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History As It Happens
What is Chinese Communism?
00:47:58
China is ruled by a Communist Party of 100 million members, a giant pyramid with President Xi Jinping and the Politburo at the top. Yet its economy, the second largest in the world, largely thrives on private enterprise and integration with global...
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- [00:00]
Martin DeCaro
History as it happens. May 23, 2025. What is Chinese Communism?
- [00:07]
Sergei Radchenko
Xi has ordered the People's Liberation army to be ready to take Taiwan by force by 2027. Nearly one in every three physical products made in the world today comes from China, including most of what we use.
- [00:19]
Martin DeCaro
In our daily lives.
- [00:20]
Enrico Fardella
Conflict in the Western Pacific over the Taiwan question would result in a 25% GDP contraction in Asia.
- [00:34]
Martin DeCaro
In this new era of strategic competition, what does China under Xi Jinping want? Can China, whose ruling Communist Party counts 100 million members, still be called a communist country? With its economy so deeply integrated into global capitalism, understanding ideas, ideology, motivations is critical. That's next, as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro.
- [00:59]
Unnamed Speaker
As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over the past three years, there can be no stable and enduring peace without the participation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people.
- [01:13]
Sergei Radchenko
I want to see us stay involved and continue to work for restraint and.
- [01:18]
Unnamed Speaker
For human rights and for democracy.
- [01:21]
Enrico Fardella
Our products will gain better access to.
- [01:23]
Unnamed Speaker
China's market in every sector from agriculture.
- [01:27]
Enrico Fardella
To telecommunications to automobiles.
- [01:29]
Sergei Radchenko
Look, for years we've been ripped off.
- [01:32]
Enrico Fardella
And taken advantage of by China and.
- [01:34]
Sergei Radchenko
Others, in all fairness, but by China, that's the big one. There's a simple answer to this question and a more complicated answer to this question. If you just ask what does it mean to be Chinese Communist today? The simplest answer to this is to say it is to be a member of the Chinese Communist Party. There is something called the Chinese Communist Party. You can become a candidate member of the Chinese Communist Party. You can become a member of the Chinese Communist Party which imposes a set of rules. There's a party charter all the party members have to effectively sign on to. So you become a part of a massive organization. That's what it means to be Chinese Communist. Now, not every Chinese citizen is a member of the Chinese Communist Party, but Chinese leaders certainly are.
- [02:19]
Martin DeCaro
If you caught some recent congressional hearings, you would have been left with the impression that US leaders are convinced Communist China will invade Taiwan and a war would result in a global economic meltdown.
- [02:31]
Sergei Radchenko
This hearing today is not just another discussion about long term competition with China.
- [02:38]
Enrico Fardella
This is about a very real near term threat. In the narrowing window, we have to.
- [02:43]
Sergei Radchenko
Prevent a catastrophic conflict in the Indo Pacific. And the famed investor Ken Griffin put it more bluntly, it's an immediate Great Depression. So why is it that Taiwan is different? Why is Taiwan such a hot flashpoint? Why could it lead not only to a catastrophic War, but also global Great Depression. Why should Americans care about an island on the other side of the world?
- [03:04]
Enrico Fardella
Senator Cotton, that last point is quite salient. Many a research organization postulate that conflict in the Western Pacific over the Taiwan question would result in a 25% GDP contraction in Asia and a knock on effect of 10 to 12% GDP reduction in the United States of America, with unemployment spiking 7 to 10 points above base.
- [03:31]
Martin DeCaro
In the words of Republican Congressman Mike Gallagher, the greatest threat to the United States is the Chinese Communist Party. The ccp, he says, continues to commit genocide, obscure the origins of the coronavirus pandemic, steal hundreds of billions of dollars worth of American intellectual property and, and threaten Taiwan. Well, it's hard to argue with much of what he said there, except for that first sentence, maybe. Is the Chinese Communist Party really the greatest threat to the United States? Does it matter that China's capitalist economy can't do without American consumers? Really, it's President Trump's tariffs that threaten China. By upending the global trading system, China is the world's top exporter. On the other hand, as Princeton's Kyle Chan writes in the New York Times, as Trump takes a wrecking ball to the pillars of US power and innovation, China already leads global production in multiple industries. Steel, aluminum, shipbuilding, batteries, solar power, electric vehicles, wind turbines, drones, 5G equipment, consumer electronics, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and bullet trains. China, he says, is projected to account for 45%, nearly half of global manufacturing by 2030. Beijing is also laser focused, he says, on winning the future. In March, it announced a $138 billion National Vent Capital fund that'll make long term investments in cutting edge technology such as quantum computing and robotics, and increased its budget for public research and development. Again, that is Kyle Chan in an op ed for the New York Times. But none of that sounds very Communist or Marxist. At least not the Marxism I remember from the Soviet Union. So what does it mean to be a Chinese Communist today? The party at the top is central to Xi Jinping's thinking. Actually, there is something called Xi Jinping thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. It was formally incorporated into the party constitution in 2017, and anyone interested can read transcripts of his speeches translated to English online. There can be no greater authority on Chinese Communism than the top Chinese Communist himself. Right, beamed you straight from Chinese state television. At a so called CCP study session last autumn, Xi stressed the need to anchor the strategic goal of becoming a cultural superpower by 2035. Uphold Marxism as the fundamental guiding ideology. Take China's profound and rich civilization as the root respond to trends in information technology and continuously develop socialist culture with Chinese characteristics for a new era. A culture with ideological leadership, spiritual cohesion, values based appeal and international influence constantly reinforcing the people's spiritual strength and firmly building a cultural foundation for superpower construction and national rejuvenation. My goodness, what does that mean? Sergei Radchenko is a historian at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, an expert on Russian and Chinese foreign and security policies, and the author of To Run the A Provocative Study of the Cold War. Enrico Maria Fardella is a historian at Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe, an expert on Chinese foreign policy and the director of chinamed.it again, that is chinamed. Looks at China's role in the Mediterranean. Sergei Radchenko, welcome back to the show.
- [07:21]
Sergei Radchenko
Martin, Great to be back.
- [07:23]
Martin DeCaro
You're always globetrotting. You're in the United Kingdom today, huh?
- [07:26]
Sergei Radchenko
I'm in the United Kingdom, which is, well, part of where I spend my year. Anyway, I'm here quite a lot.
- [07:33]
Martin DeCaro
Strangely sunny there today. And our other guest is somewhere where I would like to be all the time. Enrico Fardella, this is your first time on the show. Welcome, joining us from Italy.
- [07:44]
Enrico Fardella
Thank you so much for having me, Marin.
- [07:46]
Martin DeCaro
So nowadays, every day you hear things like China says China wants China. Is this China? Is that the title of this episode is what is Chinese Communism today? You know, many years ago I had a class at Ithaca College called Ideas and Ideologies. And I'm always thinking about ideas and ideologies, especially after reading Sergei's book last year on what drove Soviet foreign policy. Was it realism? Was it ideology? Why don't we just start broadly then, Enrico, what do we mean by China today? I know it's a sprawling and huge question, but what does it mean to be a Chinese communist in 2025?
- [08:27]
Enrico Fardella
I think being a Chinese Communist has always been first and foremost being Chinese nationalists that use communism, actually socialism, as an instrument to achieve nationalistic goals. The nationalist element, I think, is absolutely fundamental when it comes to Chinese communism.
- [08:45]
Martin DeCaro
This has real world implications, Sergei. We have to understand motivations, right? Understanding motivations is critical. So as in the United States today, we hear the Trump administration wants to prioritize the conflict or confrontation or competition with China. Well, what is China after? Right? What does it mean to be a Chinese communist in 2025?
- [09:05]
Sergei Radchenko
There's a simple answer to this question and a more complicated answer to this question. If you just ask what does it mean to be Chinese Communist? Today, the simplest answer to this is to say it is to be a member of the Chinese Chinese Communist Party. There is something called the Chinese Communist Party. You can become a candidate, member of the Chinese Communist Party. You can become a member of the Chinese Communist Party, which imposes a set of rules. There's a party charter all the party members have to effectively sign on to. So you become a part of a massive organization. That's what it means to be Chinese Communist. Now, not every Chinese citizen is a member of the Chinese Communist Party, but Chinese leaders certainly are. And in fact, in China, you have a parallel, a sort of a parallel organization. You have the state, the State Council, you have ministries, and then you have the party that is supposed to guide the actions of those ministries. And of course, then you have President Xi Jinping. Chairman Xi Jinping, we call him President in Chinese, as he's a national chairman Xi Jinping. He's also General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. So he's got those hats. In addition, he's got some other hats as well. But this is what it organizationally means to be a Chinese Communist.
- [10:20]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, it's a giant pyramid with 100 million members. 100 million Chinese, roughly, are members of the Communist Party, with the Politburo and Xi Jinping at the very top. Right.
- [10:30]
Sergei Radchenko
And the Standing Committee of the Politburo. It is very, very hierarchically structured. Right. So Xi Jinping then comes out at the very, very top. But that is organizationally, then, if you try to answer it more broadly, philosophically, fundamentally, what does it mean to be a Chinese Communist? And I think I would have to agree with Enrico, because we are talking about a worldview, first and foremost, a worldview. And it may incorporate certain insights from Das Kapital, from Marxist millennialism, maybe something from Maoism as well. But there's also very strong dose of Chinese nationalism. If we're talking about a worldview as opposed to an ideology, then I can tell you that it's a very complicated worldview that has all kinds of influences that feed then into the thinking about the world that the Chinese leaders have. But, yes, China at the center, Chinese nationalism. I think that's probably even more important than anything that has to do with Communism in the way that, let's say, Lenin would have thought about it or Marx would have thought about it.
- [11:31]
Enrico Fardella
We can find, like. We can find sort of ingredients of, like, different form of socialism. For example, I would say that being Chinese Communist today or being the member of the Chinese Communist Party today means to be much more trained in Leninism than used to be in the past. For example, I mean, I will say that Xi Jinping today, but we can go back on this, is much more Leninist in terms of puts like much more emphasis on organizational principles, you know, on the structure of the party. The ideology is functional to strengthen and enhance the solidity of the party. So in this, in this regard, I will say that today the Chinese Communist Party is more Leninist. But I think that what we have to keep in mind when it comes to China and also when we tend to somehow emphasize Chinese capacity to synthesize different thoughts, different methods, is the fact that the main goal that defines the Chinese Communism is actually the China dream. You can actually apply different categories, you can apply different methods. You can call them socialism with Chinese characteristics as long as they are functional to achieve this goal. So I think that the national horizon is the most important perspective to define being a Chinese Communist today. So you can, paradoxically, you can be a Chinese Communist today without being communist.
- [12:45]
Martin DeCaro
Well, Xi Jinping wants to make China a great power and he rests very heavily on history and interpretation of history. Mao Zedong seems to be important to him as well, despite all of the horrors that occurred under Mao's rule. So Enrico, I'll just ask you a follow up question. I mean, how important is class struggle which is so central to communist ideology in China today? I'll give you an example from time magazine. On January 1, the official ideological journal of the CCP, Cuixi published a speech by Xi Xi called for a period of protracted struggle to maintain political security, achieve self reliance and demonstrate the superiority of Chinese style modernization. He said history has repeatedly proven that striving for security through struggle brings genuine security, while seeking security through weakness and concession ultimately leads to insecurity. I guess my first question is why do Chinese people have to keep struggling?
- [13:47]
Enrico Fardella
Actually this article, the speech was originally delivered by xi Jinping in 2023 and was published this January. And this is meaningful because, you know, we have to contextualize the notion of struggle. Struggle is functional for Xi Jinping in order to enhance solidity within the party. So domestically, so it's a call for alignment and a call for order. Following the order coming from the top, the absolute face in the leader creates order and harmony within the country. In a moment when China feels or at least describes itself as being contained, circumvented under the pressure of what is called American Jeanism. You see, in Xi Jinping version, basically there is a sort of a new and I would say very functional way to Create a sort of overlapping between the thought of the leader and the identity of Chinese people in the sense that you can't be Chinese if you don't recognize yourself into Xi Jinping thought. This is kind of unprecedented in the sense that leader thought provides you with identity and mission. So fighting inside the country means following leaders thought. At the same time, this allows China to move up in the ladder, an international level.
- [15:00]
Martin DeCaro
Xi Jinping thought, that's something. Sergei, why don't you tell us about that a little more?
- [15:05]
Sergei Radchenko
Well, Xi Jinping is only the latest among Chinese leaders who wants to have something, some theoretical work to have him remembered by a collection of Xi Jinping speeches that is diligently produced. It's actually also available in English. It's Xi Jinping governance. You can get it. You can pick these things up from the Chinese Embassy, where you have this long speeches by Xi Jinping describing different policies, talking about international affairs, talking about economic policies, et cetera, et cetera. So things like that, which can be distilled, and you can say, well, here's what, you know, Xi Jinping stands for in the sort of way that you could previously talk about, for example, what Deng Xiaoping stood for, or perhaps what Mao Zedong stood for. Of course, we had something called Mao Zedong thought. Right. There's a certain degree of continuity here in this effort. But I would not go too deeply into this for the following reason. I mean, I know there are some people, there's some China scholars as well, who take it extremely seriously. I'm thinking of people like Kevin Rudd, for example, who really studied this deeply. And I understand the need to. To read the speeches and to go through them with a magnifying glass and say, well, you know, what does Xi Jinping's view on the correlation of forces in, you know, economic production tell us about his view on socialism? I think that is sometimes counterproductive, actually. You can sometimes step back from terms that are being used and get to the bottom of what actually is the meaning of some of these concepts. I mean, consider, consider. I'll give you just a couple of examples. You mentioned class struggle. Is that a Marxist notion? Is it a Maoist? Certainly Maoist notion, right. Mao had that. A concept of struggle. Mao also had notions like, you know, political power comes out of a barrel of a gun. Perhaps his most famous statement is that an ideological pronouncement, to a certain extent, you can argue that, or you can also say that this is just basically an expression of realism, and you can apply it to other contexts in other Cultures. And it has always been like that. I mean, if you go back to Thucydides, you'll find in the million dialogue something like, you know, the weak suffer what they must and the strong exact what they can. Right? This kind of argument. Mao had the same sort of approach to his own philosophical pronouncements, etc. So you have a lot of continuities and making this exceptionalist argument about this. Well, this Chinese Communist ideology just means this particular set of things, I think. To me it's just not particularly constructive way of understanding what's going on in China.
- [17:37]
Martin DeCaro
Well, you know, the Soviet Union was founded on Marxism, right? Marxism, Leninism, stage theory. You move from capitalism to socialism to then this utopia, you reach communism. But at some point relatively early in the game, I think domestically, the Soviet leaders gave up on that. They knew they were not going to reach that utopia. And of course they stopped trying to. If you agree with the thesis of Sergei's book, they weren't trying to export communism really either. I mean, is China today, Sergei, trying to export communism? And what is the Chinese world order?
- [18:09]
Sergei Radchenko
Well, and this is precisely what I'm trying to say here, Martin. You know, take the Soviet example as an interesting case study. You had a formal ideology of Marxism, Leninism, but also have you had a kind of a formal, what you just described, right, Procession of history from a more primitive stage to a more advanced stage to, you know, socialism stage, to advance socialism to communism, at which point, according to Marx, the state is supposed to wither away and we all live happily thereafter. Did the Soviet leaders actually believe the story? I don't know who actually did, frankly. Maybe Khrushchev. He was a revolutionary romantic. Maybe at some point he actually believed that we get into the 60s and 70s. Does anybody actually believe in the Soviet Union that there's going to be some kind of a communist society and wonderful society that's going to be constructed? There's nothing like that, right? You turn to China. You also have that period in China of this romantic engagement with the ideas of building some kind of a new society. Think about the late 1950s and the great Leap Forward and the reordering of society, the construction of communes, Mao's ideas surrounding the Cultural Revolution, and so on and so forth. And then you have have Chinese leaders backtracking from this, including actually Mao himself, because he realized that Cultural Revolution wasn't going anywhere and that there were economic laws that you simply could not violate. And so you have Dung Xiaoping, who then basically took China in the direction of What I would describe as capitalism, frankly, capitalism, not any kind of socialism with China's characteristic, you can name it what you want, but basically it's very capitalistic at its very core. It's very different from what China was in the 1950s and the 1960s. In other words, the structure, the formal ideology remains, presumably those ideas that were guiding China in the 1950s. At some level something remains, but in reality, I mean, are we moving towards a new socialist utopia in China? It's not happening.
- [20:04]
Martin DeCaro
Well, at the same time though, Enrico, to build off of Sergei's argument, I'd like to hear what you have to say. Xi has emphasized the importance of the party itself.
- [20:13]
Enrico Fardella
Yeah. So I have two points here that are connected to last questions. First is continuity and discontinuity. Continuity is true that of course, Xi is looking back to Mao. The point of looking back to Mao and sort of recreate a sort of continuity in the party history and methodology and the war struggle actually perfectly emphasize that is the fact that Xi Jinping was afraid of actually the discontinuity generated by the narrative that Deng Xiaoping was the good Chinese leader and Mao Zedong was the bad Chinese leader. And so this narrative was dysfunctional for the party narrative and somehow was presenting a China that was more lenient towards the west as a good option for party future and for the future of the country. When Xi Jinping was actually reemphasizing how Turkey was reemphasizing the centrality of China and the need to achieve greatness without the West. So the continuity and going back to Mao is very important, but there is a very important discontinuity in this. Mao was emphasizing permanent struggle, permanent revolution. And this generated the Cultural Revolution and you know, and the pain that even Xi Jinping family had to go through. So, and this actually Mao's permanent struggle was putting the structure of the Chinese Communist Party in danger. You know, during the Cultural Revolution, China was close to anarchy, civil war. And so for Xi Jinping is very important to enhance the Leninist component. So the party first, you know, the order and the survival of the the party is fundamental to achieve the China dream. Xi Jinping is somehow re enhancing Maoist categories in a very interconnected world. And so globalization somehow generates a sort of overextension of the security dimension within China. Anti China forces in Europe as much as in the US or even in Latin America, they are a potential threat for regime stability. And so therefore it's important to generate a system of governance that somehow expand the order that Xi Jinping is Trying to create domestically abroad.
- [22:09]
Martin DeCaro
So let's talk about what China is doing abroad then in this context, because it's not trying to turn other countries communist. The Belt and Road initiative wasn't about trying to make other countries communist. Taiwan, maybe Taiwan's in a different category. That would probably fall under the domination of the Chinese Communist Party if there were a war there or whatever. But, but just generally speaking, Enrico, what is China trying to export, if anything?
- [22:34]
Enrico Fardella
China has never tried even during its Mao's time. You know, the mission of Chinese Communist Party has never been to turn the world into a communist world. China has always tried to enhance independence externally. So if you want to basically describe simply Chinese foreign policy, there is one word, it's anti gemonic. Okay, so in 1950s and 60s as much as today, to a certain extent, China has always find like much more powerful actor, the United States, in some cases even the Soviet Union. And so what China can do politically is not to export communism, which is not functional, but actually to enhance independence. The more independence you have in the planet, the less space for American hegemony. So this is key. This strengthening independence is inversely proportional to the space that in American hegemony can have worldwide. And so this is functional as sort of proactive defense for China, China. That's why since the beginning I emphasized the importance of Chinese nationalism in Mao Zedong was talking about the intermediate zone, those areas, Europe, Africa, Latin America that were standing in between United States, so the hegemon and the socialist bloc. This is the area where China, and until today you can see with the Belter Road initiative, with the initiatives towards the global south, the brics and so forth and so on. This is the area where China is the pole that China wants to dominate and wants to dominate this pole not by expanding communism, by enhancing independence and how you announce independence, guess what? By learning from the China model, because China has been raising as an independent power. And so we have the software that can allow you to be independent and not to fall in the trap of American hegemonism.
- [24:14]
Sergei Radchenko
Just maybe one or a couple of points to add to this. And I would generally agree with Enrico. I would say there's one particular moment where the Chinese did show great messianic zeal about promoting a particular vision of the world. And this was during the Cultural Revolution. It was very actually ironic because at that time they withdrew ambassadors that they had abroad from all countries except for Egypt. And Enrico knows this. The story Huanghua stayed in Egypt for unclear reasons. We still don't know why, but they Withdrew all ambassadors. But at the same time, they had the revolutionary struggle unfold. The Chinese embassies around the world and in some countries, that really annoyed the local, local authorities. This is one, one of the reasons why Chinese relations with North Korea really worsened in the 19, late 1960s because of the Cultural Revolution, because the Chinese were trying to export the Cultural Revolution. Same in Vietnam. Nobody wanted that. And after that they recognized the error of their ways. And they're like, we're not, you know, we're not doing this any longer. And so the Chinese have become very, very pragmatic. And when you asked Martin, are they trying to export, why they're not exporting communism? Well, one of the reasons for that is, frankly, I don't think they're communist Communists themselves. You know, why would they export communists when they're not a communist country themselves? Now you might say, well, isn't there a model? We're talking about Leninist principles of state organization. You know, that's a particular model that you could potentially export. And yes, Enrico is exactly right. They're not exporting that particular model. Whether you call it communism or something else, I don't know. We're just coming back to this. What is communism fundamentally? Right. We need to try to figure this out. Is it about the way you organize your economy? Is that about the way you organize your society? Is, for example, the fact that 60% of Chinese economy is private owned is that, you know, what is that?
- [25:54]
Martin DeCaro
That's not communism.
- [25:56]
Sergei Radchenko
I mean, you can call it socialism with Chinese characteristics or whatever you call it, it doesn't actually matter. It's basically capitalism. Right? It doesn't make any sense.
- [26:04]
Martin DeCaro
Well, Sergei, let me ask a follow up to something that Enrico said. And Enrico, you can chime in as well. This idea of Chinese style modernization and an alternative model to the US hegemonic model in the eyes of Beijing. Right. So they're offering these other countries independence. But a criticism of the Belt and Road Initiative is these other countries in the global south that accept Chinese investment aren't actually becoming independent of American hegemony. They're falling under Chinese hegemony.
- [26:32]
Enrico Fardella
From a Chinese perspective, this makes sense. It's good. It's a much more sophisticated and civilized way to exercise power is not whether a foreign country is trapped into a specific hegemony. What matters is that that hegemony is not defined by a foreign actor. A foreign actor is actually, is antagonistic for China. I don't think that China actually consciously or any Chinese scholar consciously think that China is going to turn into an hegemonic force. Honestly, I think they are genuine. They are sincere. Describing this kind of growing foreign influence within the framework of the Beltarod as a sort of like. Like opportunity, you know, for the other countries, because China is bringing a more stable alternative, harmonious. There is not blatant, you know, self confidence, you know, hegemonic attempt to shape the planet, you know what I mean?
- [27:20]
Martin DeCaro
And they don't make any demands about human rights.
- [27:22]
Enrico Fardella
Exactly. But it's also very important for party stability because the less space there will be for, you know, the Washington consensus, you know, for the liberal order, you know, and liberal values, you know, the stronger will be the resilience of the party. One level is proactive defense, okay? I try to push away, you know, by enhancing independence, you know, basically impede American hegemony and, you know, liberal values to become like a threat, getting closer and closer to China. This is the proactive defense measure. Then there is another level which is ideological in the sense that, I mean, I am promoting my values because I genuinely believe that these values are better than the liberal ones. And they're. And they are allow these countries to generate more proactive processes of economic development, regime stability, and so forth and so on.
- [28:08]
Martin DeCaro
Sergei, what did you make of Xi Jinping's trip to Moscow to celebrate Soviet Victory Day, May 9?
- [28:15]
Sergei Radchenko
It's not surprising to see Xi Jinping in Moscow. He has been traveling there, and he has been there quite a few times, even as Russia continues its war in Ukraine. And of course, Putin has already promised to come back to. To China for the Chinese for the end of the Pacific war celebrations in September. So we have had this exchange between Xi Jinping and Putin, which makes people say that these two regimes are increasingly allied. I would not use that word. I would say aligned is probably better. But the question is what kind? I mean, we're talking about ideologies today in communism, et cetera. Here's an interesting example. You would never think that. That Putin's Russia is communist in any kind of sense, right? I mean, it's not communist. It's basically an authoritarian regime. When we're talking about an ideological alignment with Xi Jinping, what exactly are we talking about here? Are the Chinese finding that their ideology is somehow overlapping with Putin's ideology? But in this case, what is this ideology that is overlapping?
- [29:17]
Martin DeCaro
It's described generally as autocracy. There are a couple of autocrats who want to dominate.
- [29:22]
Sergei Radchenko
There are other. Other autocrats around the world. I mean, look at Saudi Arabia. What is MBS not an autocrat. He's an autocrat. So does that mean that MBS is ideologically aligned with China or something like that? You know, we don't talk about that in, in those terms. When we operate with terms like ideology, we quickly get mired in this completely impenetrable swamp from which we then cannot escape. And then, you know, we make this cases about, oh, you know, they're ideological aligned, but at the same time, China is a communist country, but Putin is not a communist country. How does it even square? None of this actually works. The only argument you can say is that parts of their visions of the world overlap. And what Enrico was talking about, this anti hegemonic discourse and really anti American discourse, is where you can see some anti liberal, anti liberal, anti liberal. But I think if we drill into this, we basically find that it basically means anti American.
- [30:13]
Martin DeCaro
So let me ask you this then. Cause I just talked to Antony Beaver about this on my most recent episode. There is a notion out there that we have, if not a block, a group of autocrats who are challenging the post 1945 liberal world order are a virgin to might makes right. So of course, Putin and Xi are not ideologically allied or aligned, but they both have an idea of we're going to dominate our own sphere of influence. So that's why you see them in public together and why Xi is kind of endorsing Russia's war in Ukraine. He's certainly not putting pressure on, on Putin to stop the war in Ukraine. So Putin has his sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and China wants its sphere of influence in East Asia, Taiwan, the South China Sea, et cetera. What do you make of that framing?
- [30:59]
Sergei Radchenko
First of all, I think that when we talk about the post1945 order, I don't know what we're talking about here, because post1945 order is the Cold War order, which had the world divided into blocks and spheres of influence. So nothing is being undermined. We're actually returning to the post 1945 order. So when I see and a lot of people talk about that, I find it really interesting because if we really drill into this, we'll see that it actually doesn't make any sense. You know, the idea that you could use force to protect your sphere of influence, is that new? I mean, that was the rule during the Cold War, so it was nothing unusual about it. Think about the Soviet invasions of, of Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Is that not using force to protect Your sphere. Where and where? In Europe. Oh my God, in Europe, which had never seen anything like that since the Second World War, according to a lot of people who make this argument. No, this has long been the rule and the standard. So what we're really talking about here is a period from, let's say, the end of the Cold War to, I guess now when we actually forgot what the post1945 order was about. And we thought that it was something else entirely. And we got used to this idea that, oh, we just basically have one liberal hegemon, everybody is living happily thereafter, and China and Russia will find places for themselves in that hierarchy. And it turned out that they don't want to find places for themselves. They want to overturn the hierarchy, or at least they want to unseat the United States from the top the of. Of this hierarchy. So this is how we got where we are today. But it's not about overTurning the post 1945 order in my reading at least.
- [32:40]
Enrico Fardella
I think the biggest threat to the post 1945 order, whatever that means, is coming from the United States actually more than from this like, axis of evil. Of course they are playing defense, they are trying to resist, or they can be very aggressive. But I don't think that, that they have the capacity actually to break this order because this is an order that is based on the infrastructure created by the United States that generates and distributes goods and wealth all over the world. And actually China is the first actor, much more than Iran, much more than Russia, to have interest to continue to keep working within this order. It's actually the opposite, actually. China is afraid that the US are withdrawing from this order and then China is going to pay the price of it. Which is actually the topic of the day, in my opinion.
- [33:28]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah, exactly. Because China is the number one exporter in the world. Multinational corporations that are headquartered in the United States have all their plants in Southeast Asia and in China thinking about Walmart and all these others, and they need to manufacture their cheap goods there for cheap labor in China and then send them back to the United States so I can go buy a t shirt for $5 at Walmart. So, yeah, I think you're right about that, Enrico.
- [33:51]
Enrico Fardella
Especially when we talk about this kind of political regime, we need to pay more attention to what they actually do, not to do what they say. Because of course, you know what they say. I mean, it's actually very much part of this propaganda system, the discrepancy between, you know, propaganda and reality. I mean, this is sounds like, you know, very obvious, but when it comes to China, it's humongous. Especially when it comes to the economy. An economy disappeared the last few hours simply because he dared to say that China is not growing 5%, Chinese GDP is not growing 5% but maybe 2%. Just to give you an idea, how sensitive is this topic then? If you look at what actually the relationship between the so called brics, countries like the antagonist countries to the us, Germany, you see that actually the dollar is still there, it's still dominant, it's still functional. It's actually much more in depth interest to preserve, you know, this infrastructure than it is these days for the US to preserve it.
- [34:46]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah. So you're saying the Chinese government sent away an economist who said the wrong thing that just happened.
- [34:52]
Enrico Fardella
Yeah, exactly, yes.
- [34:53]
Martin DeCaro
All right, so how about this idea? We can start wrapping up here. Miles May Choon, you writing for the Hoover Org, said that China's or the Chinese Communist Party's strategic duplicity. So China is basically fooling the world is his argument is shaped by the fusion of Warring States era realpolitik with Marxist dialectical thinking. Now if anyone is wondering what the hell is Warring States period thinking? Chinese leaders were taught the most effective approach to power was to use deception, exploit weaknesses and form opportunistic alliances without regard for strict principles or ideological commitments. Commitments.
- [35:34]
Sergei Radchenko
So this is the case of essentializing of China. We have a tendency to do that in the west among certain people, you know, they draw on Sun Tzu or something and say, oh look, Sun Tzu said in the Art of War that you should do this and this and this and practice strategic deception. I mean. Okay, okay, yes. It's not like we don't do that in the west, right? I mean we share a lot of this concept. But you've got Machiavelli, you've got, got Sun Tzu, you've got Thucydides, you've got, you know, you've got all these thinkers around the world that have contributed to this idea of realist foreign policy or realist conduct of affairs, this ideas of, about realism, about deception, how to conduct war and so on and so forth. It's not specifically Chinese and we shouldn't essentialize the Chinese here and say that they have some kind of specific qualities about themselves or they think about the world in the kind of way that nobody else can understand. Right. And then when you bring Marxism Leninism into it and say, well, there are some Marxist Leninist dialectics in the way they approach the world My counter argument to that is show me where. Show me one example where they approach the world from using something from Marxism, Leninism. Is it maybe the concept of struggle that they want to struggle or something until victory? What is that a Marxist concept? I mean, let's not be simplistic here, right. This concept, they go far beyond Marxism. There's nothing specifically Marxist about this. I think when we analyze Chinese foreign policy and what they want to do in the world. First of all, I think going back to what Enrico said at the very start, we need to begin with this idea of Chinese nationalism and Chinese centrality that is clearly important. It's not unique to China to struggle for or to build yourself up as this major power. I mean, the Russians have the same sense of great power, exceptionalism. America has the same thing. So that Chinese nationalism, that is the first point to understand what the Chinese are doing, Chinese centrality. And then, then you can draw on any number of philosophies and then you can say, okay, this is why they're doing this. But that is because we all do the same thing, frankly.
- [37:44]
Martin DeCaro
Yeah. China wants to absorb Taiwan somehow, not because of the Warring States period, but because it's always been a priority. I guess what Sergei is saying, Enrico, is that we're always trying to decode China. You know, by the way, the Warring states period was 475-221-bc.
- [38:02]
Sergei Radchenko
Anyway, it's like, you know, Martin, it's like trying to explain what America is doing with reference to the Peloponnesian Wars. That's exactly what we're.
- [38:08]
Enrico Fardella
Well, well, well, well. Okay, let me jump in and say a couple of things here. You know, at the same time, as a Sicilian, I can tell you that actually our Greek roots still matter somehow in our culture. So there is a bit of both. I mean, in past, you know, Mao Chun is a very sophisticated analyst. And so I think his work is. Actually deserves a lot of praise. Let's keep one second on the side. You know, the combination of, you know, warring state tradition plus, you know, Marxist Lenalism. Okay. And let's focus on the word deceiving. Okay. You know, and let me tell you something that may sound little bit pro China, but at the same time, it's sort of like, it's a little bit provocative. I don't think that China has tried to deceive anybody. I mean, China is trying to maximize his national power and avoid this destructive conflict with the hegemony, with a stronger power. And so by so doing, China had to find a way to be compatible with the system. So it's totally rational for China to present itself as a benign power, benevolent power, and trying to avoid clashes with the United States. But the problem is that this rising power, and actually the rising power China has achieved this level thanks to the United States, which is something that the Chinese propaganda these days doesn't emphasize enough. And now the problem is that the hegemon realized the power that China has achieved. And so the problem is that the hegemon wants to restructure the United States, they want to restructure relationship with China. And so for China is problematic. But if you read actually Chinese, even the Chinese propaganda, you know, China keeps emphasizing the need to maintain, you know, mutual and beneficial relationship.
- [39:44]
Martin DeCaro
Let me just give Miles Machun Yu his due and I'm certainly no expert here, so I don't really have the background to question his analysis. I did want to bounce it off of both of you. He said in contentious issues like Taiwan or the South China Sea, the CCP's dual influences from warring states, realpolitik and Marxist dialectics is particularly evident. Warring state strategies encourage the CCP to engage in strategic patience, presenting one narrative to the world while gradually advancing its objectives in ways that do not provoke immediate confrontation. For instance, China publicly asserts a desire for peaceful reunification with Taiwan while building military capabilities and establishing economic dependencies that increase its leverage over the region.
- [40:29]
Sergei Radchenko
Sergei, okay, so what, what exactly here can be described as a, as a Marxist, Leninist?
- [40:35]
Martin DeCaro
I don't know, legacy, I don't know.
- [40:37]
Enrico Fardella
That implies that if Japan was in place of China, Japan would have invaded Taiwan long time ago.
- [40:42]
Sergei Radchenko
I mean, my problem is we do that right in social sciences, we sort of apply terms and we try to explain phenomena and then when you dig into it and you try to be concrete about it, you just can't see anything there. That's why I'm saying that, you know, okay, so China is exercising strategic patience with Taiwan while building up its military strength. Is that something like no other country has ever done?
- [41:10]
Enrico Fardella
China is a one child country and so parents, they really care about their children life. And so China is trying to implement a strategy that a doesn't want to clash with superior force. The coalition of quad, you know, United States, Japan, because it's going to be very damaging for Chinese course in the same time doesn't want casualties, you know, because you know, Chinese parents, you know, they only have one child.
- [41:32]
Sergei Radchenko
And so this is not, this is not something you, you draw on from, you know, on Sun Tzu or from the world.
- [41:39]
Enrico Fardella
But I Mean, I think, I think it's very rational. I mean, it's rational.
- [41:42]
Sergei Radchenko
It's rational. That's why I'm saying it's totally understandable.
- [41:46]
Enrico Fardella
Adversary is not something that, you know, belongs to Chinese tradition for sure, but I don't think that defines, you know, China per se. I mean, I think that even Italy is deceiving the, you know, European Commission somehow, you know, and so it's, it's, it's, it belongs to, like a toolkit, that of any state that wants to achieve, you know, rational targets.
- [42:05]
Martin DeCaro
That's right. My last question, I said I would wrap up here because I need to tie it all together. Understanding motivations is critical to understanding, say, what China plans to do in a certain part of the world. Warring States. Marxist dialectics. Sergei, what are the most common misconceptions or dangerous misconceptions in Washington, in official Washington, about China?
- [42:28]
Sergei Radchenko
So that's, you know, that's difficult to pin down. We have this idea, for example, in Washington that China is determined to invade Taiwan in the very near future. Is that a misconception? It seems like a consensus kind of thinking. It seems, seems to me like a kind of echo chamber almost type of thinking where everybody says that and therefore everybody believes that. Is there a lot of evidence for it? If you start deconstructing some of these narratives, you'll then soon realize that actually the reality is much more complicated and foggy, and therefore you cannot actually make any clear policy recommendations on the basis of the existing evidence, which puts policymakers and policy advisors in a difficult situation. If we are fundamentally uncertain about what China is going to do, what Xi Jinping's intentions are, what are we going to advise? What kind of policy? Are we going to call for a more hawkish policy because we want to deter China, A more engaging policy because we want to build bridges to them? I think the default is always in the direction of hawkishness, because there's a fear that if you try to engage with the Chinese and then get burned, then you'll be blamed for that. And therefore, it's just so much safer to be hawkish and to say, okay, we have to deter, we have to contain. Is that a bad policy? I wouldn't argue that. I won't argue that. I think that's probably the most sensible policy, given where we are at the moment. And by the way, the same applies to China today. We're talking about strategic thinking in China, about the West. You have people in China who are saying actually we should engage with the west and Others say, well, if you engage, engage with the west, you get burned. And so we have to contain and we have to deter. And it is that second category of people who ultimately win the debate because it's always safer in the short term to deter and to contain. And so when you have two sides who are so keen to deter and to contain for obvious reasons, because they don't know about the other's intentions and we cannot know amount of discussion about Sun TZ or about, you know, Marx and Lens and Will will help us figure out the other side's intentions, then in the condition of that uncertainty, the safest thing is to deter and to contain. And as a result, what we end up in is a. Is a spiral of insecurity and a confrontation.
- [44:47]
Martin DeCaro
Exactly. That's what the hawks don't want to admit by deterring or showing strength. Right. All you do is simply push the other side to think, hey, Martin, it's the safest thing.
- [44:56]
Sergei Radchenko
It's the safest thing to do. So it's not. I'm not blaming the hawks. I'm just saying, you know, they're hawks on both sides and they're both right, Enrico.
- [45:04]
Martin DeCaro
Misconceptions about China.
- [45:05]
Enrico Fardella
Well, that's a classic, you know, exaggeration in both ways. You know, that is functional, instrumental for, you know, interest groups like, you know, enhancing China's power. You know, China's a sort of like superpower. You know, the overwhelming presence all over the place in Middle east, in Africa and Latin America, you know, in Howard Houses, in, know, in our cell phones and on the other side, like, actually, those who claim that actually Chinese economy is falling apart and, you know, China is doomed to failure. You know, this exaggeration, which is like, of the narrative about China, I think this is like a big problem which is actually mirrors what is happening in China. You know, the fact that China consider, you know, the west overall as a, you know, an aggressive and adversarial interlock. And so the space for recognition that there are rational voices and that you can actually could be in China's interest actually to partner up with the West. When I say the West, I would say the U.S. led, you know, grouping because Europe, you know, is a different story.
- [46:06]
Unnamed Speaker
Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends. It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly relations with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's enemy. I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. It is in this spirit that I will undertake what I deeply hope will become a journey for peace. Peace not just for our generation, but for future generations on this earth. We share together.
- [47:09]
Martin DeCaro
Other on the next episode of History as it happens, what do Carl Schmidt, Leo Strauss, the Claremont Institute and Adrian Vermeule have in common? The ideas behind Trump 2.0. That's next with Damon Linker. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. It is free. Sign up@historyasithappens.com.