Podcast Summary: "Noriega and New World Order"

History As It Happens with Martin Di Caro
Date: October 31, 2025
Guest: Alexander Avigna (Latin American historian, Arizona State University)

Episode Overview

This episode explores the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989—Operation Just Cause—against the backdrop of the Cold War’s closing chapter and emergence of a “New World Order.” Martin Di Caro and historian Alexander Avigna critically examine Manuel Noriega’s rise and fall, the shifting U.S. justifications for intervention (from anti-communism to the war on drugs and democracy promotion), and the continuity of U.S. imperial strategies from Latin America to the Middle East. They connect the Panama invasion with later episodes of U.S. intervention, uncovering persistent patterns in both policy and media conduct.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Omission of Latin America in U.S. Discourse

Timestamp: 11:53

• Both the general public and policymakers often overlook Latin America’s centrality to U.S. power projection.
• Nixon’s infamous quote: “Americans don’t give a shit about Latin America.”
  Alex Avigna notes,

  "In general, I think we overlook Latin America ... Americans don’t give a shit about Latin America. That’s like his direct quote. And I think by and large that applies to, let’s say, mainstream analytical political discussions of what’s going on in the world today and the US roles in it." (11:53)

2. From Cold War Anti-Communism to War on Drugs

Timestamp: 03:14; 15:46

• The Reagan Doctrine positioned the U.S. as a supporter of anti-communist forces globally, often backing authoritarian regimes in Latin America.
• Manuel Noriega, once a CIA asset, was useful for his intelligence and logistical role, especially regarding the Contras in Nicaragua, despite well-known criminal activities.
• As the Soviet threat faded, drug trafficking and “democracy restoration” became the new rationales for intervention.
• Avigna stresses the pattern:

  “Noriega becomes a cautionary tale for any sort of political leader that seeks to really tie their fortunes to the United States and its imperial actions.” (15:46)

3. Noriega’s Complicated Allegiances and Panama’s Unique Role

Timestamp: 24:06–30:30

• Noriega’s ascent: From Panamanian National Guard to CIA trainee and ultimately military dictator.
• His role as a double agent—working with the U.S., Sandinistas, and Cubans—made him indispensable until his usefulness expired.
• Avigna contextualizes Panama as a hub of U.S. military and intelligence operations in Latin America, with its banks serving both U.S. covert action and the Medellín cartel’s laundering needs.
• “Noriega was plugged into the illicit. In one ways, we can think about him as a hinge point between the illicit and the illicit components of the Reagan Doctrine in Central America in the 1980s.” (30:30)

4. The US Media’s Role and Manufacturing Consent

Timestamp: 48:22–50:20

• The mainstream U.S. media largely echoed government justifications for the invasion and uncritically reported military successes, creating an impression of a clean, low-cost operation.
• This established patterns later seen in Gulf War coverage.
• Avigna:

  “One of these important initial scripts is what they did to Panama in December of 1989 when President Bush 41 took Ortega out in Panama ... The US media becomes entranced with like smart bombs and smart war and smart technology that are somehow going to mitigate civilian suffering and deaths.” (48:22–50:20)

5. Civilian Cost and Lasting Trauma

Timestamp: 46:07–48:22

• The U.S. invasion resulted in the destruction of neighborhoods, particularly El Chorrillo, and unknown hundreds or thousands of Panamanian deaths—reminders that “clean” interventions often belie significant human cost.
• Panamanians continue to seek recognition and reparations from the U.S., with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights finding for Panama (ignored by the U.S.).

• “They were firebombed. We don’t know—like hundreds of people died. … There were still excavations of, of mass graves … Panamanian government asking the US for reparations for the deaths of probably over a thousand Panamanians.” (46:07)

6. Patterns of Intervention and the "New World Order"

Timestamp: 35:29–44:46

• Post-Cold War, the rationale for intervention shifted to humanitarian, democratic, or anti-drug rhetoric, setting the precedent for U.S. actions in the Gulf and Iraq Wars.
• Martin Di Caro and Avigna underscore the throughline from Panama to Iraq—both in justificatory logic and the reappearance of key policymakers.

• “It’s the same group of people with the same type of language.” (44:46)
  “These operations seem clean, but for the people who suffer them, they’re still living through what happened in December of 1980.” (48:22)

7. Critical Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Philosophy

Timestamp: 39:57–41:24

• The definition of “democracy” pushed by the U.S. was narrow, often imposed for neoliberal economic ends rather than truly representative or social democracy.

• "It’s a very limited political and economic definition of democracy that fits neatly within certain neoliberal capitalist conceptions of how an economy, how a national economy is supposed to interface with a global economy.” (39:57)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On US-Ignored Latin America:

  “Americans don’t give a shit about Latin America.” – Alex Avigna quoting Nixon (11:54)

• On US-Backed Authoritarians:

  “U.S. foreign policy and empire in Latin America has always been a mix of realism and idealism. And really where we see that most plainly is throughout the 1980s with Ronald Reagan and then with George H.W. Bush.” (16:41)

• When US Interests Changed:

  “Once the Cold War is over, now he’s of no more use to the United States. Now he’s a criminal. And he fits a new justification for intervention: this time to get rid of him, his drug dealing, drug trafficking.” – Martin DeCaro (14:29)

• On Media Complicity:

  “This is what we’ll see in Iraq War number one, the US mainstream media becoming stenographers of US military officials and political figures and accepting whatever type of press briefings, reports that they were receiving from military and politicians and then just repeating that as somehow, you know, being accurate and objective reporting. That happens in Panama.” – Alex Avigna (49:28)

• On Civilian Suffering:

  “These operations seem clean, but for the people who suffer them, they’re still living through what happened in December of 1989.” – Alex Avigna (48:17)

Important Segment Timestamps

| Topic/Segment | Timestamp | |------------------------------------|--------------| | Opening Historical Framing | 00:36–07:14 | | Why Panama is Often Overlooked | 11:53 | | Noriega’s Background/CIA Ties | 24:06–28:11 | | Noriega’s Downfall Begins | 37:06–39:57 | | US Media and Manufacturing Consent | 48:22–50:20 | | Civilian Impact and Reparations | 46:07–48:22 | | Lessons for Future US Interventions| 43:40–46:07 |

Flow & Utility

The episode guides listeners through the historical specifics of the U.S.-Panama relationship, the utility of Noriega to U.S. Cold War strategy, and the transition to the “New World Order” mindset that permeated future interventions. It draws connections between old and new rationales, highlights the often-hidden costs of regime change, and calls attention to patterns in media complicity and public perception.

For those unfamiliar with Panama’s story, the conversation presents both a concise chronology and a critical analysis of why it matters today—linking past interventions with contemporary U.S. foreign policy actions.

Further Reading

• "Specters of Peasant Guerrillas in the Cold War Mexican Countryside" by Alexander Avigna
• Simon Tisdall’s obituary of Noriega (The Guardian)
• "The Violent American Century" by John Dower
• Works by Greg Grandin on U.S.-Latin America relations

This summary captures the major themes, historical analyses, critical perspectives, and notable exchanges that define the episode, preserving the colloquial and reflective tone of its participants.