Martin Dakaro (2:46)

In the face of battle. Published in 1976, the legendary military historian John Keegan concluded with a chapter titled the abolition of battle decision, said Keegan, is a concept which military historians use in an ambiguous fashion. By decisive battle, they can mean simply a battle which has a result which ends in the clear cut victory of one side over the other, but also a battle whose result causes some real shift in the direction of human affairs, far away from the battlefield, bringing about the downfall of a heretofore dominant power, setting the term to a hitherto irresistible tide of imperial expansion, toppling a political system, cutting short the career of a conquering hero. The military historian's search for results is almost always directed at one or other of these two levels. At the intermediate effect of the battle on the strength of the army and the mind of its commander, or else at its impact on the morale and resources of the war waging power. Yet, as I have tried to argue, said Keegan, the most important, the really decisive effects of a battle are more immediate and personal than those belonging to these other categories. It is armies which fight battles and armies which contain the men who in any society can and will and know how to fight battles. Or more precisely, defeats are immediately decisive because they kill some of these men and dissuade the rest for a longer or shorter period from wanting to fight anymore. Keegan went on to say, the very scale of the first and Second World wars has determined that we cannot yet categorize all those results, results, or chart their dimensions. But one at least denies contradiction, that the experience of violence and sudden death has been brought through battle into many, perhaps a majority, of families. That fear of the suffering battle can cause to human societies is profound and almost universal, and that the usefulness of future battle is widely doubted. While the great armored hosts face each other across the boundary between east and west, no soldier on either side will concede that he does not believe in the function for which he plans and trains. As long as states put weapons in their hands, they will show each other the iron face of war. But the suspicion grows that battle has already abolished itself. The great John Keegan, in his classic the Face of Battle, published 50 years ago, the suspicion grows that battle has already abolished itself. The way I put it is war does not work. We know war doesn't work. Yet time and again, since its total victory in 1945, the United States has bombed or invaded or intervened in other countries with meager results, while doing incalculable damage to the societies of others. The US Military wins battles, almost all the battles. Yet the United States loses the wars or fails to produce lasting peace and stability in societies transformed by the violence of battle, the desired political outcomes do not materialize. And here we are again, flying over

Military Spokesperson / US Official (5:54)

Tehran, flying over Iran, flying over their capital, flying over the irgc. Iranian leaders looking up and seeing only US And Israeli air power every minute of every day until we decide it's over and Iran will be able to do nothing about it. B2s, B52s, B1s, Predator drones, fighters controlling the skies, picking targets, death and destruction from the sky. All day long.

Martin Dakaro (6:31)

The United States and Israel started war against Iran with devastating air power with the aim, the strategic aim of. Well, that's not entirely clear. Although in recent days, at least publicly, the administration seems to have settled on the goals of wrecking Iran's nuclear program, conventional missile capabilities and its navy. But to what end? Why do American presidents continue to make the mistake of believing US Air supremacy might produce desired political outcomes? It is the illusion of air power. But President Trump also seems to understand the public will not tolerate high American casualties in a prolonged ground war. So there are now reports the US Will arm Kurdish separatists to foment a civil war in northwestern Iran. The Kurdish fighters would be supported by US Air power. You know, it wasn't that long ago when US Leaders were wary, and rightfully so, of getting bogged down in an open ended, unwinnable war with no exit strategy. The supposed lesson of Vietnam. But some statesmen wanted to kick what was derisively called the Vietnam syndrome. In other words, Americans have to be willing to fight and win wars again. We just got to go about it the right way. And 35 years ago, President George H.W. bush believed he'd done it.

George H.W. Bush (7:51)

Should military action be required. This will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn out war.

Donald Trump (8:02)

The first Persian Gulf war lasted six weeks.

George H.W. Bush (8:06)

By God, we've kicked Vietnam syndrome once and for all. Thank you very much.

Martin Dakaro (8:11)

Those heady days of the early 1990s, a US led international coalition backed by UN Security Council quickly and decisively expelled Saddam Hussein's armies from Kuwait, but did not go all the way to Baghdad for regime change. There would be no nation building.

George H.W. Bush (8:28)

He wanted me to go into Saddam, down to Baghdad and find Saddam Hussein. Also with whose life? Kid living over there next door in Houston, you know who's. Whose life are we gonna put into a fruitless hunt like that?

Martin Dakaro (8:41)

That lesson was forgotten or ignored during the global war on terrorism. Regimes were changed in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya with disastrous consequences. And in countries where there'd be no boots on the ground, the US Expanded its air war, using airstrikes to kill suspected terrorists or punish groups like the Houthis in Yemen. In another war, one now entering its fifth year, the air is commanded by the drone. Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In eastern Ukraine, the face of battle is soldiers running terrified from remote controlled drones that follow them into their foxholes. Here is security analyst Michael Clark on Sky News explaining what happens.

Michael Clark (9:24)

Those are conceptually new because they sort of dominate the airspace below, say 2,000ft. And this is where it makes it impossible for soldiers to move around on the battlefield safely. So they're doing the same job as artillery shells pinning down an enemy. And the fact is they're cleverer than artillery shells because an artillery shell goes where it goes and the troops on the ground take their chances. They dig in and just take their chances, hope for the best. But if a drone picks you up and there's somebody else on the end of it who's watching, then it can follow you into your dugout.

Martin Dakaro (9:53)

Drones have out paralyzed the front lines. Writing for responsiblestatecraft.org, anatol Levin says over the past four years, the Ukraine war has done more to change military weapons and tactics than any other conflict since 1945. The first month of the war, says Levin, taught a striking lesson. A combination of Ukrainian handheld anti tank and anti aircraft missiles nullified the Russian combination of armor, attack helicopters and ground attack aircraft that had been at the heart of Soviet, Russian and US Planning for offensive action in big wars. As the war progressed, he says, it diverged further and further from the experience of the previous century. This has been above all because of the tremendous advantages that a combination of old and new weapons gives to the defense, like satellite intelligence. Above all, says Leaving, as now generally recognized, it is drones that have transformed the battlefield since the second half of the 19th century. Says Leaving, increases in firepower have led to a progressive thinning out of infantry on the ground. Drones have increased this to a truly revolutionary extent. The writing of Anatol Levin, or as John Keegan may have put it, battle has abolished itself. So what is the point of continuing the war? Technologies and tactics do change, yet military advantage alone cannot produce desired political outcomes. Putin has guaranteed all of Ukraine will remain hostile to Moscow rather than greeting the Russian army as liberators. The Trump administration and its pro war cheele leaders believe this time they're going to get it right in Iran, that bombing will collapse the regime and something better will come after.

Donald Trump (11:35)

The United States has the strongest military the world has ever seen. I rebuilt our military in my first term, there's never been a military like we possess and frankly, there's nobody even close. But we are now using that military for good. We want to have it for good purpose.

Martin Dakaro (11:56)

Anatol Levin is the director of the Eurasia Program and the Andrew Bacevich Chair in American Diplomatic History at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Our conversation next Tap. Subscribe now in the show Notes for early access, ad free listening and bonus content or go to historyasithappens.com Anatole Levin, welcome back.

Anatol Levin (12:20)

Hello. It's very good to be back.

Martin Dakaro (12:22)

So I take it at some point in your life you read John Keegan's the Face of Battle. Yeah, we're going to talk about the changing face of battle or maybe the changing tactics of battle is today. The face of battle is today the drone.

Anatol Levin (12:38)

Yes, the really big new thing in this war has been drones, not drones alone. I mean, there are, are other older elements, some going back to the so called revolution in military affairs in the 1980s, notably satellite intelligence, of course, and its impact on the battlefield. But on the ground, it's interesting that drones and mines work together. Mines, of course, are very old by now. You know, I've talked to veterans, Ukrainian veterans, Russian veterans, they all say that the battlefield, this so called killing zone, no man's land, 15 miles wide, is absolutely choked with mines. Some of them I talked to were missing legs to demonstrate this. Now the point is that the other effect of drones, one is anything that moves in the open, men or equipment can be destroyed. This also makes it impossible to clear minefields because of course that takes time in the open. And you know, whether a piece of equipment or, you know, a man on foot, basically still with a stick and a metal detector, is a dead man. You know, this takes hours and with drones overhead, can't be done. So all of this works together. I mean, obviously this, this doesn't transform the face of guerrilla warfare, but as far as conventional, you know, warfare goes, clearly this has become quite different from, for example, the Israeli wars which were basically still the later stages of the Second World War continued.

Martin Dakaro (14:14)

Yeah. Referring to 56, 67, 73, the smashing Israeli victories. And those were short, decisive wars, which is rare.

WWII Narrator (14:23)

And that victory is a swift smashing and total one. As crack air force, infantry, artillery and tank corps combined line to sweep across the Sinai peninsula to the Suez Canal, east into Jordan, north into Syria. Thousands of prisoners are taken while Jordan announces she lost 15,000 troops in the sudden.

Martin Dakaro (14:43)

And something that your essay for Responsible Statecraft did was it Shattered in my mind this idea that in eastern Ukraine right now, we're just seeing wave after wave after wave of infantry assault, which would explain why so many Russian soldiers are dying. I mean, the casualty figures per month are staggering. You're saying because of the drone. Russian infantry assaults are taking place in small groups.

Anatol Levin (15:08)

Tiny groups, tiny groups. I don't know if you've seen this brilliant independent Russian documentary about the war in the Donbass by a Russian Canadian filmmaker, but, I mean, what this brings out is that any larger group is going to be spotted. A tank is going to be spotted. Even artillery has been forced back miles and miles. You can't use mortars, you can't use light artillery because they too will be identified by drones. But I mean, this whole business of Russian human wave attacks, or so called meat attacks is absolute nonsense. Nobody, if you talk to Ukrainian veterans, they've been saying since 23, this is rubbish. This is not how the Russians operate. Because you can't. I mean, it would be suicidal. Russians have been trying to infiltrate, pushing forward with groups as small as three men. You know, they try to get behind the Ukrainian lines and, you know, pick off the Ukrainians one by one and of course act as drone spotters. But the point about this, of course, is, you know, Frederick the Great phrased it, but I'm sure it was known to, you know, every army long before that. He said, you know, to get soldiers to advance against heavy fire, they have to be more afraid of their own sergeants and officers than they are of the enemy. That was pretty much Stalin's principle in the Second World War as well, you know, yes, Soviet soldiers advanced with astonishing courage and grit, but it helped that there were lines of NKVD soldiers behind them to shoot down anyone who tried to turn back. Now, the point is, you know, if you're relying on groups as small as three men, you can't do that. You can't have an officer, you know, a good officer or a tough NCO with groups as small as that, because you'd soon run out of officers and NCOs. So a group of three men that comes under heavy fire is not going to advance. It's going to go to ground.

Martin Dakaro (17:09)

So why are so many Russian infantry still being killed? I mean, the casualty numbers are outstripping recruitment.

Anatol Levin (17:16)

Well, we have to be a little bit careful about this because where are we getting these figures from?

Martin Dakaro (17:23)

That was a Bloomberg News report on

Anatol Levin (17:25)

the recruitment, but relying to a great extent on Western intelligence, which relies in turn to a great extent on Ukrainian Intelligence. Now, the point is. No, I mean, the BBC has done what looks like a reliable survey, but even so, I mean, they are talking in the range of 200,000 to 300,000 dead so far. Not the, you know, much, much higher casualties that have been alleged. But the point is that even with groups as small as three men, if you've watched some of these, you know, I mean, to be honest, pretty ghastly Ukrainian drone videos on the Internet, you can see, you know, drones hunting down soldiers one by one or, you know, yes, catching groups of two or three and doing so, by the way, not just in the front line, but for miles and mil behind the lines. Obviously casualties build up and clearly the side that's attacking is going to have more casualties because the Ukrainians can sit in their bunkers and direct their drones and don't have to come out to nearly the same extent. And then again, of course, the Ukrainians have a much smaller manpower pool.

Martin Dakaro (18:39)

Yes. So people who have studied the First World War, they look back on the years leading up to that war and ask how could the warring states, the combatants, not have foreseen how barbed wire, the machine gun, rapid fire artillery, would make it a defensive war where the offensive would be futile? And even after the war started and persisted, year after year after year, major offensives ran aground. We've all heard about the stories of the Somme and Verdun. Enormous casualties in a single battle. And people ask, you know, why didn't anyone foresee this today? Did anyone? Who do I mean by anyone, The Russians and the Ukrainians, did they foresee this change taking place? That the drone would rule the battlefield and all their pre war preparations would essentially come to naught. I mean, here we are four years later and they're still fighting over the Donbass.

Anatol Levin (19:35)

No, I mean, they clearly didn't. They had begun to study the lessons of the Azerbaijan Armenian War, which the Azeris won very largely through the use of drones. But look, I mean, there is habit, there are professional interests, there are military industrial interests. The Europeans, despite all the lessons of the Ukraine war, are still planning to pump billions and billions into building tanks. The Germans proved in Ukraine virtually useless. Now, of course, in other wars, in other parts of the world, they can still be useful. In the First World War, cavalry was totally useful on the Western front. But on the Eastern front, which was of of course much wider and with fewer troops per mile, cavalry every now and again did play an important role, not so much as a battlefield weapon, but as a raiding weapon to cut

Martin Dakaro (20:34)

communications I think you meant to say that cavalry would be useless on the Western Front. Useless on the Western Front, yeah.

Anatol Levin (20:40)

But I quote in my article Field Marshal Haig, the British commander on the Western Front. And in the late 1920s, after commanding from 1915 to 1918 and by the way, presiding over the introduction of the tank and the attack ground, attack aircraft into warfare, he was still writing that there will always be a place in war for the well bred horse. Look, soldiers spend the vast majority of their time not fighting, but in peacetime exercising and exercising and basically pretending to fight with yourself. And you know, Haig had spent decades living on intimate terms with horses. He was very fond of them, very understandably. I like horses. He'd only spent three years, you know, or four at modern war. Today you have all these, you know, officers, including very senior officers who've spent their whole life with tanks. It's very difficult to give that up. But also, you know, I think as with horses, there is the romance involved. You know, the romance of the cavalry charge, the romance of the Blitzkrieg, you know, Hitler's panzer sweeping into France, Patton's in the other direction. Direction, you know, in 1944 pattern sweeping through France. Whereas basically uniformed techies sitting in a hole directing drones to kill enemy soldiers one by one. Not very romantic.

Martin Dakaro (22:08)

I didn't mean to interrupt you there, but I said the Germans. I just did a show on this with Liana Fix, a historian in political science about German rearmament. Yes, they're spending a ton on tanks.

Anatol Levin (22:20)

Whereas, you know, the Europeans could defend themselves against Russia at a fraction of the cost with belts of minefields and huge numbers of cheap drones. Yes, you need aircraft still and of course you need lots and lots of anti aircraft weapons. Ukraine has also demonstrated that. But as I say, even artillery has proved less important than it seemed. I mean, the Ukraine war has gone through stages. There was a period in the middle Russia was really. And Ukraine too were really relying on artillery, just like in the First World War. But as I say, once drones really kicked in, even artillery became much less important.

Martin Dakaro (22:59)

I want to talk about air power, the issue of air power in the context of the United States and the ongoing war in Iran in a minute. But as far as air power goes here in this war, Russia, Ukraine, it seems like it's been years since I've heard anything about the Russian air force and why it never was able to establish air superiority over Ukraine. How important has air power been in this war? Or unimportant?

Anatol Levin (23:21)

Well, I mean, the Russians were relying on the Cold War paradigm on both sides of the combination of tanks and attack helicopters. The attack helicopters, this is before the drones really came in. They were cleared from the sky as they had been by the way, in Afghanistan, of course, by handheld. What are they called? Manpads. Anti aircraft missiles.

Martin Dakaro (23:44)

Yeah. There's a Stinger in Afghanistan in the 80s. The stinger.

Anatol Levin (23:47)

The Stinger, yes. Their helicopters suffered huge casualties. Their attempt to storm Kiev airport at Gostomel with helicopter borne troops was defeated by the Ukrainians. That was a key part of frustrating the Russian blitzkrieg plan. Since then, attack helicopters have not been used at all as far as I can see. And as far as the air force is concerned, it is still being used, but it is standing. The Ukrainians are barely using it. The Russians are using their air force to fire missiles, but well, well, attack from the front line. They are not once again doing the classical thing, you know, all the way up obviously to Iraq in 2003, of using aircraft in a ground attack role. It's just not happening.

Martin Dakaro (24:38)

Pardon my sports metaphor here, but in the NFL, since you've been living in the United States for a while now, I take it you're watching football on Sundays. Maybe not. You're probably reading books instead. The NFL, some change comes in innovation on the offensive or defensive side of the ball. And then a couple years later, what seems so brilliant and unbeatable, somebody else has come up with an offense or a defensive game plan to overcome it and defeat it. Similar to chess. In the days I used to play chess, I used to be told by better players, well, that opening doesn't work anymore. What's the next thing here? Robot infantry?

Anatol Levin (25:14)

I think so. I think that's obviously the way to go because, you know, you can get robot infantry to advance where human infantry will not. A human infantryman who sees that the men on either side of him have been shot down will stop. A robot will keep going. And if enough robots keep going, then they will break through eventually. So yes, I think it's clearly robots on the ground because of course, in the end, and the present state of the Ukraine peace process demonstrates this, the Russians, for a whole set of reasons, feel, or Putin feels that he has to get the whole of the Donbass. This is about territory, it's about control on the ground. But with the weapons available, Russia has not been able, able to capture this territory. Now this could change. The Ukrainians, you know, could collapse. The Iran war could have the effect of cutting off military supplies to Ukraine because we just won't have Enough to go around if the war goes on and on. And obviously, I mean, Russia will be strengthened economically by the war if it goes on. So I'm not saying that the Ukrainians will not collapse eventually, but I mean, you know, everyone was predicting 18 months ago that the town of Pokrovsk would fall to the Russians, and it still hasn't. So, yes, I mean, you've got to have either men or machines that can capture territory on the ground. And, you know, you've got robotic drones in the air. You will have robotic soldiers on the ground.

Martin Dakaro (26:40)

I've got to say, it's a horrifying possibility. Yes, human beings won't be blown to smithereens anymore on battlefields, but if that is a check on statesmen not sending a generation of their young to fight and die in a pointless war, well, now if you could just send machines who don't feel pain, who don't bleed, who don't have a constituency, don't have parents at home to fight wars, well, then that check is gone. I mean, we're not there yet, but you can see that future, and I find that horrifying. I want to return to history, but if you just want to remark on the ethics of warfare with robots.

Anatol Levin (27:14)

Well, yes, and, you know, as a journalist, a war correspondent, you know, I had the very unusual experience for a Westerner. You know, lots of Afghans and Iraqis and Syrians and others have had it, but of being. Not personally, of course, they had nothing against me personally. They weren't out to get Leaven, but of being hunted from the air by Soviet attack helicopters and planes in Afghanistan and Chechnya. It did strike me that hardly a new thought. And of course it goes back, all the way back. But hunting human beings with machines does give you a funny feeling if you're a human being, a very uneasy feeling, not just about yourself, but about the future of humanity. And yes, I mean, it could well encourage reckless wars, just as the overwhelming US and Israeli air superiority demonstrated by Israel over the past year and more has clearly emboldened what I regard as both an unnecessary and a deeply reckless war against Iran. So robots on the ground could do that once more, because, of course, you will have a number of countries, but not just the U.S. not just the U.S. certainly China as well, which will develop these weapons. And of course beyond that, I mean, now we're talking science fiction. But of course there is the. The Terminator scenario and the fears over AI that eventually the robots too will say, sorry, mate, no, you're not Getting us killed. We're turning back, you know, about the

Martin Dakaro (28:53)

human cost of robotic warfare. There has been some work done on the PTSD suffered by American operators of Predator and Reaper Dr. Who sit in a base or an installation somewhere in the United States and they're playing a video game, controlling a missile that incinerates an alleged terrorist somewhere in Yemen or what have you. And it takes a toll on those people. Even though they're just pushing a button and you're using a joystick to guide the assassination, it does take a toll.

Anatol Levin (29:22)

Well, also, because if you're an airman or an artillerist, you don't actually see the people that you're killing as these drone video in Ukraine, if you're actually operating a drone, you are often hunting down enemy soldiers one by one. You can see them trying to run away, you can see their faces. In some cases, that makes it personal in a certain way that we haven't seen in war since the days of hand to hand combat, even though it's being done from a distance.

Martin Dakaro (29:56)

So Putin launched his war with his tanks and his helicopters, a LA World War II, if you will, hoping for the sweeping victory, the dramatic blow. Maybe one issue here, Anatol, and this is just speculation on my part, the fact that there wasn't a major land war in Europe since 1945. I mean, does that have anything to do with how badly Putin or others misjudge how this war would go?

Anatol Levin (30:20)

I mean, I think that's right. And of course also the success at very low cost of the Soviet operations in Hungary in 56 and Czechoslovakia in 68. It does look as if the Russian army was operating on a decapitation effort like Czechoslovakia. But this also does demonstrate, not that the Russians are the only ones, God knows, but certainly an appalling failure on the part of the Russians of planning and intelligence, because there had been other lessons, including to Russia. In 1980, the Soviet Union did not invade Poland, unlike Czechoslovakia, because the Poles had made clear that if they did that the Polish army would fight. You know, the Russians did not realise that the Ukrainian army would fight. The other thing was, you know, I was actually in Chechnya in December 1994 when Yeltsin tried a blitzkrieg decapitation strike against the Chechen government of Dudayev. It was a disaster. It was a disaster. Not unlike the intervention in Ukraine. Russian tanks in column drove into Grozny and were blown to pieces by people with rocket propelled grenades. Failure of military planning, but also political intelligence failure because they didn't think the Chechens would fight. Russians try to avoid criticizing Putin even in private by name. But the number of Russians who've said to me that Gerasimov, the chief of the general staff, who's still there four years later, ought to have been shot as a result of this.

Martin Dakaro (32:00)

Well, in a prior era he probably would have been by now. The conversation continues. Tap subscribe now in the show Notes for ad Free listening Supercast will set you up so you can continue to listen to history as it happens in the same place. You're listening to it right now. Subscribe today. Foreign. So something else at work here. You brought up the Israeli war, short decisive wars. There was also the Iran Iraq war, which was a World War II style war but did not end decisively. And that war also had the use of human wave attacks to clear minefields. So it wasn't exactly like World War II in that respect, although I've read actually Vasily Grossman wrote this about how the Soviets would use their own prisoners to clear minefields. Penal Battalions 1945 the hold that continues to have on statesmen, policymakers, generals, soldiers, the idea that you can have total

WWII Narrator (33:04)

victory without expressing definite optimism. Allied leaders say the final curtain is about to fall on the European war. Two of our armies have driven into the as the Russians battle just a few miles east of Berlin, the crossing of the Rhine has spelled the doom of Nazi hopes of victory.

Martin Dakaro (33:25)

Total defeat for the enemy. And then you're able to occupy the enemy's countries, Germany and Japan, and rebuild them in peace. That's an anomaly. I think we've seen especially now as technology is changing, as we've been discussing here, that is simply not how it works anymore. Yet total victory continues. 1945 has a hold on our imaginations.

Anatol Levin (33:48)

You're absolutely right. You know, there were two things. I mean, the first is, I mean Japan was not invaded. Germany, of course, had to be actually invaded and completely occupied. Now that cost hundreds of thousands of American dead and British dead and of course millions of of Soviet dead. And that of course, is why now in Iran. The US Is trying to go for regime change and effectively control of Iran purely through the air. But once again, it will be worth remembering the lessons of Afghanistan. Not in quite the same way, but the US did not use ground troops at the start in Afghanistan, they used air power and the ground troops of the Northern alliance as ground troops to overthrow the Taliban. And US Air power was so overwhelming, of course, that they couldn't achieve that. But the result was America did not control the situation on the ground, the Northern alliance ground troops did, and that led to a political settlement which infuriated the Pashtun population, who were the backbone of the, of course, had been the backbone of the Taliban and really, I mean, initiated the entire American disaster in Afghanistan. So if you're actually going to determine the future shape of the state and, you know, political developments, you have to control places on the ground. Otherwise, you know, things will, I mean, not just may, but undoubtedly will turn out in a way that you don't expect. The other thing, of course, I mean, going back all the way to the. The Second World War. War is that, you know, it's been proved again and again, Germany, Vietnam, that bombing alone does not break the will of a strongly nationalist population ruled by a ruthless, autocratic government, and it doesn't break the will of democratic populations either. It didn't break British will, you know, during the blitz in 40 to 41. So it could be in the case of Iran that Israel and the US have made a classical mistake. So.

Martin Dakaro (35:54)

But why does this keep happening, in your view? The idea, the overconfidence in air power,

Anatol Levin (35:59)

it used to be to be cheap. I mean, the life expectancy of British Bomber command pilots in 1942-43 was lower than that of infantry officers in the First World War, which is really saying something. But today, of course, states with modern technology facing states with much, much fewer weapons and weaker technology can inflict huge damage. Increasingly. What, of course, was not possible in the Second World War, assassinations, as the assassination of Khamenei and of Nasrullah in Beirut from the air with minimal casualties to themselves. I mean, so far, how many Americans have died? Six.

Martin Dakaro (36:39)

Six or so. Yeah. Yeah. The idea that air war is bloodless or cheap for us. Right.

Anatol Levin (36:44)

Yeah. Whereas so far, at last count, almost 800 Iranians have died, including a very large number of leading officials. So it looks cheap. And of course, that means you do not face the domestic.

Martin Dakaro (36:56)

Well, it's interesting there, because Trump does understand that the American people will not tolerate high casualties of our own soldiers in, say, a ground war in Iran. And I know you're obviously not advocating for that, but what you said is true. You're not going to get an outcome you want without being able to control events on the ground. Even if we did invade Iran, which is such an insane idea, I don't even want to bring it up, but we have to. You would still face armed resistance a la Iraq. Again, this is not 1945. Germany and Japan surrendered and agreed to be Occupied. Well, they didn't have much of a choice there, but you know what I mean. This is not that world anymore.

Anatol Levin (37:36)

Well, and of course, the other question is, will the American people or the European people tolerate much, much higher energy prices in the long run? Because however much you degrade the Iranian armed forces, it does look as if they are still likely to have the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz and blow up oil and gas refineries in the Gulf.

Martin Dakaro (38:00)

Could it be that the persistence of the knockout blow, shock and awe, was the term during the Iraq war in 2003? If you listen to Pete Hegseth and some of the others in the administration, they believe they're just going to knock Iran off its feet.

Military Spokesperson / US Official (38:14)

Death and destruction from the sky all day long. Our warfighters have maximum authorities, granted personally by the President and yours truly. Our rules of engagement are bold, precise and designed to unleash American power, not shackle it.

Martin Dakaro (38:31)

Those ideas are underpinned by the mere fact that conventional weaponry today is so devastating.

Anatol Levin (38:38)

It is, and it looks very good on television. But look, we will have to see. I could be wrong, obviously. I mean, a great many Iranians very recently revolted against their government, but I mean, revolting, revolting against your government in de facto alliance with forces that are attacking your country and have already managed, I mean, inadvertently, no doubt, but to massacre something like 150, 50 primary school girls. That is not a very attractive, you know, prospect politically, but maybe it'll work. But I mean, the other thing of course is it seems that the US Military have. The higher ranks of the military have warned against about the dangers of this war. They haven't, unfortunately, any of them resigned. Yes, in order to block it. But the people are making the decisions are either simply not professionals or like Hegseth are, you know, basically former junior officers.

Martin Dakaro (39:48)

He's just embarrassing.

Military Spokesperson / US Official (39:50)

The dumb politically correct wars of the past were the opposite of what we're doing here. They had vague objectives with restrictive, minimalist rules of engagement.

Anatol Levin (40:01)

No more.

Martin Dakaro (40:01)

So much goes into creating the outcome you want in war. It's a matter of having public support in a democracy, even in an autocracy like Russia. We know why Putin has not ordered a full scale mobilization. Right, because he knows how unpopular that would be in his own country. But public support, having the right hardware, having real strategic thinking. There's been an absence of strategic thinking when it comes to Iran. We just hope it's going to somehow turn out into this magical outcome. We've referenced the power of conventional weapons, yet at the same time, a $20,000 drone. This is cheap, yet effective, and has turned the Russia, Ukraine war into an endless war of attrition. So maybe that's an answer as another answer as to why wars just drag on and on and on.

Anatol Levin (40:48)

The Iran Iraq war went on for so long, basically because we, and actually the Soviet Union as well, gave Iraq modern equipment that Iran, after the revolution had been cut off from. Otherwise the Iranians would have overwhelmed the Iraqis. But yes, I mean, this business with cheap drones, their cheapness compared to the cost of our weapons, you know, of our Patriot weapons, you know, of our aircraft carriers, that does echo aspects of guerrilla warfare. You know the famous Kipling poem, British officer is killed by an afghan. Two thousand pounds of education fall to a 10 rupee Jaziel, an Afghan musket. And of course, that's how we were defeated in Afghanistan. The Taliban defeated us or wore us down at a cost to them. The. The Western intelligence estimates were of about $400 million a year. We spent how much? $3 trillion on the war in Afghanistan

Martin Dakaro (41:49)

and lost Vietnamese peasants who were benefiting from Soviet weapons, of course, but still, you get the point. The most sophisticated lethal army in the world bogged down in an endless war in Southeast Asia and could not win. Even though we never lost a battle. The US never lost a battle. That's, again, brings in the political part of this. I know I'm ranging far and wide here.

Anatol Levin (42:11)

Sure, absolutely.

Martin Dakaro (42:12)

How has the writing of military history changed? You know, my favorite military historians, the very first history books I ever read were John Keegan, Antony Beaver and some others. How will the writing of military history change?

Anatol Levin (42:28)

Well, I mean, the more robotic it gets, of course, the more boring it will get from that point of view. One of the things that, alas, makes war so interesting, it is the human factor. I mean, you take people and you examine them under circumstances of extreme stress. What did Hemingway say about courage, grace under pressure? I mean, it is just psychologically intensely interesting and also, I mean, has a real effect on your scale of values. My uncles who fought in the Second World War talked about this and I experienced it. It, you know, with fellow war correspondents. It does teach you that education, money, status, all these things, degrees from universities, are not necessarily the most important things in life. You know, there are other values and much of that will go. But also, of course, this Russian documentary, sorry, I was trying to remember its title, it's a brilliant one. There's also a very good Ukrainian 1.10km to Avdiivka I think it's called. It is very much about out the soldiers as victims, but not even, you know, victims in the First World War. Sense of being mown down in great attempts to advance. But yes, camped out there under constant threat from drones, you know, hiding in holes, coming out at night. And even, of course, that's not. Not safe. It's. Well, psychologically it's still interesting, but.

Martin Dakaro (43:58)

Well, think about.

Anatol Levin (43:59)

Glamorous it ain't.

Martin Dakaro (44:00)

Yeah, think about how wars victories defe indelibly shape national narratives. That goes away when it's robots. Last thing here, Anatole. I brought up chess before. I used to play chess. Not very well. And I would study and I'd memorize openings and I'd try to master the end game, which, like in war, was always very, very difficult. The hardest part of chess, playing well in the end game. And I would try to, you know, memorize openings and I'd use a computer to help me out and I'd prepare for my matches. But then the enemy didn't do what I thought he should do. He didn't do what the book said. I think we're seeing that in warfare today. And this unfolding disaster in Iran, it is not going to go how we say the US says, the Pentagon says it should go because the Iranians should do what we expect them to do when we begin to bomb them.

Anatol Levin (44:52)

You know, I think it's worse than that because much of what the Iranians are doing in response was, was not just absolutely predictable, but absolutely predicted. They are closing the Straits of Hormuz to energy traffic and they are targeting the energy production of Gulf states with US bases on their soil. Of course, they're also trying to hit Israel with very limited success. But everybody, except presumably Trump's advisors, was saying that this is the biggest danger. Danger. The danger to international energy supplies and the world economy. And by the way, I mean, also as the Europeans were also warning, I talked to diplomats, of course, this is vastly strengthening the hand of Russia, both economically and diplomatically. I mean, up to this war, the Indians were to some extent bowing to US pressure not to buy Russian oil. Oil. Now they have no choice in the matter. Iranian oil, which is their other big supplier, has been cut off. Where else can they go? This was predicted is the thing. This wasn't an unexpected move on the Iranians part or a new one.

Martin Dakaro (46:06)

And now, trapped by rhetoric, the US administration is trapped by its own rhetoric.

Anatol Levin (46:11)

Yeah, I mean, like Putin, we have to liberate the whole of the Donbass. Four years on they still haven't done it. You know, Trump now has to get regime change in. In Iran. If he doesn't, then this is a de facto defeat.

Martin Dakaro (46:25)

Yeah. We've discussed over the years realism and how states act upon their interests, but everyone knows, of course, that other factors influence the picture. Pride, jealousy, notions of history, national greatness. The idea that I'm a great historical actor on history's stage. I get the sense from a lot of the cheerleaders of the war in Iran right now. Now in the United States, they're seeking revenge for 1979, which is an absolutely terrible reason to support this war.

Anatol Levin (46:57)

Well, I know. I mean, for God's sake, It's been, what, 47 years? I mean, 47 years is the time between 1914 and the Beatles. Get over it, for God's sake. And it's not as if America does not not bear, and Britain bear a share of the guilt for all this because of the overthrow of a secular, liberal nationalist regime in Iran in 1953, which was insanely labeled as communist. Yes, it's revenge. It's like France pursuing a vendetta with Germany over Alsace Lorraine, but with far less reason. But as far as Trump is concerned, it's been often said of Putin, and even I think his foreign minister is supposed to have said that this a key problem for Putin is that his chief advisors are Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, and he wants to be like them. Well, it seems that Trump, too, is dreaming of great military glories.

Donald Trump (47:57)

We're undertaking this massive operation not merely to ensure security for our own time and place, but for our children and their children, just as our ancestors have done for us many, many years ago. So this is the duty and the burden of a free people. These actions are right, and they are necessary to ensure that Americans will never have to face a radical, bloodthirsty terrorist regime armed with nuclear weapons and lots of threats. For almost 50 years, these wicked extremists have been attacking the United States while chanting the slogan, death to America or Death to Israel or both. They are the world's number one state sponsor of terror. We are the world's greatest and most powerful nation, so we can do something about what they do.

Martin Dakaro (48:56)

On upcoming episodes of History, as it happens, we're going to be speaking to historian Nelson Lichtenstein about neoliberalism journalism, and author Jack L. High about the book he wrote, upon which the new Nuremberg movie was based, about the psychiatrist Douglas Kelly. And because of the ongoing war in Iran, I plan more episodes on the origins of this moment. If you have an idea for a show you'd like to hear, let me know@martinjdecaromail.com or search for history as it happens on substack.

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