's book the Origins of Totalitarianism is still very popular. Well, at least the quotes in it are. I see them all over the Internet. Even Pope Leo got in on the act this week. Is this a use or misuse of history of a great 20th century philosopher to try to make sense of our confounding times? That is Next, as we report History as it Happens. Remember, sign up for my newsletter. It is free. Go to Substack and search for History as it Happens.