Presidential Peacemakers

Summary

History As It Happens: Episode Summary – "Presidential Peacemakers"

Title: Presidential Peacemakers
Host: Martin Di Caro
Release Date: May 30, 2025
Participants: Martin De Caro, Jeremy Suri, Jeffrey Engel, Unnamed Expert
Duration Covered: 00:01 – 57:27

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Introduction to Presidential Peace Efforts

The episode opens with host Martin De Caro setting the stage for a deep dive into the complex role U.S. presidents have played in mediating international conflicts. Jeremy Suri emphasizes the intense political climate of the 2024 election and cautions listeners not to overlook the developments in 2025.

Key Quote:

“Wars are easy to start, but hard to end, even or especially when an American president presses his thumb on the scales.”
— Jeremy Suri [01:20]

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Current Presidential Efforts: Trump and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The discussion pivots to President Donald Trump's unprecedented claim to end the Russo-Ukrainian war within 24 hours. The panel critiques Trump's approach, highlighting his reliance on personal relationships with adversaries and his underestimation of the complexities involved in ending a war.

Key Quotes:

“I will end that war in one day. It'll take 24 hours.”
— Martin De Caro [01:17]

“Trump overrates how he can persuade Putin and he underrates the importance of the Ukrainians and Zelenskyy as the leader of Ukraine.”
— Jeffrey Engel [08:08]

Jeremy Suri underscores the historical difficulty in ending wars, noting that even experienced leaders like George W. Bush faced significant challenges, as seen with the prolonged War on Terrorism.

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Historical Perspectives on Presidential Peacemaking

The panel explores various historical instances where U.S. presidents acted as peacemakers, analyzing both successes and failures to extract lessons for contemporary diplomacy.

1. Theodore Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War

   • Jeffrey Engel highlights Roosevelt's role in mediating the Russo-Japanese War, emphasizing his impartiality and the Nobel Peace Prize recognition.
   • Key Quote:

     “He wins a Nobel Peace Prize for it. He's the first American president to win a Nobel Peace Prize.”
     — Jeremy Suri [25:04]

2. Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords

   • Martin De Caro discusses Carter's intensive negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel.
   • Jeffrey Engel notes the limitations of the accords, particularly their impact on Palestinians.
   • Key Quote:

     “Peace for some is not peace for everyone.”
     — Jeffrey Engel [34:50]

3. Richard Nixon's Shuttle Diplomacy

   • Jeffrey Engel points out Nixon's balancing act between being a warmaker and a peacemaker, particularly in ending the Vietnam War.
   • Key Quote:

     “Peacemakers can also be war makers. These two things are not mutually exclusive.”
     — Jeffrey Engel [31:21]

4. Bill Clinton and the Oslo Accords

   • The panel critiques the Oslo Accords’ failure to address core issues like Jerusalem, despite initial hopes.
   • Key Quote:

     “Peace negotiations had failed. Maybe it wasn't entirely Johnson's fault, but it looked like the President was ineffective as a diplomat.”
     — Jeffrey Engel [29:54]

5. George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War

   • Unnamed Expert explains Bush's role in negotiating German reunification and stabilizing post-Cold War Europe.
   • Key Quote:

     “Trust but verify.”
     — Jeffrey Engel [47:27]

6. George Mitchell and the Good Friday Accords

   • Jeffrey Engel praises the U.S. role in mediating the Good Friday Accords, highlighting its success in Northern Ireland.
   • Key Quote:

     “It's one of the most successful enterprises undertaken by a recent president for peacemaking.”
     — Jeffrey Engel [40:44]

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Challenges in Modern Peacemaking

The conversation delves into the inherent difficulties in achieving lasting peace agreements, such as ensuring both parties feel secure and addressing deep-seated grievances. The panel also examines the impact of domestic politics and public opinion on presidents' ability to successfully mediate conflicts.

Key Points:

• Trust vs. Interests: Personal relationships alone are insufficient without aligning national interests.

  “Presidents need to invest American resources... which is not his style.”
  — Unnamed Expert [23:25]

• Sustained Effort vs. Quick Fixes: Successful peacemaking often requires prolonged engagement rather than swift solutions.

  “Trump seems to favor quick fixes, which undermines his negotiating position.”
  — Jeremy Suri [15:55]

• Partisan Influences: Modern peacemaking efforts are heavily influenced by domestic political climates, making bipartisan support crucial yet challenging.

  “In the short run, it's harder in a democracy to make these deals.”
  — Jeffrey Engel [38:32]

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The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Modern Case Study

The panel revisits the Obama administration's Iran Nuclear Deal, contrasting it with Trump's dismantling of the agreement. They assess the long-term benefits and challenges of such diplomatic efforts.

Key Quotes:

“A peaceful Middle Eastern agenda is about actually reducing nuclear weapons and opening countries like Iran to international trade.”
— Jeffrey Engel [54:12]

“Trump seems convinced that by reopening Russia's economy, he's been trying to entice Putin, not pressure Putin.”
— Martin De Caro [22:24]

The experts argue that while the Obama administration focused on shared interests and long-term stability, Trump's approach lacked the necessary depth and commitment, leading to political motivations overshadowing genuine peacemaking efforts.

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Lessons for Future Presidential Peacemakers

Concluding the episode, the panel synthesizes historical lessons to provide guidance for current and future presidents aiming to mediate peace:

1. Impartiality is Crucial: Successful mediation requires the U.S. to be seen as an unbiased party.
2. Patience and Persistence: Lasting peace demands sustained diplomatic efforts and cannot be rushed.
3. Balancing Relationships and Interests: Personal diplomacy must complement, not replace, a clear alignment of national interests.
4. Domestic Support: Achieving bipartisan and public support is essential for the longevity and success of peace agreements.

Key Quote:

“It's about reducing nuclear weapons and opening countries like Iran to international trade.”
— Jeffrey Engel [54:12]

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Closing Remarks

Martin De Caro emphasizes the importance of learning from past presidential efforts to navigate present-day conflicts effectively. The episode underscores that while the aspiration for peace is a commendable presidential duty, the path to achieving it is fraught with complexities that require a nuanced and persistent approach.

Final Quote:

“The US Will take over the Gaza Strip and we will do a job with it, too. We'll own it and be responsible.”
— Martin De Caro [56:57]

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Upcoming Episode Preview:
“What is Habeas Corpus? Why is the Trump administration thinking about suspending it? What did Abraham Lincoln do? Does that apply to 2025? Jim Oaks joins us next as we report history as it happens.”

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Notable Quotes with Timestamps

• “Wars are easy to start, but hard to end, even or especially when an American president presses his thumb on the scales.”
  — Jeremy Suri [01:20]

• “I will end that war in one day. It'll take 24 hours.”
  — Martin De Caro [01:17]

• “Trump overrates how he can persuade Putin and he underrates the importance of the Ukrainians and Zelenskyy as the leader of Ukraine.”
  — Jeffrey Engel [08:08]

• “Peace for some is not peace for everyone.”
  — Jeffrey Engel [34:50]

• “Trust but verify.”
  — Jeffrey Engel [47:27]

• “It's one of the most successful enterprises undertaken by a recent president for peacemaking.”
  — Jeffrey Engel [40:44]

• “A peaceful Middle Eastern agenda is about actually reducing nuclear weapons and opening countries like Iran to international trade.”
  — Jeffrey Engel [54:12]

---

Conclusion

"Presidential Peacemakers" offers a comprehensive exploration of the intricate role U.S. presidents have played in international diplomacy. By juxtaposing historical examples with contemporary efforts, the episode provides valuable insights into the successes and shortcomings of presidential mediation in striving for global peace.

Transcript

[Martin DeCaro]

I say this every election cycle, and.

[Jeremy Suri]

I'll say it again. The 2024 political field was intense. So don't get left behind in 2025.

[Jeffrey Engel]

If you're running for office, the first.

[Jeremy Suri]

Thing on your to do list should.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Be securing your name on the web.

[Unnamed Expert]

With the your name vote domain from.

[Martin DeCaro]

GoDaddy.com you'll stand out and make your mark. Don't wait.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Get yours today.

[Jeremy Suri]

History as It Happens May 30, 2025 Presidential Peacemakers we must not only condemn.

[Martin DeCaro]

Aggression, we must enforce the dictates of our charter and resume the struggle for peace. Have the patience to work for a just and lasting peace. Reach for it. The United States will reach with you. The further shore of that peace is within your we are privileged to witness tonight a significant achievement in the cause of peace, an achievement none thought possible a year ago.

[Unnamed Expert]

To be honest, I do not feel that I deserve to be in the company of so many of the transformative figures who've been honored by this prize.

[Martin DeCaro]

I will end that war in one day. It'll take 24 hours.

[Jeremy Suri]

Wars are easy to start, but hard to end, even or especially when an American president presses his thumb on the scales. Since Teddy Roosevelt in the Russo Jackson, American leaders have played an international role, trying to mediate the end of wars with mixed success. Why did some succeed and many fail? That's next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.

[Unnamed Expert]

You know, this is one of the interesting things about Trump's overall approach of America First, I contend that every policymaker, Democrat, Republican, libertarian, doesn't matter for the last 200 and something, 50 years of our country, every policymaker is trying to do the best for their country and put America first. And actually, axiomatically, I think the same for every French policymaker and every Russian policymaker. You know, there are very few policymakers who wind up selling out their country. There's a reason we remember Benedict Arnold.

[Jeffrey Engel]

What Trump has fallen into is the narcissistic illusion that he can step into this conflict and quickly fix it somehow, and fix it on his terms, and fix it by building a relationship with an adversary who, as Jeff pointed out so well, has a long history and proclivity for seeing the United States as an enemy.

[Jeremy Suri]

When he was campaigning last year, President Donald Trump repeatedly boasted he could end the Russo Ukrainian war in a day. And the main reasons he gave were that he knew the two leaders so well and his own brilliant negotiating skills.

[Martin DeCaro]

Before I even arrive at the Oval Office, I will have the disastrous war between Russia and Ukraine settled. It will be settled quickly. Quickly. I will get the problem solved, and I will get it solved in rapid order. And it will take me no longer than one day. I know exactly what to say to each of them. I got along very well with it.

[Jeremy Suri]

Like so many of his preposterous statements, it's impossible to know for sure whether Trump really expected to bring the war to a close in 24 hours, or if he simply meant, you know, it should be a piece of cake. Whatever the case, the President seems to have underestimated the difficulty in ending war. More competent, more intelligent, less cynical American leaders have met failure, too. All modern presidents have wanted to be seen as men of peace, even the ones waging terrible wars. Like George W. Bush, whose war on terrorism was an utter failure. But he envisioned a more peaceful world once the US Was done killing terrorists.

[Martin DeCaro]

The Freedom Agenda is a powerful part of our country's desire to lay the foundation for peace. And it's making a difference. It's making a difference. I know one of the debates about the Freedom Agenda as well. Elections cause certain things to happen that you may not want to happen. No, elections are only the beginning of the process.

[Unnamed Expert]

They're not the end.

[Martin DeCaro]

Elections, plus a focused foreign policy effort that helps build the institutions of democracy is what is going to be necessary to ultimately defeat the hateful ideology of those who would do our country harm.

[Jeremy Suri]

Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon spoke of peace while prosecuting the Vietnam War. Ronald Reagan called for peace through strength. In his view, the United States had always put peace first. War was supposed to be a last resort.

[Martin DeCaro]

The record of history is clear. Citizens of the United States resort to force reluctantly and only when they must. Our foreign policy, as President Eisenhower once said, is not difficult to state. We are for peace first, last and always for very simple reasons. We know that only in a peaceful atmosphere, a peace with justice, one in which we can be confident, can America prosper as we have known prosperity in the past.

[Jeremy Suri]

He said, well, there was and is no such thing as an anti war president. Not in the modern era, anyway. The leader of the most lethal, sophisticated killing machine in human history, the leader of a global hegemon cannot avoid perpetrating violence. But some presidents have sought a role in mediating conflict, to end the killing and destruction in a violent corner of the world.

[Martin DeCaro]

I'm pleased to announce that the parties in Bosnia have agreed to a ceasefire to terminate all hostile military activities throughout the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina, to become effective on October 10th if certain conditions are met.

[Jeremy Suri]

But turning a ceasefire or truce into an enduring peace agreement has always been difficult, whatever a president's motives. Peace for peace assistance sake, to protect U.S. interests, to go down in history as a peacemaker. The Camp David Accords, Jimmy Carter's finest moment, solved the Egypt Israel cycle of violence, but not the Israeli Palestinian problem. Bill Clinton had the Good Friday accords in Northern Ireland and the Dayton Accords in the Balkans, but the Oslo accords ended in failure. Our most recent president, Joe Biden, enabled Israel to turn Gaza to dust and made no progress ending the war in Ukraine. This is a sprawling subject and we won't cover every presidential peace initiative in a single podcast. But you can consider these questions as you listen to this what makes for an effective peacemaker? Knowledge of the region where the war is taking place? Strong negotiating skills? Personal charisma? What about the ability to align personal diplomacy with national interests? What about dedication? It takes time to end a war. More than 24 hours. Jeremy Surry is a historian at the LBJ School of Public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the author of the Impossible Presidency and host of this Is Democracy podcast and Democracy of Hope newsletter on substack. Jeffrey Engel is the founding director of the center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University and the author of when the worlds seem George H.W. bush and the End of the Cold War. Our conversation Next History is defined by.

[Martin DeCaro]

The names that stand the test of time. Names that inspire, unite, and lead.

[Jeremy Suri]

Now it's your turn to create a.

[Martin DeCaro]

Lasting legacy with a dot Vote domain. Whether you're running for office, driving change, or rallying support, a dot Vote domain ensures your name is as memorable as.

[Jeremy Suri]

Those in the history books.

[Martin DeCaro]

Visit GoDaddy.com type in your name. Vote and secure a web address that stands out. Claim your place in history with Dot Vote.

[Jeremy Suri]

Jeremy Suri, welcome back.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Great to be with you as always, Martin.

[Jeremy Suri]

Jeffrey Engel likewise.

[Unnamed Expert]

It's great to be with you as well.

[Jeremy Suri]

Jeremy Suri what mistakes is Donald Trump making in his diplomacy, to try using that term loosely, try to end the Russia Ukraine war?

[Jeffrey Engel]

Well, it's hard to know where to begin, but I'll just list two to start with, right? The first is he fundamentally believes Vladimir Putin and other powerful figures around the world will take him seriously for blustering and threatening and talking big in many ways without following up. And the world of international politics is really a world of action, at least as much as it is of rhetoric. It's different from real estate development and other fields that maybe are a little More driven by talk. Not backing up your words is something that is evident already. Most of America's counterparts have realized that Trump makes huge demands and then slowly but surely backs down. And so they just wait for him to back down. And then the second mistake he's making is to believe that he and Vladimir Putin share certain interests. He falls into. Trump does the classic case of a strong man who sees himself in other strongmen and doesn't recognize that although others might use similar tactics or have similar displeasure with democracy, they have very different interests. And just because Putin is a fellow strongman doesn't mean Putin will see the world the way he does. In both of these instances, Trump overrates how he can persuade Putin and he underrates the importance of the Ukrainians and Zelenskyy as the leader of Ukraine.

[Jeremy Suri]

The danger of personal diplomacy Jeffrey Engel before you jump in here, I just want people to think about this question in a historical context. Cause that's what we're gonna get to in a bit. The problems of trying to mediate peace in somebody else's war. How much pressure do you put on how much is too much, how much is too little? There's a role for public diplomacy. Making statements at news conferences or on your social media account, like Trump did the other day. I can't believe what Putin's doing. He's crazy. And then there's the talk that happens behind the scenes when you have to be a little bit nicer. We're not just here to beat up on Trump and his mistakes. We're trying to think about this in a historical context. But go ahead, Jeffrey.

[Unnamed Expert]

We are recording this at the end of May. It is entirely possible we're gonna all wake up tomorrow, read the newspaper and say that he has a breakthrough or that he solves something. So one of the problems, I think, with this kind of high level diplomacy, personal or not, when you have such high stakes, oftentimes there's more going on behind the scenes than the public is aware of. So I do want to preface everything I say by saying when you're talking about personal diplomacy, it's personal. So your average observer on the street is not going to know exactly what's going on until after it's done.

[Jeremy Suri]

Trusting that you have a personal friendship or a relationship with this other person, and that that's enough to outweigh other factors that are weighing on the negotiations.

[Unnamed Expert]

That's a classic problem. And it's so classic it's almost silly, because we know that policymakers throughout the world do not actually care about friendship as much as they do care about their own state's interests. You know, this is one of the interesting things about Trump's overall approach of America. First, I contend that every policymaker, Democrat, Republican, libertarian, doesn't matter for the last 200 and something, 50 years of our country. Every policymaker is trying to do the best for their country and put America first. And axiomatically, I think the same for every French policymaker and every Russian policymaker. You know, there are very few policymakers who wind up selling out their country. There's a reason we remember Benedict Arnold. Having said that, I think one of the things that Trump needs to think about, looking at previous examples from presidents who are successful at this, is that this is a very time consuming process. You don't build relationships overnight. Obviously, Trump and Putin have some kind of relationship that goes back years. Some people might speculate as to how deep that relationship is, but as a president at least, you can't call up somebody on the first day and say, hey, I think we should be friends now, do what I want.

[Jeremy Suri]

I think this is a case of unrequited love, though. Antony Beaver was just on my podcast and he said in his estimation, Putin loathes Trump, but Trump doesn't understand that.

[Unnamed Expert]

You know, listen, I don't know Donald Trump personally and I don't know Putin personally, and it's all pop psychology. If we don't have any intimate assessment. Now, if Anthony Beaver has a personal conversation with Putin where he says, I loathe the president, then I'll listen.

[Jeremy Suri]

Well, he's certainly been playing him.

[Unnamed Expert]

He's just, he's a smart guy, but he's just reading the same newspapers that we are.

[Jeremy Suri]

However, it's pretty clear, though, that Putin has been, as Trump said the other day, tapping us along.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Do you still believe that Putin actually.

[Jeremy Suri]

Wants to end the war?

[Martin DeCaro]

I can't tell you that, but I'll let you know in about two weeks. Within two weeks, we're going to find out very soon. We're going to find out whether or not he's tapping us along or not. And if he is, we'll respond a little bit differently.

[Jeremy Suri]

I mean, he hasn't followed through on any.

[Unnamed Expert]

It is indisputable that many of the things that President Trump is doing as reversals of US Policy from the Biden administration are directly in Russia's interest, to a point, trying to damage the NATO relationship, which, by the way, has been not just his Putin's goal for the last 20 years. It's been in a Soviet goal since 1945, let's say 1949, to try to disrupt American relations with NATO as a way to increase Russians relative power over the rest of Europe. Similarly, we know that Donald Trump has not taken the most vigorous line that President Biden did on defending Ukrainian democracy. In fact, when we see some of the talking points that President Trump offered, the Oval Office meeting with President Zelensky, for example, they may just as well have been written by the Kremlin.

[Martin DeCaro]

You're right now not in a very good position. You've allowed yourself to be in a very bad position. And he happens to be right about.

[Jeffrey Engel]

From the very beginning of the war.

[Martin DeCaro]

You'Re not in a good position. You don't have the cards right now with us. You start having cards right now. You don't have your playing cards.

[Unnamed Expert]

You're playing serious.

[Martin DeCaro]

You're gambling with the lives of millions of people.

[Jeffrey Engel]

You're singing.

[Martin DeCaro]

You're gambling with World War 3. You're gambling with World War 3.

[Unnamed Expert]

It is notable that President Trump, in his reverses of policy, each of them, seems to be thus far what Russia would have wanted him to do.

[Jeremy Suri]

To a point. And the United States is not sending weapons to Russia. It is still sending weapons to Ukraine.

[Jeffrey Engel]

One does not have to get into pop psychology. Right. What Trump has fallen into is the narcissistic illusion that he can step into this conflict and quickly fix it somehow, and fix it on his terms and fix it by building a relationship with an adversary who, as Jeff pointed out so well, has a long history and proclivity for seeing the United States as an enemy. And that this will overnight change. And we, as historians know it doesn't. I think that's at the core of Jeff's point. Leaders matter, but leaders do not reverse the currents of the oceans. And there are long standing conflicts between the US And Russia and the Soviet Union over the future of Europe, over with the future of the Middle east and other related areas here. And that's not gonna change overnight because Donny Boy sits down with Volodya. It's just not gonna fix it. And to see the world that way is to see it as a real estate developer, not as an international diplomat.

[Jeremy Suri]

And even if President Trump wanted to shut off all US Weapons donations and aid to Ukraine, there are still US Weapons and parts that second and third parties could send to Ukraine that it would take a lot of effort to completely shut off. But I don't want to digress about that kind of stuff.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Well, I just want other points to be made is that, you know, that those on the ground get a vote regardless in the sense of what Trump and Putin decide. A lot of the war will be decided on the ground by brave Ukrainians. And to discount that on Trump's part is to totally miss the real action.

[Jeremy Suri]

A few things that Trump is doing wrong, I mean, he undermines his own credibility and negotiating position, at least in public, when he talks about, yeah, maybe we're going to do sanctions, or I'm open to doing extra sanctions on Russia to apply more pressure on Putin. And then he does not. I'm not happy with what Putin's doing.

[Martin DeCaro]

He's killing a lot of people. And I don't know what the hell happened to Putin. I've known him a long time, always gotten along with him, but he's sending rockets into cities and killing people. And I don't like it at all.

[Unnamed Expert]

Okay.

[Jeremy Suri]

He actually undermined his own ultimatum recently during that two hour phone call with Putin. The United States was about to either do sanctions. Lindsey Graham has this idea of doing a 500% tariff on any country that does business with Russian oil and gas. And there are some other items in the news. I don't want to get bogged down in too many details here. The point is Trump then spoke to Putin and backed off that ultimatum. Another thing is that he took, at least rhetorically, even diplomatically, Russia. Sigh. When it came to the causes of the war. The United States is not sending weapons to Russia. It's not materially supporting Russia. It is still sending weapons to Ukraine. And that weapons pipeline will continue for years because of the weapons that were approved by Congress during the Biden administration. But at least diplomatically and rhetorically, he took Putin's side when it comes to the causes of the war. So this whole thing got off on the wrong foot.

[Unnamed Expert]

Well, if, if the news flash is that Donald Trump has reversed his sporadic decision making, that's not a news flash. I think what's interesting to note about previous cases, as a counterpoint, one of the things that I think we can see as a through line for successful presidential diplomacy and, or successful presidential personal diplomacy is an investment of time and investment of energy and investment of president's most valuable resource, which is his time.

[Jeremy Suri]

It's not 24 hours. Then I'm going to end the war in 24 hours. I mean, exactly. Start off like that.

[Martin DeCaro]

It's before I even arrive at the Oval Office. I will have the disastrous war between Russia and Ukraine settled. It will be settled quickly.

[Unnamed Expert]

Yeah. And if we, if we think Back to one example, which I'm sure we'll delve into further. The Camp David accords between Israel, Egypt and the the United States. First of all, to our earlier point, Egypt and Israel had to both have reasons to be at the table to begin with. They were not pushed there out of purely American power. It was in their interest to want to be at the table. But then secondly, President Carter spent countless days, not just hours, countless days bordering on several weeks, with the two men, not only getting to know them personally, but also therefore being able to strong on them rhetorically in a conversation.

[Jeremy Suri]

He personally intervened when Sadat was going to leave and he made Sadat stay.

[Unnamed Expert]

By saying, essentially, I give you my word as the President of the United States that I will help make this work. Not just I give you my word as a friend, though, they built up a friendship. And not just I give you my word as the president, period. It was a combination of the fact that he had built up trust with Sadat over those intervening weeks that allowed him to leverage American power. But again, that didn't happen in 24 hours. That didn't happen after a two hour meeting. That didn't happen after a tweet. That happened after sustained, sustained hard work of the kind that frankly, in all honesty, we rarely have seen Donald Trump put forward in either of his two terms. I mean, he seems repeatedly, we know, to like quick fixes, to adopt policies and then reverse them. That is his genius. He's the President United States. I am not. But we have not seen him sustain a lot of policies.

[Jeremy Suri]

But on the part of Israel and Egypt too, a realization by both sides that, okay, decades of war, we need to try something differently here. Putin. Jeremy Suri, Putin is really not interested in peace. Peace on Russia's terms. Before you comment, let me just share with you an article, Reuters reporting exclusively based on sources that Putin wants his conditions for ending the war in Ukraine. A demand that Western leaders pledge in writing to stop enlarging NATO eastward. So that means no NATO for Ukraine, which to me in my view is not really an unreasonable request. Ukraine is never gonna join NATO, but also to lift a chunk of sanctions on Russia. Putin also wants Ukraine to be neutral. A resolution of the issue of frozen Russian sovereign assets in the west and protection for Russian speakers in Ukraine, according to three sources that Reuters used for this story. But you know, there's no mention in this story as to what would happen to the parts of Ukraine violently occupied by Russian forces. Crimea, all these other issues, right? To me, any equitable peace means Getting out of Ukraine. Right.

[Unnamed Expert]

I appreciate that Reuters has sources on that. But the three of us knew that that was going to be Putin's position ahead of time because he's been very public about it. If we go back to the initial invasion, that was illogical. That was not a good strategic decision by Putin. So I don't think that we can necessarily leave this as just some kind of rational decision making that we can understand. You know, in some kind of political science, two by two metric. Clearly there's something else that had driven Putin into making this decision. So I would not expect that he's going to be completely rational as I would understand it in, in his decision.

[Jeremy Suri]

Making going forward to unwind it. Jeremy.

[Jeffrey Engel]

And I will say that what Zelensky said in the White House in that horrible meeting with Trump is actually relevant here. I mean, as a historian, it's clear that you cannot have a peace unless both sides feel secure. It's not a peace if one side simply has a rest period, a timeout to regroup and then attack again. And this is what Zelenskyy said to Trump. And if you go back to Camp David, if you go to any successful peace negotiation, what really brings a peace negotiation to fruition is when both sides, even if one feels aggrieved, can feel secure coming out of the negotiations, that they will not be subjected to another invasion. And there's no evidence that Putin is willing to do that if this war ends for now, with Russian forces massed near whatever territory Ukraine holds, preparing to launch again, this in no way is a piece that the Ukrainians can accept.

[Jeremy Suri]

That's exactly what I was trying to say, Jeremy. As usual, you put it more eloquently than I did. One final remark here about Russia, Ukraine, then we'll get into the history. Something I touched on a little bit earlier about the sanctions issue. Trump seems convinced that by reopening Russia's economy, he's been trying to entice Putin, not pressure Putin, entice him into peace. So by reopening Russia's economy, not slamming more sanctions down on him, even as the EU does, the European Union does, that could somehow bring about peace in 2021, the year that Russian forces late in 2021 were amassing on the border to invade Ukraine in that year, Russian trade with the U.S. something like $30 billion the U.S. was going to import in goods from Russia, which is like 1% of all the trade the United States does with the eu. So it doesn't even really make sense as a money making proposition. I just don't think Donald Trump knows what he's doing.

[Unnamed Expert]

It is interesting to note that whenever Trump tries to talk up the advantages of a deal, almost the only metric he uses is the advantage of economic development, as he sees it, which oftentimes times is actual real estate development. It is notable when we compare Trump to previous presidents, how infrequently he uses words like freedom or democracy or liberty.

[Martin DeCaro]

Outside of the money, which is a big deal, but the money is the money, the money we can make up. I can make up the money on one trip like this.

[Unnamed Expert]

And one of the things that I think is at the core of his problem in trying to inject himself into this conflict. Presidents typically need to invest themselves in time, which is not his style, but also presidents need to invest American resources. Case in point, if we go back to Camp David, one of the things that made that deal work and continue to work, by the way, is the presence and the ongoing presence of American aid, but more importantly, of American soldiers on site as on site peacekeepers. It's a small contingent, yes, but an important symbolic one, along with the United nations force as well. One of the points that previous presidents have made, whether it's George H.W. bush, Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, others have said, you know, when we think about peace negotiations, we have to remember that there is not a single day of peace that is not cheaper than a single day of war. Trump has been trying to say the United States should invest less around the world, but history would suggest if he wants his deal in Ukraine to work, he's going to have to actually reverse his own fundamental policy.

[Jeremy Suri]

Trump is always talking about strength right then you see him in these negotiations, and he's wishy washy, he's weak, he's indecisive. So, Jeremy Suri, when did American presidents believe they had a role to play as peace mediators? I don't mean ending a war the United States is itself involved in, but mediating a peace between other countries.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Well, the classic moment that historians point to is the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. And it's a breakthrough because for the first time, an American president claims not only a mediating role in international affairs, but a mediating role in international affairs between ostensibly larger powers farther away from the United States than presidents generally have even thought about. And what Theodore Roosevelt does is he brings the leaders of Russia and Japan to the United States, to New Hampshire, to try to bring an end to what has become a devastating war between Russia and Japan, a war that is actually hurting Russia significantly as The Japanese are now the first Asian power to defeat a European power at sea and on land. And as the Japanese are trying to end this war, which is becoming very costly for them, as they have other ambitions obviously in Asia at the time, Roosevelt is able to pull this off, Both sides see the United States as a somewhat impartial mediator, and he wins a Nobel Peace Prize for it. He's the first American president to win a Nobel Peace Prize. So that's really where this story begins in its modern form.

[Jeremy Suri]

Impartial. That's a key word that you just used there may sound obvious, but the US has to be seen, any leader, as impartial.

[Unnamed Expert]

Well, and it's important to note in the case of Theodore Roosevelt and those negotiations, he was offering good offices is the term that's usually used in diplomacy. He was offering to essentially be that impartial host to both sides. And he invested a great deal of time with each side socially. In fact, I have an anecdote about that in a moment. He invested a great time socially, but he did not actually participate in the negotiations himself. So this is not President Carter dealing as a third party in their bilateral conflict. This is the United States basically saying, we're going to give you guys food and drink and housing. Work this out before you go home, and we'll continue to give you good housing until you work this out. But he did not actually adjudicate. He did not mediate. He did not actually get personally involved in the negotiations, unlike subsequent presidents. If I could actually just point to that anecdote for a second, this is a brilliant moment, I think, in both presidential history and also culinary history, because Roosevelt faced the problem when they first arrived in New Hampshire, and that was the Russians did not consider themselves the social and racial equals of the Japanese, and therefore, on a practical level, refused to sit down to dinner with them. Well, how do you get people to talk to each other if they're not even going to sit down to dinner at each other, with each other? Because how insulting could that possibly be to the Japanese? So Roosevelt, being quite a sophisticated lad, has the brilliant idea that, okay, I know how to solve this problem. You won't sit down together, Fine. We'll have standing cocktails and past hors d' oeuvres, and we'll get people drinking and eating, standing next to each other, and that will break the ice. A brilliant and simple solution to a complex problem.

[Jeremy Suri]

Yeah. As you say, he never attended the peace negotiations over the Russo Japanese War until the very final stages of the negotiations were held on his yacht, the Mayflower. I want to get back to Carter because there are a few names who really stand out among presidents in the 20th century who wanted to be peacemakers or took an active role in mediating another conflict. Maybe they didn't enter office with this in mind, but when the opportunity presented itself, they jumped in, like Clinton and the Oslo Accords. But Richard Nixon, he wanted to be a man of peace.

[Martin DeCaro]

I've asked for this television time tonight to make public a plan for peace that can end the war in Vietnam. The offer that I shall now present on behalf of the government of the United States and the government of South Vietnam, with the full knowledge and approval of President Thieu, is both generous and far reaching. It is a plan to end the war. Now, it includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within six months of an agreement. Its acceptance would mean the speedy return of all the prisoners of war to their homes.

[Jeremy Suri]

And the 1972 election was a landslide in his favor, Nixon's favor, against the so called peace candidate McGovern. But Nixon did this while he was bombing the living daylights, carpet bombing Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Why was Nixon able to convince a large majority of the American public that he was the man of peace?

[Jeffrey Engel]

Well, I think a lot of that had to do with what was seen as an effective foreign policy going into the 72 election election in opening relations with China, with a major meeting with the Soviet Union and what looked like major progress on arms control. The American public had it as a point of reference. The end of the Lyndon Johnson presidency where American diplomacy was flailing in all directions, where conflict in Vietnam was escalating, where peace negotiations had failed. Maybe it wasn't entirely Johnson's fault, but it looked like the President was ineffective as a diplomat. Nixon and Kissinger created at least the image. Many historians would differ on this, but they created the image of efficacy and opening relations with China, which took a lot of effort and a lot of personal credibility by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. That was a major move towards at least bringing some stability and some peace to Asia. And then this is followed up after the election with of course, the shuttle diplomacy in the Middle east, which is one of the really great achievements, achievements of Kissinger's time as Secretary of State, negotiating with the Egyptians, Israelis, Syrians, Jordanians and others. So I think we have to take Nixon seriously. But what we have to recognize as historians is that peacemakers can also be war makers. These two things are not mutually exclusive. The person that Jeffrey has written so much about this Is true for as well. George H.W. bush went to war in the Persian Gulf, but also was legitimately saw himself as a peacemaker. Those two things went together.

[Jeremy Suri]

Yeah, there's no such thing as an anti war president. And Nixon did bring bring the American forces home.

[Unnamed Expert]

The Nixon Carter comparison is interesting because they are so different. There's two different kinds of peacemaker. I think there's the one like Carter, who pursues peace not just because it's a geopolitical advantage for this country, but also because he has a heartfelt belief in peace. Carter is arguably the most religious president we've ever had and perhaps most sincere president we've ever had. And I think he genuinely wanted to get people to stop killing each other. Nixon, much like Donald Trump, I would argue, wants to be a peacemaker both because he thinks it's in the interest of the United States and also because he wants it on his resume. Donald Trump has been very explicit about the fact that from the very beginning of his first term that he wants the Nobel Peace Prize.

[Martin DeCaro]

I don't say this out of ego, but I was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Now I have to tell you, that's sort of a big thing. And the networks and most of the.

[Jeremy Suri]

News didn't cover it.

[Martin DeCaro]

Could you imagine when Obama came to office, they said, we're going to give him the Nobel Peace Prize.

[Jeremy Suri]

He actually said, what did I do?

[Martin DeCaro]

I didn't do anything. He didn't do anything for eight years.

[Unnamed Expert]

Frankly, that was not Carter's approach. Carter was genuinely trying to get people to stop killing each other. And Nixon, I would argue, is more towards the Trumpian version, wanting to use peace as a political lever, wanting to use peace as a strategic lever and also as something to burnish his own credentials, not because he cared deeply about the people of Southeast Asia.

[Jeremy Suri]

Sadat and Begin won the Nobel Prize for the Camp David Accords. Carter was there sequestered for 13 days at Camp David. Jeremy, about Camp David. There was supposed to be a resolution for the Palestinian issue there.

[Martin DeCaro]

It deals specifically with the future of the west bank in Gaza and the need to resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The framework document proposes a five year transitional period in the west bank and gaze Gaza, during which the Israeli military government will be withdrawn and a self governing authority will be elected with full autonomy. It also provides for Israeli forces to remain in specified locations during this period to protect Israel's security.

[Jeremy Suri]

Why did that never happen coming out of Camp David?

[Jeffrey Engel]

Because Menachem Begin never intended to do that. And Anwar Sadat wanted that, but didn't really care about it. Everyone knew that, including Jimmy Carter. He was hoping that he would be able to shoehorn them and pressure them and coerce them into that. As things went on, he was hoping the momentum of peace would carry them. And this is another important point. Peace for some is not peace for everyone. The Camp David Accord was an incredible agreement that still holds. It's extraordinary. It still holds between Israel and Egypt. Imagine how much worse things would be if we were seeing war between those two countries now. But it is terrible for the Palestinians in the end. The same is true for the Oslo Accords to some extent. Right? Peace for some is not peace for everyone.

[Jeremy Suri]

So the Oslo Accords, really, the Middle east, the Israeli Palestinian conflict, this is, you know, the study, the case study on how difficult peace, bringing peace between two warring parties is. Clinton jumped into this process. There was the Madrid peace talks in 1991. They were really going nowhere. And then really, to the surprise of the entire world, in secret, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators outside Oslo, that's why they're called the Oslo Accords came to an agreement, not a peace deal, an agreement to talk, to negotiate a peace settlement over the next several years. But ultimately the Oslo Accords failed. Clinton personally intervened at Camp David, wasn't it, in 2000, right.

[Martin DeCaro]

After 14 days of intensive negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. I have concluded with regret that they will not be able to reach an agreement at this time.

[Jeremy Suri]

You know, when I look back on Oslo, it strikes me they waited till it seems the end to try to tackle the most difficult aspects of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, like Jerusalem. I mean, they never really got to that until the end. Right. Here's Madeleine Albright at camp David in 2000.

[Martin DeCaro]

Jerusalem was the hardest issue. There's no question about it. And it's hard because it hasn't been resolved for thousands, you know, hundreds of years. And it's a very unique place that requires a lot of careful thought and working together.

[Jeffrey Engel]

That is a standard negotiating tactic. You start with the low hanging fruit or the fruit that's not as high on the tree, and you hope that you build momentum. You could say the same thing about Camp David. It was a lot easier to start with Israel and Egypt. They initially wanted Syria involved. And then there's the Palestinian side. You start small and you build over that. The US opening to China, what did they start talking about? Lifting trade sanctions. They don't talk about Taiwan. Taiwan is pushed off, actually. Right, so. So that standard, the key is to keep the momentum going and the concern, and to some extent what's happened in Middle east negotiations is that the small steps then empower more bad behavior in other dimensions. And that is certainly what has happened with both Israel and Egypt. You could argue that both of them have behaved worse toward third parties as a consequence of their peace with one another.

[Jeremy Suri]

Jeffrey Engel, how do you rate Clinton and the Oslo Accords? Do you think he made mistakes in that process?

[Unnamed Expert]

Listen, we all make mistakes. Clinton demonstrated, and the transcripts that we have of this are pretty clear. Clinton demonstrated just the best of Bill Clinton, personable and brilliant and savvy and knew more about the issue than even the two people he was negotiating with, though they lived there. Clinton understood which street was more dominated in Jerusalem by Arabs or Jews and so on. So I think he did a remarkable job. But he also, his remarkable job demonstrates something very important. Piece of that nature of a seemingly intractable problem can only be resolved when the parties are willing to sacrifice and when the parties are willing to risk. I know this is not a positive example for an obvious reason, but Anwar Sadat deserves a remarkable amount of credit for pushing forward on a peace deal that he knew was not only going to be hardly universally embraced in his country, but also was going to put him as a target.

[Jeremy Suri]

Well, Rabin.

[Unnamed Expert]

Rabin, yeah. We shouldn't expect our policymakers to all be a Lincoln or a Sadat or a Rabin. But we also should recognize that the personal sacrifice and the martyrdom in some ways is sometimes necessary.

[Jeremy Suri]

You did have people on both sides willing to take risks, but you also had rejectionists, Jeremy Surrey, on both sides who wanted to derail the entire thing.

[Jeffrey Engel]

That's always the challenge. And it has long been argued, and I think it's right, that in the short run, it's harder in a democracy to make these deals. Not in the long run. I think democracies actually can be more credible in their commitments in the long run, but in the short run, it's much harder because often the naysayers, the rejectionists, can be quite popular at home and can use demagogic tendencies to undermine what you're trying to do overseas. And that certainly is what happened to at Sah Rabin. That is what has made it difficult for the United States in Vietnam, for example, in other conflicts, to negotiate a deal, especially a deal that admits to some extent that we did not achieve our aims. And so this is the challenge.

[Jeremy Suri]

Yeah. And it's incumbent upon the mediator to understand those tensions. Right. You know, one peace deal that was Successful that we kind of forget about because it worked. And that is the Good Friday Accords. George Mitchell was sent over there to do that one. That's a good example of the United States acting as an impartial mediator actually did bring about a positive outcome.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Yes. And I think the United States was in a position not only as an impartial mediator, but to also be a sponsor of peace, which is to say, being able to offer carrots to both sides, carrots that were economic, but carrots that were also political. I mean, the Irish American diaspora is a very important part of Ireland, and it's a very important part of the United States. United States. It's a very important part of what was disputed in Northern Ireland. I think the United States was in a very positive position there. And George Mitchell, Senator from Maine, was someone who was seen as having the President's ear. But to Jeffrey's point, back to Theodore Roosevelt, it was not the President getting into the details, which can often create problems of the President then putting his own name on things. And so this gave Clinton the distance he needed at times to allow the negotiations to go forward and then to come in in the end and sort of seal the final part of the deal. It is one of the most successful enterprises undertaken by a recent president for peacemaking.

[Martin DeCaro]

My friends, everyone in life at some point has to decide what kind of person he or she is going to be. Are you going to be someone who defines yourself in terms of what you are against or what you are for? Will you be someone who defines yourself in terms of who you aren't or who you are? The time has come for the peacemakers to triumph in Northern Ireland, and the United States will support them as they do.

[Unnamed Expert]

The broader context is critical as well, and it's hard to know what the broader context is while it's going on. But the Good Friday Accords, in my opinion, doesn't occur, or at least doesn't occur the way it lays out. Without the concurrent growth of the European Union, part of what they were able to negotiate between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is a deal that allowed for essentially trade and people to travel as though they were in an internal border. It would have been very difficult to start from scratch and say, how can we develop a framework that goods and people next door to each other can live and trade and operate next door to each other? We already had one. We, the world already had one in, in the European Union. So we were able to use that very effectively.

[Jeremy Suri]

So, Jeffrey, I'll stay With you on this. We've been talking about Presidents acting as mediators in other people's conflicts. Reagan, Gorbachev, George H.W. bush, Gorbachev, and then for a short time, Yeltsin. This was a situation to my earlier point, about appropriate toughness, when to lay on pressure, what to say publicly, how to get a deal in private, how to, to, let's say, guide a peaceful end or a non calamitous end to the Cold War. The critics of both Reagan and George H.W. bush said that they were being duped. This was what the far right said about Reagan duped by Gorbachev. George H.W. bush was considered wishy washy or weak. Why isn't saying more when the Berlin Wall came down?

[Martin DeCaro]

What's the danger here of event just spinning out of control? Secretary Boehner commented earlier about how rapid the pace of change has been in Eastern Europe. Nobody really expected this to happen as quickly as it did. Is there a danger here that things are accelerating too quickly? Well, I wouldn't want to say this kind of development makes things be moving too quickly at all. It's the kind of development that we have long encouraged by, by our strong support for the Helsinki Final Act. So I'm not going to hypothecate that it may anything goes too fast. But we are handling it in a way where we are not trying to give anybody a hard time. We're saluting those who are, who can move forward with democracy. We are encouraging the concept of a Europe whole and free, and so we just welcome it.

[Jeremy Suri]

Both Reagan and Bush were right. Their critics were wrong about how they handled those two different situations.

[Unnamed Expert]

These are related obviously chronologically and also by the fact that Bush was in Reagan's administration. But they are different. What Reagan did in de escalating the Cold War in his second term is remarkable. He was able to de escalate, I would argue, because he had already escalated. Reagan makes the Cold war extraordinarily dangerous. 1983, I think, is arguably the second most dangerous year after 1962 in the entire Cold War, with nuclear tensions very high. In no small part because Reagan had convinced Kremlin policymakers that he was sincere when he said that we would purify the world through fire and have a crusade for freedom to ignore the facts.

[Martin DeCaro]

Of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding.

[Unnamed Expert]

Reagan did not take the initial step towards peace. The initial step towards peace was the Soviet quote, unquote, election of Mikhail Gorbachev, a Person who was willing. And not necessarily because he believed in peace, though he kind of did, but more because he realized it was in Soviet interest to stop spending so much damn money on arms. That was the whole reason that Gorbachev wanted reduction in tension and therefore reduction in spending.

[Jeremy Suri]

Reagan.

[Unnamed Expert]

Reagan and Reagan. Reagan met him halfway, which he didn't need to do. But Reagan alone would not have been able to make peace. The necessary change in the international system and in the bilateral relationship was the assumption of power of Gorbachev.

[Jeremy Suri]

You're right about Reagan's hard line in his first term, but he and Gorbachev truly abhorred nuclear weapons and wanted to do something about it.

[Unnamed Expert]

That's a nice line that people like to say about Reagan, but the truth is he develops that. And I give him credit for this because I always say we want policymakers to learn and change their opinions. But he does develop that over time. One of the reasons that he learns to abhor nuclear weapons is, I think, because he realized by 1983, after a series of nuclear scares, realized that he himself has played a part in making the world more dangerous and in potentially creating nuclear war.

[Jeremy Suri]

And he watched a TV movie, too.

[Unnamed Expert]

Watch the Day After. You know, as I like to remind my students, you know, more people watch the Day after that fictionalized account of what happens to a Kansas town when it's hit by a Soviet nuclear strike.

[Martin DeCaro]

They take about 30 minutes to reach their target.

[Unnamed Expert]

So do theirs.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Right.

[Martin DeCaro]

Missile warning.

[Unnamed Expert]

This is beall.

[Martin DeCaro]

Confidence is high.

[Unnamed Expert]

I repeat, confidence is high. More people watched that that year than watched the Super Bowl. So this is a remarkably important cultural moment. And Reagan, I think, also who saw a copy two weeks ahead of time, got an advanced copy. It's good to be. The President was able to be terrified ahead of time. I give Reagan credit that he learned to abhor nuclear weapons. I would have hoped he would not have had to learn that lesson so late.

[Jeremy Suri]

He did a big buildup of obviously of the military, too. Jeremy, what about my point about how both Reagan and George H.W. bush. I mean, maybe this is in retrospect, maybe I'm giving them too much credit, but they knew appropriate amounts of pressure.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Yeah, I think that's the key thing. I mean, they both valued personal relationships. That's where we started this discussion, of course. But they also understood personal relationships don't substitute for interests. And you use personal relationships to help move interests, but not to substitute for them. So Reagan was always saying, trust but verify. So much so that Gorbachev got tired of Hearing that phrase, Mr. General Secretary.

[Martin DeCaro]

Though my pronunciation may give you difficulty, the maxim is dovayae no proviae, trust, but verify. You repeat that at every meeting.

[Jeffrey Engel]

So you want to build trust, but you also have to verify your trust. The whole reason for the review that George H.W. bush does when he comes into office is he's a little concerned that perhaps Reagan has become too attached to Gorbachev now.

[Unnamed Expert]

Oh, definitely.

[Jeffrey Engel]

And I don't think it's that Bush was critical of Gorbachev. He wanted to make sure that they were aligning interests with personal relationships. And that is how good negotiations occur. When you simply think that your personality will substitute for the differences over interests, you are living in a fantasy world and you're ready to be taken advantage of by your adversary.

[Unnamed Expert]

In fact, we can see in. This is such a great point, Jeremy, because we can see in the reykjavik negotiations in 1986 the limits of personal diplomacy. Remember, Reagan and Gorbachev and their advisors do something that is absolutely unthinkable. They develop a plan on the back of an envelope, I'll grant you, but they develop a plan for eliminating all nuclear weapons in the world by the year 2000. And then they both kind of take a pause back and say, my God, did we just agree to do that? Gorbachev in particular says, I can't do this unless you give up Star Wars. And Reagan says, I'm never going to give up Star Wars. And the transcript is really interesting. Both Reagan and Gorbachev then try to appeal to their personal friendship. You know, if I can't persuade you at the 11th hour by the strategic logic of my thinking, can you trust me? As Jeremy said, you know, Reagan says, you know, I hope one day, as old men, we meet and can talk about what a wonderful thing this was. And this is a biblical moment in some ways, that we are going to change the universe. And both of them lay off each other's friendship and emotions. Growing friendship. They had just. Just met the year and a half before. And that proves insufficient for getting the deal done.

[Jeremy Suri]

Yeah, Star wars got in the way, but there was also the question of what would have happened to France's nuclear arsenal, Britain's nuclear arsenal, Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal.

[Unnamed Expert]

Oh, come on. This is where we have to remember, especially during the Cold War, President United States and the General Secretary of the Soviet Union are remarkably influential people.

[Jeffrey Engel]

That's true.

[Jeremy Suri]

But those other parties were not at the table.

[Unnamed Expert]

Those other parties, I mean, same argument can be made about George Bush in pushing forward the unification of Germany. Bush was able to say to Helmut Cole at the critical moment, you give me what I want, which was Germany staying in NATO and therefore NATO surviving, and therefore the United States having access to Europe, you give me what I want. And even though everyone else, literally everyone else in the process thinks German unification is a bad idea, I can pull it off. Because you know who I am? I'm the president of the United States.

[Jeremy Suri]

China going to give up the nuclear weapons. Israel nuclear weapons. It doesn't even admit it has. I don't know. That's a counterfactual.

[Unnamed Expert]

Well, but it's not going to happen if you don't try. Secondly, it's a remarkable thing if the two most powerful leaders of the world decide to put their minds together on something. And they're not just the two most powerful leaders in the world, they're two most powerful leaders by several orders of magnitude, put their mind to something. I put my money on them.

[Jeremy Suri]

So in our last couple of minutes here, Obama as peacemaker, he won a Nobel Peace Prize. I mean, I'm getting him tame at the end of my interview here. I'm such a great interviewer. I forgot about the other person President who won a Nobel Peace Prize in addition to Teddy Roosevelt. But Obama didn't really want it.

[Unnamed Expert]

To be honest, I do not feel.

[Martin DeCaro]

That I deserve to be in the.

[Unnamed Expert]

Company of so many of the transformative figures who've been honored by this prize, men and women who've inspired me and inspired the entire world through their courageous pursuit of peace. This is actually a. Jeremy, do you mind if I. This is actually a great story because it's the only time, I think, in history where the Nobel Peace Prize committee was actually asked by the recipient if he had to accept it. Because Obama, remember, had just gotten into office. And Barack Obama is a wise man and he realized that the only thing he had ever done to warrant winning the Nobel Peace Prize was not being George Bush. This was an award that Europe and the Nobel Committee in particular were giving the United States, if you will, for coming back to normality as they understood it after the. The excesses of foreign policy of the Bush years. So Obama really didn't want it and didn't think he deserved it. And we saw that in speech that he said, I don't merit this in any way, shape or form, not least because I bomb people.

[Martin DeCaro]

But perhaps the most profound issue surrounding.

[Unnamed Expert]

My receipt of this prize is the fact that I am the commander in chief.

[Martin DeCaro]

Of the military.

[Unnamed Expert]

Of a nation.

[Jeremy Suri]

In the midst of Two wars and Obama and Iran. Jeremy Suri, final question here. This is another case where somebody knows they're taking a risk, they're gonna take hell domestically for it. Right. Soft on Iran. Iran is a terrorist state, et cetera, et cetera. The Republicans opposed the deal, but as it turned out, Obama was right. And the people who came after him. Trump 1.0 destroying the Iran nuclear deal. Well, now look, trying to get back to what was the status quo under Obama.

[Jeffrey Engel]

I think the US Relationship with Iran during Obama's years and even going back to George W. Bush has parallels to the US Relationship with China in the years before the opening in 1972. Here are two countries that are at political odds with one another and are involved in conflicts indirectly. Vietnam, Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations in the Middle east involved with issues where they come into conflict with one another, but still have very strong interests in common. The Iranian economy needs access to the US Economy economy. And the United States has a strong interest in preventing Iran and other Middle Eastern countries from becoming nuclear proliferators. So there's a common interest here. That is what drove the Obama administration. It was not some belief that the mullahs in Iran had become good people. And the Iranian leadership was not of some belief that the United States all of a sudden loved the mullahs. It was more a sense that we have some common interests that would serve both sides and would bring stability and a more peaceful environment to the Middle East East. And that is why the Trump administration is coming back to this deal. The destruction of that deal was a political agenda opposed to peace and in favor of war with Iran. Remember that Mike Pompeo as Secretary of state, said U.S. interests were in defeating and overturning Iran. That's not a peaceful agenda. One can embrace that agenda if they want, but that's not a peaceful agenda.

[Jeremy Suri]

Regime change.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Right. A peaceful Middle Eastern agenda agenda is about actually reducing nuclear weapons and opening countries like Iran to international trade. And that's what the Obama administration pursued. And Secretary of State Kerry deserves credit for taking a personal role, spending weeks in France negotiating this deal.

[Jeremy Suri]

Yeah, no deal's ever going to be perfect. As you mentioned earlier, Jeremy, there's always going to be other sticky issues that you can't stuff in right away. For instance, like Iran's support of proxies around the Middle East East. It was just about the nuclear program. That's all they could handle in that first.

[Jeffrey Engel]

Yes, exactly.

[Unnamed Expert]

There's a very interesting phenomenon that occurred around the Iran nuclear deal in 2016, 2017, when this was in the news. I could tell with 100% accuracy in a way that I am not capable of doing today. Today I can't tell who is a Republican, who is a conservative, who is a Trumpee, who is not. I could tell you in those years with 100% accuracy if you are a Democrat or Republican based upon the following question. What do you think of the nuclear deal? Obviously, if you're in favor of it, you're a Democrat. If you're against it, you're a Republican. But then if I asked the follow on question, which was how many of you have actually read it or have any idea what's on page seven, nobody had any idea. So it was just viewed through a partisan lens.

[Jeremy Suri]

It's funny. Trump wants to be a realist, or he's viewed as a realist. But his realist attempts at bringing now, you know, a deal with Iran, Russia, Ukraine, whatever it is, are based on fantasies. For instance, Gaza will turn it into a seaside resort. You know, so is it realism or is it something else? I guess that's for another podcast.

[Unnamed Expert]

Jeffrey Engel that was a shock to his own staff. It's not clear where he got the idea and it's not clear how long he had thought about the idea, though the odds are very little. And his own staff said, we haven't heard that before. Well, if you press, the United States is saying things of that nature, the kind of thing that he thinks will solve a geopolitical struggle that's been going on for 75 years and seemingly intractable, with hatred on all side, violence on all side, and thinks that he's going to come up with a solution to this while sipping coffee in the morning, or I guess in Trump's case, Diet Coke, without getting any input from the experts. That tells me that he's not serious.

[Martin DeCaro]

The US Will take over the Gaza Strip and we will do a job with it, too. We'll own it and be responsible. Responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site. We have an opportunity to do something that could be phenomenal. And I don't want to be cute, I don't want to be a wise guy, but the Riviera of the Middle east, this could be something that could be so bad, this could be so magnificent.

[Jeremy Suri]

On the next episode of History as it happens. What is Habeas Corpus? Why is the Trump administration thinking about suspending it? What did Abraham Lincoln do? Does that apply to 2025? Jim Oaks joins us next as we report history as it happens. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign [e-mail] or just go to Substack and search for history as it happens.

[Unnamed Expert]

Sam.