Amnesty International Representative (5:02)

Winds blowing across the hills of Massafariyata in the occupied west bank muffle the sound of heavy machinery demolishing Palestinian homes with little warning and even less clarity on where they'll be able to go next. Amnesty International says the forced removal of civilians against their will constitutes a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions and amounts to a war crime.

Martin DeCaro (5:28)

But it wasn't supposed to be this way, and we're going to discuss why with Omar Rahman, a fellow at the Middle East Council on Global affairs, where he focuses on Palestine, Middle east geopolitics and American foreign policy in the region. He used to work as a journalist in the West Bank. Our conversation next History is defined by.

GoDaddy Advertiser (5:49)

The names that stand the test of time. Names that inspire, unite and lead. Now it's your turn to create a lasting legacy with a dot Vote Domain Whether you're running for office, driving change or Rallying support. A Dot Vote domain ensures your name is as memorable as those in the history books. Visit GoDaddy.com, type in your name, dot vote and secure a web address that stands out. Claim your place in history with Dot Vote.

Martin DeCaro (6:17)

Omar Rahman, welcome back.

Omar Rahman (6:19)

Good to be with you, Martin, once again.

Martin DeCaro (6:21)

Well, Omar, before we talk about the latest news concerning the Palestinian Authority, I'd like to get your thoughts on what's happening in Gaza. The Israeli government announcing its latest plans for the Gaza Strip to send more troops into there. Some Israeli government ministers saying Gaza will be destroyed. Ethnic cleansing in plain sight.

Omar Rahman (6:40)

I mean, what's happening in Gaza right now is, you know, nothing short of an abomination, you know, tremendous war crime. And I think the description of genocide is an apt one. I think Israel has admitted as much at this point. When its declarations again, are what you're saying, which is the destruction of Palestinian society, a society of 2 million plus people in the Gaza Strip and their dispersal, you're talking about a genocide that's happening. And so I think, you know, many of us were calling it that from very early on October, November 2023. I was writing about it, speaking about it. We're reaching that stage in which Israel's intentions are becoming much more explicit now. At the same time, you know, one thing I've also said from the beginning is that, you know, you needed for the ethnic cleansing of Gaza, you needed the Egyptians to play ball and open their border. And I think it would enter into a sort of a long game of chicken in which the situation for the people, the civilians in Gaza, would get so bad that Israel believed other people would take them in. And so I think we're sort of reaching that stage in which it's going to push the entire population or try to towards the border, immisera them completely to the point where somebody's going to step in.

Martin DeCaro (7:49)

I know why third countries don't want to become a receptacle for displaced Palestinians. That would make them party to ethnic cleansing. But this blockade that Israel has done now for the past 60 days or so as we speak here, some have also said the Egyptians aren't allowing any food or water or medicine in either. Is that true? I mean, why won't Egypt help out here? Or can it help out here?

Omar Rahman (8:11)

Israel seized the border, actually the Philadelphia corridor, in order for it to, you know, impose this kind of punishing siege so that the Egyptians don't have control over the border. There are, you know, hundreds of trucks that have been waiting to bring in food or thousands of trucks along the Egyptian side. But they've been unable to do so because Israel's restricted that in the past, when Gaza was blockaded, prior to October 7, 2023, Egypt was a participant in that blockade. But, you know, it allowed the flow of people and goods over its border. It regulated it, but, you know, it was a participant in that blockade.

Martin DeCaro (8:44)

I had been reluctant at one point to use the word genocide to describe what is going on. I'm not reluctant anymore. I think some people view genocide, and there's a good reason for this, through the lens of what happened in the Holocaust. One group trying to outright murder every last member of another group in gas chambers, in killing fields and mass shootings. But the definition of genocide is defined as acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. As such, these acts can include killing members of the group, causing serious bodily harm or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures to prevent births within the group. Anyone can find this definition at the UN Website. The UN Charter. If what's happening now in Gaza doesn't fit this definition, then the definition of genocide is meaningless.

Omar Rahman (9:44)

That's absolutely true. Again, I mean, we're talking about the destruction of a society of millions within its homeland and its dispersal, and they're not hiding that intention anymore, you know, because I think Donald Trump has come in and said, well, Gaza's destroyed. You know, the people need to go elsewhere. The Israelis have, you know, found kind of the COVID for themselves to be much more explicit. Not that they weren't being explicit in their intention to destroy Gaza from the beginning, but they were also, you know, sprinkling in other statements that, you know, allowed, you know, those who wanted to listen to take it in a different direction. But now they're being much more explicit. Gaza's destroyed. Who destroyed it? They did. And we're going to. We're going to push the population out, man.

Martin DeCaro (10:23)

Because at first it was a war or there was a military context here, the killing will stop when the war is over and when Hamas is defeated. Well, as Omer Bartov, a historian from Brown University and a former IDF officer, said on this podcast recently, he said, there is no war anymore, and you can't use the military context as an excuse anymore. Although another scholar I've had on, Dirk Moses, has argued convincingly in his book the problems of genocide, that genocides can happen within a military context, within a security context, because another defense of Israel has Been, listen, they're not killing Palestinians because they're Palestinian. I guess what I'm trying to say is at this point, none of these defenses or rationalizations hold up anymore.

Omar Rahman (11:06)

I wrote a piece in November 2023 outlining what I saw as a genocidal logic at play beyond, you know, any kind of military aims that Israel had or stated after October 7th. And there is a logic there, a two prong logic to what's happening. One is kind of a proximate cause which is, you know, you want to eliminate Hamas. Who's going to come in and govern after Hamas? Well, you don't want the Palestinian Authority to return to Gaza because then parts of the west bank and Gaza would be under the same authority. And that's too close to a, for this right wing Israeli government's liking. They've worked to split it for a very long time and they don't want the international community to come in there as a custodian or as a trusteeship as well, because ultimately there's going to be eventually down the road some pressure on Israel to negotiate an end game. And they don't want to do that with the Palestinians either. And so what you have there is a, is a logic to just push the Palestinian population out because nobody can come in and govern. And Israel does not want to reoccupied the Gaza Strip in terms of providing services for its population. And then there's just the longer term overarching confrontation between Zionism and Palestinian nationalism and the effort to dispossess the Palestinian people of their land and push them out of their homeland. And that's been ongoing since 1948 or prior to 1948. So you have those logics coming together with this pretext of the Hamas attack of October 7th in which, you know, Israel's backers in the west, including the United States of America, have given it carte blanche to carry out destruction of Gaza.

Amnesty International Representative (12:37)

Port of Haifa in Palestine lies shattered by bombs and strewn with dead.

Omar Rahman (12:46)

Victorious Haganard troops have driven the Arabs.

Amnesty International Representative (12:48)

Out of the beleaguered city, taking many prisoners. A few pitiful refugees rescue what few belongings they can. There's a rush for the boats as the bitter strife continues in the stricken Holy Land.

Martin DeCaro (13:04)

And if anyone is questioning you here, they can simply look up what the Israeli government ministers themselves have been saying and what commentators in Israel on the far right have been saying. And political parties, some of which are explicitly described, or they call themselves Jewish supremacy or religious Zionism party, they're making this rather plain what their Long term goals are and with the historical context you mentioned going back to 1948 and who is the rightful heir to the land. So where is the Palestinian Authority in all of this? Because we're going to talk about the history here. The PA was established in 1994 after the Oslo Accords of the prior year. The west bank in Gaza were supposed to be a single entity, not split up and governed by different entities as it is now. The Palestinian Authority seems completely, and I do mean completely, powerless to stop what's going on in Gaza.

Omar Rahman (13:57)

Yeah, I mean, the Palestinian Authority has been absent, let's say, from the current crisis. Its leadership has been very quiet. It has certainly not led a defense of the Palestinian people as such in the face of this existential crisis. And that's been an absolute disaster, to have no leadership, no one at the helm in this moment. One thing that October 7th has done, among many things, is it's exposed the depth of the political crisis that Palestinians have been facing. Many of us have been talking about it and writing about it for years, but we really had no sense of how deep that crisis went until it was exposed by this current moment.

Martin DeCaro (14:35)

89 year old Mahmoud Abbas last election I believe was what, 05 or 09, was it? 05? Haven't had an election since. And when the peace process broke down, Abbas then moved to try to cultivate international support for the Palestinian cause at the un to get a Palestinian state recognized at the international level. The reason I wanted to have you on was to discuss what has happened to the pa. He just appointed someone, Hussein Al Sheikh, as his deputy. I don't know if it's even an official position. Who is this man, Hussein Al Sheikh, and why is this significant?

Omar Rahman (15:10)

Well, first of all, the last elections were held in 2006. So 2005 was the last presidential election and the last legislative election was 2006.

Martin DeCaro (15:18)

That's right. That's the one that Hamas one did very well in. And that led to the Hamas Fatah.

Omar Rahman (15:23)

Rift, although there's no legislature anymore because Abbas dissolved the parliament in 2018 anyway.

Martin DeCaro (15:29)

And this guy has been ruling like a dictator basically, right?

Omar Rahman (15:32)

He has, yes. Hossein El Sheikh is a Palestinian political figure. He's not a young man, he's in his 60s. He's the right hand man of Mahmoud Abbas, who holds several titles or roles within the institution. So Abbas is the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, he's the president of the Palestinian Authority, he's the head of Fatah, which is one of the leading factions within the Palestinian Liberation Movement, the President of the State of Palestine, insofar as that exists. Hussein El Sheikh is his, you know, sort of right hand man, somebody he's considered a protege and has put into powerful positions over time. Hussein El Sheikh was not to get into his entire biography, but he was born in Ramallah, according to his, his own biography, had served, I think, 10 or 11 years in Israeli prison as a youth for his political activities. He was let out in 1988, which is curious timing because it was the, you know, start of the first Palestinian intifada. So Israel was rounding up thousands of people and putting them into prison. One reason it may have let him out is because its prisons were overcrowded. And so it let some of these older guys out or, you know, you know, not to spread conspiracy theories, but maybe they had turned him as, who knows? Anyway, he was let out in 1988. And starting with the Oslo Accords in 1993, he started to serve positions within the Palestinian Authority, security positions and others.

Martin DeCaro (16:52)

Abbas was very important in the Oslo process here.

Omar Rahman (16:56)

Yes.

Martin DeCaro (16:56)

So that's where he cultivated his relationship with Al Sheikh. Right?

Omar Rahman (17:00)

Sure, and we'll get into that. But in 2007, Abbas appointed him as the head of the General Authority on Civilian affairs, which in the world of the occupied west bank is an extremely important and influential position. There are, are, there's the Prime Minister, there's the Foreign Minister, but this position, I think is actually probably second in influence to Abbas's position itself. And that's because in that world of the occupied territories, he is the liaison with the Israeli military government and military authority. And therefore he oversees the pipeline of licenses and permits and visas and all the things that Israel has in place that, that allow Palestinian life to operate under occupation. And because he oversees that, he has all types of influence. Now, I don't want to say that translates to popularity. He's not popular at all, really. He has very little base of support. And that's probably a result of his proximity to Israel and its occupation authorities. He doesn't have popularity, but he has power. And over time, as Abbas has gotten older, you know, Abbas is 89 years old and has had less maybe energy to do certain things. He's kind of fulfilled a lot of the roles of the President. He travels with Abbas and all his overseas trips. He deals with diplomats and political heads of state. So he's kind of filled that role. In 2022, Abbas appointed him onto the executive committee of the PLO and then engineered it. So he became the Secretary General of The PLO Executive Committee. And then most recently a few weeks ago, he had the Central Committee of the PLO stacked with his own loyalists over time, create the position of a vice chairman of the plo, which now Hussein El Sheikh has been put into, and I think as the kind of vice president of the State of Palestine, Palestinian Authority.

Martin DeCaro (18:50)

So why are all these titles, appointments, promotions, significant? I mean, what does this tell us about what's happening with the Palestinian Authority and its immediate future? Because most people have never heard of, at least in the United States, they had never heard of Hussein Al Sheikh before this news broke last week.

Omar Rahman (19:06)

Well, there's been, you know, over the years, especially as Abbas has gotten older, kind of talk of succession within the Palestinian institutions or the Palestinian national movement writ large, which is a very curious topic of discussion because the Palestinian Authority was set up to be a democratic institution and it has processes for the event. Like any government, there's emergency processes. So if the president of the United States dies, the vice president becomes in another system of a parliamentary system, you know, succession processes for the Palestinians. If the president died, then, you know, the speaker of the parliament was supposed to become the caretaker for 60 days until elections were held. Well, Abbas dismantled the parliament. You know, he's kind of dismantled democracy as such for the Palestinians. So there's been a lot of talk of discussion in terms of creating those type of processes. So he's kind of engineered it. So his man is poised, I think, to take over. That doesn't necessarily mean it's going to happen. You know, it could devolve into a civil war or an infighting over these type of positions. But Abbas has done whatever he can to kind of position Hussein El Sheikh to take over. And Hossein Al Shaykh, in various profiles of him, Israeli security officials have described him as our man in Ramallah. This speaks to why he's unpopular, but the Israelis see him as their guy there.

Martin DeCaro (20:22)

And so this is the common view of the Palestinian Authority at this point, right? Among Palestinians, the Palestinians, Palestinian street, that it's just a branch of the military, Israeli military government.

Omar Rahman (20:33)

Over time, it's become what you could describe, let's say, as an appendage of the Israeli occupation, detached or unmoored from a peace process. Right. So, I mean, we can get into the history of the Palestinian Authority and why it was put in place. But, you know, it was put in place within a peace process that was supposed to lead to an end of conflict with the Israelis. And unmoored or detached from that peace process, it sort of exists as this semi autonomous entity that's functioning to provide services to the Palestinians and also provide security for mainly for Israel.

Martin DeCaro (21:08)

Ian Black, in his excellent book Enemies and Neighbors said Oslo was a fragile construct that gave innumerable hostages to fortune. It was vague and open ended. The final goal was not spelled out, but there was some detail as to what was to happen with a Palestinian Council, an elected council for the Palestinian people in the west bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five years, and that's starting in 1993. The PA was established in 94. What was its initial purpose?

Omar Rahman (21:39)

Omar the Oslo Accords established a process for Palestinian self government or autonomy, again, not to last more than five years, in which within that period the PLO and Israel were supposed to negotiate kind of an end of terms, discussing final status issues that were deferred by Oslo, which was one of the major criticisms from Palestinians of Oslo as it deferred things like borders, the issue of settlements, the issue of refugees, the issue of Jerusalem. So it deferred these to kind of an endpoint. And because of that it left so much vague and open to power dynamics between Israel and the Palestinians, which were obviously very asymmetrical and to dynamics on the ground and dynamics within, you know, let's say the Israeli government, so an Israeli democracy. When Netanyahu was elected for the first time in 1996, it totally changed the dynamics of this process. But anyway, for the Palestinians who had declared, or for the PLO which had declared independence and statehood in 1988 in Algiers, the Palestinian Authority was going to be the vehicle that was going to realize that independence and statehood and self determination on the ground. For the Israelis, you know, this was the period immediately after the first intifada. They were looking for a way out of this direct occupation of the Palestinians. They didn't want to give up control over the land and the territory, but they were looking to kind of reorganize their occupation from a direct military occupation into an indirect one in which there was an interface between the Palestinian population and their authority. And so the Palestinian Authority became that intermediary which would provide services, have autonomy over things like education and health care and direct taxation and things like that. And Israel would maintain control over security and foreign affairs and borders and everything that they cared about. Right. So it was a very security led process. And fortunately again, dynamics broke down over time. It said nothing about settlements. So settlements grew at three times the pace that they had been growing prior to that. Obviously there were security problems. Hamas was launching attacks Against Israel. Israeli settlers were attacking Palestinians, the Israeli military was attacking Palestinians. So again, over time, the situation got worse rather than better.

Martin DeCaro (23:57)

Yeah, the violence really picked up in the 90s, late 90s, leading to then the second intifada starting in 2000. But in 93, Mahmoud Abbas, who was important in getting the Oslo accords done, told the PLO Central Council in Tunis, and I'll have you respond to this quote again. And Ian Black has this on page 327 of his book. Abbas said, oslo carries in its bowels either an independent state or the consecration of the occupation. It all depends on our mentality as we deal with it. Referring to the Palestinians, he said, we're an educated people. As individuals, we have built much around the world. Now comes the test. Can we build the institutions that can rebuild this scorched land? The mind of the revolution is very different from the mind of the state. We must all put on new robes and think with new minds if we are to build this state. Somewhere along the way, the project of Palestinian statehood got lost, did it not?

Omar Rahman (24:55)

Yeah, it's amazing to hear that quote. And there are other ones. And this is why Abbas had, you know, he had his supporters among the Palestinians. Especially after arafat died in 2004, there were those who believed in Abbas because he did talk about institutions and democracy, which Arafat had really undermined. You know, he had created a one man rule type of situation in the 90s. And so some people were looking at Abbas as a, as a figure that may restore Palestinian democracy, institutions and build society in that particular way. Unfortunately, he's gone the exact opposite way.

Martin DeCaro (25:27)

You know, when you look back at this history, you can see all the incidents and events and developments that explain why the Oslo process ultimately failed. To name one, the violence. Baruch Goldstein, who was a fanatical Jew, Israeli Jew, shot up a whole bunch of Palestinians who were, I think, worshiping at the time in Hamas all the suicide bombers who were sent deliberately into Israel itself, not just the occupied territories to kill civilians, to derail the peace process itself. So when you look back at that, you say, you know what, it's no surprise this didn't work out. But at the time, there were, even, even as this was happening, there were reasons for optimism. One of those reasons was Oslo 2, which was much more detailed than the initial Oslo agreement. The Oslo II accords were hundreds of pages to actually explain how all this was supposed to get done. And at this time, it had a lot of support among Palestinians, according to polls that were done. Ian Black reports This in his book. But there was a fatal flaw here. Maybe you can address this and then a few other things. I want to ask you about the 1990s before we move on to the Fatah Hamas rift, even in Oslo, too. The Palestinian Authority was made responsible for managing all Palestinian residents in the west bank, but only had full control of 2.8% of the land. This is Area C. So there was Area A, Area B, Area C. Why did this happen? It doesn't seem like the PA really had much of a chance when you look back at this.

Omar Rahman (26:56)

Yeah, I mean, there's a number of things there.

Martin DeCaro (26:58)

Yeah, well, there's a very complex history.

Omar Rahman (27:00)

You know, what you said. Yeah, I would say. I mean, just to touch on the issue of spoilers, because I think it's an important one. And there were definitely spoilers on both sides because there was rejectionists on both sides. You know, there were those on the Israeli side who believed the Jewish people have a right to sovereignty over the entirety of the land. And we see those people very much in power today.

Martin DeCaro (27:19)

And they thought Rabin was a traitor for agreeing to Oslo. And Rabin was no dove either.

Omar Rahman (27:23)

No, he was not. And he was killed, obviously, in 1995 by Yigal Amir in an Orthodox Jew. So it was Goldstein who you mentioned, Baruch Goldstein, who killed 29 worshipers in Hebron in 1994. Actually, that was prior to any Hamas suicide bombing. So Hamas suicide bombing actually started after that, which is important.

Martin DeCaro (27:42)

Hundreds of people attended Baruch Goldstein's funeral. He was killed by the Palestinians after, I guess, he ran out of bullets. Hundreds of people attended his funeral. He was looked at as a hero among some people. I mean, it's madness, but go ahead. Yeah.

Omar Rahman (27:56)

One of those people is the security Minister in Israel today.

Martin DeCaro (27:59)

That's right.

Omar Rahman (27:59)

Tamar Ben GVIR famously had a portrait of Baruch Goldstein in his living room. So these trend lines, these threads, continue on to today.

Martin DeCaro (28:08)

Yes, Hamas has plenty of fanatics in its ranks, and no one hesitates to point that out, and they should. But there are also fanatics on the other side. But go ahead.

Omar Rahman (28:17)

Just one of the things I wanted to say about spoilers, and this speaks to kind of the way Oslo was written, which is very vague. It left things up to the dynamics on the ground at the same time. Like, you know, Israel wanted the PLO and the PA to police the Palestinians on their behalf, but at the same time, they didn't really empower them very much to do so because they were wary of the plo, who obviously was Their arch enemy for decades. So you get into these dynamics, but the way Azo was written enabled it empowered spoilers on both sides. Progress was contingent on the Palestinians fulfilling so, so much on the ground, despite being a brand new authority with very little at its disposal, that it actually empowered Hamas to undermine it. If they couldn't maintain that security, which Israel itself had a difficult time maintaining, then it would lead to kind of a slowing of progress that actually empowered Hamas. It also, because it said nothing about settlements and settlers, the growth of the settler movement undermined from the Israeli side. So that was a way for the right wing to undermine progress on the peace side by building these settlements. Regarding the residents and the 2.8% of the land, this is another aspect of it. I mean, I said earlier, Israel got into the Oslo accords and Rabin wanting to keep control of the land, but not the population itself. And this is kind of the whole trajectory of the occupation and of the Zionist movement really prior to 1948, which is to take as much of the land with as, as little of the indigenous population as possible. That's kind of the overriding strategy, let's say. And Oslo is part of that. Right? It's a different means of doing so by separating from the Palestinians politically while maintaining control over all the territory and the resources, which is also important. The way Oslo and Oslo 2 was set up was to kind of give Palestinians responsibility over Palestinian population centers. So those cities, it started off just Jericho and Gaza and then, you know, over time it was and Jenin and Nablus and all these other towns, with the exception of Jerusalem, in which Israel ceded responsibility for governance over the population but maintained control over the entirety of the territory so it could maintain security control. If you only have 2.8% of the land, then to get from Jenin to Nablus to Ramallah, you're going through Israeli controlled territory and therefore Israel can seal it off in a any point. You're going through Israeli checkpoints. So it's a system of control of permits, of all that type of thing.

Martin DeCaro (30:41)

So from the mid-90s onward, the Palestinian Authority was criticized because. Well, there are a number of reasons. It was supposed to be, as you said, some kind of democratic institution. So the PLO leaders were in exile in Tunis prior to this. Arafat was not in the occupied territories. So they had to come back to Israel and they were seen as being out of touch with the Palestinians who had struggled against the Israeli occupation during the first intifada in the 1980s. And then there was corruption Arafat had some secret bank account where money was going into. There was a lot of corruption and as we've been discussing, also worked with Israel on security issues, making arbitrary arrests of Palestinians. It was seen as just another unaccountable Arab regime. It was almost like a foreign entity in a way, wasn't it?

Omar Rahman (31:29)

Yeah. I mean, this is one of the interesting dynamics of that period and of Palestinian politics in general. Palestinian politics is in a huge way characterized by the fragmentation of Palestinians across geographic lines. And it develops in that particular way. There are Palestinians in Syria, there were Palestinians in Lebanon, Palestinians in Jordan, Palestinians in the occupied territory, in Gaza, in the west bank and elsewhere. Without getting into too much of the history here, the 80s were a very bad time for the PLO. It was pushed out of Lebanon in 1982 by the Israeli invasion, which was huge because the PLO had created a sort of state in exile there.

News Anchor (32:06)

Lebanon and Beirut in particular, has been home for the PLO since 1970 when they were expelled from Jordan. Now they walk these streets with the ease of those who've been accepted as a fact of life by the people of this city and country. Never more so than today as they brought up the necessities for their impending departure to the Arab states which are taking them in. But in the past 12 years, the PLO has had more than just a home here in Lebanon. They've run the affairs of the 700,000 Palestinians living in this country almost like a government. In effect. The Lebanese have allowed the PLO to build a state within a state.

Omar Rahman (32:43)

It had institutions, it had a governing system. And. And most importantly, it was accountable to the Palestinians in the refugee camps there. When they got pushed out, they got sent to Tunis, which was far away and didn't have its own local Palestinian population or refugee population. So it became unaccountable. Right. It was also broke and bankrupt. And therefore it had to find different sources of funds. It no longer had armed struggle on the border with its homeland. And so it became a different type of entity, I think, during that period in 1982, after 1982. And so when it returned as part of the Oslo Accords, it was broaching this type of fault line that exists in between where the experiences of the Palestinians that were living in the occupied territories and had carried on this uprising for the past six years and had sacrificed, but who also understood the lay of the land, had been dealing with the Israelis under the occupation for decades. States understood the settlements, understood what the Israelis were trying to do literally on the ground. And so this created some kind of fault line. And instead of incorporating that leadership and their points of view, Yasser Arafat and the PLO came in and took over and appointed their own people. Arafat, as you said, he had his own style of patronage that came out of the revolutionary period and wasn't really appropriate for the state building project that was going on.

Martin DeCaro (34:08)

And so about Arafat, we'll go into the early aughts now, early 2000s. There's a lot of pressure on him because, well, things aren't really working out very well under his leadership. And then he was surrounded. He was under siege during the second intifada in Ramallah for a brief time because of this pressure by the west, the Bush administration, Israel. Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas to be prime minister in 2003. But it didn't last. What happened.

Omar Rahman (34:34)

I mean, just to step back slightly, Mahmoud Abbas is kind of an interesting figure within the Palestinian national movement. He's one of the early members of Fatah, which was created in the 1950s in the Gulf. He's not one of the leading members who were mostly actually killed off by Israel, especially in the 80s. That was another experience of the 80s that transformed the Palestinian national movement. But he was one of these figures who had been calling for a type of two state solution with the Israelis for a very long time. He had eschewed armed violence. He was against the use of violence, a sort of peacenik. He maintained relations with certain Israelis on the left. One of the things that Arafat always did is he used different people to test different strategies. And he used Abbas in the early years to test that relationship with the Israelis. When something showed progress, he empowered those types of, of people. And so when they started moving in the direction of two states and negotiations with the Israelis, he empowered Abu Mazen or Mahmoud Abbas to oversee the kind of Oslo negotiations. And so Abu Mazen, Mahmoud Abbas was kind of essential to the construction of the Oslo process. And so in 2003, this is the height of the second intifada, the Americans were pushing Yasser Irfat to create a new position, which was the prime ministership, which didn't exist before that, in order for Abbas to fill that role. And so Abbas came in, Arafat relented and created the position. And Abbas came in, fulfilled that role, but not for very long because he resigned three months later. He blamed the US and the Israelis for not pushing negotiations. And I think internally, you know, people trying to bring him down within the Palestinian national movement.

Martin DeCaro (36:20)

I'm glad you mentioned that. He goes back a Long way with Arafat. I believe they met in the 1960s. So here we are 60 years later, and he's still heavily involved in Palestinian politics. Maybe it's time for some fresh leadership. Although at 89 years old, if Abbas were in the US Senate, he might be one of the younger ones. Abbas does win the presidency in 05 following Arafat's death. So he was prime minister for a very short time, but now he's in charge of the PA in 05. Were there hopes for him? The second intifada is still ongoing, but he helps bring it to a close shortly after taking office in early 05. I mean, was there any real optimism here? I mean, I don't think anyone is expecting him to still be in power 20 years later.

Omar Rahman (37:01)

Yeah, I mean, interestingly, he had a very bad relationship with Yasser Arafat at the end. Arafat didn't trust him because he was seen as being too close to the Americans and to the Israelis, and they were pushing him into a position of power at that time. At the end of the day, he was kind of the last in that line of original leaders of. Of Fatah. And there were people that, again, supported him for all the reasons we said, the quote you mentioned earlier and his support of institutions and democracy and creating healthy Palestinian political culture. And so he had his supporters. So he went to Yasserafat, you know, on his deathbed, and Yasser relented and tapped him as the successor. And so he took over for Arafat in 2004, after Arafat died. And then in 2005, it was made. Made legitimate through an election. So he became the president, and there was hope again. This is the kind of tail end of the Palestinian second Intifada. It was an absolute disastrous time for the Palestinians. The PA had been destroyed by Israel and its reoccupation of the occupied territories by Errol Sharon, who reinvaded the occupied territories of the occupied West bank in 2002, destroyed kind of all the institutions of government. And Palestinian society had kind of devolved to its lowest common denominator, in which militias and armed groups were policing and governing.

Martin DeCaro (38:18)

And this was a heavily militarized situation, not like the first Intifada. Second Intifada was far more violent.

Omar Rahman (38:25)

Yeah, I mean, the first Intifada broke down eventually and in the face of brutal Israeli repression, became more violent at the very end.

Amnesty International Representative (38:33)

The first intifada was sparked by the deaths of four Palestinians in December 1987. By the time it ended in 1993, more than 1,100 people had died. 16,000 people had been detained. Palestinians had already spent two decades struggling with the injustice of living under Israeli occupation. Intifada marked the first time Palestinians from all parts of society began such an intense resistance. The protests evolved from boys throwing rocks and people marching to fighters attacking Israeli soldiers and military targets. Palestinians went on strike and boycotted Israeli products.

Omar Rahman (39:14)

Whereas the second Intifada was the complete opposite. It was kind of an armed revolution.

Martin DeCaro (39:18)

My memories of watching this when I was a young person was the symbol of the first intifada, and I'm not the only person who's pointed this out, was a Palestinian teenager throwing a stone. The symbol of the second intifada was a Hamas suicide bomber blowing up a bus or whatever.

Omar Rahman (39:33)

So a gorilla with a rifle or something like that.

Martin DeCaro (39:35)

Hamas is much more active because they weren't really around during the first intifada. They come out of that experience.

Omar Rahman (39:41)

Yeah, they were created right at the beginning, actually, but their role kind of evolved over time and their strength and their appeal on the Palestinian street gained.

Martin DeCaro (39:49)

Strength over time as an alternative to the secular nationalists in the plo.

Omar Rahman (39:54)

Yeah, I mean, just to get back to Abbas and the hope for a second. So again he comes in, it's hoped that his relationship to the Israelis and to the Americans can kick start the peace process and get past this period of revolt and violence and killing and sacrifice. And so he's engaging with the Bush administration over the.

Martin DeCaro (40:14)

On the roadmap.

Omar Rahman (40:14)

Over the roadmap. And actually this to me is kind of the last best window because he appoints a prime minister who's being pushed by Washington, which is Salam Fayyad, who comes to power in 2007, who's a, you know, a World Bank IMF figure, US trained economist for the Palestinians. And Fayyad puts in place this plan, which comes to be known as the Fayed Plan, maybe the last strategy that Abbas had, which is a state building process, a very vigorous state building process under occupation to create a fait accompli in which a Palestinian state will come into existence by sheer momentum of having created it on the ground and kind of stripping the Israelis of any last excuse they have that the Palestinians are not ready. So complete transformation of the Palestinian security services, putting in place this economy that's functioning, all these type of things. And it works to a degree. I mean, there are problems and criticisms of Salam Fayed and his plan, and I think those are valid as well. But. But it works. It strips the Israelis and the Obama administration comes into power at the kind of the tail End of it. So this is between 2009 and 2012. The problem is at the same time, who comes back to power in Israel? Benjamin Netanyahu.

Martin DeCaro (41:25)

The second largest party, Likud, is led by Benjamin Netanyahu. As we mentioned, the former Prime Minister.

News Anchor (41:32)

Still opposes a two state solution with.

Martin DeCaro (41:34)

Palestine, but has promised to work with the United States to pursue what he calls a workable peace.

Omar Rahman (41:40)

Who in 2009 comes back to power and starts dragging his feet. And so you get to this moment of truth for the Palestinians in which they've created their state. All their backers in Norway and elsewhere and in the United States are saying they're ready for statehood. And Netanyahu puts up the obstacle. And in the end those backers relent. They don't force Netanyahu back to the table to negotiate.

Martin DeCaro (42:02)

During these early years then of Abbas rule, there was legitimate state building going on within the Palestinian Authority and in the West Bank.

Omar Rahman (42:11)

Yes, it was very successful. I was living there at the time, working as a journalist and it was a positive time in many ways. There was security, there was stability, there was to some degree, I mean, it was a bit of a bubble, but an economic prosperity there. And there was state building and an anti corruption drive and all these type of things that had created kind of the foundations for Palestine Palestinian state. And many were saying within the international community that the Palestinians are ready. Okay. But again, when Netanyahu prevented that from happening, those same parties didn't force the issue. So that project collapsed. So the Palestinians went to the UN and tried to get recognition of statehood. This was in 2011, and the Americans prevented that from happening and kind of vetoed.

Martin DeCaro (42:53)

I mentioned, I referred to that earlier how Abbas went to the international community when the peace process broke down to seek legitimacy there and recognition there. Another thing is happening though, and it's hard to overstate how important this is in today's context. Another thing is happening during these years and that is the rift between Fatah and Hamas because of Hamas winning the 06 elections, the legislative elections, and then seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 07 after what has been described as a brief civil war. Maybe this sounds like an open ended question you can spend an hour discussing, but you know who is responsible for the rift? Probably both sides. Right. But why has it never been mended? Because as I mentioned earlier, the west bank and Gaza are not supposed to be separate entities. They're supposed to be a single entity under Palestinian control or rule, if you will.

Omar Rahman (43:41)

Yeah, I mean, just to kind of step back in Time a little bit. And not to dwell too far in the past, but as I mentioned before, that's all right.

Martin DeCaro (43:48)

I dwell on the past all the time here. Omar?

Omar Rahman (43:51)

Yeah. Hamas was created in 1988, and really it was created as kind of an alternative to the plo. That's how they saw themselves. So the PLO was dominated almost exclusively by secular revolutionary factions. Fatah, which was the biggest, that's the party of Yasser Arafat, was a secular nationalist and even kind of ideologically centrist, you know, a big tent type of party. There were other kind of Marxist Leninists, leftists, all that kind of stuff. So that's who dominated the Palestinian liberation movement. On the Islamic side, there was the Muslim Brotherhood that was kind of formed in Gaza in the 1970s, but it was apolitical. And because it was apolitical, it was focusing on cultural and social reform along Islamic lines within Palestinian society, like the Muslim Brotherhood does everywhere. The Israelis actually kind of cozied up to it. They saw it as an alternative and a way to split the nationalism of the PLO. In 1987, the first Intifada starts and the Muslim Brotherhood realizes we're going to lose our influence on the Palestinian street because the tenor of Palestinian politics at the time was this revolt. And so they launched Hamas as kind of a political branch of this movement to contend with the secular parties, the secular national parties, and provide that type of alternative, Islamic alternative. And so they always saw themselves as different from the PLO as an alternative and challenging the designation of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Fast forward a little bit past the intifada and the Oslo Accords. They opposed the Oslo accords. They saw what Arafat had done in this negotiation with Israel as a betrayal. But in some ways, I mean, this is going a little too nuanced, but they kind of accepted the self government paradigm. But anyway, they challenge Oslo and start attacking the Israelis throughout the 1990s and into the second, into father right, and in which they now become a major political force. At the end of that, they decide that they're going to kind of translate their influence into political power by challenging four elections for the first time. They had challenged elections within trade unions and student groups all the way back from, like the early 1990s. But they had never challenged within this construct of the Oslo Accords, which is the Palestinian Authority. George Bush pressured the Palestinians to hold elections in 2006 or 2005. 2006. And so Hamas decided to contest the parliamentary side, not the presidential side. And they in fact run on a, not on a platform of violent revolution, but of good governance because the PA was seen as corrupt and incompetent. Fatah was. And so they run on a platform of good governance and anti corruption and all that kind of stuff, and they win the majority of the seats. Now that leads to a very difficult position for the donor countries to the Palestinian Authority, led by the United States, who have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization. So they can't do business with it.

US Government Official (46:39)

You see, when you give people the vote, you give people a chance to express themselves at the polls. And if they're unhappy with the status quo, they'll let you know. It's the great thing about democracy. It provides a look into society. And yesterday the turnout was significant, as I understand it, and it was. And there was a peaceful process as people went to the polls. And that's positive. But what's also positive is that it's a wake up call to the, to the leadership. Obviously, people were not happy with the status quo. Are you cautioning Prime Minister Abbas not to resign? We'd like him to stay in power. I mean, I mean, we'd like to stay in office. He is in power. We'd like him to stay in office. Sorry to interrupt. Will this affect aid to the Palestinians? Will you be able to work with Hamas if they're assuming they take on a large share of the government? Well, I've made it very clear that the United States does not support political parties that want to destroy our ally Israel, and that people must renounce that part of their platform. But the government has formed, yet they're beginning to talk about how to form the government. And your question on Abbas was a good one. And our message to him was we would hope he would stay in office.

Omar Rahman (47:54)

So they cut off relations, the Israelis cut off relations and financial ties. And it puts Abu Mazen in a very difficult position. And I'm sorry, I keep going back and forth between Abu Mazen and Mahmoud Abbas. It's just his nom de guer. It leads to a very tense relationship between Fatah and Hamas, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. And there is secret, a secret push coordinated between the Israelis and the Americans and Fatah to kind of lead a coup d' etat against the new Hamas led Palestinian Authority. And that devolves and culminates in the Gaza Strip into kind of a street fight in which the PA gets pushed out by Hamas out of the Gaza Strip. And that's kind of the rift that happens in Palestinian politics and has never been mended ever since.

Martin DeCaro (48:38)

So why not? I mean, that may sound like a silly question, but you're the expert here, not me.

Omar Rahman (48:43)

Well, there's numerous reasons for it. Both blaming each other. I put more of the blame on Abbas, but again, Abbas is very reliant and dependent on his donor countries and reliant on the US and Israel in a way that Hamas is not. And because those countries don't want to see Hamas return to the political system, it's very difficult for Abbas to get there. At the same time, Abbas doesn't like sharing power either. And Hamas had its own turf in the Gaza Strip that it didn't necessarily want to share. But the population at large was adamant that this was their number one priority to see a political reconciliation. Because this rift, this division in the Palestinian body politic, has been an absolute disaster. And it's led to more authoritarian governments because there's been no elections ever since. Both sides have become more authoritarian and repressive. Israel exploited that division in order not to return to the peace process and negotiate with the Palestinians. So it's been an absolute disaster.

Martin DeCaro (49:37)

Yeah, Netanyahu contributed to it to give him an excuse not to negotiate on a Palestinian state. It's been widely reported in the Israeli press how Israel had been negotiating with Hamas for years through intermediaries, money from Qatar getting into Gaza, used by Hamas to build up its tunnel network, etc. In long story short, one of Hamas's most important allies has been Benjamin Netanyahu, although he probably wouldn't refer to himself as an ally of Hamas, but you get my point. So that's absolutely true. Yeah.

Omar Rahman (50:11)

And it goes back a long ways. As I mentioned, kind of the early relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza and the Israelis. But even after Hamas was created in the early days, they weren't necessarily like, violent. It was more an Islamic character to.

Martin DeCaro (50:24)

The kind of liberation Israel facilitated. Hamas's creation. Because they thought these guys would just go to mosques, they're religious students, they're going to leave us alone.

Omar Rahman (50:32)

Even Yitzhak Rabin, as defense minister in 1988, met with Hamas leaders in Gaza. And it wasn't until Hamas started carrying out acts of violence, like killing soldiers. And they actually, you know, carried out some spectacular acts in which they killed the head of the Israeli military's undercover units in an ambush and some other ones that Israel cut off ties and started going after Hamas.

Martin DeCaro (50:56)

I didn't know Rabin met with Hamas in 88, because at that time it was illegal for Israelis to meet with the plo laws had to be changed in order for the peace process to Proceed in the 1990s, Israeli law had to change.

Omar Rahman (51:08)

Yeah, well, the Israelis, you know, considered PLO and the nationalists the problem. And they were kind of trying to cultivate local leaderships, not only Hamas, but others within the occupied territories with whom to deal with.

Martin DeCaro (51:19)

My last question then is with Gaza destroyed, Hamas weakened, but still in control of at least some parts of the Gaza Strip, still acting cruelly and inhumanely to Palestinians, as has been reported widely in major newspapers, in addition to what's going on with the Israeli blockade. So with Gaza in its current situation and the west bank de facto being annexed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority basically useless, where will Palestinian people turn to for leadership right now? It looks pretty grim.

Omar Rahman (51:51)

It's an extremely grim situation. Many of us writers, analysts, observers of this situation were working on various ways in which the Palestinians should put their house in order. This is prior to October 7, 2023, that this was a necessary condition to move the peace process or the Palestinian liberation movement forward, that this political situation, internal political situation, needed to be mended. As I mentioned earlier, I think October 7th and the crisis that has flowed since has exposed the depth of the crisis among the Palestinians. And there's no real movement towards repairing the internal situation in its aftermath. There are those, I think, in civil society, in the diaspora, among Palestinians, who are working towards that effort. But internally, Mahmoud Abbas and those around him remain an obstacle to that. And this is part of the situation with, you know, the rise of Hussein El Sheikh. Right. Because he represents the status quo. I don't see Hussein El Sheikh, after Mahmoud Abbas is gone, pivoting strategy for the Palestinians. If anything, I think you'll see kind of a doubling down in the current trajectory. And so that's the kind of danger of this moment. At the same time, he doesn't have a real political constituency beyond his own patronage network. And therefore, I think the situation is very ripe among Palestinians for kind of an internecine violence in the vacuum that's created after Abbas is gone. But what needs to happen, there needs to be an attempt to restore representation, most likely within the PLO rather than the pa. There needs to be reform of those institutions. And I think that's the way that Palestinians can responsibly and effectively get to a new leadership and a new strategy and a new vision of the future to get them out of this very dark time that the Palestinians are in.

Martin DeCaro (53:43)

So just having an election is not enough. There has to be work done before that, because there's been no election anywhere in the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian territory, since 06.

Omar Rahman (53:52)

Well, again, and the Palestinian Authority is itself an institution whose future is open to debate. What is the Palestinian Authority? Again, we got to this question earlier. The Palestinian Authority was a temporary institution for self government that was not supposed to last beyond five years and has lasted over 30. What is the PA's role in its future? So I was advocating for elections within the PA before as a means to getting towards kind of a larger process of political renewal within the Palestinian political system. But there are obvious questions over the efficacy of just holding elections within the PA itself and what the PA's future role is. So the PLO is really the larger representative institution of the Palestinians, and that has been hollowed out over time. And that is what I think needs to be restored because it has the mandate to kind of set the political agenda for the Palestinians overall. And that's something that needs to happen, especially in this moment of political crisis.

Historical Narrator (54:53)

Ever since Harry Truman first recognized Israel, every American president, Democrat and Republican, has worked for peace between Israel and her neighbors. Now the efforts of all who have labored before us bring us to this moment, a moment when we dare to pledge what for so long seemed difficult even to imagine, that the security of the Israeli people people will be reconciled with the hopes of the Palestinian people and there will be more security and more hope for all.

Martin DeCaro (55:35)

On the next episode of History as it happens, India and Pakistan have cooled it for now. A dispute that goes back to 1919 47, and its contours haven't changed very much over the past 80 years. That is next with Anatol Levin of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Sign up@historyasithappens.com or just go to Substack and search for history as it happens.