Yalta, Yalta, Yalta!

Summary

History As It Happens: "Yalta, Yalta, Yalta!"
Hosted by Martin Di Caro
Release Date: March 7, 2025

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1. Introduction: Setting the Stage

In the episode titled "Yalta, Yalta, Yalta!", host Martin DeCaro delves into the intricate parallels between historical events and contemporary geopolitical tensions, particularly focusing on the Trump administration's policies towards Ukraine and Russia. The discussion aims to unravel whether current strategies mirror past diplomatic negotiations, such as the Yalta Conference, and explores the implications of these comparisons for today's international relations.

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2. The Trump Administration's Stance on Ukraine and Russia

The episode opens with a critical analysis of the Trump administration's approach to the Ukraine-Russia conflict. DeCaro highlights significant policy shifts, including the suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine. This pivot has raised concerns among scholars and policymakers about the potential ramifications for Ukraine's sovereignty and regional stability.

• Political Analyst Insight ([01:11]):
  "You're right now, not in a very good position. You've allowed yourself to be in a..."
  (Refers to Ukraine's precarious stance due to reduced support.)

• Foreign Policy Expert Commentary ([01:15]):
  "Very bad position and he happens to..."

The conversation underscores the notion that the Trump administration perceives Ukraine as not central to America's core interests, aiming instead for an exit strategy from the ongoing conflict.

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3. Historical Comparisons: Yalta Conference vs. Today

A central theme of the episode is the comparison between the 1945 Yalta Conference and the current geopolitical climate. DeCaro draws parallels between President Franklin D. Roosevelt's negotiations with Stalin and President Trump's dealings with Putin, questioning whether historical lessons are being heeded or disregarded.

• Historian Martin DeCaro ([01:33]):
  "His critics say President Trump is selling out Ukraine just as FDR, the story goes, sold out Poland. Or that Trump is appeasing Putin as Chamberlain appeased Hitler."

The discussion reveals skepticism about the applicability of Yalta-era strategies to today's complex situation, emphasizing that the historical contexts differ significantly.

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4. NATO Expansion and Russian Security Concerns

The episode delves into the contentious issue of NATO's eastward expansion and its impact on Russian security perceptions. DeCaro and his guests explore how the inclusion of Eastern European countries into NATO has been perceived by Russia as a direct threat, contributing to heightened tensions.

• Foreign Policy Expert ([14:41]):
  "They've always seen NATO enlargement, if not a security threat, then at least a humiliation for Russia."

The conversation highlights the deep-seated mistrust and the psychological underpinnings of Russia's foreign policy, which goes beyond mere security concerns to issues of national pride and historical grievances.

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5. Perspectives from Historian Sergei Radchenko

Historian Sergei Radchenko, an expert on Soviet foreign policy, provides a nuanced analysis of both historical and current events. He contextualizes the ongoing Ukraine conflict within the broader framework of Russian ambitions and strategies.

• Radchenko on Yalta ([03:25]):
  "Here on the Black Sea near the city of Yalta in the Crimea is the meeting place of the leaders of Britain."

He elucidates the complexities of the Yalta negotiations, emphasizing Stalin's quest for a legitimate sphere of influence and comparing it to Putin's current objectives in Ukraine.

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6. Implications for Europe and Future Conflicts

DeCaro and his guests discuss the broader implications of U.S. policy shifts for Europe, particularly for NATO members like the Baltic states and Poland. They debate whether reduced American engagement could embolden Russia to exert further pressure on its neighbors.

• Foreign Policy Expert ([27:17]):
  "So I tend to agree with you. I think if you look at, let's say, the Baltic states or Moldova, they are not as important to Putin's conception of Russian greatness as Ukraine."

The analysis extends to the potential for hybrid warfare and the strategic positioning of European countries amidst shifting alliances and security guarantees.

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7. Conclusion: Lessons and Moving Forward

In wrapping up, DeCaro emphasizes the importance of understanding historical contexts while recognizing the unique challenges of the present. He cautions against oversimplified historical analogies, advocating for a more comprehensive and nuanced approach to policy-making.

• Historian Martin DeCaro ([50:04]):
  "Comparisons and also figuring out the best course of action to take today. We're not facing a Hitler. We have to come up with a different type of solution to deal with today's problems."

The episode concludes with a reflection on the necessity of informed and adaptable strategies to navigate the complexities of modern international relations, drawing wisdom from history without being constrained by it.

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Notable Quotes:

• Martin DeCaro ([01:33]):
  "What if none of these historical episodes can really be applied to today's crisis as Ukraine defends itself against a nuclear-armed Russia?"

• Foreign Policy Expert ([02:25]):
  "The Trump administration understands that Ukraine is not core to America's interest... trying to find an exit from this war by talking to the Russians."

• Historian Sergei Radchenko ([09:40]):
  "So maybe none of these historical comparisons really works or helps us understand what it'll take to establish lasting peace today."

• Political Analyst ([05:06]):
  "To solve a problem, don't tell us what we're going to feel."

• Historian Martin DeCaro ([43:33]):
  "Stalin seeking that in his domination of Poland. Horrible deal for the Poles. Of course, in my view today, Putin has given up on that. He's thrown that away."

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Final Thoughts:

"Yalta, Yalta, Yalta!" offers a compelling exploration of how historical events shape contemporary geopolitical strategies. Through insightful discussions with experts like Sergei Radchenko, the episode navigates the intricate web of diplomatic relations, echoing the lessons of the past while addressing the unique challenges of the present. Listeners gain a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the broader implications for global stability.

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For more in-depth analyses and historical insights, subscribe to Martin DeCaro's newsletter here and stay tuned for future episodes every Tuesday and Friday.

Transcript

[Financial Advisor]

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[Political Commentator]

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[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Vote history as it happens March 7, 2025 Yalta Yalta. Yalta.

[Political Analyst]

You're right now, not in a very good position. You've allowed yourself to be in a.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Very bad position and he happens to.

[Political Analyst]

Be right about it.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

From the very beginning of the war.

[Political Analyst]

You're not in a good position. You don't have the cards right now.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

People have been dying on the contact line. Nobody stopped him.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

What makes America a good country is America engaging in diplomacy. That's what President Trump is doing.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Donald Trump has said he does not want to see the war in Ukra, Ukraine going on for years and years and that Mr. Zelensky should be more appreciative of Washington's support.

[Political Analyst]

Russia, Russia, Russia. You ever hear of that deal? That was a phony. That was a phony. Hunter Biden, Joe Biden scam.

[Financial Advisor]

President Trump loves to say peace through strength. That's actually a line he stole from Ronald Reagan.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

His critics say President Trump is selling out Ukraine just as fdr, the story goes, sold out Poland. Or that Trump is appeasing Putin as Chamberlain appeased Hitler. Or that Trump is betraying the Cold War legacy of Ronald Reagan. What if none of these historical episodes can really be applied to today's crisis as Ukraine defends itself against a nuclear armed Russia. We have a lot to learn next as we report history as it happens. I'm Martin DeCaro because to support Russia.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

It means be against Americans. The Trump administration understands that Ukraine is not core to America's interest, is not central to America's interest, and is trying to find an exit from this war by talking to the Russians. The Ukrainians are hesitant because they understand that under the current conditions, the Russians are going to press for a hard bargain. They are probably going to present the Ukrainians with similar conditions that were presented to them back in the spring of 2022 during talks in Istanbul. And that's just not something that the Ukrainians are too keen to accept. No.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

In this entire meeting have you said thank you, went to Pennsylvania and campaigned for the opposition in October? Offer some words of appreciation for the United States of America and the President who's trying to save your country.

[Historian Sergei Radchenko]

Here on the Black Sea near the city of Yalta in the Crimea is the meeting place of the leaders of Britain.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

February 1945, scene of the most successful.

[Historian Sergei Radchenko]

International conference of the war, the Big Three.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Stalin, Churchill and FDR meet in Crimea to agree to plans for post war Europe. As German defeat was by then assured. The Red army had captured Warsaw in mid January and then moved rapidly into Germany. Hitler's thousand year Reich was doomed.

[Historian Sergei Radchenko]

Special communications lines are strung to the palace.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

As historian Sergei Radchenko writes in his monumental study of Soviet foreign policy. To run the world, Stalin knew he could drive a hard bargain at Yalta as his country more than any other, was responsible for the destruction of the Wehrmacht.

[Historian Sergei Radchenko]

Reaffirming the resolve of the United nations to cooperate fully after the war, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin reach agreement on the foundations of European peace.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Yet a legend grew out of the Yalta conference that the Allies, namely Franklin Roosevelt, betrayed Poland by agreeing to interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the Polish population and the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people. Well, there would be no free elections in Poland as Stalin was determined to dominate the country, though not necessarily communize Poland, at least not at first. And we'll get into this with Sergei Radchenko in a moment. But it was no surprise that after the bewildering events of the past couple weeks, topped by the Oval Office meltdown between President Trump and Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky.

[Political Analyst]

To solve a problem, don't tell us what we're going to feel.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

I'm not telling you because you're in.

[Political Analyst]

No position to dictate that. Remember this, you're in no position to dictate.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

It was no surprise. It was actually expected that some observers would compare Trump's position on the war to FDR at Yalta or Munich. When British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain agreed to Hitler's carving up of Czechoslovakia, a dirty deal Chamberlain believed avoided another European war.

[Historian Sergei Radchenko]

This morning I had another talk with the German chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Writing in the News York Review of Books, Aryeh Nair says Trump's abandonment of Ukraine has been even more inept and inexplicable than the appeasement of Hitler at Munich. I'll share a link to that article in my weekly newsletter. You can sign [e-mail] or search for history as it happens on Substack now the memory of Yalta or Munich is weaponized all the time to skewer one's political opponents, to draw comparisons between past and present. Look at what we're getting wrong again. And now we can add the end of the Cold War to this list. After Trump's address to a joint session of Congress the other night, I'm also.

[Political Analyst]

Working tirelessly to end the savage conflict in Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians and Russians have been needlessly killed or wounded in this horrific and brutal conflict with no end in sight.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Democrats responded by comparing Trump unfavorably to Ronald Reagan. Michigan Senator Alyssa Slotkin said Reagan was no weakling when it came to the Soviet Union.

[Financial Advisor]

As a Cold War kid, I'm thankful it was Reagan and not Trump in office. In the 1980s, Trump would have lost us the Cold War.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Ironically, back in the 1980s, many conservatives thought Reagan was being duped by Gorbachev and opposed his version of detente with the ussr. It is also strange to listen to Democrats today pine for a man whose politics were rather unpopular on the left.

[Historian Sergei Radchenko]

In this present crisis. Government is not the solution to our problem. Government is the problem.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

So maybe none of these historical comparisons really works or helps us understand what it'll take to establish lasting peace today, if possible, between Russia and Ukraine, rather than reaching a deal that plants the seeds for future conflict. Putin is not Hitler or Stalin or Gorbachev. He's Putin. The year is 2025, not 19, 1938. Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons, Putin has shown no serious signs of wanting peace, and President Trump apparently wants Ukraine to begin negotiations from the position that it started the war. Just yesterday, the administration's special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, Keith Kellogg, at a Council on Foreign Relations event, was asked about Trump's decision to suspend military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine. Kellogg said it was Zelenskyy's fault. He brought it on himself. He didn't follow the White House script very candidly.

[Trump Administration Official]

They brought it on Themselves, the Ukrainians. What I mean by that. Look, when we were in the Oval Office last week on Friday, and I'll kind of give you the background, a little bit of it. When we talked with President Zelensky before that meeting, there were 13 US senators at Hay Adams. And we said, okay, this is like stage managing. This is what you want to say. It's basically going to come in. We have a precious metals deal, you're going to sign the deal, you're going to have lunch, have a press conference, exit stage right, and you're good to go. We continue to go.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

So the fact that an American administration has adopted the Kremlin's interpretation of the war is astounding, and it might be unprecedented. Whether the Reagan era or Yalta can help us understand Putin's foreign policy, especially after his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, well, that is another matter. Historian Sergei Radchenko is an expert on the Cold War nuclear history and Russian and Chinese foreign policies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and he is the author of the aforementioned To Run the the Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power. Sergei Radchenko, welcome back.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Thank you for having me. Martin.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

It's been a bit. Last time you were on, we were discussing your monumental, both metaphorically and literally, your monumental book To Run the World, which I still use as a reference and as a replacement for weights. If I can't make it into the gym, I use it for bench pressing.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

So that's what it's meant for.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

I want to get into Yalta with you and the purposes of Soviet foreign policy, the purposes of Putin's foreign policy, the quest for legitimacy and recognition. Are there parallels to draw? But first, we've had a week to digest the Oval Office meltdown, Zelensky's ensuing move to try to make peace with Trump. The American administration has since cut off intelligence sharing and has also suspended military aid to Ukraine. What's your take on what's happening now?

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Well, I think it's clear where the winds are blowing. The Trump administration understands that Ukraine is not core to America's interest, is not central to America's interest interests, and is trying to find an exit from this war by talking to the Russians. The Ukrainians are hesitant because they understand that under the current conditions, the Russians are going to press for a hard bargain. They are probably going to present the Ukrainians with similar conditions that were presented to them back in the spring of 2022 during talks in Istanbul. And that's just not Something that the Ukrainians are too keen to accept. But it seems that the Americans are willing to talk to the Russians along those lines. I think it was Mike Waltz, was it Mike Waltz who mentioned Istanbul already as the basis for negotiations. So that was an interesting moment. Of course, that makes the Russians quite happy. But you can imagine the Ukrainians were not exactly thrilled by the prospect of returning to the spring of 2022.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

You wrote a major piece, co authored it in Foreign affairs, which is the in house publication of the Council on Foreign Relations about the Istanbul talks. What was on the table then? Why did those talks fall through?

[Foreign Policy Expert]

So this was just weeks after the Russian invasion of February 2022. Immediately the Russians and the Ukrainians started talking. They began in Belarus and then eventually the talks shifted to Istanbul. The Russians wanted the following. They wanted Ukraine to stay out of NATO. So this would be the treaty on Ukraine's permanent neutrality. So that was one item, one demand that the Russians had Ukraine out of NATO. Ukraine would have to be demilitarized. And by that the Russians meant that it would not be allowed to have, let's say, more than 85,000 troops to protect itself. Some of the Ukrainian laws were criticized by the Russians and they wanted them changed. Laws on historical memory and language. For example, the Russians want Russian to be recognized as an official language in Ukraine. So those things, and you know, they never agreed on quite a few things. For example, they did not agree on where the line would run, the line of control in Eastern Ukraine. This was left unclear in Istanbul. The idea was to agree to this during the summit between Zelensky and Putin, which never happened, of course. And then they could not agree on the question of demilitarization because as you can imagine, Martin, the Ukrainians wanted to have a real army that would be able to protect Ukraine in case of repeat Russian invasion. And the Russians were basically allowing the token army. And most important, perhaps the Ukrainians insisted on real security guarantees and the Russians were trying to water it down. They wanted to introduce the base for consensual decision making. So Ukrainian neutrality would be guaranteed by consensus of powers, which would include Russia, so that Russia could veto any request for external help. And the Ukrainians were not happy with that. So anyway, none of that ever came to fruition. But it seems the Russians want to continue negotiating on this basis.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Well, that's a victor's peace. Maybe some would say Ukraine doesn't. Well, Trump said it, you don't hold the cards.

[Political Analyst]

You're gambling with World War 3 and what you're doing is very disrespectful to the country, this country.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

I'm back to you.

[Political Analyst]

Far more than a lot of people said they should have.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Have you said think. But Victor's peace, or a dictated peace, could plant the seeds for future conflict. Which takes me to my next question, and that is the issue of whether Russia has legitimate security concerns vis a vis Ukraine. Does Russia. Does Putin feel threatened by Ukraine? Because from my vantage point here in the United States, wasn't Ukraine or the eastward expansion of NATO that was threatening to Russia. This is Russia acting belligerently based on a false perception of their security. But what I think and what Putin thinks and what Russian nationalists think, totally different. I mean, all Russian leaders going back to the end of the Cold War, have opposed NATO enlargement.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

I think that's about right. They've always seen NATO enlargement, if not a security threat, then at least a humiliation for Russia. Those are Yeltsin's words, by the way, in 1995, when Bill Clinton went to Moscow and told Yeltsin that there would be enlargement no matter what, the Russians could not veto it. Yeltsin said, this is nothing but humiliation for Russia. We believe this is a blunder, a big mistake, and one day this will be a historic error. So humiliation is a big part of that. Right. So not even necessarily security, but security. Two perceptions of security. And there are different ways to look at security. You might say, well, Russia is protected by nuclear weapons. And there are people in Russia, among experts, who will say, this is true, true. But there are others, including in the military, who will say, no, no, you know, NATO still matters. And we're worried about NATO being next to our border. So security threats and perceptions of security threats are real things. And when people say, well, that they don't matter and Putin is just making this up, I think that's not correct. On the other hand, I think it's more complicated than this because Putin has advanced visions for reunification of, you know, Russia and Ukraine in his various writings. If you consult those writings, you will see that his vision is very imperialistic. And there's nothing there about security. There's stuff there about, you know, Ukraine is basically part of Russia. That's why it has to be part of Russia.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

And the 2014 rupture wasn't over NATO. First of all, Ukraine was never going to join NATO. I think everyone understands that. The 2014 rupture was over Yanukovych backing out of a trade deal with the eu. And then contingency comes into play. Yanukovych leaves, he flees Ukraine, and that then leads to. I don't want to talk in the passive voice here. Putin then invaded Crimea, annexed Crimea. That wasn't about NATO, but I guess it's all part of this larger context.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

It even gets more complicated than this. In one of the recent press conferences that Putin held, Steve Rosenberg, the BBC journalist in Moscow, asked him something about security. He said something like, well, you know, after invading Ukraine, does Russia feel more secure now? And Putin, instead of saying, oh, yeah, we were really worried about NATO or whatnot, actually started to say something completely different, which struck me as extremely interesting. He said, we were being shown our place by the West. We were being shown our place. In other words, they looked down on us and now they won't anymore. So that sort of psychological state is very important for understanding what Putin is trying to accomplish. He is trying to return Russia onto this great powers on his own terms, not as a poor relative, but as somebody who can, you know, basically using force, asserted its rights. And, you know, you can see that in his various pronouncements. So it's complicated. Certainly not just security threats. It's much more complicated than this.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. It's hard for me to discern from where I'm sitting what are legitimate Russian security concerns versus aggressive belligerence that is not justified at all in this entire mix. So you said there at the top of your first response about Ukraine being a core Russian interest, not an American one. Even the Europeans. Right. If you look at recent polling data, very few Europeans say they want their country to send troops to defend Kyiv's independence. Right. And that goes back to what Obama said in 2016, which is not a popular opinion in some quarters in the United States today. But he was right. Ukraine is always going to be more important to Russia than the U.S. but at the same time, now, Sergei Radchenko, after listening to Trump take Putin's side in the war, at least when it comes to the interpretation of who started it, and demanding that Ukraine begin its negotiations from the position that it started the war, not Moscow. It's not necessarily in US Interests just to throw Ukraine to the wolves. So it's not in our interest to send our troops there and fight a nuclear armed Russia to preserve Ukraine's independence. But the other side, the other end of the spectrum, I should say, isn't in our interests either. Do you agree with me?

[Foreign Policy Expert]

I think so. You could argue this way. You could argue that for all the billions of dollars that were spent by the United States on war in Ukraine, most of which, by the way, went towards replenishing US Stocks in substitution for the material that was sent to Ukraine for all that money that was spent. It's just a fraction of the US Military budget. And what happened, One of the major strategic competitors of the United States that invaded the neighboring country was basically stuck in a quagmire as a result, for three years. Now, that's a very tragic situation for Ukraine, but the Ukrainians continue to fight. They're not the ones saying, look, you know, we're ready to surrender. Please help us. We want to surrender together with you. You know, no, that's not what they're saying. They're saying, please, we don't want to surrender because we understand that surrender is worse than even this very difficult struggle that we have to wage. So you might make the argument that by throwing Ukraine under the bus, Trump is making concessions to Putin without getting anything in return. It's not clear what he hopes to get in return for all the concessions that he has made already has not been made clear yet. And he's also creating tensions and rifts with America's allies in Western Europe, which also doesn't seem to have any positive aspects for the United States necessarily. You can make this argument.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

I don't think Trump cares about Ukraine. I think he sees it as a. And this is just my speculation, he sees Ukraine as a hindrance or an obstacle to his priority of trying to pull Russia away from China. And these comparisons to. We're going to talk about historical comparisons at some point here. These comparisons to Nixon are silly. Nixon explains exploited an already existing rift. And this is up your alley. You're an expert on Russia and Chinese history. There was already a rift between the Soviet Union, the Sino Soviet split. Right. There's no split today.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Right. I mean, we, we do have people in Washington who are very keen to do Kissinger in reverse or Nixon in reverse. I mean, there's a Kissinger in every Starbucks in Washington at this point.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

You know, I'm not one of those.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

But there are problems with this thinking. The problem, the main problem is, as you said, Martin, if you go back to the 1960s, by 1971, when Kissinger traveled to China and began this process that ultimately led to President Nixon's visit there in February 1972. By that time, the relations between China and the Soviet Union were extremely bad for. Not for a couple of years, but for more than a decade. They were really nasty for a long time. And in 1969, they actually fought a war right across their border over Some disputed territory.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

So the Usuri River. Right, The Usuri river river not far.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

From where I was born. A lot of people think that I was born in Sakhlin island, but actually I was born a little town on the Usura river, and I moved to Sakhalin island when I was a child. My parents moved me there. But anyway, so, yeah, the relationship was really, really bad, and it was exploitable. One of the things that the Russians and the Chinese learned from that period of. Of their confrontation, the 1960s and the 1970s and into the early 1980s, was that when their relations are bad, third parties try to exploit those differences in their interest. Third parties, meaning the United States above all. One of the things that they're trying to do now is to avoid this kind of situation. Now, the Chinese are anxious. They don't want to end up in a situation where, you know, they might lose the Russians or they're worried about losing the Russians. So they really were. It's, It's. It seems they're anxious. I don't know if there's really any prospect for Russia to turn its back on China, because there are historical reasons for their unity now, their economic reasons. Mutual trade is extremely important for Russia. Also important for China, to a lesser.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Extent, oil and gas. Right. Oil and gas. Russia's selling.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

That's what the Russians are exporting to China, oil and gas. Fundamental. I think the. The Russians and the Chinese understand that they need the other. They have learned to work with each other. So creating problems between those two countries is going to be difficult. I mean, obviously, they're trying, and they're trying. Washington. Marco Rubio recently talked about that. Whether they will succeed. I would say it's extremely unlikely that they will succeed. I think what will happen is President Putin is going to pocket all the concessions that the White House is willing to give him and use those concessions, build himself up for leverage with the Chinese so that he can claim a better, more equal relationship with the Chinese. Because at the moment, of course, the Chinese are driving a hard bargain in some key areas, and he probably feels that he's a little bit overdependent, but that doesn't mean that he's ready to turn his back on the Chinese. I think that's an oversimplification.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Margaret McMillan wrote an essay in the Financial Times saying Russia cannot be bought, cannot be pulled away from China. So, Sergei, my position on the war since really mid 2022 has been neither side can achieve total military victory. Now, maybe that's not true. Maybe one side will break through or the other side will be exhausted. But my position is most likely we're not going to see a total military victory which renders endless combat existentially pointless, to borrow John Keegan's words from his great World War I book. I've also objected to framing the war as a front line in a global struggle between democracy and autocracy. If that were truly the case, maybe European countries would have their soldiers in Ukraine fighting Russia. Russia has nuclear weapons. I don't know. Maybe that's not fair. But longer the war lasts, the greater the risk of escalation and destabilization, which can have global consequences. Look at the food supply. Yet at the same time, I don't see the deal that would end the war. I mean, where is the deal? The Trump administration keeps talking about Russia this, Russia that. What does Russia agree to? They haven't even agreed to stop bombing and firing missiles at Ukraine yet.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Well, exactly. I mean, there's a different expectation in Washington and in Moscow about this possible deal. I think Trump wants a quick resolution that's very clear. And if you're in a situation, it's like when you try to sell a house very, very. Or a car, car very quickly, you know, you will sell it at a worse price than if you hold out and negotiate for a long time. I don't know if Trump is prepared to negotiate for a long time. It seems that he's anxious to basically cut Ukraine loose, get rid of this problem. And that, of course, is to Putin's advantage, because he is thinking long term. He's thinking, how do I control Ukraine long term? Maybe not through military means. Maybe it turned out that the three day operation, you know, never became a three year operation. You know, the Russians got stuck, but perhaps they've clawed their way to something resembling control of Eastern Ukraine. Perhaps they could also impose political control on the rest of Ukraine. That is something that Putin is trying to accomplish. So there's a different approach. The Trump administration wants a basic ceasefire with the Ukrainians, potentially recognizing the loss of the territories that they have lost. The Russians, I think, want more than that. There's a lot more to their agenda. And that's why we've heard the Americans now again raising this prospect of Istanbul, which was, of course, music to Putin's ears, because, yes, he wants Istanbul. He wants Istanbul, plus because he feels that he's been fighting for three years, has committed so much to this war. Now he basically wants to come out of victor. The question is whether the Trump administration is going to deliver this victory on a silver plate to Putin, I don't know. I don't know whether they will. But it seems that Trump just wants to be rid of this problem.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

One argument against abandoning Ukraine that I've heard and some of my guests on my podcasts have raised this possibility is that the Baltics are next or Poland is next. Not necessarily a hot war, but Russia can find ways to interfere with those countries. I don't see Ukraine as a domino, but we do know in history, we do know, Dr. Radchenko, that there are psychological dominoes.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

So I tend to agree with you. I think if you look at, let's say, the Baltic states or Moldova, they are not as important to Putin's conception of Russian greatness as Ukraine. And there are different reasons for invading. Right. You might consider strategic reasons, you might consider economic reasons. But I think the most important in Putin's case is that notion of identity, identity Ukraine. He feels in Belarus are part of that Russian world that he's. Or Russian, you know, great Russian empire that he's trying to rebuild. And the Baltics are probably not in that sphere now. You might say, well, but there are 25% Russians that live in Latvian or Estonia, and won't he make trouble with those people and try to do something there? And I agree that he might act through hybrid means to destabilize the situation and bring to power pro Russian government, or at least not what he calls Russophobic. He keeps talking about Russophobia in the Baltics for obvious reasons. Many countries along Russian borders are quite Russophobic.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, well, thanks. Yeah, because of his invasion psychological dominoes. It's easy for me to say, oh, don't worry, Russia can't or won't invade some other country.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

But what he's interested, he's interested in quote, unquote, teaching lessons to those around Russia. And by the way, it's interesting to know that what he's doing in Ukraine has already sent signals to, let's say, Georgia. That's why you have a Georgian government today that is not nearly as pro Western as some former governments. For example, you know, former government of Mikhail, you know, Georgia seeking entry into NATO, et cetera. All of that has been sidelined because the church and current Georgian government is looking in the situation thinking, well, you know, maybe we should be hedging our bets here and keep on Putin's good side. So depending on how the war in Ukraine actually works out, so if he actually gets what he wants, I. E. Political control of Ukraine, that will send a very chilling message to Russia's other neighbors that who will be then reminded to, quote, unquote, behave and not frustrate Russia with, you know, the various statements that are directed against what Putin feels. You know, images of Russian greatness. I mean, the bolts are, are famous for that, right? Removing statues of soldiers or whatever, things like that. I mean, that has been a long going back. When did, when did this thing start in estonia? Back in 2007, when the Estonians removed that bronze soldier. And when the Russians attacked Estonia using. There was like a cyber attack and carried out against Estonia in 2007, you know, that some of those things really go back. But if you try to analyze what is the problem here? The problem is Russians sense that they are being disrespected by what they see as inferior countries that should be in their, quote, unquote, sphere of influence, or at least not raise their voice against, you know, great Russia's voice. So that sort of attitude, I think, is still relevant for understanding the Kremlin. That's how they think, and they will continue to do that.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

This is fear of infrastructure, influence, thinking as if the Baltics are any threat to Russia. But what I say here doesn't matter.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Well, I mean, the, the Baltics have, and they've had a very difficult history. They have a history of Russian domination, Soviet domination under Stalin. Whole population of the Baltics was deported to Siberia. It's a very tragic thing, and they think really carry that with them historically. They are worried about the return of Russian imperialism. Sometimes their worry leads them to act in the kind of way that triggers various Russian, you know, aggressive impulses. And you might say, well, this is just victim blaming and we should not, we should blame the Russians for their imperialism and not the bolts for being worried about Russian imperialism and trying to push back against this. But the reality is, and this is the sad reality for the Baltic states and for, you know, other countries along Russia's borders in Eastern Europe is that, you know, where is their security? They hope that their security would come from NATO. Today, it seems that the Trump administration, at least, is becoming increasingly disinterested in providing any kind of security like that. And that's why we have this whole conversation now in Europe about, well, how do we guarantee their security? Do we provide a nuclear umbrella like, like President Macron did in the speech? Just what was it yesterday? How credible is this? Will anybody in Western Europe actually fight to protect the Baltic states or Poland, or do they have to just depend on themselves? And I think the argument would seem to me that they have to increasingly depend on themselves because I don't know if we can actually get very far with this promises of nuclear umbrella from somebody else. You know, it's not the United States is going to be France now. I just don't buy that.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

We can point to all the hypocrisies, double standards, inconsistencies because America has shredded the rules based order as well. The invasion of Iraq, so many different examples I can point to, but that does not make what Russia is doing okay. There are still rules. There is still supposed to be some kind of rules based order, although I think it's been buried in the rubble of Gaza as well. One more thing about the current situation, then we'll get to Yalta. Yalta, Yalta, Yalta. Sergei, I thought of your book as soon as I started to see Yalta comparisons and that is I want you to respond to what Jack Matlock said in an article or wrote in an article for the Quincy Institute. He said Vice President Vance and Secretary of Defense Hegseth made policy statements in Munich that raised the ire of some European allies and prominent politicians and journalists in the U.S. in fact, he says these comments were either statements of fact like Ukraine is not a member of NATO or of policy adjustments that are not only essential if the war is to end, but in fact would have prevented the war if they had been adopted by earlier presidents such as Ukraine will not become a member of NATO. Direct American involvement in the fighting will end. The US Will not act to protect European NATO forces deployed in Ukraine. If these had been the policies of previous American administrations, Matlock says the war in Ukraine would not have occurred.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Well, I, I saw the article on responsible statecraft and I have enormous respect for Ambassador Matlock. He's a very interesting individual and obviously somebody with great lengthy experience of serving as US Ambassador in Shasta Fair in the Soviet Union during the 1980s. A really, really fascinating individual. And on this particular issue, I disagree with him for the reason that I mentioned at the beginning of our conversation, I. E. He says, well, if NATO did not expand, there would not be the Russian invasion of Ukraine. What is the evidence for it? What exactly is the evidence? You know, the evidence is mixed. We've talked about perceptions of insecurity, but we also talked about Putin's imperialism and the desire to show them. I show the west, you know, you've looked down on us and now we'll stand tall and proud. Those things cannot be squared within the simple argument, what I would call the Mearsheimer argument, that Jack Matlock is putting forward in this article. So I think it's much more complicated.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

I agree. Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference, that was before George Bush blundered and offered or floated the idea of Ukraine and NATO at the 2008 Bucharest conference. Although that idea I guess had been around for a while. But the 2007 speech by Putin, he does mention NATO like 60 times. But he's also arguing for something else there. He's arguing for Russian autonomy in the so called rules based order, the autonomy that he says the United States enjoys but doesn't want to give to anyone else.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

One of the things he mentioned in the Munich speech was to complain about the promises that were made to Russia about NATO non enlargement. Of course, Matlock also talks about that in his piece in Responsible Statecraft.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, but there were no promises, so it's complicated.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Obviously Matlock argues that there were promises made and we know that certain things were said by for example, the Secretary of State James Baker and others to Gorbachev. I argue in my book, in the relevant chapter where I discussed with all the evidence we have discussed in very great detail about what Gorbachev actually agreed to, it's very clear that he did not actually accept that deal that was being offered. And I think we have to be a little bit more nuanced about the Russian reaction and not just accept what Putin says, but one thing, and this is something that, that Ambassador Matlock does not mention in his article, that Americans may have been talking about NATO non enlargement in the context of, you know, German reunification, but the Russians not only talked, actually signed the Budapest memorandum right in, in 1994, promising to respect Ukrainian territorial integrity and its sovereignty. And these people are complaining about something that, that James Baker said that was in a conversation.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

And Russia signed the treaty, the final settlement of, of Germany, the end of.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

The call, which had Germany that actually allowed for NATO enlargement into eastern Germany. So it's basically very complicated. If we buy into Putin's rhetoric on this and say Putin is right and we're wrong, I think that just basically dumps it down considerably. The reality is more complicated if you look. And that's why I would encourage listeners to read that chapter of my book. I think it's the final chapter where I talk about this, the final chapter. I go into great detail about the so called broken promises with all the new evidence, not just from the American side, but also from the Russian side so that we know what Gorbachev was thinking about this. And actually, yeah, does does make the story much more complicated.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Okay, Sergey, finally time for Yalta. This is really what I wanted to talk to you about. But so much has happened in the past two weeks. I needed to get your take take on what's happening now. But it ties into what's going on now because immediately people reach back into history. This is what FDR did to Poland at Yalta. Trump is now selling out Ukraine. Now maybe he does want to throw Ukraine to the wolves, but let's just start with the comparisons to Yalta. Even if there is some legitimacy to them, I still don't understand the need to have to compare what's happening now to 1945. FDR did not sell out Poland.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

FTR had his interests in Yalta. The war was still ongoing. He wanted the war to finish in Europe, but he was also looking to Asia where the Americans were fighting a brutal, brutal war against the Japanese in the Pacific. And FDR wanted Stalin's participation in that war. He wanted Stalin to help the Americans defeat the Japanese in Asia. So he was willing to give some concessions. And so there was give and take at Yalta with Roosevelt basically enticing Stalin by giving him parts of the Japanese empire, including the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, agreeing to so called status quo for Mongolia which actually led to independence. Mongolia. There was also discussion of Poland, there was discussion of Germany. Now on Poland, the issue was this. I don't think, you know, FDR was in the position to sell out the Polish. The issue for me is what could he possibly do do. The Soviets actually were in control militarily already. Basically they've already imposed on Poland what they wanted to impose on Poland. The British and the Americans ultimately got away with this promise that the Soviets would hold elections, free and fair elections, which of course was. I mean, they knew that this was going to be a flawed election. It was never. Stalin was never going to allow.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Yeah. What cards could FDR have played?

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Right? Exactly. Churchill had this, this operation unthinkable, right. This idea of going to war against the ussr. This was exactly, was unthinkable. Nobody wanted to go to war against the USSR at the end of, just after fighting the Germans, the Japanese, you know, after this horrible, horrible war. What, another war against the ussr? It was absurd. Over what? Over Poland? No, I mean the Americans had their own national interest to look after the British also. And yeah, was very sad for Poland. But was that a sellout? You know, I just refused to accept that. Here's the parallel to the President. The reality today is that Putin is not in control of Ukraine. If Putin was in control of Ukraine, then you could just basically say, well you know what, what can we do? Let's just say just forget it. You know, Russia will annex Ukraine and that's all fine. Or maybe it's not fine, but we can't do anything about it. So why.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

That's what happened in 2014, seen with Crimea.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

We're not going to go to war with Russia. The Ukrainians don't want that, we don't want that.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

I mean, what could have been done?

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Exactly. It's a fair complete at the moment, you know, we don't have a fair complete. So under those circumstances, I think you can actually speak of something like a sellout of Ukraine. If you basically say, if you basically force Ukraine to surrender to the Russians, who force Ukraine to accept terms that will be tantamount, that will amount to surrender.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

And another parallel, I never thought I'd say this, but Stalin was actually more reasonable in some ways than Putin. He saw Poland as a legitimate Soviet security concern. Now a lousy deal for Poland. They were consigned to the Soviet prison for what, 45 years because of this? From 1945 to 1989. 90. But after being invaded through Poland by Germany twice. Well that was World War I under the Tsars and then the Second World War War. Stalin saw Poland as a legitimate security concern. I guess some of your insights in this book that I learned were Stalin was actually capable and willing to make concessions to the enemy in the west in some areas to get what he wanted in other areas.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Yeah, I mean that's an underappreciated element of the whole Yalta negotiation of what happened in 1945, also in 1944, percentages agreement. Stalin understood that lesser gains with greater legitimacy were better than greater gains with lesser legitimacy. And what does legitimacy mean? It means American recognition of those gains. So that's why he wanted a negotiated settlement. That's why he wanted Yalta. He was willing to make concessions. And you might ask which concession? Well, clearly not in Poland. Although in Poland. What happened in Poland? Communization of Poland. That came a little bit later. And I think that came as a result of Stalin became basically realizing that unless you communize the country fully properly, you cannot really politically control it. For a time he was kind of trying to play both sides and let fall and have a, you know, a.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Mixed government with a few non communists government, etc.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

It didn't work out. So in the end, I mean the.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Polls didn't want this. They didn't want?

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Yeah. Across Eastern Europe you had that situation. But then in some areas he was also willing to compromise and he would pull out. For example, the key example as China, a lot of people, when they think about Yalta, they don't just think about Poland, but in reality there was just as much on China. And as a result of what Yalta, what was decided that Yalta, Stalin, that then negotiated with the Chinese, not the communists, but the nationalists, and they concluded a treaty in the summer of 1945 by the terms of which, or as a result of which Stalin basically betrayed separatist movement in Xinjiang. So get this, you know, today China is in control of Xinjiang. Well, that's actually a legacy in some important ways of Yalta because Stalin was supporting a separatist, separatist movement in Xinjiang in 1943, 44, 45. And the separatists, you know, the Uyghurs, the Muslims, they actually won out with the Soviet support. And then Stalin betrayed them because he felt that he needed cooperation of the Nationalist government, which was blessed by the Yalta agreement. And he also kind of sold out Mao Zedong for a time. He forced Mao Zedong to go to Chongqing to negotiate with Chiang Kai Shek, the leader of the Nationalist government. Mao Zedong did not like that. But from Stalin's perspective, Mao was not so important. What was important was to have a cooperative relationship with the Kuomintang non communist government which was accepted by the United States in the context of Yalta. So Stalin sometimes moderated his demands in order to have a better relationship with the United States and to have that American recognition.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Yeah, recognition. He didn't need it to control Poland, but it was important to him to get it.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

It was important because, you know, that meant that those gains were more permanent if the Americans recognized them as legitimate. I mean, actually you could argue that the Cold War partly emerged from this failure of Stalin and FDR successor Harry S. Truman to reconcile their visions. Because in the fall of 1945, Stalin wanted the Americans to recognize Soviet imposed governments in Bulgaria and Romania. And Americans were not willing to do that. They thought, well, why? How can you impose undemocratic governments on Bulgaria and Romania? From Stalin's perspective, this was just a natural thing to do because they were in the Soviet so called sphere of influence. Stalin thought that this was totally legitimate. And he just thought, you know, why would the Americans come and bother about it? Look where America is and where Romania and Bulgaria are. Clearly they have no business here. But from Harry and Struman's perspective, he was not willing to allow that. And he wanted to challenge Stalin's so called legitimate or, you know, what he thought was, were actually illegitimate sphere of influence or illegitimate interests in, in Eastern Europe. And so that actually was one of the driving forces of the Cold War.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Stalin, a cynical, paranoid mass murderer. I'm not trying to compliment the guy here. Maybe the main or most important driver of Soviet foreign policy was not ideology, it was the quest for legitimacy and recognition. Stalin seeking that in his domination of Poland. Horrible deal for the Poles. Of course, in my view today, Putin has given up on that. He's thrown that away. I don't think he's seeking recognition or legitimacy. He's trying to dominate violently.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

I would disagree, Martin. I think he still does. He wants that legitimacy. He wants that recognition. But the question is by who? He wants recognition by the United States as an equal player and, you know, a power with considerable interests in Eastern Europe.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Well, he might get it actually from the current administration. Well, he wasn't going to get it from Biden.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Clearly hoping for that. Right. He's hoping to return to kind of 19th century division of the world. And it seems that he finds an ideological ally in Trump because President Trump also is interested in something like that. He's interested in great power, cooperation, but also rivalry, but also this notion that the United States would be great in its own hemisphere and the Russians should have their own sphere. So that is really interesting. And the difference here from the whole Yalta discussion. What happened in 1945, again, you know, history does not repeat itself today. Europe is not Profit Straight. In 1945, Europe was in a state of vacuum. And you know, the Soviets actually had an ambition to dominate all of Europe. They just, they could not dominate Great Britain, but they wanted to dominate as far as Sweden and as, as you saw in my book, also Africa. The Americans were not willing to allow that. But today you have a major power in Europe and you might, you know, we might ridicule the Europeans because they can never work together. Nobody leads or everybody leads at the same time. It's just utter chaos. But economically, in, in some key military aspects, Europe is a power. Two European nations have nuclear weapons, France.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

And Great Britain, and there's the NATO umbrella.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

So yeah, yeah, there's still made. So, so it's not like, it's not like Russia is about to run over, you know, and, and conquer Europe when today you have some European commentators who are basically saying, oh my God, where, you know, they're trying to impose another Yalto on us and we're finished. I don't understand that this panicky attitude. I think the Europeans actually have a lot with which they could confront Russia and not allow Putin to roll over Europe. So the situation is not 1945. And so the Yalta parallel, I think, has its limitations as well.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

It's not 1945. It's also not 1938. So Munich, we regard the agreement signed.

[Historian Sergei Radchenko]

Last night and the Anglo German Naval Express agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Listen, it's not that these historical episodes don't have anything to teach us. They have a lot to teach us. And it's not that all comparisons are wrong. All parallels are misguided. But we still have to be careful about this. And when Munich comes up now, because Trump is seen to be allowing Putin to carve up Ukraine the same way Chamberlain agreed to Hitler taking over the Sudetenland to be followed months later by the rest of Czechoslovakia. The problem, number one with this comparison is that there's no Hitler today. Putin is an SOB like Stalin was, but they're not Hitler or Putin's not Hitler.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

I agree, I agree. I mean, with any historical comparison, what you have to do really is drop a little table and say, well, here are things that are similar and here are things that are not similar. And a lot of the times the things that are not similar will be more prominent than things that are similar. So people do tend to overuse simple comparisons with Munich or Molotov ribbon Trop Pact and things like that, and they just don't work. I think that's intellectually lazy, actually. And I say that as a historian, I should be able, you know, I should want to actually sell the historians craft and say, yeah, look at all this historical parallels. I do think it's important to read history, understand the sources of foreign policy behavior. For example, the source of resentment in Russian foreign policy. Where does this come from? Well, you know, I've spent years trying to understand that, and I put that together in that book to run the world. People will read it and they'll see where some of those sources of resentment are coming from and where some of the motivations for the Kremlin's policymakers come from. But that doesn't actually mean that Putin is completely, you know, just following the tracks of his predecessors and will always do what, let's say Stalin did or what, you know, I don't know, Nikita Khrushchev did, because Peter the Great or Peter the Great, he's Got agency of his own. He's trying to. To do his own thing. But I think it is important to be aware of that complicated history. Including Yalta. Yes, including Munich. Including all of those things. And not just one particular historical interpretation, but a range of historical interpretations. You can have a Polish beyond Yalta, but you can have the view on Yalta that I present in my book, which is very different. All of that, I think, is very helpful for making comparisons between the past and the present, but also rejecting some.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Comparisons and also figuring out the best course of action to take. Today. We're not facing a Hitler. We have to come up with a different type of solution to deal with today's problems. Yeah. The best book I ever read about Munich, it wasn't just about Munich, but Munich took up hundreds of pages. Was Zara Steiner's book the Triumph of the European International History, 1933-1939. Even longer than your book. But what an amazing book.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Exactly, exactly. So it's important to read history and to think historically. A colleague of mine at sais, Frank Gavin, is going to have a book on that subject. Speaking of thinking historically. He will have a book on that subject coming out, I think, next year. And so that'll be very interesting for the general public and policymakers as well.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Well, what you said there, you've been looking at these issues for years and you're still sorting through them.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

I have lots of flaws. I have lots of flaws. But at least, you know, one thing that I'm more than often I'm willing to do. I have been wrong many times and I'm, I'm, I accept that I'm wrong a lot of the time.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Well, I'm allowed to kid you about the length of your book, which is top 750 pages. That includes the footnotes. The text is around, I don't know, 600 pages. I gave you such a positive review last year. I wrote a review so I can make fun of you now about the length of the book.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

I appreciate, I appreciate it, Martin. Thanks for reading.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

Well, who needs to read a long book when you can just read Wikipedia, right? I kid. I kid.

[Foreign Policy Expert]

Well, they're actually there. There are actually articles on Wikipedia that draw on this book. I, I was quite entertained by that. It's already been incorporated, you know, into Wikipedia. I once asked ChatGPT to tell me something about the Sino, Russian relations, for Sino Soviet relations, and it wrote a little essay and then I said, well, what are the sources for this? And it gave me the sources. And when I checked the sources. Turned out it was actually my own essays about the about Sino Russian plagiarizing bastard.

[Historian Martin DeCaro]

ChatGPT on the next episode of History as it Happens. Who are alternative for Deutschland? AfD, the right wing political party that came in second in the German elections? Are they neo Nazis? Fascists? Right wing populists? What does it mean for Europe? That is next as we report History as it Happens. New episodes every Tuesday and Friday. My newsletter every Friday. Subscribe free at historyasithappens. Com.