B (10:25)
There's a few things I talk about which you have to new employees and their new team members and I think about every day. It's like we, we chose to be in a highly, in a high growth sector with companies that are largely not public, right. I mean there's a number of public companies obviously, but most of the market cap is in the private world. And these companies are generally high, growing. They're usually not at their full EBITDA margins. They're usually losing money or breaking even. They're, you know, changing their, their business, changing the business models every couple years. They're, you know, altering the landscape of financial services and they're hard to value. So what I figured out was that the skill set of being able to value properly and actually attain proper value for highly opaque assets is the, you know, best job in all of investment banking. Right? If you're at Goldman Sachs and I say Goldman Sachs Lexus because I work there and I vow respect for Goldman Sachs. But at the end of the day, if you're one of these big banks, you know, and you're working on, let's say an IPO, first of all, you're one of five or six or seven or eight firms working on the IPO. And second of all, you're one of maybe 50 people on the meat grinding process on the IPO just at one firm, right? You got the bankers ECM, you've got, you know, equity sales, equity research, you got back office, you've got, you know, stabilization people. And it's this whole entire process and it's very hard as an individual banker, as anyone on the team or even any one of the banks to sort of claim credit for. Oh, I was the one or our team was the one that added all the value, you know, to this, to this particular deal. As a matter of fact, you take a debt deal, it's like, is it really adding that much value to wire someone out $500 million, do a bunch of credit work and hope to get it back? Sure, that's value add. But it's like you're, you're giving someone $500 million and charging library, it's commoditized, it's somewhat commoditized, right? And then if you're working on very large, you know, M and A, it's generally seen as these companies typically trade it, you know, 25, 30% premium to market. That's the average over many, many, many deals. So you go in there, there's already 10, 20 owls covering the stock. So there's no mystery there. They've been public for how many years, how many quarters. Everyone knows that market premium is 25 or 35%. So if you get 25 or 35%, you're, you're basically doing an average shot, right? There's no, there's no glory in it. You add that much value, you got to be administering and processing the deal. If on the buy side, you know, you're not really creating a lot of value, you may be trying to compress value and maybe getting a deal of the hump, you know, but most of the time, you know, bankers are paid very little for the buy side because they're not really doing a lot of work. They don't really get in the weeds and understand the fundamentals of the company and decide is this going to be worth buying or not. They're doing more or less back of the envelope work to figure out whether the company might be worth X or Y and the increase might be worth A or B and, and might be, or B and so but it turns out all those things are like administrative roles, right? And, and you deserve to be paid administrative fees for administrative roles and like, like there's nothing wrong with that. Goldman Sachs, amazing place. They, they had a huge market share and same with Morgan Stanley. Mary. Nothing, nothing wrong with their model for the kind of deals that they do. But if you're a smaller elite firm and you can pick one or two things on earth to do, those will be capital raising and sell side M and A. In the private markets where valuations are highly opaque, the clients don't really know the buyers that well. They don't know the investors that well. And we can kind of be a network between the buyers, the investors and the companies and help get things done at in, in a high class way. Like I said before, another other even maybe your podcast like it's always about maximizing the value. It's finding the right fit. None of my clients wants to maximize, maximize value. They'd rather find a good partner and a quick deal that made sense for all sides. So that's actually even harder to do. It's actually fairly easy if you want to just maximize value. This one Function maximize value. You don't care who the buyer is. You don't care what the timing is. You don't care about anything. But when you're trying to think about, you know, speed and certainty and quality partner and what's the employees and you know, you want, you want the buyer to be happy with the transaction as well. So, you know, there's, or the investor for that matter. So it's, that matchmaking game is you can add an enormous amount of value in that equation and you know, you can get paid for that. Right? You know, we have a deal right now. We have a lot of our deals that are, you know, we get, you know, X percent up to say 500 million and Y percent above that and Z percent above that. And you know, we just got a, this is not public. I'll make it public here for you. But we just got $167 million fee on one transaction, which is the largest fee in the entire year. There's been two articles in the Wall Street Journal that Goldman Sachs got $110 million fee on this deal, the largest deal in the firm's history. And Merrill's got $137 million deal. And those were on like four, 40, $50 billion deals. Right. You know, or even bigger, quite frankly. I think the Bama was even a bigger fee on a big, small fee that was on a much, much larger deal. But we came in and we actually added billions of dollars of value to, you know, to a company. And, and so, you know, we got paid a, you know, a good fee for that. So, you know, we kind of figured out how to turn, you know, basically, you know, get paid on a value added model as opposed to administrative model. And that's really what we do. So it's a, it's a, you know, how do you get paid for adding value versus being an administrator of a transaction? And it's very similar to, you know, if you're, you know, managing Treasuries, you're not going to make as much money as Sequoia makes adding value to its portfolio companies. And it's, it's investors, LPs money. They're making 35% of everything over X par. Right? Because they're adding value to that X. Right? They're quadrupling that X. They should get 30, 35% of it. And I always say, why don't bankers get 10, 20, 30% of everything they get? They help achieve over a certain benchmark. And the reason is that bankers don't have any track record of doing so. In pebc, there's a perfect track record of who added value and who didn't. Right. You know exactly what your money mind returns. You know exactly your ROI is, you know exactly what your IRR is, I should say. And, and, and everyone knows it. It's completely 100% provable. There's not a banker on the planet that has anything like a track record of adding actual economic value. And we do. Right. Because that's the only thing that we're known for outside of fintech and selling companies is that everyone sort of says, you guys have really served your clients well and your loyalty serves the clients and you've actually gotten them great outcomes over the course of time. And it's been really consistent over 20 something years. Right. It's not just, oh, there was this one deal that was a high valuation that, you know, maybe you got lucky on that deal.