Jimmy Carter, the Shah, and the Ayatollah

Summary

History As It Happens: Jimmy Carter, the Shah, and the Ayatollah Episode Release Date: January 24, 2025 Host: Martin Di Caro

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Introduction

In this compelling episode of History As It Happens, host Martin Di Caro delves into the intricate dynamics of U.S.-Iran relations during the late 1970s, focusing on President Jimmy Carter’s tenure, the reign of the Shah of Iran, and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini. Through insightful interviews with historian Gregory Brew and an analysis of pivotal events, the episode unravels the historical threads that have shaped contemporary geopolitics in the Middle East.

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The Legacy of the Shah and U.S. Support

The episode commences by examining the legacy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, whose relationship with the United States began with the pivotal 1953 coup d'état that reinstated him to power. Brew explains, “By the late 1960s, the Shah had become much more autonomous than he was in 1953,” highlighting his efforts to balance U.S. support with a degree of independence (16:35).

Key Points:

• 1953 Coup: The U.S. involvement in toppling Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh solidified the Shah's power, establishing a long-term U.S.-Iran alliance.
• Autonomy and Modernization: The Shah pursued aggressive modernization and industrialization policies, fostering close ties with Western nations while maintaining a cautious stance towards Soviet influence.
• Military Aid: Throughout the 1970s, Iran's arms purchases from the U.S. soared, with Brew noting, “Iran spent $16 billion buying weapons from the United States” between 1972 and 1977 (30:32).

Notable Quote:

“The Shah was always conscious of how his government had been put into power and that if the stars aligned in a different direction, potentially another government would be put into power to replace him.” — Gregory Brew (16:50)

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Jimmy Carter’s Presidency and Foreign Policy Challenges

Martin Di Caro outlines President Jimmy Carter’s ascent to power in 1977 and his initial approach to foreign policy, particularly regarding Iran. Despite Carter’s reputation as a human rights advocate, his administration continued substantial military support to the Shah, a decision that would later come under intense scrutiny.

Key Points:

• Carter’s Dual Approach: While advocating for human rights, Carter maintained military aid to Iran, resulting in contradictory policies. Brew elaborates, “Carter more or less held position on most of what had characterized U.S. foreign policy with Iran” despite growing congressional and public criticism (02:21).
• Public Criticism: Carter’s 1976 debate remarks criticized the previous administration's extensive arms sales to Iran, stating, “Iran is going to get 80 F14s before we even meet our own Air force orders for F14s” (37:59).

Notable Quote:

“Carter more or less held position on most of what had characterized U.S. foreign policy with Iran.” — Gregory Brew (02:21)

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The Shah’s Declining Power and Rising Unrest

As the Shah's regime grappled with widespread dissatisfaction, Iran teetered on the brink of revolution. The episode details key events, including the infamous Jala Square massacre on September 8, 1978, where security forces violently suppressed peaceful protests, leading to international condemnation and exacerbating internal tensions.

Key Points:

• Jala Square Massacre: Security forces killed several hundred protesters, a turning point that galvanized opposition against the Shah (08:58).
• Economic Strain: The Shah’s relentless focus on modernization led to economic disparities, corruption, and inflated petrodollars, fueling public resentment.
• Religious and Political Opposition: Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as a central figure opposing the Shah, using religious influence to mobilize dissent (10:56).

Notable Quote:

“Now when an outfit like the international commission of jurists comes here and then comes out with a report saying that in spite of what you say, your majesty, torture continues… they have even accused Great Britain of acting against human rights.” — Jimmy Carter (04:17)

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The Iranian Revolution and the Shah’s Exile

The culmination of escalating unrest was the Iranian Revolution, which saw the Shah flee Iran in January 1979. Khomeini returned from exile in February, spearheading the establishment of an Islamic Republic that would drastically alter U.S.-Iran relations.

Key Points:

• Shah’s Exile: Under mounting pressure, the Shah left Iran for vacation from which he would never return, a move that destabilized the region further (02:21).
• Khomeini’s Return: Ayatollah Khomeini's return marked the definitive end of the Pahlavi dynasty and the onset of an Islamic Republic (09:53).
• U.S. Response: The Carter administration struggled to navigate the rapidly changing political landscape, ultimately supporting a provisional government that failed to stabilize the nation (10:56).

Notable Quote:

“We have no intention, neither ability nor desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.” — Jimmy Carter (11:47)

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The Hostage Crisis and Its Aftermath

One of the most defining moments of Carter’s presidency was the Iran Hostage Crisis, initiated by the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, shortly after the Shah was admitted to the United States for medical treatment. This event not only symbolized the collapse of diplomatic relations but also severely undermined Carter’s presidency.

Key Points:

• Hostage Siege: Sixty American diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444 days, becoming a symbol of Iran’s hostility towards the U.S. (00:34).
• Carter’s Dilemma: Carter’s decision to admit the Shah, despite the risks, was a critical factor leading to the hostage crisis. Brew reflects, “Carter was under a lot of pressure from Republicans… to let the Shah in because he had been an ally” (56:45).
• Diplomatic Failures: The crisis highlighted the structural constraints of U.S. foreign policy, where longstanding alliances hindered effective responses to emerging threats (13:23).

Notable Quote:

“The nature of these demonstrations shows that they're violent, they're nihilistic, they are working for world disorder, terrorism, and we are not a weakling that is going to fall.” — Jimmy Carter (03:36)

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Structural Constraints of U.S. Foreign Policy

Gregory Brew provides a nuanced analysis of how entrenched U.S. foreign policy structures limited Carter’s ability to negotiate effectively with the Shah and later with the new Islamic Republic. The continuity of policies from previous administrations created a framework that prioritized geopolitical stability over humanitarian concerns.

Key Points:

• Policy Continuity: U.S. foreign policy towards Iran remained largely consistent from Nixon to Carter, emphasizing strategic alliances despite human rights abuses (13:23).
• Limited Leverage: The U.S. was heavily invested in maintaining the Shah as a strategic ally, particularly for intelligence operations against the Soviet Union (27:49).
• Realpolitik: Decisions were driven by practical geopolitical considerations rather than ideological consistency, often leading to moral compromises (30:35).

Notable Quote:

“Our priorities ought to be, first of all, to meet our own military needs. Secondly, to meet the needs of our allies and friends.” — Jimmy Carter’s opponent (38:26)

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Lessons for Contemporary U.S.-Iran Relations

Concluding the episode, Martin Di Caro and Gregory Brew draw parallels between the historical U.S.-Iran dynamics and the present-day challenges. Brew speculates on the potential strategies of Donald Trump’s administration in 2025, emphasizing the unpredictability and enduring tensions that trace back to the Carter era.

Key Points:

• Enduring Tensions: U.S.-Iran relations remain strained, with historical grievances like the 1953 coup and the hostage crisis continuing to influence diplomatic interactions (55:47).
• Trump’s Strategies: The episode anticipates a return to a "maximum pressure" campaign, reflecting a hardline stance reminiscent of past policies but with new complexities due to Iran’s evolving geopolitical role (59:05).
• Unpredictable Outcomes: The uncertain nature of Trump’s approach introduces potential for both escalations and diplomatic breakthroughs, echoing the ambiguity faced by Carter (59:52).

Notable Quote:

“I don’t see a whole lot of scope for that [a positive relationship without the hostage crisis]. It’s sort of the defining trauma.” — Gregory Brew (58:35)

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Conclusion

History As It Happens masterfully reconstructs a critical period in U.S.-Iran relations, offering deep insights into how historical policies and pivotal events have reshaped the modern Middle East landscape. Through detailed analysis and expert commentary, the episode underscores the complexities of foreign policy decision-making and its long-term ramifications.

As Martin Di Caro aptly concludes, the legacies of Jimmy Carter’s decisions continue to reverberate, reminding us that history’s lessons are ever-relevant in addressing current and future international challenges.

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Next Episode Preview: In the forthcoming episode, the podcast will explore the contentious debates surrounding genocide, particularly focusing on the current situation in Gaza and its impact on scholarly discourse.

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Transcript

[Jimmy Carter]

In history.

[Gregory Brew]

It's the decisions made today that shape tomorrow.

[Jimmy Carter]

So don't wait.

[Gregory Brew]

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[Martin DeCaro]

History as it happens January 24, 2025 Jimmy Carter, the Shah and the Ayatollah.

[Jimmy Carter]

Political killing, torture, arbitrary and prolonged detention without trial or without a charge. These are the cruelest and the ugliest of human rights violations. Not the torture in the old sense of torturing people, twisting their arms and doing this and that. But there are intelligent ways of questioning. Ayatollah Khomeini returns to a country teetering on the brink of civil war.

[Martin DeCaro]

Jimmy Carter was hailed as an exemplary leader on human rights, a man whose presidency was ruined by crises outside his control, none worse than the hostages in Iran. This favorable view ignores what happened in the years before the US Embassy was seized in Tehran. When the new president acted like his predecessors, Carter embraced the brutal shah and then failed to reach out to Khomeini. What if Carter had made different moves? Would U S Iran relations be different today? That's next, as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Jimmy Carter]

No, we have not communicated directly with Mr. Khomeini. Our views have been expressed publicly that he support stability and an end to bloodshed in Iran. The tearful Shah of Iran left his country today on a vacation from which he may never return. Some 60Americans are now beginning their sixth day of captivity inside 222nd day of captivity, the 285th day of captivity. The government of Iran must recognize the gravity of a situation which it has itself created.

[Gregory Brew]

Carter more or less held position on most of what had characterized U.S. foreign policy with Iran. His administration supported selling advanced aircraft to Iran against congressional pressure. And this is where you know, as I noted before, there was increasing congressional criticism of US military aid to Iran by the mid to late 70s, based around the perception of the Shah as a human rights violator, but also based around the perception that Iran was a hostile petrol power that was trying to extort American consumers.

[Martin DeCaro]

Imagine a head of state, a monarch of a major US Client in the Middle east, visiting Washington, standing shoulder to shoulder with the President at A news conference near the White House and tear gas deployed by police to disperse nearby protesters is carried by the wind, causing them to dab their eyes with handkerchiefs. Totally embarrassing, right? Well, that's what happened in November 1978, when the Shah of Iran made a state visit to president Jimmy Carter's White House.

[Jimmy Carter]

This morning, our nation and its people are indeed honored to have visiting us from Iran.

[Martin DeCaro]

This audio was featured in the PBS documentary taken hostage.

[Jimmy Carter]

The nature of these demonstrations shows that they're violent, they're nihilistic, they are working for world disorder, terrorism, and we are not a weakling that is going to fall.

[Martin DeCaro]

Cops clashed with Iranian American protesters who were there to denounce the brutal shah, whose secret state security force, the Savak, had a notorious reputation for torturing regime opponents. In an interview with Mike Wallace on 60 Minutes a couple of years prior, the shah of Iran admitted SAVAK agents were operating in the United States.

[Jimmy Carter]

So you do have SAVAK agents? I hope so. In the United States. I hope everywhere to gather those informations. Now, when an outfit like the international commission of jurists comes here and then comes out with a report saying that in spite of what you say, your majesty, torture continues. How do they know? Well, they can't continue saying this, but you have. They have even accused Great Britain of acting against the human rights. We're talking for the moment about your country. They are putting us in the same category. In other words, you're saying you do what every country does. If torture is necessary, you torture. Not the torture in the old sense of torturing people, twisting their arms and doing this and that. But there are intelligent ways of questioning.

[Martin DeCaro]

Now, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Iran, was a son of a bitch, but he was our son of a bitch as Jimmy Carter toasted him just weeks later on a state Visit to Iran, December 31, 1977.

[Jimmy Carter]

Iran, because of the great leadership of the shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, your majesty, and to your leadership and to the respect and the admiration and love which your people give to you. The transformation that has taken place in this nation is indeed remarkable under your leadership.

[Martin DeCaro]

When president Carter died a few weeks ago, I did an episode about his one term in the white House, But I was intending to return to this subject because it holds valuable lessons for understanding U. S. Iran relations today to help us understand structures in U.S. foreign policy. The hostage crisis that began in November 1979 dominates memory of Carter's presidency Less attention is paid to the two years that preceded it. The Iranian Revolution began in early 1978. So why did Jimmy Carter, a champion of human rights, embrace the Shah? During his second debate with gerald Ford in 1976, the then governor of Georgia chastised the Ford administration for selling enormous quantities of weapons to the Shah.

[Jimmy Carter]

And I believe it's not just a matter of idealism. It's a matter of being tough. It's a matter of being strong. It's a matter of being consistent. Our priorities ought to be, first of all, to meet our own military needs. Secondly, to meet the needs of our allies and friends. And only then should we ship military equipment to foreign countries. As a matter of fact, Iran is going to get 80 F14s before we even meet our own Air force orders for F14s. And the shipment of Spruance class destroyers to Iran are much more highly sophisticated than the Spruance class destroys that are present being delivered to our own Navy. This is ridiculous and it ought to be changed. I believe that Governor Carter doesn't realize the need and necessity for arms sales to Iran. He indicates he would not make those. Iran is bordered very extensively by the Soviet Union. Iran has Iraq as one of its neighbors. The Soviet Union and the communist dominated government of Iraq are neighbors of Iran, and Iran is an ally of the United States. It's my strong feeling that we ought to sell arms to Iran for its own national security and as an ally, a strong ally of the United States.

[Martin DeCaro]

Well, President Carter would eventually agree with what President Ford had to say there as US Policy stuck with the Shah of Iran as he cracked down on demonstrators during 1978. As historian John Ghazvinian writes in his marvelous book, America And Iran, on September 8, 1978, the unthinkable happened. In Tehran's Jala Square, security forces open opened fire on a large crowd of peaceful demonstrators, while in the southern slums, helicopter gunships shot volleys down into the labyrinthine alleys. By day's end, several hundred people had been gunned down, one of the bloodiest incidents of regime violence in Iranian history. Images of the massacre made their way onto newspaper front pages and television news bulletins around the world. And even the Shah's most vigorous defenders sensed that he might be in trouble.

[Jimmy Carter]

Since there have been no opposition political figures to whom the masses could turn, they looked instead to their holy men for political leadership. He tells them the Shah should be arrested, tried for crimes against the state, and ousted.

[Martin DeCaro]

Recognizing his friend's predicament, President Carter tried to Help, but succeeded only in making matters worse. Immediately following the Jala Square massacre, Carter took time out from high level Arab Israeli peace talks he was hosting at Camp David and made a telephone call to the Shah assuring him he had the full support of the United states. And again, that is John Gasvinian. By early February 1979, the Shah was in exile, never to return, and a charismatic cleric, the Ayatollah Khomeini, was back in his home country leading the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini was being helped down the steps.

[Jimmy Carter]

Of his chartered Air France jet to set foot on Iranian ground for the.

[Gregory Brew]

First time in 15 years.

[Martin DeCaro]

Like the Shah, Khomeini was not an obscure figure to Western television audiences. While he was in exile in France, he sat for interviews.

[Jimmy Carter]

Good evening from Ponchartrain, France. For the last seven weeks, this small village 20 miles to the south of Paris has become the center of resistance to the Shah of Iran. It is the temporary residence of the man who symbolizes the religious opposition to the ship.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yet as Ghazvinian points out, officials inside the Carter administration knew little about the man. And after the Ayatollah returned to Iran, the Carter administration made little to no contact with him. As moderate reformers wrangled with Islamist hardliners for control of Iran's new revolutionary government.

[Jimmy Carter]

In accordance with the provisions of the Iranian Constitution, a change in government has now been accomplished under Mr. Bakhtiar, whose government we do support. The majilis, the lower house of Parliament and the upper house of Senate have approved his government and his Cabinet. We have encouraged to the limited extent of our own ability of public support for the bacteria government, for the restoration of stability, for the end of bloodshed and for the return of normal life in Iran. No, we have not communicated directly with Mr. Khomeini. Our views have been expressed publicly that he support stability and an end to bloodshed in Iran. And no matter what his deep religious convictions might be, and I don't doubt their sincerity that he permit the government that has now been established by the legal authorities in Iran under the Constitution to have a chance to succeed. We do know that the Iranian military and many of the religious and political opponents to the Shah have given their pledge of support to the back to yar government and that's our hope. And I would like to add one other thing. We have no intention, neither ability nor desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. And we certainly have no intention of forbidding other nations to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.

[Martin DeCaro]

Carter's decision in October 1979 to allow the cancer stricken Shah into the US for treatment is rightly remembered as the trigger for the hostage crisis that began the following month. Because U. S Iran relations have never recovered to this day. What if Jimmy Carter had gotten different advice or made different choices? Or maybe the better question is why did he feel constrained or trapped into making the choices that helped lead to the nightmare that sank his presidency? What are the structural constraints of US Foreign policy, the continuities from one administration to the next? Gregory Brew is a historian and a senior analyst at Eurasia Group. He is one of the sharpest minds following Iran and the Middle east today. The co author with David S. Painter of the Struggle for Oil, Autocracy and The Cold War, 1951-1954. Gregory Brew, welcome back, my friend.

[Gregory Brew]

Thanks so much for having me back.

[Martin DeCaro]

I've been covering a lot of presidential stuff lately. Jimmy Carter, Donald Trump's return, Joe Biden's departure. Now back to Jimmy Carter. I like to do this, I like to revisit subjects because it was really difficult when Jimmy Carter passed to cover every aspect of his life and times in a single episode. And this subject in particular really interested me because in many of the obituaries, many of the retrospectives on Carter's life, obviously the hostage crisis that began November 4, 1979, looms really large. Less emphasis is given to the two years or so of diplomacy, really decades of US foreign policy in the Middle East. I guess that's not entirely surprising. What are your general thoughts on that?

[Gregory Brew]

Well, I think it's true, and I don't think it's necessarily a mistake to say that the hostage crisis is one of the more important parts of Carter's legacy. It likely contributed to his defeat in the 1980 election, although there were lots of other factors. The economy wasn't doing very good, inflation was high. Carter's other policies on, you know, on energy, other aspects of his administration, it hadn't gone particularly well. But Iran features heavily in all of that. I mean, the energy crisis that was affecting the US in 1979, 1980, was caused by the revolution in Iran. And the sense of Carter as something of a weak president, something of an indecisive president, was also connected to his handling of the hostage crisis. But as you say, the hostage crisis, the storming of the US embassy in Tehran in November of 1979, it didn't occur in a vacuum. It certainly didn't occur without precursors. There was a long history of US Iranian relations going back decades. And you Know, there's a lot of context to understand the hostage crisis in, but I think you sort of hone in on one of the more interesting questions, which is that the hostage crisis wasn't the first crisis or first issue to affect Carter where Iran was concerned. It had been an important part of his foreign policy up until that point.

[Martin DeCaro]

The continuities between administrations over decades. In US Foreign policy, Carter hailed as a champion of human rights, although here he makes an exception for the brutal Shah of Iran, especially the son. His father was a strong man, too, but the son was a really ineffective leader. And I still think there are valuable lessons to extract from this episode, if you will, that can be applied to today. We'll get to today in the return of Donald Trump and maybe a maximum pressure campaign on Iran again. But to begin this story, Greg, we need to touch very briefly on 1953. On your first appearance on the podcast, we talked about the coup d'etat to topple Mohammad Mossadegh. Why is that relevant here? I mean, I guess the obvious answer is, well, that's how we get the Shah back in power, right?

[Gregory Brew]

Well, yeah, that's true. You said something interesting there, which was that on the point of the US Attitudes towards the Shah's human rights record and the Shah as an ineffective leader, there's some interesting context to delve into there. But I'll take your 1953 question first. I mean, the obvious connection. As you note, 1953 is the date in which the US supports the Shah coming back to power. It's really the beginning of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the beginning of his tenure as the unquestioned ruler of Iran.

[Jimmy Carter]

The rioters freed those taken prisoner earlier and stormed the House of Mosaddegh. Foreign Minister Fatimi gets through first. Reports that he was torn to pieces have not been confirmed. Meanwhile, the mob flocked the streets demanding the return of the Shah.

[Gregory Brew]

It's a little bit more complicated than that. But he was effectively the ruler of the country. He made all the major decisions. He led the government. And 53 matters to 79, because 53 was a moment of US intervention in Iranian politics. And a lot of what the rhetoric, positioning, the ideology of 79 was about, the reaction to that intervention and its perceived effect on Iran's history, on Iran's culture, on the rejection of the perceived Western influence over the Shah, in the sense that the United States infected Iran. There is this concept of Garb Zdegui, west toxification. The actual reality is a little bit more complicated. The Shah by 1979, by 1978 had established quite a degree of autonomy and independence from the United States, much to the chagrin and irritation of various US administrations. By the late 1960s, I would even say the Shah had become much more autonomous than he was in 1953. And he was looked to by the United States by Carter as well as Ford, Nixon, Johnson administrations as an important US ally, perhaps one of the most important US allies in the Middle east, but also something of an imperfect partner. The Shah had his own agendas, he had his own policies. We can get to a few of them in a moment. He took a lot of support from the United States. He bought a lot of U.S. weapons, he accepted a lot of U.S. investment. He was very eager to partner Iranian businesses with businesses of the West. He did all this to strengthen Iran and to strengthen his own government. Very often he looked at the United States with a degree of suspicion. And again, 53 was an important part of that relationship. The Shah was always conscious of the fact, and it's interesting he often thought of the British in these terms rather than the Americans. Was often conscious of how his own government had been put into power and that if the stars aligned in a different direction, potentially another government would be put into power to replace him. So he was always very conscious of that. And that affected his relationship with the US and his relationship with presidents, including Carter.

[Martin DeCaro]

This is not the only time that a client turns the table on the superpower. Right. And the superpower is not entirely in control of the client anymore. I mean, that's not surprising. And that's one of the morals of this story. The United States using a leader, a dictator for its own geopolitical aims. When that dictator and the people in his country have other ideas. It is an amazing fact of history that at one point, as you say, Iran was the most important American client or partner in the Middle East. Today it's Israel who is referred to in that manner. So let's go back to your point that you wanted to make about the Shah. He was a dictator or he was a monarch who exercised dictatorial powers. He had a secret police called the savak. How was he depicted by the Western media or how did he present himself to Western audiences?

[Gregory Brew]

Generally speaking, the perception of the Shah in the west, in the US probably by the mid-1960s, late 1960s and then by the 70s, was as a very powerful leader of an emerging country that was important in the so called third world, so called developing world or global South. You know, Iran was on the fast track of Industrialization as well as modernization in the 60s and 70s, largely thanks to the Shah's policies and the policies of his government. The Shah himself characterized himself as a modernizing monarch, a modernizing leader, a revolutionary monarch. He was also careful to distinguish himself as a Muslim. He went on the Hajj to Mecca. He talked about his beliefs, his spiritual side. And he also paid a certain degree of deference to the more sort of traditional aspects of Iranian society. But generally speaking, the attitude, the perception that the west had of him was as a modernizing figure and a figure who was modernizing in the pro west direction. You know, obviously in this period, the period of the Cold War, there are rivalries throughout the third World between the United States, the Soviet Union, Mach China to a certain degree about what modernization looked like, about what the proper sort of strategies of development were. And the Shah's Iran was seeing, was seen as a particular success story for the Western project of development. And a lot of that was sort of credited to the Shah's leadership. He was, as you say, a dictator. There were aspects of his regime that were dictatorial, repressive, Savak, the secret police being one of them, the lack of democracy. I mean, there were elections in Iran under the Shah, but they were essentially shams given that the political parties were managed by the Shah's government and that the Prime Minister didn't have power beyond what the Shah permitted him to have. So everything sort of came back to the person of the Shah, the person of the monarch. But he perceived, and this perception was shared by much of Western media, that this was all to a certain extent necessary to stabilize Iran, develop it along Western lines to ensure that it modernized. This would provide the necessary bulwark against the forces of revolution, the forces of communism. Generally speaking, the perception was positive. That changes a little bit in the 1970s, particularly around the issue of oil. The Shah was a price hawk. Iran, of course, was a major oil producing power, a member of OPEC. And in the context of the early 1970s energy crisis, the Shah emerged as a figure, you know, a certain negative figure in the West. Given that he was constantly pushing for higher oil prices. He never cut production or cut off the flow of oil to the west or to the United States. Those were the Arab states of opec. He was always happy to pump more, happy to sell more to the US but he made it very clear that it would be at a price beneficial to Iran and that price was much higher than what the United States wanted. And he gives interviews in the early 70s where he talks about this. And he says, like, oh no, the west has been made decadent by cheap energy and it's the job of Iran to impose a more suitable price to allay this balance.

[Jimmy Carter]

Have you seen, have you seen the lines of cars stretching for blocks, in some cases for miles, waiting to get gas? I have seen the pictures. And you cannot. But you have imported more oil than any time in the past. Well, not recently we haven't. You have. You mean we are still importing more oil than we were, let's say in September. You believe that? I can't say for sure.

[Gregory Brew]

So he was very confident by the 70s in his position, which of course would unravel quite quickly over the course of the second half of the decade.

[Martin DeCaro]

Control of oil assets in Iran, a very sensitive nationalist issue for Iranians. Of course, it was Mosaddegh who nationalized the oil industry, kicked the British out and that was the beginning of the end of Mossadeq. So you're right, the Shah did not join the 1973 embargo, but he did want to continue to sell his oil to enrich his regime and then purchase the best American weapons that were possible. I want to talk a little bit about the Nixon Kissinger visit to Tehran in 1972 and military aid to the Shah and why that was so important to him. But the Cold War, two things I want to return to the US media's perception of the Shah, but the Cold War as well. Why was Iran an important Cold War geopolitical peace? Because it was next to the Soviet Union. Was there more to it than that?

[Gregory Brew]

There's a little bit more to it than that, but geography was important. This sort of feels like ancient history. But Iran had a 1400 mile long border with the Soviet Union which was an important element in the Shah's foreign policy. He's regarded as a US client, he was regarded at the time as a US ally. But the Shah was also quite astute in managing relationships with Moscow. You know, he made a number of important foreign policy moves. He pledged to never allow US nuclear weapons on Iranian soil. That's a pledge he took seriously and it was meant as an olive branch to Moscow, you know, removing the perception from the Soviets that Iran could be used as a base for attacks against the Soviet Union. He also made a number of economic relationships with Moscow, energy deals, industrial deals. He agreed to pursuing a degree of normalization and degree of positive relations. At the same time. He was known to be an ardent anti communist. The Communist Party, the Tudor Party that had been active in Iran for decades was effectively wiped out under the Shah's government shortly after the coup of 1953, and it never recovered until the revolution of 79. He allowed the CIA to operate very, very important listening posts along Iran's border with the Soviet Union. These were listening posts that allowed the CIA, allowed the United States to collect very, very crucial intelligence on what was happening inside the Soviet Union, particularly in regards to Soviet nuclear tests. And this intelligence was regarded as so important that the director of the CIA in the late 60s went to Johnson and said, Mr. President, you know, we have to be careful of our relations with the Shah because he is allowing us to operate in Iran and if he rescinds that permission, we can't operate anymore and we're going to lose this intelligence. At the same time, Iran was perceived to be strategically important for two other reasons. For one, it wasn't an Arab country. Given that the politics of the Middle east, the diplomacy of the Middle east in the Cold War was primarily, I would say, centered around the issue of Arab Israeli conflict. The fact that Iran wasn't Arab meant that the Shah could maintain reasonable relations with Arab states as well as Israel. Iran was actually quite a close friend to Israel. The Shah was. He sold oil to Israel. There was a degree of intelligence cooperation between Mossad and Sabak. At the same time, the Shah could remain fairly neutral or fairly friendly towards Arab states. He famously sort of didn't trust Arab states, particularly Iraq. There was some murkiness in his relationship with states of the Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia. But generally speaking, the fact that Iran was not Arab, a little bit like Turkey in that sense, that it could maintain a balance in these different relationships. The third reason was oil. As you mentioned, Iran was both a major oil producer, but it was also the power in the Persian Gulf. Following the British departure in 1971, the British. This is another sort of long lost aspect of history. The British had been the military power in the Persian Gulf for decades. You know, for the first three quarters of the 20th century, economic problems, financial pressures and just a fact that the British were overstretched meant that in the late 1960s, the British government announced publicly that they were withdrawing, that they were pulling their military presence out of the Gulf. And this created a great sense of concern in the United States. What are we going to do without a guarantor of Persian Gulf oil? And the Shah very consciously stepped forward and said, iran will be the policeman. Iran will be the pillar for the West. We will maintain the security of the Gulf. We will maintain the security of oil flows. And in many ways this was a natural choice. Iran was the strongest country in the region. It had a large military, again largely equipped with U.S. western equipment. The Shah was perceived to be a strong leader with a close attachment to Iran's military. So when the British withdrew in 71, Iran formed part of the so called twin pillars strategy. Iran and Saudi Arabia were viewed by the Nixon administration as the necessary guarantors, the policemen of security in the Persian Gulf. And the Shah maintained that role until he fell from power in 1979.

[Martin DeCaro]

There were no US military bases in the Middle east in those days. Actually it was Jimmy Carter with the Carter Doctrine, his State of the Union address in 1980 who announced the militarization of the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf to protect the oil after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The Soviet Union never came close to entering Iran to take over the oil fields. Maybe we'll return to that in a little bit. You know, it's easy to look back and criticize. Well, it's always easy to criticize Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger foreign policy, but Carter too for making a big stink about human rights and then making this exception for the Shah. But information was important here, the way again he was depicted in the United States. I'll just share something from John Gazvinian's great book America and Iran, page 244. This is in the 1960s. American newspapers and television journalists portrayed the Shah as an enlightened monarch who is dragging his nation into the 20th century in the face of constant resistance from entrenched interests and reactionary forces such as landlords and religious leaders. The New York Times in 1967. The Shah has been instrumental in leading the country into the modern era through land reform and other progressive programs. Time magazine says the Shah has allowed considerable freedom. His once dreaded SAVAK is now little more than an intelligence gathering agency. By the way, the CIA helped train Savak agents. So Nixon and Kissinger, they visit Tehran in 1972. Why was this important?

[Gregory Brew]

So this was important, Martin, because it established that strategy that I mentioned before, this idea that Iran would serve as guardian of the Gulf. And an aspect of that relationship was, you know, what are we going to offer the Shah in return? We're asking him to undertake this mission. Granted this is a mission that he wants to undertake, but how are we going to do it? How are we going to facilitate this? The US side of this relationship was essentially to remove any kind of obstacles to the Shah acquiring high tech, non nuclear US weapons. So the Shah had wanted US weapons really ever since becoming Shah, certainly since the 1953 coup. Although he had put pressure on the US before 53, and the US had been fairly obliging, but always with limits, always with restrictions, largely restrictions built around Iran's political development. You know, there was a constant pressure on the Shah to liberalize Iran to allow for a greater degree of democracy, also to focus on issues such as the economy, the budget, and in return he would get the toys that he wanted. Well, those restrictions all fell away in 72. Kissinger and Nixon regarded the Shah's economic policies as successful. They also knew that by 72, the US really didn't have the leverage that it needed to push Iran in different directions. The Shah was sort of running his own show.

[Martin DeCaro]

This is real politic, then realpolitik.

[Gregory Brew]

Realpolitik, exactly. I mean, the US can only exert leverage where it has necessary means. And they didn't really have the means in Iran. On the other hand, they also saw the Shah as being a fairly reliable ally who had interests that aligned with the United States and the largest interest being maintaining security in the Gulf and keeping the Soviets out. So with that in mind, in 72, Nixon offered the Shah what is referred to as a blank check. Essentially, whatever weaponry you want to buy. And again, he was buying all this. Iran was flush with petrodollars by this point. So this wasn't a question of usa, this was simply a question of what military systems is the US Going to allow Iran to buy. You know, and Iran and the Shah made, you know, full use of this. He bought advanced fighter aircraft, air defense systems, destroyers for Iran's navy. He had great naval ambitions, other high tech radar equipment that he wanted to establish around Iran's borders, as well as lots of other things. The figure for US military purchases or US military sales to Iran in the 70s runs in the billions of dollars.

[Martin DeCaro]

I have it right here.

[Gregory Brew]

There you go.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, I'll just cite Ghazvinian's numbers here. As you also said, yes, in the billions, Iran's annual arms purchases from the United States was 113 million. Early 1970s, it jumps to 400 million in 71, then 2.2 billion in 1973, 4.4 billion in 1974. So we've gone from 400 million to 4.4 billion. From 72 to 77. Iran spent $16 billion buying weapons from the United States. As you say, the Shah did like his toys. He really liked F14s and F15 aircraft. While this was happening, there was Simmering discontent in the population right, communists on the left, Islamist traditionalists on the right, who had become a mistreated underclass under the Shah's father. It's not clear the US, US officials even knew this was going on.

[Gregory Brew]

Well, the story of where does the revolution come from, why does it happen, why does it happen when it happens and what could the US do about it? You know, these have been debated to death at this point. You know, the generations of scholars and experts have weighed in and my sense is, you know, it's a combination of factors. The Shah did spend a lot of money on development. The figures bear that out. Billions of dollars were spent on roads, dams, power plants, factories, large scale agricultural reforms, land reforms that occ in the first half of the 1960s. All of this was designed to spread the wealth and create self sustaining growth. The problem was, is that it wasn't executed very effectively. There was a high degree of corruption, much of it stemming from the manner with which the Shah ran his government. He didn't really allow authority to be practically delegated. He made a lot of the decisions himself. And in order to keep the various factions within his government happy, he distributed patronage. And the patronage very often came in the form of corruption. This was a problem that Iran had had before the Shah. And it got much worse as there was more money sloshing around the system. It's also an issue of, you know, what happens to developing states when they become flush with petro wealth. Very often they have trouble processing that amount of money quickly. Bottlenecks very quickly form inflation is an issue. A lot of the money ends up being wasted on projects that don't apply great deal of productive energy to the economy. So all of this was happening and at the same time it was happening in the context of the Shah's struggle to create a legitimate narrative behind his rule. I mean, one of the issues that emerged from the Mossadegh period that we discussed was that Iran's modernizing middle class that had driven Mossadegh's political project was effectively kneecapped by the 1953 coup. The National Front party that had been built around Mossadegh was essentially banned. It did exist in a sort of reduced form throughout the period, but it wasn't allowed to participate in politics. Nobody was allowed to participate in politics without the expressed permission of the Shah. And that meant that there really wasn't politics as we would understand it. There wasn't really space for political representation, political expression. Where there was space was in the seminary, was in the realm of Islamic Jurisprudence, clerics were still sort of practicing, were still preaching, were still writing. Given that continued tradition, given that continued ability, this was part of where the revolutionary energy ended up coming from. Because it didn't come from the middle class movement of Mossadegh, which had been sort of discredited by the 1953 coup. It came from the form of Islamist government that were coming out of the writings of Khomeini and Ali Shariati and others, as well as, as you mentioned, from the left. Communists, socialists, labor organizations. All of them were kind of filling the vacuum that the Shah had allowed to be created by not permitting liberalization, by not really allowing Iran's politics to advance beyond a state where sort of he could keep control. All of that becomes very problematic when the Shah is also dying of cancer and isn't really able to give the same kind of leadership, provide the same kind of effective decision making that you would have needed in that kind of period.

[Martin DeCaro]

He gets diagnosed sometime in the early to mid-70s. But the United States wasn't aware of it right away. That Islamist revivalism, if you will, wasn't just a factor in Iran that was sweeping across the Middle east during this period. We're talking in the 1970s. It's a reaction to decades of secular dictatorship.

[Gregory Brew]

The driving forces of the revolution in Iran come from the frustration with the kind of vacuity and emptiness that a lot of Iranians associated with the ideology of the Shah. That Pahlavism was just sort of an empty shell that something needed to fill it. The fact that the revolution happens the way that it happens, it's also stemming from the Shah's inability to really answer that question. Right? When he is challenged by a real challenge to his rule, he responds ineffectively and indecisively. There is repression and violence and also liberalization, right? There's an attempt to put a reformist or moderate government in charge, but at the same time, the military is being called in to put down protests. The Shah himself, who ideally would have steered this process, couldn't both because this was another period where he became sort of afflicted with his habitual indecision, but also because he was dying. I mean, he was, he was not a healthy man by 1978. That significantly affected, I think, his ability to. To navigate a very, very complicated situation. And at the same time, some of his generals, some of his strongest supporters, were saying, we can put this revolution down if we use significant force. And the Shah was never comfortable doing that. He was never comfortable doing what Bashar Al Assad did in Syria or what other military dictators have done in other countries. He wasn't fully comfortable with ruling entirely by the sword. And that's one of the reasons why he opted to leave Iran rather than sticking it out.

[Martin DeCaro]

So by the time Jimmy Carter enters the White House in January 1977, ordinary Iranians across the political spectrum, the more reform minded centrists, Western thinking centrists, communists on the left, Islamist traditionalists, they're all not very happy with the United States for the support of the Shah in the second debate. However, wind back the clock a little bit. In the second debate against Gerald Ford in 1976, Carter rips Ford and the Republican Party for backing the Shah and sending Iran copious amounts or selling, I should say Iran US military hardware.

[Jimmy Carter]

As a matter of fact, Iran is going to get 80 F14s before we even meet our own Air force orders for F14s. And the shipment of Spruance class destroyers to Iran are much more highly sophisticated than the Spruance class destroyers that are present being delivered to our own navy. This is ridiculous and it ought to be changed.

[Martin DeCaro]

Iranians heard or noticed Carter's remarks. How were his statements received by ordinary people there?

[Gregory Brew]

US Presidents had said similar things. In the context of his comments to Ford, it was reflecting a general, quite a general Democratic frustration with what was perceived to be Republican foreign policy or the, or the foreign policy of a previous era. Right. I mean by 1976 you've gone through the Church Committee hearings, you've gone through, you know, other hearings that have happened in the Senate about CIA assassination attempts. You've also gone through the energy crisis which again as I mentioned, Iran plays the role of the enemy in that crisis by charging very, very high prices for its oil. So Carter is delivering these criticisms in the context of the military government of Iran receiving all this help as not a successful policy. There is emphasis that he chooses to put on the issue of human rights. And this creates a contradiction obviously for US policy with Iran that Carter doesn't really do anything to address. There's a degree of pressure that's put on the Shah on the issue of human rights, but it doesn't go anywhere and it's understood not to be too strong. Right. The relationship between the US and the Pahavi government is too important to undermine.

[Martin DeCaro]

Over the issue of human rights, per John Ghazvinian. When news of that debate in 76 reached Iran and actuated a ripple of excitement in all corners. If Carter were elected, opposition activists believe he would put the Shah under major pressure to placate Carter, the Shah might feel compelled to restrain SAVAK from its worst abuses and allow a few critical voices to be heard. As it happened during the Kennedy administration, the Shah, for his part, fretted about the same thing. The last thing he wanted was another sanctimonious, untested liberal in the White House.

[Gregory Brew]

That second point, I think is important. The Shah did have concerns about Carter. He had always enjoyed working with the Republicans more. His relationship with the Kennedy administration had been a little bit more tense. He didn't trust anyone. He didn't trust any US President. He was often quite suspicious of what the US was trying to get him to do or if the US was trying to push him in a particular direction, hence his efforts to create autonomy and independence for himself. On the question of, you know, were moderates and nationalists excited about Carter? You know, I think that's. I think that's reasonable. You know, moderates and nationalists didn't have a tremendous amount of power exactly at this point. So it comes down to how did the Shah work, his relationship with Carter, and how did Carter respond to the revolution when it happens? I mean, those are the really important questions.

[Martin DeCaro]

The Shah, as it turned out, didn't have too much to worry about, because what does Carter do within the first weeks of taking office vis a vis Iran? Essentially, it reinforces US Policy as it had been. Right?

[Gregory Brew]

Absolutely. There is, and we've heard a lot of this. I think in the wake of Carter's passing. There are memories of what Carter did. There are ideas of who Carter was and what he represents that are not always 100% backed up by fact. Carter was a Cold War president. He had a Cold War national security team. There were divisions between his National Security Council and State Department over the finer points of policy. As had actually been the case under previous administrations, the State Department was often pushing for somewhat more moderate policies towards Iran, moderate in the sense of trying to get Iran to liberalize in exchange for receiving weapons. But Carter more or less held position on most of what had characterized U.S. foreign policy with Iran. His administration supported selling advanced aircraft to Iran against congressional pressure. And this is where, you know, as I noted before, there was increasing congressional criticism of US military aid to Iran by the mid to late 70s, based around the perception of the Shah as a human rights violator, but also based around the perception that Iran was a hostile petro power that was trying to extort American consumers. Carter held this position in the face of external and internal pressure. And I think, you know, it's True, The Shah didn't really have that much to worry about. At the end of the day, this relationship was too important to change around human rights. The issue though, however, was Carter and the US in general wasn't in the kind of position to intervene once it became clear that the Shah was on his way out.

[Martin DeCaro]

The shah visits Washington November 1977. So we're nine, 10 months into Carter's really 11 months into Carter's administration, he's in Washington and there are anti Shah protesters on the streets. The police fire tear gas, the wind carries it over to where Carter and the Shah are speaking in public. There's a photo of the Shah having to take out a kerchief to wipe away the tears in his eyes because the tear gas is affecting him. He goes back to Iran really now feeling confident that he can do whatever he wants. And the shock continues. A crackdown on regime opponents. So that's November 1977. Why does then Carter feel like it's necessary for him to visit Tehran the next month, New Year's Eve 1977?

[Gregory Brew]

Well, some of this comes down to the nature of diplomacy. If I am a head of state and I visit you, the understanding is that you as a head of state will visit me at some point. The other aspect of it was that there were negotiations taking place around the sales of advanced weapons. I believe they were F16 fighter aircraft, AWACs, advanced sensor and intelligence gathering aircraft. So some of that was still being worked out. Carter's effort was also to, if not placate the Shah, then assuage his concerns that the US had his back. And a state visit was a good way to do that, particularly a state visit coming after the Shah state visit. So some of this comes down to sort of the niceties of diplomacy. At the same time, Carter was still trying to work out a personal relationship with the Shah. The Shah was one of these world leaders who had been around for so long and had had relationships with seven or eight presidents at this point, establishing a personal rapport was important. It was important for Carter, it was important for his national security team, and it was important for the Shah. December 1977. Carter's only been president for, you know, 10 months and the state visit is an effort to advance that kind of relationship. Neither of them knowing what kind of pressure it would be under within just a few months.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's right. And the Shah at this time is still received or depicted in very positive light in the US press. So Carter gives this really cringe worthy looking back on it now Toast to the Shah, praising him with platitudes about a wonderful guy and what a strong leader he is. The revolution begins not just because of the toast, but the revolution begins just weeks later. Religiously inspired Iranians take to the streets. We talked about some of the currents in Iranian society, the centuries, or the pragmatists or the Western reformers. You had the Communists on the left. They had a different aim of what kind of society they wanted to live in. But here you have religiously inspired Iranians, conservatives who are upset at the Shah's decadence, taking to the streets. They want him gone. How does the Carter Administration respond to the growing unrest? Were they even aware of what was going on in Iran? As 1978 unfolds, the sense of what.

[Gregory Brew]

Was happening inside Iran from the US had significantly declined in the sense that the US Embassy, the CIA, others, didn't have the kinds of sources that could provide them with accurate information. Really understanding the degree of unrest, instability inside the country, which the US had previously been able to do, wasn't really there. Now, as a historian, I've always been a little bit conscious of not having the full picture of 1978. Records from that period haven't been fully declassified, particularly records from the US Embassy, which I should note was a pretty significant institution inside the country. It had a large staff, it had significant resources. When I've worked on US Iranian relations, I've primarily worked on the period coming up to this period, in other words, up until the late 1960s. And I've often been struck by the complexity and nuance that the embassy, State Department, CIA was able to put in its official reports and its. Its findings on the situation inside Iran. There's, generally speaking, quite a high level of understanding of the country's domestic politics. Were they able to accurately predict revolutions? No. But there are a number of reports from the embassy in the 1960s saying if the Shah doesn't turn this around, eventually there are going to be problems. Right. His basis of support is small. The military is largely in charge. Corruption is rampant. There are various classes of society are unhappy. I don't think they were fully conscious of the existence of Islamist political ideology and how that would serve as an engine for change. But I've read reports from the 60s saying, like the seminaries in Qom are often very critical of the government. They're allowed to be because cracking down on the seminaries is a little tough for the government to do. And there's this understanding that most clerics won't become political. But the embassy and the State Department was often one of the key voices in various administrations, warning that US Policy towards Iran was not sustainable, that eventually the Shah's house of cards would come tumbling down. Now, in 78, what we know is that the Carter administration was essentially responding to events, that there was this sense that the wheels were sort of coming off, that the Shah didn't have a good sense of how to handle the situation. So you have seminaries and university students who are in various states of unrest. You've got police forces cracking down, making arrests, then releasing people. You have the Shah occasionally making gestures to moderate, allowing moderate figures back in the government. He fires his longtime prime minister or his longtime loyalist prime minister and chooses a moderate figure. He's trying to assuage public discontent, but at the same time, he's cracking down. The US Reaction is mostly, we'll just have to see how the Shah handles this.

[Martin DeCaro]

Right.

[Gregory Brew]

There's not really this discussion about what are we, the United States, going to do about this revolution in Iran until very late in the year.

[Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. November of 78 is when the ambassador, William Sullivan, first informs Washington that the Shah's rule might be coming to an end. And that is stunning for the Carter administration back at the State Department and inside the White House. Yes, there was a massacre September 8, 1978, at Jala Square. A lot of blood was spilled. It wasn't like President Carter didn't know this happens. But he sticks with the Shah. And also something else very important I have to introduce into the conversation now these religiously inspired Iranians who are protesting. They had been imbibing tape recordings of the Ayatollah Khomeini who was in Iraq. He had not been in Iran for a long time. He had been exiled, if you will, I guess, to Iraq. And his tape recorded sermons were being smuggled, if you will, back over the border into Iran. This is where the Shah makes a really important decision that would come back to haunt him. They exile, with the agreement of Saddam Hussein, exile Khomeini to France, where he's then able to host Western media and he becomes even more popular. So the wheels are coming off the regime in late 1978. You have the State Department telling the Carter White House, you know, maybe we need to start exploring other options here. The Shah might not stick around. You have Brzezinski and the hardliners who are telling Carter, no, the Shah is our friend, he's our ally. You have to stick with him. Gregory Brew, what realistic options did Carter have available here in the closing weeks? Of 1978, there were three options.

[Gregory Brew]

Well, maybe four. The first option was stay the course, support the Shah in whatever he decides to do. The Shah, by this point, had appointed a new government under Shapur Bakhtiar, who is a former member of Mossadegh's National Front. It was seen as being a moderate figure. And there was this sense in the US that, well, maybe this is the Shah showing a willingness to step back and allow a degree of democratic government to fill the void. Maybe we just sort of stand by and let him do that. There's also a second option, which is support hardliners within the Shah's government and enforce a crackdown. In other words, lean on the Shah to use repressive machinery to put the revolution down. Now, there are some documents suggesting that this was actually the policy words exchanged by Sullivan with the Shah, where Sullivan suggests that the Shah should be willing to use any instruments he has necessary to put down the revolution. Now, again, the Shah chooses not to do this. There's also likely, had the US and the Shah agreed to sort of back this policy, there's the possibility that there could have been defections and revolts from within Iran's military. It's unclear whether the military was really prepared to do this kind of thing to the Iranian people. The third option which was explored was getting the Shah out and backing a new military government, essentially another military coup. 53 had been a military coup. The Shah had served as a figurehead for what was essentially a new military government. The issue for the Carter administration was there was really no one in the Shah's military who could lead a new government. There was very little confidence that the military had what it took to assemble a new government or work with Paksiar and others within the Shah civilian government. The other option was get the Shah to go and let Khamenei back into the country and sort of watch what happens. And this is essentially what they do. And it gets to the issue that I mentioned before, which is that the US didn't have a ton of leverage or control over what was happening in Iran.

[Martin DeCaro]

And it seems like Carter was really grasping here because as late as December 12, 1978, at a news conference, he expresses his ongoing support for the Shah At a news conference, basically, we're sticking with this guy. It's gonna turn out okay. But the Shah does leave. February 1, 1979, or I should say, the Shah is convinced it's time to get out of the country. February 1, 1979, the Ayatollah does return to Iran, first time in 15 years. How is that received in Washington? Did the Carter administration say, all right, let's reach out to this guy and see what he has to offer?

[Gregory Brew]

Well, the Carter administration's attitude towards Khomeini was more. They saw him more as a social figure, a political, cultural figure. They had very little, and I think this was actually quite widely held. There was little sense that Khomeini would come and erect a new government around himself. He was seeing as the most important resistance figure, but he was, from the point of view of the Carter Administration, it was seen as vital that Khomeini would be allowed back in the country. Because if he wasn't, that meant more violence, that meant more instability. So once it was clear that there could be a degree, a modus vivendi between moderate nationalists and Islamists, once Khomeini was back in the country, then the US Attitude was essentially, okay, we should sort of allow him back in. But again, I would hesitate again to say we don't know the full picture until everything's been declassified. But the US May not have been in a position to do very much about Khomeini getting back into the country. Right. Standing in his way would only further inflame the revolution, would only further endanger US Interests. There was a degree of openness also inside the Carter Administration with Khomeini because it was clear he wasn't a communist, it was clear he wasn't a Soviet leader. And when you study U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War, you realize that there is a certain flexibility in backing governments in the Third World because for the United States, the first priority was keeping the Soviets out. So if an Islamist cultural figure, you have the Shah leaving, which looked inevitable because he was increasingly weak. The military is still present, the civilian government is still functioning. And the attitude from the Carter Administration is this is something we can work with as a best case scenario rather than allowing the situation to deteriorate in a way that would significantly threaten U.S. interests inside the country. That was their understanding in early 79. Obviously, everything changes by the end of the year.

[Martin DeCaro]

We're still living with the results of what happened in that year. U.S. iranian relations have never recovered. So as you say, 1979 is unfolding. There's a provisional government of technocrats and reformers. There's also the Islamic Revolutionary Council at odds over how to run the country and who should ultimately wield the most power. But as the spring and the summer are unfolding, the state of relations with the US Is not entirely defined and still the US Administration's not reaching out to Khomeini.

[Gregory Brew]

Correct. There was hesitation to build any kind of relationship until they knew what kind of government Iran would have. Publicly, there is no outreach to Khomeini. There may have been more going on behind the scenes. Again, we don't know. We don't have the full picture. But the official attitude of the US Is we need to take it slow and we need to preserve what we have. Because there were huge US Investments in Iran. There were lots of Americans there. There were U.S. businesses that were based there. There was the Iranian status of the guardian of the Gulf. All of this is up in the air in 79. And rather than take action that might imperil those positions in those assets or complicate relations further, the US Ends up sort of watching and waiting to see what happens while exploring the opportunities potentially of working with a new Islamist government. And I don't think they fully anticipated that the new regime would be as hostile to the United States as it ends up being. And they didn't anticipate the kind of effect that a crisis like the hostage crisis would have on U. S. Iranian relations. There is a world. I'm not saying it's very likely, but there is a world where the Islamic Republic emerges in 1979 and is able to work out a degree of relations with the US without the impact of the hostage crisis. But given the amount of anti Western, anti American rhetoric that was infused within the revolution, I don't see that as being super likely. Also, given the US Role and its identity as one of the primary backers of the Shah's regime, it would have been an uphill fight.

[Martin DeCaro]

Now, there was lingering distrust still over 1953. Yes, that the US might swoop in here, derail the revolution, undo the revolution, and put the Shah back into power. So the Shah during this time is bouncing around from country to country kind of in an undignified way, trying to find a place to stay. And then he does reveal the news that he's dying from cancer and he wants to go to the United States for treatment. Carter had turned the Shah down earlier in the year because he was actually worried about the safety of the personnel in the US embassy. He relents in late 1979. To make a long story short, he's under a lot of pressure from Republicans to let the Shah in because he had been an ally. I guess, Greg, it's really hard to overstate the significance of this decision. After this year where it was very fluid, who knows how this new government's gonna behave whether we can have a relationship with it. But after that decision on October 21, the embassy is stormed just a couple of weeks later. It's really hard to overstate the significance of that turning point.

[Gregory Brew]

I completely agree. And I also should say that Carter was under a lot of pressure from Republicans. He was under pressure from members of his own administration. And the message was essentially like, if we don't let the Shah in, the message we're sending to any of our other allies is we'll back you until we don't. We're not as good as our word when it comes to supporting your position, your security. Because naturally there are lots of US Allies who are looking at the situation in Iran with a great degree of concern. You can argue whether this was justified or not. But there was concern within the Carter administration that if the Shah was not allowed in to receive medical attention, that this would imperil US Relationships elsewhere. It's not necessarily a one to one. Yes, the students storm the embassy in response to the Shah being permitted into the United States. But the storming of the embassy was also. It was designed to do a lot. It was designed to demonstrate the power of the revolution. It was designed to demonstrate the independence of the students groups, specifically, not only independence against the US but independence within the revolution. There's evidence to suggest that Khamenei did not know that the students were going to storm the embassy and that he may have opposed it until he didn't. Actually, storming the embassy was not meant to be permanent. The original plan was to storm it, hold it for some time, and then leave again. This is based on some evidence. So had the US not allowed the Shah in, would the hostage crisis still have happened? Possibly. Did it have to happen because the Shah was permitted into the United States? It's difficult to say. And then finally, the point I made before. Could the US and the Islamic Republic have had a more positive, more functional relationship without the hostage crisis? I actually don't see a whole lot of scope for that. It's sort of the defining trauma. But the two governments were not on the best of terms before, and we're not really progressing towards having the kinds of relationship that they might have had. So in some ways, the crisis accelerates a process that likely would have happened anyway.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's a great point. Final thing, and this is the lasting or enduring lessons or consequences of what we've been discussing here. The continuities between presidential administrations, the structures of US Foreign policy had a way of trapping Carter in a situation where the shah was his guy and it was so hard to drop him. So we'll fast forward now to 2025, and US Iranian relations are still pretty bad. Donald Trump is taking office. What are your expectations for him vis a vis Iran?

[Gregory Brew]

There's a degree, there's a high degree of uncertainty stemming from, I think, three things. One, Trump is unpredictable. You can never know for sure what he's going to do.

[Martin DeCaro]

You don't say.

[Gregory Brew]

We're only two days into the administration and there's already been a number of surprises. The second is the state of affairs is critical. Iran is in a weakened state. There is grave concerns that it could develop a nuclear deterrent based on this weakness. There is similar concern that Israel is considering a military strike against Iran to remove this threat, and that in order to do so, it will look to the United States for support. There's a degree of uncertainty over whether Trump will engage in diplomacy with Iran. This would have been unthinkable in his first administration. But the Iranians are signaling quite clearly that they want to talk. Trump himself is known as a dealmaker, is known as a transactional figure.

[Martin DeCaro]

That's how he likes to see himself. Yeah.

[Gregory Brew]

So I think, you know, there's lots of unknowns here. I would offer up a prediction that we're going to hear a lot of talk about maximum pressure from the United States. We're going to see a return to maximum pressure. The immediate US Stance on Iran will be we're going to get tough. And it's not only because the Trump administration has a tough policy on Iran. It also wants to look tough after the perceived failures of the Biden administration. That will be the first priority. We're being tough because Biden couldn't be tough. Whether that leads to a deal or whether that leads to a military escalation between Iran and the US And Israel right now looks uncertain. One thing that is a little bit of a ticking time bomb is the state of Iran's nuclear program. They are very close. They haven't made the decision to build a bomb yet, but their program is advanced to the point that if they made that decision, they'd be able to build a bomb fairly quickly. And the mechanisms of the original nuclear deal that was signed in 2015, most of them expire in October of this year. So what happens after that is even more uncertain. So we're going to have to wait and see. There's a degree of unpredictability. There is the chance that things could get worse before they get better, but with Trump, you can never be entirely sure.

[Jimmy Carter]

I was profoundly impressed, again, not only with your wisdom and your judgment and your sensitivity and insight, but also with the close compatibility that we found in addressing this difficult question. As we visit with leaders who have in their hands the responsibility for making decisions that can bring peace to the Middle east and ensure a peaceful existence for all of us who live in the world, no matter where our nations might be, it's important that we continue to benefit from your sound judgment and from your good advice. As I drove through the beautiful streets of Tehran today with the Shah, we saw literally thousands of Iranian citizens standing behind inside the street with a friendly attitude, expressing their welcome to me. And I also saw hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of American citizens who stand there welcoming their president in a nation which has taken them to heart.

[Martin DeCaro]

On the next episode of History As It Happens, the question of genocide revisited and how the debate over what's happening in Gaza has caused a rift among genocide scholars. That is next, as we report History As It Happens. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. And sign up for my [e-mail] you'll get it every Friday.