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- [00:00]
A
So right out of school, you spent two years at Washington St. Louis, one of the most storied investment offices in the country. What did you learn during those two years at WashU?
- [00:12]
B
So those are my first two years in the professional world and I had interned throughout college at a hedge fund. But you know, everything was still kind of very theoretical at that point from what I learned in undergraduate business school. And Washu was really drinking from the fire hose for two years. So I'd say the first thing I learned was the art and the science of investing. I, I started covering public markets when I was at Washu and we invested with long only public equity managers. We tended to favor very concentrated managers that did deep fundamental research, you know, very long term time horizon, kind of like that private equity style investing in public markets. And so I got a great training and just like really deep fundamental research. My, my managers there, my bosses started a book club. This was a great crash course in learning from some of the greats. And so we read Ben Grah and Philip Fisher and things like Margin of safety and 0 to 1. The other thing that I learned was about transition. And I saw three different chief investment officers during my first years at Wash U's endowment. I joined during the kind of tail end of the longtime tenure of Kim Walker, who had been there for almost a decade. And then when she retired, Eric Upin, who had actually run Stanford's endowment for a period of time and then later went on to run McKenna Capital Management. He was on our board. He stepped in to kind of steward the endowment while we looked for a full time cio. And Eric was there for about a year, kind of just steady as she goes. You know, we didn't do a ton of crazy stuff. And then we ended up hiring Scott Wilson, who came on and is still running the show now and has done an amazing job, but three different chapters during those short two years. And so I learned a lot about just resiliency and change and like just being in a workplace where people come and go. But it was amazing and really like learned a lot during the different kind of three chapters around, over those two years.
- [02:02]
A
And you around some of the best fundamental public investors at Washu give me a sense for do you believe that the market is efficient, whether in the long term, in the short term, and how do you look at the pricing of public assets?
- [02:19]
B
That's a good question. And this is something that, you know, in undergraduate like business school, you learn about this efficient market hypothesis and you learn about all of these like theoretical things. And you're taught in school that a lot of these things are like how the real world works. And you're kind of taught them as gospel. But then you get into the real world and you realize that nothing is black or white. And I think one of the biggest things I learned is that the market is often not efficient in the short term, or at least that's my belief. And I think that lack of efficiency in the short term creates longer term opportunities for investment. So the way a lot of our managers thought about it, the way I think about it is in the short term, the market can be inefficient and present, you know, whether it's pricing irregularities or just areas for really good long term investment opportunities. And I think in the long term, at least, my philosophy is that over the long term, the market is efficient. But, you know, it might not be efficient at any given time. But if you buy something that's mispriced or, you know, compounding over the long term, eventually that price should, you know, eventually reflect the underlying fundamentals of the business. It could take a year, it could take five years, but over a long enough period of time, those things should converge.
- [03:30]
A
Eventually the trading catches up to intrinsic value of the asset.
- [03:34]
B
Yeah, at least that was how we thought about it. And that's how I think, I think I still think about it today, you know, but again, it's hard to predict that time frame. And it's hard to predict like all of the, you know, incremental like inefficiencies that might happen in the interim.
- [03:47]
A
You spent some time under Scott Wilson, who's considered one of the top CIOs in the country. What makes Scott such a great CIO?
- [03:54]
B
Scott is very different than, I'd say a lot of the traditional archetypes for endowment cio. So, you know, the first thing is Scott had a very non traditional background. He was not trained by David Swenson or he didn't kind of grow up in the endowment world. He was actually a rates trader and spent a lot of time in Tokyo sitting on rates desks. And he had kind of a quant background. And I think this was actually a really good thing for him because it allowed him to come in and take kind of a first principle approach to endowment investing. Right. He wasn't influenced by the way things had been done for many decades beforehand. And he was able to kind of build his own approach. And so the first thing I would say is like he disregarded convention completely. You know, there was kind of a standard way this endowment model of managing a portfolio that most other endowment heads had embraced and by the way, that had worked really well for a lot of endowments. But Scott didn't really care what other people said or did and kind of built his own approach. One of the tenets of, I think like Scott as a CIO was he is just, he's completely ruthless when it comes to making manager decisions. And I, I don't mean that in a bad way at all. I think that's actually like absolutely critical to being an elite investor, but is really hard for a lot of people to do. There's a lot of psychological headwinds in this industry. If you're invested in a manager over the course of many years or even a decade, you become friends with the manager. There's a lot of close relationships. And I think it gets really hard to, you know, get off the train. And I think a lot of institutional investors are bad at putting in redemptions, are bad at, you know, not re upping in funds that they probably should get off the train. And Scott was really good at that. And so the first thing we did when Scott joined was we went through every asset class in our portfolio and we force ranked every single manager in every single asset class. There could not be a tie. There had to be a one and there had to be, you know, whatever the last number was, right? And, and what that did is it forced you to acknowledge and to admit, like, who are your really high conviction managers? Maybe we should give them more money. But also who are the low conviction managers and why are they still in the portfolio? And I think it was kind of close to Jack Welch, who was a longtime CEO of ge. Every year they would look at their workforce and they would fire the bottom 10% of their employees. I think Scott took a very similar approach that if something was in the bottom, you know, quartile or 10% or whatever it was of our portfolio, why is it there? And why do we still have capital with that manager? And every day we continue to have capital with that manager, was almost making a conscious decision that we wanted to be invested with that manager. And so he really, I'd say, forced us to look in the mirror and take a hard look at our portfolio and make those tough decisions and, and do it in a really objective way.
- [06:34]
A
It accounted for this consistency bias where by default you wanted to re up in a manager, but here his system was more an opt in where you had to force rank and you had to consciously make a decision who to cut. You didn't need exactly reason to cut somebody, you need a reason to keep somebody in.
- [06:52]
B
Exactly. And I think that's something that a lot of LPs struggle with. And look, it's, it's, it's really hard. Right? Like the default every morning when you wake up is you have an existing portfolio already and so like let that existing portfolio continue. And I think Scott's view is kind of the converse of that, which was, you know, like I said, every day you continue to have capital with that manager. You know, you should view that as like you're making a conscious decision to re underwrite that manager and have capital with them today. And if you would not invest with a manager today, then why would you still have capital with them even if you made that decision?
- [07:24]
A
The zero based budgeting type of framework. It's same with employees. If you wouldn't hire them again, why, why are they still at your firm?
- [07:31]
B
It's exactly.
- [07:32]
A
Lack of friction.
- [07:33]
B
Yeah. And it's, it's such a simple concept to understand, but I think it's, it's, it's really hard to actually do it in the right way. And I think a lot of LPs still get this wrong pretty consistently.
- [07:46]
A
How do you balance being very opt in conscious about your portfolio versus what people call relationship alpha or the alpha that comes from having deep relationships with managers.
- [07:57]
B
After Scott joined Washi's endowment, he did a podcast actually a couple years later and he talked about how they ruffled a lot of feathers others in those, in those first few years. And you know, I think a lot of, a lot of managers were unhappy with Scott, but you know, that was him coming in with a clean slate and wanted to rebuild the portfolio from scratch. When you know, Scott decided to commit to a manager and re underwrite a manager, you know, he would set expectations with them up front, like very much like, hey, this is why we're underwriting you. This is what you said you're going to do. And if you do it and you do it well, we will continue to be a great partner with you for a while. But if you don't, you know, like this is a business and we're going to move our capital somewhere else. And I think just being really objective about it, not being personal about it and setting expectations up front is really important. And if you're a rational investor, rational human, rational business person like you under, you should, you should understand that those decisions, while tough to make, like, are often the right decisions. And I think like the right managers did not take it personally and from.
- [08:57]
A
My understanding, Scott is very focused on finding the best in class athlete, the best managers, versus kind of trying to fit somebody in a box. Talk to me about that strategy.
- [09:06]
B
Yeah, so there's a few components of that. So the first thing I would say is Scott very heavily favored concentration both in, as, as we thought about the number of managers in the total endowment as a whole, but also as we thought about positions within our underlying manager portfolios. And so, you know, we called our manager roster a ton when Scott joined and really tried to, you know, concentrate capital on like our top manager ideas. But then going a layer beyond that, Scott would also want to concentrate in underlying positions within those managers. And so the way, like Scott's general philosophy as a whole was he didn't really care so much if, if, if an opportunity came from the public equity sleeve, the private equity sleeve, the real estate sleeve. Like, he took effectively this opportunistic approach where at any given time he wanted to concentrate capital on the best ideas, regardless of the asset class, regardless of kind of the end exposure. And so we would actually like spend time with underlying managers. And they started to do this a lot more after I left. I mean, Scott kind of joined at, you know, the tail end of my two year analyst program there. But we started to do this and we would, we would meet with our managers, we would go through their portfolio, we would talk to the managers about their highest conviction names within their portfolios, and then oftentimes we would do our own research on those names. And if we agreed with the manager where we had outsized conviction in a certain name, we would often increase our exposure to individual names within our portfolio. This was something that a lot of other institutional investors were not doing at the time. Right. Like the traditional endowment model is identify best in class managers who are great at their domain, give them capital and effectively like outsource your decision making to them. Scott had this perspective where we could do our own really good research. Not, not that we thought we could do research better than our managers, but we focused on like incremental research, incremental insights, leveraging their research and conviction and perspectives to maybe build a little more of an incremental perspective that would give us the conviction to, you know, to increase exposure to those individual names. And that concentration has really been a huge tailwind to Huachi's portfolio since Scott joined.
- [11:27]
A
You could think about almost as a counterbalancing factor to growth of AUM of some managers. So if you think about it from first principles, the reason that returns go down as Fund sizes go up is because deal flow does not scale in proportional with proportion with the increase in AUM. So let's say that the AUM goes up by 2x but the quality of deal flow goes up by 50%. So that incremental, you know, fourth of their portfolio is lower quality than it would have been in the previous fund. And said another way is GPS will, the GPS will never admit this, but gps have a grading system for every single opportunity. Now it might be A plus plus A plus, A A A minus, B plus and, and maybe, maybe no opportunity ever goes below B plus. Let's just, let's just give the benefit of the doubt. But there is a grading system. So by actually going double clicking, having the relationship and having the facetime with the managers, you could actually figure out you could double down on those A and A plus opportunities. Even forget about co invest and, and lowering of fees. That obviously moves the needle a lot as well. But just by re concentrating your portfolio, you could actually get higher returns than the underlying fund if you do it right, which is huge asterisk.
- [12:50]
B
Yeah, yeah, exactly. And like when I think about the traditional co investment model, I think it's more like reflexive and reactive and a lot of LPs, you know, they'll wait for a manager to come to them with an idea and the manager might say like, hey, like I've got excess allocation. You know, in this company that's raising a new round. It's, we have really high conviction. Do you want to participate? And LPs might often participate in that. Scott was very proactive about this, right? Like we would, we would, we would identify companies, right? And we would, we would spend a lot of time building those, building our own conviction in those companies. And you know, to your point, like, yeah, if we do a good job of that and Washu has done a good job of that, like that adds a lot of alpha to the portfolio. And you know, you could, you could also like take a step back and say, well like if managers had such conviction in their top ideas, why not just make, you know, size those bigger in their portfolio. We were already investing with very concentrated managers. I mean, you know, the managers in our long only, in our, in our long only public equity portfolio, they would sometimes already have 10, 15, 20%, you know, sometimes even more than that, 25% in their top name and often 50 to 75% of their portfolio in their top five or 10 names, right? And so they were kind of maxed out on concentration. But we really thought like, if you have such conviction in these names. Why shouldn't we have more exposure? And actually one of the projects, one of the last projects I worked on at Wash you before I left is we looked back at all of our public equity managers going back I think 10 years. We looked at the performance of, of their portfolios as a whole and then we compared each of their, you know, 10 year performance periods to the performance of their top one, two and three single names in their portfolio. And almost always those top names outperformed. It wasn't always like the top one name that outperformed the broader portfolio, but it was usually either a combination of the top one, two or three or some combination therein. And that really gave us the conviction that managers are generally good at sizing higher conviction bets better. And that I think also gave us the conviction to execute on the strategy where we would buy more of their top names.
- [15:01]
A
Change said another way you could be very confident on investment, but would you stake your entire career on it if you went over the ledge or would you stake little Johnny's college tuition on it? So you know, asking managers to take a career risk is such a high standard and there's somewhere between that and the average investment in the portfolio there's this alpha. So you might be very convinced on it, but not willing to stake your career on it. And they're still, that conviction is still valuable. A valuable LPN site.
- [15:32]
B
Yeah, exactly. And like, you know, look, if we, you know, we, yes, we had the conviction and in every position that we put more money in, but we would sometimes get it wrong. And I think the way to mitigate that risk was to still have exposure to the manager's broader portfolio. Right. It wasn't like we wouldn't invest in their, you know, number two to ten idea. We would, we would still have that through their core LP check in their, in their fund. We would just increase exposure to some of their best ideas as like a complement to that strategy.
- [15:58]
A
I'm still struggling to understand how do you operationalize a best idea strategy within the context of an endowment portfolio. So how do you go about taking that strategy and turning into practice?
- [16:08]
B
It's a really good question. So the first thing I would say is, and the first thing Scott did was prior to Scott joining, we were siloed by asset class. And so I worked on the public equity team. We had a hedge fund team and we had a private markets team. Right. And anybody working within one of those teams, all you did was work on that asset class. The first thing that Scott did when he joined was he got rid of that structure and everybody became a generalist and almost retrained and rewired us to think about not only finding the best ideas within a single asset class, but at any given time trying to find the best ideas in general. Right. And so we thought about this idea of like, everything should be competing for capital against everything. And at any given time, let's be opportunistic and flexible to put capital in the best idea regardless of asset class. And so I think like decoupling, you know, any individual from one asset class just gave us like the broader mental space to not only think, you know, again, about like the best ideas within a constraint, but like the best ideas in general. The other thing we did, and they started to do this a lot more after I left. But the Washu team is on the road, traveling all the time. They go meet with not only managers, but they're meeting with management of portfolio companies, like constantly. They're touring factories, they're talking to customers, they're doing that really deep primary research that a lot of other endowments don't do. And I think to execute this strategy well of really forming an opinion on individual assets, you can't do that without traveling and without doing this level of primary deep research that the Washu team does.
- [17:49]
A
Double click on that. So let's say I'm backing Bill Ackman in activist investing and he's. I'm sitting with him and he's saying this is my one or two best ideas. WashU would also go and essentially visit these companies, let's say they're private companies for simplicity. What are you trying to do? How are you trying to get better information than a Bill Ackman or choose your top quartile manager?
- [18:12]
B
So we didn't necessarily think about it as trying to get better information than the underlying manager. Right. A lot of it was we started from a place of one, validating the underlying manager. Because as an LP, you're really 2 degrees removed from the underlying asset, typically. Right. You're 1 degree removed from the manager, who's then another degree removed from the underlying asset. So a lot of LPs take whatever a manager says at face value and you have to believe them. But Washu did not ascribe to that. And I think we were like, very much we started with let's re underwrite the asset and build conviction in the manager's thesis. Right. So almost like testing what the manager told us and then from there seeing if there was any incremental value or insights that we could add. But we definitely did not think that we could do a better job of underwriting the asset than the underlying manager. It was like doing the work to kind of re underwrite it, understand their thesis, borrow a lot of conviction from them, and then see if we could add anything incremental.
- [19:10]
A
Another way to look at it is co investments. There's a lot of pressure to give co investments to large institutional investors. If you think about that from a first principles perspective, that pressure could lead to bad incentives and offering the incremental co investment that maybe is the average investment in the fund or maybe even sub sub average. But there's so much pressure to offer that that the GP may have no choice but to give kind of a sub sub average opportunity to lp. So you have to re underwrite that from your own perspective just to make sure that truly is a great opportunity.
- [19:43]
B
Yeah, exactly. And I think to your point, like in the co investment world, the biggest problem that LPs deal with is adverse selection, right? You have to understand, well, if this is such a great deal, like why am I seeing this, right? And, and I think that problem is more prevalent in the private markets where things are capacity constrained and, and less prevalent in the public markets where anybody can go and buy a security in the open market. But we did a lot of public markets, you know, almost co investing as well, where we would go and buy more of a stock, typically through an SPV that the manager set up to align incentives where they would, they would manage the asset. But it was, it was again, it was much more of that proactive approach or we weren't waiting for managers to send us an idea where, you know, who knew what the incentives were like. We were really going to them and saying, hey, let's, let's talk about your best ideas today. And even if you weren't planning on like actioning on them, let's create a structure where we can increase our exposure and align incentives at kind of the appropriate.
- [20:37]
A
So after Washu St Louis, you went to Bowdoin College. So considerably smaller endowment, but still today, couple billion dollars. What was the difference in Bowdoin vs. Washu St. Louis?
- [20:50]
B
There were a lot of, a lot of differences and some similarities, but both had done exceptionally well over a long period of time. And the first thing I observed at Bowdoin was just excellence. I joined at the end of Paula Valent's tenure. She had spent 20 years at Bowdoin and grew the endowment from something like 400 million when she joined to over $2 billion that was net of spending, net of paying out distributions to the college. So just an incredible track record. And I learned a few things from Paula. The first was kind of going back to this buffet adage of like, be greedy when others are fearful. And she aggressively leaned into venture capital in the early 2000s after the dot com bubble, when I think a lot of LPs had still had scar tissue and trauma. And you know, she, she wasn't at Bowdoin before that. And so in a way it was like fortuitous that she joined after this and had this amazing opportunity to invest like without the legacy baggage of, you know, major markdowns and that trauma from that bubble popping. But she was really greedy during that time and it worked out really well. And she was early in a lot of amazing Sequoia funds and other great managers. So definitely learned the be greedy when others are fearful. One big difference between Bowdoin and Washu was Bowdoin was a lot more diversified than Washu under Scott. So Scott had this really concentrated approach. Bowdoin had a lot of line items, a lot of manager line items, and Paula wasn't afraid to kind of try things out and if it didn't work, you know, redeem capital and kind of move on. And so, you know, what that resulted in was a much more diversified portfolio, but still a portfolio that generated exceptional returns. And so this kind of made me question convention a little bit or what I learned at Scott. And I think it made me realize that there are more than one ways to win in investing and it works for somebody, it might not work for somebody else. And another kind of good example of that was, you know, Scott was really allergic to macro managers, right? Managers that did not do fundamental research but took more of a tops down approach. And Bowdoin, especially under Paula, really leaned into that type of manager. Stan Druckenmiller, who's a Bowdoin alum, was, you know, on the board and investment committee and obviously famously ran Duquesne, which had done really well and was probably one of the best macro shops ever. And Paula leaned into that, you know, really leaned into his conviction. A lot of his network folks that, you know, had worked at either for him or at Soros and spun out. And those managers had done really, really well for Bowdoin over a long period of time. And so again, challenge, like some of my convention that, you know, maybe those didn't have a place in a portfolio and made me realize that actually they can't, you know, those type of managers can do very well. And again, goes back to this, like, one size does not always fit all kind of approach.
- [23:38]
A
What would you call Bowdoin's investment philosophy? How would you explain it?
- [23:42]
B
I would say very manager driven. And so, you know, we had somewhat less opportunistic than Washu in the sense that, like, we did have asset allocation targets and parameters and we did view our portfolio more in buckets, but it was very network driven. And so we would, you know, Bowdoin would get in deep in a network, whether it was Stan's network or a venture network, and just continue to compound within that network. And so being early to venture and investing in Sequoia's funds in the early 2000s meant that we got really close to. And this was before my time, but, you know, Paula got really close to the Sequoia team, built really deep relationships in venture, and then would back like people that came out of those networks and those networks compounded over those 20 years. And so we ended up being really early to a lot of great new funds that launched between 2005 and 2015, funds like Founders Fund and Andreessen. And. And I think, like, being early and like, really leveraging those networks to compound was. Was core to Paula's philosophy. And like, she really took advantage of those networks that she built to get really good access. And that was like, where I first really, like Scott was much more about the individual manager and like, underwriting them and being opportunistic. And Paula was very much about, like, we have this amazing access to these amazing networks. Let's use that for all we can and like, use that to get access to really interesting things.
- [25:09]
A
That's almost like founder, product fit. They both played to their strengths and really leaned into their strengths and trying to kind of fit their personality to a strategy.
- [25:19]
B
I think that's, I think that's definitely right. And again, it goes back to my, you know, this whole philosophy that, like, different things work for different people. Right. And what works really well for one person might not work for. For the, for another person.
- [25:32]
A
And then you went to Allocate, which, just full disclosure, I was a seed investor in the platform because I believe in it, obviously. What was your role at Allocate and what were some of the lessons that you learned there?
- [25:44]
B
So I joined Allocate right after it had raised its seed round, and I effectively launch and lead Allocate's emerging manager platform. So Allocate is, you know, it's a startup, it raised venture capital, and it's building an alternative investment Platform with a couple different parts. On one end you have this asset management platform where we would, you know, we had funds that we manage, but we also would get access to really good venture funds and effectively syndicate out that access. And then on another end of the platform we built software for the private markets. And you know, it's funny, the reason I joined Allocate in the first place was by this point in my career I had been, I'd kind of become a venture specialist. I moved away from being a generalist and I really wanted to concentrate in venture. But I thought that, you know, still being an LP inventurer, you're, you're always two degrees removed from like the real action. And I thought that if I worked in a startup and saw that zero to one phase, it would give me a lot more empathy for my managers, but it would also just make me a better investor and make me able to ask better questions. And so, you know, we were, even though I kind of managed a fund of funds and acted like an institutional investor, we were still doing it within the context of a startup and we were breaking conventions and really like doing things from a first principle standpoint. We didn't have to like do things the way they've always been done, which is like the worst thing you could ever mutter within the context of a startup. And so we backed a ton of emerging managers when I was there. We also backed a lot of non emerging, a lot of big platform firms. And I learned a lot about selling and sales and things that you didn't have to do within the context of a non for profit endowment.
- [27:25]
A
I often think about, with how I invest, I think about how do people become better investors? And one of the things that's really important is to get ground truth in different industries. How could you be a great endowment investor without understanding, without understanding AI and what's driving that market? How do you become a good venture investor without understanding what drives startup returns? I think it's really important, especially if you're focused on one asset class, to go as close to ground truth as humanly possible in order to be better and be able to go back 10,000ft up and be a better investor.
- [28:03]
B
Yeah, absolutely. And like I had never seen how the sausage gets made within a startup. I didn't know what it took to you know, scope out building a software product, working with an engineering team and a product team and like actually building and shipping something. You know, these were things that were like very much in the abstract for me and still I think very much in the abstract for a lot of institutional investors. But, but being an allocate, like seeing that 0 to 1, seeing what it takes to hire a team and go from 10 people to 50 people, seeing what it takes to raise a Series A, you know, these were all things that happened when I was there. And just seeing it up front I think gives me, it just gave me a lot better understanding and appreciation for like how hard these things are. Like how hard it is for, for, for founders to build companies, how hard it is for investors to, to pick companies and understand companies and it, and it just gave me a lot more empathy I think, for, for what like all of these players in the ecosystem have to go through. And, and I'm really glad that I did it because I think it's made me a better investor.
- [29:03]
A
So then you went on to found a fund of fund Pattern Ventures. Why in the world do we need another fund of fund?
- [29:10]
B
It's a good question. And my, my somewhat snarky response is like the world doesn't need another fund of funds actually. And I tell this to, to managers we meet with, like the world doesn't need another venture fund. But if you have the right to exist, then I think there's always room for more. And I think we earned the right to exist for a few reasons. You know, in venture, if you want exposure to the big brand name firms, the Lightspeeds, the Sequoias, the Andreessens of the world, it's really purely an access play. And you don't need a fund of funds to do that. You can try to get access directly or you can leverage a platform like Allocate to get access. There's ways to get access. It's not really like a diligence or an underwriting game. It's an access game. And I think it's becoming increasingly easier to access these, these bigger firms. But in the emerging manager world it's, it's much less of an access game and it's much more of like a discovery and diligence and manager selection game. And it just takes a lot of time. There's thousands of venture funds in the emerging manager world to pick from. You need the right network to find these funds, you need the right skill set to diligence them, you need to reference them. It takes a ton of time. Return dispersion in this world, in the emerging manager world is massive and so manager selection matters even more. And that means you need to spend a lot of time meeting with a lot of managers to pick the right funds and a lot of LPs just don't have that time or don't have the bandwidth or the skill set to do that. And so to do this part of the market right. I think a fund of funds makes a lot of sense. And you know, I've been doing the emerging manager, you know, LP investing for a while. My two partners who started pattern have been fund of funds investors for multiple decades and they've been investing in venture companies for multiple decades. And so I think we've earned the right to do this. But I don't think, I don't think the world again needs another fund of funds unless you have earned the right. Like I think we have another way.
- [31:13]
A
To look at return dispersion. There's obviously just beta and market beta, but I would actually call it LP error. I think there's significant LP error in the venture space. Said another way, the return dispersion is only partially due to actually just variance or randomness. A lot of it is actually due to picking the wrong managers. I caution people to really think critically about their venture exposure. First of all, it's completely idiosyncratic to every other asset class on the planet. There's no learnings. In fact, if you know a little bit or maybe even a lot about private equity, it's a recipe to be a terrible venture investor because of power laws versus downside protection and things like that. The second aspect is there's a right way and a wrong way to enter any asset class that you have no experience with. So if you look at how endowments or institutional investors enter asset classes, at least most of them, the humble ones, they'll start actually with a fund to fund, they'll start with the most high view, kind of 10,000 square foot view. Then they'll start to see what does look good, look like maybe the fund to fund will start giving direct exposure into the funds. So they get kind of this, this sense for what does good look like. It's almost impossible in the first year to even know what an asset, what a good asset looks like. And then maybe five, ten years later they'll start to actually build out a direct platform into the actual underlying companies. And if you look at the behavior of 70, 80, 90% of high net worth investors, when they go into venture, they actually go the other way. They go directly into startups because that's what naturally comes into them. Then they go into funds if they kind of learn from their mistakes and then once in a while they'll go into fund of funds. But again, the The LP error on the manager side and even more so on the startup side that that LP error because there's almost no barrier to entry start a startup is so massive that whatever investors save in fees, they pay, you know, 5, 10x oftentimes, oftentimes they just lose all their money. It's like do you want to pay 2% management fees or do you want to pay 100% mistake fees anytime you're going into an new asset class, even if it's for the first year, maybe two years, going with a fund of fund and learning the ropes on somebody else's dime, I think is so valuable.
- [33:42]
B
I completely agree. And it's, it's the crawl, walk, run approach, right? And it's funny, I made this mistake earlier on in my career actually. After Washu, I joined in OCIO where we manage endowment capital. When I joined, we had almost no venture exposure and I kind of took the lead on building out our venture program and we were starting from zero. And this is when my venture network was very, very limited. And we basically spent a year trying to just get up to speed and understand. And then we started making a few commitments the following year. But I think in retrospect, I should have started with a fund of funds to help me get to know the ecosystem and build relationships and then maybe co investing alongside the fund of funds directly in some managers as you build kind of conviction and then eventually going to do it myself. We could have jumpstarted the program a lot better. And like we made some mistakes early on backing managers that, you know, in the early days, everything sounds great, right? When you're, and even now when I'm, you know, training like our analyst or intern, you know, in the beginning everything sounds great and everyone's interesting. And by the way, like almost every manager we meet with, even if we pass, they're all very impressive. They have great experience, they have great backgrounds, they worked at a great company or they worked at a great firm. But it's really hard to delineate between who's, who's just okay or good and who's really great. And you know, we've had LPs come to us and say like, hey, look, I tried to do this myself and I just got really burned and I just need help, right? And, and I don't think it has to be like an either or, right? Like, you know, you can, you can use a fund of funds and use it as a, as an educational experience to start doing this yourself, which a lot of our LPs too and so I definitely am a big believer in the, in the crawl, walk, run approach.
- [35:25]
A
I made the same mistake, which is why I so intimately understand it. I think I probably did 100 startup investments before even investing in a manager. So I did not take my own advice. Had I known it, I of course would have done it. I want to double click on something that you said that rather obvious for people in the industry. But if you made your money in a widget factory and then you start investing in venture, the average, let's call it the bottom quartile venture investor is the top 1% of society or the top 10% of Ivy League. So the bar to even have a venture fund or raise 20, 30, 50 million, 100 million is so high that even just to be in the game, there's a quality bar. That's why you have to meet like 100 managers before you actually know what good looks like. It's because everybody actually looks pretty good. That's a common mistake that people, people make.
- [36:16]
B
Yeah, absolutely. Like everybody's smart in this industry, right? Like when we talk about the managers we like, it's, you know, we're not saying things like, oh, they're so smart, like we need to invest, right. Like those are, that's table stakes. And, and I actually think this is what some managers get wrong about their differentiation, right? Because we, you know, we'll talk to some new managers and I'll ask them, like, why do you think you have the right to exist? Or why do you think you have the right to win? And they'll say something like, oh, well, you know, we're operators and we have great operating experience and founders want that. And by the way, that's great. And maybe you do have great operating experience, but I've met with 200 other firms that also, you know, were operators at great companies. And that in and of itself is not enough. Right. It's impressive and, and it's impressive when these folks worked at great companies and did great things. But, but it's almost table stakes and it makes it a lot harder to really differentiate. Again, if you haven't met with hundreds of firms and you don't know like where that relative baseline kind of is.
- [37:13]
A
So for your fund, you're targeting sub $50 million managers. Tell me about your strategy and your portfolio construction.
- [37:20]
B
Primarily, what is 50, $50 million fund? The reason why we settled on this is. Well, there's a few reasons. One, when my partners were setting a pattern, they went back and looked at every fund going back about 45 years I think to 1980 until today and looked at every 5x net venture fund in that period and what we noticed was the largest cohort of 5x returning funds was in the sub $50 million range. This is for a few reasons. One, smaller funds are less competitive against the bigger incumbent firms. You don't have to compete for that lead spot. Leading around is binary. You either win the lead position or you don't. Sometimes you can co lead, but if you have to have a bigger fund and you have to deploy more dollars in lead, now you're becoming competitive against not only the other seed funds but also the big incumbent kind of tier 1 brand name firms that occasionally do see it as well. And so we like that smaller funds are less competitive, they can get better access to deals. We also like that they're purely focused on precede and seed where we think the biggest opportunity for outlier power law driven exits exist, valuations are better and the fund math, most importantly to get to a good return, it's just a lot easier, right? You don't need to rely on the next uber just to three extra fund. If you're a 50 million dollar fund, you know, an acquisition at a couple hundred million dollars can really move fund level returns. And you know, if you get a single billion dollar company that could return your fund sometimes multiple times over. And so, you know, venture we believe is hard enough as it is and we just want to try to stack the odds even more in our favor in terms of generating great returns. And so that's why we focused on this sub 50 million dollar.
- [39:01]
A
I recently had a podcast with a guy that runs a lean AI leaderboard which is looking for these one person led, kind of, he calls it seed strapping which is you raise a seed round and then you become profitable. I've been thinking about the second order effects of AI on, on investing. So if AI does bring down costs and what I've kind of settled on is this bifurcated model precede and seed and then the mega funds. So you need money to prove out your thesis and then you need capital as a moat. So in my version of the future you see these highly value added preceding seed investors and then thenreeson's and Sequoia is writing kind of the billion dollar checks. What do you think about that thesis and help me refine that thesis.
- [39:50]
B
So I agree, I very much agree that venture is becoming bifurcated. And I think you either need to be like a small, nimble, collaborative early stage investor or you have to be really A deep pocketed multi stage big brand name. I think in the middle it's really hard to win for a few reasons. Put it this way, I think a lot of founders at the pre seed and seed stage, they know the risk of taking capital from those big incumbent tier one multi stage firms. Right. The risk is you're kind of an option check to them at the precede or seed stage and if they don't follow on and do your A, there's material adverse signaling in that. Right. And so a lot of founders say I'm going to raise my precede or seed from a smaller specialized precede seed fund where I know I'm going to get, you know, really good engagement from the gp. Often it might be a solo GP where like I know exactly what I'm getting and who I'm getting it from and they can be really helpful and I'm meaningful to them as a part of their portfolio. But the best founders when it comes to the Series A, I think they want to raise from a big brand name firm because it's signaling, you know, raising from a big great firm in your Series A is a great signal. But more than that, those firms have deep pockets and can fund you, you know, theoretically through IPO and beyond. Right. And if you're a founder, they want.
- [41:01]
A
To do too, which they want their new business model today.
- [41:05]
B
Yeah, absolutely. Which they want to do. And if you're a founder, the biggest distraction to your business is fundraising. Take a lot of time and if you have to go out and fundraise for every round, a new process like that's a big distraction and a big time commitment. And so, you know, if you can just raise your Series A from a big brand name firm and then effectively not have to worry so much about raising subsequent rounds because you can just go back to them like that's a really attractive value proposition. And I think it makes it really tough for, you know, the midsize Series A specialist funds, you know, like the 200 to $400 million Series A funds who maybe they can lead your A, but after that they can't. And you're going to have to go out and find a new Series B investor and again a new investor beyond that. And so I completely agree with you that this bifurcation is definitely happening and I think it's only going to get more pronounced.
- [41:52]
A
You're investing in these sub $50 million funds. Is there a pattern in terms of are they concentrated, are they leading rounds, are they collaborative? Distill what you see as Best in class strategy.
- [42:05]
B
So we take a very GP centric approach to investing, meaning we focus a lot on the gp. And what I mean by this, and kind of going back to something you and I talked about earlier, this concept of like GP Thesis fit or founder Market fit, what works for one GP might not work for another GP and beyond. And so we want to back GPs where their strategy is really playing into their strengths. And that means sometimes we back very concentrated gps where we think like, they're exceptionally good at picking or engaging with founders and they have to have a more concentrated portfolio. But sometimes we pick more diversified GPs where maybe they have really good network, really good deal flow, really good access, maybe they're not as strong on the picking side. And so having a more diversified portfolio allows them to really take advantage of their network and their deal flow without having to make even more concentrated bets. And we've seen both models really work out. We have a pretty eclectic portfolio where our managers look different from one another. Like we've got. So we have a lot of solo GPS in our portfolio. We have one or two partnerships. We actually tend to prefer solo gps. This is maybe a little counterintuitive to what a lot of other LPs think, but I think there's more risk in a partnership. Actually. I've just seen so many partnerships blow up and I've seen so many partnerships formed out of convenience rather than out of a real reason to partner with someone. And if you're a solo gp, you don't have to worry about dealing with someone else. And the psychology of that and investing is such a business of biases. And I've seen in organizations where people become possessive about their investments and when people want to strike down other people's investments because maybe that person had struck down one of your investments. And I think the decision making and staying power and underwritability in a solo GP is actually more attractive at the end of the day. And so we tend to focus a lot on those. But we're open to partnerships so long as there's a real reason for the partnership and we don't think there's a lot of risk there.
- [44:05]
A
What's one or two mistakes that you've made early on that you've since corrected?
- [44:09]
B
One thing that I've actually changed my mind on over the, really over the course of my career, but more over, over the course of the past couple years is, you know, I used to think that having meaningful reserves in your portfolio was a really good way to, you know, increase exposure to the best names and like juicy returns even more. But I think it's really hard, at least what I've noticed and observed is a lot of precede and seed managers, it's really hard for them to effectively deploy their reserves. And here's why. If you're a seed manager and you invest in the seed and maybe you have reserves to take you through the A, you know, series A companies still have a very high failure rate and it's, you know, you often don't have a lot of time to gather a ton of new incremental information between a seed and a series A or even a, you know, precede or a seed. Right. And so by the time you have to deploy those follow on reserves, you're often doing it only with marginally incremental more information and you're doing it at a materially higher valuation. You usually. Right. And so I think like reserves are actually really tough to be effectively deployed for precede and seed funds. And I would almost rather those funds just buy up more ownership. In the early days and I can't tell you how many times I've talked to managers and asked them like, if you went back and you know, by the time this seed company raised its series A, like, did you know that, like, did you know which companies were going to break out or did you know which companies were going to fail? And oftentimes they say, you know what, we actually did it or the companies that we thought were really strong out of the gate ended up plateauing and stagnating and the companies that were slower out of the gate ended up really ramping up. And so I do think reserves can be really effective, but I think they're more effective actually in the later stages. Like Founders Fund has been exceptionally good at deploying reserves and doubling and tripling down, but that's because they can deploy massive reserves at the series C and D and beyond, where like there's metrics, there's traction, you know, which companies are already like really on that hockey stick trajectory. And so I've, I've kind of come around and actually prefer our managers to have lower reserves, if that makes sense.
- [46:16]
A
It's, it makes total sense. And it's very interesting that the managers are telling you that they may not know who the breakouts are because there's a very direct incentive for them not to say the opposite, to say, oh yeah, we should have just, let's double our fund size. We could have piled into these three. We knew for sure that these three were. But the fact that they're saying the opposite, despite the incentive is a pretty strong signal.
- [46:38]
B
Yeah. And I think this is a tough thing that you need to like, try to figure out managers. It's very easy for managers to retrofit a story and to say, oh, you know, we made this like five years ago. We made that investment because we had this thesis on this thing that nobody else believed in. And we did it and we knew that this company was going to break out and become a billion dollar company or $10 billion company. The reality is venture managers think every one of their companies could become a $10 billion company at the time they invest. Right. But obviously not every company is going to be successful. Most actually aren't going to be. And I think what people don't realize is oftentimes it's not until much later when it becomes obvious that, that a company is going to be successful.
- [47:22]
A
This has been an absolute masterclass on endowment investing fund of funds. What would you like our listeners to know about you, Pattern Venture? Is there anything else you'd like to share?
- [47:30]
B
The first thing I'd say is, you know, Pattern, we're open for business, we're actively deploying and so we'd love to chat with, you know, any managers that are really high quality and raising and we source through our network, we source through a data tool that we have. But we don't have a monopoly on sourcing. We don't believe anybody does. And so we're always happy to meet with folks that know people really highly recommend. And the other thing is, I would just say like, you know, and we are building Pattern. And how I've thought about being an LP over the course of my career is I've seen too many lps that I think feel entitled or feel that GPS owes them something because like we're giving them capital. And I just think this business needs more like true partnership. And, and I think like at the end of the day these are, these are marriages, these are really long term relationships. They're, they're two way streets. And, and so I would just like encourage everybody listening to like really think deeply about partnership, both if you're an LP or a GP and, and recognize that like none of these relationships are one way streets. And I think that's like something that we really hold near and dear to us here, here at Powder.
- [48:27]
A
Big purpose of this podcast is to tell the LP story in hopes of basically telling kind of both sides of the story so that there could be more empathy and relationship in the industry. Thank you, John. Look forward to sitting down in person very soon.
- [48:41]
B
Likewise, David, thank you for having me.
- [48:42]
A
Thanks for listening to my conversation. If you enjoyed this episode, please share with a friend. This helps Us Grow also provides the very best feedback when we review the episode's analytics. Thank you for your support.