History of Philosophy Without Any Gaps – Episode 485: Liz Jackson on Pascal’s Wager

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This episode features Peter Adamson interviewing Liz Jackson, Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Louis University, on the topic of Pascal’s Wager. The discussion provides a rich, contemporary philosophical exploration of Pascal's Wager, its foundational logic, objections (like the “many gods” objection), formal challenges about decision theory and infinity, the psychological and ethical dimensions of faith versus belief, and how Pascal’s pragmatic argument complements or differs from traditional evidential arguments for God's existence.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

Introduction and Overview of Pascal’s Wager

• Difference from Traditional Proofs: Unlike the ontological, cosmological, or design arguments, Pascal’s Wager is not about proving God exists but about the prudence of believing in God based on decision theory or "cost-benefit analysis."
  • Liz Jackson: “Pascal's Wager is not an argument that concludes just that God exists. ... Instead of giving evidence that God exists, it concludes that you ought to wager on God or you ought to believe in God.” [01:05]
• The Payoff Structure:
  • Four logical possibilities are summarized in a 2x2 matrix: (Believe & God exists), (Believe & God doesn't exist), (Don't believe & God exists), (Don't believe & God doesn't exist).
  • The key claim: If you believe in God and God exists, the payoff is infinitely good (heaven/etc.). For all other outcomes, the payoff is less than positive infinity.
  • Jackson: “You don't have to believe in hell for Pascal's Wager to work.” [04:49]

Why Philosophers Are Drawn to the Wager

• Interdisciplinary Implications: The wager intersects with philosophy of religion (nature of God and afterlife), epistemology (ethics and voluntariness of belief), philosophy of mind, decision theory, and even mathematics (infinity).
• Adamson: “The wager ... interacts with so many different fields in philosophy.” [05:38]
• Pascal’s Wager is historically significant in decision theory, introducing the controversial use of infinite payoffs.

The “Many Gods” Objection

• Core Worry: The wager supposedly only supports belief in the Christian God, but a similar wager could be constructed for any religion or gerrymandered god.

• Formal Problem of Infinity in Decision Theory:

  • When the payoffs are infinite, multiplying probabilities by infinity ("the absorption property") washes out differences in probability—every choice with some non-zero probability of infinite reward is equivalently rational.
  • Adamson: “Twice infinity is the same as infinity.” [13:04]
  • Jackson: “So ... Maybe we can't use decision theory to decide after all, maybe these probabilities don't matter in the way we thought they did.” [13:12]

• Jackson's Solution:

  • Argues probabilities should matter in rational decision-making, even with infinite payoffs. Proposes modeling payoffs with very large finite numbers or advanced mathematics (hyperreal numbers, limits).
  • Jackson: “Probabilities matter even when we're dealing with infinite values. ... Go for the higher chance at getting the infinite good rather than the lower chance.” [14:29]

• Gerrymandered Gods & Mixed Strategies: Bizarre conceptions of gods (e.g., rewarding only wine lovers) show the need for a model where probability influences rational choice to avoid recommending all possible “wagers.”

  • Jackson: “Metaphysically possible... but this is why we have to get a system where the probabilities matter.” [17:44]

Control and Rationality of Belief vs. Faith

• Is Belief a Voluntary Act?:
  • Central objection: Can one simply choose to believe for pragmatic reasons? Jackson distinguishes between belief and faith to address this.
• Belief vs. Faith:
  • Belief = cognitive judgment about truth; can be neutral or even negative in attitude.
  • Faith = pro-attitude, commitment, or action in the face of doubt or with positive engagement toward the proposition.
  • Jackson: “Faith involves seeing the object of faith as positive... Belief just represents that it's true, but it's kind of neutral on its value.” [21:34]
  • Faith may not require belief: Faith can persist amid strong doubt or even lack of belief but involves commitment or action.
  • Wagering may more appropriately be about faith (a commitment), not belief (a cognitive state).
• Addresses Two Objections:
  1. “Wagering is impossible”—We can't directly control belief, but perhaps we can choose faith (commitment).
  2. “Wagering is irrational”—Choosing beliefs for self-interest is suspect, but acting on commitment (faith) is consistent with practical reason.
  • Jackson: “If we can control whether we have faith, ... then if we make wagering about having faith, then ... we can control whether we have faith.” [23:53]

The Self-Interest Worry: Is Pascal’s Wager Morally Suspect?

• Concerns: Relying on self-interest is considered out of place in religious faith, which should arise from awe, piety, etc.
  • Adamson: “Religious belief is a really good example of a kind of belief or even kind of faith where you shouldn't think like that. So you shouldn't believe in God or have faith in God out of self interest.” [25:04]
• Jackson’s Response:
  • Entry through self-interested motives can lead to genuine relationship/commitment, akin to movie plots where people’s motives evolve positively.
  • Distinguishes “self-interested” (prudence) from “selfish” (neglecting others), defending that self-interested reasoning isn't inherently disreputable.
  • Wagering could also have altruistic or moral motivations.
    • “I think one those [bad reasons] could lead to good ways. And two, I think there are ways of taking the wager that do represent good motives.” [30:44]

Pragmatic and Epistemic Arguments: The Wager’s Relation to Traditional Proofs

• Complementarity: The wager and traditional evidential arguments (e.g., cosmological, ontological) play complementary roles.
  • The wager can operate given even a modest probability that God exists; doesn’t require high confidence from traditional arguments.
  • Jackson: “You don't have to convince someone that God exists. You just have to say it's at least as likely as it is not.” [33:20]
• Hybrid Arguments: Combining pragmatic and evidential strategies yields a powerful case; e.g., "If the probability is at least 50%, then the wager advises belief."
  • Jackson: “You can combine the pragmatic considerations with the epistemic considerations to still get something like Pascal's Wager.” [33:58]
• Local Pragmatic Reasons: Other pragmatic reasons for belief—including communal benefits, psychological health, or social cohesion—can supplement the Wager logic.

Memorable Quotes & Notable Moments

• On Infinite Rewards:
  • “As long as it's less than infinite utility, it could even still be positive. So you don't have to believe in hell for Pascal's Wager to work. I think that's maybe one of the common misconceptions about the argument.”
    — Liz Jackson [04:49]
• On the “Absorption” Problem:
  • “Twice infinity is the same as infinity.”
    — Peter Adamson [13:04]
• On Faith and Belief:
  • “Just because you believe something doesn't mean you have faith that it's true.”
    — Liz Jackson [21:21]
• On Motive-Formation:
  • “Maybe it gets you on the boat, but then, you know, the commitment gets better over time.”
    — Liz Jackson, on self-interest evolving to genuine faith [27:09]
• On Decisions and Self-Interest:
  • “It's helpful to note that there's a difference between something being self interested and something's being selfish.”
    — Liz Jackson [28:35]
• Almond Croissant Humor:
  • “If this all comes out with everyone having good reasons to eat almond croissants, that would be a good result from my point of view.”
    — Peter Adamson [16:36]

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Introduction and presentation of the wager: [00:35]–[04:59]
• Relevance and philosophical richness of the wager: [05:38]–[08:48]
• Decision theory, infinite values, and faith as pragmatic attitude: [08:48]–[17:19]; [21:14]–[24:50]
• The “many gods” and “gerrymandered gods” objections: [09:01]–[19:56]
• Self-interest, faith, and moral objections: [24:50]–[31:54]
• Pascal’s wager vs. traditional proofs; hybrid arguments: [31:54]–[36:30]
• Pragmatic reasons for religious belief beyond the wager: [36:30]–[37:29]

Conclusion

The episode unpacks the enduring philosophical fascination with Pascal’s Wager, addressing objections with technical rigor and accessible examples. Liz Jackson’s contemporary take reframes the wager in light of advances in formal decision theory, the philosophy of action, and religious epistemology. The conversation highlights that while Pascal’s Wager, considered alone, faces significant challenges, there may be a promising future for hybrid arguments and nuanced forms of religious commitment that distinguish faith from mere belief. The dialogue’s tone is inviting, witty, and always intellectually serious.

Guest: Liz Jackson
Host: Peter Adamson
Date: January 25, 2026

Listen at: www.historyofphilosophy.net