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We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created. As a member of Congress, I get to have a lot of really interesting people in the office, experts on what they're talking about.
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This is the podcast for insights into the issues.
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China, bioterrorism, Medicare for all. In depth discussions, breaking it down into simple terms.
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We hold.
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We hold.
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We hold these truths.
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We hold these truths.
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With Dan Crenshaw. The eagle has landed.
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Welcome back to hold these Truths. Greatest podcast ever. Give us five stars. Today we're, we are talking national security. I know that's a frequent topic on this podcast, but, you know, the thing is, the first hundred days of Trump's presidency, a lot of it has been focused on foreign affairs, national security, his deal with Ukraine, attempt to deal with Russia, dealing with the Middle East. There's just, there's just a lot of fires to put out around the world and the President's working hard on it. So there's just a lot of updates to give you guys. So today I brought in one of many experts on the, on the, on the topic, as we always do. Today we're excited to be joined by, by Bradley Bowman. Brad, thanks for being on.
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B
Thank you very much. Great to be here. Real honor. Thank you.
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A
I go by Brad.
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B
Brad works. Yeah, thank you.
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A
Yeah. Now, now he's the senior Director of the center for Military and Political Power at the foundation for Defense of democracies.
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B
And D.C. you have to have a really long title.
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A
Long title, Longer the better. Yeah, yeah. You have to have two cards.
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B
Yeah.
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A
Leading expert on US Foreign and defense policy, especially on security assistance and arms sales. So I think that's a really interesting topic. So why we had you. We're going to get to that. Like some of the details, the nitty gritty stuff. We'll start with, you know, just a little bit overview of the world and, and kind of get, you know, let's catch people up on, on current events and what's going on a little bit. And then let's talk about how to fix the defense industrial base.
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A little bit of your history. Served as National Security Advisor to members on Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee for years. Active duty US army officer, Blackhawk pilot, assistant professor at West Point. Deep understanding of how we manage arms sales and defense cooperation with allies. So let's dive into some critical topics. Brad, again, appreciate you being on, like I said, we'll, we'll get to, we'll get to what's real and what's not about, you know, Nicholas Cage's Lord of War.
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And how defense sales really work. You know, you've written a lot of interesting things about that, about how it benefits the U.S. but, like, just take a step back. So about the first hundred days of Trump's presidency, you know, would you. How do you. How do you assess that? How do you assess the term peace through strength? I've made my opinion known on that on this podcast many times. People could probably. Or regular listeners could easily repeat it. But what does it mean to you? And is. And are we doing it now? And compared to. Also to the mass last. The last administration.
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B
No. Thank you, Congressman. It's a real honor to join you and respect your service in uniform, your continued service here on the Hill, sincerely, and I'm really excited for our conversation.
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A
I just got an online certificate. That's what that is on the wall seal qualification. You just apply online. Nobody knows this.
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B
If half the things on your bio are accurate, then I'm still impressed. But thanks for admitting that. No, thank you for the question. The peace through strength idea, as the students of history listening will know, goes back at least to the Romans. If you want peace, prepare for war. And of course, Ronald Reagan was big on the idea. And.
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I appreciate that the Trump administration is kind of making their calling card this. It's a good place to start at the broadest level. Of course, the devils will be in the details. And one of the things that my colleagues get tired of me saying, but I think it just really kind of answers the who cares? Question. And that is when I survey, and I've been doing this for a while now in different capacities, when I survey the geostrategic environment in front of us, for me, I believe it's the most dangerous geostrategic environment that the United States has seen since 1945. And if someone doesn't believe me, then you can look at the congressionally mandated, bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission's report. Last year, I got the quote in front of me. They called it the most serious and most challenging since 45, quote, including the potential for near term major war. So I'm not sure a lot of Americans were busy paying the mortgage, raising our kids, living our lives. I'm not sure many Americans realize that. And when I look at the policies of the previous administration.
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I saw real distance between the policies we needed and those that were being implemented, including defense spending, which we may get to later. So, you know, I would rather send weapons to partners than send Americans to fight and die. And so that's really kind of my service pales in comparison to yours. But we both had people who didn't return from war. And this isn't a game of risk or Stratego for me. This is, is war and peace, life and death. And so I bring what I'd like to think is a sincerity and a passion, a sense of urgency of these issues. And that's what motivates my work at our center.
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A
You said something before we started recording like, you know, you believe that we're in the most dangerous geostrategic situation since 1945. And of course there's been some blips on the radar since 1945. Yeah, the Korean War, kind of a big one, but Cuban Missile crisis. So. But, but I think what you mean is just when you take all of the aggregate factors into account.
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B
Right, I do, but let me, I welcome any pushback that you want, but I mean if I look at China alone. Right. So if I look at the People's Republic of China alone, let's pretend that Russia, Ukraine, excuse me, Russia, Iran and North Korea are not issues, just China alone. They have a hostile political ideology, they have a large economy and they have an increasingly capable military that in some areas is more capable than our own. Two of those three things were true of the Soviet Union. They had a hostile political ideology, they had a formidable military, but they did not ever have an economy the size of China. So I think by that measure that China's more concerned to me just by looking at China. Yeah, yeah, it's just China alone. And then when you add to that what Russia's up to, what North Korea and Iran are up to, it gets scarier. And then we're undertaking a year long research project at our think tank that we're calling the Axis of Aggressors. Everyone's got to access this axis that I call them aggressors because that's what they all have in common. They're either currently engaged in aggression or they're threatening to do so. And we've documented since 2019 across five categories. Weapons development, proliferation, intel sharing, military exercises and military. Military. We've documented over 470 instances of cooperation among those four adversaries, making each of them have increased capacity, capability, resilience and readiness in their respecter ongoing spheres of aggression. So that's when I say the most dangerous. That's some of the thinking and analysis that's behind that.
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A
And I agree with that. It's just.
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I agree with it. Right. I, I don't, I didn't mean to.
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B
No.
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A
Seem like I disagree But I think it's interesting that one of the things you mentioned is that, you know, despite the fact, that fact being true.
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Americans don't act like it. To be fair, Americans didn't act like it before 1945 either. I mean, you know, it, it takes a wake up call. 911 was a wake up call to the global war on terror. Then of course, the American public quickly lost interest and trust and it's like, it's almost like completely forgot what even led up to that, what conditions led up to that, what kind of ideology led up to that. There's an increasing and worrisome trend. Although this trend has always been there on the left, it's very much alive and well on the right now. And that trend is this sort of self hatred, right, this self loathing for your own country and its policies. Now of course I'm being on the right, wouldn't say no. I love my country. I just hate my government and everything they do to protect me abroad. They're just wasting my money in lining the pockets of politicians and lobbyists and defense industrial and Raytheon and whatever. And it's like that's, that, that wasn't something you heard before. But now with, you know, like leaders like Tucker Carlson leading this kind of liberal form of Republicanism.
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It'S alive and well now. People are skeptical. That's okay. Skepticism is warranted. There has been screw ups, there's been this and that. And when you ask a typical person like, okay, were you getting this idea from. Sometimes they come up with examples like that that are, you know, and you're like, okay, well I get that, you know, you're not crazy to be upset about X, Y and Z or why we went into Iraq on the basis of weapons of mass destruction. Um, and then, you know, now were you lied to about it? Not exactly. Like, was there other factors at play at the time? And you know, you have to look at it through the lens of what they knew at the time. Right, but I get your frustration. Yeah, I get it. And I get your frustration that maybe it didn't feel like we had a great strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now I could have told you that our strategy was really simple. No more 9 11s. We accomplished it. But, but I can also acknowledge that the voters just never had any leader telling them that.
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B
Right, right.
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A
You know, I didn't get into the office until 2019, so I didn't get a chance to really help, help people, to explain this to people over time. So I get, I get the skepticism but, but there is a strong tendency, and you see this a lot with the Russian propaganda that gets repeated here in the United States of like, well, you know, I mean, this, this only is happening because of our fault. Right. You know, poor, like Putin's basically, you know, like, what the hell are we talking about? You want a question? As you were talking came to mind, we obviously know that Russians can take basically infinite casualties and just not care. That's just a. There is something deeply embedded into the Russian psyche that maybe is. Maybe it has made them survive for the, you know, as many hundreds of thousand years as, as they have.
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What do you think about the Chinese? Like, so would the Chinese be willing to take the kind of casualties that the Russians are taking right now consistently and for years to come? What is. I don't know what that is. One thing I don't have a good cultural insight into.
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B
Thank you. It's a really interesting question. And you're right. I mean, the tens of thousands of casualties that the Russians have suffered due to Putin's unprovoked naked aggression in Ukraine, it's extraordinary. And they're having thousands of additional casualties each month, as you know. And, and there's some discussion about, you know, what is more sustainable, Russia's offensive or America's support for Ukraine? And if I can just quickly put a little facto on the table before I get to.
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A
It's a tough question.
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B
Let me attempt to answer it. And then I want to answer your China question. I don't want to take us down on cul de sac. You don't want to go, but you hear a lot, oh, you know, we're giving so much money to Ukraine. We're doing this, we're doing that. Well, we actually did the math at our center, and this data is as of last September 30, but it's actually gotten lower. If you look at the US security assistance, Ukraine, it's equivalent to less than 2.8% of what we spend on the Pentagon over the same time period. So what are we getting for that? What are we getting for that?
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A
I've used higher numbers than that, although years have passed, so naturally that percentage must have gone down. So, yeah, because I've always said, I'm like, guys, it's 5% of our annual defense spending. And I didn't say annual spending, I said annual defense spending.
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B
I won't bore the listeners with all the details, but, but it's about 2 point. But by our 2.8, there's different ways to measure. So I think probably both our numbers are.
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A
Well, because also at this point in time, I bet 2.8% is a lot.
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B
It's, it's, and you have US US security assistance for USAI, so some of it goes via state, you know, so there's different ways to measure. So I'm sure both are.
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A
But the point is 2%, 5%.
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B
Right, right. So it's a very small percentage. And what are, what are we as Americans getting for that? We're dealing body blows to the conventional military threat Americans confront without putting a single US Service member in harm's way. We're decreasing the likelihood of a direct war between Russia and NATO, where you would have Americans fighting, most likely. And we're sending a very helpful deterrent message to Beijing that we're not neutral when it comes to naked aggression, thereby decreasing the likelihood of aggression in the Taiwan Strait. And I think that's what a lot of people get wrong. If someone's a China hawk, which I am. If someone believes we need to do more in the Pacific, which I believe, if you only cared about China, and.
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A
Most people do, most populists even.
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B
Yeah. I mean, if you look at the Reagan defense survey, that's an area of bipartisan consensus concerned about China in the Pacific. So I, I, yes, and yes, I agree. But if you don't care about Europe, NATO and Ukraine, which I think we should, but if you only care about China, 2.8% is a bargain for the benefits we're getting. And if you want to, if one wants to criticize with understandable reasons, 170,000 troops in Iraq at the high mark or 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, no more, never again. Right, right. There's no U.S. service members fighting in Ukraine.
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A
And I thought this was the middle ground we wanted.
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B
Right.
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A
And, but on point, that's where people get really bogged down. Your second point was that it decreases the chances of an, a full frontal conflict between NATO and Russia. I agree with you. However, the, that that group, who, you know, the critics do not. Right. They, they're like, it's the opposite because.
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B
They'Ve been fed lies by Tucker Carlson and others that the reason for this war is NATO enlargement, which is ridiculous. The reason Putin doesn't like NATO enlargement is because he likes to bully, coerce and invade his neighbors.
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A
Right, Right, exactly.
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B
Joins NATO.
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A
That's why he's threatened by enlargement, because it doesn't, it makes it harder for him to conquer.
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B
And if people are skeptical, what I'm saying, look at borders where you have a NATO member country adjacent to Russia, and what do you see on the Russian side of the border? You don't see heavy fortification.
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A
Why? It's not like the word.
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B
Because Putin doesn't believe his own talking points that NATO is an offensive threat to Russia, which is completely ridiculous.
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A
And it's also literally not. It's in our doctrine.
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B
Right, right.
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A
So. And the other thing to point out is, like, look, if you have it your way, Tucker, and you let. And you let Russia just win because, you know, they're your buddies and you want them to win because you always want your friends to win. But let's imagine that, and let's imagine them just plowing through Ukraine, minimal losses, because again, we're assuming we just never even helped them. Let's, you know, let's assume extreme losses. Let's assume they win now, because, again, they don't seem to care about losses. And they've done a. A very impressive and admirable job of rebuilding their own defense industrial base to keep up with the fight, for sure. So now you've got a Russian army that now knows two things. It's on the border of four more NATO countries, many of which have ethnic Russian populations, that, you know, Putin has already made the argument that he needs to save them, just as Hitler made that argument back in the day. And he also knows that the west gives up on its allies, and I fear a very major. How would you call it, a miscommunication, a miscalculation, a geostrategic miscalculation in which Putin believes that America won't actually abide by an Article 5. Like, so, you see, they. He can invade the politics and get away with it, and now that's what leads to war, because I think we do abide by that, and he thinks we won't. And so he gets us into this mess that neither of us wanted.
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B
It's such an important point, and a wonky word that dorks like me use too often is deterrence. But it's worth just spending a minute thinking deterrence. Is it not what I think or you think?
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A
I thought you were gonna say something cool. Discombobulated.
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B
Give me 30 seconds. It'll be cool.
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It's not what we think. It's what our adversaries think about two things, Our political will and our military capability. And you can be the biggest bodybuild in their gym, but if no one knows that, no one believes you're gonna throw a punch. The muscles don't matter.
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A
Yeah.
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B
And. And so.
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If we're not willing to spend less than 2.8% equivalent to what we spent on the Pentagon to help the Ukrainian men defend their men, women, children in their homes. Then why would they believe we're gonna send thousands of Americans to fight and some of them die in the Taiwan Strait, thereby increasing aggression? And everyone talks about NATO and Article 5, right? And it's like, oh, like it's some self reinforcing thing. It's not. When someone walks into the Oval office and says, Mr. President, we have a Crimea style invasion in the Baltics happening right now. What do we. If Vladimir Putin believes that whoever's sitting at the desk at that moment won't send American forces, you make the invasion more likely. So their perceptions of our political will are very, very important. I agree with you.
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A
It makes it absolutely more likely. And geopolitics isn't different from barroom politics. I call it my like bar room politics. I forget what I called it. It was smart when I wrote it down. Yeah, it's the bar room theory. It's individual. The way bullies interact at an individual level within a, within a confined space is the same way that countries interact. It's really not different. Okay, so let's.
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B
Yeah, so I didn't answer, I didn't answer your China question. You still want me to answer that?
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A
Yeah, it's just an interesting. The. Never thought of it before, honestly, until we're having this conversation.
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B
Yeah, I mean, there's this idea of democratic peace theory that democracies tend not to fight each other. If that's true, and to the degree that it is somewhat true, it's because theoretically at least, that governments that are accountable to the people don't like to take lots of casualties. And so if you're an autocracy, an autocrat, an authoritarian thug, and you have more insulation from angry mothers who lost their children in a war of choice, then theoretically you're going to very be happy to send thousands of Russians to casualties. And I suspect because China, the People's Republic of China, is also an autocracy, an authoritarian government, that we would see. My prediction, my humble prediction, would we see a similar dynamic with China. And if one looks at the Korean War, if we look at how China behaved in the Korean War, where we had human waves going at our forces at Chosin Restaurant, we had the disaster of Task Force Smith, going back to your earlier point in 1940, one year before Pearl harbor, we were spending 1.9% of our GDP on defense. And then it exploded to over 35%. And we see this time and time again. And it reminds me of Marshall's famous quote, which I'm paraphrasing. Paraphrasing. When I had the time, I didn't have the money. When I had the money, I didn't have the time. And you know and I know, and some of your listeners may know, is that even if we're spending the perfect amount on defense right now, it's going to be one to five years before that starts to manifest itself in terms of combat readiness. And so, anyway, to answer your question, I worry that in a major war that Xi Jinping wouldn't give a blank about how many Chinese are dying and Americans proudly.
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A
He's got too many men. Yeah, demographically, anyway.
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B
Yeah.
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A
If you want to really get down a conspiratorial rabbit hole. They designed Covid to deal with their own demographic problem. I don't think they actually did. There's no evidence for that. But.
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Is suspicious that Covid kills unhealthy people and old people. And that is exactly China's problem.
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B
My colleague Craig Singleton, who leads our China program at ftd, just published a major report on biowarfare issues that touches on some of what you just talked about.
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A
And obviously, I don't even believe my own conspiracy theory, but mostly because China had a zero COVID policy, which also gets into an interesting conversation about how they're really not 10ft tall, because how stupid is zero COVID policy? I mean, I thought even the mitigation we took on the United States was deeply stupid and misguided, and we've hit that topic plenty, but they went way, way further than we ever considered going.
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And, you know, and I guess what I get from that is, and I heard, I heard at some point, like, they were literally disinfecting airplane runways, you know, and now maybe that was just a job program.
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But it speaks to a degree of stupidity and bad decision making that is also inherent in a dictatorship because they lack that kind of, that public discourse that sort of, that is messy, but at least brings out and, or calls out bad ideas, hopefully prevails with the good ideas. They don't have that. I mean, you talk to some experts on China and they'll, you know, there was like, rolling blackouts at one point. I mean, just massive, massive losses in electrical grid power. And a lot of people were like, you know, there's a really good chance, and we think that Xi Jinping doesn't even know it happened because they'll, because they'll insulate him from bad News like that. So they're not 10ft tall, but they're definitely a problem. And when you're talking about Taiwan, well, I mean that's, that's their backyard. It's easier to defend, to defend your backyard than it is to do whatever else they want to do. And that makes it of course harder for us as well. And I think we have to rethink our, our entire strategy and like what weapons we build. And that's maybe. So we'll segue into the procurement and arms sales issues as we move forward. You know, one of the things I've noticed and you know, I'm not on the Foreign affairs committee, so I don't deal directly with the whole arm sales thing and I'm not even on hask. I just, but I'm on the intel committee, so I don't deal with it super closely. But I do know that, you know, I remember Chairman McCall telling me, he's like, I signed off on these weapons because actually the chairman from that committee signs off on weapon sales. I signed off on, I think he was talking about harpoon missiles. I'm not sure what he was talking about, but it's like I signed on three years ago and it like still hasn't been delivered. Yeah, like, so why, what is going on?
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B
Yeah, no, I mean a harpoon missile.
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A
For instance, is an anti ship missile.
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B
Right. If you ask. So deterrence failed in Ukraine and we've seen the, the cost, tens of thousands of people dead. If, if deterrence fails in Taiwan, the cost could be much higher, especially including for Americans. And so if you ask me what are the two or three systems I'd love for Taiwan to have yesterday? And I don't take any money from the defense company building, so I'm not shilling from them. I'm saying it because I actually believe it is the Harpoon coastal defense system because and for the listeners, this is just, it's an ability to sink Chinese ships from a ground vehicle that can move around. Therefore it's hard to detect and target. And that's the idea. So it's funny you should mention harpoon because in our Arsenal Democracy monograph that we just published in April, we mentioned that specific case and here's the shocking details.
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A
So who's building them and why aren't.
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B
They building more of them? So I mean, check out. This will just demonstrate what's so wrong with the system and why Trump's executive order is so needed. The time it took real quick.
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A
Trump's executive order.
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B
So Trump has issued many Executive orders, two that are relevant to our discussion. The one that I referenced was on how to reform our defense sales process. How we can expedite delivery to partners like Taiwan. Thank you. Sorry. But on harpoon, the time it took from congressional notification to signing the contract. So not even bending a single piece of metal to as congressional notification to signing the contract was the same amount of time as from Pearl harbor to D Day.
- [23:12]
A
Yeah.
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B
Okay, so if you and I are sitting here saying China's number one threat, we got potentially a major aggression or War in 2028 and we got to provide, then why the blank is it taking so long for the Pentagon to get the contract signed? Now there's.
- [23:28]
A
So to be clear, that's about two years.
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B
It was like two and a half.
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A
Everyone knows the exact dates of Pearl Harbor.
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B
Yeah, yeah, yeah. So.
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Right, so Pearl Harbor, December 7th.
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A
That'S an administrative, that's an administrative exercise that took two and a half years.
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B
So I mean, stop me if I get too much detail, but so a country or partner says I want the system, it goes to the State department and about 95% or so go quickly in a matter of days, about 5%. Don't you, don't you have internal disagreement among the bureaucracies? The Paul Mill bureau versus the human rights folks. They don't agree. No one's designated to adjudicate. This sits there forever in those cases.
- [24:04]
A
Is that, is that maybe a reform that needs to happen?
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B
Yeah, it's one of 18 recommendations where there is legislative tax to address it. It's really where Congress you have, you say these are our priority partners. You have a time bound process. You have to make a decision. Yes or no.
- [24:18]
A
It would be useful for me as I look at the cartel issue because I want to get weapons to Mexico.
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B
Yeah, I know.
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A
And that's, that's where those human rights folks, State Department really get in our way.
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B
Yeah, yeah, I know you've been a leader on that and a lot of what we're talking about.
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A
I'd like a copy of that legislation.
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B
Yeah, yeah.
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I'll give you my business card. I'll be. But, and so you have, so you have some sitting there in the State Department forever. That's a problem. And then we'll talk about the different ways.
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A
Was that a problem with this one?
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B
It's been a problem during the Biden administration. It's too early for me to assess with, with partners like Israel, it's, things are moving very quickly. I think generally speaking it's much less of a problem or Almost no problem.
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A
But, you know, because there's no reason that Democrats or Biden would have had any problem arming Taiwan. Right? I mean, no, no, no.
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B
Most of it was related to other countries or. And so forth. But the point is, is make a decision. Make a decision. And then Congress, as the Article 1 branch of government should have some oversight over there. And there should, you know, priority partners and a time limit and a person like, you know, just. It's a military concept. Who's in charge, hold them accountable, make a decision. So that's one. And then for foreign military sales, where you actually have the Pentagon. It's kind of odd when you, you say it in foreign military sales, one of these four processes we'll talk about. The Pentagon actually contracts on behalf of the foreign partner with American industry.
- [25:38]
A
Yes.
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B
And that contract, as you know, and the contracting process takes forever in many cases and for all kinds of reasons, including something called bundling. We talk about. So State Department delays, in some cases, Pentagon contracting process, major source of delays. And then the leading source of delay is insufficient defense production capacity. You know, because when.
- [25:59]
A
So even if the bureaucrats get it. All right.
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B
Yes.
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A
And if we could just focus on the harpoon system.
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B
Yeah.
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A
Because again, that was my understanding is.
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B
Yeah.
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A
That was signed off again by chairman. Because it has to be signed off by the chairman here. Miners is my understanding. But that happened years ago. Which, which implies that State Department wasn't the problem years ago. They approved it. But so it implies that the problem is we're just not producing them and getting them over there.
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B
And what is that?
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A
The contracting.
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B
Well, it's a great anecdote to kind of explore the larger problems. In the case of the harpoon, the Pentagon had just recently done a contract for harpoon missiles just previously. So I mean, yeah, different partner, but they could have copy and pasted a lot of it. So it makes the delay even more recent.
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A
Partner.
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B
I forget. I don't want to. I don't want to. I don't want to misquote. Who else needs harpoons missile systems.
- [26:52]
I don't want to miss it.
- [26:53]
A
Who else is on the verge of a maritime invasion?
- [26:57]
B
No, exactly. And I was going to say this later, but I'll say it now and drive me back to the original question. But, you know, we have this idea of first come, first serve in our arms sales. And first come, first serve works well in McDonald's. Like if the person behind you gets their Big Mac first, we get pissed. It seems unfair. But here's a crazy idea. When I First started saying this three or four years ago. I got all this, These condescending pats on the heads from State Department lawyers. And here's the statement. Well, first of all, why is the State Department listeners? Might be, why is the State Department even involved in arm sales? Isn't that a Pentagon thing? The answer to that is someone long ago decided that arm sales an important tool of foreign policy. So the State Department.
- [27:35]
A
Yeah, I don't have a problem with that. I don't necessarily have a problem with that.
- [27:37]
B
No, I don't either. I don't either. I agree with it. But if we have a national security strategy and a national defense strategy, shouldn't we periodically look at the delivery queue and say, sorry, Morocco. God bless you, Morocco. We know you want this weapon. Sorry, yeah, sorry, Spain.
- [27:54]
A
I.
- [27:54]
B
We don't want thousands of Americans dying in Taiwan state in 2020. We're going to move Taiwan up the line. We know you're going to be pissed, but here's three things.
- [28:01]
A
Now, the president could just do that.
- [28:03]
B
Well, yes, it's a political will thing. And I was told for years, can't do it, can't do it, can't do it. Well, news flash. The Biden administration did it with Ukraine. Proving my case that if there's a political will, you can do it. Now, Morocco's gonna be angry, and others will be saying, mmm, if I buy from the Americans, they're gonna push me down the queue, too. I get it. Maybe, maybe. But interim. Hey, Morocco, we're gonna give you an interim.
- [28:23]
A
Fingers can't be cheated.
- [28:24]
B
We'll give you an interim capability to make you feel a little better, make you a little less angry. Hey, maybe we'll do more military exercises with you, and maybe we'll rotate some American units through there. Tell me what your threat is. We'll take care of that. Don't worry. But I'm sorry, it's more important to get it to Taiwan.
- [28:38]
A
What is their threat?
- [28:40]
B
I just. I just picked Morocco. Okay. Okay. Yeah.
- [28:42]
A
Okay. So they don't actually have.
- [28:45]
B
No, no, I just. I picked Morocco. I'm like.
- [28:47]
A
I'm like.
- [28:47]
B
I tried to.
- [28:48]
A
Maritime invasion.
- [28:49]
B
I tried to pick something not in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East. And.
- [28:52]
A
Yeah, but.
- [28:53]
B
But the point is. And so periodic, maybe annual. Look at the delivery queue and say, is this aligned with our national security interests? Our national security strategy, national defense strategy. You'd think I was saying, you know, something crazy. I don't think that's crazy. And so that's one example of prioritizing arms Deliveries to align with our interests and our strategy.
- [29:12]
A
Again, focusing on this particular Harpoon missile system problem.
- [29:17]
Do you have any more insight?
- [29:18]
B
Yeah, I do. So industry had a. Industry tells me, let me be uber precise. Industry told me that they had a means to expedite the design and delivery and the last administration did not take them up on it.
- [29:30]
A
It.
- [29:31]
B
So I keep saying 2027, 2020. The truth is no one knows when China is going to roll the dice against Taiwan. Xi Jinping may not even know. And it's going to be based on what probably his military advisors are telling him about how hard this will be and what the Americans will or won't do. We don't know. He may not know until the day he wakes up. But I want to push that further and further in the future so that ideally it never happens. But if you look at the Harpoon coastal defense system, according to our latest numbers that I've seen, it may not even be delivered until 2029. That could be the year after the 2028 number that a lot of us have been looking at. So if that doesn't demonstrate some of the problems we were talking about, I don't know what does.
- [30:09]
A
How is that possible? I mean, what is so hard about building it the thing we've already built?
- [30:15]
B
Right. So often the partner takes too long to make their decision. The State Department delays, the contracting delays and then insufficient defense industrial based production cost capacity. Those are the four primary sources of delays, both here and more broadly.
- [30:29]
A
But in this case, again, it's like it's been approved. Right, but, but then you just told me that the Biden administration actually did not approve their.
- [30:37]
It's just super confusing. Yeah, yeah, so, so they didn't approve. What's the company that makes B.O.
- [30:43]
B
I think Boeing.
- [30:44]
A
Okay, so Boeing, so whatever. Approve the, the contractors, I guess, proposal.
- [30:53]
For a thing that has already been decided upon.
- [30:57]
And did they go back and say, hey, fix your proposal this way or.
- [31:01]
B
Just, you know, I don't want to be flippant or cute. I mean there are details here, there are lawyers involved. But if we really believe what we're saying about our interests in the Pacific and the threat to Taiwan, then you make it happen. You make it happen. And there's a training of contracting officers element here. There's the incentives and disengages. Incentives. I mean, you know, from military experience, people respond to incentives. And if you make one mistake and you're never going to get promoted again or you, you know, or you know, then, then everyone's going to be paranoid and they're going to do everything in triplicate and everything's going to go slow. We have to incentivize reasonable risk taking and speed. And that's one of my problems about the efficiency initiatives. Stop me if this is not interesting focused on the Pentagon. Does the Pentagon waste money? Absolutely, yes. But in this moment, it feels like to me we're kind of in a late 1930s moment. And for my part, I think we need to be focusing on combat readiness, speed of delivery and production capacity. And anything that undercuts any of those three, I think is exactly the wrong approach at the worst possible moment.
- [32:03]
A
Yeah. Okay, so in this case, harpoon missiles, I mean, let's say President Trump reverses President Biden's tepidness and says, look, just build it, just build as fast as you can. What is the industry's capacity to build, you know, this specific weapon?
- [32:18]
B
You know, I would want to talk with the industry, not speak. But one of one of the 18 recommendations we talk about, and you might appreciate this is when the budget request comes over every year from the Department of Defense to the Armed Services Committee. They request, hey, I want to buy this many long range anti ship missiles or this many of attack guns or this many precision strike missiles, whatever. And then you have staff sitting here. Okay, that's nice. That number seems good. Well, according to about a year ago, when we looked at this based on reasonable assumptions, we would run out of long range anti ship missiles about two weeks into the war. Because what we were consistently doing for years is we were buying just the minimum amount necessary to keep the production line going. Right. And kind of like a just in time model that works well for Walmart but maybe for not national security. And so what I, what we argue, me and my colleague Ryan Brobst, is we argue that whenever they come over, whether it's a weapons system or ammunition, the Department of Defense should be forced by Congress to say here's the max production capacity for the following fiscal year. And any case where they're not asking for at least 80% of that max, they have to justify it. If you say we're the most dangerous since in 1945, if you say we might have worn the Taiwan Strait, why the blank? Are you not buying the maximum available quantity? And I want to plan for increasing that maximum production capacity for the following year.
- [33:34]
A
Yeah.
- [33:34]
B
And the article, one branch of government act like the ark of one branch government. Thank you for your analysis. But we think you're wrong to be only buying this many long Range, not because we're parochial or hacks, but because we don't want a war that we could have prevented. Thank you very much. Let's buy more and buy the max and tell us how to increase it by double the following year. That's not currently in the budget request and I think it should be.
- [33:55]
A
Yeah, that's a problem. And that creates the disincentive for the industry to invest what they need to invest into those production lines which, which.
- [34:04]
B
Goes right to multi year procurement. Another thing that Congress has a leading role on. So we, we saw the, the Armed Services Committee authorize the use of multi year procurement. The listeners, what the heck is that? We want industry on their own to invest in research and development, science and technology and production capacity. Not on the taxpayer dimes, on their own dime. But you know, I ran a lemonade stand, I'm not a business expert. But you don't make those investments unless you have predictability of demand. And if with this continuing resolution crud, you know, the failure to pass appropriations before the beginning of the fiscal year, they don't have that predictability. But if you give them that predictability, hey, we're going to buy this system for the next five years and you can count us buying at least this much, then they will make those investments so that when the next, I don't know, the largest war in Europe since World War II happens, Putin's invasion, you turn to our dib and you don't find it lacking because you have this private investment and they've built a defense industrial race capacity. And this relates to the topic of defense sales is like, you know, army demand for tanks and one tanks goes up and down. You know, Navy demand for this goes up and down. The beauty of arms sales is that when you sell to another country, it keeps sustainable demand and gets you through those trough periods. So that when the Marine Corps comes back and says oh shoot, we need this, we know we haven't bought any for three or four years. The personnel are still there, they're still trained, their production line is still active because they've been selling, selling to foreign partners. It helps us.
- [35:26]
A
I see, I see. We're getting that. Yeah, like a way to, a way to keep the production lines going without us just, just kind of funding it, just to fund it.
- [35:33]
B
I mean we don't want to just, I mean sell it to Alex. I mean I would make an argument that we should do that for ourselves. But the beauty is we don't have to waste money because we just simply by selling to partners, it dampens the troughs so that it's there when our DOD's demand returns 1, 3, 4, 5 years later.
- [35:50]
A
And then so I mean, what's the pushback to that?
- [35:52]
B
So the pushback often has come from appropriators, if I'm just being respectfully blunt. So we had the authorization for multi year procurement, which that and a quarter doesn't even get you a cup of coffee at Starbucks because you have to have the appropriations to do it as well. And patriotic hard working appropriation members and staffs will ask questions like, well, to appropriate money for that munition, I need to see that we're going to have, you know, 3 to 5% savings before I want to appropriate for that. And I don't really want to give up my annual oversight of that, which I understand, I'm all for the Article 1 branch of government, but here's my point. You and I pay money to Amazon to get something delivered quicker to our home because sometimes getting it quickly is the most important thing.
- [36:35]
I'm repeating myself that we're in a moment of urgency and if we have to spend 3% more to get something faster than, so be it. So thank you appropriators. I'm all with you on saving money. But you know what, sometimes you just want to get it faster and you want industry to invest and you do that with multi procurement. So even if the Pentagon can't show you that 3% savings, who cares? It's the late 1930s.
- [36:57]
A
But on the other hand it's like we, we always get the Pentagon's budget request and we always give them a higher number. Like because I see what they give, you know, and I, I work the defense intel enterprise, you know, that's, that's, I'm the chairman of that subcommittee on intel. So I see that portion and, and I'm like what do you guys need? What do you need for this, this and this. And they'll give me a number. I'm like what? No, that can't be right. I mean, because I want you to do all these things. You need more money to do it. This is, this is nuts.
- [37:25]
B
Yeah.
- [37:26]
A
And so on the one hand I'm like, well thank you for being fiscal conservatives and you know, kind of lowballing your ass. I appreciate that. On the other hand we in Congress tend to, tend to, tend to plus up those numbers. So.
- [37:41]
I guess it's case by case it is plus up the top line numbers. But I think what you're saying is appropriators Won't plus up. Some of these multi year contracting programs that we really need to be plusing up is that.
- [37:52]
B
Yeah, no, I mean I work for.
- [37:53]
A
Is there at least some cases where we do do that?
- [37:56]
B
Where we do what?
- [37:57]
A
Where we, where we, where we do that multi year funding.
- [38:00]
B
Yeah, yeah, no, absolutely.
- [38:01]
A
Some systems we do.
- [38:02]
B
We have done it. And I'm not saying that we haven't. I'm just saying that, that the reluctance that I've seen over time often came from appropriators who are asking not evil questions about savings. You have, what savings are going to. I'm not saying that's evil. I'm just saying in this moment there's something more important and it's speed.
- [38:17]
A
One of the more interesting things about Congress is like, you know, NDAA has and until we authorize things. But there's, there's an immense amount of power in the appropriations for sure that people don't really quite understand. I didn't quite understand it, I think when, until I spent a few years.
- [38:33]
B
Yeah.
- [38:33]
A
And then got me thinking maybe I should try and get a spot on Hack D because then I could really like.
- [38:38]
B
Right. I had.
- [38:39]
A
That would allow me to like do everything I need to do. But you know, it's also just, you can just have good relations with those guys.
- [38:47]
B
You'll appreciate this. When I was working for Senator Kelly Ayotte, we, we passed, we got legislation in the National Defense Authorization act, the annual defense bill, saying that DoD couldn't buy a particular air and defense system because it sucked. And then I was, you know, I was a little proud of myself. Oh, look at that. We got it in the NDA. And then here comes the appropriators and they're funded. I was like, can they do that? And that was, that's where I learned that yeah, they can do that. Because when Congress speaks last, that's what's definitive. And so that's why the appropriators often will have so much power.
- [39:13]
A
Yeah, they put them, they put the money that can be authorized. Yeah, there's zero money.
- [39:17]
B
Exactly. Which goes to my point earlier, procurement. But if you don't appropriate it, what's the point?
- [39:22]
A
Well, it's interesting too is that makes, it's another like interesting civic discussion that I've always had with people because we get this, this discussion happens a lot in Congress and the Republican conference. Like, you know, we've got to take a look at everything and see what's not authorized. But it's still getting funded because on the other the Other side of that coin with appropriators, they tend to appropriate a lot of things that are not even technically authorized right now. No, I'm not sure. I have a huge problem with that because in my opinion, once we, once Congress votes on that bill to fund something, to me, that's a de facto authorization.
- [39:55]
B
Right.
- [39:55]
A
It's not like it's unconstitutional. I mean, it's, it's a de facto authorization. We voted on it to do it. Does it. You know, there's a lot of people would argue, well, no, it also requires the committee of jurisdiction, in this case Armed Services, to also authorize it, or in our case, like, you know, reauthorizing the epa.
- [40:14]
B
Right.
- [40:15]
A
In statute. And there's, you know, there's an effort to do that. And then I think it's a bit disingenuous political rhetoric, to be honest, because it implies that, like, we're just allowing these illegal things to happen and they're not illegal.
- [40:30]
B
Right.
- [40:31]
A
Like you're appropriating it. That's a de facto authorization, in my opinion. But it's a, it's a just an interesting sort of civics side side piece there. What's also interesting about the Taiwan Straits, though, is so Harpoon missiles are important, you know, traditional weaponry that can sink ships, but they're probably expensive. It's an expensive way to sink ships. And what I do like about how the defense industry is thinking about this now and the DOD is let's, let's, let's, let's have a paradigm shift and let's take some lessons from Ukraine. And in Ukraine, the, the fight is won with thousands and thousands of cheap killer drones that can do just as much damage to a ship and even more because you send 500 drones at a ship, you know, they might have, they might have some kind of system to defend themselves against a Harpoon missile. I don't know how good those things are, but 500 cheap drones or surface autonomous jet skis with explosives on them. Right. Which is a thing.
- [41:30]
B
Unmanned surface.
- [41:31]
A
I mean, it's. The stuff that's happening in that space is very exciting.
- [41:34]
B
Yeah, no, it is. And you know, I looked at the gao, the Government Accountability Office, recent annual report on major defense acquisition programs, and I got the numbers here. 14 of the 31 that they looked at have had significant cost increases. And of the 25 programs, 15 had scheduled delays. And how's that relevant to your comment? That when you have companies like Anduril and others coming in, they're kind of unorthodox, then it creates competition. And to me, competition is a good. And that's the other I mentioned, you know, President, President Trump's executive orders I mentioned too. And the other one was acquisition reform. And as part of that, they're doing like a 90 day review saying, Tell me all the programs that are delayed and over budget. And you know, and are these what the Pentagon needs and are they serving? If not, let's cancel.
- [42:18]
A
By the time we get them, are they even going to be relevant?
- [42:21]
B
Right. And we move so slowly by the time the technology is outdated. And your point about the drones is so important. There's so much we can learn from Ukraine. And we have these main operating bases in the first island chain, and they're in a major war of China. They're just going to get pulverized. And we don't have enough air and missile defense in the Army. We don't have enough to protect our ports, our air bases. And that's why the US Air Force is looking at things like agile combat employment, which is this doctrine where they assume that once the shooting starts, the main operating base will get overwhelmed with cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and maybe drones, depending where it is, and so they won't be able to land. And so this is another reason why the harpoon is so important. Right. Because you're only going to sink Chinese naval vessels in two or three ways. It's going to be other ships sinking them, it's going to be planes, or it's going to be ground forces. And the more capability you have to sink ships, the more dilemmas you create for your adversaries that are difficult for them to solve. So they say today is not the day to initiate the aggression.
- [43:18]
A
Right. I mean, it's. If I were China, I would say that a maritime invasion and also.
- [43:27]
Maintaining the infrastructure that you actually want to take from Taiwan. Right. Without, you know, without destroying it. Pretty damn difficult.
- [43:34]
B
Yes.
- [43:35]
A
Especially from a. This is, again, you know, on the optimistic sides is why they're not 10ft tall. Like, they haven't fought a war.
- [43:42]
Nobody in, nobody who's currently serving in China has ever been in combat.
- [43:47]
B
That's true. But can I, Can I. One factoid that might interest you is I was talking about the acts of aggressors and how they're cooperating. And one of those five categories I rattled off quickly was military exercise. And you've probably seen this. We've had land force exercises in China up to the brigade level where you have Chinese and Russians training together. Now, I'm not saying that the Russians are not 10ft tall. We've seen that in Ukraine. But you have Russians sharing best practices from Syria, for example, with China. So you're right. China is not fought in major war going back decades. And we. I comfort myself a little bit with that. But the more they're working together, the more they're learning the tactics, techniques and procedures that will make them more effective if combat comes.
- [44:24]
A
Yeah. And that's a little scary by itself.
- [44:28]
B
Yeah.
- [44:29]
A
On foreign military. So I want to. What's the best way, you know, I'm going to put my go back to Latin America now. Again, one of my big priorities and trying to get everybody to listen is.
- [44:42]
Sort of doing what we did in Colombia, doing what we do in Ukraine, but doing it with Mexico. Now, this was a useless conversation to have just a year ago because it was Mexico that didn't want it. Yeah, that's changed quite a bit. And so with all these different avenues of how we actually deliver weapon systems. And you were a Blackhawk helicopter.
- [45:00]
B
I was. I'd be dangerous now. Many years ago.
- [45:02]
A
Well, that's, you know. Well, that's like what they, they, they want a lot more Blackhawks, for instance, now. You know, they want them for transport. They think they're close air support. I keep telling them those are not close air support platforms. And you could probably.
- [45:13]
B
Yeah, yeah.
- [45:14]
A
I mean, they got a minigun on them.
- [45:15]
B
Yeah, that's right.
- [45:16]
A
They're a little easy to shoot down.
- [45:17]
B
Yeah. Give me an Apache if you want.
- [45:19]
A
Yeah. But they can't really maintain Apaches, so. So they have another. The Tejano platform.
- [45:23]
B
Yeah.
- [45:24]
A
You're familiar with. But anyway, you know, the point is, is we have to give them stuff. It's mostly aerial. It's. It's mostly the close air, so support transport and isr. And maybe for the first time ever, they would, they would take it if we just gave it to them. So what's our best. What's our best avenue to actually do that efficiently?
- [45:44]
B
Yeah, no, for sure. I don't know if it's legal here, but can I ask you a question? Because one of the first questions that I would have, and I'll be honest, I focus on some things related to China, Latin America. I haven't focused as much on Mexico. Do you believe that Mexico has the political will to use this equipment if we give that to them?
- [45:59]
A
Yeah, that would be because, I mean, they are currently using it.
- [46:02]
B
Yeah.
- [46:02]
A
So they're just every night going after cartel.
- [46:05]
B
So they need more capability. And then we'd want.
- [46:07]
A
That's why I said it was a waste of time a year ago. Yeah, yeah, let's. You know. So we're operating under the assumption that. Yeah, that has changed dramatically. And it's not really an assumption, it's what they've told you to my face.
- [46:17]
B
Yeah, yeah.
- [46:18]
A
I've been to Mexico State three times in the last couple years.
- [46:20]
B
So yeah, there before. I mean, I won't get too wonky here and cut me off if it's not helpful, but there's four primary mechanisms by which we could get capability to the Mexican government to go after these cartels which are killing Americans. As you know better than me. One is for military sales and that is basically what we just described, where they make the request of the State Department and then the Pentagon contracts on behalf of Mexico with American industry that would get them new stuff, advantages, new stuff. Lots of legal, logistical and sustainment support for them to maintain. That's the good part. The bad part is it tends to take a long time, as we've been discussing. The other is direct commercial sales. That's where Mexico would contract directly with the American company. So you bypass that whole slow glacial Pentagon process. You get new equipment and you can get it quicker. In some cases, something instead of taking six years, can take much quicker because you're bypassing the Pentagon contracting process. That's direct commercial sale sales.
- [47:15]
A
And when we do that, do we. Is there instances where we're still footing the bill for that? So.
- [47:20]
B
So the only way we would be paying for it is if there was some sort of fm. We got lots of acronyms, Alphabet. So fmf, Foreign Military Financing. So we do that with Israel, we do that Egypt, but with most countries we don't.
- [47:32]
A
And then they do the direct contract.
- [47:34]
B
So the FMF is just like American money. We give it to you Egypt, you buy our stuff. That's fmf.
- [47:40]
A
So.
- [47:41]
B
But FMS is, is the one I described earlier where it's basically the Pentagon contracting with American industry for Mexico. The other is direct commercial sales where Mexico is contracting directly with Boeing, Lockheed and OR will pick your company. A third one is eda. Excess Defense Articles. So when the Pentagon decides, hey, we don't need this anymore, they designate it eda. There's a statutory mechanism where it could be that excess equipment could be transferred to Mexico.
- [48:04]
A
That's a presidential drawdown.
- [48:05]
B
No, that's different. So that's eda. So that anything that's deemed excess. So what's key there is. You got it. The Pentagon's the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine says We don't need this anymore. And then the administration would have authority to transfer that.
- [48:16]
A
Do they have that authority without us in Congress?
- [48:18]
B
Yeah, it's already. It's already in statute. And if the President makes the appropriate designations, that can happen fairly quickly once. Once it's deemed excess.
- [48:26]
A
Yeah.
- [48:27]
B
And then the last one that you just mentioned, pda Presidential Drawdown Authority, which a lot of your listeners will be familiar with in Ukraine context. A large portion of what we sent Ukraine is PDA Presidential Drawdown Authority. It's an existing authority in law that allows the President, once there's an emergency declaration, up to a certain cap each year to transfer weapons from the Department of Defense's arsenal to a country. So that could be used for Mexico. That could be used for Mexico if the appropriate emergency declaration is in place and you haven't exceeded the annual cap, but that Congress could pass authorization to say, hey, you can go above the cap for Mexico. So they could extend that cap if they've already reached.
- [49:06]
A
Yeah, I'm just trying to figure out what our. As we write, what I call the North America First Security Assistance Initiative. Yeah, that sounds kind of familiar, right? Yeah, the Ukraine Security System Initiative, because I believe it's the right framework with which to do this rapidly. And I'm. I'm just not an expert enough on all those four categories on which the best way is to get. I know what they need. I know what the strategy is. Been studying this for almost two years. Yeah, it's just a matter of execution at this point.
- [49:32]
B
Frankly, if you know what they need, you and I, in about 30 minutes could come up. Come up with a strategy. But here.
- [49:38]
A
But now it's the administrative part that I don't quite.
- [49:40]
B
Right. But I mean, it seems like you're pushing on an open door with this administration in terms of understanding the threat from the cartels and wanting to do something about it. And so I think you're well positioned to kind of advance your leadership on the this issue is my assessment real quick. 30 seconds on PDA, and people at the Pentagon would be upset at me if I didn't say this. When we're transferring stuff from the Army's arsenal via presidential redoubt authority, that simply gives you the permission to do it. But we have to make sure going back to the appropriations discussion, that you're also appropriating the money to replace it, because if you don't replace it, then you're undermining our own security, which is.
- [50:15]
A
What we do with Ukraine. I mean, when we talk about the money spent in Ukraine actually going to the DOD so that they can then transfer weapons.
- [50:23]
B
Yeah, exactly. One of our 18 recommendations. Other 18 recommendations in here is that we need to make more aggressive use of presidential drawdown authority for Taiwan. But if we're going to do that, we got to make sure that we're appropriating the money to replace stuff in our own arsenals that's sent to Taiwan. Otherwise, we erode our own security and capability and capacity over time.
- [50:41]
A
So is that, you know, as we look at this problem for Mexico. Mexico, is that probably the most efficient way to think about it?
- [50:47]
B
I think, you know, once.
- [50:49]
A
I'm not sure that we have a lot of Tejano aircraft and I don't even know what.
- [50:53]
B
Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, you know, I would want. I would want to go system by system by you. Is it already in our arsenal or not? How is there excess defense are usually that's going to be. Not like major systems. So if you're talking about like, aircraft, EDA is probably not your option. PDA is more for, like, you know, artillery shells and things like, you know, things like that. But. But we've also used it for more significant system. So basically, if I know what they need, then you can look at each of these four and pick the one. And honestly, I wouldn't pick just one. If I would say this should be a comprehensive effort and you can use each of them. You could have an fms, you could.
- [51:25]
A
Have a D. That's why I want to write this into one bill.
- [51:27]
B
Right.
- [51:28]
A
Again, call it North America First. And it's almost like I love the label because people. People's major complaint about Ukraine and like. And it's a valid one. On. Yeah, at least. At least during the Biden administration, it was a valid one, which was okay, why. Why are we so concerned about their border but not ours? Yeah, that was a valid. That's a really valid question.
- [51:45]
B
It's a valid question. I argue we can do both.
- [51:47]
A
100 we can do both. That was always my answer.
- [51:49]
B
Exactly.
- [51:50]
A
We should be doing both. Like, just because we're not doing this doesn't mean I'm gonna, like, change my philosophy against this other thing. Two wrongs don't make a right for sure. But of course we can do both. Yeah. And. And we're just in a historic opportunity with the Trump administration administration and the Sheinbaum administration, and the only thing lacking is Congress. So we just established my. We sort of formalized my former task force into a task force within the intel committee that in, in my goal is to design exactly what I described, the North America Security Assistance Initiative. That, that is not just DoD and weapon sales from there. But, you know, there's a judiciary component. I mean, the biggest problem we have against the cartels is.
- [52:27]
B
Right.
- [52:27]
A
The Mexican judiciary system is broken. Well, we have, we have programs in place at DOJ and FBI that are specifically designed to send people down there.
- [52:35]
B
Yes.
- [52:35]
A
Train Mexican prosecutors, help them bring those cases. That's right. To their, to their final, you know, final end. You know, I've got the strategy. It's a coin strategy, it's a counterinsurgency strategy and, you know, it's just about executing it. And again, I'd love, I'd love to see some of the legislation that you guys have written because I forgot what it was we talked about earlier, but that would be very helpful.
- [52:56]
B
Yeah.
- [52:56]
A
In, in how we think about this at this point. We have run out of time though.
- [53:00]
B
Yeah.
- [53:01]
A
So I'm sure we could, we could nerd out on military acquisition. It's a problem that everybody knows exists, just like the solutions have eluded us. And I'm not sure any of us in Congress know what the solution is. Trump's executive order is a big help because it just at least gets people to like, you have to think about this, this. Now sometimes that's all executive orders are. Hey, go think about this.
- [53:23]
B
Right.
- [53:24]
A
Because like, you know, bureaucrats, they should have been thinking about it. The dod, but you know, it's still a nine to fivers. Like, you know, it's, it's easier just to kind of just keep going. Right. I'm deeply frustrated. I see a lot of really interesting Texas companies that are doing some amazing things. And I'm trying to, you know, but they're not the primes.
- [53:44]
B
Right.
- [53:44]
A
And they have a real hard time. They're like, look, we built this Cape code capability. It's freaking awesome. And, and like, we can't even get phone calls back.
- [53:52]
B
Right.
- [53:53]
A
You know, it's a very frustrating.
- [53:54]
B
No, I experienced that when I was working for a senator from New Hampshire and I'd go up there and, you know, yeah, we had BA Systems up there, but we also had a lot of small and medium sized companies and you couldn't afford lots of lawyers and lobbyists. And yet when I'd go visit them in the back of some strip mall, they had the most amazing technology that.
- [54:08]
A
Our war fighters needed and they'd already invested in it.
- [54:11]
B
Right. And they were doing it on their own because. Because they were patriotic and they Were smart. And it's like, and there's like, Brad, I don't know who to call. Help me. And so I took great pleasure as a senator, Senate staff for trying to help them. But, you know, I mean, you know, a lot of this acquisition stuff is complicated. Some of it's not. And the reason I am, and some.
- [54:30]
A
Of it for good reason. Like you don't want to just waste.
- [54:32]
B
A bunch of money. No, absolutely. We don't want our enemies getting the technology. There's all kinds of good reasons why we need to be careful about what we share with other. Of course. But my point is this is that if our defense industrial base. I told you there's three or four major reasons for delays. The biggest one by far is insufficient defense production. Why? Why? Because they respond to demand. And we have been. We are spending near Post World War II lows as a percentage of GDP on defense. If you want a stronger defense industrial base, spend more on defense. If you buy. What I'm saying that this is the most dangerous moment we've seen since 1945. Why the blank are we still spending, other than 3 years before 9, 11, less on defense than we spent since 1940 as a percentage of GDP one year before Pearl Harbor?
- [55:13]
A
But again, your other interesting point is that to make up for the fact that maybe we don't want to spend it for our current arsenal, make it easier to do foreign military sales so that it keeps these companies alive.
- [55:23]
B
And so those, so those small, amazing, small to medium sized, amazing companies in your district can sell to allies and partners, help secure our interest, reduce the burden on us and make them bigger, stronger, better, so that when DoD finally comes lumbering along, they're still there.
- [55:37]
A
Yeah, they're there and they're bigger, they're stronger and ready to give you what you need.
- [55:40]
B
And that's, that's why Trump's executive order on acquisition sells like, hey, hey, big primes, okay? Either deliver or not. And if you don't, we're going to go to some of these unorthodox people because unorthodox programs because they're going to deliver on time and on budget and that's what we value.
- [55:55]
A
Yeah, there's a lot of those we could talk about.
- [55:57]
B
Yeah.
- [55:57]
A
Brad, thanks so much.
- [55:58]
B
Thank you. I really appreciate it.
- [55:59]
A
Thank you.
- [56:00]
B
All right, thank you.