History As It Happens

Episode: Kai Bird on Bob Ames, Reagan, and the Two-State Solution

Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: Kai Bird
Release Date: October 10, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode explores the origins and lost opportunities of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through the story of CIA officer Robert "Bob" Ames. Pulitzer Prize-winning historian and journalist Kai Bird joins host Martin Di Caro to discuss Ames' clandestine work, his relationship with the PLO, Ronald Reagan’s policy initiatives in the 1980s, and the repeated diplomatic failures that reverberate in today's Middle East crisis. Using the life and tragic death of Ames, the conversation sheds light on the long roots of peacemaking, the importance of personal empathy in diplomacy and intelligence, and why pathways to a two-state solution have repeatedly been missed.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

Bob Ames: The "Good Spy" and the Intelligence Origins of the Peace Process

• Personal Connection

  • Bird recalls childhood memories living across from the Ames family in Saudi Arabia, unaware that Ames was undercover CIA (11:26-12:48).

    "I picked up the newspaper and read about the embassy bombing in Beirut and where it was announced that one Robert Ames had died...and that he was in fact a very high ranking CIA officer at the time." – Kai Bird (12:00)

• Secret Beginnings

  • The peace process with the PLO began as a clandestine intelligence operation; Ames used informal channels to build a bridge to the PLO starting in 1969—despite US policy forbidding official contact (13:10-16:29).

    "Ames had been encouraging Ali Hassan Salameh to think about achieving their Palestinian goals in a political context. To give up the gun, to give up revolutionary politics, to give up terrorism." – Kai Bird (15:46)

• The Oslo Connection

  • The Ames-Salameh channel foreshadowed later public breakthroughs, planting early seeds for the Oslo Accords.

    "I argue in the book that it's quite clear this friendship planted the seeds for what later became the Oslo peace process." – Kai Bird (15:11)

Complexity and Empathy: Understanding Bob Ames

• Rare Arabist in US Government

  • Ames learned Arabic out of personal fascination, becoming one of the few Arab speakers in US intelligence (20:27-22:29).

    "He had a fascination for just the beauty of the language. And he began to teach himself Arabic ... that's not surprising that he would just sort of have a natural affinity or sympathy for the Palestinian plight." – Kai Bird (21:35)

• Intellectual Approach to Policy

  • Ames was not an ideologue but someone who, due to his linguistic and cultural immersion, recognized the Palestinian predicament and saw diplomacy as possible by building trust (19:57-22:29).

• CIA's Linguistic Blind Spots

  • Even on the eve of 9/11, shockingly few Arab speakers were in the CIA (22:35).

1970s Shifts: Black September, Jordan, and Lebanon

• Internal CIA Conflicts

  • Ames contended within the Agency, suggesting the US should consider supporting a Palestinian state in Jordan, a view dismissed by policymakers (24:18-26:22).

• Missed Opportunities

  • Bird emphasizes how repeated unwillingness to break political taboos—first with the PLO, later with issues like settlements and two states—became historic missed chances for peace.

    "If it had happened, you know, this is a counterfactual in history. If it had happened, it might actually have paved the way for a solution..." – Kai Bird (25:54)

Reagan, The 1982 Lebanon War, and the Proposal for Palestinian Autonomy

• Reagan’s Initiative

  • Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and subsequent withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut in 1982, Reagan launched a peace proposal—crafted with input from Ames, who slipped a copy to Arafat ahead of Reagan's speech (3:30-5:39, 39:14).

    "Bob Ames had helped Reagan speechwriters and the President didn't know Ames managed to get Arafat a copy of the proposal before Reagan went on TV." – Martin DeCaro (4:24)

  • Reagan called for Palestinian “autonomy” but stopped short of endorsing an independent state, proposing a five-year transitional period per Camp David Accords, and controversially suggested an Israeli settlements freeze (5:05-6:01).

• Israeli and PLO Reactions

  • Speech was well received—except by Israeli PM Menachem Begin, who was furious (6:01-6:19).

  • The Israelis intended to permanently eliminate PLO influence in Lebanon and hoped, by shifting the PLO out, to isolate and eventually annex the West Bank (34:37-37:45).

  • Memorable Moment:

    "Israel must have learned that there is no way it can impose its own solutions on hatreds as deep and bitter as those that produce this tragedy." – Ronald Reagan (44:01)

The Aftermath: Violence, Missed Chances, and the Importance of Human Intelligence

• Embassy Bombing and the Rise of Hezbollah

  • Ames was killed in the April 18, 1983 bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, marking a deadly new phase in US–Middle East relations and the emergence of Hezbollah (8:33-9:44, 45:42).

    "It was the beginning of America's deadly encounter with a political Islamist movement. It was also the birth of a Shiite political entity that we now know as Hezbollah." – Martin DeCaro (8:33)

  • Bird emphasizes how Iranian Revolutionary Guard operatives, notably Ali Reza Askari, were the masterminds, involving a young Imad Mughniah (precursor to Hezbollah) (47:31-49:29).

    "It turned out to be not Arabs, but Iranian Revolutionary Guard intelligence elements...Ali Reza Asgardi ... organized this truck bomb attack both of the embassy and later of the Marine barracks." – Kai Bird (45:42)

• The Value of Personal Relationships and Empathy

  • Bird highlights the unique role of intelligence officers in diplomacy—building human trust, not replaceable by technology—and laments today's lack of investment in "human intelligence" (50:19-51:47).

    "You can't be friends with a drone." – Martin DeCaro (51:47)

The Shadow of Oslo and Present-Day Resonance

• Oslo’s Symbolism and Aftermath

  • Bird opens his book with colleagues of Ames at his Arlington grave during the 1993 Oslo signing, linking Ames' secret efforts to that public breakthrough, and the tragedy that followed as peace unraveled (17:47-19:22).

  • Notable Moment:

    "It was a perfect cinematic opening for the book to introduce the characters and to introduce the significance of Robert Ames." – Kai Bird (18:39)

• Empathy in Leadership

  • Bird contrasts Reagan’s conditional empathy for Palestinian suffering, moved by media images, with what he sees as the absence of empathy from more recent American leaders (42:05-43:22).

    "Trump and his people have no empathy at all for the Palestinian cause... Terrorism is the weapon of the weak, and they use terrorism to provoke the state to create worse crimes than the original terrorism. And that's exactly what Hamas has achieved in Gaza." – Kai Bird (42:14)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Missed Opportunities:

  "This story is about missed opportunities. Missed opportunities in 1970, missed opportunities in 1979 when Ali Hassan Salameh is assassinated..." – Kai Bird (31:19)

• On Human Intelligence:

  "The lesson of the missed opportunity...also underscores the importance of human intelligence in the making of foreign policy...To do that, you have to know the language, you have to know the history of your target, and you have to have some empathy." – Kai Bird (50:19, 51:47)

• On Oslo and Ames’ Legacy:

  "He created the relationships that led to OSLO diplomacy in 92, 93. Unfortunately, in these days of high tech intelligence... they haven't invested, as the agencies used to be known, in human intelligence." – Kai Bird (51:47)

• On the Cruel Irony of Ames’ Death:

  "He wanted to solve the dilemma of the Arabs in the Middle East, Bob Ames, was killed by Arab extremists...It turned out to be not Arabs, but Iranian Revolutionary Guard intelligence elements." – Martin DeCaro & Kai Bird (45:42)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Ames’s Early Life & Kai Bird’s Personal Connection: 11:11-12:48
• Origins of PLO Backchannel & Intelligence-Led Diplomacy: 13:10-16:29
• CIA, State Department, and the Lack of Arabists: 22:29-23:04
• Jordanian Civil War, Black September & Internal CIA Feuds: 24:18-26:22
• Reagan’s 1982 Peace Proposal & Reaction: 3:30-6:19, 39:14-41:26
• Embassy Bombing, Iran's Role & Hezbollah’s Emergence: 8:22-9:44, 45:42-50:03
• Camp David’s Legacy & Settlement Policy: 32:57-37:00
• Bird’s Reflections on Ames’s Legacy & Human Intelligence: 50:19-51:56

Conclusion/Takeaways

• Long Chain of Missed Chances:
  The episode argues that every decade has featured openings for peace that have been lost due to fear, domestic politics, or misconceptions about on-the-ground realities.

• Importance of "Seeing the Other":
  Both Ames’s effectiveness and ultimate vulnerability came from his ability to empathize and communicate across divides—something institutional diplomacy and modern surveillance lack.

• Repetition of History:
  The failures and violence of the past reappear in today’s tragedies. Bird’s account suggests knowing the people and grasping grievances is as urgent as understanding policy.

Final words:

"You can't be friends with a drone." – Martin DeCaro (51:47)
"That's the remarkable lesson of his tragic career." – Kai Bird (51:56)

For a deeper understanding:
Read Kai Bird's The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames and remember that the history of the present is never far behind us.