Goodbye Assad / Hello Who?

Summary

History As It Happens: Episode Summary – "Goodbye Assad / Hello Who?"

Release Date: December 13, 2024
Host: Martin Di Caro
Special Guest: Safa Sechin, Expert on Syria and Middle East Security at Nazareth University

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Introduction

In the episode titled "Goodbye Assad / Hello Who?", host Martin Di Caro delves into the seismic shift in Syrian politics marked by the sudden downfall of Bashar Al Assad after more than five decades of authoritarian rule. This historic event concludes a 13-year-long civil war that few anticipated would culminate in Assad's ousting. The episode explores the intricate dynamics that sustained the Assad dynasty, the emergence of new power players in Syria, and the uncertain future that lies ahead for the war-torn nation.

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The Fall of Assad

The episode opens with vivid imagery of the final moments leading to Assad's fall. Historical Analyst and Safa Sechin provide context about Assad's rise to power in 2000, following the death of his father, Hafez Al Assad, who had governed Syria since 1970.

Notable Quote:

Rebel Leader (00:34): "The dictator is done."

This declaration by a rebel leader encapsulates the dramatic end of Assad’s reign. The rebels, primarily Islamist fighters with ties to Al Qaeda, seized Damascus, signaling a turning point in Syrian history.

Martin Di Caro narrates:

"Bashar Al Assad is gone. Syria's 13-year-long civil war at long last brought his tyrannical regime crumbling to the ground. A historic event few anticipated." (00:39)

The fall of Assad raises critical questions about Syria's future and the legitimacy of the new power structures emerging in the aftermath of his regime.

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The Assad Regime’s Longevity

Safa Sechin provides an in-depth analysis of how the Assad dynasty maintained power for over five decades despite significant internal and external challenges.

Key Factors for Longevity:

1. Authoritarian Toolbox:

   • The regime's reliance on violence and repression to silence dissent, exemplified by the Hama massacre in 1982 and the use of barrel bombs in 2013 (02:24).
   • Safa Sechin (12:19): "The regime never avoided using sheer violence against its population. Right. So we saw this in Hama in 1982."

2. Balancing Ethnic and Religious Divisions:

   • Integration of minorities, particularly Alawites, into key positions within the military and intelligence sectors to secure loyalty (12:19).
   • Safa Sechin (14:48): "The regime has done a good job of playing on the ethnic and religious divisions within Syrian society."

3. International Alliances:

   • Strategic partnerships with Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah provided military and economic support, crucial during pivotal moments like the 2016 Russian intervention (12:19).
   • Safa Sechin (18:33): "These international alliances provided a lot of flexibility and power for the Syrian regime."

These pillars created a formidable structure that sustained Assad's rule despite widespread unrest and international condemnation.

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Unraveling the Military and International Support

The military, once a cornerstone of Assad’s power, began to falter amid prolonged conflict. Safa Sechin explains how the Syrian army's effectiveness declined due to low morale, insufficient pay, and fatigue from 13 years of war.

Notable Points:

• Martin Di Caro (17:30): "Bad morale, low pay, from what I've read, a lot of younger recruits."
• Russia's diminished capacity to support Assad due to its involvement in the Ukraine war and overstretched resources contributed to the regime’s vulnerability (18:33).

The shifting international focus and the overextension of Russian resources left Assad's regime exposed, enabling the rebel factions to gain ground rapidly.

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Emergence of New Factions

With Assad's fall, several key factions vie for control over Syria’s fragmented landscape:

1. Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS):

   • An Islamist group formerly linked to Al Qaeda, now rebranded to distance itself from terrorist affiliations.
   • Led by Ahmed Al Shara, HTS seeks to establish its own governance model while maintaining a complex relationship with other factions and international actors (08:47).

2. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF):

   • A Kurdish-led coalition backed by the United States, controlling significant territories in northeastern Syria.
   • Safa Sechin (25:39): "If the US withdraws from Syria, SDF would be losing its international support."

3. Syrian National Army (SNA):

   • A heterogeneous group supported by Turkey, primarily composed of defectors and volunteers opposing Kurdish autonomy (27:52).

4. Other Groups:

   • Druze militias and remnants of the Islamic State add to the volatile mix of armed entities within Syria.

Notable Quote:

Rebel Leader (08:28): "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen."

The power vacuum left by Assad’s departure complicates Syria’s path forward, with various factions holding divergent visions for the country’s future.

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Historical Context of the Assad Dynasty

The episode provides a comprehensive history of the Assad family's rule, tracing its roots back to Hafez Al Assad’s rise to power in 1970. Safa Sechin outlines the Assad dynasty's strategic maneuvers to maintain control:

Key Historical Points:

• Ba’ath Party Coup (1963):

  • Establishment of a single-party system, suppressing political pluralism (32:42).

• Hafez Al Assad’s Consolidation (1970):

  • Final consolidation of power through military coups and elimination of rivals.
  • Introduction of socialist policies and nationalization efforts aimed at stabilizing the economy (35:53).

• Hama Massacre (1982):

  • Brutal suppression of an Islamist uprising, cementing the regime’s reputation for cruelty (38:33).

• Economic Policies:

  • Shift from an agrarian economy to one focused on oil exports and industrialization, though hampered by the regime’s prioritization of military expenditure over domestic development (43:58).

Notable Quote:

Safa Sechin (38:16): "Ba’athist ideology tried to integrate various elements of secular nationalism, socialism."

The Assad regime’s history is marked by a delicate balance of oppression, strategic alliances, and economic maneuvering, which together sustained its authoritarian grip for decades.

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The Alawite Minority and Assad’s Rule

The Assad family's Alawite background played a crucial role in the regime’s stability. Safa Sechin explains the significance of this sect in a predominantly Sunni Muslim Syria:

Key Insights:

• Alawite Integration:

  • Hafez Al Assad’s recruitment of Alawites and other minorities into key security and military positions ensured loyalty within the regime (35:53).
  • Safa Sechin (41:21): "Most of the individuals that he puts into the positions of power in the military and intelligence come from Druze and Alawite families."

• Cultural and Religious Manipulation:

  • The regime exploited ethnic and religious divisions to prevent unified opposition, creating a sectarian balance that marginalized Sunni dominance.

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Modern Implications and Future of Syria

As Assad's regime collapses, Syria faces an uncertain future marked by fragmentation and potential conflict among emerging factions. Safa Sechin emphasizes the challenges in achieving a cohesive state amidst competing interests:

Future Scenarios:

1. Fragmented Governance:

   • Different regions may be governed by conflicting factions, leading to a de facto partition of the country (24:35).

2. International Interventions:

   • Continued involvement by external powers like Turkey, the US, and Israel could exacerbate tensions and hinder peaceful transitions (27:24).

3. Autonomy vs. Unity:

   • The SDF’s aspirations for autonomy clash with Turkey’s opposition, raising the possibility of renewed armed conflict (26:57).

Notable Insight:

Safa Sechin (43:58): "There are important differences and tensions between different factions."

The episode underscores the complexity of Syria’s situation, where historical grievances, ethnic divisions, and geopolitical maneuvers converge, leaving the path forward fraught with uncertainty.

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Conclusion

"Goodbye Assad / Hello Who?" provides a thorough examination of Syria's tumultuous journey from Assad’s authoritarian rule to its recent collapse. Safa Sechin and Martin Di Caro highlight the enduring legacy of the Assad dynasty, the intricate web of internal and external forces that maintained its power, and the precarious balance of power among newly emerging factions. While the fall of Assad is a momentous victory for the Syrian people, the episode concludes with a cautious outlook on the potential for achieving a just and inclusive political system amidst ongoing fragmentation and external influences.

Final Quote:

Safa Sechin (51:46): "We can say that it's a moment to celebrate for the Syrian people the fall of the regime. But it's also realistic to think about what's going to come next."

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Notable Quotes with Timestamps

• Rebel Leader (00:34): "The dictator is done."
• Martin DeCaro (00:39): "Bashar Al Assad is gone. Syria's 13-year-long civil war at long last brought his tyrannical regime crumbling to the ground. A historic event few anticipated."
• Safa Sechin (12:19): "The regime never avoided using sheer violence against its population."
• Safa Sechin (18:33): "These international alliances provided a lot of flexibility and power for the Syrian regime."
• Rebel Leader (08:28): "At long last, the Assad regime has fallen."
• Safa Sechin (25:39): "If the US withdraws from Syria, SDF would be losing its international support."
• Safa Sechin (38:16): "Ba’athist ideology tried to integrate various elements of secular nationalism, socialism."
• Safa Sechin (41:21): "Most of the individuals that he puts into the positions of power in the military and intelligence come from Druze and Alawite families."
• Safa Sechin (51:46): "We can say that it's a moment to celebrate for the Syrian people the fall of the regime. But it's also realistic to think about what's going to come next."

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Resources and Further Reading

For those interested in exploring more about the topics discussed in this episode, Safa Sechin’s analytical essays on The Conversation (The Conversation.com) provide in-depth insights into the evolving situation in Syria. Additionally, Martin Di Caro encourages listeners to subscribe to his weekly newsletter for updates and further analysis.

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Stay tuned for the next episode of History As It Happens, where Martin Di Caro explores the political shifts in Georgia, the former Soviet republic, as it navigates its commitment to joining the European Union.

Transcript

[Martin DeCaro]

History as it happens. December 13, 2024. Goodbye, Assad. Hello. Who?

[Historical Analyst]

Bashar Al Assad took power in 2000.

[Safa Sechin]

After his father Hafez had been in.

[Historical Analyst]

Control since the 90s.

[Safa Sechin]

Opposition forces have reached Homs, where thousands.

[Martin DeCaro]

Of civilians have already fled. Meanwhile, Israel has moved.

[Historical Analyst]

Syrians hoped Bashar, trained as a doctor in London, would reform and modernize the country.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the outskirts of Damascus, rebels storm.

[Safa Sechin]

Assad's notorious Sadna prison.

[Martin DeCaro]

Islamist fighters took the capital Damasc, yesterday.

[Safa Sechin]

Do you know what happened now?

[Rebel Leader]

The dictator is done.

[Martin DeCaro]

Bashar Al Assad is gone. Syria's 13 year long civil war at long last brought his tyrannical regime crumbling to the ground. A historic event few anticipated. The rebels who toppled him are Islamists once affiliated with Al Qaeda. What's next for Syria? And how did the Assad dynasty hold on to power so long? More than five decades. That's next as we report History as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Historical Analyst]

He'll be remembered as one of the.

[Safa Sechin]

Most violent rulers in response to the uprisings that started in late 2010 in the Arab world.

[Tony Blair]

I do, however, believe it's important to engage with Syria because Syria is going to be an important part of building a peaceful and stable future in the Middle East.

[Barack Obama]

We understand the strong desire of the Syrian people that no foreign country should intervene in their struggle, and we respect their wishes.

[Rebel Leader]

No, no, no. We don't have no one's command. There was no command to kill or to be brutal.

[Safa Sechin]

Syria gained its independence from France in 1946. Right? So the last French troops withdrew from Syria in 1946. And between 1946 and 1970, Syria had been in a political upheaval and experienced like seven military coups. Right. We're talking about like, you know, a country that experienced seven military coups, like, you know, in 14 years. Right? So the authoritarianism that was formed and maintained by Hafez Al Assad provided authoritarian stability for 54 years.

[Martin DeCaro]

Picture a street in Damascus lined with people cheering their next leader. He arrives flanked by bodyguards at a polling station. With our blood and our soul, we set, we sacrifice ourselves for you. They say, no, this is not Syria today. This is July 2000, more than 24 years ago. Bashar Al Assad is the only candidate. And the outcome of the vote in a presidential referendum is not in doubt. One month after his father, Hafez Al Assad, died after 30 years in power. Now, in four out of the prior five referendums, all of them orchestrated by the ruling Ba'ath Party, Hafez al Assad won at least 99.6% of the votes. Not bad. Spoiler. Bashar won this election and would remain in power, ruling with an iron fist until last week. I'm here in front of Umayyad Square.

[Rebel Leader]

Which is in downtown Damascus Center. As you can hear, as you can.

[Martin DeCaro]

Hear, people are pretty happy.

[Safa Sechin]

I cannot imagine we will arrive to this moment. Do you know what happened now?

[Rebel Leader]

The dictator is gone.

[Martin DeCaro]

And so ends a dynasty that'll be remembered for its tyrannical cruelty as father and son unleash the security forces on any and all dissenters, even children. They murdered thousands of Syrians and imprisoned and tortured thousands more. So this may be hard to believe, but when Bashar Assad succeeded his dad, there was optimism in Syria and foreign capitals. He released prisoners and promised economic liberalization and political reform. And in 2002, when Great Britain sought Syria's backing for the coming US led invasion of Iraq because Syria shared a 600 mile long border with that country, Prime Minister Tony Blair rolled out the red carpet for the dictator.

[Tony Blair]

We've discussed, obviously, bilateral issues between the two countries. In particular how Britain can help with the continuing change and reform program in Syria, not least to do with information technology and with the banking system there. And we've discussed various ways that we can take that forward. Secondly, obviously we've discussed the international situation, and of course, as you will be well aware, there are differences in view and emphasis about this, and we don't disguise those. On the other hand, it is good that both Syria and Britain backed the resolution in respect of Iraq. We all of us want to see the Middle east process resolved in a way that allows Israelis and Palestinians to live side by side together in peace. And we recognize that Syria has as much to gain as anyone from success in the fight against international terrorism. As I say, we do not hide where we disagree. Those disagreements are obvious and clear. But I believe that a process of engagement with Syria is the right way forward. And once again, I thank President Assad for accepting the invitation to come here and to have the talks with me.

[Bashar Al Assad]

I thank Mr. Tony Blair for his invitation for me to be today in Britain. And I'm very happy to be in a country in which I had lived for two years and in which I closely got to know British citizens.

[Tony Blair]

We condemn totally anybody who's engaged in terrorist activity of any sort at all, wherever in the world. I do, however, believe it's important to engage with Syria because Syria is going to be an important part of building a peaceful and stable future in the.

[Martin DeCaro]

Middle East Assad even enjoyed a photo op with the Queen.

[Rebel Leader]

But I used to work in Melbourne Road, but for a while I used to have courts in King's College. I used to pass by this, I'm.

[Bashar Al Assad]

Sure past the height.

[Martin DeCaro]

But back home, his rule resembled his father's. And in 2011, the winds of the Arab Spring blew into Syria. Peaceful protesters are met with lethal brutality, provoking global condemnation.

[Barack Obama]

This morning, President Obama called on Assad to step aside and announced the strongest set of sanctions to date targeting the Syrian government.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yet in this interview with ABC's Barbara Walters, Bashar Al Assad denied it all.

[Bashar Al Assad]

Why was there such a brutal crackdown?

[Rebel Leader]

What happened?

[Bashar Al Assad]

Well, I'll give you some examples that I saw a 13 year old boy who was arrested in April. A month later, his body was returned to his family bearing scars of torture. A famous cartoonist whom you know, who was critical of you, badly beaten, his arms were broken. A singer, famous singer who wrote a popular song calling for your ouster. He was found with his throat cut. You have seen these pictures, have you not?

[Rebel Leader]

No, but I saw.

[Bashar Al Assad]

Is this news to you?

[Rebel Leader]

No, no, no, it's not news. I met with his father, with the father of that child, and he said that he was in torture.

[Bashar Al Assad]

The cartoonist. The cartoonist who was critical of you. I've seen his pictures. His hands were broken. He was.

[Rebel Leader]

Many people criticized me. Did they kill all of them? Who killed who? Most of the people that being killed are supporters of the government.

[Martin DeCaro]

In 2016, Vladimir Putin came to Assad's rescue, dispatching Russian aircraft to carpet bomb rebel positions in a civil war that would end the lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians. A civil war that froze in 2000. So it looked like the regime would survive until just a couple weeks ago. Rebel factions made sudden and dramatic gains, pushing all the way to Damascus.

[Bashar Al Assad]

At long last, the Assad regime has fallen.

[Safa Sechin]

This regime brutalized and tortured and killed literally hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrians. The fall of the regime is a fundamental act of justice. It's a moment of historic opportunity for the long suffering people of Syria.

[Martin DeCaro]

So who are these new guys? Well, there is hts, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, Organization for the Liberation of the Levant, the main rebel group that toppled the regime. They're led by Ahmed Al Shara, whose nom de guerre was Abu Mohammed Al Jalani. They are Islamists. Al Shara made his way into Iraq after 2003 to join Al Qaeda to fight the US occupation. There is also SDF, Syrian Democratic Forces, backed by the United States. They are Kurds. Kurds make up about 10% of Syria's population. During the civil war, SDF established an autonomous region in the northeast of the country. SDF is opposed by SNA Syrian National Army, a rag tag group backed by Turkey. Now Turkey opposes Kurdish militants and Turkey also wants to send millions of Syrian refugees back to their homes. So take note. If you have a pen and paper, you can do it. HTS Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, a designated terrorist organization by the US and the European Union. SDF Syrian Democratic Forces. They're backed by the US and the Syrian national army, backed by Turkey. Druze militia and Islamic State fighters are also in Syria. And we have to note, in the past couple weeks, Turkey, the US and Israel have bombed Syria for different reasons. So Syria's future is murky, its past now coming into focus as its people celebrate the downfall of a horrendous dynasty. Safa Sechen is an expert on Syria and Middle east security at Nazareth University. He has been writing analysis essays about these remarkable events for the conversation.com and I will share links to his work in my weekly newsletter. You can sign up for my newsletter [e-mail] Sefa Sechin, welcome to the show.

[Safa Sechin]

Thank you so much for having me, Martin. I'm delighted to be on this podcast.

[Martin DeCaro]

So isn't the fall of Assad another example that we humans, when it comes to predicting the big events, we're simply not very good at doing it.

[Safa Sechin]

I think you're definitely right about this. Right. So we failed to predict the major events in human history. Nobody was expecting the regime to fall at this time. Right. So the attacks or the recent offensive were a surprise for the rest of the world. And it came at a time where Russia was tied in the Ukraine war. Iran and Hezbollah have suffered important setbacks due to Israeli airstrikes. Like people were expecting the opposition factions to make territorial gains in Aleppo and perhaps move towards south a little bit, but nobody was expecting the regime to collapse completely. And when it comes to authoritarian regimes, on the one hand they look very resilient, they look very strong, but they have also their own niches and vulnerabilities. And at certain points they just collapse. And it's difficult to explain this.

[Martin DeCaro]

Dictatorships are stable until they aren't. One of my recent guests made that point. Michael Kimmage in the context of Putin and Russia, even dictatorships need some popular legitimacy. Did Assad have any popular legitimacy?

[Safa Sechin]

I think all dictatorial regimes rely on some level of popular support, right? So you can't Rule based on fear, completely. But this doesn't mean that you get the support of the kind of the vast majority. Right. So there are kind of different levels of support, varying degrees of support in different regions, regimes. I would say the regime has relied on three instruments overall. The first one was this authoritarian toolbox where the regime never feared or avoided using sheer violence against its population. Right. So we saw this in Hama in 1982. There was an insurrection started in Hama in 1976. It continued until 1982, when Hafez Al Assad actually ordered artillery fire on the city and even chemical weapons were used.

[Martin DeCaro]

And the same 20,000 dead.

[Safa Sechin]

20,000 dead in 1982, somewhere between 10 and 25,000 deaths. And the same thing happened in 2013 in Eastern Ghouta. Assad used barrel bombs against civilians. So that's one thing. Right. The regime never avoided using sheer violence against population. That created a culture of fear. And secondly, I think the regime for a long time has done a good job of playing on the ethnic and religious divisions within the Syrian society. It primarily relied on the minorities, like in terms of bringing them into the positions of power in intelligence and security apparatus. But it also tried to appeal to the Sunni majority to some extent by bringing them into the positions of power in the parliament. For a long time, they played this delicate game of balancing ethnic and religious divisions within the Syrian society. And the third component here is the kind of international alliances. Both father Assad and son Assad, they build regional alliances and also international alliances. Russia has been an important ally of the Syrian regime since 1970s. There was a pact, security pact, signed between the Soviets and the Syrians in 1956, right after the Swiss war. And then there was another pact signed in 1980s, and this time around, during the Syrian Civil war, Russia plus Iran plus Hezbollah were heavily involved in the war. Russia provided aerial support, bombed Aleppo, and that was a turning point in the.

[Martin DeCaro]

War that was in what, 2013 or 2015, the carpet bombing. That was actually in 2016, 2016, Russia carpet bombed Aleppo.

[Safa Sechin]

I think it tipped the balance of power in favor of Assad. The opposition factions were controlling almost like 70% of Aleppo. Right. So if they captured Aleppo at that time, they could have captured other provinces, Hama, Homs and Damascus eventually. Right. So I would say, like, these are kind of three main factors that explain the longevity of the regime, the levers.

[Martin DeCaro]

Of power, institutions that he had at his disposal. You mentioned how he tried to cater to the Sunni majority. So yes, Syria is a Sunni majority country, but the Assad family is from an obscure Shia faction or I don't know if you want to call it.

[Safa Sechin]

From an Alawite family.

[Martin DeCaro]

Alawite family. We'll get into the Alawites and who they were in a little bit. So what happened to the Syrian military? I mean, he needed it. You said that was one of the three legs underneath the stool keeping the Assad regime in existence. What happened to the military here? It seemed to just fade away or melt away.

[Safa Sechin]

On the one hand, Syria, compared to other dictatorial regimes in the Arab world, had been the most resilient and strongest one. Right. So like if we compare it with Tunisia, with Egypt, with Libya, you know, we're talking about the longest lasting civil war here. And the civil war actually lasted 13 years. Right. So the regime has been able to actually resist the change, this kind of transformative change for 13 years. So, like, when compared with other regimes in the Arab world, we should kind of highlight the fact that this was perhaps the most resilient regime dictatorship in the region. But when we talk about the recent phase of the conflict, I think you can definitely make the case that in the absence of international backers, you know, the Russian aerial support and then Iran and Hezbollah were providing the ground forces. So I think these international alliances provided a lot of flexibility and power for the Syrian regime, which were absent in this recent phase of the conflict. So the Syrian army, military forces, so they had a huge repressive capacity which helped it consolidate and maintain power. But when it comes to repelling or quelling this recent offensive, I think they failed because in the first place, HDs this time around was more organized and there were different factions being supported by Turkey, sna, Syrian National Army, SDF had the American support.

[Martin DeCaro]

And we're going to get into all these factions in a bit.

[Safa Sechin]

These factions, right, they seized the moment where, you know, the Syrian army, although the conflict was in a stalemate since 2020, they still had fought a long civil war and they were still actually bombing Idlib despite a stalemate since 2020. Right. So the army got tired of this long conflict and there was absence of international support and the opposition factions took advantage of that.

[Martin DeCaro]

Bad morale, low pay, from what I've read, a lot of younger recruits. I mean, it is a long war. They were fighting 13 years. So as you say, they were still capable of torturing people in prisons and dungeons, but maybe not fighting out in the field. The conventional wisdom now, safa, is Iran, Hezbollah weakened by the war with Israel. Russia distracted, weakened by its involvement, its war on Ukraine. Well, what's your take on this? Why didn't Russia do more to try to save him? It's hard to know what's going on inside the Kremlin. Go ahead.

[Safa Sechin]

Exactly. You're right. So I think it's difficult to guess. Russia was definitely overstretched when you're fighting multiple wars. I would assume from a strategic point of perspective, you may find yourself compelled from moving a maximalist position to a kind of minimalist position in certain cases. And if the regime doesn't really have the manpower, military power, and if they have not completely aligned with your interests, I guess Russia was also in favor of a negotiated settlement between Turkey and the regime. Turkey tried to normalize relations with Syria with the regime. Assad neglected and rejected all of these demands. Right. So he had this whole arrogance that, like, the regime would remain intact.

[Martin DeCaro]

This is a situation of Gordian complexity. I recommend to everyone listening to us in another window or another tab or however you're doing it, pull up a map of Syria in the Middle east so you can see what we're talking about here, because this is a geopolitical struggle. I think what's tragic about Syria, Safa, all of the countries that are involved in it to one degree or another, Israel, Turkey, Russia, Iran, are in it for interests that aren't the Syrian people's interests. That's so true. I do want to get into the history of the Assad dynasty and also, who are these other factions? I want people to come away from this conversation with some idea who we're talking about here. But one other thing about the current situation, because this is a fluid situation, and things are going to change over the days and weeks and months. As people listen to this. Hayat Tahrir Al Sham is the group that led the assault that brought down Assad. They were operating out of the northwest of Syria, near the Turkish border. Who is this group? We know they used to be an offshoot of Al Qaeda. And who is Abu Mohammed Al Jalani, who has dropped his NOM degree and now goes by his real name, Ahmed Al shara.

[Safa Sechin]

So in 2016, they rebranded themselves as Japat al Nusra, and they cut ties with Al Qaeda. Right. Then they rebrand the group and call it Hayat Tahrir al Sham. All of these were happening kind of in search of more international support because they didn't want to be affiliated with Al Qaeda anymore. It's a group of its own. Right. So it doesn't have a lot of international backing. Turkey doesn't support this group. Sna Syrian national army is supported by Turkey. But Turkey also designated this group as a terrorist organization. It was designated as a terrorist organization by the US by many of the international actors. Right.

[Martin DeCaro]

And that is still the designation as we speak, so.

[Safa Sechin]

Yeah, exactly. It's likely to change for some countries. I know that the UK is not reviewing the designation of HDS as a terrorist organization. Right. So we're going to see what's going to happen on that front. The whole opposition, the Islamist opposition in Syria was pushed to northwest, right. You know, to Idlib. And there were also a lot of Syrian refugees living there. So, you know, the movement took 3, 4 years to build itself and launch this offensive. Mohammed Jelani himself, you know, he was born in Saudi Arabia. His family was from Golan Heights. You know, the Jelani, his last name actually literally means someone from the Golan Heights. After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, he joins Al Qaeda in Iraq. This is how his jihadist career starts. 2011. You know, he's involved in the Syrian civil war in Al Qaeda in Syria, isis, and then he splits from ISIS and forms the Hayat al Tahir Al Sham. So so far, and Giuliani himself are trying to kind of soften the image of the movement, the military group, in the eyes of the international community. They openly said that they don't target the west and they're not going to attack Israel in any ways. And they cleared their intention that they want to create a diverse, inclusive political system in Syria.

[Martin DeCaro]

So is that convincing, this conversion that Al Jelani is making now? Ahmed Al SHARA so I think there.

[Safa Sechin]

Are serious doubts that persist here. We need to be also a little bit optimistic in the sense that this is a historic chance for the Syrian people to create a political system that is inclusive, pluralistic and relies on a form of effective governance. Right. That's a historic opportunity. And I want to give the moment the benefit of the doubt here. So we will see whether actually they will be successful in ensuring basic human rights and creating a sustainable political system in Syria. And we're talking about a fully situation here, right? So still the control of different areas in Syria shifts between different groups within Syria.

[Martin DeCaro]

When hts, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, they set up what you might call a de facto autonomous or state within a state they were governing part of, and they were pretty hard on the people within their governance, if you will, or whatever you want to call it.

[Safa Sechin]

So there was salvation government in Idlib, which was a de facto government formed by hds. There were, you know skirmishes and fights between HDS and sna, the other group in Idlib. You're right that they were kind of trying to impose type of political system on the individuals living there.

[Martin DeCaro]

So because Syrians may not want to live under a radical Islamist regime.

[Safa Sechin]

Yes, that's true. They don't want to live under a radical Islamist regime. And there are different factions of the position. SDF is primarily secular and other factions, nationalist factions, are not Islamists either. So politics is an art of compromise and all of these factions need to make some compromises. I don't think SDF can completely move forward with its own autonomy and independence idea because HDS and other groups are pretty much protective of the territorial integrity of Syria. So there will be compromises made and I'm hoping that they'll create a political system that functions well.

[Martin DeCaro]

It's hard to see that now. Right, because, well, as we said, this is just happening. And as you write in an article for the conversation.com and I will share a link to this article in my weekly newsletter, you say a fragmented landscape. The fact that different opposition groups have taken control of various once government held areas points to a crucial fact. You write Syria is de facto partitioned. So making a cohesive single state. When you have competing groups that are, as we speak, actually fighting each other in some parts of the country, how are you going to have a single unitary state? So let's talk about that one faction that you were just discussing, sdf, that is short for Syrian Democratic Forces. They are Kurdish led, backed by the United States. Turkey does not see them as being democratic forces, if you will. They see them as linked with Kurdish breakaway Kurdish forces. Talk a little bit about SDF and what would happen to it if the United States under Trump withdraws from Syria.

[Safa Sechin]

So they were the main US Ally during the fight against isis. They were providing ground forces and then US Was bombing ISIS targets in the region. So during this latest offensive, they also expanded their territories. Right. So they captured their Azor, which was actually recently captured by the other opposition factions as of yesterday. So like, the conflict is very fluid. The HDS wants to build a workable, functioning relationship with SDF to some extent because, you know, you cannot completely take SDF out of Syria. They are an important actor that need to be reckoned with. If the US Withdraws from Syria, SDF would be losing its international support. They would be compelled to negotiate with Turkey and other factions of the opposition to create a sustainable system in Syria if they push for independence and autonomy. I'm not sure to what extent that would be welcomed by other opposition factions, and I don't know to what extent this could actually lead to new rounds of armed conflict in Syria.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's right, because they're in the northeast of the country and Turkey would not want an autonomous Kurdish region there. And Hayat and Tahrir al Sham, who I don't want to call them the central government, they toppled the main force that toppled the region.

[Safa Sechin]

The strongest opposition factor.

[Martin DeCaro]

If they want to consolidate power, they may not want a Kurdish autonomous region in the northeast of the country.

[Safa Sechin]

It has become apparent that Turkey doesn't want an autonomous Kurdish region in eastern Syria. And they have been involved in incursions into some parts of SDF controlled areas. Right. So if negotiations do not result in a kind of sustainable peace, there's still a high risk of armed conflict between.

[Martin DeCaro]

These different factions in the northwest part of the country. There's also this thing called the Syrian national army, which is a misnomer. This is a ragtag group of people that is backed by Turkey. Turkey, its air force has been dropping bombs in Syria this week. Israel and the United States have as well less attention paid to what Turkey is doing there. The Syrian national army, this function in.

[Safa Sechin]

Northwest Syria is primarily supported, backed by Turkey. And understandably, Turkey has been the country that has been impacted by this conflict to the largest extent. We're talking about 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. And there has been increasing political pressures on President Erdogan to return refugees. They try to facilitate diplomatic negotiations with Assad regime normalized relations. Those attempts have failed. And then they considered the military option and backing this opposition group. But they are also using these opposition groups in their fight against Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Turkey has two primary goals in Syria. First, facilitating the return of Syrian refugees. Most of the Syrian refugees in Turkey are from Aleppo, so some of them have already begun returning. And secondly, this fight against Kurdish autonomy. And this goes back to Turkey's fight against PKK, this Kurdish military group since 1980s. Turkey sees STF as an offshoot actually of PKK.

[Martin DeCaro]

People may be listening to this podcast months from now. So I don't want to get into too many current headlines. I'll just mention one happening this week from the New York Times. Fierce fighting underway between rebels supported by Turkey versus the US backed Kurdish led forces near Kobani, a town in northern Syria with historical and symbolic significance. So the civil war is not truly over.

[Historical Analyst]

The Nasser vision of a single great Arab nation collapses overnight as Syria revolts against his rule and proclaims Itself an independent state. Anti Nasser demonstrations broke out all through Syria After a pre dawn army coup ousted governing Egyptians who passed the word to Nasser that his republic.

[Martin DeCaro]

Okay, to the history of the Assad regime. You know, Syria is entering a new era now. We're not quite sure what it's going to look like and how long HTs might be able to hold on to power in Damascus. When Hafez Al Assad and his Baathists pulled off a successful Coup in the 1960s, he took full power in 1970. There had been a coup a few years earlier. That was also the end of an era, if you will, in the Arab world. Right. The Assad regime was replacing this Nasserite military officer class that had been ruling Arab states. Syria, Egypt, Iraq. It was called the office Officer State. But they made a mess of things, right? And they fell into disrepute, although Assad was an officer himself.

[Safa Sechin]

We need to understand the Arab Cold War here, right? And in order to understand the Arab Cold War, we need to go back to the, you know, the Egyptian Revolution. In 1952 in Egypt, King Farrokh gets overthrown by Mohammad Negib. And Gamal Abdel Nasser in a military.

[Historical Analyst]

Coup inspects officers and men of his country's rapidly expanding cavalry. The new strong man of the Nile who led the July coup of army officers that forced ex King Farouk into exile is building Egypt's military strength while carrying out land reforms. The eyes of the free world are on the well drilled and well equipped forces of General Nagib Egypt.

[Safa Sechin]

And in 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser becomes the president of Egypt. He is the ideologue of this Nasserism, right? You know that this whole ideology was named after him. This ideology promotes Pan Arabism, creating a united Arab state. Secular nationalism in the Arab world. And during the Cold War there are ideological tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States. And in the region now we have this new kind of layer of Cold War where you have secular republics versus monarchies. So monarchies are increasingly perceiving the secular republics as a threat. And in 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalizes Suez Canal, right? So when he nationalizes Suez Canal, that makes him a hero in the Arab world and he also wins the victory, right? So the French and British and Israelis, they invade in the Suez Canal, but the Soviet Union and the United States want them to pull out and they pull out. And it's a victory for Nasser and that makes him a hero in the world. Increasing influence. And then we kind of see his Influence bringing other Arab countries closer to Egypt. There is a United Arab State formed between Syria, Egypt and Yemen in 1958. That doesn't really last long.

[Martin DeCaro]

It's called the United Arab Republic Republic, exactly.

[Safa Sechin]

UAR. UAR collapses in 1961, you know, in 1963. Kind of connecting all of these developments to Syria. In 1963 there is a Ba'ath military coup in Syria. So the Baathist Party was formed in 1947 in Syria and Syria has been at the heart of this Ba'athist movement because all of the ideologues of the Ba'athists come from Syria. You were talking about Michelle Leflak, Zaki Al Suzi, all of these individuals are from Syria. So in 1963 they actually eventually staged a wholly like Baathist military coup and they banned all of the other political parties. So there's a single party system in Syria, but there are intra conflicts between the Ba'athist party. There is another military coup in 1966, as you mentioned, and eventually Hafez Al Assad, he was the Minister of Defense, he stages this kind of final Ba'athist coup in Syria in 1970 and consolidates the whole power in his hands.

[Martin DeCaro]

As they say, the rest is history. 54 years later, his family finally toppled from power. So yes, Hafez Al Assad, as you say, had to wage several internal battles before finally achieving full power in 1970. I'll just share something here from William Cleveland's book A History of the Modern Middle East. Assad, who was born in 1930 by the way, admired Nasser and supported the notion of Arab unity. However, he was dismayed over Egypt's domination of the union and was especially upset at Nasser's insistence that the Syrian Ba'ath Party be dissolved. Assad's outlook was not improved when he was assigned to a meaningless post in Cairo, presumably because the Egyptian authorities regarded him as a potential troublemaker. During Assad's time in Cairo, he became involved with other like minded young Syrian officers in a clandestine organization that plotted for the revival of the Ba'ath Party in their homeland. Their opportunity came in the two years of political chaos that followed Syria's secession from the UAR, the United Arab Republic, in 1961. So he was then at odds with the towering Nasser. Who are the Alawites, a Shia minority in a Sunni Islam country. How was this man able to achieve power coming from a small sect?

[Safa Sechin]

I will answer the question, but I want to add just one important thing on kind of the Arab Cold War. I Think it's important there's competition between Egypt and Syria for the leadership of the Arab world. There's also competition between Syria and Iraq for the leadership of the Arab world, like during the Cold War. So if you remember during the Iraq Iran war which started in 1980, Syria was actually supporting Iran. That was pretty much a power move in the region. Even like in the 1991 first Gulf War, Syria supported the US right. So I think we need to also understand the regional balance of power and Syria's attempt to kind of assert this leadership role in the Arab world. Their involvement in 1967, six day Arab Israeli war, 1973 Arab Israeli war. So they're attempting to assert their leadership role in their world.

[Martin DeCaro]

Assad the father, his primary foreign policy goal was war with Israel. And by 1991, I guess he had become so upset with Saddam Hussein he wanted to stick his finger in Saddam's eye. So he supported Operation Desert Shield or Operation Desert to kick the Iraqis out.

[Safa Sechin]

Of Kuwait, which actually created a lot of resistance in Syria itself. Because at the time a lot of Syrian galaxies were sympathizing with Saddam.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, I mean, you mentioned some important milestones on the way here. The 67 war, the 73 war. I mean, these were massive and humiliating failures for the Arab world, were they? Not?

[Safa Sechin]

Exactly. So they were humiliating for Syria as well. And definitely those failures or defeats undermined Hafz Al Assad's kind of assertion of leadership in the Arab world. And eventually in 1976 he gets involved in this Lebanese civil war to actually restore his regional power. Right. So in Lebanon there's a civil war which lasted like 15 years. He supports the Lebanese front, right. You know, the Maronite militias in order to weaken plo, Palestinian Liberation Organization and its leftist allies. So, and there is an invasion occupation of Lebanon by syria which lasted 30 years from 1976 to 2005 until the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon. And then Lebanese people demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops in Lebanon in 2005 and eventually Syria withdrew from Lebanon.

[Martin DeCaro]

Since you brought that up, what was Syria's interest in occupying and dominating Lebanon for so long?

[Safa Sechin]

Maybe the rise of PLO to poverty in Lebanon could have led to a kind of complete invasion of Lebanon. Right. So maybe he wanted to avoid that completely. That's kind of like one plausible explanation. And I think since this pro Palestinian cause was his main kind of political rhetoric, perhaps he didn't want to lose it. Like if PLO came to power in Lebanon, perhaps Assad would not Havz al Assad would not be in a position to own this whole cause, so to speak, for the Arab world. Because for a long time pro Palestinian activism and foreign policy has made kings in the Arab world. Right.

[Martin DeCaro]

So you're saying Hafez Al Assad, he was, he was married to the Palestinian cause. It seems like he had an ambiguous relationship with it. Based on what you just said.

[Safa Sechin]

The country fought two wars for the Palestinian cause, 1967 and 1973. But on the one hand, on the other hand, you know, he was fighting against PLO and leftists, its leftist allies in Lebanon. Right. So I think it's a very complicated situation here and it's difficult to explain.

[Martin DeCaro]

What did the Ba'athists believe in? They were socialists of a kind. Right?

[Safa Sechin]

Ba'athist ideology tried to integrate various elements of secular nationalism, socialism. They were nationalists, right. So Arab nationalists and they wanted to unite Arab world and they introduced a lot of socialist policies as well. In Syria, for example, Hafz Al Assad nationalized most of the industries and interestingly enough, Jelani has just commented on this and said that like he wants to open Syria to kind of free market in international investment. So like, you know, this idea is a free market are coming from an Islamist now in Syria. I'm not sure if they're going to actualize or not, but like, you know, this is just an Iranian products and I wanted to bring it up. So it was a popular ideology throughout the Cold War. You know, the Ba'athist parties emerged in Iraq and in Syria. So there was a fierce competition between these Ba'athist political parties. When we kind of come back to the question of Elavites in Syria, I think that's an important question as well. Let's also talk about hellovites as a religious community. So this is a branch of Shia sect of Islam, right? Alawites has this mystical interpretation of Quran, not literal interpretation of the Quran. Right. So a mystical interpretation of the Quran. They venerate Ali IBN Talib, Prophet Muhammad's cousin. And they believe that he was a physical manifestation of God on earth. And for a long time in the Muslim world. Historically, Elawites had been persecuted and marginalized, you know, subjugated in Syria during the French mandate, the French recruited Alawites, Jews and other religious minorities into the army because they thought they would be more loyal to them compared to the Sunni majority. Divide and conquer kind of policy in Syria. And then when Hafiz Al Assad came to power, as we mentioned, he's coming from this Alavite family in 1973, he introduces this secular constitution which leads to the uprising in Hama in 1976 and the Hama massacre in 1982. But most of the individuals that he puts into the positions of power in the military and intelligence come from Druze and Elavite families. So he played on the ethnic and religious differences in the country for a long time. He wanted to appeal to both the majority and minority groups. But the massacre in Hama in 1982 brought the regime into an open conflict with the Islamists. Right. So Islamists never forget about Hama that happened in 1982. If you have seen some of the images coming out of Hama today, like individuals were openly referring to the 1982 Hama massacre. So these are, you know, people were born in 1980s and grew up with the memories of the massacre. Right?

[Martin DeCaro]

History lives within all of us. That's 42 years ago, right? He is remembered even in the west, probably most of all for what he did in 1982, talking about Hafez al Assad, God the father here, murdering thousands of people, chemical weapons to put down that uprising. When he took power in 1970, according to William Cleveland, he did also want to govern in a cautious and more pragmatic way. As Cleveland writes, his pragmatism was evident in the moderate way he applied Baathist principles and in the attempts he made to broaden the base of popular support for his regime. Now, whether he was successful at this over time is another question. When he seized power in 1970, Syria's economy was predominantly agrarian based, and the country's leading cash export was cotton. During the first decade of Assad's rule, the economy shifted to one dominated by the service, industrial and commercial sectors, and oil replaced cotton as the main source of foreign exchange. Did Assad, while obviously there was no political or intellectual freedoms under his rule in Syria, he was a cruel dictator. Did he succeed at at least modernizing the country at all?

[Safa Sechin]

His success here is a relative term, right? So if you're comparing his success in terms of the ability to consolidate power and maintain an authoritarian rule in Syria, he has been really successful. And when Hawez Al Assad came to power, he was definitely a pragmatist leader, definitely understood the ethnic and religious tensions within the Syrian society. And then he was able to placate an appeal to, as I said, to minorities as well as the majority to some extent. So he initially, so like the land reform that he introduced, understanding the tensions between landed elites, city and urban elites, and peasants. So he's introducing land reforms to be able to get the support of the peasants, not only Elawites, but also Sunni peasants. Right. Most of the industries were nationalized, as I said, state subsidized education, state subsidized healthcare. All of these policies will also bring some level of support to the regime and the transformation from an agrarian society to an industrialized society. That might be a little bit of an overstretch. You introduced industrial policies, but I would say to a large extent, they failed. Syria is still a country that exports crude oil, right? So, like, you know, if you're talking about the Syrian economy, 1/4 of GDP comes from agriculture and 1/4 of GDP comes from oil exports. Right.

[Martin DeCaro]

So 1/4 from farming, 1/4 from oil.

[Safa Sechin]

Before the Syrian Civil War, most of the economic activities have stopped to a large extent during the. During the war. Right. So that the cities have been leveled. Right. So as you can imagine, and half of population has been displaced. Half a million people have been killed. So you can't have a stable economy in a civil war. But before the civil war, 14 of the Syrian economy was based on agriculture and 1/4 was based on oil. And today, most of the oil refineries in Syria are in eastern Syria in their azure, which was being controlled by SDF and recently captured by other opposition factions. Interestingly, President elect Trump made a comment the other day, and he said, we are in Syria also for oil because we're supporting SDF's fight against ISIS, which still remains in some parts of Syria. But also there are important oil resources in eastern Syria, which we want to protect. So Syria has never been a major oil exporter in the Arab world. To compare to Iraq and Saudi Arabia, oil revenues are not very high. But within its own economy still, you know, oil exports are important because 1/4 of GDP comes from oil exports.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, well, something else got in the way of Assad's plans, such as they were to improve the lot of ordinary Syrians, and that was his commitment to armed struggle against Israel. Diverted a lot of money away from domestic policy, domestic issues. Yeah, I'll just share another paragraph from Williams. William Cleveland here. He persuaded Syria's principal arms supplier, the Soviet Union, to increase the quantity and quality of weapons it provided. He launched a huge buildup of the Syrian armed forces that saw them grow from 50,000 in 1967 to over 400,000 in the early 1980s. Such an unprecedented expansion of the military was costly. By the early 1980s, Syria was devoting 20% of its gross national product to military expenditures. The Arms purchases strain the country's economy and, says William Cleveland, consume funds that might otherwise have been invested in domestic projects. Again, for what? Right, this illusion of defeating Israel and becoming, you know, the military or the most powerful leader of the Arab world.

[Safa Sechin]

This is the international aspect of this military investment. But there's also domestic side. Right?

[Martin DeCaro]

So that's right, he needs the military. He needs a strong military to maintain.

[Safa Sechin]

He is invading, investing in the military, but also in the security apparatus to surveil and also maintain a rule based on fear. So, like we're talking about thousands of people being capped in dungeons, in jails to make sure that masses do not revolt. This whole obsession with defeating Israel and also maintaining authoritarian rule within the country has made the regime to channel most of its economic resources to the military and made the country fail in other spheres of life.

[Martin DeCaro]

So Hafez Al Asad dies in 2000. He was about 70 years old when his son succeeds him. Bashar. He became the successor because another brother had died in a car accident. But when Bashar Al Assad takes power in 2000, there was some optimism about him. Right, here's from inside Encyclopedia Britannica. I want your thoughts on this before we wrap up. It says, although many Syrians objected to the transfer of power from father to son, Bashar's ascent engendered some optimism both in Syria and abroad. His youth, education and exposure to the west seemed to offer the possibility of a departure from what had been the status quo. An authoritarian state policed by a network of powerful overlapping security and intelligence agencies and a stagnant state run economy reliant on shrinking oil reserves. In his inaugural speech, Bashar Assad affirmed his commitment to economic liberalization and vowed to carry out some political reform. But he rejected Western style democracy as an appropriate model for Syrian politics. I wonder why, what happened? I mean, maybe this is a dumb question, but I don't know a lot about Syrian history. Why did the sun rule like the father?

[Safa Sechin]

These are all great questions, actually. Just going back to Hafiz Al Assad's plans for his potential successes. His initial thought was kind of appointing his brother Rifat Al Assad as his successor. But Refat Al Assad stages a coup against Hafiz al Assad in 1993 and he gets exiled. Perhaps Refahad Al Assad was his first choice then. The second potential choice as a successor was Basile, his oldest son, who died in a car accident in 1995. His third option is Bashar Al Assad. You know, Bashar Al Assad was not an experienced politician. He graduated from a university in Damascus, but he spent most of his time in London. He was an ophthalmologist.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's right. He was an eye doctor and had kind of a cosmopolitan upbringing.

[Safa Sechin]

Yeah, eye doctor in London. So all of a sudden, in 2000 when his father dies, he finds himself in a situation to take over the regime in Syria. He's not prepared for it. He initially works with the old guard of his father. Right. But he gradually replaces them and creates his own closed circle. And then when he comes to power in 2000, as you alluded to, he makes promises. So economic liberalization, political reforms, although he's not ready to introduce democracy, he's still trying to appeal to some of the demands by the public. Right. You know, economic liberalization and political reforms. He tries to deliver some of those. But I think during his first 10 years, right. We were talking about or 11 years from 2000 to 2011, he's not very successful. But there are breakthroughs in international relations of Syria, so to speak. You know, there's normalization with Turkey and then withdraws from Lebanon in 2005. Right. So he is following a different kind of foreign policy than his father to some extent, but he's not as much pragmatist, he's not as much experienced. When faced with the uprisings in 2011, he's initially shocked and he just applies the old book here, old playbook here.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, massive violence, torture.

[Safa Sechin]

Massive violence, torture. And uses the existing structures of intelligence and security apparatus in Syria and eventually the high hopes that the rest of the world had because he was a vast and educated, expected to kind of introduce serious reforms in Syria. And even the Sunni majority had high hopes. I remember those days, people were actually favoring him, they liked him, they wanted him to do things for the country, but he could not deliver those. And in 2011, if you remember the revolution, the Syrian civil war, the Syrian uprising started in Dara. Like there were like 15 school children who chanted anti regime slogans and they were detained and tortured. And this is how the uprisings spread from Dara to the rest of Syria.

[Martin DeCaro]

Syrian uprising started as peaceful demonstrations, peaceful demonstrations in the streets. And they were brutally.

[Safa Sechin]

And then they turned into a full blown kind of civil war in a matter of a few years.

[Rebel Leader]

Yeah.

[Martin DeCaro]

So Safal, we did cover a lot of ground here. Last question. It is hard to put the Assad dynasty, if you will, into historical perspective. We're just a week or so since Bashar went to spend the rest of his Life presumably enjoying the winters in Moscow. But looking back on this last half century of rule, it's hard to see any positive legacy.

[Safa Sechin]

That's true.

[Martin DeCaro]

Any positive legacy.

[Safa Sechin]

Syria gained its independence from France in 1946. Right. So the last French troops withdrew from Syria in 1946. And between 1946 and 1970, Syria had been in a political upheaval and experienced like seven military coups. Right. We're talking about like a country that experienced seven military coups. Like you know, in 14 years. Right. More than 30 cabinets. There wasn't political stability. Right. So the authoritarianism that was formed and maintained by Hafez Al Assad provided authoritarian stability for 54 years. Like if you call it stability, you know, it has come at the end of Syrians being displaced, tortured, persecuted and subjugated and all of that. So the hope is the creation of democratic stability in Syria. Ideally, that should be the next kind of phase or episode of Syrian history. But of course, if you are going to be realistic about this, we will see whether actually these hopes are going to be realized or not. But there are important differences and tensions between different factions. Human rights and democracy might not be the highest priority of some of these opposition factions. But I guess at this point, by way of a conclusion, we can say that it's a moment to celebrate for the Syrian people the fall of the regime. So we're Talking about a 13 year civil war and 54 year reign of Assad dynasty in Syria. But it's also realistic to think about what's going to come next and whether this of different opposition factions will be able to engineer peaceful transition and create a sustainable political system in Syria.

[Barack Obama]

At the same time, we will do our part to support their aspirations for a Syria that is democratic, just and inclusive. And we will stand up for their universal rights and dignity by pressuring the regime and Assad personally to get out of the way of this transition. All along, as we have worked to expand the circle of global condemnation, we have backed up our words with actions. As I've repeatedly said, it does take both words and actions to produce results.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next episode of History as it happens, are the winds of change blowing through Georgia, not the US State? The former Soviet republic protests as the central government there pulls away from its commitment to join the European Union. That is next as we report history as it happens. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign up at History as it happens dot com.