History As It Happens — “Russia and Syria”

Host: Martin Di Caro
Guest: Hanna Nota (Expert on Russian foreign policy, Middle East, Arms control)
Release Date: October 14, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode explores the enduring influence of Russia in Syria, even after the unexpected fall of the Assad regime and the rise of President Ahmed Al Shara — a former jihadist and ex-al Qaeda member. Host Martin Di Caro and guest Hanna Nota (of CSIS) dissect the deep historical roots of Russian involvement in Syria, unpack the motivations behind Moscow’s strategies, and discuss the complex web of regional interests at play in post-civil war Syria. The conversation ranges from imperial ambitions to geopolitical calculations, highlighting why Russian interests persist in Syria and what this means for the broader Middle East.

Main Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Fall of Assad and Russia’s Continuing Influence

• After rebel leader Ahmed Al Shara toppled Assad, many expected Russia to lose its position in Syria, but Moscow remains entrenched (01:49).
• Russia values its bases on Syria’s Mediterranean coast (notably Tartus) and continues to maneuver diplomatically to retain relevance (04:08).

Notable Quote:

“If you expected Russian influence in Syria to end with the fall of the Assad regime, you were wrong. Moscow remains involved...a stunning turn because the country’s liberator had once been a member of Al Qaeda.”
— Martin Di Caro (01:49)

2. Historical Roots: From Imperial Russia to the Soviet Era

• Russia's interest in the Middle East predates the Soviet Union, principally driven by access to the Mediterranean and protection of Orthodox Christians (06:03).
• Under the Soviets, Syria became a key client, especially post-1967 war when Assad sought arms after the Arab defeat by Israel (09:24).

Key Moments:

• Imperial Russian motives: Focused on solving the "Eastern question" — securing access to warm water via the Mediterranean (06:11).
• Agreement between Hafez al-Assad and the Soviets in the 1970s cemented deep military ties (09:24).
• Periodic frictions existed, e.g., 1976 expulsion of Soviet advisors by Assad (10:44).

Notable Quote:

“An important factor here, Martin, is also the Arab-Israeli conflict, which draws in the superpowers on opposing sides, with the USSR supporting its Arab allies. And indeed, Syria becomes especially important, especially after the Arabs' overwhelming defeat by Israel in the 1967 war.”
— Hanna Nota (09:24)

3. Post-Cold War Shift and the Putin Era

• The 1990s saw diminished Russian engagement as Moscow focused on internal issues. Syria lost some of its strategic importance, which shifted again under Putin (13:13).
• Putin reinvigorated ties, seeing Syria both as a legacy and as a means to counter US influence and maintain a market for Russian arms (16:18).

4. Geopolitics Trump Economics: Why Syria Matters to Russia

• The relationship has always been less about resources, more about military projection and keeping a foothold near NATO and key trade routes (15:26).
• The Tartus naval base stands as a symbol and strategic asset (12:54).

5. Russian Intervention in Syrian Civil War

• Russia’s military intervention in 2015 aimed to save Assad as his regime dwindled to control just 22% of territory (19:01).
• Motivations included fear of state collapse and extremism spillover (especially after the fall of Gaddafi in Libya), not just regime preservation or rivalry with the West (17:09).

Notable Quote:

“[A Russian diplomat] likened statehood in that part of the world...with a Mercedes engine. It’s kind of easy to take it apart, but very hard to put it back together.”
— Hanna Nota (19:01)

6. Lessons and Gains from Intervention

• Russia didn’t just serve Assad, it developed relationships with a wide array of actors: Iran, Turkey, Israel, and even rebel groups (22:20).
• Russia used its role to enhance leverage far beyond Syria, negotiating with major regional players and gaining hard power experience (22:20).

7. Why Russia Didn’t Save Assad in 2024

• Russia’s focus and resources were mostly tied up in Ukraine, limiting its capacity and willingness to save Assad as his regime collapsed.
• Moscow shifted strategy, preserving its interests by engaging with the new leadership instead (24:24).

8. Russia’s Role in the “New Syria”: UN, Leverage, and Limits

• President Al Shara seeks Russia’s support mainly for its Security Council veto — critical for sanctions relief and legitimacy (25:11).
• Russia cannot offer economic aid or large-scale reconstruction due to its own weakened finances (26:42).
• Still, Shara and others keep Russia at arm’s length, not wishing to antagonize but wary of over-reliance (26:42).

9. Regional Complexity: Competing Interests

• Multiple forces — including Turkey, Israel, the US, Kurds, and Druze groups — seek Russia’s favor to strengthen their positions (28:05).
• Kurds look to Russia given US unreliability in the region (29:11).
• Turkey and Israel have conflicting visions for Syria’s future; both see value in Russia’s residual presence as a balancing force (28:29).

10. Potential for Escalating Conflict

• Deeply divergent regional aims risk sparking direct confrontations — especially between Turkey (a NATO member) and Israel (30:32).
• Al Shara pursues a “zero problem strategy,” attempting to avoid alienating any major power as he consolidates rule (31:06).

Notable Quote:

“So far the Syrians are navigating fairly well what is a very complicated landscape. But they certainly have their work cut out for them.”
— Hanna Nota (31:24)

11. The Role of Prestige and Status in Russian Foreign Policy

• Beyond material interests, Moscow’s enduring Syria presence boosts perceived international status and leverage, even as its capacity declines (32:20).

Notable Quote:

“Russia made itself an actor that argued that it had to have a seat at every table of every conflict in the region...”
— Hanna Nota (32:20)

12. Is Syria Still a Core Interest for Russia?

• Syria, while important for projecting power and prestige, is now a peripheral interest overshadowed by the war in Ukraine (33:44).

Notable Quote:

“It is a peripheral interest because the only core interest of Russian foreign policy right now is to stand firm in the war against Ukraine...”
— Hanna Nota (33:44)

Timeline of Key Segments

• Assad falls/New Syria context: 01:28–04:08
• Russian historical involvement (Imperial/Soviet): 06:03–11:27
• Strategic motives & Cold War dynamics: 11:27–15:26
• Post-Cold War/Putin era renewal: 13:13–16:18
• Syrian Civil War & Russian intervention: 16:10–20:58
• Outcomes of Russian involvement: 22:20–24:24
• Russia’s choices after Assad, limits of influence: 24:24–27:23
• Regional complexity & multiple interests: 28:05–31:36
• Status, prestige, hard vs. soft power: 32:20–33:24
• Peripheral vs. core interest for Russia: 33:44

Memorable Quotes

• “There are no permanent enemies. There might be permanent interests.”
  — Martin Di Caro paraphrasing Hannah Nota (04:08)

• “By going in and creating facts on the ground, Russia will compel the United States...to deal with Russia on a sort of equal level, eye-to-eye.”
  — Hannah Nota (19:01)

• “The Russians have not been expelled from the country and they are probably managing to preserve at least their bases in the country. And I do think that is important to Russian prestige.”
  — Hanna Nota (33:21)

Tone & Style

The episode maintains a thoughtful, analytical, and accessible tone. Di Caro’s questions are incisive but clear, while Hanna Nota offers rich, nuanced answers rooted in historical detail and astute geopolitical analysis. Both emphasize complexity and avoid simplistic narratives, continually referring back to history as a guide for current events.

Bottom Line

Despite the dramatic changes in Syria’s leadership and the end of its civil war, Russia’s interests and involvement persist — driven by a blend of historical precedent, geopolitical necessity, prestige, and pragmatic adaptation. The future remains fraught as Syria becomes an arena for maneuvering by many outside powers, all with competing, often incompatible, ambitions.