Interviewer (2:37)

Another word for manager risk and manager selection risk is career risk. Goes back to the old adage as you don't get fired for firing IBM. And what's interesting, a lot of people, there's a bias to this as well that's quite interesting, which is if you invest into IBM and IBM goes down, well, IBM went down. But if you invest into a small company and it went down, you made the mistake. So there's this fundamental attribution bias where if you invest in a lower middle market manager and they do that, the person who made the investments or lower middle managers is seen as making the mistake versus if it's in a buyout, it's blamed on the market and other external forces.

Alex (3:10)

That's absolutely true. And I would say that, you know, for a lot of folks that might even be pretty active investors in private equity but don't know our part of the market, you know, they will look, they could look at our names in our portfolio and maybe not even recognize any of them. Right. And that's not unusual. And sometimes the best managers are the ones that stay under the radar screen, unlike big market private equity. You know, the majority of managers that we back actually aren't in the major cities, right? They're not in New York, they're not in Chicago, they're not in la. They're in secondary and tertiary cities. Right. Because that's where frankly a lot of the smaller companies are. Right. And when we're talking about small, we're talking about companies that are generally under 100 million of enterprise value. Right. And so those managers tend to be more local, they tend to be not in New York, although there are obviously a lot of managers that we do back in New York as well. But they, they tend to try to use that fact to ingratiate themselves within, in our part of the market. Most sellers are actually family owned businesses, right? So our data shows about 75% of the deals that are done in this part of the market are from businesses that are owned by a family or an entrepreneur owner. And that is just a very different type of transaction than say a private equity firm to private equity firm transaction where a large bank is involved in holding a big auction, right? And so the sort of intricacies of winning that deal of creating value in those companies is a very different type of skill set and frankly a different type of opportunity to actually create value. And that's one of the reasons why we see these returns in this part of the market be so robust Expert

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Interviewer (6:14)

howiinvest when you look at large buyouts they're oftentimes using a lot of financial leverage. You mentioned in lower middle market they're oftentimes providing real value to the company. Is there an argument to say that lower middle market is actually safer than large buyouts, or is it just higher returning, higher risk?

Alex (6:29)

Safer in some ways, riskier in others. So we'll take leverage as an example, right? So in most of the managers in our part of the market and in our data that we show, let's say in companies under 100 million of enterprise value, just give some numbers. The median multiple right? On cash flow that we often see the debt being is around three turns cash flow, right. We usually see capital structures in the deals, about 50, 50 equity and debt. Compare that to the upper part of the market where that Multiple might be six turns of cash flow, might be 30, 70, right equity to debt. So in that way financial leverage is less of a risk. But there's also a reason why the companies in this part of the market are using less leverage, or I should say the managers, when they do these transactions, use less leverage. There's other things about these small companies that makes them inherently risky, right? There are risks involved that bigger companies don't have. So for example, if you're a family owned business that's been run by the same person for 20 years, you may not have the best operations in place, maybe not best practices. Your CFO might be really a controller, right? Might be the cousin of the owner, right? And so there's opportunities to improve these companies, right? So the flip side of that is they are a little bit less, more risky on entry. They may have customer concentration in a way that a $5 billion company doesn't have. But these are also things that are big opportunities, right? So the managers that we back in this part of the market are groups that have very activist ownership structures, right. And strategies, right. They are using operational resources, they are improving what is, let's say, a less polished asset, right? One that has a need for a more professional management team, a real cfo. Maybe they have customer concentration. So they might use M and A or other means to sort of diversify their customer base. They may have geographic concentration. Right? These are all big risks. But. But if you can have a manager that attacks these risks, right? And can grow that company and scale it. Right. And do it organically, but also through M and A, which is a big part of, not just the bigger part of the market, but our part of the market, there's a lot of fragmented industries and you can create that value with scale, then you're selling that asset, which is a much more polished asset, into a much frothier part of the market, right? Where most of the capital is where they use double the leverage, where their cost of capital is different, frankly. And that leads to what we call multiple expansion, right? So valuations are lower in our part of the market. And, and there's structural reasons for that, right? Because these companies are a little less polished. They don't earn the same amount of dollars per cash flow. But once you fix that, right? And you grow these companies and you scale them, they become really attractive assets. And for, for every dollar of cash flow you've grown, you get the returns on the growth, but you're usually getting a higher valuation multiple on those dollars of EBITDA as well. And in our data, what we see is that the median, sort of what we call multiple expansion between when you bought the company to when you sold it in our part of the market is around two terms. So if you bought it for six times, you might be able to sell for eight times or more. Top quartile is like four terms. So that is what leads to sort of these outsized outcomes in our part of the market. And that also sort of counteracts the fact that you are dealing with companies by their very nature that can be more risky in their operations at the time that you buy.

Interviewer (9:19)

So, brass tax, when you compare large buyouts versus lower middle market, how have they done over the last couple of decades?

Alex (9:25)

You think about it as a vintage year basis, right? The top quartile returns in the smaller funds have beaten the top quartile returns in the larger funds. Again, using $1 billion fund size as a demarc line, 13 of the 16 vintages in that time period, and they've beaten them by over 600 basis points on average. So significant outperformance in IRR and then

Interviewer (9:45)

on the other side, the other three years, how have large buyouts done and what has been their outperformance?

Alex (9:50)

So when large buyouts beat small buyouts in those three vintage years, the outperformance was only 250 basis points or so. So again, when, when large BIOS is beating small bias, it's a little bit less magnitude and we see much higher magnitudes in the vast majority of the vintage years historically.

Interviewer (10:05)

And those tend to be almost like interest rate trades. The interest rates goes down and then the leverage, basically the company adds value of that. Is that a oversimplification?

Alex (10:14)

It is a little bit of an oversimplification, but it's not completely wrong either. Right. So there's no doubt that in times of interest rates, reducing the amount of leverage that's used in the bigger part of the market. That interest rate reduction and really the sort of healthy functioning of the debt markets in the bigger part of the market are key to having M and A performed, key to getting exits. And of course another big part of that for the bigger part of the the market is a very functioning IPO market, right? Because in some cases those companies are so large that's the only place you can exit them. In our part of the market, because we use such a significant amount less debt in our transactions, the over the time period where we saw interest rates go up by 500 basis points, we didn't see a major effect. And the other big difference in our part of the market related to interest rates and leverage is that the vast majority of the deals and the debt that's provided in our part of the market is not from the traditional money banks and it's certainly not syndicated debt. It is generally private credit funds, right? About maybe 70, 80% of the debt is probably private credit funds. And so they have capital to put to work, they tend to be more risk on. So even in times when the debt markets and the bigger part of the market have sort of seized up, we've seen activity continue in our part of the market in a much more healthy way. Now sometimes that debt can be more expensive, right? So that's certainly a downside to that. But because our managers are generally using so much less of it in the transactions, it doesn't really that that additional sort of spread, let's call it doesn't have a significant effect on their decision making around investment activity or how much leverage they're going to use because they already use very relatively small leverage at the time that they make their initial acquisitions.

Interviewer (11:39)

Just to make an apples to apples comparison. Over that 16 year period, what was the average return for large buyouts versus lower middle market?

Alex (11:45)

So over the last decade we've seen significant outperformance right in the, in the small buyout market. So the last 10 year returns is around 21% annualized compared to just over 16% for the larger buyout.

Interviewer (12:00)

And you've been in this part of the market really for two decades. You mentioned there's 1200 managers, so there's much more managers to diligence. How long did it take before you had a good sense for what great, a great manager looks like?

Alex (12:11)

It takes a number of years. So I started this role as a limited partner right out of business school and that was 25 years ago and started with Hewlett Packard's pension fund. And you know, that time you start taking manager meetings. At that point it was focused on a variety of things, not just lower middle market. And you really build up almost like a muscle memory, right? So you know when you, when you first take your first meetings with a gp, if they're good at pitching their fund and their strategy, then you come out of it loving, right? And you don't have is the sort of mental comparison of the hundred other managers you've met with up until that point or maybe thousands of other managers you met up to that point. So today like I think that like having met with so many different managers, lots of different strategies. I started working for RSVP about 11 years ago and started finding, focusing exclusively on this part of the market at that point you start to realize pattern recognition of what types of things are you looking for in a manager that you believe and the data shows leads to outperformance. And you only get that from experience and being around people that are smarter than you and have the ability to teach you and mentor you through those years that you're learning how to identify those things.

Interviewer (13:15)

I'm sure you do hours and hours of diligence on every manager, but how quickly do you have a really good sense for this is going to be good or this mate, this is going to be bad.

Alex (13:22)

Your initial reaction is important, right? So we obviously don't make decisions on just one meeting, but you can tell a lot in a first meeting about whether or not you believe that this is one. A team that has something about them that's unique, that allows them to create repeatable returns. Is there something about their strategy that you learned in that meeting? And having seen tons of different lower middle market private equity firms, you can start to sort of zero in on the things that you're looking for that can lead to that outperformance. And then finally what you're looking for is how they go about executing that strategy, right? The process. And so you can learn a little bit about that in a first meeting. And usually it takes several sort of follow up meetings, the review of their materials. And then of course, like I think that for us the biggest moment of realization is generally after what we call an on site visit where we spend maybe a full day working with that manager, meeting other members of the team, going through case studies, really understanding what has led to the performance numbers that you're looking at in those tables, right. And, and then identifying something about that manager that one way I like to describe it is their superpower. What is it about what they do that's different than everybody else. That gives them the ability to have not just great returns, but also repeatable great returns where there's something that they're doing that can consistently be pointed to as a way of generating those outsized returns.

Interviewer (14:35)

You mentioned what you look for in a manager in terms of what makes them great. Double click on that.

Alex (14:39)

I would say that initially it's really a qualitative assessment. So we're looking for people that have experience and a background that fits the strategy. Right. That it makes sense that they are executing on this strategy. And as I mentioned, they have the ability to do something that is unique and differentiated from all the other managers that we're looking at. Right. So we may see three or 400 managers fundraising every year. We're going to do 10. Right. So. So those 10 managers have to separate themselves out in some way. And sometimes it could be how they source deals that's unique that gives them an advantage in buying and finding unique deal flow. It could be operational resources or expertise that they have that is unique, that helps them do all those things that I talked about that add value to these companies that actually generate really good returns. Sometimes it's the exit, and sometimes it's just their ability to understand a sector or a certain subsector or market in a way that's much better than their peers. And so we have qualitative assessments that allow us to do that. We meet with them, we talk to references, which are an extremely important part of the process. And then I'll go back to the quantitative. Right. So their track records. So one of the things that makes track records so difficult in private equity is that most people rely on vintage or benchmark. Right. And vintager benchmarking has some problems. Part of it is that the most relevant fund that you want to benchmark, it is their last fund. And I can guarantee you, especially in this environment, their last fund is probably made up of mostly deals that are unrealized. Right. That have not actually achieved a return that's real. Right. It's a mark and that's helpful, but it's not a realized outcome. And so as you start to go back in their historical track record, you start moving farther and farther away, usually from both the people that are actually doing the deals today as well as the strategy. Right. Because again, successful funds do tend to raise larger and larger funds. So they may have started off doing companies that are under 100 million enterprise value. Now they're doing companies that are 300 million enterprise value. So part of the way that we try to counteract that is through our data. So one of the things that RCP is very well known for in our market is we have an extensive database that has over 50,000 deals in it. And in those deal data we have the ability to benchmark not just things like outcome, which is certainly important, but also things like revenue growth and EBITDA growth and what they bought these companies at compared to what the market was buying companies at. Right. So we have the ability to benchmark these managers in very unique ways that most other LPs frankly don't have the ability to do. Because we've been collecting data in this part of the market for 25 years. And that we think gives us certainly an advantage in making the picture that we're trying to sort of take of this manager clear.

Interviewer (16:58)

You've essentially created your own internal benchmark that may be more representative than just taking something off the shelf. Two things really strikes me about what you were saying. One is obviously strategic creep. If you're investing in companies under 100 million now, they're 500 million and your team has all changed, you know your track record is not going to be predictive of the future. It's just just a different activity. The other thing is this interesting incentive mechanism between TVPI turning into dpi. Professor Steve Kaplan, University of Chicago, did the study that showed that first, second, third time funds over inflate their TVPI versus more established managers under inflation. And the, the intuition behind that is early stage, early vintages are just really focused on raising the next, the next fund. And then later, later funds are all focused on under promising, over delivering because they want to build, they want to take that $10 million check into 100 million, 100 million to 200 million. They're more able to think long term. Do you find that as well? And is this one of the things that you really have to focus on is, is this TVPI going to turn into dpi?

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Alex (20:32)

That's a really important part of this. And one of the things that you even mentioned in the Question is that how people mark their portfolios can be either conservative or aggressive. Right? And what we generally see, it's interesting, you know. So I know Kaplan's work on the earlier managers, and we definitely see that in emerging managers, but we also see it in, let's say, less accomplished managers that are raising their third or fourth fund or fifth fund even, but where they have some issue that they're trying to deal with in their fundraise. Right? Because maybe a partner left, maybe the performance is not that great. And so for them we see usually more aggressive marks, not surprisingly, marks that might not hold up to what's going on in the real world today. And what we tend to see is that our best managers tend to sandbag. They tend to, they tend to put marks that are much lower than what they probably can sell that company for today. In part because they're not worried about fundraising, because our best managers, again are highly oversubscribed. They might fundraise for three to six months and be done right. And it's really just existing or maybe some folks that they're bringing in and they don't have the need to sort of bolster up their track record with marks that could be, let's say, seen as aggressive. We have a number of managers where the average exit compared to what they were valuing the company at, let's say one or two quarters before was as high as 100%. Right. The average across most of our managers is 30 or 40%. And when we look at the upper part of the market today, there's actually, I think, a pitchbook analysis that showed that you're actually getting retraction on average in terms of the marks. So if you held it at 2 1/2x, you might be getting an exit at 2.3x because you were holding an unrealistic value.

Interviewer (21:59)

That's a much more precise way to say it. Which is it's not second vintage or fifth vintage or tenth vintage. It's if you have much more supply for your next fund, you're going to be aligned over a long term alignment and long term reputation. If you don't have enough demand, you might even subconsciously focus on gamifying the next race.

Alex (22:17)

Yeah, and some of it is definitely subconscious where you're just trying to put on the best face in a realistic range that you think is true. And then there's definitely groups that I think manipulate. Right. That are purposely trying to sort of overmark stuff or in some cases in this environment they've held it at something that might have been true three or four years ago. And in this environment that valuation has really come down. Right. And they haven't, they haven't reduced that valuation over that time period. So sometimes it's not over marking, it's sort of not reducing it when it's appropriate.

Interviewer (22:47)

Steve Kaplan also has a study that only funds in their first or second quartile ever fundraise. So somehow magically there are no funds in third and fourth quartile that ever fundraise.

Alex (22:56)

Part of the reason for that is that again, this goes back to why vintage your benchmarking can be challenging. It's that usually within the first six or seven years of a fund's life, it will bounce around vintages. Right. And so, you know, Cambridge Associates, you know, has, you know, one of the benchmarks that a lot of folks use. They even have that in their notes now. I think that shows that like that any given vintage you're benchmarking, if it's before year six or seven, has problems with it. Right. Because it could be showing up as a third quartile fund or a first quartile fund that then regresses. Right. The other thing that we see managers obviously do is you can cut your data certain ways. Right. That is favorable to you. Maybe you were doing four or five different sectors and you're cutting out one sector, which happens to be some of your worst returns. And now you're sort of recalculating your returns and comparing them to vintages and then your top quartile. Right. So we see that kind of, that kind of, let's call it creativity with managers oftentimes. And that's why we see this sort of thing where everybody can kind of fit themselves into a box that can be said as top quartile or they don't talk about that in their materials. Right.

Interviewer (23:54)

So it's like the banker's table. Every banker could rank themselves in top one or two spots. Do you find that in your real world experience? Do you rarely find anybody in the third quartile that's out fundraising?

Alex (24:06)

We will find folks that have third quartile outcomes in their funds that are out fundraising. It often can be a difficult fundraise for them. I think a lot of it depends on how good some of their other funds are. Right. So we've seen many managers who might have had a first quartile fund one or fund two, and now their last fund is struggling. And that's a manager that's trying to explain the struggling. Right. What's happened. Maybe it's Covid, maybe it's stuff around the tariffs that got put on. Whatever that reason could be to say, hey, look at our earlier funds that did really well. These last few funds that have struggled, there's reasons for it, and that doesn't represent what we can do going forward. Right. And that's a legitimate argument. There's. There's definitely been examples of managers that we've backed where, you know, we've done a lot of work to get comfortable with maybe underperformance in one of their funds and what the reasons were behind it. And then sometimes we see managers that are restarting and we call them phoenixes. And what I mean by that is they might have been operating for many years with a set of partners that founded the firm. Their performance is just either mediocre, maybe it's worse than mediocre, but there were some young partners midway through that time period that sort of rose and were really responsible for the deals that were good going forward. The firm sort of changes hands. At some point, those younger generation of partners take over. And then you have to really look at it is that those early negative performances may not be representative of what the new leadership is going to do going forward. And we call those phoenixes, right, that rise from the ashes. And sometimes those types of investments can actually be some of our best, right, because you generally have very experienced, highly motivated people who probably haven't earned a lot of carry yet or economics, right? And they're generally younger and they're in their time in their life where they are, they're willing to hustle to try to earn that carried interest. And also they've often learned from mistakes, right? So one of the great things about that is that if, if, if a set of partners, right, can learn from the mistakes of a, of a more senior set of partners that they lived under, that they did deals under, that can actually be really beneficial to all the folks that didn't lose money on those, on those original partners, right? All the new LPs are going to come in and potentially partner with this new group.

Interviewer (25:59)

Their capital pools tend to be smaller. It's harder to fundraise. So, so they're able to, to make account.

Alex (26:03)

So their, their capital pools may be smaller. And we think again, the size is the enemy of return. So, you know, the ability to put less capital to work, less pressure to put capital to work generally leads, we think, to good discipline and decision making.

Interviewer (26:15)

I, I had this whole episode where I talked about where alpha is in the markets. And the summary is that it's things that are boring and things are hard. But there's also alpha in truly contrarian thinking, which is if everybody thinks that this is a great manager and they're going to go out and raise $2 billion, sure, that might have a good returning fund, but how much alpha is there versus if it's a small fund and everybody's discounting them, they're looking at the headline third quartile fund. But once you go under the headline and start to look at their deal, see that you know, there was some, some issue that has been resolved since then, in theory at least that that's a place where you can find quite a bit of alpha.

Alex (26:50)

Absolutely. I mean, we, we're faced with that dilemma a lot in our investing because our best managers that are under a billion, if they're really good, they generally go above a billion. Right. They're raising bigger, bigger pools of capital based on that great track record. And they have plenty of LPs that are willing to back them at one and a half billion or two billion or more. Right. So we often say goodbye over time to some of our best managers and that's okay. Right. And so for us, you know, on the flip side of that, we, we have specific program that's focused on emerging managers, not just our regular core program, but let's say first and second time funds specifically and usually very small funds. So funds under 300 million in front size. Right. And that's the situation that you just described, where often there's not a lot of track record to look from. They've generally spun out of maybe another firm, maybe they've operated as an independent sponsor for a while. And the ability to sort of evaluate them comes down to a lot of these more qualitative components that are equally or more important in some cases than the track record itself. And you have to sometimes take leaps of faith. Right. Sometimes you're backing essentially blind pools in most cases, but you're backing people. Right. And that's part of our job, is really evaluating those people. And are these people that we think are highly competent, highly motivated people and that generally leads to good outcomes.

Interviewer (27:59)

You think about this kind of supply and demand and how do you get to this fund 3? There's this whole idea that the first three funds are a GP problem, the next funds are an LV problem as they scale as we talk about. And I wonder why there hasn't been a dispersion of fees, why earlier fund 1, fund 2s aren't more flexible on their fee structure, knowing that really what they're trying to get is to fund three and really building a franchise.

Alex (28:20)

Some are, and it's not overly common. Right. And what we obviously are worried about in those situations is selection bias. Right? Right. Oftentimes there's a reason why a GP is offering, let's say, more attractive fees and it's because they can't fundraise Right. Without doing that. Now, every once in a while you have groups that are, let's say, diamonds in the rough. Right. Where there's reasons why they're having trouble fundraising that we don't believe sort of correlates to their ability to generate future returns. Right? And that's a great opportunity because then we do have the ability to sometimes what we call sort of takes sort of seeding of those funds economics, to help enhance the economics for our investors. It reduces the risk of that manager, for sure. And then we have the ability sometimes to get that for even more than one fund. Now, what I would say is that most of the emerging managers that we back, because their fund sizes are really small and because they have good track records either from their previous organizations or as their independent sponsor activity, a lot of the smaller funds that are emerging managers are actually oversubscribed as well, even though they don't have all that experience, even though they're not on fund threes and fund fours. And so when you don't raise a lot of capital, right, it makes it easier to create sort of momentum and acceleration for the folks that are out in the LP world that like those types of early managers. Right? So both is true. But here's the reality is that like most of the economic terms that are given for managers of really high quality, they're on the margins, right? They can definitely help enhance returns, but at the same time, if the manager doesn't perform at least at some minimal level of outcome, right. It doesn't matter how good your fee rate is. So it's very important to have that balance, right? That it definitely reduces the risk of, let's say, a fund not being amazing and maybe it's just good, right? And if it's a fund that ends up being mediocre, right? Which is really what our downside is, right? We think of our downside not as losing money, not as a disaster, hopefully. But our downside should be a fund that's just average, right? Or median, whatever you want to think about it. And if the economic enhancement can take that median fund and actually make it a top quartile fund, then that reduces the risk going in. And that leap of faith you have to take with some of these earlier,

Interviewer (30:20)

what's that spread between a medium performance and a top quartile?

Alex (30:25)

If you look at the data over long periods of time, that spread can be as much as, I don't know, thousand basis points, let's say median to sort of top quartile performance. And that's a lot, right? So like a thousand basis points, these

Interviewer (30:38)

are not going to get you there.

Alex (30:39)

No, these are not going to get you there. So like you know you need to have managers and that what those fees do and that fee sort of, let's say the benefit of those fee breaks or better economics or better economic terms. What it does is it makes, let's say a, an average outcome, be better than average, but it's never going to make it the top decile, top quartile fund. But it does reduce some of your risk for sure.

Interviewer (31:02)

There's this game theory and signaling to it right now in venture, the top 10 funds are all two and a half and 30. So you know, 95% of funds are having trouble raising anything and then the top 5% are 2 and a half and 30. And I've had a GP off the record to name nameless told me that he had to do two and a half and 30 because if he didn't go out with two and a half and 30, he wouldn't be seen as a premium brand. So there's this crazy signaling effect that, that protrudes to your point as well. Like why am I, why am I seeing this fund at discount terms? Where's the negative selection?

Alex (31:32)

Right. That's the worry of the, of the discounted terms is there's not only is there potentially real selection bias, it could be optical. Right. It doesn't help them in their fundraise.

Sponsor/Ad Host (31:39)

Is that less of a risk on a first close discount?

Alex (31:42)

Yes, 100%. I think that, I think that if you're in the market, is that kind

Sponsor/Ad Host (31:46)

of the best practice in today's Definitely.

Alex (31:48)

I think first close investors. Right. Are an anchor investor of size. Right. Those are the folks that are generally open to get economics when there, when there is an opportunity for economics because you want to incentivize like a large first close that you know, creates capacity, scarcity. Right. So limited partners sometimes take a little bit of time to sort of get off our butts and start doing work on managers. And there's nothing that helps more than a manager. You kind of like and you find out they only have a small percentage of the fund left to raise. Right. Because then all of a sudden you start to flip over from them being in the sort of like negative position of having to raise capital to being in a positive position where there's potential scarcity and over subscription where LPs are fighting for their allocation. Right. And that and momentum and having that sort of early closes is really key to doing that. And that's why you tend to see a big anchor investor that could be as much as, let's say 20, 30% or more of the fund as a big part of that. And on the flip side of that, as you mentioned, these premium economics, we do see premium economics every once in a while in managers in our part of the market. As you would expect, they are for people that have significantly outperformed. We tend to like it better when they've traded off raising a much larger fund for more premium economics that have some sort of hurdles in them, right. Where they can, you know, where they're only getting the premium if they achieve the return outcomes that, you know, that match it. Right. And in that case, you know, we're definitely more amenable to that idea because at the end of the day we're all aligned. Right. And incentive alignment is really important. We've also seen premium terms be, I think, more effective when GPs are putting more of their own money in the funds. So where they're making a GP commitment that's much larger than what they, let's say the market is right now.

Interviewer (33:24)

What's the market today?

Alex (33:25)

Usually 2%. We see 2% as being sort of normal, but we've seen managers that have put in as much as 10 or 20% of their.

Interviewer (33:31)

How much do you care about cash versus deferred GP commit?

Alex (33:34)

Many years ago when managers started doing that, I think a lot of us in the LP community were a little bit up in arms about, you know, that it should just be cash and you know, look, I think that from a practical perspective there's, there's significant tax advantages for GPs to do it this way. And at the end of the day it's still their money that's going into the funds as a commitment. And so we're much less sensitive generally to that. We do like to see that at least it's not, not all non cash and it's not all deferral. But I think that we've seen a lot of groups go to a sort of 5050 model which has been pretty successful and we can get comfortable with that kind of stuff.

Interviewer (34:04)

I want to get the exact numbers in terms of first closed discounts. What do you see in the 25th percentile versus 75th percentile of best practices today?

Alex (34:11)

Obviously at the low end it's zero discount and I would see that, you know, we see some area between sort of 10 to 20% discounts in management fee and potentially carried interest as well. And sometimes that's just for one fund and sometimes it could be for a second fund with obviously usually a promise of a certain minimum investment size in the second fund as well as a way of getting that discount now, again. So I would say that'd be the normal, the median. We've definitely seen some examples of folks that have discounted more than 20% or 30%. Again, that's when you start seeing a little bit of maybe just optical selection bias, right? Or you're worried about, like, why do they have to discount so heavily to get somebody into the funds.

Interviewer (34:49)

It's interesting because you would think, well, why does that matter? You guys are supposed to be the experts, the best in your class. But if you think about your investment, you're investing both money, but you're also investing time. And it's going to get you a thousand hours. So a lot of GPs don't realize that LPs are really making two decisions. One is where do we do the work? Where do we really do a lot of diligence on? And then who do we invest from that basket? But most, most GPs don't make it to that second thing, which is we're going to do a lot of work on this fund. And I think the funnel from doing a lot of work to investing is probably, if I had to guess, at least 50%, maybe higher. But the funnel from not doing any work to doing work might be 5% or 10%. So I think that signaling is where that optimizes, which is if I could signal the right thing, if I had the right returns, all these things that look good on the headline and on, and some would say superficially looks good, it's still important because that determines where you do your work to actually get to the right answer.

Alex (35:39)

I think you're 100% right. I mean, I think that, know, limited partner organizations in general have relatively small teams. Right. And so even a $5 billion endowment might have one or two people that are covering private equity. Right. And that's all of private equity. That could include venture, it could include a bunch of other categories. So, you know, we have the, the luxury of being a, you know, GP ourselves. We have a, you know, 30 plus people that are focused on one specific area of the market. And so for us, for most LPs, I, you know, I think getting, I always tell my GP friends that I either went to business school with or I've, you know, become friendly with over the years. They, you know, getting a first meeting is not hard. What's hard is getting the second meeting right, because getting the LP to sort of focus, spend time on you and to sort of be able to be willing to address whatever deficiencies they see. Right. Whatever the concerns Might be which every manager pretty much has something that they have to get LPs have to get comfortable with. So it's getting like someone to spend the time on you is really hard and you're 100% right. Like once somebody gets to an on site, even if it's. We sort of categorize our on sites as sort of one of two sort of purposes, right? One is either confirmatory or one is exploratory, right. So either we're still trying to decide like a lot of different issues, we're trying to get answers to questions versus we've done a lot of work, or maybe we've known the manager for many years, maybe it's a re up. And we're trying to just confirm that what we believe is true now for most LPs once they get to an on site, you know, is there's no doubt that the, let's say the selection rate goes up much higher. But they're also their, their inbound selection rate in terms of what they work on is probably much lower than a for profit type of group like us that has a very large team that can be focused on lots more managers at any given time. Right. And so our top of the funnel, we tend to take way more meetings, we tend to take way more second meetings that end up with a smaller funnel that we pick from at the end.

Interviewer (37:19)

There's a subtle distinction there, which is you call yourself for profit. And why does that matter when you have endowment or pension funds? Pension funds have the biggest issue where their salaries are known to every pensioner. So every teacher, every fireman, when they see why is the CIO making $500,000 a year when I'm making 75,000 or why does the CIO have a staff of 10 people? Even though it could be economically rational, politically, it becomes difficult. And that's why a lot of these endowments, pension funds, foundations are understaffed because of that kind of misalignment between optics and I guess, return to kind of return maximizing.

Alex (37:52)

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, look, I think. And it's hard to make that connection directly, right? So, you know, if you look at performance outcome, you know, it's very difficult to tell whether you would have done better if you had doubled yourself stuff right? Now, if you think about for some of the biggest, largest organizations and institutional limited partner allocators, the dollars that they're investing is so big that sometimes I wonder if they did some quick math, right? They just, you know, you know, if you were a $200 billion, massive state pension plan. Right. And you just, and you did take one more percent of that AUM and apply it to people. Could you get over a percent right. Of outcome on that given year? Right. And yeah, I don't know the answer to that. But again, like that's the exercise I would assume they go through. Now to your point, it's not always based on pure logic. Right. Or pure data. There's optical components, political components, a lot of these organizations as well. And they have to be very careful. Right. For that exact purpose, to show that like they are spending a, let's say, appropriate amount of money but not overspending on people.

Interviewer (38:47)

Well, Alex, I only got through half my questions. We're going to have to do this again soon. Thanks so much for jumping on podcast.

Alex (38:52)

Thank you for having me. Really enjoyed it and happy to come back and talk more.

Sponsor/Ad Host (38:56)

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