Greg Jackson (2:02)

And listen to those last few episodes to get a full picture.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (2:05)

For my book club discussion today, I'm pleased to be joined by Professor Lindsey Cormack, an associate professor of Political Science, director of the Diplomacy Lab at Stevens Institute of Technology, and a respected expert on government. You may remember Professor Cormack from episode 177, when we talked about the New.

Greg Jackson (2:22)

Deal and the CCC.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (2:24)

This time we'll discuss America's reluctant but ultimately unavoidable entanglement with another Great War in Europe. Then Professor Cormack interviews historian Lynn Olson.

Greg Jackson (2:33)

Author of several books on World War.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (2:35)

II, including Citizens of London, a fantastic book about three influential Americans that helped turn the tide of sentiment of both the United States leadership and the American public toward Britain's stand against the mighty German war machine. But first, a few quick reminders before we jump into those interviews. Our website, htdspodcast.com has the complete bibliography.

Greg Jackson (2:57)

Of all our episodes and additional book recommendations.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (3:00)

You'll also find tour dates where you can come see me storytelling live on stage. And you'll find information about our membership program.

Greg Jackson (3:08)

HTDS will always be widely available, supported by ads.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (3:12)

However, the HTDS membership program offers ad free episodes delivered early, plus extra stories and deep dives. For example, right now you can listen to two extra stories narrated by me about Edward R. Murrow's dramatic live radio broadcasts during the London Blitz and another about a pivotal moment when American Ambassador Wynant convinced striking British coal miners to get back to work for their king and country. You can access those exclusive stories and.

Greg Jackson (3:38)

More by visiting.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (3:42)

Or by clicking on the link in the episode notes to start a free seven day trial.

Greg Jackson (3:58)

Professor Cormac, it's great to have you back on htds.

Dawson McCroft (4:01)

Professor Jackson I'm so happy to be here. Thank you. I have really enjoyed listening to the last few episodes up until now. It's really fascinating to see that America up until this point is mostly a spectator to war that's raging in Europe.

Greg Jackson (4:15)

Yeah, that whole isolationism or non interventionism, we got into that in one of these recent episodes going all the way back to George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, essentially telling the United States, hey, success is not getting wrapped up in things that are European. We want to stay out of that mess. Of course, we've got to put a lot of interesting caveats there on wars that are still waged. Participation in the Great War. And yet when we think of it from the American perspective of the Western hemisphere of being unilateral, of not being a full on ally, which even in the Great War they were an associate of the Allies and not all the way in. I mean, we've got a century and a half of precedent of the United States kind of saying we can be friends, we're not interested in a relationship, friends with benefits, you know, or we're not looking to really commit here to anything ever to anyone.

Dawson McCroft (5:04)

Well, and if we want to keep with that sort of mode of thinking, there's also some location settings that are really different. Like the United States gets to be blessed by Having two oceans, keeping them apart from the squabbles that are happening elsewhere. And so when we think about not as being connected then as we are now, so it's really hard to get as engaged with something that you're not seeing or being confronted with in your phone all the time like we are today.

Greg Jackson (5:27)

Yeah, it's so true. And FDR obviously can't make the point about the way phones bring information to us. But in one of his fireside chats he touched on that, noting that, hey, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are great barriers. They just aren't the great barriers that they once were. Americans still see the Pacific and Atlantic oceans as these massive natural barriers that cut them off from the concerns of the quote unquote Old World. So Monroe Doctrine, Western hemisphere, sure, they'll, we'll do things here, but that's it.

Dawson McCroft (5:56)

Well, and I wouldn't even see, you know, it's not necessarily that it's we don't care about the rest of the world. It's that we don't see it. There's also plenty of things that are happening domestically that are keeping Americans really preoccupied. Like they're still recovering from the Great Depression, they've got their own economic hardships, individual personal families trying to rebuild generations of wealth that are wiped out. And so to me, I sort of give an understandable pass to some of the reasons to not want to concern yourself with global conflict. If you're just trying to do the basics of your day to day living and you have a really fresh memory of another world war still ever present in most of the adults of that time.

Greg Jackson (6:35)

And it's not a positive memory.

Dawson McCroft (6:37)

No.

Greg Jackson (6:38)

Even the, the rah rah of we're fighting for democracy at the time of the Great War, that has very much shifted now whatever one's narrative is today. Right. Historians continue to debate that and we'll never completely settle on just how opportunistic versus idealistic U.S. engagement in World War I was. But this is peak mid-1930s. You're right. We've got the Great Depression raging and we are with the NYE Committee investigating the role of munition sales and bankers after their loans, wanting to see those get repaid loans that they made to the Allies, specifically Britain and France. Yeah, Americans are very much questioning, did my doughboy son get killed so that some rich New York banker could get his payday? So what, Europe's in yet another squabble? This is just what Europe does. We don't have that hindsight yet to realize what Hitler's going to prove to actually be what Benito Mussolini will entirely prove to be. In fact, let's dial back a little bit now that we've talked about. So the US has this long tradition of isolationism, one that even FDR is embodying when he first comes into the presidency. It's, it's only as we get into 39 and 40, the FDR 2 is starting to go, okay, we're going to have to reassess the situation here. But coming out of Versailles, we also have to. If we're going to understand how did this situation even develop in Europe in the first place, let's remember that we have losers and then we have psychological losers. In the Treaty of Versailles, which I maintain is the worst treaty ever. I cannot think of a. There were such brilliant people in the room working on that thing, and I have much respect and admiration for some of the people involved or aspects of their work. That doesn't mean that a lot of smart people can't get together and put together a really dumb document. At the end of the day, is.

Dawson McCroft (8:27)

Your quibble there that you think it's too punitive and so there's no way that Germany can possibly want to live under it for a longer period of time?

Greg Jackson (8:34)

Yes, that's. That's my, my main quibble. It essentially sets up World War II. Now, I can appreciate how everyone involved in, in Paris in 1919 didn't see how they were doing that. But Again, this is 2020 historical hindsight. It's pretty easy for historians to go, oh, yeah, well, this all but paved the path to a harsh reaction from Germany. No, you can't predict that specifically Adolf Hitler would rise, but that there would be some sort of massive backlash. And within that, it's not just Germany, but Italy. Even though it's a winner, you know, quote unquote, it's one of the Allies. Historians typically talk of Italy as being a psychological loser. So in episode 184, the rise of Benito Mussolini, well, how do we get fascism, which Mussolini founds? Well, it's a lot of frustration. It's a lot of angry vets from the Great War who are not being taken care of. We have more economic conservatives who are feeling walked over by Italy's far left. It's just a perfect mixture of awful tensions that lead people to think a authoritarian take on nationalism is the answer to their problems. So Benito Mussolini rises, and then we get a bit of a copycat situation in Adolf Hitler. His fascism is not the same as Benito Mussolini's. I'LL remind listeners I defined it in episode 184 or I gave a working definition of fascism. There were a lot of people who commented on that, in fact. So I will go ahead and read what I. What I did there one more time. My working definition, fascism is extreme nationalism that one, glories in blood and war, particularly waged to build empire with expanded borders. 2. Is governed by a one party authoritarian state under the leadership of a dictator with a cult like following. Three, values the tribe over the individual and the state over civil rights. Four, Economically does whatever benefits the state. In other words, it'll act economically, conservatively or liberally, all depending on what serves the state's interests.

Dawson McCroft (10:44)

I really think that last part is one of the reasons why it's probably hard for Americans of that day to figure out which is worse. Communism, fascism, Nazism, Trying to, like, make sense of all the new isms they're having to deal with. But the idea that the economic rationale for fascism can be adaptable, like it can be a capitalistic fascism. It can be one where a state takes over enterprise or industry that it needs for those ends. That flexibility probably makes it really hard for people to sort of say, like, is this necessarily good or is this necessarily bad? Sometimes you might want a strong state. It seems really hard to make sense of.

Greg Jackson (11:19)

It really is. And it's why I distilled that into the definition that, that I have. And yet Paxton's book the Anatomy of Fascism, which is kind of the classic quintessential work, if you want to understand fascism, I highly recommend reading it. And yet he purposely says, I'm not defining this thing until the end because there's so many things to talk through and fascism is so much more about what it hates and what it dislikes rather than putting forward a very clear ideology. So Marxism is far more definable than fascism. It is a bit of a Venn diagram of overlap. And yet they are opposite ends of the political spectrum. Marxism, or, you know, communism specifically. That brand of Marxism being what we hold as the far left and fascism being what we hold as the. The farthest extent on the far right. I remember thinking about putting this in the episode, and I didn't. I'd love your reaction to this. I'm a bit of a fan of the horseshoe theory on the whole left right spectrum, that when you go far enough, that's where things start to just look the same. Those extreme differences ultimately come to the same, which in my mind, that is a loss of liberty and freedom in so Many different senses, whether it's economic, civil rights, you name it. But communism will take you to that place, as we saw in the episode that I did on Stalin's rise, where the Gulag system, the famines, millions are dying. So that's not a winning way to go. And yet fascism also results ultimately in millions dying, the Holocaust. So you're coming to those same ends. The question is, are you doing it under a philosophy of collectivism for the working class versus A? Anything is right if it contributes to the chosen tribe of the state, yeah.

Dawson McCroft (13:10)

So the way that I always think about something like the horseshoe theory is not so much in that shape, but more like a Taurus. T O R U S like a circle where you can like at any point be really far away from the other side, but if you keep moving, you're just going to like, pass through the same mirror of it. And it seems like it's hard for common people to make sense of their world at this time. But it also seems like elites didn't really know which was going to be the lesser of two evils. So if you're trying to figure out who you're going to take on or who you're maybe going to make an alliance with, I think it seems difficult to say, well, is Russia going to be a trustworthy partner if we're going to be going up against Nazis or Italian fascists, or is communism really going to be a bigger issue for us? That seems like a fraught environment to make public policy decisions as an elite. So it's not surprising to me, or it's less surprising to me that everyday people aren't really trying to engage in that intellectual debate in a way that's very meaningful because it's just very difficult from the get go.

Greg Jackson (14:08)

Yeah.

Dawson McCroft (14:09)

It's easier to say, let's not get involved.

Greg Jackson (14:12)

It is. It very much is. And even over in Europe, Winston Churchill is impressed with Benito Mussolini initially. Definitely changes his opinion on the guy as things, you know, snap together. But initially he's seen, and this is, I think, important for us to understand if we're going to see how did the concrete get poured and set in the first place? Italy looked so in flux and unstable. And let's remember right after the treat of Versailles, early 1920s, with the Russian Revolution and the violence and the harsh world that Lenin was setting up, the rest of the world, the United States included, is thinking anything but communism is better until it isn't. Right. Then that starts to switch in a way. Or rather we get to this enemy of my enemy is my friend situation once the Nazis attack the ussr. Well, this is the guy who uses the Gulag system, who doesn't believe in civil rights. He's antithetical to everything American, and yet he's now an enemy to Adolf Hitler, who's also proved himself to be antithetical to everything America stands for in a different way.

Dawson McCroft (15:19)

Although there are a number of Americans who do sort of find reasonable approaches in Nazi rhetoric. Like we even have instances of Nazi rallies happening within the United States so that we can now say it's antithetical to the American experiment or to the American ideals. It's not the case that every person who's living then sees it that way. Some of them actually think these are pretty fine ideals or things that they're at least willing to emulate in crowds of others in public here in America.

Greg Jackson (15:48)

Sure, we. Geez, which episode was that? But we covered the Madison Square Garden Nazi rally, right, where you've got swastikas flying right beside a banner of George Washington. In this attempt to fuse Nazism into the American tradition. In fact, we can see both of these extreme ideologies playing out in part in the United States. We have the Madison Square Garden Nazi rally in 1939. The Red Scare is very much that. It's a scare. There's a drastic overstatement in the 1920s and other flashpoints on the leftism of union workers, many of whom are just not that far left. And yet we did see this goes all the way back to episodes in the 1940s Anarchists that are sending bombs to leaders of the nation. And again, to situate all of our left rightness here, anarchists are typically held as yet another subset under the large umbrella that is Marxism. And this is a great credit to fdr. I think we forget what a moment of crisis the nation really was in in 1933 as he came to the presidency. These very extreme ideologies are getting very real attention from Americans. And his ability to come in and enact emergency measures that effectively save democracy and capitalism, keep enough Americans back in that sane, you know, whether they're on the left or the right, but that more sane space of the spectrum, it's to credit for America not embracing the sort of extremism that they're seeing play out in Europe in that exact same era.

Dawson McCroft (17:26)

And in some ways, that probably is to do with his domestic focus very early on. The idea that we're going to have relief, recovery, reform, the idea that we're not going to make it so dire here in America that these more extreme viewpoints or ideas can't be as seductive because things aren't as desperate. And it's like sort of hard to underplay how much that matters because you don't know what you don't see. And we don't see what it would have been had things gotten worse in America. But I think there's also this other really interesting FDR backdrop, which is the notion that he's already served two terms when it's looking like war is going to be more and more eminent. And this question of a third term is certainly something that's looming as like, well, maybe I should get into this because if we're going to go into war, we need a steady hand on the tiller or someone who like knows what's happening here, who's been in the rooms with the other leaders who have been doing this sort of work. And so that undertone of the political reality of the time is something that I think it really matters in terms of do we get in or do we not? Well, am I going to be president or am I not? And as soon as he gets the green light, plus Pearl harbor, of course, but that continuity of leadership probably makes it far more likely that the United States gets in versus if you have a different actor who doesn't want to do that in the competition in the run up to that election.

Greg Jackson (18:43)

Well, and there are a lot of interesting pieces to his, his election. We of course need to remember that the 22nd Amendment doesn't exist yet. So it's an option. Right. That wouldn't stand today. It's now unconstitutional. But I think it's also worth noting, I don't mean this as like some sort of FDR apologist for him choosing to run a third time, but he's also not the first to have the idea to even go for it. He's simply the first to get the nomination from his party. His own dear fifth cousin, Theodore Roosevelt was looking at going for a third term. He did step into his first term early on as a non elected president. Right. He's the vice president. McKinley got assassinated. But he looks at what would be effectively a third term, but doesn't get the GOP nomination. Same thing goes for Ulysses S. Grant who goes to the convention trying to get the nomination, does not succeed.

Dawson McCroft (19:32)

But FDR is categorically different guy.

Greg Jackson (19:34)

Oh, absolutely. I mean, he's of course made ample enemies in the process. Many of our most admired and successful presidents, you know, we need to remember that when they were president. Well, it probably means they made really hard decisions. They also had plenty of people that didn't like them. Lincoln was not exactly loved by the Confederacy, for instance. So sure, there are definitely those who are opposed to fdr. But let's also keep in mind the man won his reelection in 36 with 46 of the then 48 states. He is very much appreciated the way he was able to navigate the Great Depressions.

Dawson McCroft (20:05)

Yeah. He also has decently supportive Congress in the sense that Democrats, while their power shrunk, shrinks. The time that he is in presidency, it starts with an overwhelming majority and doesn't really get to something that's going to challenge that. So he has a more supportive backdrop. And I think it's hard for us to say what the public opinion was at the time because public opinion polling is just starting in this era. But it does seem like the way that he approaches this does follow at least my read on the scant data at that time, which is it starts with really high percentages of people being please don't do anything about war, let's just stay in America, America first. That we're going to just focus here. And then that does start to drop as stuff changes in Europe. And I think something that we haven't mentioned yet, but something that is one of those markers of leadership is the notion that FDR asks Congress to institute a draft prior to us agreeing that we're going to do any war fighting at all. That the Selective Training and Service act of 1940 is the first time that we have a draft in peacetime in the United States history. We haven't declared war. It's not clear that we're going to. But interestingly enough, this piece of legislation passes with bipartisan majorities, but not unanimously. There's plenty of Democrats that don't vote for it in both the House and the Senate. And so before we've even said we're going to get into war, we require through this Selective Service act that all the men 21 to 35 register with local draft boards. We know it's going to be a lottery system and eventually that's expanded to 18 to 45 year old men. But it's incredible to have had that done to, had that process to make sure our military readiness is up to it before we've agreed to enter this war.

Greg Jackson (21:41)

Yeah, it just speaks to frankly, incredible leadership. I mean, Americans do not like the draft that cuts against that our whole concept of liberty. We like a volunteer force. The first time we lean on a draft at all is the Civil War. And it speaks to the need to prepare for possible eventualities, the recognition that if we go to war, what we don't want to do is end up doing what we did in World War I. You know, and I think it's, it's important and worthwhile for listeners to think back to those Great War episodes and how when the United States enters the war in 1917, as Woodrow Wilson asks for that war declaration, Congress makes it, well, here's the US military ranked 17th in the world. It numbers in the hundreds of thousands even including the National Guard. And now it's supposed to go throw down with the millions strong German military over in, in Europe. So there's a lot of the buildup to World War II, regardless of which country we're talking about. Of course we are talking about the United States where you can see them learning from the lessons of World War I. Sometimes it means they just make different mistakes. But in this case in particular fdr, his administration, they realized, no, no, no, if we end up going to war, let's build an American expeditionary force ex nilio when we already need it. So situation, we need to be able to hit the ground running. So no, we don't want to go to war. And there's this, this odd tension, right, of we don't want to go to war, we don't want this to happen. We're not trying to precipitate it. And yet we need to be ready in the event that that happens. We've got the draft, we've got General George C. Marshall doing everything he can to prepare his troops for potential combat. We have the Rainbow plans that are being thought through from 1939 to 1941, which explored different potential ways in which the nation would deploy soldiers. And then the victory plan, which this is often confused with Rainbow 5, that's the last plan they come up with. The treat is one the same. They're actually separate documents, though they work hand in glove. Rainbow five envisions how to deploy into the Pacific and in Europe. Whereas the victory plan is the write up of the nuts and bolts. Okay, how many soldiers do we actually need to carry out this plan? And as they look at it and realize that they're looking at over 8 million men in uniform, you know, and all the tanks, bullets and whatnot to support that. I mean, that's just a gut wrenching moment in the fall of 1941, right as they're looking at, well, do we want to re up this draft? Men are about ready to go Home do we extend their service? And they do. Right. It squeaks through with one vote, with one whopping. Yeah. And I'm not a big fan of playing counterfactual history, but wow, I hate to think of where we would have been if World War II had started and we had not been preparing.

Dawson McCroft (24:39)

So the backdrop of this is FDR is probably talking with people prior to his third election. And Wendell Wilkie, what was his sort of take on this?

Greg Jackson (24:50)

So Wendell Wilkie was of course, his Republican challenger in 1940. And you know, I think Wendell Wilkie is a very interesting figure. He's this very charismatic, likable guy, really a newcomer to politics. He doesn't have a resume of offices he's held. And yet here he is, the Republican nominee in 1940. And, well, I found myself very much impressed as I'm diving in deeper. And he could have embraced the isolationism within the Republican Party at this point. The Democrats, yes, they have their isolationists. Let's not forget that. In fact, it's an isolationist Senator, Senator Wheeler, who exposes the top secret victory plan after it's leaked to him. He shares it with the Chicago Tribune. So there are isolationists in both camps. But with FDR being a Democrat and the President, the Republicans have come to inhabit the stronger isolationist tradition. Wendell Wilkie, in my take, he could have made some serious political Hay in the 1940 presidential election and perhaps increased his chances if he had leaned into that isolationism to differentiate himself from fdr. He refused to do that. Instead he said, no, I believe interventionism is in fact the way forward and I support the draft. It was highly controversial and yet he saw that the policies FDR was already pursuing were the right policies and he wasn't going to mess with them. And that of course speaks to where FDR came to respect him deeply. And as we then get into 1941, it's Wendell Wilkie right along with Harry Hopkins, that FDR and trust. Just think about this for a second. Think about our political climate of the last 10, 20 years. FDR sending his former adversary for the White House as of just a year prior as his emissary to the uk, to the most important ally the United States has. That's who he entrusts to go work one on one with Winston Churchill prior to their meeting up in the Atlantic.

Dawson McCroft (26:48)

Yeah, that's wild to think about now, isn't it? It is, but it also maybe speaks to a greater level of interpersonal and institutional trust.

Greg Jackson (26:57)

It absolutely does.

Dawson McCroft (26:58)

That we had and that for the 70 years after have been slowly decreasing. But when you have demands that are existential and when you have a reality that is you're going to be confronting these people over and over again, like the political class is not going to change that much, the ability to collaborate with them to make things better is an outcome that we're more likely to get. And that's not really where we find ourselves today many times.

Greg Jackson (27:24)

But conditions shift and perhaps we'll see that again.

Dawson McCroft (27:27)

Perhaps.

Greg Jackson (27:27)

Yeah, hopefully, Yes, I believe so. I choose to believe that. Well, I think we've flown through a whole lot of history here.

Dawson McCroft (27:36)

I think we really have. And I think we've talked about some people who were outside of the political realm proper, but able to really influence what we're going to do internationally. Someone like Ed Murrow, who's deeply in favor of interventionism because he's already there and he's seeing what war can do on the ground in London. And it's interesting to think about how these people who are not the decision makers, they are really the influencers who do turn and pull levers on the decision makers.

Greg Jackson (28:03)

Well, and speaking of that influence and what's going on in London, you have had a wonderful conversation about what is going on in London at this time.

Dawson McCroft (28:12)

Yeah. Lynn Olson and I got to get into parts of history that I think are not taught in the way that we think about political actors, but really all these other people who are shoring things up, whether they be through the media or appointees or business people who really have powers, who have things that they can do to change the outcomes. But we don't necessarily point to them as the central people in these things, but things do pivot and turn around what they're deciding to do.

Greg Jackson (28:38)

Well, I'm looking forward to hearing it. So with no further ado, why don't we go ahead and jump into it?

Dawson McCroft (28:44)

Sounds good. It was nice talking with you today.

Greg Jackson (28:46)

A pleasure always, Lindsey.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (28:59)

Welcome back, my friends. And now I'm going to turn this episode over to my colleague, Professor Lindsay Cormack, who had an informative conversation with author Len Olson. Lynn's book gives a unique perspective on the situation in Britain in 1940 and 1941 through the experiences of three very.

Greg Jackson (29:15)

Influential Americans living in London.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (29:17)

The American ambassador to Britain, John Gilbert Winant, who replaced isolationist Joseph P. Kennedy.

Greg Jackson (29:23)

Sr. Also father to future President John F. Kennedy.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (29:26)

Businessman Averell Harriman, whose name you may recognize from the contemporary investment bank Brown Brothers Harriman. And finally, legendary CBS radio and TV journalist Edward R. Murrow it is my.

Dawson McCroft (29:40)

Distinct pleasure today to be talking about this terrific book, Citizens of the Americans who stood with Britain in its darkest finest hour. And the author of this book, Lynn Olson. Lynn, welcome.

Lynn Olson (29:52)

Thank you very much for having me.

Dawson McCroft (29:54)

And Lynn, before I get started on questions with you, I want to say I thought this was a wonderful read. And I'm actually a little bit sad that we're only going as far as we are because the stories in the second half of the book, they just tickled me. I also learned some new words like it's. This was a wonderful, wonderful experience for me reading it and I can't wait to hear what you have to say on these things.

Lynn Olson (30:12)

Yeah, it was a really fun book to write. And you know, the best part about it is I kind of brought Leinet back to history because he was really forgotten. And so that's the thing I'm promised of.

Dawson McCroft (30:24)

So let's start by setting the scene. Britain is the last country standing against the seemingly unstoppable German war machine. As your book ends, why didn't Americans at that time realize the threat that they were actually facing? And in specific, thinking about the difference between Joe Kennedy's isolationism and how Murrow's reporting on this was different, their sorts of attitudes and actions seemed really different. Can you tell us a little bit about that?

Lynn Olson (30:49)

Yeah. Joe Kennedy was the American ambassador to England before and shortly after the war began. He was not a diplomat, he was a businessman before he got into government. He was an Irishman, which you would think was not exactly the right kind of person to send to the uk. I mean, the Irish, many of the Irish, really hated the British. Kennedy was chosen by Roosevelt to go to London as the ambassador for a number of reasons, one of them political. He wanted to get Kennedy out of the US he considered Kennedy a possible political opponent. And he thought that the further away he could get Kennedy, the better off he was. Kennedy was a hit at first in England because of his, basically because of his very attractive family, his many children. But he soon aroused a lot of resentment on the part of the British people. For the most part, he was very much a businessman still. He owns a number of businesses, including a liquor export business. Partly because of that, he was very sympathetic, quite frankly to Germany. He was a friend of Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, who was very appeasement minded. And Kennedy was appeasement minded as well. He really thought that we needed to get along with Hitler, that the US should not ever think of defying Hitler, you know, to let him have Whatever he wanted. And Kennedy was very, very outspoken about that. Even as, you know, as it became very, very clear that Hitler had designs on Western Europe and definitely on Britain. So he became extremely, extremely unpopular in England. Edward R. Murrow was absolutely opposite. He was the head of CBS News in London. Radio was very new in terms of broadcasting news reporting and broadcasting news. In fact, Murrow was really the one who, in a way, invented broadcast journalism overseas. He had never done any reporting before he went to London. He was assigned as director of talks for cbs. But he saw what was happening in Europe and he basically became determined to report on it and to hire a group of journalists who would do the same. He became, you know, in a matter really of months, it's certainly a year, he became one of the most popular journalists in London. He reported virtually every night before the war, what about what was happening, about what was going on in terms of Chamberlain's government trying to appease Hitler. And then certainly once the war began, he was reporting on how the British were dealing with the fact that finally, you know, about a year after the war, less than a year after the war began, they were the last European countries standing against Hitler. And so Murrow was reporting all of that all the way along.

Dawson McCroft (33:59)

So Murrow, I think he precedes Kennedy's arrival by at least a year going through Europe through his reporting. What was his attitude when Kennedy gets installed as the ambassador?

Lynn Olson (34:11)

Amuro did not like Kennedy, to put it mildly. In fact, he. He really despised Kennedy, despised his attitude toward appeasement, and did what he could to try to convince the Roosevelt administration to replace him. He was a very close friend of the man who did replace Kennedy, John Gilbert Winant. And he helped smooth the way for Winant to become Ambassador Murrow right from the beginning, right from the beginning of the buildup to the war. And then once England got into the war, felt it was absolutely essential that Britain survived, not only for Britain's sake, but also for America's sake. That America really had a vested interest in helping Britain survive, even though most Americans didn't know that or agree with that. He felt very strongly that. That America would be in deep trouble if Britain was defeated. And he made that quite clear in his broadcasts.

Dawson McCroft (35:12)

And it seems like in his broadcast he ignored directives that he had to just be analytical. And instead it seems like there's more opinion infused in that. Do you think that's because he thought the task of convincing Americans needed these opinions, or why do you think he chose that tactic?

Lynn Olson (35:27)

Yeah, Merle was in A constant kind of argument with the powers that be at cbs. CBS News basically told their correspondents that they should be objective, you know, that they should present both sides of the argument, that there should not be any sort of trying to convince the audience one way or the other. Murrow, I think, believed that to some extent, but he also believed that the whole idea of objectivity, which is what CBS was promoting, did not apply in certain circumstances, that one could not be objective about things like intolerance or prejudice or murder. There was a real need to explain to Americans why they should feel so strongly about what the British were going through, why they should feel so strongly that the British should survive and why they should feel so strongly about defeating Hitler. Didn't think that there was any possible reason that you could give to talk about Hitler's point of view. And then the other side.

Dawson McCroft (36:39)

We know that the Battle of Britain and the Blitz both begin in 1940, and London becomes a war zone. The blitz kills nearly 45,000 British civilians. And I imagine that takes a big toll on the public. And Murrow personally, how did he translate that into what he put onto radio?

Lynn Olson (36:55)

Ed Murrow made his name covering the Blitz. It was a horrifying experience for everybody in London who went through it. And everybody in London did go through it. It was night after night after night of bombing by German planes. London is a very big city. Many parts weren't hit, but a lot of Central London, East London, West London, battered by bombs. And this went on for, I think it was 57 straight nights. 57 straight nights of bombing. It was extraordinary. I mean, it was extraordinary that in itself, but it was extraordinary how the British responded to it, which is basically getting up every morning and going to work. They didn't let it destroy them. The correspondents who were in London were citizens of London too. They lived in London. They were under those bombs. So they knew exactly what the ordinary citizens of London were feeling because they were among them. There were a number. You know, there were dozens of journalists in London at the time who were reporting. But what Merville could do is to. He had a preternatural ability to observe what was happening around him and to explain it to his American listeners in a way that brought it alive for them. He once told one of his correspondents whom he just hired. He explained how he should report, what he should think about when he was reporting and then writing his broadcast. He said, imagine yourself in a living room at home and you are telling your parents and their guests about what was happening in London. And you're describing what you've seen. And it's not just your parents and their friends in that room. There may be, you know, a cab driver who's just dropped something, someone off listening. So you have all these different people hearing what you're saying. And he said, just tell the story what it looks like, what it feels like, what you hear, what you see. And he was incredibly good at doing that himself. He wouldn't just say a huge bombing raid occurred over London tonight. He would describe how people would react when the bombs were going off. He would describe the anti aircraft crews in London parks wheeling around with their guns. He made it come alive for Americans in a way that I don't think anybody else could quite do. Many several of his correspondents were also very, very good at doing that. But I don't think anybody was as good as Ed Murrow. And of course that kind of immediacy was so much more dramatic and it was so much more impactful than any print story, no matter how good it was, could be because you really sensed that you were there listening to him describe what was going on. And you know, he broadcast a lot live from the rooftops of London or from the streets of London. So he made it real. He made it real for Americans in a way that nobody else had done.

Dawson McCroft (40:12)

When we're thinking about the differences between journalism and propaganda, it's maybe more understandable at this time that the BBC would have something like advocacy in how they broadcast. Would you ever say that cbs, with Murrow's broadcast tipped over into propaganda versus just journalism?

Lynn Olson (40:28)

First of all, I don't think BBC, when the war began, once the war began, was involved in propaganda. The BBC before the war began was, it was heavily pro Chamberlain and pro appeasement. It was a very kind of elite, stiff upper lip kind of institution which supported the government, the Chamberlain government, and refused to allow critics of Chamberlain to speak on the BBC. People like Winston Churchill at the time when the war actually broke out and the British really got into it, the head of the BBC who was running it and who was very pro Chamberlain was sent to a different position. And the BBC attitude totally changed. A big group of new reporters and producers, editors came in and they were very much like Murrow. They were determined to tell the truth, which was not something that the BBC was really known for up to that point, but determined to tell the truth, the bad as well as the good. Murrow was in a way part of the BBC. His CBS studios were in the BBC building and he was very Close friends with BBC editors and reporters. He didn't mimic them. He followed their lead and they followed his lead. They were very, very intertwined. Certainly the BBC was not involved in propaganda. In fact, because of the war they became the world's most trusted news outlet. Broadcast news outlet, no question. And Murrow tried to tell the truth as he knew it. You know, you could debate the definition of propagandizing. He was certainly very outspoken in his broadcast, making it clear to Americans that he didn't think that America should stay out of the war. That if America tried to do it it would be disaster not only for Britain but for the United States. But I wouldn't call it propagandizing. I wouldn't use that word. I think both the BBC and certainly, and Murrow and his men did their best to tell the truth, to report on what was happening as fully and completely and truthfully as they could.

Dawson McCroft (42:53)

Okay, now I want to move to March 1941 where we have two new arrivals on the scene, Avril Harriman and John Gilbert Winant. I want you to tell us who these men are and maybe more importantly who they are to fdr. And if we can, let's start with Herriman because his background is really fascinating. His father is a railroad magnet and financier. And Teddy Roosevelt once described his dad as one of the worst malefactors of great wealth the country had ever seen. How did Harriman's elite background shape his entry into public service and what did that mean for FDR's relationship with him?

Lynn Olson (43:27)

Harriman was really always trying to live up to his father. He grew up in a very wealthy family, obviously very well connected family. And he, he became a businessman like his father. He was a big playboy, he played polo. But he was very, very intent on emulating his father in terms of making money and of making a contribution. He wanted to become somebody in the Roosevelt administration. He was chairman. He had replaced his father's chairman of Union Pacific. He was also involved in a number of business ventures in Europe before the war, all over from the Soviet Union, Poland, France, various places. He was conservative to some extent. He certainly was in it for business. I mean, he wanted to get involved with the Roosevelt administration not because he wanted to help end the Depression for the same reasons that many people in the Roosevelt administration wanted to end the Depression. That is to, to help the millions of people who had been devastated, who had been made destitute by the Depression. He was not interested in economic and social justice. What he was interested in is helping Business recover from the Depression. And that's really why he was very intent on joining the Roosevelt administration. Roosevelt didn't think all that much of Harriman in the beginning. He knew him from the time he was a child. You know, Roosevelt came from a very prominent, wealthy family in New York, as did Harriman, obviously. And Roosevelt wasn't impressed by Harriman. But Harriman kept working on Roosevelt. And finally, in 1941, they. He managed to worm his way into the administration. Franklin Roosevelt made him the London director of the Lend Lease program, the government program that Roosevelt created to provide weapons and equipment and food and other necessary supplies to the British. And so that's how he finally became part of the administration, and that's why he was sent to London.

Dawson McCroft (45:41)

Okay, and can you contrast that with someone like Wynet, who seems to come from a very different trajectory and what his utility and relationship was with fdr?

Lynn Olson (45:49)

Wynnet was a Republican as well when he started out. In fact, he was the governor of New Hampshire at the same time that Franklin Roosevelt was governor of New York in the early 30s. But Winant was a very different kind of man than Roosevelt. He was a shy, kind of reclusive man who found it very hard to speak. But he had an incredible ability to communicate with people. Despite that, he was very interested in helping people. Unlike Ehrriman, he was very interested in helping them survive the Depression, get out of the Depression, and he eventually became governor of New Hampshire. And that was his main concern, to help the citizens of New Hampshire economically and socially, in every other way at the time of the Depression. And he was incredibly popular. It's very hard to understand exactly how this man became a politician, because from all accounts, he was just very, very reticent and tongue tied and had a very hard time speaking. But he managed to convince the people of New Hampshire that he was genuine and he really, really, really cared about them. And he was a very popular governor and very successful governor. He got through a number of programs that were of great help to people who were really struggling. And he became a good friend of Franklin Roosevelt's. They were both. Even though Minot was a Republican, they. They both were doing similar things in their states to help the people of their states recover. So he was diametrically opposite in terms of politics and attitude. Approach from Avril Harmon.

Dawson McCroft (47:36)

So let's talk about how these men were received by Churchill when they arrive in London. What were some of the changes that Churchill made? Maybe about, like, how military intelligence was sharing or other things that you think are important for people to understand that might not have occurred had not someone like Wynant come into the ambassadorship.

Lynn Olson (47:54)

Well, I think it's true for both of them. I think both Wynant and Harriman knew Roosevelt well, Wynnet, in a way, better than Harriman. But both of them knew Roosevelt well, and they could explain to Churchill why Roosevelt did what he did or felt what they felt. I mean, I think it's really important to note that the famous friendship between Churchill and Roosevelt that everybody knows now that they were very close friends or very good friends during the war and that helped create the special relationship, the alliance, the Anglo American alliance, that was all somewhat true, but it wasn't really true in the beginning of the war. I mean, both of them were very suspicious of each other. Actually. Franklin Roosevelt had been told by Joseph Kennedy and others that Churchill was a drunk, that he couldn't be relied on, that he's reckless, et cetera. Churchill was furious at Roosevelt because the United States initially wouldn't give Britain aid when it needed it most. He was very frustrated. Churchill was very frustrated about what was going on. And what both Winant and Harriman did was to explain to Churchill what was going on not only with Roosevelt, but in the American government. Now we're talking about this is before the US Got into the war. So the US still at that point was quite isolationist. Certainly many members of Congress were. And that Roosevelt, Churchill didn't understand really how the American government functioned. And Roosevelt didn't understand how the British government functioned either. So, you know, despite the fact we, you know, speak the same language, the two countries were really at odds with each other. At least the leaders of the two countries were at odds with each other because they truly didn't understand what was going on in the other country. And what Winant and Harriman could do was to tell Churchill, talk about the challenges that were facing Roosevelt and what made Roosevelt tick. And it made an impression on Churchill. For example, you mentioned military intelligence. Churchill was initially very, very reticent about sharing any kind of military intelligence, military secrets with the US and particularly about how broke the British were in the year leading up to when we finally got into the war. I mean, the British were on the verge of defeat. They had really run out of money, and they desperately needed American equipment, American planes, American tanks, et cetera, but they had no money to pay for it. And Churchill was very loath to tell Roosevelt that. And both mine and Herriman said it was absolutely essential that he do that. He come clean. And he let Roosevelt know how bad things were. And Church finally went along with that and shared that information, but also a lot of other military intelligence that he had been reluctant to give to the Americans. And that really helped. I mean, doing that helped grease the skids for Roosevelt to introduce the Lend Lease program, the program that ultimately was one of the main things that won the war, this incredible product of American industry. Basically, American industry helped win the war. And it really began when Roosevelt first introduced Lend Lease and when it actually started getting going. I mean, there's just no way that the British could have survived without American aid. And there's no way the Soviet Union, which became an ally soon after, could have survived that. American aid. American aid was absolutely essential.

Dawson McCroft (51:36)

So I'm glad you moved to Lend Lease, because this, to me, seems like the material manifestation of America stepping closer to war, even though it's not going to be officially in it by the time they've agreed to this setup. Can you tell us what the reaction in London was once the program passed? Did you get the sense that common people understood what it meant or how was it received?

Lynn Olson (51:56)

This was the worst part of the war for the British. We're talking now here about 1941, early 1941, into until December 1941, they were really on the verge of defeat. You know, much of the convoys that were carrying, even the material that was coming across the Atlantic in convoys, it was being bombed by German submarines. And so they were very short of almost everything, including food. And so it was a really, really tough time for Churchill and for the British people. And at that point, they were wondering if. If the Americans were really serious about helping them survive. And it's here when John Gilbert Winant proved his medal, I mean, Herriman was helping Churchill, trying to get him to understand what was going on with Roosevelt and urging Roosevelt to be much more forthright in sending material over. John Gilbert Winant was out there on the streets of London during the time when the bombs were falling and basically telling them that we are in it, that the United States is in it. We are here for you. So he became kind of the face of America during that time. There were stories written about him, and while the bombs were falling, he was walking and, you know, stopping and helping find people and wreck buildings, et cetera. And it was the first indication, public indication, that for many people, that America really did still care. And that was very, very important. Not only it was important for the public to realize that and to know that, but it's also very important for the British government to feel that actually there were people that actually were doing everything they could to get the Americans more involved.

Dawson McCroft (53:44)

In your book, you have laid out exactly how much influence these three men had on Churchill and FDR and public opinion and ultimately on world events. It's really staggering what they were able to accomplish. Can you tell me what is one standout example about how this web of personal relationships really move together to shape global policy? Is there something that you see as like a turning point or some standout moment?

Lynn Olson (54:06)

The moment that I can think of is more a symbol of how important they were, the three of them, and how much of an impact they had and how influential they were with the two leading characters in this drama, and that was on December 7, 1941. All three of them were involved with Churchill or Roosevelt. I mean, Murrow was at the White House on December 7, 1941. And in London, Harriman and Wynant were having dinner with Churchill when the news of Pearl harbor was broadcast. And so all three of them heard directly from the two, Churchill and Roosevelt, what was going on. And in the case of Churchill, Winant and Harriman actually did have some sort of impact that night. For example, Churchill wanted to call Roosevelt immediately and Winan said, no, we have to wait. But all three of them knew what the bombing of Pearl harbor meant. It meant that the United States was finally going to get into the war. It meant, as Churchill said in his memoirs later, that Britain probably was going to survive. And that basically what these three men had worked very hard to do since they arrived in London had paid off. That the United States, it took the Japanese bombing of Pearl harbor, but America was now at war and everything was going to be different.

Dawson McCroft (55:44)

Your book reconstructs this agonizing moment in late 1940, early 1941, when U Boats are strangling supply lines, London is being bombed nightly. American aid is still a desperate dream. And it's something people today don't often think about because we know how the story goes. Eventually the United States gets involved after Pearl harbor and the Allies triumph in the end. But at the moment, people don't really know what's going to happen. Why is it important for us to understand that moment of uncertainty?

Lynn Olson (56:13)

I think it's very important to know what was happening at the time. I mean, I think the story of the Anglo American alliance now, to those who know anything about it, it almost seems preordained. I mean, people have a sketchy idea of what happened. First of all, they were about to be Defeated. Then Winston Churchill comes to power, and he inspires the British people to hang strong, to defy the Germans, even when nobody thinks that the British are going to be able to be successful at that. And so the British are hanging on by their. Their fingernails. They're about to be defeated, and then all of a sudden, bang, the Americans come to the rescue. Franklin Roosevelt and the Americans come to the rescue. And then that alliance is created, and the rest is history. That alliance helps win the war. It could not have been won without the alliance, et cetera, et cetera. And I think that's the way people who know anything about the war, that's how they think. But that's not true. It could have gone so wrong so many times during that period. It was not a given that that was going to happen. I mean, when you look at the situation that was there, you had two men that were very suspicious of each other, two leaders who were very suspicious of each other. You had leaders in their administrations that didn't like the other country, who didn't know much about the other country. That friendship that Roosevelt and Churchill had, as I said, was not there. They did not have their friendship at the beginning. In fact, they really didn't like each other. So to jump from that and then say, okay, then they became friends. Well, how did they become friends? Who. Who were the people who were involved in helping them create that friendship, to create that? There were many, many people. The three that we've been talking about are at the top of the list. But there were many people involved in bringing these two countries together in an alliance that would hang tough until the end of the war. And so I think it's important for people to understand how history is made, that it's through people and it's through their actions. It is not just an impersonal force that happens and that it could have been so much different if certain things worked in place. And I have written about World War II. Almost all my books have been about World War II, and a lot about Britain, a lot about France, for example, just to give an example about France and the fact that most people didn't resist and why that was and wasn't that terrible. And having done so much research about all this, people who write that, historians who write that have no idea how complex it is to live in that kind of situation. You know, when you are controlled by another country. And would you be able to hold out? Probably not. So I think it's just extremely important for people to see how things actually happened and how Important the actions of individuals are in making history. And it's not just the leaders. We know so much about the Churchills and the Roosevelts. It's people like Murrow, Winant, Harriman, many, many others who had a role in making an alliance that didn't look like it was going to happen actually come together.

Dawson McCroft (59:42)

Lynn, I liked that so much when you said history is made through people. How can understanding that history could have gone differently shape how we approach current events today?

Lynn Olson (59:53)

What I take from all that I've learned about what happened in this particular period with these particular people and other times during World War II and other places is how important individuals are. I write a lot about unsung heroes, about people who are like John Gilbert Winan, who most people don't know about, but have done really amazing things for the country and the world, but for some reason have slipped through the cracks of history. And I really think it's important that readers know about these people, just to know about these people, but also to realize that they are people like them. They're people like the readers themselves who, for whatever reason, decide, okay, I've had enough, you know, in terms of maybe defying the Germans, I've had enough. I'm going to. I am going to defy the Germans and who come together with other people that, you know, an individual by himself or herself probably is not going to make an. A big difference unless they're a Churchill or a Roosevelt. But by joining together in a community, they can actually have an impact. And we see that in citizens of London, and we see that over and over and over again. I see it over and over again in various other places during the war. My big thing as a historian is to underline the importance of people in making history.

Dawson McCroft (61:23)

So in a slight detour, all three of these men also did something similar, which is they all engaged in different affairs with parts of Winston Churchill's family members. What was in the air? Why was that happening?

Lynn Olson (61:36)

Well, I think war can be a great aphrodisiac. There was certainly this mentality in London that, you know, live for today because tomorrow you may die. And London was probably the most exciting city in the world at that time during the war. I mean, you had people from all over the world in London, and when they weren't bombing Germany or they weren't fighting or they weren't busy in meetings, you know, they were having a good time. There was a lot of partying going on in London. And to answer specifically your question about these three men and Churchill's family. They were, Churchill really made them, those three men, part of his family. He not only included them as important American representatives at meetings, et cetera, he actually included them in his family. So they were invited to Chequers, the Prime Minister's country house a lot. They came to number 10 Downing street in London a lot. But during the weekends it was very common. Murrow did not actually go to Checkers very much. He didn't socialize with Churchill and his wife but he did not go to Checkers. But both Wynnet and Herriman were often invited to Checkers and spent the weekends with the Churchills. And Herriman very shortly after he arrived began an affair with Pamela Churchill who was Winston Churchill's daughter in law. She was married to Randolph Churchill, Churchill's son who was off in Egypt and this affair became quite well known in London. They did not, the two of them did not really keep it very much of a secret. I mean he was, they were seen together a number of times and the interesting thing is that Churchill didn't really seem to mind it at all. He didn't talk to Pamela about it but she thought he, he knew and I think one of the reasons Churchill was a very pragmatic man. He loved his son very much. His son was very difficult, he understood that. He understood that Pamela had a difficult time with his son. But the bottom line is that he cared about his country most and that he thought that it was good for his country that Pamela have a relationship with Herriman because Pamela told him everything Herriman told her. So I think there was a certain pragmatism going on. The relationship that Linet had was quite different. He fell in love with Churchill's daughter, middle daughter Sarah, who is an actress who is separated from her husband. Wynot was quite a bit older than Sarah. He was married himself but the marriage had been very strained I think for a number of years and his wife was not with him in London and he fell madly in love with her and she with him and she never told her father anything about. In fact they never talked about the affair. I'm sure that Churchill probably knew but nothing was ever said. They were very discreet. They did not go out together. They, it was, it was a true. I think they really were very, very much in love and you know, God knows, you know, how Herriman and Pamela felt about each other but, but it was in the water, it certainly was in the air in London it happened a lot. So we talked about wine and Herriman eventually later in the war was sent to Soviet Union as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and when he left, Pamela immediately took up with Edward R. Murrow and had an affair with him. Murrow was also married but fell for Pamela, so that affair continued through the.

Greg Jackson (65:12)

Rest of the war.

Dawson McCroft (65:13)

Lynn, this has been incredible. I have so enjoyed hearing your insights and I feel like I know a lot more having heard them from you. Thank you so much for joining us today.

Lynn Olson (65:22)

Thank you so much for including me. I really had a good time too.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (65:25)

Well, my friends, that wraps up this epilogue episode. My thanks to Professor Cormack and Lynn Olson. I'll see you back here soon for a special Halloween episode about Orson Welles. 1938 panic inducing war of the Worlds radio broadcast, a special conversation with filmmaker Ken Burns, and then we're into the.

Greg Jackson (65:45)

Pacific and the, if I may quote.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (65:47)

Blatant and deliberate attack on Pearl Harbor. And don't forget that right now you can listen to two extra stories narrated by me about Edward R. Murrow's dramatic live radio broadcast during the London Blitz and another about American Ambassador Wynnett convincing striking British coal miners to get back.

Greg Jackson (66:04)

To work for their king and country.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (66:05)

You can access those exclusive stories and more by visiting htdspodcast.com membership or by clicking the link in the episode notes to start a free seven day trial. History that Doesn't Suck is created and.

Greg Jackson (66:22)

Hosted by me, Greg Jackson.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (66:24)

Special thanks to episode co host Professor Cormac and author Lynn Olson. Episode Produced by Dawson McCroft with editorial assistance by Ella Henriksen Production by Ayership Sound design by Molly Bach Theme music composed by Greg Jackson Arrangement and additional.

Greg Jackson (66:39)

Composition by Lindsey Graham of Airship For.

Professor Lindsey Cormack (66:42)

A bibliography of all primary and secondary.

Greg Jackson (66:44)

Sources consultant in writing this episode, visit.

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Greg Jackson (67:05)

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Greg Jackson (68:32)

Weeks where I'd like to tell you a story.